# The International Transmission of Democratic Values: Evidence from African Migration to Europe*

Marco Manacorda† Jacopo Ponticelli‡ Andrea Tesei§

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This paper examines how increasing anti-immigrant sentiment in host countries influences perceptions of host country institutions within migrants' origin communities. We focus on African migration to Europe and propose a novel methodology to estimate migration stocks from subnational areas of origin in Africa to any country worldwide using Google Trends data. We combine these data with electoral outcomes that capture the success of anti-immigrant parties in Europe to derive African region-specific measures of exposure to anti-immigrant sentiment at destination. Our results show that increased anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe led to a deterioration in democratic attitudes among African citizens, with the effect being concentrated in non-democratic countries. Consistent with the hypothesis that these effects are mediated through migrant networks, we find evidence of worsened labor market outcomes and declining support for democracy among African migrants in Europe. We conclude that rising anti-immigrant sentiment in Western democracies has the potential to hamper migrants' integration and support for host country institutions, in turn undermining democratic progress at origin.

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† School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London; CEPR; CEP (LSE), IZA; CES-Ifo; contact: m.manacorda@qmul.ac.uk.

‡ Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University; NBER & CEPR. contact: jacopo.ponticelli@kellogg.northwestern.edu

§ School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London; CEPR; CEP (LSE); CES-Ifo; contact: a.tesei@qmul.ac.uk.

# 1. Introduction

International migration is at an all-time high, with approximately 3.5 percent of the world's population currently living in a country different from their birthplace (IOM, 2024). Most migrants relocate from poorer nations and fragile democracies - or even outright autocracies - to wealthier, often more stable democracies in search of better economic opportunities and more equitable and accountable societies for them and their children. However, not all societies are welcoming of migrants: history is replete with instances of xenophobia, and there is evidence of a resurgence in anti-immigrant sentiment around the world, including in Western countries.

In this paper we study the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes in host countries on views about these countries' political institutions among those at origin. A body of literature shows that migrants' discrimination might lead to enhanced sense of in-group identity and negatively affect their integration and even their views about the founding institutions of host societies (Abdelgadir and Fouka, 2020; Fouka, 2020; Gould and Klor, 2016; Grewal and Hamid, 2024; Mitts, 2019). There is also evidence that individuals' views about the desirability of democracy are highly instrumental and shaped by the ability of such regime to deliver prosperity and peace (Acemoglu et al., 2024). Migrants' direct experience of democracy and the disappointment and negative economic consequences resulting from discrimination and hostility at destination, hence, might negatively affect their views about the desirability of democratic systems. A separate body of literature argues that, migrants remit norms and values back home ("social remittances") (Barsbai et al., 2017; Spilimbergo, 2009). Hence, these effects could percolate back to origin communities leading to reduced support for democratic values at origin, especially in countries with little or no prior experience of democracy. This might have actual political consequences, as literature in both political economy and political science argues that support for democracy is a precondition for democratic progress especially in autocracies and fragile democracies (Besley and Persson, 2019; Persson and Tabellini, 2009).

We bring this argument to empirical scrutiny by focusing on African migration to Europe. As of 2020, an estimated eleven million African citizens were living in Europe, representing about one percent of Africa's population (a three-fold increase since 1990), approximately two percent of Europe's population, and a quarter of non-EU migrants stock in Europe. Many of these migrants flee dire poverty, fragile states, and even conflict, in search of better economic and social opportunities for themselves and their families. Indeed, according to the Polity index (Marshall and Gurr, 2020), more than 50 percent of African countries are classified as non-full democracies. Widespread racial animosity and discrimination, alongside the fact that many African migrants arrive undocumented or as asylum seekers, means that they are often disproportionately represented at the lower end of the income and social distributions at the destination (EUAFR, 2023).

Despite European countries often being regarded as bastions of liberal democracy, the past two decades have seen a rapid rise in anti-immigrant sentiment, with political parties advocating for restrictive immigration policies and demanding the assimilation of migrants gaining significant electoral support (Dustmann et al., 2019; Halla et al., 2017; Manacorda et al., 2023).

Meanwhile, in Africa, although support for democracy remains high, since the mid 2010s democratic progress has stalled (Arriola et al., 2023; Diamond, 2015). Citizens' dissatisfaction with democracy is typically associated with misgovernance, rampant corruption and rigged elections (AfroBarometer, 2024), a democratic "fatigue" that several scholars associate also with the adoption of Western-style democracy following independence (Ake, 2001), in turn leading citizens to perceive it as a heritage of colonialism and embodying Western-values.

In order to bring our argument to empirical scrutiny, we start by studying the experiences of migrants in Europe. We use micro data from the European Social Survey (ESS) to measure their performance and views in nineteen countries between 2005 and 2021. We use multiple measures to capture changes in attitudes towards migrants and policies towards migration at destination. In particular, we combine data on electoral outcomes in national parliamentary elections, with data on party platforms from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. We focus in particular on parties' opposition to migration, support for restrictive migration policies and demand for migrants' assimilation vis à vis multiculturalism. This allows us to derive a time varying measure of "anti-immigrant sentiment" for each European country. We show that in response to an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment, non-EU migrants report greater self-perceived discrimination relative to natives and EU Migrants. We show that this also leads to lower satisfaction with democracy among these migrants. We show that this result is not driven by differential perceptions between non-EU migrants and the rest of the population about the state of the economy or by overall changes in macro-economic conditions and changes in the quality of government, both of which might potentially affect migrants differentially from non-migrants. Collectively, we take this as evidence that anti-immigrant sentiment affects the lived experiences of non-EU migrants and, in response, their appraisal of institutional performance in receiving countries.

We then turn to perceptions and views among those left behind. In particular, we relate African citizens' attitudes and voting intentions to their exposure to anti-immigrant sentiment in their area of origin. We build this measure as the average of trends in anti-immigrant sentiment in each European country weighted by the baseline number of migrants in each European country relative to the area's population. The main empirical challenge associated with deriving such a measure of exposure is the absence of systematic information on the stock of migrants from *subnational* areas of origin to different destinations. Indeed, reliable estimates of migrants' stocks that systematically cover the entire world (e.g., from the Global Migration Database) are only available at the country-pairs level. This problem is more acute for developing countries, the major net donors of international migrants. Because the data only allow to identify outmigrants from a country irrespective of their precise subnational place of origin, this implies that widely available data will only provide measures of exposure to anti-immigrant sentiment at the level of origin country (and time). This poses clear challenges for the identification of the effect of anti-immigrant sentiment on origin communities' outcomes, as country level variation will likely be correlated with an array of other determinants of attitudes.

In order to overcome this empirical challenge, we propose a novel methodology to estimate migration stocks from each subnational region of Africa to each destination country in the world that exploits data on Internet searches performed around the world from Google Trends. In

particular, building on a literature in social psychology and human geography on individuals' attachment to their places of origin (Tuan, 1990; Hernández et al., 2007), we postulate a "structural" model of behavior, whereby migrants from a specific place of origin are more likely to perform Google searches for that place relative to other individuals, and we capture the presence of migrants from a specific region of Africa in each country of destination based on Google searches for the region's capital performed in each country.[1] According to this logic, for instance, a greater number of searches recorded in Italy for the term "Kumasi" - the capital city of the Ashanti region in Ghana - relative to searches for the same term in France, would indicate a comparatively higher presence of Ashanti migrants in Italy than in France. In practice, there are a number of challenges associated with operationalizing this approach which we discuss at length in the paper. This procedure allows us to provide novel estimates of migration stocks from the 709 origin regions of 50 African countries to 133 countries in the world, including European countries. We validate our methodology using both data on bilateral nation-level migration stocks as well as data on return migration from the 1% samples of national Censuses for sixteen countries in Africa. These data record the number of native-born individuals who previously resided in a different country, together with their current region of residence. We document a clear positive within-country of origin and country of destination correlation between our estimated subnational migration stocks from Africa and the stock of return migrants, lending support to our methodology. Of course, our methodology has the potential to be applied to other origin countries and hence its purpose goes beyond the specific estimates we derive and the research question we address in this paper.

We then turn to the effect of migrants' exposure to anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe to African citizens' support for democracy. We use data from the Afrobarometer rounds 3 to 8, which cover about 250,000 respondents across 624 regions of 37 African countries between 2005 and 2021. We investigate respondents' support for democracy, alongside their preferences for the rule of law, electoral competition and demands for media freedom and freedom of association.

Our results show that exposure to strong anti-immigrant sentiment leads to a deterioration in support for democracy. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients indicates that one extra migrant exposed to high versus low anti-immigrant sentiment - proxied by a one standard deviation increase in anti-immigrant sentiment at destination - leads to approximately one extra individual at origin turning from pro- to anti-democratic positions. At -0.800, the effect is precisely estimated but small in magnitude.

However, our data reveal pronounced differences across countries. Consistent with a model of learning, whereby individuals with limited or no prior exposure respond more to information shocks, effects are much more pronounced in autocracies and anocracies compared to full democracies. In particular, our data reveal that one extra migrant exposed to a negative anti-immigrant

[1] Although others have used Internet generated data, and in particular Facebook network data (Spyratos et al., 2019), to estimate bilateral migration stocks across fine geographies in the USA and Europe, these data are unlikely to provide reliable estimates of migration stocks for Africa, as Facebook usage in the continent is still very limited, with an estimated number of users as of 2020 of 25.4 million relative to a population of over 1.2 billion, i.e., a usage rate of 2%, and highly selected in terms of countries, urban and socioeconomic status. Others, e.g., Böhme et al. (2020), use Google searches to predict migration intentions.

shock leads to around 11 individuals turning antidemocratic in the first set of countries, compared to effectively zero in full democracies. We find similar results in terms of self-reported trust in the president, the ruling party, and the country's political institutions, all of which increase in response to anti-immigrant sentiment at destination. When turning to voting intentions, consistent with this, we find an increase in self-reported support for the incumbent and reduced support for parties with strong democratic platforms. We conclude that anti-immigrant sentiment at destination has the potential to shape electoral outcomes in fragile democracies, benefiting incumbent authoritarian leaders.

Our paper is related to several strands of research. First, we contribute to a body of literature focusing on support for democracy. A number of influential papers in political economy argue that support for democracy is a precondition for democratic progress and stability, and that exposure to democracy can affect itself support for this form of government (Besley and Persson, 2019; Persson and Tabellini, 2009). This squares well with evidence that democracy promotes growth (Acemoglu et al., 2019) and that individual support for democracy increases with the length of time spent under the system, particularly when democracy delivers economic progress and peace (Acemoglu et al., 2024; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015). There is also evidence of long-term persistence in democratic institutions (Giuliano and Nunn, 2013), possibly mediated by persistence in preferences or learning. In contrast to these studies that focus on the direct exposure to democracy and long-term changes across generations or over one's life cycle, we focus on individuals with little or no exposure to democracy, on short term changes in attitudes and on the transmission via migrants networks.

Of course, our paper relates directly to the literature on the transmission of values from host to origin societies via migrants' networks. In particular, a number of papers focus on "social remittances", i.e., the transfer of ideas and values from migrants in host countries back to their home communities. Focusing on political attitudes, studies in this area document how migrants' exposure to democratic regimes contributes to spreading democratic values, political participation and demands for political accountability and for political change (Barsbai et al., 2017; Batista and Vicente, 2011; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014; Mercier, 2016; Pfutze, 2012). There is also evidence that migration can directly promote democratic progress in origin countries (Spilimbergo, 2009). These effects can happen via communication between diasporas and origin communities, return migration or the role of migrant elites, which play a key role in shaping origin countries' political trajectories and are often overrepresented among migrants from poor to rich countries.[2] Differently from these studies, we emphasize how migrants' experiences in democratic host countries in terms of assimilation and attitudes towards migration may affect views about

[2] A related body of literature highlights how opportunities for migration can affect migrants' support for democracy or lead to political change and democratization at origin even when migrants are not directly exposed to democratic regimes (Docquier et al., 2016; Karadja and Prawitz, 2019), an effect that is typically ascribed to improved outside options (a "voice effect"). Effects working via "exit", i.e. the selection of migrants and those left behind are generally thought to work in the opposite direction (e.g., Barsbai et al., 2017). A separate strand of literature argues that economic remittances can foster democratization (Escribà-Folch et al., 2018). Related, there is evidence that economic integration, via international trade, can foster the spread of democratic values and promote democracy in non-democratic countries (Tabellini and Magistretti, 2024). This is consistent with evidence that well-functioning institutions can spread via learning to neighbouring countries (Buera et al., 2011).

democracy in origin communities. Additionally, we enhance previous research by focusing on continent-wide outcomes while exploiting detailed within-country variation. In contrast, existing studies either focus on cross-country variation (e.g., Spilimbergo, 2009), which may not address potential biases in the estimates stemming from endogenous settlement patterns from countries with different latent trends in democratic support, or exploit fine geographical variation within a single country (e.g., Barsbai et al., 2017), which offers more credible identification but might suffer from limited external validity.

Broadly speaking, our paper relates to an influential body of research on the effect of shocks and experiences on preferences and beliefs (for a review see Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2024) and more specifically to the literature on the effect of anti-immigrant sentiment and assimilationist policies on migrants' attitudes and outcomes. In particular, there is evidence that discrimination against minorities and policies that foster assimilation have ambiguous effects on migrants' integration. While, by creating incentives to assimilation, these factors can enhance migrants' integration (Fouka, 2019; Abdelgadir and Fouka, 2024), there is also evidence that these can lead to a migrants' backslash and a rise in oppositional identities (Abdelgadir and Fouka, 2020; Fouka, 2020; Gould and Klor, 2016), and even lower support for the founding institutions of host societies, including the democratic values they embody (Fan et al., 2020; Grewal and Hamid, 2024; Mitts, 2019). We contribute to this literature by focusing on shocks induced by changes in preferences of the electorate and changes in support for parties holding anti-immigrant positions and by showing that anti-immigrant sentiment affects not only the lived and perceived experiences and attitudes of those directly exposed - migrants at destination - but also percolates to origin communities via networks.

A separate literature in the area of the economics of culture focuses on the transmission of values between host and origin societies and across generations, including migrants and their offspring (for a review see Algan et al., 2012). A number of influential studies document how migrants maintain a strong connection with their culture of origin, in dimensions such as trust, preferences for redistribution or gender attitudes (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Fernández and Fogli, 2009) and even propensity to engage in violence (Couttenier et al., 2019). This is of course related to evidence on cultural persistence: norms and values are shaped by experiences (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007) and institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Tabellini, 2008) and they serve as heuristics for decision making when information acquisition is costly (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002). These often emerge as a result of societies accumulated experiences and they show high degree of persistence. On the other hand, adopting norms and values of host societies might yield economic gains (Lazear, 1999) and exposure to host societies' norms, values and institutions might involve learning - i.e. about their ability to deliver economic benefits - leading to migrants' cultural integration. In this area, there is evidence that, with time, migrants' views tend to converge to the ones of host societies (Giavazzi et al., 2019). These papers however focus on long term changes in values and norms while we focus on short term changes in preferences and beliefs.

We also contribute to the literature estimating migration stocks using big data. Google Trends

data have been used in a number of applications (e.g., Choi and Varian, 2012; Nuti et al., 2014), including to predict migration intentions (Böhme et al., 2020). While these studies utilize Google Trends to forecast local events, our approach involves key terms associated with foreign places, namely subnational regions of origin across Africa. In this regard, our measure is similar in spirit to Burchardi et al. (2019) who show a systematic relationship between Google searches for specific countries across US metro areas and the fraction of residents with ancestry from that country.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the impact of rising anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe on migrants' experiences and their attitudes on host societies institutions. Section 3 presents our novel methodology to predict migrant stocks at subnational level using data from Google Trends. Section 4 analyzes the effects of anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe on attitudes and voting intentions in Africa while section 5 concludes.

# 2. Attitudes Towards Migrants in Europe and Migrants' Support for Host Countries' Political Institutions

## 2.1. African Migration to Europe

Over the past three decades, migration from Africa to Europe has increased significantly. In 2020, African-born individuals accounted for 11 million of Europe's population, nearly three times the 1990 figure. African migration represents 25% of non-EU migrants in Europe, with an annual increase of 3-4% over the past decade (United Nations, 2021). The majority of African migrants originate from North and West Africa, particularly Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali. East African migration, historically smaller in scale, has been increasing, with significant diasporas from Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, often driven by conflict and political repression. In contrast, migration from Southern Africa remains limited, with South Africa acting more as a destination country within the continent rather than a source of emigration (OECD, 2022).

African migrants in Europe are overrepresented in low-wage and informal employment, particularly in construction, domestic work, and hospitality, despite growing numbers of high-skilled migrants from countries such as Nigeria and Egypt (Eurostat, 2023). Many face occupational downgrading, earning less than similarly educated European-born workers. Structural barriers to integration persist, including higher unemployment rates, discrimination, and limited social mobility (EUAFR, 2023). Studies suggest that African migrants earn 20-30% less than native-born workers with comparable skills, and they report higher rates of perceived discrimination in access to jobs and housing (Fasani et al., 2022). Labor market integration varies widely by country, with Northern European destinations generally offering better employment prospects than Southern Europe (OECD, 2022).

## 2.2. Trends in Attitudes Towards Migrants in Europe

In order to study the evolution of anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe, we use data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES, Jolly et al., 2022), waves 1 to 6, covering the period 1999-2019. This survey provides information on European political parties' platforms based on experts' assessment. We focus in particular on three measures that capture parties' positions on immigration: (1) support for restrictive immigration policies; (2) support for ethnic minority rights and (3) preference for multiculturalism versus migrants' assimilation. Precise questions from CHES are in Appendix C. For each party and variable in CHES, we take the average position over all available years.[3] We rescale all CHES variables so that higher values correspond to lower support for immigration and we express them in terms of their standard deviation. We also compute a principal component of these three variables, which for brevity we label "Synthetic Index".

We combine these data with electoral outcomes in national parliamentary elections (except for France, for which we use data in the first round of the Presidential elections) across nineteen major European countries from the early 2000s to 2021.[4] This allows us to compute a measure of "anti-immigrant sentiment" at the level of country and election year, which - for each dimension in CHES as well as for the Synthetic Index - we derive as a weighted average of parties' positions with weights given by the vote shares of each party. We assign a measure of anti-immigrant sentiment in non-electoral years based on its value in the closest preceding national election. Clearly, this variable not only captures voters' demand for lower immigration but it also subsumes policy responses. Later on in the analysis we use data on restrictive immigration policies as an alternative measure of a country's Anti-immigration stance.

Figure 1 shows the evolution of anti-immigrant sentiment - captured by the average party position - over the period 2005-2021, separately for each dimension CHES. Each graph refers to a separate country, and the top left-hand panel refers to the (population-weighted) average across all countries. Because we are interested in the evolution of anti-immigrant sentiment within countries, as opposed to cross-sectional differences across countries, we standardize the data so that all series are expressed in terms of their values in the first year of observation. Two main observations emerge. First, as documented elsewhere (e.g. Manacorda et al., 2023), over the last twenty years, Europe witnessed an increase in support for parties advocating restrictive immigration policies and migrants' assimilation. The rise is on the order of 0.1 of a standard deviation, with the rise being particularly pronounced in the later years. Second, there is considerable heterogeneity in trends across countries: while trends are positive in some countries, notably Germany and Sweden. Other countries, e.g. Spain, Portugal and Greece, witnessed an increase in electoral support for parties more tolerant of migration. In other instances, there is no clear trend, with electoral victories of anti-immigrant parties followed

[3] We do so because not all parties feature in all CHES rounds and because survey waves are not synchronised with elections. It is reassuring though that party fixed effects explain around 99% of variation in parties' positions, implying that these positions are extremely stable.

[4] Countries in the sample are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

by reversals in the subsequent elections. Later in the paper, we exploit the variation across European countries and time to identify the effect of anti-immigrant sentiment on attitudes and outcomes among migrants and their communities of origin.

## 2.3. Migrants' Support for Host Countries' Political Institutions

Before studying how attitudes towards migrants in European destination countries affect the views and perceptions in their communities of origin in Africa, we provide evidence of how such attitudes influence migrants' lived experiences and their views of the political institutions of receiving countries. To this end, we use micro-data from the European Social Survey (ESS, XX), waves 3 to 10, covering the period 2005-2022 a biennial survey sampling around 1,500 individuals per country across up to thirty European countries. The data provide a variety of variables on respondents' assessment of the government, the economy, and labor market outcomes, alongside information on socioeconomic characteristics, including country of birth. In particular, we focus on: (1) Satisfaction with Democracy; (2) Satisfaction with the Government; and (3) Trust in politics and political institutions (derived as the principal component of trust in politics, in parties and the parliament). According to the literature in political science (XX), these variables are good indicators of respondents' appraisal of the performance of the country's political system and its actors (rather than support for general liberal democratic values). Second, we focus on respondents' economic performance, measured by indicators for whether they are (4) employed; (5) report being discriminated; subjective well-being, measured in terms of (6) satisfaction with life; and (7) satisfaction with the economy. For ease of interpretation, we express all satisfaction and trust variables in terms of the respective continent-wide standard deviations. We investigate the impact of anti-immigrant sentiment on various measures of migrants' attitudes and economic performance based on the following regression:

$$Y_{idt} = \theta A_{dt} \times M_i + X_i'\gamma + f_{dt} + \varepsilon_{idt} \tag{1}$$

where $Y_{idt}$ denotes a generic outcome for individual $i$ in country of residence $d$ in year $t$, $M_i$ is a dummy equal to one for migrants and $A_{dt}$ denotes our measures of anti-immigrant sentiment in country $d$ and year $t$ based on CHES. The model includes country of residence X year fixed effects, hence leveraging within country variation between migrants and natives for identification. We also include country of birth fixed effects, hence purging our estimates of compositional effects that might simultaneously affect natives' intolerance of migrants and migrants' outcomes. Finally, we include individual characteristics (dummies for age, gender, education, marital status and residence in a large urban centre) to account for the circumstance that migrants differ from natives in terms of such observables. Regressions are weighted by the interaction of population size and design weights (see XX) and standard errors are clustered by the interaction of country of residence and migrant status. The parameter $\theta$ identifies the differential evolution in outcomes and attitudes among migrants relative to natives in response to changes in anti-immigrant sentiment at destination.

Regression results are reported in Table 1. Columns (1) to (3) refer to political attitudes, in particular satisfaction with democracy and with the government, and trust in politics. Columns

(4) to (7) refer to economic outcomes, namely employment, perceived discrimination, satisfaction with life and with the economy. In row 2 of the Table we report the migrants' natives differential using the same set of controls as in equation 1, with the exception of country of birth dummies. Row 2, columns (1) to (3) show that migrants are disproportionately more likely to support the government, trust political institutions and report satisfaction with democracy compared to natives. Magnitudes are sizeable, on the order of 0.3 of a standard deviation, independent of the measure used. This differential is eroded when anti-immigrant sentiment rises: row 1 shows in particular that a one standard deviation increase in anti-immigrant-sentiment leads to this gap falling by between 0.12 and 0.22 of a standard deviation. The remaining columns, row 2, show that, relative to natives, migrants report lower employment (minus 4.3 percentage points), greater discrimination (plus 9 percentage points) and lower satisfaction with life (minus 0.06 of a standard deviation). Despite this, they also display greater satisfaction with the economy (plus 0.24 of a standard deviation). Row 1, though, shows that greater anti-immigrant sentiment leads to a deterioration across all these dimensions, with lower employment (a decrease of 6 percentage points for a one-standard-deviation increase in anti-immigrant sentiment), higher reported discrimination (an increase of 3 percentage points), and lower satisfaction with life and the economy (a decrease of 0.23 and 0.10 of a standard deviation, respectively). In sum, the Table illustrates much higher support for the country's political institutions and its actors among migrants relative to natives, despite much worse economic outcomes and lower self-reported satisfaction with life. One interpretation for these findings is that migrants harbour high expectations about the ability of host countries' institutions to deliver freedom and prosperity, despite the disadvantage they suffer at destination. However, and consistent with a body of literature cited in the introductions showing that migrants respond to discrimination by reducing their support for host countries' institutions, there is also evidence of a deterioration in such attitudes when anti-immigrant sentiment is widespread, an effect that we speculatively attribute to their or their groups' worse economic performance.

We have also performed a number of robustness checks. In Appendix Table A.1 (Panel A), we include additionally the interaction between migrant status and both per capita GDP growth and the V-DEM democracy index (Coppedge et al., 2024; **?**). The concern here is that anti-immigrant sentiment might be driven by worse economic performance (XX), while at the same time migrants are disproportionately affected by economic downturns. A related concern is that the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties might be associated with a deterioration in the principles of liberal democracies (XX), with migrants being disproportionately affected by a deterioration in the quality of political institutions. Results though remain effectively unchanged, ruling out these competing explanations. Appendix Table A.2 presents regressions with further interactions, namely specific migrants' attributes and anti-immigrant sentiment. For consistency, the bottom rows of each panel present the differential in outcomes between these groups of migrants and all other migrants. The Table illustrates that migrants from Africa and in general those from non- or fragile democracies, as measured by a value of the Polity index in the period 2000-2005 of 5 or below, and more recent migrants (residing in the country for 5 years or less) tend to be more supportive of local institutions despite worse economic outcomes even

if compared to other migrants. These results are consistent with migrants overestimating the desirability of host country's political institutions when lacking prior exposure to them. There is also some suggestive evidence that these groups disproportionately bear the brunt of anti-immigrant sentiment in terms of deteriorating labor market outcomes, and that they respond more strongly to rising anti-immigrant sentiment by reducing their support for host countries' political institutions, although point estimates on these interactions are largely statistically insignificant. This evidence also reinforces our claim that worse economic opportunities in the face of discrimination are responsible for negative attitudes.

In sum, our analysis reveals that migrants, and especially those from less democratic countries, including migrants from Africa, come to European countries with high expectations about the ability of these countries' institutions to deliver freedom and prosperity and they appear to value such institutions much more than natives. However, the tide of anti-immigrant sentiment that has swept the continent since the early 2000s has led migrants to suffer from increased discrimination and worse economic outcomes, in turn eroding their support for the founding institutions of host societies.

# 3. Predicting Migration Stocks from African Regions to the Rest of the World using Google Trends Data

## 3.1. Methodology

Before turning to estimate the consequences of migrants' exposure to attitudes at destination on attitudes and outcomes among these migrants' fellow citizens in origin communities, in this section we provide a methodology to estimate the stocks of migrants from each subnational region of Africa to Europe (and actually to the rest of the world) based on Google Trends (henceforth, GT) data. These data reflect "trending topics" based on searches people make on Google every day (as well as irregular search activity, such as automated searches or queries). A formal discussion is presented in Appendix A.1.

Our object of interest is the distribution of migrants from each subnational origin region in Africa across destination countries. As discussed in the Introduction, most available data sets with wide-enough geographical coverage only provide systematic information on international bilateral migration stocks, at the level of country dyads, which has substantially hampered research on the consequences of out-migration. We propose to proxy this distribution using GT data about searches performed in each country (other than the African country of interest) for the name of the most populous city in each African region, which is typically the region administrative capital. This is likely to be a good predictor of migrants' interest for that region, either because migrants from the region disproportionately originate from that city or because they are likely to have a specific interest in it (due to politics, sports etc.). Our approach is based on the simple idea that if, say, more searches are performed for "Accra", the capital city of the homonymous region of Ghana, in the UK relative to Switzerland, then this suggests that

migrants from the Accra region are more likely to be located in the UK than in Switzerland.[5] Despite its intuitive appeal, there are some main challenges associated with this approach.

First, the relationship between Google searches and number of migrants need not be one to one. This will depend on the intensity by which migrants perform such searches relative to natives. The problem is very similar in spirit to Henderson et al. (2012) who use nightlight density to predict GDP across granular geographical areas in Africa. These authors postulate a "structural" relationship between night-light intensity and GDP and exploit the aggregate data across countries to derive the best linear prediction of the latter based on the former, namely estimates of local GDP based on local nightlight intensity. We follow a similar approach. In particular, we postulate a "structural" model of Google searches and assume that migrants from a certain place of origin are systematically more likely to perform searches for that place than non-migrants or migrants from other areas and countries. We use searches for different origin countries in Africa performed across different destination countries together with data on the total number of migrants from each country in Africa to each destination country to derive the best linear prediction coefficient of migration conditional on Google searches.

A second challenge is that GT data do not provide the *absolute* volume of searches for a certain term but only *relative* searches. In particular, these data allow us to recover either within-country-of-destination relative searches, i.e. relative searches performed in a given country across two regions (e.g., searches in the UK for the term "Kumasi", the regional capital of the Ashanti region in Ghana, relative to searches, say, for "Accra") or between-country-of-destination relative searches, i.e. searches for the same region ("Accra") across two countries (say the UK and Switzerland), where the latter are further expressed as the ratio of total Google searches in the two countries (UK vis á vis Switzerland) in order to avoid that these are affected by scale effects. As we cannot recover total searches for each country's regional capitals, we cannot directly obtain the best linear prediction of migration given total searches. One can, however, still use information on between-country-of-destination *relative* searches to estimate this coefficient. In particular, let $M_{r_od}$ denote migrants stocks from origin region $r$ of country of origin $o$ to destination country $d$, $S_{r_od}$ denote Google searches for region $r_o$ performed in country $d$ (relative to all searches in country $d$), $M_{od} = \Sigma_{r \in o} M_{rod}$ denote total migrants stock from country $o$ to country $d$, $s_{od} = \frac{\Sigma_{r \in o} s_{r_o d}}{N_o}$ denotes average log searches from all regions of country $o$ performed in country $d$, where $N_o$ is the number of regions of country $o$ and $s_{oD}$, are average log searches from all regions of country $o$ performed in a numeraire country $D$. As long as our model includes country of origin fixed effects, it is irrelevant if one uses $s_{od}$ or $s_{od} - s_{oD}$ as a regressor, and one can obtain estimates of the BLP based on the following "gravity" equation:

$$m_{od} = \psi(s_{od} - s_{oD}) + \delta_o + \delta_d + \mu_{od} \tag{2}$$

where where $x = ln(X)$ and $\delta_o$ and $\delta_d$ denote country of origin and country of destination fixed effects. Estimates of 2 also serve to validate our strategy, as one will expect the coefficient $\psi$ to

[5] Note that Google Trends does not typically allow us to derive searches performed in units smaller than countries, such as subnational regions in Europe.

be positive and significant at conventional levels.

A third challenge is that searches for a certain regional capital city in Africa might reflect its popularity (e.g., as a tourist destination or an economic hub) rather than migration. As long as a place's popularity is the same across destination countries, though, one can purge Google searches of this effect. In practice, we exploit relative searches for a certain region of origin (say Ashanti relative to Accra, in Ghana) performed in countries with no migrants from Ghana (say Uruguay, Indonesia, etc.), and hence a fortiori from any of its regions, to identify the popularity of each regional capital relative to the country capital.

Lasr, and even once these popularity effects have been netted out, the fact that GT provides only relative rather than absolute searches implies that one will not be able to derive how many migrants from a certain African region, say Accra, reside in the UK but only how this number compares with the number of migrants from the Ashanti region. Effectively, we lack one degree of freedom for identification. One can solve this problem, though, again exploiting national migration stocks together with within-country-of-destination Google searches. Intuitively, say, if searches for the city of Accra performed in the UK are twenty times as large as searches performed in the same country for each of the other nine other regions of Ghana, and if there are 100,000 migrants from Ghana to the UK, this implies that the number of migrants from Accra to the UK will be roughly 69,000 (=20/29 X 100,000). One can obtain similar estimates for each destination country and hence the overall distribution of migrants from Accra across destination countries.

Two more considerations are in order on our measure of migrants networks. First, Google searches might capture not only the presence of migrants but also their attachment to their place of origin. This is a desirable feature of our measure of migrant networks, as the intensity of such ties will likely influence how origin communities respond to shocks at the destination, as the intensity of such ties will likely affect how origin communities respond to shocks at destination. Second, Google searches might reflect bilateral links between African regions and countries over and above migration. These might be due for example to commercial or colonial ties that relate specific areas in origin countries to countries of destination. In practice, as long as these links are codetermined with migration (Burchardi et al., 2019), or these ties also affect the spread of information from destination countries to origin communities, this will not invalidate our approach. As a further check, we can include a variety of additional country of origin X country of destination specific variables in our aggregate bilateral aggregate regression (2). If the results survive their inclusion, this provides further evidence in favor of our claim that GT data genuinely capture bilateral migration stocks.

## 3.2. Empirical Results

In the following we present predictions of migration stocks from subnational regions in Africa to the rest of the world based on the procedure outlined above. For all 50 African countries in our sample, we start by identifying the most populous city in each subnational region. In total, we identify 709 cities. Figure 2 reports a map of Africa with the precise location and name of

each of these 709 cities, while Appendix Figure A.1 zooms in on Western Africa. We perform separate GT queries for each of these 709 cities relative to the respective country capital across 133 destination countries. We also perform searches for each of these cities relative to searches in Switzerland. We average the resulting monthly searches across all months from January 2004 to December 2020. We complement these data with data on bilateral migration stocks from the United Nations Population division.[6]

We turn to estimates of equation (2) in Table 2, where we present increasingly saturated models with different combinations of country of origin and country of destination fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by population at origin, although results are very similar if we weight by population at destination, and are restricted to country pairs with zero or unreported by the United Nations, which is likely associated with a small number of migrants. Standard errors are clustered two-way, by country of origin and destination. Results are only mildly sensitive to the specification. Point estimates for $\psi$ vary between 1.504 and 1.287 and are statistically significant at conventional levels. Appendix Table A.3 also reports coefficients separately across groups of destination countries, using the most saturated specification with the interaction of country of origin and country of destination fixed effects. Results hold true across most continents except the Americas. As one might be concerned that such correlations capture the strength of bilateral ties between country pairs, which might be correlated with both migration stocks and Google searches, as said, in Appendix Table A.4, we also present regressions where we control for a large array of country of origin times country of destination specific variables, including: common language, distance between capitals, (log) trade volume, past colonial links, and common legal origin. In the most demanding specification including all bilateral controls, the point estimate is still positive (about 0.781) and precisely estimated.

As explained in the previous section, and more formally, in Appendix A.1, we use the estimates of $\psi$ together with relative Google searches to reapportion migrants from each to country to their respective region of origin. Before doing so, though, we purge relative searches from the relative popularity of each city relative to the country capital. In order to do so, we use data on country pairs for which migration stocks relative to the population at destination is zero or unreported. On average, there are low migration stocks across two-thirds of African country of origin times country of destination dyads.

Figure 3 finally reports the results of our prediction procedure. In particular, for each of the 709 subnational regions of Africa the figure reports the top three predicted European destinations. The objective of this exercise is twofold. First, to provide a preliminary assessment of the plausibility of the information content of our GT-based measure. Second, to assess the amount of variation generated by this measure within country of origin. For each African region, Panel A reports to the top country of destination, which on average accounts for around 58% of total predicted migration to Europe from Africa. The map clearly hints at the importance of the European colonial legacy, with regions in West and Central Africa mainly linked to France and regions in East and Southern Africa linked to the UK, as well as more localized enclaves of Portuguese and Italian influence in, respectively, Mozambique and Angola and Libya and Ethiopia.

[6] The data are available at `www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock`.

Panels B and C refer to predicted migration to the second and third main European destinations, which account for 14% and 8% of total European migration, respectively. Compared to panel A, panels B and C display a more diverse set of destinations across regions of the same country, with as many as seven different top-2 European destinations in the same country of origin. Indeed, an Herfindahl index for the dispersion in the second (third) ranked European destination across regions of the same country delivers a value of 0.46 (0.38), reflecting the high degree of dispersion in European destinations within African countries.

To further probe the predictive content of our measure of subnational migration stocks, we compare it with measures of subnational return migration available for a sample of fifteen African countries from IPUMS. The list of these countries is reported in Appendix Table A.5. In Table 3, we formally estimate the relationship between return migration from national censuses in Africa and predicted subnational migration stocks from Africa to European destinations. Our units of analysis are all "region of origin-country of destination" pairs for which we have information on predicted and actual migration.We run the following regressions:

$$rm_{r_od} = \kappa m_{r_od} + f_{r_o} + f_{od} + \omega_{r_od} \tag{3}$$

where $rm_{r_od}$ is log number of return migrants from country$d$ residing in region $r_o$ and $m_{r_od}$ the predicted migration stocks from Google trends. While we present results weighted by population at origin, unweighted results or results weighted by population at destination (available upon request) are remarkably similar. The model includes region of origin and country of origin X country of destination fixed effects. This approach allows us to control for variation in predicted and actual migration from a given region that is due to its size or popularity across all destinations. It also absorbs all time-invariant origin-destination links, allowing us to abstract from bilateral country ties, such as colonial history, common language, and trade links. Column (1) presents estimates across all world destinations, which delivers a positive and statistically significant point estimate (0.29). Similar results are found when estimating coefficients separately across destination continents, except for North America and Oceania, where IPUMS data reveal very limited migration from Africa. We note that the coefficients are substantially lower than one, suggesting considerable measurement error in our predictions, although this cannot be distinguished from concavity in return migration as a function of the migrant stock. As return migrants might disproportionately locate in the country capital as opposed to their region of origin Appendix Table A.7 presents results excluding African capital cities or cities in the top quartile of the country population distribution. Results are effectively unchanged. In sum, the evidence in this and in the previous section supports our GT-based measure of migration as a valuable source of information about migration stocks from subnational regions of Africa to the rest of the world.

# 4. Attitudes Towards Migrants in Europe and Attitudes towards Democracy and Political Outcomes in Africa

Democracy in Africa is both a legacy of colonial rule and a continuation of its historical trajectory. As African nations gained independence, starting in the 1950s, many adopted Western-style liberal democratic systems. This shift was driven by several factors, including the influence of former colonial powers, the Cold War geopolitical climate, and conditions tied to international development aid, with Western governments and international organizations promoting electoral democracy as a condition for financial assistance and diplomatic recognition (XX).

However, while democracy has taken root in many African countries, its implementation has often fallen short of expectations and, although support for democracy remains relatively high, it has shown signs of decline (AfroBarometer, 2024). Scholars argue this decline stems partly from the disconnect between democratic governance structures and pre-existing social norms, traditional institutions, and the deep role of ethnicity in political life. In many cases, political leaders have exploited ethnic divisions to consolidate power, undermining democratic processes and fostering conflict (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016). Consequently, a growing discourse challenges the idea that liberal, Western-style democracy, in its current form, serves the interests of African nations. Some view it as an externally imposed system that primarily serves Western political and economic agendas rather than local needs.

This suggests that African citizens will form their views about democracy also based on how this performs in countries that are typically seen as bastions of liberal democracy. Based on established evidence about social remittances, one such information channel is via the experiences of migrants in democratic countries. Exposure to liberal democratic societies that fail to uphold principles of equality and fair treatment could highlight a "democratic failure", influencing citizens' perceptions of democracy in their own countries and possibly even their regime preferences. This does not imply that citizens in developing countries care solely about the well-being of fellow citizens in host countries. Rather, migrant networks are likely to convey information filtered through their experiences. Such information might have a particularly strong impact on citizens from non-democratic countries, where individuals often lack firsthand knowledge of how democracy functions. Consequently, they may place greater weight on the experiences of migrants. Evidence supporting this argument would align with findings in Section 2 that individuals with little or no prior experience of democracy are more likely to value democratic institutions in host countries and that their evaluations of these institutions tend to decline more when exposed to intolerance in host societies.

Information about political institutions in host societies can spread through several channels: migrants directly communicating with those back home, returning to their countries of origin to share their experiences and attitudes, or members of origin communities directly acquiring information about the political systems of countries with a significant migrant presence.[7] These

[7] Appendix Table A.6 presents descriptive evidence suggesting the potential for this information to travel all the way to migrants' community of origins. We use data from the EU-commissioned Migration from Africa to Europe (MAFE) and from Oxford EUmagine, two small-scale migration surveys that provide information, among other things, on the frequency of contact with relatives abroad among about 6,000 respondents from

multiple channels suggest that the effects of exposure to democratic institutions abroad are likely to be stronger in areas with larger migrant populations exposed to intolerance in their host societies.

In sum, while African nations continue to grapple with the challenges of implementing democracy, migrants' experiences in host Western countries may influence how liberal democracy is perceived back home. In regions with significant migrant populations experiencing intolerance, we might expect a more pronounced shift in political attitudes. This suggests that the process of democratization in Africa could be shaped not only by local factors but also by the experiences of its citizens abroad.

## 4.1. Methodology

In order to bring this argument to empirical scrutiny, in this section we devise a methodology to estimate the effect of shocks to anti-immigrant sentiment on the views held by those at origin via migrants' networks. In particular, we assume that each migrant from origin region $r_o$ in country of destination $d$ on average successfully remits back to a subset $C$ of individuals in her community of origin with a "remittance coefficient" $\rho$, which measures the marginal effect of exposure to shocks among those affected at origin. If $Y_{ir_ot}$ denotes a generic outcome for individual respondent $i$ in origin region $r_o$ in year $t$, it is easy to show (see Appendix B) that leads to the following expression for individual outcomes at origin:

$$Y_{ir_ot} = \beta Exp_{r_ot} + X_i'\lambda + X_{r_o}'\pi_t + f_{r_o} + f_{ot} + \eta_{it} \tag{4}$$

where $Exp_{r_ot}$ is origin communities' exposure to anti-immigrant sentiment at destination via migrants' networks, which we obtain as a weighted average of trends in anti-immigrant sentiment across countries of destination, $A_{dt}$, with weights given by the baseline fraction of migrants from each region relative to the region's population. In formulas:

$$Exp_{r_ot} = \sum_d \frac{M_{r_od}}{Pop_{r_o}} \times A_{dt} \tag{5}$$

In Appendix B we show that the parameter $\beta$ carries the interpretation of the effect of one additional migrant in the origin region population being exposed to a negative versus a positive anti-immigrant shock - which we measure as a one standard deviation increase in anti-immigrant sentiment - on the cumulative value of $Y$ among all those at origin. This is the product of the extensive margin effect ($C$ - how many people are affected) and the intensive margin effect ($\rho$ - the marginal effect among those affected). If $Y$ is a dichotomous variable and monotonicity holds, i.e. successfully affected individuals are all positively affected, namely $\rho = 1$, then $\beta = C$, and this parameter carries the natural interpretation of the number of people at origin who are

African countries. Participation in the surveys is conditional on having at least one relative residing in a foreign country (not necessarily in Europe, in the case of the EUmagine survey). The upper panel in the table shows that the vast majority of respondents have been in contact at least once over the previous year, while the lower panel shows that the contact is quite frequent: over 70 percent of respondents are in contact at least once a month, while one third is in contact every week.

swayed away by exposure to such shock.[8]

One can think of equation (4) as deriving from a model where individuals are affected by information shocks at destination (which we cannot directly measure) and where the former is affected by a classical exposure instrument derived from the interaction between baseline migration shares and country of destination shifts. In this case equation (4) carries the natural interpretation of a reduced form equation. This is useful, at it allows us to discuss consistent identification of the parameter $\beta$ in the light of recent advancements in the literature on shift-shares instruments (Borusyak et al., 2022, 2025; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020), namely in terms of exogeneity of the shares or of the shifts. As the latter is typically invoked when there are many independent shocks, which is not the case in our application (we have 19 countries of destination), we hence rely on exogeneity of the shares. In practice, a sufficient condition for consistent estimation of the parameter is that African regions with a different distribution of migrants across European destination countries are not on different trends in terms of their citizen's views other than because of differential exposure to migration shocks. In order to assuage these concerns, in the model we include, in addition to region or origin fixed effects, $f_{r_o}$ and country of origin X year effects $f_{ot}$, hence relying on the differential variation over time across regions of the same country for identification, a large array of baseline region-specific characteristics, whose effect we allow to vary unrestricted over time. We also include the additional shocks at destination which we interact with the shares. This is important, as one might be concerned that trends in anti-immigrant sentiment across European countries are correlated with other macro-variables, that might themselves affect trends in attitude at origin. Because the variable $Exp_{r_ot}$ is mechanically correlated with region-specific overall outmigration rates and the share of migrants to Europe, both of which might be correlated with the outcomes (a classical case of "incomplete shares"), we include these two variables in the regression which we further interact with year effects. This in turn implies that our estimates only capture the differential exposure to anti-immigrant shocks driven by compositional differences in outmigration rates across European destination countries conditional on outmigration to Europe. This is important for the interpretation of the coefficient, as our estimates abstract from common effects of exposure to European democracies, which others have claimed affect attitudes at origin. Finally, we include in the model individual characteristics $X_i$ to control for compositional changes among respondents that might be correlated with the exposure variable.

## 4.2. Empirical Results

In order to estimate equation (4), we use micro data from the Afrobarometer survey, waves 3 to 8, covering the period from 2005 to 2021. Overall, the data provide information on around 240,000 respondents across 37 African countries, in turn accounting collectively for 63 percent of the continent population as of 2005.[9] The data provide information on individuals' attitudes

[8] Similarly, if $\rho = -1$, then $\beta = -C$ i.e this the opposite of the number of people at origin who are swayed away by exposure to such shock.

[9] Countries in the sample are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,

and voting intentions, alongside a large array of socio-demographic characteristics. One major advantage of the data is that they allow us to identify the region of residence of each respondent. This allows us to investigate trends in attitudes and electoral decisions across different regions of the same country.

We focus on measures of individual-level preferences for different forms of government (democracy versus other forms of government), support for the current government as well as voting intentions. Specific questions are reported in Appendix D. In particular, we use questions that are consistently asked through waves 3 to 8 of the Afrobarometer. First, we focus on: (1) "Support for democracy". This is based on the question asking respondents whether they think democracy is preferable to any other form of government and we derive a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answers that democracy is "preferable to any other form of government", and 0 otherwise (that "it does not matter" or that "sometimes a non-democratic government can be preferable"). Differently from satisfaction with democracy, this variable is thought to capture support for the principles of liberal democracy. Second, we focus on (2) "Demand for electoral competition", which captures respondents' support for specific features of consolidated democracies, such as free and fair elections and multi-party competition. Third, we derive a measure of (3) "Demand for constraints on the executive" which captures respondents' support for constraints on the president, namely whether the president should be bound by law, whether it should be monitored and have a term limit. Finally, we focus on (4) "Demand for media freedom and freedom of association", which captures respondents' support for statements that media should be free and individuals should be free to join in any organization. We construct variables (2) to (4) using a principal component of the answers to underlying questions in the Afrobarometer and we express them in terms of their standard deviations.

We also use measures of political attitudes and trust towards the parliament, the president and the ruling party, all of which are expressed as dichotomous variables. We finally derive information on voters' voting intentions. In particular, for each individual in the Afrobarometer we identify the party that the voter reports being closest to. Note that effectively all countries in the sample held elections during the period, although these elections vary widely in terms of their freedom and fairness. We use this variable to identify voters' support for the incumbent as well as to classify parties into high, moderate and low democratic parties. As we have no systematic information of such parties' platforms, we derive this based on the attitudes of voters. In particular, for each party we use means of support for democracy among those reporting that they support that party, and we classify parties based on within countries terciles of voters' support for democracy.

The Afrobarometer data also reports a large set of individual characteristics for each respondent. In all specifications, we control for the respondent's age, gender, level of education, dummies for urban areas and ethnicity (Black/African, White/European, Coloured/Mixed Race, Arab/Lebanese, South Asian). We also control for other baseline regional characteristics (log population, natural resources, conflict incidence, distance to the border, the coast and the cap-

Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

ital, total baseline outmigration and share of outmigrants to Europe) that we interact with unrestricted time dummies as well as characteristics of the primary sampling unit of the respondent reported in the Afrobarometer (access to electricity, access to running water, presence of a school, a police station, a hospital, or a local market.)

OLS estimates of equation (4) are reported in Table 4. Standard errors in all specifications are clustered at country of origin. The estimated $\beta$ in column (1) is negative and statistically significant, indicating that individuals in communities of origin exposed to an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment at destination experience a decline in their support for democracy. At -0.800, this estimate implies almost a one to one effect, namely that one migrant being exposed to a high versus low anti-immigrant shock equivalent to a one standard deviation higher anti-immigrant sentiment, leads to effectively one less individual stating strong support for democracy at origin. The effect is small: because around 1 percent of the population emigrates to Europe, this leads to around 8 individual out of 1,000 individuals changing their attitudes. At average support for democracy among Afrobarometer respondents of around 0.73, this implies a fall in support for democracy of around 1 percent. When considering alternative outcome variables capturing demand for electoral competition (column 2), demand for constraints on the executive (column 3) and for media freedom and freedom of association (column 4), effects range between negative 1.7 and negative 3.8 of a standard deviation.

Appendix Figure A.2 reports estimates obtained using separate components of anti-immigrant sentiment at destination. Recall that our measure of Anti-immigration sentiment uses three components from the CHES: support for restrictive immigration policies, opposition to ethnic minorities and preference for integration over multiculturalism. We estimate equation (4) separately for each component and report the estimated coefficient. As shown, results on the different measures of support for democracy at origin do not depend on any specific component of Anti-immigration sentiment at destination and are consistent across them in terms of both magnitude and precision. In Appendix Figure A.3 we also open up our measures of support of democracy at origin, and estimate a separate specification for each of the eight Afrobarometer questions used to construct them. As shown, results are broadly consistent across specific Afrobarometer questions, with more noisy estimates for questions capturing support for multi-party systems, support for the idea that the president should be monitored and support for media freedom.

In Appendix Table A.8 we test the robustness of the main results to additional controls. First, in panel A, we include a measure of exposure to GDP growth at destination via migrant networks. This measure is designed to capture changes in attitudes towards democracy driven by changes in economic conditions in the European regions where individuals have migrated. We also include a continuous measure of the quality of democratic institutions at destination based on the V-DEM index. As shown, the point estimate on exposure to anti-immigrant sentiment remains effectively unchanged. Next, we replicate our analysis using alternative definitions of our measure of exposure to anti-immigrant sentiment at destination. In particular in Panel B of Table A.8, we show results using actual changes in migration policy restrictiveness, and the magnitude of such policy changes, from the DEMIG database published by the International

Migration Institute. This alternative definition of Anti-immigration shock at destination is meant to capture the impact of changes in actual policies rather than in the electoral success of parties supporting such policies. Results are again confirmed, suggesting that our measure of anti-immigrant sentiment is correlated with actual policy changes.

As stated, one would expect the effects to be larger in autocracies (e.g. Zimbabwe, Angola) and anocracies (e.g. Mozambique, Nigeria) compared to full democracies (e.g. Senegal, Ghana, South Africa). In Table 5 hence we report separate results for these two group of countries, which - as before - we define based on a Polity index below or above 5. Consistent with our hypothesis, the effects are 5 to 6 times larger in autocracies and anocracies compared to the average, while we find no effect in democracies. This evidence squares well with evidence in Appendix Table A.9 that effects are larger among elderly individuals, those poorly educated, and those residing in rural and poor areas and in areas with no 3G mobile signal coverage, all likely predictors of lower direct exposure to information about the functioning of democracy, and hence a greater propensity to weight information coming via migrants' networks.

We finally investigate whether changes in support for democracy at origin have political consequences. In particular, we focus on both attitudes towards the current government as well as voting intentions. We present results on (1) "Trust in Parliament", (2) "Trust in the President", (3) "Trust in the Ruling Party", (4) "Voting intentions for the Incumbent Candidate", and (5-7) "Voting Intentions for Parties in each tercile of Support for Democracy". Results for non-full democracies are reported in Table 6, while results for full democracies are in Appendix Table A.10. The data reveal that in countries with autocratic regimes or those with only moderate level of democracy, where elections are often rigged, citizens react to shocks to anti-immigrant sentiment in Western countries by expressing greater support for the incumbent and the parliament. They also express intending to vote for parties which are less supportive of democracy. Magnitudes are similar to the ones found in terms of support for democracy. We do not find evidence of effects among citizens in full democracies. These result suggest that deterioration in support for democracy among African citizens in response to greater hostility in the reception of migrants might have a negative effect on democratic progress in Africa.

## 5. Summary and concluding remarks

We study how anti-immigrant sentiment at destination affects support for democracy at origin, focusing on African outmigration to Europe. We propose a novel methodology to estimate subnational migration stocks using Google Trends data. We postulate and find strong evidence in favor of migrants disproportionately performing Google searches for their place of origin, making these searches a good proxy for their presence. We use these estimates to derive a measure of exposure to anti-immigrant sentiment at destination across subnational areas in Africa. We apply this measure to the study of the international transmission of support for democracy and preference for characteristics of democratic systems. We document that rising anti-immigrant sentiment in EU destination countries erodes migrants' support for democratic institutions at destination. This reverberates into origin communities, lowering support for

democracy, demand for electoral competition and constraints on the executive.

As public support for democracy is considered a fundamental prerequisite for a legitimate and lasting democratic structure in countries with weak institutional capacity, these findings suggest that the consequences of negative anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe may be far-reaching and have important political consequences for the future path of countries at the crossroad in their democratic journey. Indeed, our results on voting behavior suggest that these changes in support for democracy at origin can have real consequences. While one of the long-term efforts of Western foreign policy has been to export democracy through the creation of liberal democratic institutions in countries with limited institutional capacity, often with poor results, our results suggest that a key factor in consolidating democracy abroad is setting an example at home.

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
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**Figure 1** Anti-immigrant sentiment at destination





**Notes:** The Figure reports trends in the vote-share weighted of parties' support for restrictive immigration policies (1); for ethnic minority rights (2) and preference for multiculturalism versus migrants' assimilation (3), separately by country and for the continent as a whole. Variables are expressed in terms of the respective continent-wide standard deviation and rescaled to their value in 2005. Continent-wide trends are obtained as population weighted averages of country values. Series are extrapolated forward to account for elections occurring every 3 to 6 years. Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey.

**Figure 2** Largest city by sub-national region





**Notes:** The map reports the name and location of the largest city in each of the 709 sub-national regions in our sample. We use the names of these cities as search terms in Google Trends, as proxies for the interest in the corresponding region.

**Figure 3** Top European Destinations




**(a)** Panel A **(b)** Panel B




**(c)** Panel C

**Notes:** The figure reports the top three European destination countries across the 709 admin-regions in Africa.

**Table 1** Anti-immigrant Sentiment and Migrants vs Natives' Attitudes and Outcomes at Destination

| | Political attitudes | | | Economic Outcomes and Well-being | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Satisfied with Democracy (1) | Satisfied with Government (2) | Trust in Politics (3) | Employed (4) | Discriminated Group (5) | Satisfied with Life (6) | Satisfied with Economy (7) |
| Anti-Imm (s.d.) X Immigrant | -0.216** | -0.179** | -0.225*** | -0.061** | 0.032* | -0.237*** | -0.103 |
| | (0.096) | (0.080) | (0.072) | (0.024) | (0.018) | (0.060) | (0.064) |
| Observations | 222,343 | 222,634 | 222,021 | 228,769 | 228,110 | 228,510 | 224,291 |
| Immigrants-natives differential | 0.336*** | 0.312*** | 0.272*** | -0.043*** | 0.093*** | -0.056*** | 0.243*** |
| | (0.018) | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.006) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.035) |

**Notes:** The Table reports OLS coefficients from a regression of each dependent variable on the interaction between anti-immigrant sentiment at destination, measured by vote share-weighted of the principal component of parties' different anti-immigrant dimensions in CHES, and a dummy for immigrant status (equation (1) in the text). Dependent variables are: (1) satisfaction with democracy, (2) satisfaction with the government, (3) trust in politics and political institutions, (4) a dummy for being in employment, (5) a dummy for the respondent reporting belonging to a group that is discriminated, (6) satisfaction with life and (7) satisfaction with the economy. Variables in columns (1) to (3) and (6) to (7) are expressed in terms of their standard deviations. The bottom row of the table reports the migrants-natives differential in the outcome variable obtained from a regression of the dependent variable on an immigrant dummy. All regressions include fixed effects for country of destination X year and country of birth plus individual level controls (age in years, years of education, dummies for marital status, a dummy for big city, gender). Regressions are weighted by the interaction of population size and design weights. Standard errors clustered by migrant status X country of destination in brackets. ***,**,**: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: European Social Survey, rounds 2-10.

**Table 2** Country-Level Correlations between Bilateral Migration Stocks and GT searches

| | Dependent Variable: Country-level migration | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Log aggregate searches | 1.470*** | 1.504*** | 1.119*** | 1.287*** |
| | (0.284) | (0.306) | (0.190) | (0.201) |
| Observations | 2,070 | 2,070 | 2,062 | 2,062 |
| Country of origin FE | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Country of destination FE | × | × | ✓ | ✓ |

**Notes:** The Table reports estimates of equation (2) in the text. Observations are at the level of country of origin X country of destination and regressions are weighted by country of origin population. ***,**,**: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

**Table 3** Relationship between Return Migration and Predicted Migration Stocks across Sub-national Regions in Africa

| | Dependent Variable: Log IPUMS return migrants | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Any destination | Africa | Europe | Asia | Latin America | North America | Oceania |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| | Baseline Specification: All Cities | | | | | | |
| Log predicted migration stock GT | 0.297*** | 0.387*** | 0.216*** | 0.244** | 0.085* | 0.025 | 0.021 |
| | (0.041) | (0.058) | (0.048) | (0.089) | (0.041) | (0.064) | (0.073) |
| Observations | 30,420 | 10,998 | 8,190 | 6,552 | 3,744 | 468 | 468 |

**Notes:** The table reports the coefficient from a regression of log return migrant stocks from each country to each region in Africa based on IPUMS data on log migrants stocks estimated based on GT data plus region of origin and country of origin times country of destination fixed effects (equation (3) in the text). Two-way standard errors clustered by country of origin and destination reported in parenthesis. ***,**,**: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

**Table 4** Exposure to Anti-immigrant Sentiment at Destination and Support for Democracy at Origin

| | Support for Democracy | Demand for Electoral Competition | Demand for Constraints on the Executive | Demand for Media Freedom and Freedom of Association |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Exposure to Anti Imm. | -0.800** | -1.685* | -3.488*** | -3.014*** |
| | (0.386) | (0.945) | (0.937) | (0.784) |
| Observations | 210,851 | 219,159 | 187,827 | 217,326 |

**Notes:** The Table reports OLS coefficients from a regression of each dependent variable on on exposure measure to anti-Immigrant sentiment via migrant networks (equation (4) in the text). Dependent variables are: (1) A dummy for Support for democracy, (2) Demand for electoral competition, (3) Demand for constraints on the executive and (4) Demand for media freedom and freedom of association. Variables (2) to (4) are derived from PCA of the underlying variables in the Afrobarometer and expressed in terms of their standard deviations. Specifications include region and country X year fixed effects, individual controls (age, gender, level of education, dummies for urban areas and ethnicitt, baseline regional characteristics (log population, natural resources, conflict incidence, distance to the border, the coast and the capital, total baseline outmigration and share of outmigrants to Europe) that we interact with unrestricted time dummies as well as characteristics of the primary sampling unit of the respondent reported in the Afrobarometer (access to electricity, access to running water, presence of a school, a police station, a hospital, or a local market. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}$ $p < 0.05$,$^{*}$ $p < 0.1$..

**Table 5** Exposure to Anti-immigrant Sentiment at Destination and Support for Democracy at Origin - Heterogeneous Effects by Baseline Institutional Quality

| | | | Demand for Democratic Institutions | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Support for Democracy | | Electoral Competition | | Constraints on the Executive | | Media Freedom and Freedom of Association | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| | Dem. | Non Dem. | Dem. | Non Dem. | Dem. | Non Dem. | Dem. | Non Dem. |
| Anti Imm. shock | -0.482 | -11.320*** | -1.007 | -41.027*** | -3.367** | -17.055* | -3.093*** | 0.067 |
| | (0.536) | (1.675) | (0.716) | (7.345) | (1.179) | (9.118) | (0.880) | (4.045) |
| Observations | 114,336 | 96,511 | 119,268 | 99,884 | 100,233 | 87,591 | 117,355 | 99,966 |

**Notes:** The Table reports the same regressions as in Table 4, separately for full democracies (Polity index $> 5$, in odd columns) and autocracies and anocracies (Polity index $\leq 5$, in even columns). See also notes to Table 4.

**Table 6** Exposure to Anti-immigrant Sentiment at Destination and Political Implications at Origin - Non-Democracies

| | Political Attitudes | | | Voting Intentions | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Trust Parliament | Trust President | Trust Ruling Party | Incumbent | Low Democratic Parties | Moderately Democratic Parties | Highly Democratic Parties |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Anti Imm. shock | 12.371*** | 4.896 | 19.617*** | 7.704** | 1.196 | 2.494 | -3.691* |
| | (0.536) | (1.675) | (0.716) | (1.179) | (9.118) | (0.880) | (4.045) |
| Observations | 98,961 | 101,213 | 95,013 | 83,134 | 77,711 | 77,711 | 77,711 |

**Notes:** The Table reports similar regressions to Table 4, for autocracies and anocracies only (Polity index $\leq 5$). Dependent variables are dummies for: (1) Trust in Parliament, (2) Trust in the President, (3) Trust in the Ruling Party, (4) Voting intentions for the Incumbent Candidate, and (5-7) Voting inentions for Parties in Each Tercile of Support for Democracy. See also notes to Table 4.

# A. Appendix: Estimating subnational migration stocks from GT data

In this section we provide details on the GT data, the data extraction procedure and the methodology used to predict migration stocks from subnational areas of origin in Africa to destination countries.

## A.1. Google Trends Data

GT queries return the interest for a certain topic based on Google searches. A query requires a user to specify one or more search terms, one or more search countries and the reference time period (spanning from four hours to multiple years). Queries can be performed for a combination of up to five different terms and countries.[10] The output is provided by sub-periods (i.e. hours, days, weeks or months depending on the length of the period searched).

As mentioned, GT data provide *relative* rather than *absolute* volumes of searches. In particular, for each query, the data are expressed relative to the total volume of searches in the respective country(ies) and further standardized to the maximum value of searches across all specified terms, locations and sub-periods in the query (set to 100). The relative importance of a search term is thus expressed as an integer value from 0 to 100.

Formally let $S_{jdt}$ denote the volume of Google searches for term $j$ performed in country $d$ in subperiod $t$ relative to the total volume of Google searches performed in that country and subperiod. A GT query for the term $j$ in country $d$ over period $T = \{t_1, t_2, ..t_k\}$ will return one values for each sub-period $t$, namely $\frac{S_{jdt}}{Max\{S_{jdt_1}, S_{jdt_2}, ...S_{jdt_k}\}}$.

Figure A.4 for example shows the results of a query for the term "Accra", the capital of Ghana in the UK over the period January 1st 2015 to December 31st 2020. The resulting data are at the monthly level. The figure shows that the maximum number of relative searches for this term was performed in January 2020. Compared to this base period, relative searches for the same term, say, in January 2015 were 63%.

As said, GT also allows comparing two or more search terms in the same country. A GT query for the terms $j$ and $z$ over period $T$ in country $d$ will return two values for each subperiod, respectively $\frac{S_{jdt}}{\tilde{S}_{jzdT}}$ and $\frac{S_{zdt}}{\tilde{S}_{jzdT}}$ where $\tilde{S}_{jzdT} = Max\{S_{jdt_1}, S_{jdt_2}, ...S_{jdt_k}, S_{zdt_1}, S_{zdt_2}, ...S_{zdt_k}\}$. Taking the ratio between the two, one will hence be able to recover relative searches for term $j$ relative to term $z$ in country $d$ in each subperiod, namely $\frac{S_{jdt}}{S_{zdt}}$. x For example, Figure A.5 provides the results of a search for the search term "Accra" relative to the search for the term "Kumasi", the regional capital of the Ashanti region, also in Ghana, performed in the UK over the same period. One can see that relative searches for the term "Kumasi" in February 2020 are 11% of those for the term "Accra". And that this number is 8% in January 2015.

Finally, GT also allows to compare searches for the same term across two or more countries. A GT query for term $j$ in countries $d_1$ and $d_2$ will return two values for each subperiod $t$, respectively $\frac{S_{jd_1t}}{\tilde{S}_{jd_1d_2T}}$ and $\frac{S_{jd_2t}}{\tilde{S}_{jd_1d_2t}}$, where $\tilde{S}_{jd_1d_2t} = Max\{S_{jd_1t_1}, S_{jd_1t_2}, ...S_{jd_1t_k}, S_{jd_2t_1}, S_{jd_2t_2}, ...S_{j_2dt_k}\}$. Taking the ratio between the two, one will hence be able to recover relative searches for the term $j$ across the two countries in each subperiod, namely $\frac{S_{jd_1t}}{S_{jd_2t}}$.

For example, Figure A.6 provides the results of a search for the term "Accra" in the UK and Switzerland. The Figure illustrates that in February 2020 searches for the term Accra in Switzerland (relative to the overall number of searches performed in Switzerland) - were 54% of searches performed in the UK (again standardized to the total number of searches in the UK).

[10] Note if the absolute number of searches for a term is below an undisclosed threshold this appears as a zero in the data. This implies that we typically cannot examine searches performed at subnational level (i.e. regions) in countries of destination.

## A.2. Measuring relative interest in African regions

In order to extract Google searches for African capital regions for the purpose of predicting subnational migration stocks we proceed in two steps.

First, for each of the 50 African countries we perform pairwise GT queries for any regional capital against the country capital, what we label within-country-of-destination relative searches. We do this separately for all 133 destination countries in the world (not only Europe). If $S_{r_od}$ denote the number of searches for region $r_o$ of country of origin $o$ performed in country $d$ relative to total searches in $d$, and $x = ln(X+1)$, this allows us to identify $s_{r_od} - s_{r_o^*d}$, where $r_o^*$ denotes the capital region of country $o$.

Second, we perform pairwise extractions of GT searches for any region of Africa performed in any destination country against searches for the respective country capital in Switzerland. We average the resulting monthly searches across all months from January 2004 to December 2020.[11] This allows us to identify $s_{r_od} - s_{r_o^*D}$, where $D$ denotes the numeraire country, what we label between-country-of-destination relative searches.

We extract data for the period January 1st 2004 to December 31st 2020.[12] As the relative popularity of a given search term in a single extraction is calculated on a random sample of Google searches we also iterate the procedure ten times to reduce the extent of measurement error. The process results in around 280k extractions. We average relative searches from each of the two steps across these ten iterations and all months to derive average relative searches across the entire period.

## A.3. Predicting migration stocks from subnational areas of origin in Africa

Armed with Google searches, we use these to predict migration stocks. In particular, let $M_{r_od}$ denote the number of migrants from region $r_o$ of country of origin $o$ residing in destination country $d$ and let $M_{od} = \Sigma_{r \in o} M_{r_od}$ be the total number of migrants from origin country $o$ in $d$.

We assume the following "structural" model relating log searches for region $r_o$ performed in country $d$ to log migrants from region $r_o$ residing in country $d$:[13]

$$s_{r_od} = \beta m_{r_od} + f_{r_o} + f_d + u_{r_od} \tag{6}$$

where $\beta$ reflects migrants' propensity to search for their own place of origin. The model includes $f_{r_o}$, i.e., region of origin fixed effects, which capture the relative popularity of a region across all countries, irrespective of the destination country, and $f_d$, i.e., country of destination fixed effects, which we assume are the same across origin countries/regions and that capture overall differences in search behavior across destination countries.

In order to estimate subnational migration stocks we proceed in three steps.

First, we derive an estimate of the best linear prediction of migration on Google searches by aggregating data across at the level of country of origin X country of destination. If $N_o$

[11] In practice we split this into two sub-steps. We do so because, when the volume of searches for one the terms or country in the data is comparatively low, GT approximates this to zero. In particular, for each national capital city in the 50 countries of origin, we perform pairwise extractions of its GT searches in any country against its searches in Switzerland. We combine this with information from the first step to derive relative searches for a certain regional capital in a given country relative to its searches in Switzerland. This allows us to identify $s_{r_o^*d} - s_{r_o^*D}$.

[12] In practice, we perform three separate extractions over thee partially overlapping time periods: 2004-2010, 2010-2015 and 2015-2020 and we link these three data sets to express all searches relative to the maximum over the period and search term.

[13] One can derive this model from an underlying model of behavior where users maximize the utility from online searches, subject to a time constraint and where migrants derive a greater utility than other users from searching for their region of origin.

denotes the number of regions in $o$ and $s_{od} = \Sigma_{r \in o} \frac{s_{r_o d}}{N_o}$ denotes average log searches for all regions of country $o$ in destination country $d$, aggregating (6) across regions, and assuming that $\Sigma_{r \in o} \frac{m_{r_o d} - m_{od}}{N_o} \approx k_o + k_d$, where the left hand side term is a measure of entropy of country $o$'s migrants' in terms of their sub-national origin in country $d$, it follows that:

$$s_{od} = \beta m_{od} + f_o + f_d + u_{od} \tag{7}$$

And the best linear prediction of $m_{od}$ given $s_{od}$ is:

$$m_{od} = \psi s_{od} + \kappa_o + \kappa_d + e_{od} \tag{8}$$

Although equation (8) cannot be estimated directly on GT data, as we have no information on absolute searches, we can recover an estimate of $\psi$ using between-country-of-destination variation in searches. In practice, as long as we include country of origin fixed effects, rescaling the right hand side variable for searches for the country capital performed in the numeraire country, will leave the model specification unchanged. In particular:

$$m_{od} = \psi(s_{od} - s_{r_o^* D}) + \delta_o + \delta_d + e_{od} \tag{9}$$

Second, we exploit within-country-of-origin variation to recover estimates of region of origin fixed effects (a place "popularity"). In particular, from equation (6) it follows that :

$$s_{r_o d} - s_{r_o^* d} = \beta(m_{r_o d} - m_{r_o^* d}) + f'_{r_o} + u'_{r_o d} \tag{10}$$

and

$$s_{r_o d} - s_{r_o^* d} = f'_{r_o} + f_d + u_{r_o d}, \quad M_{r_o d} = 0, M_{r_o^* d} = 0 \tag{11}$$

from which:

$$\hat{f}'_{r_o} = \Sigma_{d:M_{od}=0} \frac{s_{r_o d} - s_{r_o^* d}}{\bar{N}_{od}} \tag{12}$$

In practice, one can obtain estimates of $f'_{r_o}$ by taking averages of within-country-of-destination relative searches, $s_{r_o d} - s_{r_o^* d}$ (step 1 in the previous section), across the $\bar{N}_{od}$ countries for which $M_{od} = 0$ (and hence, a fortiori, $M_{r_o d} = M_{r_o^* d} = 0$).

With estimates of $f'_{r_o}$ and $\psi$, one finally can recover estimates of the number of migrants from region of origin $r_o$ to destination country $d$, $M_{r_o d}$. These can simply be obtained by re-apportioning migrants from country $o$ to country $d$, which one can derive from aggregate statistics, based on within-cunty-of-destination relative searches. In formulas, this is:

$$\widehat{M}_{r_o d} = \frac{exp(s_{r_o d} - s_{r_o^* d} - \hat{f}'_{r_o})^{\hat{\psi}}}{\Sigma_{r \in o} exp(s_{r_o d} - s_{r_o^* d} - \hat{f}'_{r_o})^{\hat{\psi}}} M_{od} \tag{13}$$

## A.4. Descriptive Evidence

Before presenting regression estimates of equation (2) in the text, and in order to add transparency, we report a set of correlations between log migrant stocks from each African country to each destination country, $m_{od}$, and average log searches for the origin country's regions relative to Switzerland, $s_{od}$. We plot residuals of both variables relative to country of origin fixed effects based on population-at-destination weighted regressions. Appendix Figure A.7 reports the results for Algeria, Ghana, Morocco, and Nigeria - four large migrants' donor countries, two of which francophones and two anglophones. Although regressions include all destination countries, we explicitly label observations corresponding to European countries. One can see a clear positive gradient between migrants stocks and Google searches: higher searches at destination

are associated to higher outmigration. For example, searches for regions of Algeria and Morocco are higher in France, where large migrants communities from these countries reside, than in the UK. By converse, we see higher searches for countries such as Ghana and Nigeria in the United Kingdom, a preferred destination for such migrants, relative to France. This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that GT are good proxies for migration stocks.[14]

A concern is that these estimates might be capturing common country of destination effects. This will happen if migrants disproportionately settle in countries with higher Google searches for African countries for reasons other than migration. To shed some light on this, in Appendix Figure A.8 we plot the two series across African origin countries separately for four large destination countries in Europe, namely France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Data are obtained as residuals from regressions on country of destination fixed effects and are weighted by population at origin. Again, there is a very clear positive gradient between searches and migrants stocks.[15]

[14] For completeness, Appendix Figure A.9 reports the same data, separately for each origin country in Africa. Larger dots correspond to larger countries (both in Europe and elsewhere). One can see that this relationships holds across most origin countries.

[15] For completeness, Appendix Figures A.10 to A.12 report the two series for all destination countries in the world. We report separate graphs for destination countries in Africa, Europe plus North America and Oceania, and Asia plus Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). We restrict to destination countries with population as of 2015 greater than 1 million. Again, across most destination countries, there is a very clear positive gradient between searches and Migrants' stocks.

## B. The effect of migrants' networks on outcomes at origin

In order to study the effect of shocks to Anti-immigrant sentiment on the views held by those at origin via migrants' networks, we assume that each migrant $j$ from origin region $r_o$ in country of destination $d$ successfully remits back to a subset $C_j$ of individuals in her community of origin with a "remittance coefficient" $\rho$, which measures the marginal effect of exposure to shocks among those affected at origin. If $Y_{ir_ot}$ denotes a generic outcome for individual respondent $i$ in origin region $r_o$ in year $t$, this is equivalent to assuming that:

$$Y_{ir_ot} = \rho \sum_d \sum_j M_{jr_odt} c_{ij} A_{dt} + v_{it} \tag{14}$$

where $M_{jr_odt}$ is a dummy equal to one for migrant $j$ from origin region $r_o$ residing in country $d$ at time $t$, $c_{ij}$ is dummy equal to one for migrant $j$ successfully remitting to individual $i$ at origin, and, as before, $A_{dt}$ is Anti-immigrant sentiment in destination country $d$ in year $t$, while $v_{it}$ captures individual heterogeneity. As we have no information on individuals who happen be affected by remittances, we focus on average outcomes among those at origin. Summing across all individuals at origin and dividing by origin population $Pop_{r_ot}$, this gives:

$$\sum_i \frac{Y_{ir_ot}}{Pop_{r_ot}} = \rho \; C \; \frac{\sum_d M_{r_odt} A_{dt}}{Pop_{r_ot}} + v_{r_ot} \tag{15}$$

where $M_{r_odt} = \sum_j M_{jr_odt}$, $C_j = \sum_i c_{ij}$ is the number of individuals migrant $j$ successfully remit to, $C$ is average the number of individuals migrants successfully remit to, and $v_{r_ot} = \frac{\sum_i v_{it} + \rho \sum_d \sum_j M_{jr_odt}(C_j - C) A_{dt}}{Pop_{r_ot}}$.

From (14) and (15), it follows that:

$$Y_{ir_ot} = \beta Exp_{r_ot} + \eta_{it} \tag{16}$$

where $\eta_{it} = Y_{ir_ot} - \sum_i \frac{Y_{ir_ot}}{Pop_{r_ot}}$ and

$$Exp_{r_ot} = \sum_d \frac{M_{r_odt}}{Pop_{r_ot}} \times A_{dt} \tag{17}$$

In practice, as we have have no information on migrants' stocks at different point in time ($M_{r_odt}$) and because one might be legitimately concerned that changes in such flows are endogenous to the outcome variable, in the analysis we use a measure of exposure that uses baseline migration stocks (and population) as weights, namely $Exp_{r_ot} = \sum_d \frac{M_{r_od}}{Pop_{r_o}} \times A_{dt}$.

## C. List of Variables in CHES

*GAL-TAN*: position of the party in terms of a cultural dimension with Green, Alternative, Libertarian (GAL) at one extreme and Traditionalist, Nationalist, Authoritarian (TAN) at the other extreme. 0= Green, Alternative, Libertarian (GAL)...10= Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist (TAN).

*IMMIGRATE POLICY*: position on immigration policy. 0= Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration...10= Fully favor of a restrictive policy on immigration.

*ETHNIC MINORITIES*: position towards ethnic minorities. 0= Strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities...10= Strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities.

*MULTICULTURALISM*: position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation). 0= Strongly favors multiculturalism...10= Strongly favors assimilation.

*LRGEN*: position of the party in terms of its overall ideological stance. 0= Extreme left...5= Center...10= Extreme right.

# D. List of Variables in Afrobarometer

- **Support for Democracy**
  - Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government
  - In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable
  - For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have

- **Demand for Electoral Competition**
  - Free and fair elections
    - We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections
    - Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders
  - Many parties are needed
    - Many political parties are needed to make sure that citizens have real choices in who governs them
    - Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties

- **Demand for Constraints on the Executive**
  - President bound by law
    - The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he/she thinks they are wrong
    - Since the President was elected to lead the country, he/she should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong
  - Parliament makes laws
    - Members of Parliament represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree
    - Since the President represents all of us, he/she should pass laws without worrying about what Parliament thinks
  - Term limit
    - The Constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office
    - There should be no constitutional limit on how long the president can serve

- **Demand for Media Freedom and Freedom of Association**
  - Media should be free
    - The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control
    - The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers harmful to society
  - Individuals free to join any organization
    - We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves of it
    - Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies

# Appendix Tables and Figures

**Figure A.1** Afrobarometer respondents in subnational regions of West Africa






**Figure A.2** The effect of exposure to anti-immigration sentiment via migrant networks on Afrobarometer respondents





**Notes:** The Figure reports the estimated coefficients $\beta$ with 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals from equation (4). We report the coefficients separately in four panels which correspond to the four main outcomes variables. For each outcome variable, we report the results for the three components of the PCA measure of exposure to anti-immigration sentiment in destination countries.

**Figure A.3** The effect of exposure to anti-immigration sentiment via migrant networks on Afrobarometer respondents





**Notes:** The Figure reports the estimated coefficients $\beta$ with 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals from equation (4). For each outcome we report the coefficients of the three components of the PCA measure of exposure to anti-immigration sentiment in destination countries.

**Figure A.4** Google Searches for the Term "Accra" in the UK





**Notes:** The figure reports the results of a Google Trends query for searches of the term "Accra (capital of Ghana)" performed in the UK between January 1st 2015 and December 31st 2020.

**Figure A.5** Google Searches for the Terms "Accra" and "Kumasi" in the UK





**Notes:** The figure reports the results of a Google Trends query for searches of the terms "Accra (capital of Ghana)" and "Kumasi (city in Ghana)" performed between January 1st 2015 and December 31st 2020.

**Figure A.6** Google Searches for the Term "Accra" in the UK and Switzerland





**Notes:** The figure reports the results of a Google Trends query for searches of the term "Accra (capital of Ghana)" performed in the UK and Switzerland between January 1st 2015 and December 31st 2020.

**Figure A.7** Outmigration versus Google searches across country of destination - Selected African countries of origin





**Notes:** The figure reports log migration stocks from four African countries to all destinations vis a vis average log Google searches for regions of such origin countries in all destinations. Searches are standardized relative to corresponding values for Switzerland. Data are residuals from regressions on country of destination fixed effects and are weighted by population at origin. Data refer to the year 2015.

**Figure A.8** Outmigration versus Google searches across country of origin - selected European countries of destination





**Notes:** The figure reports log migration stocks from all African countries to four European destinations vis a vis average log Google searches for regions of origin countries in such destinations. Searches are standardized relative to corresponding values for Switzerland. Data are residuals from regressions on country of origin fixed effects and are weighted by population at destination. Data refer to the year 2015.

**Figure A.9** Outmigration versus Google searches across countries of destination





**Notes:** See notes to Figure A.7. Larger dots correspond to larger countries of destination.

**Figure A.10** Outmigration versus Google searches across country of origin - Destination countries in Europe, North America and Oceania





**Notes:** See notes to Figure A.8. Larger dots correspond to larger countries of origin. Data only refer to countries of destination with population greater than one million.

**Figure A.11** Outmigration versus Google searches across country of origin - Destination countries in Africa





**Notes:** See notes to Figure A.10.

**Figure A.12** Outmigration versus Google searches across country of origin - Destination countries in Asia and Latin America





**Notes:** See notes to Figure A.10.

**Figure A.13** Sub-national Validation - Cities of Morocco




**Notes:** The figure reports log migration stocks from admin1 regions of Morocco to all destinations vis a vis average log Google searches for these regions in all destinations. Searches are standardized relative to corresponding values for Switzerland. Data are residuals from regressions on city fixed effects and country of destination fixed effects.

**Figure A.14** Sub-national Validation - Cities of Cameroon




**Notes:** The figure reports log migration stocks from admin1 regions of Cameroon to all destinations vis a vis average log Google searches for these regions in all destinations. Searches are standardized relative to corresponding values for Switzerland. Data are residuals from regressions on city fixed effects and country of destination fixed effects.

**Table A.1** Anti-immigrant Sentiment and Migrants' Outcomes at Destination - Robustness

| | Political attitudes | | | Economic Outcomes and Well-being | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Satisfied with Democracy (1) | Satisfied with Government (2) | Trust in Politics (3) | Employed (4) | Discriminated Group (5) | Satisfied with Life (6) | Satisfied with Economy (7) |
| | | | PANEL A: + Country controls X immigrant | | | | |
| Anti-Imm. × Immigrant | -0.224** | -0.188** | -0.228*** | -0.058*** | 0.031* | -0.240*** | -0.113* |
| | (0.095) | (0.081) | (0.074) | (0.021) | (0.017) | (0.059) | (0.067) |
| Observations | 222,343 | 222,634 | 222,021 | 228,769 | 228,110 | 228,510 | 224,291 |
| | | | PANEL B: + SES X Anti-immigrant Sentiment | | | | |
| Anti-Imm. × Immigrant | -0.246** | -0.230** | -0.223*** | -0.051** | 0.044** | -0.265*** | -0.139* |
| | (0.103) | (0.087) | (0.073) | (0.022) | (0.020) | (0.068) | (0.074) |
| Observations | 222,343 | 222,634 | 222,021 | 228,110 | 228,769 | 224,291 | 228,510 |

**Notes:** The Table reports similar regressions to those in Table 1. Panel A controls for the interaction of a migrant dummy with the following variables: growth rate of national GDP and the VDEM democracy index. Panel B controls for the interaction of the measure of Anti-immigrant sentiment with socio economic characteristics (age in bands (<35, 35-55, >55), gender and years of education). See also notes to Table 1.

**Table A.2** Anti-immigrant Sentiment and Migrants' Outcomes at Destination - Additional interactions

| | Political attitudes | | | Economic Outcomes and Well-being | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Satisfied with Democracy | Satisfied with Government | Trust in Politics | Employed | Discriminated Group | Satisfied with Life | Satisfied with Economy |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| | | | PANEL A: By continent of Origin | | | | |
| Anti-Imm. × Immigrant | -0.191** | -0.136** | -0.243*** | -0.063* | 0.013 | -0.173*** | -0.056 |
| | (0.083) | (0.065) | (0.088) | (0.034) | (0.021) | (0.037) | (0.062) |
| X African Immigrant | -0.015 | -0.103 | 0.301 | -0.028 | 0.043 | -0.325 | -0.029 |
| | (0.308) | (0.325) | (0.297) | (0.100) | (0.062) | (0.290) | (0.283) |
| Observations | 222,339 | 222,631 | 222,018 | 228,766 | 228,107 | 228,507 | 224,288 |
| Immigrants-Natives differential | 0.310*** | 0.297*** | 0.247*** | -0.035*** | 0.070*** | -0.028 | 0.246*** |
| | (0.024) | (0.033) | (0.033) | (0.009) | (0.013) | (0.022) | (0.049) |
| African Immigrants-Immigrants differential | 0.128*** | 0.073 | 0.120** | -0.041** | 0.115*** | -0.137*** | -0.016 |
| | (0.041) | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.026) | (0.050) |
| | | | PANEL B: By Level of Democracy at Origin | | | | |
| Anti-Imm. × Immigrant | -0.125 | -0.056 | -0.161* | 0.013 | -0.049* | -0.035 | -0.157*** |
| | (0.077) | (0.071) | (0.080) | (0.027) | (0.025) | (0.073) | (0.046) |
| X Non-Full Democracy | -0.283 | -0.254 | -0.282 | 0.080** | -0.080 | -0.152 | -0.356** |
| | (0.198) | (0.195) | (0.193) | (0.035) | (0.049) | (0.221) | (0.172) |
| Observations | 220,450 | 220,767 | 220,184 | 226,790 | 226,169 | 226,530 | 222,369 |
| Immigrants-Natives differential | 0.293*** | 0.281*** | 0.231*** | -0.025*** | 0.067*** | -0.039** | 0.237*** |
| | (0.027) | (0.038) | (0.031) | (0.007) | (0.009) | (0.017) | (0.050) |
| Non-Full-Full Democracy differential | 0.135*** | 0.113** | 0.142*** | -0.080*** | 0.094*** | -0.107*** | -0.013 |
| | (0.036) | (0.048) | (0.047) | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.024) | (0.054) |
| | | | PANEL C: By time of arrival | | | | |
| Immigrant | -0.249** | -0.204** | -0.267*** | -0.053** | 0.026* | -0.261*** | -0.121 |
| | (0.110) | (0.096) | (0.078) | (0.024) | (0.015) | (0.068) | (0.073) |
| X Recent Immigrant | -0.084 | -0.128 | 0.012 | -0.072 | 0.086 | 0.160 | -0.124 |
| | (0.107) | (0.226) | (0.106) | (0.088) | (0.058) | (0.183) | (0.149) |
| Observations | 222,361 | 222,653 | 222,038 | 228,788 | 228,129 | 228,529 | 224,310 |
| Immigrants-Natives differential | 0.304*** | 0.276*** | 0.245*** | -0.032*** | 0.096*** | -0.057*** | 0.209*** |
| | (0.022) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.007) | (0.012) | (0.016) | (0.036) |
| Recent-Previous Immigrants differential g | 0.359*** | 0.418*** | 0.320*** | -0.120*** | -0.028 | 0.015 | 0.376*** |
| | (0.039) | (0.049) | (0.039) | (0.021) | (0.031) | (0.033) | (0.084) |

**Notes:** The Table reports similar regressions to those in Table 1. Panels A, B and C include additionally the interaction between anti-immigrant sentiment and a dummy for: African migrants, migrants from countries with a Polity Index lower than 5 and migrants who arrived in the last five years, respectively. See also notes to Table 1.

**Table A.3** Country-Level Correlations between Bilateral Migration Stocks and GT Searches - Separately by Continent of Destination

| | (1) Africa | (2) Europe | (3) Asia | (4) Latin-America | (5) North-America |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GT searches | 1.720*** | 1.434*** | 1.515** | -0.195 | 0.617 |
| | (0.285) | (0.486) | (0.666) | (0.366) | (0.225) |
| Observations | 633 | 1,007 | 81 | 203 | 54 |
| Country of origin FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country of dest. FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

**Notes:** The table reports the same estimates as in column 5 of Table 2 separately by destination continent. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}$ $p < 0.05$,$^{*}$ $p < 0.1$.

**Table A.4** Country-level Correlations between Bilateral Migration Stocks and GT Searches - Robustness

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GT searches | 1.287*** | 1.187*** | 0.942*** | 0.878*** | 0.808*** | 0.781*** |
| | (0.201) | (0.206) | (0.174) | (0.157) | (0.162) | (0.154) |
| Common language | | 0.663*** | 0.782*** | 0.779*** | 0.664*** | 0.612*** |
| | | (0.245) | (0.206) | (0.188) | (0.161) | (0.200) |
| Distance | | | -0.365*** | -0.292*** | -0.296*** | -0.299*** |
| | | | (0.063) | (0.054) | (0.053) | (0.054) |
| Log Trade Volume | | | | 0.146*** | 0.142*** | 0.140*** |
| | | | | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.021) |
| Colony of destination ever | | | | | 1.504*** | 0.934** |
| | | | | | (0.238) | (0.391) |
| Colony of origin ever | | | | | 0.493 | 0.252 |
| | | | | | (0.302) | (0.254) |
| Common colonizer | | | | | | -0.379* |
| | | | | | | (0.215) |
| Common legal origin | | | | | | 0.691* |
| | | | | | | (0.362) |
| Observations | 2,062 | 2,062 | 2,062 | 2,015 | 2,015 | 2,015 |
| Country of origin FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country of dest FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

**Notes:** The table reports similar estimates to those in column 5 of Table 2 with the addition of controls. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}$ $p < 0.05$,$^{*}$ $p < 0.1$.

**Table A.5** Migration Survey and Census Data by Source

Panel A: World Bank MRS

| Country | # Regions | # Destinations | # Migrants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burkina Faso | 7 | 14 | 1704 |
| Ethiopia | 8 | 11 | 123 |
| Kenya | 8 | 35 | 1089 |
| Nigeria | 13 | 16 | 779 |
| Senegal | 11 | 24 | 1292 |
| Uganda | 44 | 18 | 381 |
| Total | 91 | 59 | 5368 |

Panel B: IPUMS1

| Country | # Regions | # Destinations | # Migrants1 (Migrants5) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Botswana | 13 | 19 | 3831 (5504) |
| Burkina Faso | 13 | 11 | 6186 |
| Cameroon | 7 | 33 | (10271) |
| Kenya | 8 | 20 | 4103 |
| Mozambique | 10 | 24 | 5686 (6215) |
| Tanzania | 22 | 12 | 2271 |
| Zambia | 8 | 16 | 4565 |
| Total | 81 | 64 | 26642 (21989) |

Panel C: IPUMS2

| Country | # Regions | # Destinations | # Migrants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Benin | 11 | 21 | 59074 |
| Cameroon | 7 | 40 | 26438 |
| Malawi | 26 | 38 | 17620 |
| Mali | 8 | 57 | 46635 |
| Morocco | 14 | 33 | 6836 |
| Rwanda | 5 | 19 | 27325 |
| Togo | 3 | 18 | 32226 |
| Uganda | 35 | 10 | 43455 |
| Total | 109 | 97 | 259698 |

Panel D: IPUMS South Africa

| Country | # Regions | # Destinations | # Migrants |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | 9 | 51 | 27842 |

Panel E: MAFE

| Country | # Regions | # Destinations | # Migrants |
|---|---|---|---|
| DR Congo | 26 | 50 | 1059 |
| Ghana | 10 | 60 | 958 |
| Senegal | 13 | 48 | 1158 |
| Total | 49 | 85 | 3175 |

Panel F: EUMAGINE

| Country | # Regions | # Destinations | # Migrants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Morocco | 3 | 17 | 1184 |
| Senegal | 4 | 36 | 865 |
| Total | 7 | 41 | 2049 |

**Table A.6** Contact with Relatives Abroad

| | EUmagine (1) | MAFE (2) |
|---|---|---|
| | Have you been in contact during the last 12 months? | |
| Yes | 94% | 96% |
| No | 6% | 4% |
| | How often have you been in contact? | |
| Every day | 5% | – |
| Every week | 28% | 33% |
| At least once a month | 77% | 71% |
| Observations | 1,452 | 4,723 |

**Notes:** The exact wording of the question is the following. EUmagine: "During the last 12 months, how often have you had contact ((spoken, written, sms) with this person [your relative abroad]"; MAFE: "How often have you or anyone else in the household been in contact with this person [your relative abroad] over the last 12 months, by phone, mail, Internet?"

**Table A.7** Relationship between Return Migration and Predicted Migration Stocks across Sub-national Regions in Africa - Robustness

| | Dependent Variable: Log IPUMS return migrants | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Any destination | Africa | Europe | Asia | Latin America | North America | Oceania |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| | | | Exclude Capital Cities | | | | |
| Log predicted migration stock | 0.240*** | 0.340*** | 0.173*** | 0.168** | 0.049* | 0.037 | -0.074 |
| | (0.045) | (0.070) | (0.045) | (0.078) | (0.028) | (0.065) | (0.045) |
| Observations | 28,340 | 10,246 | 7,630 | 6,104 | 3,488 | 436 | 436 |
| | | | Exclude Cities in Top Quartile of Population | | | | |
| Log predicted migration stock | 0.272*** | 0.399*** | 0.177*** | 0.093 | 0.123** | 0.009 | 0.031 |
| | (0.046) | (0.067) | (0.051) | (0.077) | (0.050) | (0.067) | (0.104) |
| Observations | 25,610 | 9,259 | 6,895 | 5,516 | 3,152 | 394 | 394 |

**Table A.8** Exposure to Anti-immigrant Sentiment at Destination and Support for Democracy at Origin - Robustness

| | | Demand for Democratic Institutions | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Support for Democracy | Electoral Competition | Constraints on the Executive | Media Freedom and Freedom of Association |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Panel A: Additional Shocks at Destination | | | |
| Exposure to Anti-imm. | -3.616*** | -2.349** | -4.310*** | -1.089 |
| | (0.922) | (1.019) | (1.122) | (1.156) |
| | Panel B: Alternative Definition of Anti-Immigrant Shock: Policies | | | |
| Exposure to Anti-imm. | -0.196** | -0.060 | -0.361** | -0.286** |
| | (0.085) | (0.175) | (0.154) | (0.140) |
| Observations | 210,851 | 219,159 | 187,827 | 217,326 |

**Table A.9** Exposure to Anti-immigrant Sentiment at Destination and Support for Democracy at Origin: Heterogeneous Effects by Individual and Regional Characteristics

| | Individual Characteristics | | | | | Regional Characteristics | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Old | Low Educ. | Uncov. 3G | Gender | Rural | Low Pop. | Low Nightlights |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Anti Imm. shock | -0.710* | -0.703* | -1.134** | -0.748** | -0.798** | -0.919** | -1.213*** |
| | (0.371) | (0.380) | (0.535) | (0.352) | (0.383) | (0.343) | (0.421) |
| Anti Imm. shock X trait | -0.279* | -0.331*** | -0.714* | -0.102 | -0.298 | -4.120* | -11.117** |
| | (0.155) | (0.124) | (0.420) | (0.166) | (0.182) | (2.065) | (5.371) |
| Observations | 210,851 | 210,851 | 209,899 | 210,851 | 194,756 | 210,851 | 210,851 |

**Table A.10** Exposure to Anti-immigrant Sentiment at Destination and Political Implications at Origin - Democracies

| | Political Attitudes | | | Voting Preferences | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Trust Parliament | Trust President | Trust Ruling Party | Incumbent | Low Democratic Parties | Moderately Democratic Parties | Highly Democratic Parties |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Anti Imm. shock | -0.014 | 0.688 | 1.567** | -0.064 | -0.673 | 0.904 | -0.236 |
| | (0.640) | (0.659) | (0.719) | (0.857) | (0.703) | (0.618) | (0.582) |
| Observations | 114,442 | 117,595 | 116,526 | 98,250 | 94,058 | 94,058 | 94,058 |