Measuring partisan induced turnover in law enforcement

Richard T. Boylan*

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Since *Elrod v. Burns*, courts have constrained politically motivated firings of government employees. However, there is limited empirical evidence of the prevalence of these political firings. I fill this gap by examining Ohio personnel records of sheriff deputies for 2002–2022. I find that two months after an election, the share of sheriff deputies that departs is 91% higher when the new sheriff represents a different party than the incumbent, compared to when the new sheriff belongs to the same party. Thus, sheriffs can staff their offices with deputies who will support them in future elections. In turn, the incumbency advantage strengthens the sheriff's political power and allows them to take extreme political stances and still be reelected.

In the United States, both county sheriff offices and city police departments have similar roles, which include patrolling and responding to citizen calls. However, this paper shows that sheriff deputies are more likely to be terminated due to their political beliefs than police officers. The ability to enforce political loyalty among employees may help explain the high reelection rates of sheriffs. Thus, the average tenure of a sheriff is ten years [Clark, 2017]. In contrast, the average tenure of a police chief in large cities is typically between two and a half to three and a half years, while in smaller cities it ranges from five to six years [Klayman and Reid, 2015]. Additionally, sheriffs' significant incumbency advantage can undermine their accountability [Besley et al., 2010]. Ultimately, this lack of accountability may contribute to divisive behavior among sheriffs [Burns, 2020, Billeaud and Superville, 2017, Cieslik, 2024, Chammah, 2022].

*Rice University, Department of Economics, MS#22, 6100 S. Main Street, Houston, TX 77005-1892, rboylan@rice.edu.

Court rulings have played a role in making patronage more common in sheriff's offices than in police departments. In *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), the Supreme Court held that four sheriff's office employees who were dismissed for refusing to change party affiliation had legitimate claims for violations of their constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, in *Branti v. Finkel*, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), the Supreme Court ruled that employees could be dismissed if "party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved," but left it to lower courts to figure out for which offices alignment of party affiliation is required.

While lower courts have not allowed police officers to be fired for political reasons, they have been divided on whether sheriff's deputies could be terminated based on political affiliation under the legal standard established by the Supreme Court.[1] For instance, in *Thomas v. Carpenter*, 881 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1989), the court did not find that the lieutenant sheriff's political loyalty was essential for his responsibilities. In contrast, in *Upton v. Thompson*, 930 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1991), the court ruled that sheriff deputies could be fired because they have substantial discretionary authority in implementing the sheriff's policy goals. Finally, in *Hall v. Tollett*, 128 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 1997), the court held that the duties of the six sheriff deputies in the lawsuit did not make their political affiliation an appropriate requirement for employment, but left open the possibility that in future cases they may rule differently.[2]

Moreover, sheriffs may be able to fire deputies without giving any reasons or giving pretextual reasons. For instance, Ohio sheriff deputies can be fired at will when their duties "are such that the sheriff must rely on the deputy's personal judgment and leadership abilities."[3] Finally, the firing of deputy sheriffs and police officers may be legal if there is insufficient evidence that the sheriff or police chief were aware of the political affiliation of their employees.[4]

While *Elrod* and *Branti* impact a wide range of government employees, they are especially

[1] Berry [2001] discusses disagreements on whether deputy sheriffs can be subject to politically-based firings. For police officers, *Stephens v. Kerrigan*, 122 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1997), states that "It is not disputed that ... positions of sergeant and lieutenant do not require a political affiliation"; similarly, in *Saullo v. Burough of Nesquehoning*, Civil No. 3:16-CV-00811 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 21, 2020) "by alleging he was employed as a police officer, Saullo has shown he was employed at a public agency in a position that does not require political affiliation."

[2] For more recent cases, see *Shockency v. Ramsey Cty.*, 493 F.3d 941, 950 (8th Cir. 2007); *Young v. Bailey*, 240 N.C. App. 595 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015); *Curtis v. Christian Cnty.*, 963 F.3d 777, 784 (8th Cir. 2020).

[3] *Yarosh v. Becane*, 3 Ohio St. 2d 5 (Ohio 1980).

[4] See *Hall v. Tollett*, 128 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 1997) and *Saullo*.

significant for law enforcement officers due to the many obstacles they encounter when seeking new employment [Masur et al., 2024]. First, when officers transition to a new law enforcement position, they forfeit knowledge specific to their former department and jurisdiction. Second, they lose pension benefits; for example, in Ohio, the pension benefits for police officers and sheriff's deputies are based on years of service and age at retirement, but years of service in one office do not count towards benefits in another. Third, state and civil service regulations may cause an officer to lose rank when transferring to a different law enforcement agency. Lastly, police officers are required to obtain state certification, making interstate relocations costly.

Given the obstacles law enforcement officers face in seeking new employment, it is important to assess whether partisan-driven turnover persists; for instance, whether partisan-driven turnover continues because sheriffs or police chiefs can claim ignorance of their employees' political affiliations. I estimate the prevalance of partisan-driven turnover using personnel records for all law enforcement employees in Ohio from 2002 to 2022.

While I cannot determine whether deputy sheriffs leave voluntarily, there are several reasons to believe that the additional departures associated with the election of a new sheriff are involuntary. First, law enforcement officers face significant challenges in securing new jobs [Masur et al., 2024]. Second, in my sample, only a small percentage of deputy sheriffs who leave their positions are able to find new jobs in law enforcement (see Table 1). My findings reveal that two months after an election, the share of sheriff deputies that depart is 91% higher when the new sheriff is from a different party than the incumbent, compared to when the new sheriff belongs to the same party as the incumbent.

In contrast, police officer departures appear unaffected by elections of mayors. The absence of politically motivated firings could explain the finding that mayoral partisanship does not affect the police force and its leadership demographics [de Benedictis-Kessner et al., 2024].

The *Elrod* and *Branti* decisions were controversial, with three justice dissenting based on the belief that patronage is essential for competitive elections. Specifically, they argued that challengers need the ability to offer jobs to their supporters in order to mount a successful campaign. While this may be true, it is equally likely that incumbents can leverage patronage jobs to secure support

for their reelection. For instance, in Medina County, Ohio, the sheriff's reelection committee was led by the Chief Deputy Sheriff [Sheriff Stuart tops Election Filing, 1972]. Similarly, the Chief Deputy of DeKalb County, Illinois, expressed hope that no one would challenge the incumbent, citing the incumbent's significant contributions to the community [Finlon, 2018].

Thus, whether patronage hinders or helps political competition is a question that must be explored empirically. Folke et al. [2011] employ a difference-in-differences design to demonstrate that the use of patronage increases the likelihood of incumbents maintaining control of state legislatures and statewide elective offices. Consequently, existing research suggests that courts have bolstered the incumbency advantage of sheriffs by permitting politically motivated firings of deputies.

A fundamental problem in all political systems is the difficulty in limiting elected officials' abuse of power [Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2009]. For instance, the challenge of preventing elected officials from increasing their salaries or implementing controversial policies. Elected officials are more likely to prioritize the public's interests when facing the risk of electoral defeat, whereas a lack of political competition tends to produce the opposite effect [Besley et al., 2010]. Consistent with this hypothesis, decreases in political competition in Swedish municipalities led to increases in financial support of the ruling majority [Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2009]. Similarly, Spanish regional presidents elected by larger margins provided more grants to mayors of the same party [Marta Curto-Grau and Sorribas-Navarro, 2018].

Thus, the ability of sheriffs to ensure deputies' political support could enable them to take controversial stands and still be reelected. For instance, Barry County Sheriff Dar Leaf criticized Governor Whitmer's coronavirus restrictions and raised the prospect that an alleged plot to kidnap the governor may have been a legal citizen arrest [Burns, 2020]. Nonetheless, Sheriff Dar Leaf ran unopposed in the 2020 and 2024 general elections.[5] Additionally, around ninety out of 102 sheriffs in Illinois expressed opposition to the enacted assault weapons ban, with many stating they would refuse to enforce it [Cieslik, 2024]. Furthermore, 48.6% of sheriffs surveyed agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, "the sheriff's authority supersedes the federal or state government in

[5]See `https://www.barrycounty.org/departments_and_officials/officials/county_clerk/election_results.php`.

my county," while 70.7% agreed that, "I am willing to 'interpose' on behalf of county resident when I believe a state or federal law in unjust" [Chammah, 2022].

Moreover, the divisive behavior of sheriffs may be amplified by their deputies. For instance, a patrol commander for the Clark County Sheriff (Ohio) posted on Facebook [Orozco, 2024]:

> At the end of the day, I will require proof of who you voted for if you ask me for help. Weapons and ammo are not cheap. ... I am sorry. If you support the Democrat party I will not help you.

I first discuss the empirical framework, then the data, and finally the results.

1 Empirical framework

The dependent variable in this paper is an indicator variable y_{ijt} for whether employee i departs sheriff office j (or police department j) in month-year t. In order to focus on political factors, I only look at the months right before and right after a sheriff's (or mayoral) election. The main explanatory variable is the outcome of the sheriff (or mayor) election: whether voters elect the incumbent I, a new sheriff P of the same party as the incumbent, or a new sheriff N of a different party than the incumbent.

Thus, political motivated departures are measured as the difference between the likelihood that an employee departs when the sheriff is of a different party as the incumbent minus the the likelihood that an employee departs when the incumbent sheriff is reelected ($E[y_{ijt}|N] - E[y_{ijt}|I]$). Note that political departures equal to the sum of two terms: departures due to change in party control ($E[y_{ijt}|N] - E[y_{ijt}|P]$) and departures due to change in incumbent ($E[y_{ijt}|N] - E[y_{ijt}|I]$).

To empirically estimate "departures due to change in party control," the "treatment group" includes counties that elect a sheriff from a different party than the incumbent ($D = 1$), while the "control group" consists of counties that elect a new sheriff from the same party as the incumbent ($D = 0$). Similarly, to empirically estimate "departures due to change in incumbent," the treatment group includes counties that elect a new sheriff from the same party as the incumbent ($D = 1$), while the control group consists of counties that re-elect the incumbent ($D = 0$).

To ensure the robustness of my results, I estimate the model both at the county level and at the sheriff deputy level. The analysis could suffer from the incidental parameters problem because of the large number of fixed effects (year-month or county/city). For this reason, I use two methods that provide consistent estimates with a large number of fixed effects: the Poisson and the linear probability models.

In the robustness section, I obtain similar results using a logit model. However, to ensure consistency of the estimates, I only include year and county fixed effect. Thus, I estimate the years when departures increase, rather than the months.

1.1 Poisson regression

The Poisson regression estimates the total number of deputies that depart in county (or city) j and month-year t ($y_{jt} = \sum_i y_{ijt}$) as a function of the number of deputies n_{jt} and and $D_{j,t+k}$ is an indicator variable equal to one if voters elected a sheriff of a different party in county j and month-year $t+k$, and equal to zero if voters elected a new sheriff of the same party. Specifically,

$$E(y_{jt}|n_{jt}, D_{j,t-8}, \ldots, D_{j,t}, \ldots, D_{j,t+4}) = e^{n_{jt}+\sum_{k\in\{-10,\ldots,0,\ldots,4\}} \beta_k D_{j,t+k}+\alpha_j+\delta_t},$$

where β_k measures the impact of the outcome of an election on the number of deputies that depart in year-month t, α_j are counties fixed effects and δ_t are month-year fixed effects.

1.2 Linear probability model

I estimate the linear probability model:

$$\text{Prob}(y_{ijt} = 100) = \sum_{k\in\{-10,\ldots,0,\ldots,4\}} \beta_k D_{i,j,t+k} + \alpha_i + \delta_t,$$

where α_i are deputy sheriff fixed effects and δ_t are month-year fixed effects.

2 Data

Information about current and former peace officers in Ohio for 2002–2022 was obtained from the Ohio Attorney General's Office. Sheriff election data in Zoorob [2022] and mayoral election data in Boylan [2019] were updated using information obtained from county elections offices and NewsBank. In Ohio, all sheriff elections are partisan, but some mayoral elections are partisan while others are nonpartisan. Thus to ensure comparability, I restrict the analysis to cities with partisan elections. Also, to ensure that the mayor selects the police chief, I restrict the analysis to cities with mayor-council government (rather than council-manger).

Table 1 provides summary statistics for the data. Annual departure rates for sheriff deputies and police officers are 7.8% and 5.3%. These numbers are comparable to federal employee departures rates, which are 6.2% [Bolton et al., 2021]. In contrast, more than ten percent of U.S. workers separate from their employers each quarter [Davis et al., 2006]. The lower departure rates for government employees may be attributed to multiple factors; e.g., the higher likelihood that government employees can appeal their termination to an arbitrator under a Collective Bargaining Agreement, compared to private sector employees. Moreover, only 0.47% of departing sheriff deputies and 0.87% of departing police officers are employed as a full time peace officer in Ohio six months after their departure.

For the sheriff sample (panel (a)), an average election year results in victories by 64 incumbent sheriffs, 18 new sheriffs of the same party as the incumbent, and 5 sheriffs of a different party from the incumbent. For the police sample (panel (b)), an average election year results in victories by 86 incumbent mayors, 18 new mayors of the same party as the incumbent, and 6 mayors of a different party than the incumbent.

I conduct additional robustness tests using data from sheriff deputy data obtained from the National Police Index.[6]

[6] `national.cpdp.co`.

3 Results

3.1 Sheriff elections

I estimate a Poisson regression for the number of sheriff deputies that depart in a month, examining the period between ten months before a sheriff election and four months after. The estimates are used to compute the "incidence rate ratio", which represents departures in "treated" counties (e.g., those with changes in party control) divided by departures in "control" counties. Finally, Figure 1, panel (a) graphs the percent increase in deputy sheriffs departures in counties with changes in party control, relative to counties without changes (the incidence rate ratio minus one). Thus, it can be seen that the share of deputy sheriffs that departs increases by 91% after the election of a sheriff of a different party, compared to the election of new sheriff of the same party.

One may be concerned that the causation is reversed. Namely, that departures measure turmoil in the office and that turmoil makes it less likely that the incumbent remains in office. However, this alternate explanation is disproved by the lack of an increase in departures before the election.

Similarly, I find that the share of deputy sheriffs that departs increases by 123% after the election of a new sheriff of the same party as the incumbent, compared to the reelection of the incumbent (Figure 1, panel (b)).

In Figure 2, I estimate sheriff deputy departures with a linear probability model and obtain results similar to the Poisson estimates. For instance, two months after the election that selects a sheriff of a new party (and one month after the new sheriff takes office), departures increase by 2.8% points.

3.2 Mayoral election

I estimate the Poisson regression for the number of police officers that depart in an month, examining the period between ten months before a mayor election and four months after. The estimated percent changes in departure due to changes in the mayor's party are graphed in panel (a) of Figure 3, while the estimated percent changes in departure due to changes in incumbency are graphed in panel (b). Moreover, the linear probability estimates of these same models are in Figure 4. None

of these model find any impact of mayoral election on the number of police officer departures.

4 Robustness tests and additional findings

Roth [2022] has shown that the pretrend tests have low power. Specifically, even a mild pre-trend, which cannot be statistically detected, can influence the estimated post-treatment coefficients. To address the possibility that the results are driven by pretrends, the red solid lines in Figure 5 represent the conjectured linear violation of parallel trends for the linear probability model. The lines are drawn in a steep enough way to ensure that if the pretrend was correct, the pretrend coefficients would be significant 80% of the time. Nonetheless, not even a pre-trend line of such a large magnitude can explain the large increase in departures two months after the election (which can be seen since the red line does not intersect the error bars two months after the election).

Alternatively, the blue dashed lines in Figure 5 depict the expected values of the coefficients if the violation was present but undetectable. Again, these expected values lines cannot explain the large increase in departures two months after the election. Thus, the results of the linear probability model cannot be explained by pretrends.

Moreover, I estimate the impact of sheriff elections on turnover of deputy sheriff in North Carolina. The results are similar to what I obtain for Ohio thus providing further evidence of the robustness of the findings (see Figure 6 and Figure 7).

Finally, I model the likelihood that a deputy sheriff departs according to a logit regression to check whether the findings are robust to changes in model specification. To ensure consistency of the estimates, I only include year and county fixed effect, I include all years, and I combine the impact of change in the sheriff's party and whether the incumbent is reelected. Thus, the regression includes an indicator variable "New sheriff of the same party" which is equal to one the year after the election of a new sheriff of the same party as the incumbent, and an indicator variable "New sheriff of different party" which is equal to one the year after the election of a new sheriff of the different party than the incumbent.

Regression 1 in Table 2 provides the marginal effects (in percentages) computed from the logit regression. The analysis reveals that the election of a new sheriff from the same party increases

deputy sheriff departures in the subsequent year by 0.1 percentage points, whereas a new sheriff from a different party results in a 0.28 percentage point increase in departures. The coefficients are smaller since the they are the average of first few months of the subsequent year when the departure rate increase, and the rest of the years when the departure rate stay the same.

As discussed in the introduction, there have been contradictory court rulings about whether sheriff deputies with supervisory responsibilities can be fired for political reasons. Originally, the Supreme Court allowed politically motivate dismissals for policymaking positions (*Elrod v. Burns*). However, few years later, the Supreme Court ruled that political firing were only appropriate when it could be shown that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance (*Branti v. Finkel*).

The Ohio data does not provide information on the responsibilities of each sheriff deputy. For this reason, I proxy deputy sheriffs with grater responsibilities by deputy sheriff with more than 15 years of experience. I find that the additional departures in the year following a change in sheriff only have a statistically significant impact on more experienced deputies (see Regression 2 in Table 2).

The same regressions are estimated for police officers. Changes in mayor do not impact police officer turnover or experienced police officer turnover.[7]

5 Conclusion

Since *Elrod v. Burns*, courts have been divided about whether to allow sheriffs to fire employees of different political affiliations while forbidding police chiefs to do so. In order to evaluate the impact of these court rulings, I examine the 2002–2022 personnel records of Ohio sheriff deputies and police officers. I find that the share of sheriff deputies that depart increases by 91% two months after the election of a sheriff of a different party as the incumbent, compared to after the election of a new sheriff of the same party as the incumbent. Moreover, the fraction of police officers that depart does not change after the election of a mayor of a different party.

[7] Actually, turnover of experienced police officers decreases following the election of a new mayor of the same party.

Given the difficulty for departing officers to obtain employment as peace officers elsewhere, the findings support the plurality opinion concern that the ability to fire employees of different political affiliations limits First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of employees concerning their political beliefs and associations. Moreover, the ability to ensure employee support could help explain sheriffs's significant incumbency advantage [Zoorob, 2022]. In turn, the great incumbency advantage contributes to sheriffs' lack of accountability [Tomberlin, 2018]. Finally, a lack of accountability could contribute to instances of divisive behavior among sheriffs [Burns, 2020, Billeaud and Superville, 2017, Cieslik, 2024].

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
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
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Figure 1: Change in the share of departing sheriff deputies

(a) Counties that elected a new sheriff of a different party (versus a new sheriff of the same party)




(b) Counties that elected a new sheriff of same party (versus kept incumbent)




Estimated impact on the fraction of sheriff deputies that depart of a change in sheriff's party 10–1 months before the election and 0–4 months after the election. Estimates are obtained using a Poisson regression with district and year-month fixed effects. Results are converted into one hundred times the incidence ratio minus one. For instance, a value of "30" means that departures are 30% higher when the sheriff changes party affiliation. The shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals, which account for clustering at the county level. The data is discussed in Section 2.

Figure 2: Change in the probability that a sheriff deputy departs

(a) Counties that elected a new sheriff of a different party (versus a new sheriff of the same party)




(b) Counties that elected a new sheriff of same party (versus kept incumbent)




Estimated impact on the fraction of sheriff deputies that depart of a change in sheriff's party 10–1 months before the election and 0–4 months after the election. Estimates are obtained using a Poisson regression with district and year-month fixed effects. Results are converted into marginal effects times one hundred. The shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals, which account for clustering at the county level. The data is discussed in Section 2.

Figure 3: Change in the share of departing police officers

(a) Counties that elected a new mayor of a different party (versus a new mayor of the same party)




(b) Counties that elected a new mayor of the same party (versus kept incumbent)




Estimated impact on the fraction of police officers that depart of a change in mayor's party 10–1 months before the election and 0–4 months after the election. Estimates are obtained using a Poisson regressin with district and year-month fixed effects. Results are converted into one hundred times the incidence ratio minus one. For instance, a value of "30" means that departures are 30% higher when the mayor's office changes party affiliation. The shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals, which account for clustering at the county level. The data is discussed in Section 2.

Figure 4: Change in the probability that a police officer departs

(a) Counties that elected a new mayor of a different party (versus a new mayor of the same party)




(b) Counties that elected a new mayor of same party (versus kept incumbent)




Estimated impact on the fraction of police officers that depart of a change in mayor's party 10–1 months before the election and 0–4 months after the election. Estimates are obtained using a Poisson regression with district and year-month fixed effects. Results are converted into marginal effects times one hundred. The shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals, which account for clustering at the county level. The data is discussed in Section 2.

Figure 5: Pretrends test for change in the probability that a deputy sheriff departs in counties that elected a sheriff of a different party

(a) Counties that elected a new sheriff of a different party (versus a new sheriff of the same party)




(b) Counties that elected a new sheriff of the same party (versus kept incumbent)




Estimated impact on the likelihood that a sheriff deputy departs of a change in sheriff party 10–1 months before the election and 0–4 months after the election. Estimates are obtained with a linear probability model. The regression includes deputy sheriff and month-year fixed effects. The error bars around each estimated coefficient are the 95% confidence intervals, which account for clustering at the county level. The red solid line represents the conjectured linear violation of parallel trends with 80% power. The blue dashed line represents the expected values of the coefficients if the violation were present but undetectable using standard techniques. The data is discussed in Section 2.

Figure 6: Change in the share of departing sheriff deputies (North Carolina)

(a) Counties that elected a new sheriff of a different party (versus a new sheriff of the same party)




(b) Counties that elected a new sheriff of same party (versus kept incumbent)




Estimated impact on the fraction of sheriff deputies that depart of a change in sheriff's party 10–1 months before the election and 0–4 months after the election. Estimates are obtained using a Poisson regression with district and year-month fixed effects. Results are converted into one hundred times the incidence ratio minus one. For instance, a value of "30" means that departures are 30% higher when the sheriff changes party affiliation. The shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals, which account for clustering at the county level. The data is discussed in Section 2.

Figure 7: Change in the probability that a sheriff deputy departs (North Carolina)

(a) Counties that elected a new sheriff of a different party (versus a new sheriff of the same party)



(b) Counties that elected a new sheriff of same party (versus kept incumbent)



Estimated impact on the fraction of sheriff deputies that depart of a change in sheriff's party 10–1 months before the election and 0–4 months after the election. Estimates are obtained using a Poisson regression with district and year-month fixed effects. Results are converted into marginal effects times one hundred. The shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals, which account for clustering at the county level. The data is discussed in Section 2.

Table 1: Summary statistics

(a) Sheriff sample

	Mean	Min	Max
Sheriff deputies	64.975	6	648
Departures per month	0.422	0	41
Departing deputies obtaining new jobs	0.002	0	1
Incumbent sheriffs reelected	64.016	51	68
New sheriffs of same party as incumbent	17.918	0	23
New sheriffs of different party as incumbent	5.448	2	35

(b) Police sample

	Mean	Min	Max
Police officers	50.450	3	1,878
Departures per month	0.241	0	30
Departing officers obtaining new jobs	0.004	0	2
Incumbent mayors reelected	42.391	0	49
New mayors of same party as incumbent	19.045	0	23
New mayors of different party as incumbent	11.272	0	15

Departures Information about current and former peace officers in the state of Ohio was obtained from the Ohio Attorney General's Office. Sheriff elections data in Zoorob [2022] and Mayoral election data in Boylan [2019] were updated using county elections offices and NewsBank.

Table 2: Logit estimation of probability of deputy sheriff departure

	1		2	
New sheriff of same party	0.097	*		
	(0.046)			
New sheriff of different party	0.279	**		
	(0.080)			
(New sheriff of same party) (Tenure 15 years or less)			0.033	
			(0.048)	
(New sheriff of different party) (Tenure 15 years or less)			0.179	
			(0.099)	
(New sheriff of same party) (Tenure more than 15 years)			0.185	*
			(0.079)	
(New sheriff of different party) (Tenure more than 15 years)			0.419	**
			(0.109)	
Tenure 15 years or less			-0.102	
			(0.056)	
Number of observations	1,461,901		1,461,901	

Coefficients are the marginal effects (in percentages) computed from a logit regression with year and county fixed effects. * significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level.

Table 3: Logit estimation of probability of police officer departure

	1	2	
New mayor of same party	-0.125		
	(0.096)		
New mayor of different party	-0.071		
	(0.107)		
(New mayor of same party) (Tenure 15 years or less)		0.075	
		(0.117)	
(New mayor of different party) (Tenure 15 years or less)		-0.184	
		(0.238)	
(New mayor of same party) (Tenure more than 15 years)		-0.347	*
		(0.171)	
(New mayor of different party) (Tenure more than 15 years)		-0.005	
		(0.136)	
Tenure 15 years or less		-0.263	**
		(0.066)	
Number of observations	1,303,786	1,303,786	

Coefficients are the marginal effects (in percentages) computed from a logit regression with year and county fixed effects. * significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level.