Firm Premia in Pay vs. Amenities

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Abstract

This paper develops a new approach to measuring non-wage amenities and compensating differentials in the labor market. Using a survey of 20,000 job movers in Denmark, we elicit workers' reservation wage to return to their previous job. Our sample contains a large, connected network of firms, enabling us to estimate firm-wide premia and match effects in amenities. Overall, higher-paying firms provide slightly worse non-pay amenities. Although they provide better perks and flexibility, they also come with higher layoff risk, faster work pace, and greater stress. On average, moves to jobs offering 10% higher pay involve a 5% reduction in the value of amenities, with 0.7% attributable to firm-wide tradeoffs and the remainder attributable to match effects. Using a standard search model, we quantify the role of amenities in labor market inequality while accounting for endogenous mobility. While firms in the top wage decile pay 16% more than those in the bottom decile, the difference in total utility remains substantial at 12% of wages, reflecting that most amenity-wage tradeoffs are idiosyncratic.

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A long-standing body of research documents that some firms tend to pay higher wages to equivalent workers. The most recent chapter in this literature studies two-way fixed effect models, introduced by Abowd et al. (1999), that measure systematic differences in the average wage changes of movers between firms. These methods have now been applied to administrative datasets from around the world. A common finding in such "AKM" studies is that firm effects are important contributors to inequality, often explaining 20% or more of cross-sectional earnings variance, as well as changes in inequality over time (see Card et al. (2018), Bonhomme et al. (2023), and Kline (2024) for recent reviews).

While firm effects are an established empirical phenomenon, their interpretation remains controversial. Since at least the work of Adam Smith, economists have recognized that some wage differences between firms may persist in competitive markets as compensation for unpleasant working conditions. On the other hand, firm effects may also emerge due imperfect labor market competition that allows, for example, productivity differences between firms to seep into wages. Understanding the source of firm effects is crucial for drawing conclusions about inequality in the labor market, the strength of competition for workers, the suitability of various economic models, and the attractiveness of important policies.[1]

Analyzing the relationship between firm effects and working conditions is challenging because most datasets contain little information on anything besides pay. As a result, much recent work has relied on revealed preference arguments based on firm size or worker flows to study non-pay characteristics of jobs (e.g., Taber and Vejlin (2020); Sorkin (2018); Lamadon et al. (2022); Lehmann (2023)). Amenities in these approaches are structural residuals that explain why some firms are larger or poach more workers from others given an assumed labor supply model. As a result, their identification rests on the underlying structural assumptions about worker preferences and search. Related work, meanwhile, has relied on choices over interview opportunities or hypothetical offers to estimate firms' relative appeal to prospective workers (Roussille and Scuderi, 2023; Caldwell et al., 2024b).

This paper develops a different approach to studying amenities. We fielded a survey of roughly 20,000 workers who recently changed jobs in Denmark. Our survey asked workers about specific amenities, including flexibility, job security, perks and benefits, and stress and respect. To measure the total amenity difference between jobs, we ask respondents to provide a reservation wage to return to their previous job both for themselves and for a typical worker with their skills. By design, nearly all the firms in our survey sample are

[1] Katz et al. (1989), analyzing evidence of industry-level wage differentials for equivalent workers, argued: "We believe wage differentials should be one of the factors considered in the design of sectoral policies." If firm effects primarily reflect compensating differentials, however, then high-wage firms are not necessarily any better or worse than low-wage firms.

connected by movers, allowing us to estimate AKM-like specifications that recover firm and match effects in non-pay amenities. We then link responses back to the universe of employer-employee administrative data and relate amenities to firm characteristics, including AKM pay premia.

We analyze the survey using a simple framework in which the utility workers receive from a job is additive in wages and amenities, each of which contains a common firm-level component and an idiosyncratic match effect. We treat the reported reservation wage for a *typical* worker—the minimum wage change at which a respondent would recommend their old over their current job to a worker with the same skills—as a noisy estimate of the difference in the firm-level components of amenities. We then estimate these differences using two-way fixed effect models. Match effects are revealed by the gap between workers' *own* reservation wages and firm-level components. Because reported reservation wages may be infected by status-quo bias that makes workers unwilling to change jobs at all (Caldwell et al., 2024b), our analysis incorporates switching costs that can depend on worker observables.

Estimated firm-level amenities show intuitive patterns. They are highest in sectors known to be family-friendly and flexible, such as the public and education sectors, and lowest in industries such as accommodation and food services and waste and water management. Relating firm-level amenities to worker responses about specific job characteristics shows that high-amenity firms tend to offer more job flexibility and security, benefits and perks, and respect and sense of purpose on the job. Consistent with the AKM framework used to estimate them, moves up and down the firm amenity ladder offer equal and opposite changes for a typical worker. Estimated amenities are also correlated—although imperfectly—with revealed preference measures of firm desirability, such as log size or PageRank (Sorkin, 2018) valuations.

Firm amenity effects are negatively correlated with firm wage effects. A simple regression of firm amenity effects on firm wage effects estimated in our survey sample yields a slope of -0.16, implying moving to a firm with a 10% higher wage policy yields 8.4% higher utility, all else equal. Because firm effects are imprecisely estimated, this slope may be highly attenuated. Since reservation wages were elicited relative to workers' *current* pay, sampling error in estimated firm wage and amenity effects may also be negatively correlated.[2] To account for both these issues, we instrument for firm wage effects with split-sample estimates constructed using the full Danish population excluding our survey sample. Remarkably, the two-stage

[2]Intuitively, a mover who experiences a larger than usual wage change will tend to increase the estimate of the destination firm's wage effect but also require a smaller pay differential as compensation for any amenity differences between firms.

least squares slope is also -0.16, suggesting the two sources of bias roughly cancel.

Survey questions on specific amenities help unpack the negative correlation between firm wage and amenity effects. Workers report more having more flexibility, better perks, and less physical jobs at high-wage firms, consistent with some prior evidence (Caldwell et al., 2024b; Sockin, 2022). Implied willingness-to-pay for amenities such as schedule flexibility are comparable to recent estimates from hypothetical discrete choice experiments (Maestas et al., 2023). However, workers switching to higher wage firms also report higher layoff risk, more stress, and lower social impact. For a typical worker, the net effect of this package of amenities serves to make the non-pay characteristics of jobs at high-wage firms slightly less valuable, although not nearly enough to fully offset the benefits of higher pay.

Some of these patterns reflect the strong industry components of amenities. Public and education sector jobs, for example, tend to be relatively low wage. Waste and water management tends to be higher wage on average. Some sectors such as accommodation and food services tend to both low wage and low amenity. As a result, the between-industry relationship between wage and amenity effects is not significantly different from the pooled relationship. Likewise, when examining job movers between the same pairs of industries, we find that within-industry shifts in wage effects are associated with comparable changes in amenities.

Even if high-wage firms offer slightly worse amenities for the typical worker, the workers who chose those jobs may have a particular taste for the amenities they offer. For example, workers who choose high-wage firms may be more comfortable with—or even thrive in—the faster work pace at these workplaces. We find little support for this hypothesis. Using the reservation wages workers report for themselves, we find that a 10% increase in firm wage effects is associated with a 2% decrease in total amenities (i.e., common amenities plus match effects), an estimate indistinguishable from the tradeoff between wage effects and common, firm-level amenities. High-wage firms therefore do not seem to attract movers with particularly strong match effects in amenities.

Match effects in wages, however, are strongly associated with match effects in amenities. For example, workers with a strong preference for a particular firm are more likely to accept lower wages to work there. Regressing changes in total amenity valuations on reported total changes in wages and instrumenting the latter with analogous measures from the administrative data, we find a slope of -0.52, suggesting that roughly half of pay changes translate into increases in utility. Interestingly, the same relationship persists among movers to the same firm and even within the same pair of origin-destination firms. The majority of compensat-

ing differentials experienced by job movers thus reflects correlations between idiosyncratic amenity valuations and wages, a channel commonly restricted in theoretical approaches (e.g., Lamadon et al., 2022). These correlations could arise through bargaining (Caldwell et al., 2024a) or, as we pursue below, through search and endogenous mobility.

We conduct a host of robustness checks to probe the sensitivity of our results, including varying the weights used, how the sample is selected, and the instruments employed. One concern is that some job changers experience major upheavals—the birth of a child, a long-distance move, or a divorce, for example—that substantially alter their preferences or constraints. Such movers may experience weaker compensating differentials because the type of job they are seeking changes. Looking at jobs switchers who do not change addresses or change the family situation in any way (the vast majority of our sample), however, we find nearly identical results.

Several worker characteristics do reveal substantial heterogeneity, however. Men experience significantly larger compensating differentials than women, as well as older workers vs. younger ones. In addition, voluntary job-to-job switchers show some of the strongest evidence of compensating differentials, with a 10% wage gain offset by a 6.1% decrease in amenities. By contrast, involuntary movers experience trade-offs roughly half as strong. This suggests that the patterns we document may reflect workers searching for jobs offering with heterogeneous wage and amenities. When workers' outside option is to remain at their current job, optimization naturally leads to stronger negative correlations between wage and amenity changes conditional on moving being worthwhile. Voluntary movers who experience a relatively small wage change, for example, must be benefiting from larger increases in amenities. When searching from unemployment, however, changes primarily reflect draws from the distribution of potential job offers.

We conclude by fitting a simple model of search that captures these forces, allowing us to examine how endogenous mobility affects our estimates and extrapolate to the utility of job stayers not in our survey. In particular, if workers switch jobs based on their idiosyncratic wages and preferences, our evidence from job movers may not directly apply to those who choose to stay. Workers in the model search on- and off-the-job for work that provides utility through a combination of firm-level components and match effects in wages and amenities. The model replicates many of our core empirical findings, including the relationship between firm wage and amenity effects. Although mobility in the model is endogenous, we also find that estimating firm wage effects in data simulated from the model provides nearly unbiased estimates of firm wage components. Using the model, we can provide a complete decomposition of the differences in utility across the firm wage effect distribution. Although

firms with wage effects in the 90th percentile offer 16% higher wages than firms in the 10th percentile, the difference in utility is equivalent to a 12% increase in wages.

This paper contributes to a long-standing literature on compensating differentials in the labor market (Rosen, 1986). Traditional approaches to this topic relied on cross-sectional "hedonic" regressions of wages on job characteristics. Estimates using this strategy are frequently small or have counter-intuitive signs due to difficulties in defining choice sets, controlling for unobservables, accounting for labor market frictions, and other challenges (Thaler and Rosen, 1976; Brown, 1980; Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009). To make progress, recent work has attempted to measure willingness-to-pay for specific amenities using revealed- and stated-preference experiments, often based on hypothetical jobs (Wiswall and Zafar, 2018; Drake et al., 2022; Maestas et al., 2023). While a long-standing literature debates the reliability of stated-preference elicitation (e.g., Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Hausman, 2012), some work finds close alignment between stated- and revealed-preference experiments in the labor market (Mas and Pallais, 2017). Unlike traditional conjoint analyses where some features of options may be left unspecified (Manski et al., 2000), we use a complementary approach that estimates workers' valuations of the complete bundle of amenities in two real-world alternatives familiar to the worker. While we apply these methods to the labor market, the same techniques could be used to study housing, healthcare, education, or other sectors where market participants make repeated choices.

Our analysis also contributes to the growing literature on the role of firms in labor market inequality. Particularly related are a series of recent papers using revealed preference approaches and administrative data to estimate firm-level amenities and study their implications for earnings inequality (Taber and Vejlin, 2020; Sorkin, 2018; Lamadon et al., 2022; Lehmann, 2023; Lachowska et al., 2023; Lagos, 2024; Morchio and Moser, 2024). These approaches typically find weak or positive correlations between firm wage effects and amenities. As noted above, our approach differs in that we estimate amenities without assumptions about how workers are allocated to firms. Although our estimated firm-level amenities are positively correlated with many revealed preference measures, we also find several puzzling correlations between job characteristics and those measures, such as a positive relationship between revealed preference amenities and job physicality and inflexibility.

Most related are several recent papers that attempt to directly estimate amenities and connect them to pay. Roussille and Scuderi (2023) use data from an online job board for software engineers to estimate heterogeneous worker preferences over job opportunities. They find positive correlations between firm pay and non-wage amenities estimated using worker interview choices. Caldwell et al. (2024b) survey roughly 14,000 German workers about their

perceptions of pay and amenities among 30 large publicly traded or family-owned firms. They find that workers think high-wage firms offer the same or better amenities ("e.g., home office, childcare subsidy") as low-wage firms. They also find that amenities estimated as residuals in a choice experiment over hypothetical offers are positively correlated with wage effects. Finally, Sockin (2022) uses voluntarily provided pay and employer reviews data from Glassdoor and finds that higher-paying firms are associated with higher overall job satisfaction.

A key feature of our approach is that we ask workers about specific jobs they know well rather than their beliefs about other opportunities. Ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of amenities may differ, especially if workers have incomplete information about outside options (Jäger et al., 2024). Choices over potential interviews or offers may reflect these ex-ante beliefs as well as strategic considerations. Indeed, many job attributes easily gleaned from an advertisement or interview interaction, such as workplace perks and the office environment, are positively correlated with firm wage effects in our data. Factors that may only become clear once a worker has spent time in a job, such as job security and social impact, tend to be negatively correlated with premia. While firm characteristics that explain workers' interview and offer choices are potentially most relevant for search, we seek to understand what affects realized utility on the job. Relative to past work, we also study a larger sample of more than 7,000 both public and private firms from across the size distribution rather than a specific sector or major, widely-known firms, and provide a simple framework for distinguishing between common and idiosyncratic valuations of the amenities they offer.

1 Data and institutions

Denmark offers a unique setting for measuring non-wage amenities in the labor market. Every Dane has a digital mailbox that we use to distribute our survey. We are able to link the survey to the administrative data at Statistics Denmark, which offers two important advantages. First, we can target our survey invitations to individuals who have recently moved within a large, connected set of firms. Second, we can link the survey responses back to the matched employer-employee data with recorded earnings and hours, which forms the basis of much existing research.[3]

[3] Bertheau and Hoeck (2023) exploit the same data infrastructure to survey Danish firms about their beliefs about the wage distribution.

1.1 Survey outline

Our survey is organized into four blocks summarized below. The full questionnaire is available in Appendix E.

Block 1: Facts about current and previous job. After confirming that they have changed jobs within the past three years, survey participants report the end date of their previous job and the start date of their current one. They are then asked to provide details about the hours and pay of both their current and previous jobs. Finally, workers specify the reason for their job move.

Block 2: Job amenities. Workers evaluate their current and previous jobs based on a range of non-wage amenities, including job flexibility, benefits, work environment, and type of work; see Box 1 for an overview. Our formulation of these non-wage amenity measures closely follows the RAND American Working Conditions Survey (Maestas et al., 2023).

Box 1: Battery of Job Amenities

Flexibility	**Benefits**	**Work environment**	**Type of work**
• Hours of work per day	• Pension benefits	• Physical work env.	• Interesting work
• Days of work per year	• Paid leave	• Collegial support	• Demanding work
• Job flexibility	• Fringe benefits	• Relationship to boss	• Responsibility
• Commute time	• Promotions/bonuses	• Respect	• Further education

Block 3: Evaluation of jobs. Workers report their reservation wages for choosing their previous jobs over their current ones. We use two versions of this question, asking workers to either return to or remain in their prior jobs, with survey participants randomized into one of these formulations; see Box 2. Additionally, we ask workers for the wage that would make them recommend their prior job over their current one to a typical worker with their same skills (Box 3).

Box 2: Own Reservation Wage

Now imagine that you [could get your previous job back as it was before you left it / were still employed in your previous job and had the opportunity to switch to your current job]. Everything else in your life was otherwise as it is today, i.e., family situation, place of residence, etc.

Try to disregard one-off costs or difficulties of changing jobs, such as changing workplaces, learning new work procedures, etc.

What is the lowest salary that would make you willing to [take your previous job back / stay in your previous job and not switch to your current job]?

I would [take back / stay in] my previous job ...

☐ even if the pay was more than 20% lower than my current pay
☐ even if the pay was 10-20% lower than my current pay
☐ even if the pay was 1-10% lower than my current pay
☐ if the pay was similar to my current pay
☐ if the pay was 1-10% higher than my current pay
☐ if the pay was 10-20% higher than my current pay
☐ if the pay was more than 20% higher than my current pay

Follow-up question: *You stated you would be willing to [take back / stay in] your previous job (even) if the pay was $x_1 - x_2$% higher (lower) than your current pay. What is the minimum pay increase (decrease) in that interval you would require (accept)?*

☐%

Box 3: Reservation Wage for Typical Worker

Think of a typical person with the same skills as you. Imagine that you had to advise the person to choose between your previous or current job. Assume the person is qualified for both positions.

What is the lowest salary that would make you recommend your previous job?

I would recommend my previous job over my current job ...

☐ even if the pay was more than 20% lower than my current pay
☐ even if the pay was 10-20% lower than my current pay
☐ even if the pay was 1-10% lower than my current pay
☐ if the pay was similar to my current pay
☐ if the pay was 1-10% higher than my current pay
☐ if the pay was 10-20% higher than my current pay
☐ if the pay was more than 20% higher than my current pay

Follow-up question: *You stated you would recommend your previous job (even) if the pay was $x_1 - x_2$% higher (lower) than your current pay. What is the minimum pay increase (decrease) in that interval that would make you recommend your previous job?*

☐%

Block 4: Plans for future job moves. Finally, workers indicate whether they are actively looking for a new job and how long they expect to stay in their current job.

1.2 Survey sampling

We invited 100,044 individuals to participate in our survey from May to June 2024. Our survey population consists of wage earners who had moved jobs in the last three years; see Appendix A.1 for details.

To ensure that our survey respondents moved between a connected set of firms, we used a "snowball" sampling method. This approach begins with a randomly selected firm and expands through the networks of firms and workers, randomly sampling edges of movers connected to the previously selected firm. Appendix A.1.1 provides a detailed description of the algorithm. Importantly, because the sampling mechanism is known, we can restore the representativeness of our sample by simulating sampling probability weights and reweighting our survey data accordingly. We present most of our analysis without weights, however, since in practice the large firms that contribute the most to cross-sectional earnings patterns are also more likely to be present in our sample.

The survey invitation letter is in Appendix D. We sent three reminders, two by e-mail and one by text. Our survey received complete responses from 26,265 job movers. Appendix A.2 describes our response rates in detail.

1.3 Register data and linking

Our matched employer-employee data come from the *E-Income Register,* which records earnings, hours, occupation, and industry for all job spells in Denmark on a monthly basis from 2008 onward. This register is compiled by the Danish tax authorities and subsequently harmonized by Statistics Denmark into the *Employment Statistics of Employees* (BFL) dataset. The most recent data available when we drew our sample was from February 2024. We complement this with demographics data on individuals from the *Population Register* (BEF). We compute wages in this data as monthly earnings divided by monthly hours.

Because our survey was sent to workers identified in the register data by their (deidentified) social security numbers (*pnr*), 100% of respondents are able to be matched to the register data. To match survey responses about specific jobs to the corresponding spells in the registers, we use the reported start and end dates. Figure A.4 shows a close alignment between these dates and the dates their primary employers change in the administrative data. Using a one-month buffer around reported start and end dates, we can identify both

the new and previous jobs in the administrative data for about 80% of survey respondents. Many of the respondents for whom we cannot identify both jobs appear to have changed jobs after our register data ends. We will be able to incorporate these workers future drafts.

1.4 Labor market institutions in Denmark

Denmark's labor market is characterized by a "flexicurity" model that combines flexible hiring and firing rules (similar to the US, cf. Botero et al. (2004)) with generous government support for displaced workers. Health care and education are publicly funded through progressive taxes ranging from 40% to 55%. Furthermore, Denmark has relatively generous parental leave policies and subsidized childcare (Kreiner and Svarer, 2022).

Collective bargaining agreements cover 84% of the labor market and set minimum standards across industries for wages, working hours, pension contributions, holidays and leave policies, termination rules, skill development, and workplace conditions (Dansk Industri, 2024). Employers retain significant flexibility to offer terms exceeding these minimums, especially in the private sector, where most jobs pay above stipulated rates (Dahl et al., 2013). Agreements also allow for firm-level negotiation, often involving union representatives. Union membership stands at 66%, with participation higher in the public sector and traditional industries like manufacturing and construction (Kreiner and Svarer, 2022). Finally, individual negotiations enable workers, especially in high-skilled roles, to secure personalized terms.

2 Sample and summary statistics

In total, we successfully link survey responses to the relevant administrative records for 19,211 workers across 7,088 firms. These responses form our primary analysis dataset. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for workers and firms included in this sample, as well as for all workers, the universe of job movers, and workers invited to respond to the survey. The table presents means of key labor market and demographic outcomes at the worker-month, worker-, and firm-level. Earnings information is converted to USD at an exchange rate of 0.14 USD/DKK and inflated to 2023 equivalents using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

The analysis sample is subject to two levels of potential selection. First, our "snowball" sampling methodology may not produce a representative sample of job movers (Table 1, Columns 3-4 vs. 5-6 capture this difference). However, because the sampling mechanism is known, we can address this issue by simulating sampling probabilities and reweighting

the data. Second, survey respondents may comprise a selected subset of those invited to participate (Table 1, Columns 5-6 vs. 7-8 capture this difference). As Table 1 shows, our analysis sample closely mirrors the survey population in terms of observable characteristics, though respondents in the analysis sample earn slightly higher incomes and are more likely to be female. Importantly, we demonstrate that the main findings remain robust when reweighting the analysis sample to account for sampling probabilities.[4]

The sample distribution of reservation wage responses is reported in Figure 1. On average, workers report requiring a 27% increase in pay to make them indifferent between their current and old jobs, with a median response of 22%.[5] Nearly 15% of workers report being willing to switch for no pay change, however, and 9% report being willing to take a pay cut to return to their prior job. Reservation wages for a typical worker are generally lower than what workers report for themselves. The mean response is 15% increase in pay, for example, with nearly 25% of respondents reporting that a typical worker would be indifferent between the two alternatives at the current level of pay. That workers' own reservation wages are typically higher than what they imagine for a typical worker suggests they recognize that their jobs are likely better for them than for the average person. Workers often report values that imply the opposite, however—roughly 20% of responses show the worker would need *less* additional compensation to change jobs than they recommend for a typical worker.

Figure A.6 shows how reservation wages correlate with workers' answers to survey questions about specific amenities.[6] Because reservation wage questions are about a pair of jobs, this figure compares them to the reported change in amenities due to the move. Most correlations have intuitive signs for both own and typical worker reservation wages. Own reservation wages are higher for moves that involve decreases in commutes, increases in flexibility, better perks and benefits, and increases in social impact and support and respect from colleagues and supervisors. Many of these relationships persist in a multivariate regression of reservation wages onto all amenities simultaneously, although the partial effects of task interest, social impact, family friendliness, support and respect, and stress stand out.

[4]Reweighted summary statistics presented in Table A.2 show that, as expected, correcting for sampling probability is sufficient to match the survey invite population to the population of movers from which they were drawn. Even after reweighting, however, survey respondents tend to be more female, have higher income, and work at larger firms due to differential survey response.

[5]We winsorize responses at +/− 100% to account for extreme response. Roughly 9% of own reservation wage and 5% typical worker reservation wage responses are affected.

[6]Summary statistics for these questions are available in Table A.3. The specific amenity questions typically elicited ordinal information (see Appendix E), an issue we ignore throughout the paper by cardinalizing responses (e.g., 1 = "Very good," 2 = "Good," etc.). An alternative approach would be to estimate ordered models that predict amenity responses as a function of reservation wages and other predictors, although doing so would require addressing measurement error in these variables.

2.1 Response quality

The link to administrative registers offers an opportunity to validate our survey responses. Specifically, our survey asked workers about changes in pay and hours—quantities that are also recorded in the register data. Figure B.1 shows a strong correlation between these measures. The relationship between pay changes recorded in the registers and those reported in the survey yields a slope of 0.80, with an R^2 of 0.315 (Panel (a)). Similarly, recorded and reported hours are closely aligned, with a slope of 0.91 and an R^2 of 0.58, up to the apparent top-coding point of 37 hours per week in the registers.

Before utilizing the reservation wage elicitations for analysis, we assess their ability to predict job search behavior. Table B.1 presents a regression of a dummy variable for whether workers are actively searching for new work on their reported pay changes and reservation wages. A 100% increase in a worker's willingness to pay for their current job reduces the probability of job search by 16 p.p. Reassuringly, pay and reservation wages exhibit similar and independent effects on job search. Finally, in a "horse race" between the two reservation wages, we find that job search decisions load onto the individual reservation wage rather than the typical worker's. These results suggest that respondents understood the distinction between the reservation wage questions and provided internally consistent responses.

Finally, as an internal consistency check of our preference elicitations, Figure B.2 shows that workers who report greater improvements in the ideality of their current jobs compared to their prior jobs also report higher reservation wages for returning to (or keeping) their prior jobs.

3 Measurement framework

3.1 Basic setup

We consider a simple framework where the utility worker i enjoys from working at firm j is additive in wages and amenities. Wages include a component specific to the worker's skill, a firm-level effect, and a match effect. Amenities also include a firm-level component and a match effect.

$$U_{ij} = \underbrace{s_i + w_j + \tilde{w}_{ij}}_{\textit{log wage}} + \underbrace{a_j + \tilde{a}_{ij}}_{\textit{log amenities}}$$

Wages are measured in logs and amenities in log wage equivalents, so that differences in utility across jobs can be interpreted as approximate percent changes in compensation. The

common components w_j and a_j capture the wages and amenities the average worker would experience if assigned to firm j. Match effects reflect idiosyncratic deviations from these averages. The skill component of wages s_i is assumed to portable across firms, as is standard in AKM approaches.

Own reservation wage: We model workers' own reservation wage as the quantity δ_{ijk} that, for a mover from firm j to k, satisfies:

$$\underbrace{U_{ik}}_{\textit{utility in new job}} = \underbrace{U_{ij}}_{\textit{utility in old job}} + \underbrace{(w_k + \tilde{w}_{ik}) - (w_j + \tilde{w}_{ij})}_{\textit{pay change}} + \delta_{ijk}$$

That is, δ is the additional compensation required to make utility the same in the worker's old and new job net of their pay change. Some simple algebra reveals that δ captures the total amenity difference between the two alternatives, including both common components and match effects:

$$\delta_{ijk} = \underbrace{(a_k + \tilde{a}_{ik}) - (a_j + \tilde{a}_{ij})}_{\text{total amenity difference}}$$

Intuitively, a worker with $\delta = 0$ is willing to go back to their old job at their current level of pay. This implies the worker is indifferent between the two jobs holding pay fixed. A worker with $\delta > 0$ requires additional compensation to return to their old job, which implies that their old job must offer less attractive amenities than their current job. Likewise, workers with $\delta < 0$ are willing to take a pay cut to go back to their prior job, implying it must offer more attractive amenities.

Typical worker reservation wage: The typical worker's reservation wage is defined as the quantity δ^c_{jk} that satisfies:

$$\underbrace{U_{ik}}_{\textit{utility in new job}} - \underbrace{(\tilde{a}_{ik} - \tilde{a}_{ij})}_{\textit{idiosyncratic amenities}} = \underbrace{U_{ij}}_{\textit{utility in old job}} + \underbrace{(w_k + \tilde{w}_{ik}) - (w_j + \tilde{w}_{ij})}_{\textit{pay change}} + \delta^c_{jk}$$

That is, δ^c is the quantity that equalizes utility between the two jobs after adjusting for both pay changes and the worker's amenity match effects $\{\tilde{a}_{ij}, \tilde{a}_{ik}\}$.

Rearranging this expression shows that:

$$\delta^c_{jk} = \underbrace{a_k - a_j}_{\textit{common amenity difference}}$$

3.2 Measurement

To facilitate taking this framework to the data, we introduce several additional features that capture aspects of measurement. First, we assume that workers' responses may bake-in a fixed status-quo bias c that inflates responses to reservation wage questions. This bias measures the compensation required for a worker to change jobs regardless of the alternatives considered. Secondly, we assume that survey responses include additional noise u that reflects inattention, misunderstanding, or any other source of variation that may lead the same respondent to answer the same question differently if the survey could be re-administered. Finally, we assume that workers may not be fully informed about how the average worker would view their current and previous jobs alternatives or may have different mental models for who a typical worker may be. As a result, different movers between the same firm pair may provide systematically different answers about the typical worker's reservation wage.

Specifically, we assume that worker's own reservation wage reports, Y_{ijk}, satisfy:

$$Y_{ijk} = \delta_{ijk} + c(X_i) + u_{ijk} \tag{1}$$

where $c(X)$ represents status-quo bias for a worker with observables X and u is the additional survey noise.

We assume responses to the typical worker's reservation wage question, Y^c_{ijk}, satisfy:

$$Y^c_{ijk} = \delta^c_{jk} + c(X_i) + e_{ijk} + \ u^c_{ijk} \tag{2}$$

where $e_{ijk} = (\hat{\tilde{a}}_{ij} - \tilde{a}_{ij}) - (\hat{\tilde{a}}_{ik} - \tilde{a}_{ik})$ is error in the worker's guess about the idiosyncratic components of their own amenity valuations and u^c represent survey noise.

We restrict survey noise to be mean zero but leave its correlation structure unrestricted:

Assumption 1 (Survey noise) *Survey errors for reservation wage questions ($\{u_{ijk}, u^c_{ijk}\}$) are mean zero and have finite variance and unrestricted correlation.*

Although we focus on reservation wage questions in this section, we assume that other survey responses (i.e., for changes in pay) have an analogous noise component which may also be correlated with both u_{ijk} and u^c_{ijk}.

Finally, we make one important assumption about e_{ijk}:

Assumption 2 (Unbiased and informed forecasts) *On average, workers' assessments of a typical worker's reservation wage are unbiased and informative: $E[e_{ijk}|i \text{ moves } j \rightarrow$*

$k] = 0 \ \forall \ j, k$ *and* $E[e_{ijk}^2 | i \text{ moves } j \to k] < \infty \ \forall \ j, k$.

The first component of Assumption 2 requires movers' estimates of how a typical worker would view jobs j and k to be unbiased. It would be violated if, for example, men and women systematically differed in their estimate of the typical worker's reservation wage and the gender composition of movers differs across firm pairs. The second component requires there to be some information in these estimates. Both enable us to identify and consistently estimate firm amenity effects using the AKM framework described in the next subsection. We discuss tests of Assumption 2 after presenting the primary estimates further below.

3.3 Estimation

We begin by estimating the common firm amenity effects using data on δ_{ijk}^c. We do so by finding the set of firm effects $\{\hat{a}_j\}_{j=1}^J$ and status-quo effects $\hat{c}$ that solve:

$$\min_{\{\hat{a}_j\}_{j=1}^J, \hat{c}} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\delta_{ijk}^c - \hat{a}_k + \hat{a}_j - \hat{c}(X_i))^2 \tag{3}$$

In practice, numerically identical estimates can be obtained by estimating a simple two-way fixed effect model after converting our survey responses into a panel with two observations per worker.[7] This equivalence also allows us to make use of existing tools for obtaining bias-corrected estimates of the variance of firm effects (e.g., Kline et al., 2020).

Status-quo effects are allowed to depend on worker's sex, education (binary indicator for having a BA or higher) and birth year (pre vs. post 1980). The average $\hat{c}$ is roughly 16% for men and 12% for women.

We use the same approach to estimate firm wage effects in our survey sample. That is, we find the set of firm effects $\{\hat{w}_j\}_{j=1}^J$ that minimize Equation 3 replacing δ_{ijk}^c with the wage change (pay divided by hours) experienced by worker i when moving from firm j to firm k. We consider using the wage change reported in the survey as well as the change recorded in the administrative data.

Estimating both firm and amenity effects requires sub-setting to a connected set of firms.

[7] Specifically, we estimate:

$$\delta_{ijk}^c 1\{t = 2\} = \gamma_i + a_{m(i,t)} + c(X_i) \cdot 1\{t = 2\} + \xi_{it}$$

where each respondent i is assigned to their old firm in period one and their new firm in period two and $m(i, t)$ indexes firm assignments. Taking the first difference shows why the two approaches produce identical estimates.

The largest connected set in our survey sample includes 7,017 firms (99% of all firms in the analysis sample) and 19,167 workers (99% of all workers in the analysis sample). In some exercises we also use the largest leave-worker-out connected set, which effectively prunes a large number of firms connected by a single mover and contains 2,584 firms (36%) and 19,109 workers (99%) in total.

Finally, it is possible to directly estimate changes in match effects by subtracting off the relevant common components and any status-quo bias:

$$\widehat{\tilde{a}_{ik} - \tilde{a}_{ij}} = \delta_{ijk} - (\hat{a}_k - \hat{a}_j) - \hat{c}(X_i)$$

In most of our analysis, however, we examine either common amenities (i.e., a_j) or total amenities (i.e., $a_j + \tilde{a}_{ij}$), obviating the need to deal with estimated match effects directly.

3.4 Out-of-sample estimates

To account for both survey noise (e.g., u_{ijk}) and estimation error (e.g., in $\hat{w}_j$), it is useful to have independent measurements of several objects. We use wages changes recorded in the register data as an independent measurement of wage changes reported in the survey. These wage changes are computed as the change in median log hourly wage over the last and first six months of the old and new job, respectively, excluding the last month of the old job and the first month of the new job. We also estimate firm effects $\{\hat{w}_j^{-s}\}_{j=1}^J$ using wage data for the full population of firm and workers in Denmark excluding the survey sample (hence the $-s$ superscript). These estimates are available for all 7,088 firms in the survey sample save one not present in the population-based connected set. We impute a firm effect for this firm using the average in its one-digit industry.

4 Firm wage and amenity effects

We begin by estimating firm wage and amenity effects using the framework developed in Section 3. The basic results are presented in Table 2. This table reports the variance of firm effect estimates for wages and amenities in the largest connected set in the survey sample and the largest leave-worker-out connected sample. The table also reports bias-corrected variance estimates valid under homoscedasticity and under heteroscedasticity (in the leave-out samples), as well as correlations between wage effects estimated using survey responses vs. administrative data. For readability, the underlying outcome data (e.g., for log wages)

is scaled by 100, so that variances are scaled by 100^2.

Firm effects in wages vary considerably regardless of whether they are estimated using the survey responses or administrative data. The standard deviation in effects corresponds to a roughly 7% increase in wages. This figure is comparable to but smaller than recent estimates from other developed countries, but more similar to prior estimates using Danish data.[8] De-biased variances are similar regardless of whether homoscedastic or heteroscedasticity-robust correction is used, with the former also similar in the full and leave-worker-out sample. The final rows of the table report both raw and de-biased correlations between wage effects estimated using survey or administrative data and show a tight connection.[9]

Firm amenity effects are considerably less variable than firm wage effects. The de-biased standard deviation of effects corresponds to a 4% change in wages in the full sample and 3% change in the leave-out sample. As with wage effects, estimates are similar regardless of the correction used. We do not have an administrative analogue for our amenity measures, so Table 2 does not report correlation estimates between survey and register based measures of firm amenity effects. We examine the correlation between firm wage and amenity effects further below.

Figure 2 reports the average firm amenity effect by one-digit industry for the roughly 7,000 firms in the connected sample. Average amenities are highest among the 545 firms in the education sector, lower in sectors including finance and insurance and health and social services, and lowest in accommodation and food services. The differences in means between the best and worst industries implies a roughly 9% difference in wage-equivalent value of amenities. These patterns correspond to intuitive perceptions of which industries tend to offer "good" jobs. For example, Kleven et al. (2019) use the public sector (which includes education in Denmark) as a proxy for the family-friendliness of workplaces.

Figure 3 regresses firm amenity effects onto the specific amenities reported by workers. Panel (a) pools all data by stacking workers' responses for the current and prior job. Panel (b) effectively adds a worker fixed effect by comparing the change in firm amenity effects to the change in specific amenities for each move. The latter approach is robust to worker effects in how amenities are perceived (e.g., if workers differ in what they think "very stressful"

[8] Song et al. (2018) report variances of firm earnings effects on social security data between 8 and 9%. Bagger and Lentz (2019) find a variance of 1.4% over a much longer time period. One key distinction between our firm effects and estimates using US data and some other studies is that we report effects on hourly wages, as opposed to annual or daily earnings. The variance of firm effects on earnings in the administrative data tends to be larger.

[9] The de-biased correlation is the raw covariance divided by the product of the square roots of the bias-corrected variance estimates.

means). In both approaches, we present simple bivariate regressions for each amenity one-by-one and the coefficients from the multivariate analogue. Amenities are standardized by their cross-sectional standard deviation to provide a comparable scale.

Both sets of regressions show similar and intuitive patterns. In the multivariate version, interesting task content, social impact, pension contributions, family friendliness, the quality of the work environment, support from colleagues and managers, and stress levels are the most robust predictors of firm amenity effects. Commute length is a weaker predictor of firm amenity effects, which we view as supporting the assumption that these effects capture the value of the firm's amenities to a "typical" worker, since commuting has a strong match component by nature.

Perk quality has a counterintuitive sign in panel (a), a feature that is reversed in panel (b). This fact serves as a useful reminder that these relationships do not have a causal interpretation without strong assumptions. Like all "hedonic" approaches, they may be biased by other omitted amenities that are not directly measured. All told, the collection of specific amenities we measure capture roughly 33% of the de-biased variation in firm amenity effects.[10] Enumerating all potentially valuable amenities would be difficult (and exhausting for survey respondents). The virtue of our reservation wage approach is that we are able to price the complete bundle of amenities offered by the two alternatives regardless of what they consist of.

4.1 Relationship with revealed preference measures

Table A.4 regresses estimated firm amenity effects on multiple revealed preference measures of firm quality, including log size, a poaching index, and Sorkin (2018) valuations. Odd columns show the bivariate regressions while even columns include a control for firm wage effects instrumented using the independent register estimate, $\hat{w}_j^{-s}$. Conditional on wages, our amenity estimates are positively correlated with all three measures, although the relationship is weakest for the poaching index. Figure A.7 provides some intuition for why our amenity measures and these revealed preference indicators do not perfectly align. This figure shows, for example, that larger firms tend to have longer commutes, less team work and social impact, and be less family friendly. Firms that receive a high Sorkin (2018) valuation tend to be more physical jobs with less flexibility to work from home, while firms with higher poaching index have worse perks and higher layoff risk.

[10] This calculation comes from the fact the R^2 of the regression underlying the multivariate estimates in panel (a) is 0.039. Table 3 Column 5 implies a signal to noise ratio for estimated firm amenity effects of $19.74/160.91 = 0.12$. Dividing 0.039 by 0.12 yields 0.33.

4.2 Benchmarking against prior estimates

Although our survey did not elicit willingness-to-pay for specific workplace amenities, the combination of reservation wage and specific amenity questions provides a simple opportunity to compare our results to prior estimates. Table A.5 does so by reporting regressions of own reservation wages on changes in specific amenities coded to mirror the formulations in Maestas et al. (2023) Table 2 as closely as possible. The results show, for example, that moves to jobs that allow workers to set their own schedule involve a 6.3% increase in reservation wages (and hence valuation of amenities). In their stated preference discrete choice experiment, Maestas et al. estimate that workers are willing to take an 8.9% wage cut to be able to set their own schedule. Importantly, however, while a discrete choice experiment attempts to hold all job attributes fixed besides the amenity of interest, our reservation wages capture the value of all amenities present in the two alternatives. Amenities correlated with schedule flexibility may bias the implied willingness-to-pay in either direction. Consistent with this idea, effects attenuate somewhat when controlling for all recoded amenity changes jointly, although they remain directionally comparable to those in prior work.

4.3 Validating firm amenity effects

Figure 4 presents two simple validation tests of the estimated amenity effects. In panel (a), each worker's typical-worker reservation wage response is plotted against the estimated change in common amenities for their current vs. prior firm. This estimate is constructed after dropping that worker from the sample, so that there is no mechanical correlation between the dependent and independent variables. As a result, only workers in the leave-worker-out connected set are included in this exercise. These estimates on the x-axis are frequently based on just a handful of movers, so one should not expect a slope of one. The fact that the slope is positive and strongly significant demonstrates that workers' views of the amenities of particular firms are correlated, however, implying there is useful signal in the survey responses.

The framework developed in Section 3 implies a symmetry restriction that job switchers moving in opposite directions between pairs of firms, on average, agree on the typical worker's evaluation of those firms. Panel (b) explores this symmetry restriction. For each worker, we estimate firm amenity effects, dropping that worker from the sample. We then group these estimates into deciles and classify the worker by the decile of their origin and destination firm. Panel (b) plots the average typical worker reservation wages for upwards and

downwards movers for each decile pair after subtracting estimated status quo bias $\hat{c}(X_i)$.[11] Our framework implies that responses for upwards and downwards movers should be equal in absolute value and opposite signed. The bottom of panel (b) shows that a simple bootstrap test of this null does not reject, suggesting that the dispersion in panel (b) is plausibly attributable to sampling error. The fact that job switchers who move in opposite directions agree on the typical worker's evaluations of firms supports our identifying Assumption 1 that the these evaluations are unbiased. Apparent symmetry also supports the additive structure of the two-way fixed effect model we estimate.

4.4 Relationship between pay and amenity effects

Figure 5 shows the cross-sectional relationship between firm wage and amenity effects in our survey sample, as well as the ordinary least squares slope. This raw correlation shows a strongly significant negative relationship that implies every 10% increase in firm wage effects implies an average decrease in the value of amenities of roughly 1.6%. There are at least two problems in this estimate, however. First, as the bias corrections in Table 2 illustrate, firm wage effects are very noisy. All else equal, this noise serves to attenuate the slope in Figure 5 towards zero. And second, sampling error in firm wage effects may be correlated firm amenity effects. For example, a firm's wage effect will tend to be over-estimated if movers to the firm in our sample reported larger than usual wage gains. These movers will also require smaller wages change to make a typical worker indifferent between the two alternatives as a result, inducing a mechanical negative correlation.[12]

We correct for both sources of measurement error by instrumenting firm wage effects with independent measurements of the same objects. These estimates are obtained by estimating the same AKM model in the full Danish population excluding our survey sample, as discussed in Section 3.4. All firms in our survey sample but one are present in the connected set in this split sample.[13] Remarkably, the two-stage-least squares slope is very similar to the OLS slope, implying a 10% increase in firm wage effects involves an average decrease in amenity values of 1.56%. The estimate is very precise, ruling out declines beyond roughly 2%, for example. The similarity of OLS and 2SLS estimates implies the two sources of bias—attenuation and mechanical—roughly cancel out.

Why do high-paying firms offer amenity trade offs? Figure 6 provides some hints. This figure

[11] This estimate is also constructed using the same leave-out strategy.

[12] More concretely, both e_{ijk} and u^c_{ijk} may be correlated with pay changes $(w_k + \tilde{w}_{ik}) - (w_j + \tilde{w}_{ij})$.

[13] Figure A.8 shows that these estimates are very strong predictors of wage effects in the survey sample, with a first stage regression slope of 0.51 (0.073).

repeats the exercise from Figure 3, but puts firm wage effects on the left-hand side. Focusing on panel (b), the results illustrate that high-wage firms tend to offer several attractive amenities, including more flexibility, more paid time off, less physical work, better perks, and fancier office environments. At the same time, however, high-wage firms appear to involve faster paced work on less interesting tasks, lower pension contributions, heightened layoff risk, less support from colleagues and managers, and more stress.[14] Taken together, workers tend to see the bundle of amenities offered by high-wage firms as slightly less valuable, on average.

Some of these patterns likely reflect common patterns in working conditions and pay levels across industries. Figure 7 illustrates this between-industry relationship by plotting the average amenity values from Figure 2 against the industry-average firm wage effect. Some high amenity sectors, such as education and the public administration, also tend to be relatively low paying. Some low amenity sectors, such as construction or manufacturing, tend offer worse amenities but better pay. Yet some industries appear to offer both low pay and amenities, including wholesale and retail trade and accommodation and food service. The raw between-industry slope is slightly stronger than the overall slope, implying moving to an industry with 10% higher average firm wage effects implies a decrease in amenities of roughly 2.6%. Using the same instrumental variables strategy as before, however, we find a trade off of about 2%. Standard errors are such that we cannot reject equivalence between the pooled and between-industry slopes.

Table 3 presents regression estimates of the basic relationship between firm wage and amenity effects in the full survey sample, replicating the results shown in Figure 5. The table also shows that we find a similar relationship when including worker fixed effects, so that the regression compares changes in firm wage effects to changes in firm amenity effects. Finally, the table estimates the within-industry relationship by including fixed effects for one-digit industry. The IV slope is 0.12, comparable but slightly smaller to the pooled estimate, and not significantly different.

5 Match effects in wages and amenities

Firm effects account for only part of the total variation in wages and amenities workers receive. Next, we incorporate match effects in both dimensions.

[14] At least some of these patterns are corroborated by prior work noting that job displacement is more common at high-wage firms (Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2017; Lachowska et al., 2020; Bertheau et al., 2023).

We first ask whether high-paying firms are able to attract workers with a specific taste for the amenities they offer. Figure 6, for example, shows that moves to higher-paying firms are associated with increases in the pace of work, but some workers may thrive in high-intensity environments. If workers recognize that their taste might not be shared by a typical worker, movers to high-paying forms may report very different reservation wages for themselves than for a typical worker. Figure 8, however, shows that this does not appear to the case. Changes in total amenity values have approximately the same slope in changes in firm wage effects as changes in common amenities. The 2SLS slope implies a slope of roughly -.2. It thus appears that workers moving to higher wager firms recognize that the move typically involve tradeoffs both for the typical worker and for themselves.

On the other hand, firm wage effects capture only a portion of the wage changes experienced by movers. Figure A.10, for example, shows that on average, a 10% increase in pay is associated with a 4% increase in firm wage effects. How do the components of pay not explained by firm pay policies relate to amenities? Figure 9 provides an answer. This figure plots total amenity changes against total wage changes. The regression fit shows a strong negative relationship that is attenuated somewhat by extreme wage changes driven by workers reporting very low hours. For moderate wage changes (i.e., below 20%), the slope of amenity valuations in wages is roughly -.15.

This relationship may also be affected attenuation bias due to measurement error in reported pay changes. This measurement error may also be negatively correlated with reservation wages if, for example, workers who over-report their pay change from a move also underestimate their valuation of the amenity difference between firms.[15] We use a similar instrumental variables approach as before to correct for both issues. Here, wage changes reported in the register serves as the instrument. Unlike for common effects, we find IV estimates that are significantly more negative. The IV slope for moderate wage changes implies a slope of -0.52.

Figure 9 suggests some asymmetry in compensating differentials, with moves involving wage cuts typically entailing larger increase in amenities. Figure A.11 shows that this is partly due to measurement error. When plotting reservation wages against second stage fitted values (from a regression of survey wage changes on the instrument, wage changes in the register), there is a clear negative relationship for both negative and positive wage changes. Only extreme wage increases ($> 20\%$) tend to involve weaker decreases in amenities. These outliers likely reflect moves to jobs with very low hours and thus changes in participation as

[15] In the notation from Section 3, this amounts to a correlation between u_{ijk} and the analogous noise term for the reported change in pay.

well.

Table 4 reports several variations on the exercise from Figure 9. Remarkably, we find highly similar trade offs when we include either destination firm and origin-destination firm pair fixed effects. The estimated amenity-wage slope among movers to the same firm is -0.5, for example, while the slope within pair is -0.52. This finding suggests that idiosyncratic valuations of amenities and match effects are strongly correlated, even among movers between same pair of firms.

Putting our estimates together, we can assess how much of workers' total trade-offs between wages and amenities reflect firm-wide versus idiosyncratic trade-offs. Our results imply that a 10% increase in wages is offset by a 5.2% decrease in the value of amenities (Table 4, Column 4). Since the elasticity of firm wage effects with respect to wage changes is 0.4 (Figure A.10), and we find that a 10% increase in firm wage effects is associated with a 1.8% decrease in common firm amenities (Table 3, Column 4), roughly 0.72% ($10 \times 0.4 \times .18$) of the total decrease in amenities is attributable to firm-wide trade offs. The majority of compensating differentials ($\sim$ 90%) is driven by the fact that firms tend to pay workers relatively more if they value its amenities relatively less, rather than high-wage firms systematically offering worse amenities.

Still, the trade-off between amenities and wages is far from a perfect of -1 for our sample of movers, whom (relative to stayers) one might expect to be closer to marginal between their alternatives in the labor market. Even these workers experience substantial increases in utility from a move; the majority of wage changes thus do not appear to reflect compensating differentials. If the worker's prior firm remains representative of their next best alternative, the majority of the wage gains instead reflects rents.

6 Robustness

The appendix provides several stress tests of these results. One concern, for example, is that if the move coincides with an important change in life circumstances (e.g., due to the birth of a new child), the workers' preferences may have shifted substantially. Appendix C.1 shows that most of our survey respondents have "stable" situations, with less than 10% changing martial status between jobs. Additionally, the next section shows that similar results hold for workers without children and those who do not change their residential address between jobs.

Appendix Table A.6 also shows that the basic trade offs between wages and amenities re-

main similar when adjusting for sampling weights, using mean instead of median wages as the instrument, and focusing varying bands of wages changes. If anything, compensating differentials are strongest for the most moderate wage change (e.g., +/− 10%), where point estimates suggest nearly all of wage changes are offset by changes in amenities. Finally, Figure A.12 shows that we find very similar estimates regardless of which framing of the reservation wage question (take back old job vs. keep in old job) we use.

7 Heterogeneity

How does the relationship between reservation wages and pay changes vary among job movers? Figure 10 explores this by analyzing this relationship across worker characteristics (gender, age, education, family situation), job characteristics (public vs. private sector, union membership), and the circumstances surrounding the job move (self-reported reason for the move, whether it coincided with a residential move or becoming a parent). Panel (a) shows the estimated slope from a regression of reservation wages on wage changes using the same instrument and sample restrictions as Column 3 of Table 4 for each group of movers. Panel (b) presents the differences in slopes relative to their respective base categories.

The results reveal several important differences. First, men experience significantly stronger compensating differentials than women. Specifically, while a 10% wage increase is offset by a 6.9% reduction in amenities for men, the same move for women involves reductions of only 4.1%. One interpretation of this finding is that most moves for men are made between jobs that are relatively close substitutes, perhaps because they have already made the most obvious leaps up the relevant job ladder. Women, however, may face greater constraints and be less able to optimize mobility. Women changing jobs as a result of being a "trailing spouse," for example, may experience a variety of changes in wages and amenities that do not perfectly offset (Jayachandran et al., 2024). Figure 11 probes these gender differences further with binned scatter plots of reservation wage vs. wage changes separately for each group. The difference in slopes is driven by moves to jobs with substantially lower pay (less than 20% of prior jobs). While men only switch to these jobs if they have a strong preference for them, women do not exhibit the same patterns.

We also find that workers under 40 also show weaker tradeoffs between pay and non-pay aspect of their jobs. This finding is consistent with the idea that young workers are more likely to be making job transitions that generate sizable wage growth and lead to stable careers (Topel and Ward, 1992), whereas older workers may be choosing between more comparable set of options having already settled into more narrow career path. Several other

characteristics show limited differences, including degree of education, marital status, having children, job sector, unionization status, and whether or not the worker moved residences between jobs.

A final dimension that matter is ths reason for job transition. Workers more closely trade off pay and non-pay aspects of their jobs when the was voluntary employer-to-employer (EE) instead of an involuntary. Specifically, for voluntary switchers, every 10% increase in wages is associated with a 6.1% reduction in reservation wages.[16] For involuntary switchers, the same change in wages is offset by a reduction in amenities roughly half as large. This finding is consistent with voluntary switchers carefully weighing the costs and benefits of moving vs. staying. If a move occurs despite a small changes in wages, it must be that the worker was motivated to do so by a relatively large increase in non-wage amenities. The choices of involuntary movers, however, are not as closely tied to their previous jobs and therefore primarily reflect the distribution of offers. The next section presents a search model that is consistent with these findings.

8 Search model

Our estimates reveal that many job switchers experience partially offsetting changes in wages and amenities, with idiosyncratic variation in both factors driving the bulk of effects. These trade-offs are heightened when the decision to move was voluntary as opposed to driven by external factors such as a layoff. In this final section of the paper, we build and estimate a partial-equilibrium model of job mobility to capture these facts. The results allow us to quantify how endogenous mobility contributes to the compensating differentials we measure and extrapolate to the utility enjoyed by job stayers who are not in our survey sample by construction. This latter exercise provides a more complete answer to whether workers at high wage firms generally enjoy higher utility from their jobs than similar workers at low wage firms.

8.1 Model overview

The backbone of our model is discrete-time undirected search in the spirit of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Workers' search processes are heterogeneous and depend on their observed and unobserved characteristics Z_i. A worker with $Z_i = z$ draws new job offers with probabilities $\lambda_e(z)$ and $\lambda_u(z)$ while employed and unemployed, respectively. Jobs are destroyed with probability $\delta(z)$.

[16] Figure A.13 plots the underlying binscatters.

Firm j's job offer to a worker with attributes z consists of a log wage and amenity pair $(w_j(z), a_j(z))$.[17] In our econometric specification Z_i will have discrete and finite support, so this assumption amounts to allowing firms to offer type-specific wages and amenities. These offers reflect the idiosyncratic wages and amenities discussed in Section 3, with common components defined by their average over the population distribution of Z_i.

Workers face an offer distribution $F(w, a; z)$ with density $f(w, a; z)$. Consistent with our prior measurement framework, utility is linear over the sum of wages and amenities. Because jobs only differ in the wages and amenities provided, voluntary job changes occur when a worker receives an offer with utility that exceeds the utility of their current job. We assume that no offers are made below workers' reservation wage in unemployment.

Transition probabilities in this model depend on the workers current state and characteristics. The likelihood of a transition from employment to unemployment is simply $\delta(z)$, for example. The likelihood of a voluntary job switch for a worker at a job with wages and amenities (w, a) is $\lambda_e(q)(1-F_u(w+a; z))$, where $F_u(u; z)$ describes the cumulative distribution of $w+a$ given z. Similarly, the likelihood of remaining at a job with wages and amenities (w, a) for an additional period is simply $1 - \lambda_e(z)(1 - F_u(w + a; z)) - \delta(z)$.

If there were a continuum of firms and the cumulative offer distribution was differentiable in u, the steady state of this model for workers with $Z_i = z$ would feature an accepted distribution of wages and amenities with density given by:

$$g(w, a; z) = (1 + k(z)) \frac{f(w, a; z)}{[1 + k(z)(1 - F_u(w + a; z))]^2}$$

where $k(z) = \frac{\lambda_e(z)}{\delta(z)}$ indexes search frictions (see, e.g., Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009). Although our data contains a large number of firms, in practice assuming a continuous offer distribution may provide a poor approximation to the data. Instead, we pin down initial conditions using the discrete analogue of this expression, which implies that the steady-state probability mass function of accepted offers is given by:

$$g(w, a; z) = f(w, a; z) \frac{1 + k(z)G(w + a; z)}{1 + k(z)(1 - F_u(w + a; z))}$$

where $f(w, a; z)$ is the probability mass function of offers, $F_u(w + a; z)$ is the marginal cumulative mass function of utility, and $G(w + a; z)$ is the steady-state cumulated mass

[17] Workers can also have persistent skills s_i that increase wage offers additively at all firms. Because these skills will not affect the likelihood of measured wage changes or search behaviors, they would not influence estimation.

function of accepted offers strictly lower than $w+a$. We assume that no two firms offer exactly the same (w, a). Although the mass function depends on the cumulative mass function, it can be solved recursively by starting with the firm with the lowest value of $w + a$ for whom $G(w + a; z) = 0$ and working up the marginal distribution of utility.

8.2 Econometric specification

Our data consists of reported wages and reservation wages (i.e., amenity changes), denoted Y_i^w and Y_i^a, as well as labor market histories, for a large sample of movers. For each worker, we let M_i be a J-vector that encodes their most recent transition. A mover from firm j to k has the jth entry of M_i equal to -1, the kth entry equal to 1, and all other entries equal to zero. The indicator E_i encodes whether worker i's transition was employer to employer or passed through unemployment. And finally, let the J-vector D_i record the duration in months of worker i's employment at their former and current firm in the jth and kth entry, respectively, while U_i records the length of any intervening unemployment spell (with $U_i = 0$ if $E_i = 1$).

Building on the framework introduced in Section 3.2, we assume that wage and amenity changes for respondent i can be written respectively as:

$$Y_i^w = c^w(Z_i) + M_i' w(Z_i) + u_i^w \tag{4}$$

$$Y_i^a = c^a(Z_i) + M_i' a(Z_i) + u_i^a \tag{5}$$

where c^w and c^a capture status-quo bias, $w(z) = (w_1(z), \ldots, w_J(z))'$ and $a(z) = (a_1(z), \ldots, a_J(z))'$ collect wage and amenity effects across firms, and u_i^w and u_i^a capture survey noise.[18] We assume these noise components are jointly normally distributed with unrestricted covariance, so that $(u_i^w, u_i^a)|Z_i = z \overset{iid}{\sim} N(0, \Sigma(z))$. This structure implies that, if all components of Z_i were observed, one could estimate $w(z)$ and $a(z)$ up to normalization as well as status-quo bias terms using regressions of Y_i^w and Y_i^a onto a constant and M_i in the sample with $Z_i = z$. The variance of survey noise $\Sigma(z)$ could then be estimated using the sample variance-covariance of residuals. We will take advantage of this fact in estimation.

We model heterogeneity by assuming that workers belong to one of a discrete number of types. That is, $Z_i \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$. Types are unobserved, but type membership depends on worker observables X_i. We model $Pr(Z_i = z|X_i) = \pi_z(X_i; \gamma)$ using a multinomial logit

[18] The status-quo effect on wages can also be thought of as a time effect capturing general trends in wages, much as typical AKM specifications include year dummies.

structure:

$$\pi_z(X_i;\gamma) = \frac{exp(X_i'\gamma_z)}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} exp(X_i'\gamma_k)}$$

where $\gamma = \{\gamma_k\}_{k=1}^{K}$.

Finally, we parameterize offer distributions by assuming offer probabilities are proportional to the multivariate normal density with mean $\mu(z)$ and variance-covariance matrix $\Omega(z)$, or $\phi(w, a; \mu(z), \Omega_z)$.

8.3 Likelihood contributions

Let $\psi = \{c^w(z), c^a(z), w(z), a(z), \Sigma(z)\}_{z=1}^{K}$ collect the parameters that affect the likelihood of survey responses and let $\theta = \{\lambda_u(z), \lambda_e(z), \delta(z), \mu(z), \Omega(z)\}_{z=1}^{K}$ collect all other parameters. Each observation's conditional contribution to the likelihood factors as:

$$l(Y_i^w, Y_i^a, E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i|z, \psi, \theta) = \underbrace{l(Y_i^w, Y_i^a|M_i, z, \psi)}_{AKM\ component}\underbrace{l(E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i|z, \psi, \theta)}_{search\ component}$$

The first "AKM" component captures the likelihood of observing (Y_i^w, Y_i^a) conditional on M_i and z. The model implies that this likelihood is independent of other components of labor market history and is simply given by the multivariate normal density with mean zero and variance-covariance $\Sigma(z)$:

$$l(Y_i^w, Y_i^a|M_i, z, \psi) = \phi\left(Y_i^w - c^w(z) - M_i'w(z), Y_i^a - c^a(z) - M_i'a(z); \Sigma(z)\right)$$

The second "search" component of the likelihood captures the likelihood of transition types and employment histories. It can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} l(E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i|z, \psi, \theta) = {} & g(w_{j(i)}(z), a_{j(i)}(z); z) \\ & [1 - \lambda_e(z)(1 - F_u(w_{j(i)} + a_{j(i)}; z)) - \delta(z)]^{D_{i,j(i)}-1} \\ & [\delta(z)(1 - \lambda_u(z))^{U_i-1}\lambda_u(z)]^{1-E_i}\lambda_e(z)^{E_i} \\ & f(w_{k(i)}(z), a_{k(i)}(z); z) \end{aligned}$$

where $j(i)$ indexes worker i's former firm, $k(i)$ indexes their current firm, and $D_{i,j(i)}$ is duration at their former firm (i.e., the $j(i)$th component of D_i).[19]

[19] As of writing, our register data contains no information beyond the month we sampled workers for the

Finally, the marginal likelihood for a worker with observables X_i can be expressed by integrating over the support of Z_i:

$$l(Y_i^w, Y_i^a, E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i | X_i, \psi, \theta) = \sum_{z=1}^{K} \pi_z(X_i; \gamma) l(Y_i^w, Y_i^a | M_i, z, \psi) l(E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i | z, \psi, \theta) \quad (6)$$

Our goal is to find parameters ψ and θ that maximize this likelihood.

8.4 Identification

A constructive identification argument can be sketched starting with the AKM component of the likelihood. For each directed edge between firms $j \to k$, the model implies that reported changes in wages and amenities are generated by a bivariate Gaussian mixture with component means $(w_k(z) - w_j(z), a_k(z) - a_j(z))$ and noise covariance $\Sigma(z)$. Fixing the number of components (i.e., types), the means, covariances, and mixture probabilities are identified so long as each type occurs with positive probability along each edge and all component means are distinct. Given $(w_k(z) - w_j(z), a_k(z) - a_j(z))$ for each edge and type, $w_j(z)$ and $a_j(z)$ can be identified up to normalization so long as all firms belong to the same connected set. This provides identification of ψ. The remaining parameters θ are identified by the mixture over the search component of the likelihood, which must rationalize the mixture probabilities on each edge as well as the marginal likelihood of observed job histories.

8.5 Estimation

Our baseline specification sets $K = 2$ and uses the leave-worker-out connected set of firms for estimation. We include an indicator for gender, an indicator for having a bachelors degree or higher, and year of birth in X_i. To ensure that type probabilities are positive on each edge, we restrict the offer distribution to the same across z.

We maximize the sample likelihood using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977). Although the log likelihood can be maximized directly in the M-step, in practice exploiting the factorization of the conditional likelihood discussed above can make it significantly easier to update parameters.

To see how, note that the full likelihood in Equation 6 can also be written as a mixture over

survey. At that point all workers were employed in their current firm, so there is no information in duration at the current firm. In future version of the paper we will be able to incorporate this data into the likelihood.

the AKM component of the likelihood alone:

$$\begin{aligned} l(Y_i^w, Y_i^a, E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i | X_i, \psi, \theta) &= \sum_{z=1}^{K} \pi_z(X_i; \gamma) l(E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i | z, \psi, \theta) l(Y_i^w, Y_i^a | M_i, z, \psi) \\ &= \sum_{z=1}^{K} \pi_z(X_i, E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i; \psi, \theta, \gamma) l(Y_i^w, Y_i^a | M_i, z, \psi) \end{aligned}$$

where $\pi_z(X_i, E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i; \psi, \theta, \gamma) = \pi_z(X_i; \gamma) l(E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i | z, \psi, \theta)$ is proportional to the likelihood an individual has $Z_i = z$ given their labor market history and observed move. This conditional probability is not simply $\pi_z(X_i; \gamma)$ because type shares are not independent of labor market histories. If $M_i = m$ corresponds to move that is particularly attractive to workers with type z, for example, one should expect relatively more workers of this type given that $M_i = m$. The search component of the model disciplines this adjustment.

The tth M step of the EM procedure maximizes over $\{\psi_t, \theta_t\}$:

$$\begin{aligned} Q_t(Y_i^w, Y_i^a, E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i | X_i, \psi_t, \theta_t) = \\ \sum_{z=1}^{K} w_i(z) \left[log(l(Y_i^w, Y_i^a | M_i, z, \psi_t)) + log(l(E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i | z, \psi_t, \theta_t)) \right] \end{aligned}$$

where the weights $w_i(z)$ are posterior type probabilities given the parameters from the previous EM step:

$$\begin{aligned} w_i(z) &\propto \pi_z(X_i; \gamma_{t-1}) l(Y_i^w, Y_i^a | M_i, z, \psi_{t-1}) l(E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i | z, \psi_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}) \\ &= \pi_z(X_i, E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i; \psi_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}, \gamma_{t-1}) l(Y_i^w, Y_i^a | M_i, z, \psi_{t-1}) \end{aligned}$$

This expression makes clear that the M-step weights can be viewed as either overall type posteriors or the posterior type share given (Y_i^w, Y_i^a) for a mover between two firms with a particular labor market history, among whom the population type share (i.e., the "prior") is specified as of step t as $\pi_z(X_i, E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i; \psi_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}, \gamma_{t-1})$. Our estimation procedure takes advantage of this fact using the following modification of the standard M step:

1. Given an initial starting guess for all parameters $(\psi_t, \theta_t, \gamma_t)$, compute posterior type shares $w_i(z)$.

2. Compute ψ_{t+1} by maximizing the log of the AKM component $l(Y_i^w, Y_i^a | M_i, z, \psi_{t+1})$ weighted by $w_i(z)$. This can be accomplished quickly using regressions of Y_i^w and Y_i^a on a constant and M_i for each type weighting by $w_i(z)$.

3. Fixing ψ_{t+1}, compute θ_{t+1} by maximizing the log of the search component of the likelihood $l(E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i|z, \psi_{t+1}, \theta_{t+1})$ weighted by $w_i(z)$. This can be accomplished quickly because the dimension of θ is significantly smaller than ψ.

4. Refine the solution by maximizing $Q_t(Y_i^w, Y_i^a, E_i, M_i, D_i, U_i|X_i, \psi_{t+1}, \theta_{t+1})$ over ψ_{t+1} and θ_{t+1} simultaneously.

The the procedure then updates γ_t in the E-step and repeats until convergence.

A final complication is that with relatively few movers between each firm, this procedure may tend to significantly over fit firm wage and amenity effects. To account for this, we add a ridge penalty term to the likelihood given by $p_w \sum_{z=1}^{K} ||w(z)||_2 + p_a \sum_{z=1}^{K} ||a(z)||_2$, where $||\cdot||_2$ indicates the $\mathcal{L}_2$ norm. We set p_w and p_a so that the variance of firm wage and amenity effects in a model estimated with $K = 1$ are close to the estimates reported in Table 3.

8.6 Results

The model produces a number of findings consistent with our reduced-form analysis. These results are summarized in Figure 12. First, firm amenity effects in the model, defined as the population averages of $a_j(Z_i)$, are strongly correlated with the firm amenity effects estimated using responses to questions about a typical worker's reservation wage and studied earlier in the paper. Importantly, these responses are not used in model estimation. Despite this fact, Panel (a) shows that the two sets of estimates are tightly linked.[20] Secondly, Panel (b) shows that model-based firm wage and amenity effects (population averages of $w_j(Z_i)$ and $a_j(Z_i)$, respectively) have a very similar relationship as the reduced form analogues studied in Figure 8. On average, a 10% increase in firm wages is associated with a 1.6% decline in firm amenities.

Figure 13 illustrates the primary implications of the model estimates for between firm inequality across the firm wage effect distribution. This figure simulates data from the estimated model and groups the cross-sectional distribution of employed workers by their firm wage effect (also estimated in data simulated from the model). The three series plot average wages, amenities, and utility relative to the first firm effect decile.[21] Among firms in the top decile, wages are roughly 16% higher on average. Consistent with the negative but relatively weak relationship between firm wage and amenity effects in the cross-section, the bulk of this

[20] One should not expect a slope or R^2 of one in this panel because both sets of estimates are noisy.

[21] Since mobility in the model is endogenous, it is not obvious that estimated firm effects should track firm wage components closely. Figure A.14, however, shows that firm wage effects estimated in data simulated from the model are rouhgly unbiased predictors of firm wage components.

wage difference reflects differences in utility (12%), although average amenities are roughly 4% lower among firms in the top vs. bottom decile.

Thus, consistent with our reduced-form results, the negative but relatively weak correlation between firm wages and amenities generates imperfect trade-offs across the firm wage effect distribution. Although dispersion in firm wage effects explains a relatively small share of overall inequality, compensating differentials are not strong enough to fully offset the benefits of higher wages for workers at these firms. While movers experience stronger trade-offs between idiosyncratic wages and amenities, these trade-offs happen among moves to firms with both high and low wage effects, as well as within-firm. As a result, virtually all of the compensating differentials across the firm wage effect distribution are explained by common amenities.

9 Conclusion

Many aspects of a job besides pay are deeply important to workers. This project developed a new, survey-based methodology for measuring these non-wage amenities and relating them to pay. We find that job switches typically involve steep trade offs between wages and amenities, with roughly half of the benefits of higher pay offset by reductions in the value of amenities. Firms that tend to pay systematically high wages tend to offer some attractive amenities, such as better perks and flexibility, but also some draw backs in the form of heightened layoff risk, work pace, and stress, as well as reduced potential for social impact. Overall, however, firm-wide pay and amenities patterns are relatively unimportant for compensating differentials. Partly as a result, high-wage firms tend to offer significantly more utility to their workers than low-wage firms.

An important limitation of our study is that we measure amenities by asking about hypothetical job moves back to workers' previous jobs. This scenario involves two alternatives the worker knows well, but some may find the question difficult to evaluate if, for example, they have moved to a new city or their previous workplace has closed. Despite these potential issues, we find that our estimated amenity valuations closely track well-known industry patterns, have intuitive relationships with concrete amenities such as telecommuting, and strongly predict mobility intentions. Nevertheless, future work could further explore the sensitivity of our reservation wage elicitation to framing and incentives.

Our study also examines the wage and amenity offers workers experience without delving into how they are generated. An important topic for future work is how amenities enter firm's input choices and wage-setting behavior. It seems plausible, for example, that high-

wage firms involve more stress and less social impact due to the nature of the work they do (e.g., consulting vs. social work). These firms may invest in fancier offices and more generous perks partly to offset these negative amenities. Likewise, few theories offer strong guidance on what generates within-firm correlations in wages and amenities. Although we model this correlation as coming from a reduced-form offer distribution, future work should examine how worker-level bargaining, occupation choices, and other dimensions of within-firm heterogeneity may generate these patterns.

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Table 1: Summary statistics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	All workers	Movers		Survey invites		Survey respondents	
Jobs included	All	All	Last two	All	Last two	All	Last two
Worker month-level means							
Earnings	5471.1	5276.7	5909.3	5129.6	5785.1	5507.9	6064.2
	(7926.6)	(4619.3)	(4751.3)	(4018.6)	(3933.9)	(3685.3)	(3233.0)
Hours	139.8	138.0	147.7	135.7	146.6	139.6	150.1
	(43.7)	(45.6)	(34.0)	(47.0)	(34.5)	(43.5)	(28.9)
Tenure (months)	90.3	60.6	73.5	60.4	73.7	67.4	82.4
	(64.6)	(50.2)	(56.3)	(50.5)	(56.3)	(53.0)	(58.3)
Worker-level means							
Male	0.49	0.52	0.52	0.45	0.45	0.40	0.40
YOB	1977.5	1979.8	1979.8	1980.2	1980.2	1978.7	1978.7
	(8.85)	(8.97)	(8.97)	(8.90)	(8.90)	(8.94)	(8.94)
Bachelor or higher	0.40	0.44	0.44	0.52	0.52	0.62	0.62
# firms	4.66	6.38	2	6.35	2	5.94	2
	(3.45)	(3.51)	(0)	(3.46)	(0)	(3.17)	(0)
Firm-level means							
# workers	6.38	10.5	29.2	18.5	57.0	46.2	135.8
	(115.9)	(156.0)	(311.8)	(222.7)	(466.2)	(394.4)	(786.7)
Construction	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.10	0.075	0.067	0.044
Knowledge services	0.098	0.080	0.089	0.076	0.092	0.089	0.10
Accommodation / food	0.089	0.11	0.067	0.12	0.052	0.11	0.023
# worker-months	286,260,111	62,148,039	28,296,091	15,386,877	7,229,056	3,147,939	1,541,424
# workers	1,831,473	400,349	400,349	100,200	100,200	19,211	19,211
# firms	342,413	188,496	46,212	92,329	20,530	29,197	7,088

Notes: This table provides summary statistics on the universe of Danish workers and our ultimate survey sample. Earnings information is converted to USD at an exchange rate of 0.14 USD/DKK and inflated to 2023 equivalents using the CPI. Column 1 includes all workers employed as wage earners as of February 1, 2024. Columns 2 and 3 include all workers from Column 1 in the leave-one-out connected set of firms who had changed jobs within the last three years. Column 2 includes all observations for workers in this sample, while Column 3 includes employment at their most recent two jobs only. Columns 4 and 5 provide the same statistics sub-setting to the sample of workers invited to take the survey. Slightly more than 100,000 invitations were sent to account for worker deaths. Columns 6 and 7 subset to the sample of survey respondents matched to jobs in the register data. See Table A.2 for statistics weighted to account for nonrandom sampling probabilities.

Table 2: Firm wage and amenity effect variance estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log wage (register)		Log wage (survey)		Typical res. wage	
	Connected	Leave-out	Connected	Leave-out	Connected	Leave-out
Var outcome	979.27	961.06	263.94	264.35	430.89	434.31
Var fixed effects	125.94	76.63	140.52	74.03	160.91	71.41
share	0.13	0.08	0.53	0.28	0.37	0.16
De-biased *var* (hom)	57.29	46.72	58.80	38.99	19.74	10.27
share	0.06	0.05	0.22	0.15	0.05	0.02
De-biased *var* (het)		46.68		34.36		9.66
share		0.05		0.13		0.02
Correlation with register			0.49	0.61		
de-biased (hom)			1.12	1.07		
de-biased (het)				1.14		
# observations	38334	33843	38334	33843	38334	33843
# firms	7017	2584	7017	2584	7017	2584
# workers	19167	19109	19167	19109	19167	19109

Notes: This table reports estimates of firm wage and amenity effect variances estimated in the connected survey sample using a two-way fixed effect (worker-firm) model. The rows show the variance of the outcome, the variance of the estimated firm fixed effects, and de-biased variances that account for sampling error under homoscedasticity and heteroscedasticity (Kline et al., 2020), with the latter computed in the leave-worker-out connected set by necessity. Outcomes are scaled by 100, implying variances are scaled by 100^2. Each estimate is constructed using a panel with two observations for each survey worker (old job and new job). Columns 1 and 2 use the median monthly wage over the last and first 6 months recorded in the register as the outcomes for the old and new job, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 set the outcome to zero for the first job and use the survey reported change in wage as the outcome in the second job. Columns 5 and 6 do the same but use typical worker reservation wage responses as the outcome for the second job. Share is share of outcome variance. The correlation rows report the raw correlation between firm effects estimated with survey vs. register data (i.e., columns 1 vs. 3 and 2 vs. 4), as well as de-biased correlations that divide by the raw covariance by the product of the square roots of the de-biased variance estimates.

Table 3: Firm wage vs. amenity effects

	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Firm wage effect	-0.160***	-0.156***	-0.151***	-0.175***	-0.126***	-0.120**
	(0.0137)	(0.0246)	(0.0142)	(0.0293)	(0.0157)	(0.0400)
# observations	38334	38334	38334	38334	38329	38329
# workers	19167	19167	19167	19167	19167	19167
# firms	7017	7017	7017	7017	7015	7015
First-stage coef		51.17		45.21		36.47
First stage SE		(7.325)		(4.928)		(6.310)
Person FE			Yes	Yes		
Industry FE					Yes	Yes


Notes: This table reports regressions of firm amenity effects on firm wage effects in the connected survey sample stacking old and new jobs. Odd columns show OLS estimates, while even columns address measurement error by instrumenting firm wage effects with independent estimates constructed using the full Danish population excluding the survey sample. Columns 3 and 4 add person fixed effects, effectively comparing changes in firm wage effects to changes firm amenity effects for moves in the survey. Columns 5 and 6 remove person effects but include one-digit industry effects, capturing the cross-sectional relationship between wage and amenity effects within sector. Sectors with only a single firm are dropped. Firm-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Table 4: Reservation wages vs. wage changes for movers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	All moves		Wage changes < 20%					
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Change in wages	-0.0759***	-0.222***	-0.143***	-0.516***	-0.120***	-0.498***	-0.147**	-0.520***
	(0.0120)	(0.0242)	(0.0174)	(0.0534)	(0.0206)	(0.0683)	(0.0477)	(0.130)
# workers	19211	19211	15156	15156	12822	12822	4394	4394
# directed moves	15601	15601	12519	12519	10185	10185	1757	1757
First-stage coef		0.54		0.31		0.30		0.37
First stage SE		(0.011)		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.028)
Dest. firm FE					Yes	Yes		
Firm pair FE							Yes	Yes


Notes: This table reports regressions of own reservation wage responses on changes in log wages. Columns 1-2 use all 19,211 movers across 15,601 directed edges. Columns 3-8 trim outliers by using all movers with wage changes below 20%. Odd columns present OLS estimates, while even columns present 2SLS estimates that instrument wage changes with changes recorded in the register. Columns 5 and 6 include fixed effects for the destination firm and drop destinations with a single mover. Columns 7 and 8 do the same for directed firm pairs. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Figure 1: Distribution of reservation wage responses



Notes: This figure plots the distribution survey responses to the reservation wage questions. The pink bars pool the two framings for worker's own required pay change to take back / remain in their prior job. The gray bars show reservation wages to recommend the prior job over the current job to a typical worker. Responses above 100% are capped at 100.


Figure 2: Average firm amenity effects by industry




Notes: This figure shows average firm amenity effects estimated by industry. The number in parentheses indicates the number of firms in each industry in the sample. Industries with 10 or fewer firms are not shown. Amenity effects are multiplied by 100 so that values can be interpreted as approximate percentage point differences. Averages are weighted by firm size in the survey sample. See Figure A.9 for a version that weights firms by their average size in the full register data and inverse sampling probabilities.

Figure 3: Predictors of firm amenity effects

a) Relationship in cross section




b) Relationship in changes



Notes: This figure shows the relationship between firm amenity effects and specific amenities. Panel (a) stacks the survey data into a panel with two observations per worker and regresses amenity effects onto the reported level of each amenity provided. Blue dots reflect the bivariate relationship, while red squares are coefficients from a multivariate regression including all amenities simultaneously. Amenities are divided by their pooled standard deviation so that coefficients can be interpreted as the impact of a 1 s.d. increase. Panel (b) reports the same estimates after taking first differences within worker. The specific amenity questions typically elicited ordinal information (see Appendix E), an issue we ignore by cardinalizing responses (e.g., 1 = "Very good," 2 = "Good," etc.).


Figure 4: Validating firm amenity effects

a) Out-of-sample predictive power



Binscatter with 50 quantiles. Change in estimated amenity is winsorized at 1%/99% level.
OLS Slope: .095 (.017), R-squared: .002.
Total sample size: 14734.


b) Symmetry in changes



OLS slope: -.254 (.096), R-squared: .107.
Bias corrected slope: -.655
All variables winsorized at +/- 100%.
Bootstrap χ^2 test of perfect symmetry: 42.958 (45), p=0.559.

Notes: This figure presents validation tests of the estimated firm amenity effects. P plots worker's typical worker reservation wage response against the change firm amenity effects for their current vs. prior firm estimated leaving out that worker. The positive slope indicates that amenity estimates constructed using other workers' responses predict worker's own responses. Panel (b) plots the average typical worker reservation wage for movers grouped by deciles of amenity effects estimated excluding that worker. Means for workers moving up the amenity ladder are the x-axis variable, while means for workers moving down are the y-axis variable. The notes to the figure present a bootstrap chi-square test for the null that all dots line on the 45 degree line up to sampling error. All reservation wage questions are adjusted for estimated status-quo bias.


Figure 5: Relationship between pay and amenity effects: $\hat{a}_j$ vs. $\hat{w}_j$




Notes: This figure shows a binned scatter plot of firm wage effects vs. firm amenity effects in the survey sample. Each blue dot represents the average of the dependent and independent variables in 20 quantiles of the independent variable. Both effects are multiplied by 100 so that quantities can be interpreted as percentage point differences. The red line is the OLS fit, which as reported below has a slope of -0.16 and robust standard error of 0.014. The IV slope is estimated instrumenting for firm wage effects $\hat{w}_j$ with out-of-sample estimates $\hat{w}_j^{-s}$ constructing using the full Danish population excluding the survey sample. The slope is -0.156 with a standard error of 0.025.

Figure 6: Predictors of firm wage effects

a) Relationship in cross section




b) Relationship in changes




Notes: This figure shows the relationship between firm wage effects and specific amenities. Panel (a) stacks the survey data into a panel with two observations per worker and regresses wage effects onto the reported level of each amenity provided. Blue dots reflect the bivariate relationship, while red squares are coefficients from a multivariate regression including all amenities simultaneously. Amenities are divided by their pooled standard deviation so that coefficients can be interpreted as the impact of a 1 s.d. increase. Panel (b) reports the same estimates after taking first differences within worker. The specific amenity questions typically elicited ordinal information (see Appendix E), an issue we ignore by cardinalizing responses (e.g., 1 = "Very good," 2 = "Good," etc.).

Figure 7: Pay vs. amenity effects at the industry level




Notes: This figure plots the relationship between industry average firm wage effects and industry average firm amenity effects. Averages are weighted by firm size in the survey sample. The dotted line is the OLS fit, which as reported below has a slope of -0.262 and robust standard error of 0.055. The IV slope is estimated instrumenting for average firm wage effects with the industry average of out-of-sample estimates constructing using the full Danish population excluding the survey sample. The slope is -0.195 with a standard error of 0.036.

Figure 8: Changes in total amenities vs. firm wage effects



Notes: This figure shows a binned scatter plot of own reservation wages vs. changes in estimated firm wage effects, i.e., $(a_k + \tilde{a}_{ik}) - (a_j + \tilde{a}_{ij})$ vs. $\hat{w}_k - \hat{w}_j$. Each blue dot represents the average of the dependent and independent variables in 20 quantiles of the independent variable. Both effects are multiplied by 100 so that quantities can be interpreted as percentage point differences. Reservation wage responses are adjusted for estimated status-quo bias. The red line is the OLS fit, which as reported below has a slope of -0.152 and robust standard error of 0.015. The IV slope is estimated instrumenting for firm wage effects $\hat{w}_j$ with out-of-sample estimates $\hat{w}_j^{-s}$ constructing using the full Danish population excluding the survey sample. The slope is -0.191 with a standard error of 0.032.


Figure 9: Changes in total amenities vs. wages




Notes: This figure shows a binned scatter plot of own reservation wages vs. changes in wages reported in the survey, i.e., $(a_k + \tilde{a}_{ik}) - (a_j + \tilde{a}_{ij})$ vs. $(w_k + \tilde{w}_{ik}) - (w_j + \tilde{w}_{ij})$. Each blue dot represents the average of the dependent and independent variables in 20 quantiles of the independent variable. Both effects are multiplied by 100 so that quantities can be interpreted as percentage point differences. Reservation wage responses are adjusted for estimated status-quo bias. The red line is the OLS fit, which as reported below has a slope of -0.076 and robust standard error of 0.012. The IV slope is estimated instrumenting for survey reported wage changes with wage changes reported in the register and has a slope of -0.222 with a standard error of 0.024. Both estimates are attenuated by large positive wage changes changes, largely driven by workers who report low hours in the prior job. Sub-setting to wage changes below .2 log points yields an IV slope of -0.516 (0.053).

Figure 10: Heterogeneity in changes in total amenities vs. pay

a) Magnitude of slope




b) Difference in slope (relative to base category)



Notes: This figure shows heterogeneity in the slope of the relationship between own reservation wages and changes in wages reported in the survey, i.e., $(a_k + \tilde{a}_{ik}) - (a_j + \tilde{a}_{ij})$ vs. $(w_k + \tilde{w}_{ik}) - (w_j + \tilde{w}_{ij})$. Following the footnote of Figure 9, we instrument for survey wage changes with wage changes reported in the register and subset to wage changes below .2 log points. Panel (a)) shows the slopes for each category, while Panel (b)) presents the differences in slopes relative to their respective base categories. The first five categories focus on workers' characteristics: gender, age, education, and family situation at the time of our survey. The next two categories relate to job characteristics: whether the new job is in the public or private sector and whether the worker is a union member (measured in 2022, the most recent year for which union dues data are available). The final three categories focus on the circumstances surrounding the job move: workers' reasons for moving, and whether the move coincided with a move of residence or becoming a parent.

Figure 11: Changes in total amenities vs. pay: gender heterogeneity

a) Female




b) Male




Notes: This figure shows a binned scatter plot of own reservation wages vs. changes in wages reported in the survey, i.e., $(a_k + \tilde{a}_{ik}) - (a_j + \tilde{a}_{ij})$ vs. $(w_k + \tilde{w}_{ik}) - (w_j + \tilde{w}_{ij})$, split by gender. Each blue dot represents the average of the dependent and independent variables in Xyz quantiles of the independent variable. Both effects are multiplied by 100 so that quantities can be interpreted as percentage point differences. Reservation wage responses are adjusted for estimated status-quo bias. Panel (a)) focuses on women and Panel (b)) focuses on men. The red line is the OLS fit, which as reported below has a slope of -0.068 for women (-0.087 for men) and robust standard error of 0.015 (0.019 for men). The IV slope is estimated instrumenting for survey reported wage changes with wage changes reported in the register and has a slope of -0.193 for women (-0.26 for men) with a standard error of 0.032 (0.037 for men). Both estimates are attenuated by large positive wage changes changes, largely driven by workers who report low hours in the prior job. Sub-setting to wage changes below .2 log points yields an IV slope of -.409 (0.067) for women and -0.685 (0.089) for men.

Figure 12: Model validation

a) Reduced-form vs. model-based firm amenity effects




b) Model-based firm wage vs. amenity effects



Notes: This figure presents validation tests of the model estimates. Panel (a) plots model-based firm amenity effects (y-axis) defined as the population average of $a_j(Z_i)$ against the firm amenity effect estimated using survey responses about the typical worker's reservation wage (x-axis), which are not used in model estimation. Panel (b) plots model based firm wage vs. amenity effects, replicating the reduced form analysis in Figure 8.

Figure 13: Cross sectional wage, amenity, and utility inequality according to the model



Notes: This figure summarizes the main results from the model described in Section 8. The figure plots average utility, wages and amenities across the firm wage effect distribution in data simulated from the model. Differences are plotted relative to the average for firms in the first firm wage effect decile. Firm wage effects are estimated using two-way fixed effect models applied to panel data simulated from the estimated model.

Online Appendix
Firm Premia in Pay vs. Amenities

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A Data

A.1 Survey sample criteria

Our survey universe consists of individuals who meet the following criteria:

1. Employed as wage earner as of February 1, 2024
2. Aged 30-60 as of February 1, 2024
3. Changed jobs at least once within the last three years preceding February 1, 2024, subject to the following conditions:
   (a) A maximum gap of six months between jobs
   (b) At least three months tenure in each job
   (c) Neither jobs in agriculture
4. Current and previous employers are part of the largest leave-one-out connected set of firms (that is, firms that remain connected by job moves if we drop any worker from the dataset)

A.1.1 Sampling methodology

We employ a "snowball" sampling methodology, which ensures our survey participants move within a large, interconnected set of firms with multiple observations within firm pairs. The method begins with a randomly selected firm and expands through the networks of firms and workers, randomly sampling edges of movers connected to the previously selected firms.

Formally, our sampling method is a variant of Primm's algorithm for finding a Minimum Spanning Tree of a connected, weighted graph (Prim, 1957). Our algorithm relies on a graph representation, where:

- Firms are represented as nodes in an undirected, weighted graph $G = (V, E, w)$.
- Edges correspond to worker transitions between firms.
- Edge weights represent the number of workers who moved between firms.

The sampling procedure begins by selecting a random firm j and proceeds as follows:

1. Identify the set of connected firms $C = \{k \mid k \in V \text{ and } \{j, k\} \in E\}$.
2. For each firm $k \in C$, add a maximum of $\min\{w(\{j, k\}), 10\}$ workers to the sample, provided the edge $\{j, k\}$ has not been previously selected.

3. Select the next firm at random from the set C.

This process repeats until the maximum sample size of 100,000 is reached.

Because we know the sampling mechanism, we can simulate probability weights for any unit of analysis. These weights facilitate corrections for non-random sampling, ensuring the representativeness of the analysis.

A.2 Response rates

Table A.1 shows how our sample restrictions reduce the analysis dataset. We sent 100,044 survey invitations and received 26,265 complete and valid responses, of which 19,211 could be linked to the corresponding prior and main jobs in the administrative data.

Table A.1: Analysis sample reduction

	Individuals
1. Invitees	100,044
2. Respondents	34,225
3. Employed and recent job movers	29,312
4. Complete responses	26,265
5. Link to registers	19,211

Notes: This table shows how our sample restrictions shrink the analysis data.

A.3 Additional tables and figures

Table A.2: Re-weighted summary statistics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Movers		Survey invites		Survey sample	
Jobs included	All	Last two	All	Last two	All	Last two
Worker month-level means						
Earnings	5470.3	5909.3	5507.8	5937.3	5715.4	6036.6
	(4619.6)	(4751.3)	(4002.7)	(4006.7)	(3639.8)	(3216.0)
Hours	140.6	147.7	140.6	147.8	143.0	149.9
	(42.9)	(34.0)	(42.9)	(34.3)	(39.6)	(29.5)
Tenure (months)	64.3	73.5	63.9	72.6	70.3	80.2
	(51.6)	(56.3)	(51.2)	(55.9)	(52.8)	(57.4)
Worker-level means						
Male	0.52	0.52	0.53	0.53	0.44	0.44
YOB	1979.8	1979.8	1979.8	1979.8	1978.2	1978.2
	(8.97)	(8.97)	(8.93)	(8.93)	(9.01)	(9.01)
Bachelor or higher	0.44	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.57	0.57
# firms	4.79	2	4.78	2	4.68	2
	(2.41)	(0)	(2.38)	(0)	(2.24)	(0)
Firm-level means						
# workers	7.60	7.60	2.97	7.51	4.65	19.1
	(57.4)	(57.4)	(18.1)	(56.9)	(34.7)	(110.9)
Construction	0.12	0.12	0.15	0.12	0.083	0.068
Knowledge services	0.089	0.089	0.062	0.092	0.067	0.11
Accommodation / food	0.067	0.067	0.12	0.050	0.16	0.021
# worker-months	52,410,602	28,296,091	13,297,153	7,229,056	2,781,838	1,541,424
# workers	400,349	400,349	100,200	100,200	19,211	19,211
# firms	46,212	46,212	31,615	20,530	14,259	7,088

Notes: This table provides summary statistics after re-weighting to account for nonrandom sampling. Earnings information is converted to USD at an exchange rate of 0.14 USD/DKK and inflated to 2023 equivalents using the CPI. Columns 1 and 2 include all workers and firms in the leave-one-out connected set of firms among workers who had changed jobs within the last three years. Column 1 differs from column 2 of table 1 because it drops all firms not in the movers connected set, since these firms do not have a defined sampling weight. Columns 3 and 4 provide the same statistics sub-setting to the sample of workers invited to take the survey. If sampling weights were perfectly accurate, these means should match those columns 1 and 2 exactly. Columns 5 and 6 subset to the sample of survey respondents matched to jobs in the register data. These means need not match even after re-weighting due to differential response rates across survey characteristics. Worker-month and worker-level means use worker-level inverse sampling probabilities as weights, while firm-level means use the firm-level analogue. See Figure A.1 for the distribution of worker-level sampling weights and Figure A.2 for the distribution of firm-level sampling weights.

Table A.3: Summary statistics for specific amenity responses

	Old Firm			New Firm			Difference	
Variable	Mean	SD	Median	Mean	SD	Median	Mean	SD
Commute length	3.75	1.03	[4]	3.63	1.03	[4]	-0.11	1.35
Work from home	3.46	1.40	[3]	3.11	1.39	[3]	-0.35	1.22
Control of hours	2.75	1.07	[2]	2.39	1.01	[2]	-0.36	1.07
Independence	2.57	0.91	[2]	2.20	0.78	[2]	-0.36	1.00
Work pace	1.98	1.07	[2]	2.17	1.02	[2]	0.19	1.20
Interesting tasks	2.11	1.10	[2]	1.59	0.85	[1]	-0.52	1.13
Physicality	3.66	1.61	[5]	3.89	1.47	[5]	0.23	1.13
# of reports	1.44	0.94	[1]	1.43	0.94	[1]	-0.0094	0.91
Team work	1.91	1.28	[1]	1.69	1.10	[1]	-0.22	1.41
Social impact	2.17	1.15	[2]	1.85	1.00	[2]	-0.32	1.04
Pension contributions	2.10	0.86	[2]	1.92	0.77	[2]	-0.18	0.89
Paid holidays	1.85	0.50	[2]	1.94	0.51	[2]	0.00	0.00
How family friendly	2.47	1.13	[2]	1.89	0.96	[2]	-0.58	1.32
Quality of perks	3.00	1.25	[3]	2.66	1.29	[2]	-0.34	1.59
Layoff risk	1.64	0.80	[1]	1.52	0.66	[1]	-0.12	0.89
Negotiation opportunities	3.23	1.45	[2]	2.90	1.37	[2]	-0.33	1.43
Continuing education	3.14	1.50	[3]	2.46	1.41	[2]	-0.68	1.63
Quality of work environment	2.45	1.04	[2]	2.14	0.95	[2]	-0.31	1.28
Support from colleagues	2.23	1.07	[2]	1.70	0.79	[2]	-0.53	1.26
Support from boss	2.82	1.30	[3]	1.89	0.98	[2]	-0.93	1.62
How respected	2.23	1.09	[2]	1.71	0.79	[2]	-0.52	1.27
How stressed	2.72	1.30	[3]	3.20	1.13	[3]	0.48	1.46
Weekly hours	37.3	6.76	[37]	37.2	5.91	[37]	-0.16	5.89
Observations	19167			19167			19167	

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the specific amenity questions. Most questions presented options on a 1-5 Likert scale; see Appendix E for complete questions.

Table A.4: Comparison with revealed preference measures of firm amenities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log(size)		Sorkin (2018)		Poaching index	
Firm amenity effect	1.835***	0.672***	-0.155***	0.338***	-0.114***	0.0214*
	(0.145)	(0.163)	(0.0311)	(0.0410)	(0.00754)	(0.0101)
Firm wage effect		-7.952***		3.269***		0.928***
		(0.235)		(0.0596)		(0.0160)
Observations	38332	38332	37643	37643	38332	38332
# workers	19167	19167	19167	19167	19167	19167
# firm	7017	7017	7017	7017	7017	7017

Notes: This table reports regressions of various revealed preference measures of firm amenities on firm wage and amenity effects estimated in this paper. Columns 1 and 2 use log average monthly employment. Columns 3 and 4 use the PageRank valuation from the methodology described in Sorkin (2018). Columns 5 and 6 use the poaching rank, which is the share of new hires coming from other employers vs. non-employment. Firm wage effects included in columns 2, 4, and 6 are instrumented with independent estimates constructed using the complete register data excluding the survey sample.

Table A.5: Regressions of reservation wages on recoded amenities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Set own schedule	6.344***									3.573***
	(0.472)									(0.515)
Telecommute		3.636***								-0.473
		(0.566)								(0.608)
Not physical			0.579							-1.165
			(0.679)							(0.687)
Relaxed				6.299***						4.997***
				(0.389)						(0.392)
Choose how to work					9.821***					6.501***
					(0.550)					(0.580)
Six + weeks PTO						5.702***				2.945***
						(0.647)				(0.641)
Work in teams							3.165***			3.171***
							(0.417)			(0.412)
Training opportunities								7.758***		5.051***
								(0.477)		(0.487)
Social impact									1.990***	1.648***
									(0.414)	(0.404)
Constant	25.93***	26.47***	26.83***	26.01***	25.67***	26.54***	26.66***	25.68***	26.03***	23.17***
	(0.226)	(0.225)	(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.220)	(0.224)	(0.277)	(0.278)
Observations	19167	19167	19167	19167	19167	19167	19167	19167	19167	19167


Notes: This table reports the results of regressions of own reservation wages on changes in specific amenities recoded to mirror the coding in Maestas et al. (2023) as closely as possible. Each variable is coded as a binary indicator for presence of the amenity. The outcome is the reservation wage, which can be interpreted as the percentage point change in pay required to make the respondent indifferent between their current and previous job. The coefficients can therefore be interpreted as estimated willingness to pay for each amenity.

Table A.6: Robustness: Reservation wages vs. wage changes for movers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All moves	Wage $\Delta < 20\%$		$\Delta \in [-30, 30]$	$\Delta \in [-20, 20]$	$\Delta \in [-10, 10]$
Change in wages	-0.283***	-0.684***	-0.468***	-0.399***	-0.537***	-0.913***
	(0.0732)	(0.193)	(0.0577)	(0.0418)	(0.0683)	(0.188)
Observations	19211	15156	15156	16892	14449	9842
# directed moves	15601	15601	15601	15601	15601	15601
First-stage coef	0.52	0.31	0.28	0.35	0.25	0.12
First-stage SE	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Sampling weights	Yes	Yes				
Alt. instrument			Yes			


Notes: This table reports 2SLS regressions of own reservation wage responses on changes in log wages. All columns use the same instrument as in Table 4 except column 3, which uses the mean hourly wage recorded in the register instead of the median. Columns 1-2 use worker-level inverse sampling weights. Columns 2-6 vary the restriction on wage changes incl included. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The bottom of the table reports the first stage coefficient and standard error.

Figure A.1: Worker-level weight distributions




Notes: This figure shows kernel density estimates of the distribution of weights for the worker in the analysis sample. "Sample" refers to observations per worker in the analysis sample, which is mechanically equal to 1 for each worker. "Sampling" is the inverse probability of sampling, normalized by the median weight. The notes to the figure report the max weight, max leverage for the worker-level mean, and share of worker with weights > 20, which are not pictured in the plot.

Figure A.2: Firm-level weight distributions




Notes: This figure shows kernel density estimates of the distribution of weights for the firms in the analysis sample. "Sample" is the number of workers at the firm in the survey sample. "Register" is average monthly employment in the full Danish microdata. "Sampling" is the inverse probability of sampling. "Combined" is the product of register and sampling weights. All weights are normalized by the median. The notes to the figure report the max weight, max leverage for the firm-level mean, and share of firms with weights > 20, which are not pictured in the plot.

Figure A.3: Distribution of own reservation wages (stay vs. take-back framings)



Notes: This figure shows the distribution of own reservation wages by whether workers were shown the question framed as taking back vs. staying in their previous jobs.


Figure A.4: Match rates between job start/end dates in survey and register



Notes: This figure shows the share of survey respondents we can link to jobs in the register data based on the reported start/end dates of their current/prior jobs. The x-axis increases the window we allow around the reported dates in the survey.


Figure A.5: Marginal distributions of pay and hours in survey and register

a) Earnings change between jobs



Survey: Mean 7.6 SD 18.4. Register: Mean 9.3 SD 25.3. Data is winsorized at +/- 100% (affecting 3.0% of sample).
Bins with N<5 removed (affecting 0.04%/0.01% of sample)

b) Weekly ours of prior and current job




Survey: Mean 37.24 SD 6.09. Register: Mean 35.14 SD 5.14. Data is winsorized at 80 hours.
Bins with N<5 removed (affecting 0.00%/0.00% of sample)


Notes: This figure shows the distributions of earnings changes (Panel (a)) and weekly hours (Panel (b)) in the survey and register data. Earnings in the register are recorded as the median monthly pay during the last six months of the prior job and first six months of current job, excluding the last and first month of each, respectively.

Figure A.6: Predictors of reservation wages

a) Own reservation wage




b) Typical worker reservation wage




Notes: This figure shows the relationship between reservation wages and changes in specific amenities. Blue dots reflect the bivariate relationship, while red squares are coefficients from a multivariate regression including all amenities simultaneously. Amenities are divided by their pooled standard deviation so that coefficients can be interpreted as the impact of a 1 s.d. increase. Panel (a) shows the results for workers' own reservation wage between the jobs, while Panel (b) shows their reported reservation wage for the typical worker. The specific amenity questions typically elicited ordinal information (see Appendix E), an issue we ignore by cardinalizing responses (e.g., 1 = "Very good," 2 = "Good," etc.).

Figure A.7: Predictors of revealed preference amenity measures




Notes: This figure show the relationship between specific amenities and various revealed preference measures of amenities. Each estimate stacks the survey data into a panel with two observations per worker and regresses amenity effects onto the reported level of each amenity provided. Blue dots reflect the bivariate relationship, while red squares are coefficients from a multivariate regression including all amenities simultaneously. Amenities are divided by their pooled standard deviation so that coefficients can be interpreted as the impact of a 1 s.d. increase. All estimates include a control for firm wage effects instrumented with independent estimates constructed using the complete register data excluding the survey sample. The outcome in panel (a) is log average monthly employment. Panel (b) uses the PageRank valuation from the methodology described in Sorkin (2018). Panel (c) uses the poaching rank, which is the share of new hires coming from other employers vs. non-employment. The specific amenity questions typically elicited ordinal information (see Appendix E), an issue we ignore by cardinalizing responses (e.g., 1 = "Very good," 2 = "Good," etc.).

Figure A.8: Wage effects estimated in- vs. out-of-sample




Notes: This figure shows a binned scatter plot of firm wage effects estimated in the full Danish register data excluding the survey sample and estimated in the survey sample using survey responses. The notes to the figure report the OLS slope and robust standard error.

Figure A.9: Average firm amenity effects by industry: Population weighted




Notes: This figure shows average firm amenity effects estimated by industry. The number in parentheses indicates the number of firms in the industry in the sample. Industries with 10 or fewer firms are not shown. Amenity effects are multiplied by 100 so that values can be interpreted as approximate percentage point differences. Averages are weighted by the product of their inverse sampling probability and their average monthly employment in the full Danish microdata.

Figure A.10: Relationship between changes in wages and change in firm wage effects



Notes: This figure shows the relationship between changes in wages and changes in firm wage effects. Each blue dot represents the average of the dependent and independent variables in 20 quantiles of the independent variable. Both effects are multiplied by 100 so that quantities can be interpreted as percentage point differences. The red line is the OLS fit, which as reported below has a slope of 0.139 and robust standard error of 0.006. The IV slope is estimated instrumenting for survey reported wage changes with wage changes reported in the register and has a slope of 0.42 with a standard error of 0.015.


Figure A.11: Changes in total amenities vs. wages (second stage fits)




Notes: This figure shows a binned scatter plot of own reservation wages vs. second stage fitted values from a regression of changes in wages reported in the survey on changes in wages reported in the register. Each blue dot represents the average of the dependent and independent variables in 20 quantiles of the independent variable. Both effects are multiplied by 100 so that quantities can be interpreted as percentage point differences. The red line is the OLS fit of the outcome on the independent variable, which in this case corresponds to the second stage regression in the 2SLS regression instrumenting for survey reported wage changes with wage changes reported in the register.

Figure A.12: Changes in total amenities vs. pay: Effects of question framing

a) Take back old job




b) Keep old job




Notes: This figure shows binned scatter plots of own reservation wages vs. second stage fitted values from a regression of changes in wages reported in the survey on changes in wages reported in the register. Panel (a) uses only the "take-back" framing of the reservation wage question, while panel (b) uses the keep old job framing. Each blue dot represents the average of the dependent and independent variables in 20 quantiles of the independent variable. Both effects are multiplied by 100 so that quantities can be interpreted as percentage point differences. The red line is the OLS fit of the outcome on the independent variable, which in this case corresponds to the second stage regression in the 2SLS regression instrumenting for survey reported wage changes with wage changes reported in the register.

Figure A.13: Changes in total amenities vs. pay: heterogeneity by reason for job move

a) Voluntary EE




b) All other



Notes: This figure shows a binned scatter plot of own reservation wages vs. changes in wages reported in the survey, i.e., $(a_k + \tilde{a}_{ik}) - (a_j + \tilde{a}_{ij})$ vs. $(w_k + \tilde{w}_{ik}) - (w_j + \tilde{w}_{ij})$, split by workers' reported reasons for their job moves. Each blue dot represents the average of the dependent and independent variables in Xyz quantiles of the independent variable. Both effects are multiplied by 100 so that quantities can be interpreted as percentage point differences. Panel (a)) focuses on workers who switched voluntarily from their previous job and Panel (b)) focuses on all other reasons. The red line is the OLS fit, which as reported below has a slope of -0.091 for voluntary EE (-0.048 for all other) and robust standard error of 0.015 (0.019 for all other). The IV slope is estimated instrumenting for survey reported wage changes with wage changes reported in the register and has a slope of -0.272 for voluntary EE (-0.12 for all other) with a standard error of 0.03 (0.042 for all other). Both estimates are attenuated by large positive wage changes changes, largely driven by workers who report low hours in the prior job. Sub-setting to wage changes below .2 log points yields an IV slope of -.609 (0.064) for voluntary EE and -0.345 (0.101) for all other.

Figure A.14: AKM wage premia vs. firm wage effects in the model




Notes: This figure shows a binned scatter plot of estimated firm wage premia vs. common wage components from the model estimated in Section 8. Firm wage premia are estimated using two-way fixed effect models applied to panel data simulated from the model. Common wage effects are defined as the population average of $w_j(Z_i)$.

B Sample and summary statistics


B.1 Response quality

Figure B.1: Pay and hours in survey vs. register

a) Earnings change between jobs



b) Hours of Jobs



Notes: This figure shows binned scatter plots of the register data against our survey responses for earnings changes (Panel (a)) and hours (Panel (b)). Earnings in the register are recorded as the median monthly pay during the last six months of the prior job and first six months of current job, excluding the last and first month of each, respectively. Panel (b) includes a dashed line at 37 hours, where the register data shows strong evidence of topcoding.


Table B.1: Are you actively looking for new work? (in pp)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pay change in %	-0.110			-0.137
	(0.0153)			(0.0154)
Own res wage in %		-0.165		-0.158
		(0.00825)		(0.0102)
Typical worker res wage in %			-0.125	-0.0242
			(0.00893)	(0.0110)
Constant	17.02	20.60	18.07	21.82
	(0.300)	(0.386)	(0.319)	(0.418)
Observations	19211	19211	19211	19211

Standard errors in parentheses. RHS variables winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles.

Notes: This table presents a regression of a dummy variable for whether workers are actively searching for new work on their reported pay and non-pay changes. Columns (1)-(3) are univariate regressions, and Column (4) is a multivariate regression.

Figure B.2: Reservation wages versus changes in job ideality



Notes: This figure shows a binned scatter plot of workers' reservation wages against the difference in ideality of their current versus previous jobs. Change in ideality is difference in responses for the old and new job, with "The ideal job" coded as a 6 and "Very farm from ideal" coded as a 1.

C Heterogeneity

C.1 Reason for job move

Table C.1: Share of workers, reservation wage, and pay change by reason for job move

	Share in %	Res. wage in %	Pay change in %
Fired	6.6	30.3	3.1
Workplace closed	1.9	14.8	5.4
Temporary	4.8	20.5	9.4
Education	0.9	26.7	27.9
I quit	5.8	40.1	3.6
I switched voluntarily	66.0	25.9	9.0
Moved residence	2.5	16.2	1.6
Family situation	1.2	20.4	3.5
Other	10.3	32.1	4.9
Total	100.0	26.9	7.7

In registers, most job movers have stable life situations:


- 13.5% move address
- 6.4% have first kid
- 9.2% change marital status
- 1.0% experience mass layoff

Validating Reason for Job Moves. Share reporting "family situation" is


- 6.1% (0.8%) among job movers with (without) first kid
- 2.9% (1.0%) among job movers with (without) change in marital status

Figure C.1: Self-reported and register-based move motivations align

a) "Workplace Closure" vs. Firm Growth



b) "Moved Residence" vs. Distance of Move



Notes: This figure shows xyz.

D Invitation letter

This section contains the invitation letter for the main survey. We sent three reminders, two by e-mail (Digital Post) and one by text (SMS).

The English translation starts on page 27, with the original Danish version on page 29.

Maj 2024

What is a good job?

Dear [name]

We are reaching out to hear your opinion about your current job and your previous job, as well as the aspects you value most in a job.

Statistics Denmark is conducting this survey on behalf of a team of researchers from the University of Copenhagen and the University of Chicago. The results will be part of a **research project** on inequality in the Danish labor market. By completing the questionnaire, you will contribute to our understanding of what drives inequality in the Danish labor market.

Your responses are important, regardless of which aspects of a job you value, and they will not be shared with your employer.

By completing the questionnaire, you will automatically participate in a lottery for a **prize of [X.XXX] DKK tax-free**.

The questionnaire takes **about 10 minutes** to complete. You can participate by clicking the link below and filling out the questionnaire:

Start survey «uns_url»

Alternatively, visit www.dst.dk/ditsvar and enter the response code **«code»**.

Statistics Denmark handles your responses confidentially. Results are presented in a way that ensures no one can see individual answers, and the data is used solely for statistical and scientific purposes.

Participation is voluntary. If you do not wish to participate, you can indicate so: «refusal_link».

If you have questions, you can email info@dstsurvey.dk or call 7777 7708 (every day from 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM). Please provide your response code when contacting us.

Best regards,

Marie Fuglsang
Head of Division, DST Survey

Mette Rasmussen
Assistant Professor, University of Copenhagen

Who gets invited to Statistics Denmark's surveys?

Everyone residing in Denmark may be invited to participate in one of Statistics Denmark's surveys. Selection for the survey is random. It is crucial for our surveys to include opinions and attitudes from the entire population across gender, age, education, and residence.

Why can Statistics Denmark contact you?

One of Statistics Denmark's statutory tasks is to use statistical production and related activities to perform tasks for customers under the rules for income-financed business activities. This is stipulated in Section 1, Subsection 3, No. 5 of the Statistics Denmark Act. This allows Statistics Denmark to contact you to collect information for this survey.

How do we process your information?

Your responses in the questionnaire are processed in accordance with the rules in the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Danish Data Protection Act.

The University of Copenhagen is the data controller for the survey. You can read more about the data controller and find contact information here: https://informationssikkerhed.ku.dk/persondatabeskyt-telse/privatlivspolitik/

Statistics Denmark is the data processor and manages data collection on behalf of the data controller.

Your responses are used solely for statistical and scientific purposes in this survey. Your responses are deleted or archived in accordance with applicable legislation when they are no longer needed for the survey.

At this link, https://www.dst.dk/privatlivspolitik-i-en-frivillig-undersoegelse, you can read more about how we process your information.

If you have further questions about how we process your personal data, you are welcome to contact Statistics Denmark's Data Protection Officer at databeskyttelse@dst.dk.

Maj 2024

Hvad er et godt job?

Kære «navn»

Vi skriver til dig, fordi vi gerne vil høre din mening om dit nuværende job og dit forrige job, samt hvilke aspekter du sætter pris på i dit job.

Danmarks Statistik gennemfører undersøgelsen for et hold forskere fra Københavns Universitet samt University of Chicago. Resultaterne fra undersøgelsen skal indgå i et **forskningsprojekt** om ulighed på det danske arbejdsmarked. Ved at besvare spørgeskemaet vil du derfor medvirke til at gøre os klogere på hvad der skaber ulighed på det danske arbejdsmarked.

Dine svar er vigtige, uanset hvilke aspekter af et job du sætter pris på, og de vil ikke blive delt med din arbejdsgiver.

Ved at gennemføre spørgeskemaet deltager du automatisk i lodtrækningen om **en præmie på [X.XXX] kr. skattefrit.**

Det tager **ca. 10 minutter** at besvare spørgeskemaet. Du deltager ved at klikke på nedenstående link og svare på spørgeskemaet.

Start undersøgelsen «uns_url»

Eller gå ind på www.dst.dk/ditsvar og tast svarkoden **«kode»**

Danmarks Statistik behandler dine svar fortroligt. Vi formidler resultaterne på en måde, så ingen kan se, hvad den enkelte har svaret og data anvendes alene til statistiske og videnskabelige formål.

Det er frivilligt at deltage. Ønsker du ikke at deltage, kan du tilkendegive det: «refusal_link»

Har du spørgsmål, kan du skrive til info@dstsurvey.dk eller ringe på tlf. 7777 7708 (alle dage ml. kl. 9-16). Oplys venligst din svarkode ved henvendelse.

Med venlig hilsen

Marie Fuglsang
Kontorchef, DST Survey

Mette Rasmussen
Adjunkt, Københavns Universitet

Hvem bliver inviteret til Danmarks Statistiks undersøgelser?

Alle, der har bopæl i Danmark, har mulighed for at blive inviteret til at deltage i en af Danmarks Statistiks undersøgelser. Udvælgelse af personer til undersøgelsen sker tilfældigt. I vores undersøgelser er det vigtigt at kende meninger og holdninger fra hele befolkningen på tværs af køn, alder, uddannelse og bopæl.

Hvorfor må Danmarks Statistik kontakte dig?

En af Danmarks Statistiks myndighedsopgaver er at bruge den statistiske produktion og afledte aktiviteter til at udføre opgaver for kunder mod betaling efter reglerne for indtægtsdækket virksomhed. Det følger af § 1, stk. 3, nr. 5, i lov om Danmarks Statistik. Dette er årsagen til, at Danmarks Statistik må kontakte dig for at indsamle oplysninger til denne undersøgelse.

Hvordan behandler vi oplysninger om dig?

De svar, du afgiver ved deltagelse i spørgeskemaundersøgelsen, bliver behandlet i overensstemmelse med reglerne i den europæiske databeskyttelsesforordning (GDPR) og den danske databeskyttelseslov.

Københavns Universitet er dataansvarlig for undersøgelsen. Du kan læse mere om den dataansvarlige og finde kontaktoplysninger her: https://informationssikkerhed.ku.dk/persondatabeskyt-telse/privatlivspoli-tik/

Danmarks Statistik er databehandler og står for dataindsamlingen på vegne af den dataansvarlige.

Dine svar i bruges udelukkende til statistiske og videnskabelige formål i denne undersøgelse. Dine svar slet-tes eller arkiveres efter gældende lovgivning, når oplysningerne ikke længere har et formål i undersøgelsen.

På linket https://www.dst.dk/privatlivspolitik-i-en-frivillig-undersoegelse kan du læse mere om, hvordan vi behandler oplysninger om dig.

Har du andre spørgsmål til behandling af dine personoplysninger, er du velkommen til at kontakte Dan-marks Statistiks databeskyttelsesrådgiver på databeskyttelse@dst.dk.

E Survey questionnaire

This section contains our survey questionnaire. The English translation starts on page 32, with the original Danish version on page 47.

"What is a good job?"

[Q1] Thank you for participating in this survey.

Are you employed?

1. No
2. Yes

[Q1e] Have you changed jobs within the last three years?

1. No
2. Yes

If [1] = No or [1e] = No: The questionnaire ends.

Block 1: Facts about current and previous job

[Intro_A]

We will now ask you a series of questions regarding your current and previous job. If you have several jobs, we ask you to think about the job where you earn the most.

It will not be possible to answer "don't know" in the questionnaire. If you are unsure which answer category is correct, please choose the one you think comes closest.

Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and will not be shared with your employer.

[For Q1a: Answer option in dropdown with months (Jan-Dec) and year (2024-1970).]

[Q1a] When did you start your current job?

Month [XX] Year [XX]

[For Q1b: Allow answers in the range between 0-120 hours, otherwise warning]

[Q1b] How many hours a week do you work on average in your current job? Please enter your answer in whole hours.

[XX] hours

[For Q1c: Answer option in dropdown with months (Jan-Dec) and year (2024-1970)]

[Q1c] When did you end your previous job, i.e. the job before your current job?

Month [XX] Year [XXXX]

[For Q1d: Allow answers in the range between 0-120 hours, otherwise warning]

[Q1d] How many hours per week did you work on average in your previous job? Please enter your answer in whole hours.

[XX] hours

[Q2] Why did you end your previous job? Choose the statement that best fits.

1. I was fired.
2. My previous workplace closed.
3. My previous job was a temporary position.
4. My previous job was part of my education.
5. I resigned from my previous job without having a new job at hand.
6. I resigned from my previous job because I found my current job.
7. I would like to move residence.
8. My family situation changed.
9. Other, please write: [open text]

[if Q2=8:]

[Q2b] How did your family situation change?

1. I had children/child
2. I found a partner
3. I got married
4. My partner/spouse and I separated
5. My partner got a new job
6. A member of my family fell ill
7. Other, please write

[Q2a1] Think about the salary in your current and previous job. How does the salary you received at the start of your current job compare to the salary in your previous job?

We define salary as your gross monthly salary, before tax and including pension contributions. Choose the answer that is most accurate.

The salary at the start of my current job was…

1. over 20% higher than the salary in my previous job.
2. 10-20% higher than the salary in my previous job
3. 1-10% higher than the salary in my previous job
4. same as the salary in my previous job
5. 1-10% lower than the salary in my previous job
6. 10-20% lower than the salary in my previous job
7. over 20% lower than the salary in my previous job.

[If Q2a1= 2,3 (only allow answers in the relevant range)]

[Q2a2] You stated that the salary at the start of your current job was [xx-xx%] higher than the salary in your previous job. Which number in the range [xx-xx%] best corresponds to how much higher the salary was in your current job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers

[xx]%

[If Q2a.1=1 (allow answers >=20, i.e. no upper limit)]

[Q2a2a] You indicated that the salary at the start of your current job was more than 20% higher than the salary in your previous job.

Which number (over 20%) best corresponds to how much higher the salary was in your current job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers

[xx]%

[If Q2a1= 5,6 (only allow answers in the relevant range]

[Q2a3] You stated that the salary at the start of your current job was [xx-xx%] lower than the salary in your previous job. Which number in the range [xx-xx%] best corresponds to how much lower pay was in your current job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers

[xx]%

[H show Q2a.1=7 (allow answers >=20, i.e. no upper limit).]

[Q2a3a] You indicated that the salary at the start of your current job was more than 20% lower than the salary in your previous job.

Which number (above 20%) best corresponds to how much lower the salary was in your current job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers

[xx]%

Block 2: Job amenities

[Intro_B]

You will now be presented with a series of questions about different aspects of your current and previous job.

Please enter one answer in each column.

[Programming: Randomize all Q3 3D grids. Randomize column x=1 (Current job) and x=2 (Previous job), but keep order for each respondent from Q3a through Q4.]

[Q3a_x] How long is your commute between your place of residence and your workplace?

1. No commute / homework
2. Less than 10 minutes
3. 10 to 19 minutes
4. 20 to 40 minutes
5. More than 40 minutes

[Q3b_x] How often does your workplace allow you to work from home?

1. Every day
2. A couple of times a week
3. A couple of times a month
4. A few days a year
5. Never

[Q3c_x] To what extent does your employer decide when you work?

1. I decide my own working hours
2. I can organize my working hours within certain limits
3. I can choose between several fixed working hours
4. My employer determines my working hours

[Q3d_x] How much independence do you have in your work?

1. I decide entirely on my tasks and work methods
2. I decide on my tasks and working methods within certain limits
3. My manager and I jointly decide on my tasks and working methods
4. My manager decides my tasks and working methods

[Q3e_x] How often do you have to work at a fast pace?

1. Every day
2. A couple of times a week
3. A couple of times a month
4. A few times a year
5. Never

[Q3f_x] How often do you work on tasks that you find interesting?

1. Every day
2. A couple of times a week
3. A couple of times a month
4. A few times a year
5. Never

[Q3g_x] How often does your job involve physically demanding work?

1. Every day
2. A couple of times a week
3. A couple of times a month
4. A few times a year
5. Never

[Q3h_x] How many employees do you have managerial responsibility for?

1. None
2. 1-3 employees
3. 4-10 employees
4. More than 10 employees

[Q3i_x] How often does your job involve working in a team?

1. I work in a team every day
2. I work in a team a few times a week
3. I work in a team a few times a month
4. I work in a team a few times a year
5. I always work alone

[Q3j_x] How often do your work tasks contribute positively to society?

1. Always
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never

[Q3k_x] How much does your employer contribute to your pension?

1. Over 15%
2. 10-15%
3. Under 10%
4. I do not have any employer-paid pension

[Q3l_x] How much vacation are you entitled to?

1. 5 weeks
2. 6 weeks
3. More than 6 weeks

[Q3new1_x] To what extent is your job family-friendly? For example, regarding parental leave conditions, accommodations for family challenges, etc.

1. To a very high degree
2. To a great extent
3. Somewhat
4. To a lesser extent
5. Not at all

[Q3m_x] How good or bad are your perks? Perks can be, for example, lunch arrangements, Christmas gifts, company parties, etc.

1. Very good
2. Good
3. Neither good nor bad
4. Bad
5. Very bad

[Q3n_x] What is your risk of being laid off in a typical working year?

1. Very small risk
2. Small risk
3. Big risk
4. Very big risk

[Q3o_x] How often do you have the opportunity to negotiate with your employer? For example, about salary increases beyond the regular salary adjustment?

1. Several times a year
2. Once a year
3. Every other year approximately
4. Every five years approximately
5. Never

[Q3p_x] How often do you have the opportunity for continuing education?

1. Several times a year
2. Once a year
3. Every other year approximately
4. Every five years approximately
5. Never

[Q3q_x] How good or bad is your physical working environment? For example, buildings, furniture, temperature, equipment, etc.?

1. Very good
2. Good
3. Neither good nor bad
4. Bad
5. Very bad

[Q3r_x] How supportive are your colleagues?

1. Very supportive
2. Supportive
3. Neither supportive nor non-supportive
4. Not supportive
5. Not supportive at all
6. I don't have any colleagues

[Q3new2_x] How supportive is your boss?

1. Very supportive
2. Supportive
3. Neither supportive nor non-supportive
4. Not supportive
5. Not supportive at all
6. I don't have a boss

[Q3s_x] How respected do you feel in general at your workplace?

1. Very respected
2. Respected
3. Neither respected nor disrespected
4. Not respected
5. Not respected at all

[Q3t_x] How often do you feel stressed because of your work?

1. Every day
2. A couple of times a week
3. A couple of times a month
4. A few times a year
5. Never

Block 3: Evaluation of jobs

[Intro_c]

We will now ask for your overall assessment of your current and previous job.

Please note that since you changed jobs, your personal situation may have changed and you may also have gotten to know your new job better. Please answer the following questions based on your situation and knowledge today.

[Q4a_x] Considering all aspects of your previous and current job (including salary), how would you rate the jobs?

1. The ideal job
2. Very close to ideal
3. Close to ideal
4. Neither far from nor close to ideal
5. Far from ideal
6. Very far from ideal

[Q4b_x] Considering all aspects of your previous and current job (including salary), how do you think a typical person with the same skills as you would rate the jobs?

1. The ideal job
2. Very close to ideal
3. Close to ideal
4. Neither far from nor close to ideal
5. Far from ideal
6. Very far from ideal

[If subtype2=1]

[Q5a] Now imagine that you could get your previous job back to the way it was before you left it. Everything else in your life was otherwise as it is today, i.e. family situation, place of residence, etc.

Try to disregard one-off costs or difficulties of changing jobs, such as changing workplaces, learning new work procedures, etc.

What is the lowest salary that would make you willing to take your previous job back?

We define salary as your gross monthly salary, before tax and including pension contributions. Choose the statement that best fits.

I would take my previous job back…

1. even if the salary was over 20% lower than the salary in my current job.
2. even if the salary was 10-20% lower than the salary in my current job.
3. even if the salary was 1-10% lower than the salary in my current job.
4. if the salary was the same as the salary in my current job.
5. if the salary was 1-10% higher than the salary in my current job.
6. if the salary was 10-20% higher than the salary in my current job.
7. if the salary was over 20% higher than the salary in my current job.

[If subtype2=1 and Q5a=1]

[Q5a1] You indicated that you would be willing to take your previous job back even if the salary was over 20% lower than the salary in your current job.

What is the biggest pay cut (over 20%) you would accept to take back your previous job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers.

[xx]%

[If subtype2=1 and Q5a=2,3]

[Q5b] You indicated that you would be willing to take your previous job back even if the salary was [xx-xx%] lower than the salary in your current job. What is the largest salary decrease in the range [xx-xx%] you would accept to take your previous job back?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers.

[xx]%

[If subtype2=1 and Q5a=5,6]

[Q5c] You indicated that you would be willing to take your previous job back if the salary was [xx-xx%] higher than the salary in your current job. What is the minimum salary increase in the [xx-xx%] range you would require to take your previous job back?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers.

[xx]%

[If subtype2=1 and Q5a=7]

[Q5c1] You indicated that you would be willing to take your previous job back if the salary was 20% higher than the salary in your current job.

What is the minimum salary increase (over 20%) you would accept to take your previous job back?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers.

[xx]%

[If subtype2=1 and Q5a1>=50]

[Q5a1a] You indicated that you would be willing to take your previous job back if the salary was [answer from Q5a1]% lower than the salary in your current job.

Can you briefly explain why you would take your previous job back despite such a big pay cut?

[open text]

[If subtype2=1 and Q5c1>=50]

[Q5c1a] You indicated that you would be willing to take your previous job back if the salary was [answer from Q5c1]% higher than the salary in your current job.

Can you briefly explain why you would require such a large salary increase to take your previous job back?

[open text]

[If subtype2=2]

[Q5d] Now imagine that you were still employed in your previous job and had the opportunity to switch to your current job. Everything else in your life was otherwise as it is today, i.e. family situation, place of residence, etc.

Try to disregard one-off costs or difficulties of changing jobs, such as changing workplaces, learning new work procedures, etc.

What is the lowest salary that would have made you willing to stay in your previous job and not switch to your current job?

We define salary as your gross monthly salary, before tax and including pension contributions. Choose the statement that best fits.

I would have stayed in my previous job…

1. even if the salary was over 20% lower than the salary in my current job.
2. even if the salary was 10-20% lower than the salary in my current job.
3. even if the salary was 1-10% lower than the salary in my current job.
4. if the salary was the same as the salary in my current job.
5. if the salary was 1-10% higher than the salary in my current job.
6. if the salary was 10-20% higher than the salary in my current job.
7. if the salary was over 20% higher than the salary in my current job.

[If subtype2=2 and Q5d=1]

[Q5d1] You indicated being willing to stay in your previous job, even if the salary was over 20% lower than the salary in your current job.

What is the biggest pay cut (over 20%) you would accept to stay in your previous job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers.

[xx]%

[If subtype2=2 and Q5d=2,3]

[Q5e] You indicated being willing to stay in your previous job even if the salary was [xx-xx%] lower than the salary in your current job. What is the largest salary decrease in the [xx-xx%] range you would accept to stay in your previous job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers.

[xx]%

[If subtype2=2 and Q5d=5,6]

[Q5f] You indicated that you would be willing to stay in your previous job again if the salary was [xx-xx%] higher than the salary in your current job. What is the minimum salary increase in the [xx-xx%] range you would require to stay in your previous job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers.

[xx]%

[If subtype2=2 and Q5d=7]

[Q5f1] You indicated that you would be willing to stay in your previous job again if the salary was over 20% higher than the salary in your current job.

What is the minimum salary increase (over 20%) you would accept to stay in your previous job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers

[xx]%

[If subtype2=2 and Q5d1>=50]

[Q5d1a] You indicated being willing to stay in your previous job, even if the salary was [answer from Q5d 1]% lower than the salary in your current job.

Can you briefly explain why you would be willing to stay in your previous job despite such a big pay cut?

[open text]

[If subtype2=2 and Q5f1>=50]

[Q5f1a] You indicated that you would be willing to stay in your previous job if the salary was [answer from Q5f 1]% higher than the salary in your current job.

Can you briefly explain why you would demand such a large salary increase to stay in your previous job?

[open text]

[Q6] Think of a typical person with the same skills as you. Imagine that you had to advise the person to choose between your previous or current job. Assume the person is qualified for both positions.

What is the lowest salary where you would recommend your previous job?

We define salary as your gross monthly salary, before tax and including pension contributions. Choose the statement that best fits.

I would recommend my previous job over my current job…

1. even if the salary was over 20% lower than the salary in my current job.
2. even if the salary was 10-20% lower than the salary in my current job.
3. even if the salary was 1-10% lower than the salary in my current job.
4. if the salary was the same as the salary in my current job.
5. if the salary was 1-10% higher than the salary in my current job.
6. if the salary was 10-20% higher than the salary in my current job.
7. if the salary was over 20% higher than the salary in my current job.

[If Q6=1]

[Q6a] You indicated that you would recommend your previous job over your current job, even though the salary was over 20% lower than the salary in your current job.

What is the biggest salary decrease (over 20%) where you would recommend your previous job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers.

[xx]%

[If Q6=2,3]

[Q6 b] You indicated that you would recommend your previous job over your current job, even if the salary was [xx-xx%] lower than the salary in your current job. What is the biggest salary difference in the range [xx-xx%] where you would recommend your previous job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers.

[xx]%

[If Q6=5,6]

[Q6c] You indicated that you would recommend your previous job over your current job if the salary was [xx-xx%] higher than the salary in your current job. What is the smallest salary difference in the range [xx-xx%] where you would recommend your previous job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers.

[xx]%

[If Q6=7]

[Q6d] You indicated that you would recommend your previous job instead of your current job if the salary was more than 20% higher than the salary in your current job.

What is the smallest salary increase (over 20%) at which you would recommend your previous job?

Please enter your answer in whole numbers

[xx]%

[If Q6a>=50]

[Q6a1a] You indicated that you would recommend your previous job over your current job, even though the salary was [answer from Q6 a]% lower than the salary in your current job.

Can you briefly explain why you would recommend your previous job despite such a big pay cut?

[open text]

[If Q6d>=50]

[Q6d1a] You indicated that you would recommend your previous job over your current job if the salary was [answer from Q6 d]% higher than the salary in your current job.

Can you briefly explain why you would require such a large salary increase to recommend your previous job?

[open text]

Block 4: Plans for future job moves

[Q7] Are you actively looking for a new job?

1. Yes
2. No

[Q8] How long do you expect to stay in your current job?

1. Less than six months
2. Between six months and a year
3. Between one and three years
4. More than three years

[Outro]

We have now received your answers – thank you very much for your participation.

You can now close the window or you can click further below and read more about surveys at Statistics Denmark.

”Hvad er et godt job?”

[Q1] Tak fordi du vil deltage i denne undersøgelse.

Er du beskæftiget?

1. Nej
2. Ja

[Q1e] Har du skiftet job inden for de seneste tre år?

1. Nej
2. Ja

Hvis [1] = Nej eller [1e] = Nej: Spørgeskemaet ender.

Blok 1: Oplysninger om nuværende og forrige job

[Intro_A]

Vi vil nu stille dig en række spørgsmål vedrørende dit nuværende og dit forrige job. Såfremt du har flere jobs, beder vi dig tænke på det job, hvor du tjener mest.

Det vil i spørgeskemaet ikke være muligt at svare ”ved ikke”. Hvis du er usikker på hvilken svarkategori, der er den rigtige, bedes du vælge den, du mener kommer tættest på.

Dine svar vil blive holdt strengt fortrolige og vil ikke blive delt med din arbejdsgiver.

[For Q1a: Svarmulighed i dropdown med måneder (Jan-Dec) samt år (2024-1970).]

[Q1a] Hvornår startede du i dit nuværende job?

Måned [XX] År [XX]

[For Q1b: Tillad svar i intervallet mellem 0-120 timer, ellers advarsel]

[Q1b] Hvor mange timer om ugen arbejder du i gennemsnit i dit nuværende job? Du bedes angive dit svar i hele timer.

[XX] timer

[For Q1c: Svarmulighed i dropdown med måneder (Jan-Dec) samt år (2024-1970)]

[Q1c] Hvornår stoppede du i dit forrige job, dvs. jobbet før dit nuværende job?

Måned [XX] År [XXXX]

[For Q1d: Tillad svar i intervallet mellem 0-120 timer, ellers advarsel]

[Q1d] Hvor mange timer om ugen arbejdede du i gennemsnit i dit forrige job? Du bedes angive dit svar i hele timer.

[XX] timer

[Q2] Hvorfor stoppede du i dit forrige job? Vælg det udsagn, der passer bedst.

1. Jeg blev afskediget.
2. Mit tidligere arbejdssted lukkede.
3. Mit tidligere job var en tidsbegrænset stilling.
4. Mit tidligere job var en del af min uddannelse.
5. Jeg sagde op i mit forrige job, uden at have et nyt job på hånden.
6. Jeg sagde op fra mit forrige job, fordi jeg fandt mit nuværende job.
7. Jeg ville gerne flytte bopæl.
8. Min familiesituation ændrede sig.
9. Andet, skriv venligst [åbent tekstfelt]

[hvis Q2=8:]

[Q2b] Hvordan ændrede din familiesituation sig?

1. Jeg fik børn/barn
2. Jeg fandt en partner
3. Jeg blev gift
4. Min partner/ægtefælle og jeg gik fra hinanden
5. Min partner fik et nyt job
6. Et medlem af min familie blev syg
7. Andet, skriv venligst [åbent tekstfelt]

[Q2a1] Tænk på lønnen i dit nuværende og forrige job. Hvordan er den løn, du fik ved ansættelsestidspunktet i dit nuværende job sammenholdt med lønnen i dit forrige job?

Vi definerer løn som din månedlige bruttoløn, før skat og inklusiv pensionsbidrag. Vælg den svarmulighed, der passer bedst.

Lønnen på ansættelsestidspunktet i mit nuværende job var…

1. over 20% højere end lønnen i mit forrige job.
2. 10-20% højere end lønnen i mit forrige job
3. 1-10% højere end lønnen i mit forrige job
4. tilsvarende lønnen i mit forrige job
5. 1-10% lavere end lønnen i mit forrige job
6. 10-20% lavere end lønnen i mit forrige job
7. over 20% lavere end lønnen i mit forrige job.

[Hvis Q2a1= 2,3 (tillad kun svar i det relevante interval)]

[Q2a2] Du angav, at lønnen på ansættelsestidspunktet i dit nuværende job var [xx-xx%] højere end lønnen i dit forrige job. Hvilket tal i intervallet [xx-xx%] svarer bedst til hvor meget højere lønnen var i dit nuværende job?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal

[xx]%

[Hvis Q2a.1=1 (tillad svar >=20, dvs. ingen øvre grænse)]

[Q2a2a] Du angav, at lønnen på ansættelsestidspunktet i dit nuværende job var over 20% højere end lønnen i dit forrige job.

Hvilket tal (over 20%) svarer bedst til hvor meget højere lønnen var i dit nuværende job?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal

[xx]%

[Hvis Q2a1= 5,6(tillad kun svar i det relevante interval]

[Q2a3] Du angav, at lønnen på ansættelsestidspunktet i dit nuværende job var [xx-xx%] lavere end lønnen i dit forrige job. Hvilket tal i intervallet [xx-xx%] svarer bedst til hvor meget laverelønnen var i dit nuværende job?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal

[xx]%

[Hvis Q2a.1=7 (tillad svar >=20, dvs. ingen øvre grænse).]

[Q2a3a] Du angav, at lønnen på ansættelsestidspunktet i dit nuværende job var over 20% lavere end lønnen i dit forrige job.

Hvilket tal (over 20%) svarer bedst til hvor meget lavere lønnen var i dit nuværende job?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal

[xx]%

Blok 2: Jobgoder

[Intro_B]

Du vil nu blive præsenteret for en række spørgsmål, der handler om forskellige aspekter ved dit nuværende og forrige job.

Du bedes indtaste ét svar i hver kolonne.

[Programming: Randomize all Q3 3D-grids. Randomize column x=1 (Nuværende job) and x=2 (Forrige job), but keep order for each respondent from Q3a through Q4.]

[Q3a_x] Hvor lang er din transport mellem din bopæl og din arbejdsplads?

1. Ingen transport / hjemmearbejde
2. Mindre end 10 minutter
3. 10 til 19 minutter
4. 20 til 40 minutter
5. Mere end 40 minutter

[Q3b_x] Hvor ofte tillader din arbejdsplads, at du kan du arbejde hjemmefra?

1. Hver dag
2. Et par gange om ugen
3. Et par gange om måneden
4. Et par dage om året
5. Aldrig

[Q3c_x] I hvilken grad bestemmer din arbejdsgiver, hvornår du arbejder?

1. Jeg bestemmer helt selv mine arbejdstider
2. Jeg kan tilrettelægge mine arbejdstider inden for visse grænser

3. jeg kan vælge mellem flere faste arbejdstider
4. Min arbejdsgiver fastsætter mine arbejdstider

[Q3d_x] Hvor meget selvstændighed har du i dit arbejde?

1. Jeg bestemmer helt selv mine opgaver og arbejdsmetoder
2. Jeg bestemmer mine opgaver og arbejdsmetoder inden for visse grænser
3. Min leder og jeg beslutter i fællesskab mine opgaver og arbejdsmetoder
4. Min leder fastlægger mine opgaver og arbejdsmetoder

[Q3e_x] Hvor ofte skal du arbejde i højt tempo?

1. Hver dag
2. Et par gange om ugen
3. Et par gange om måneden
4. Et par gange om året
5. Aldrig

[Q3f_x] Hvor ofte arbejder du på opgaver, som du finder interessante?

1. Hver dag
2. Et par gange om ugen
3. Et par gange om måneden
4. Et par gange om året
5. Aldrig

[Q3g_x] Hvor ofte indebærer dit job fysisk anstrengende arbejde?

1. Hver dag
2. Et par gange om ugen
3. Et par gange om måneden
4. Et par gange om året
5. Aldrig

[Q3h_x] Hvor mange medarbejdere har du lederansvar for?

1. Ingen
2. 1-3 medarbejdere
3. 4-10 medarbejdere
4. Flere end 10 medarbejdere

[Q3i_x] Hvor ofte indebærer dit job at arbejde i et team?

1. Jeg arbejder i et team hver dag
2. Jeg arbejder i et team et par gange om ugen
3. Jeg arbejder i et team et par gange om måneden
4. Jeg arbejder i et team et par gange om året
5. Jeg arbejder altid alene

[Q3j_x] Hvor ofte bidrager dine arbejdsopgaver positivt til samfundet?

1. Altid
2. Ofte
3. Nogle gange
4. Sjældent
5. Aldrig

[Q3k_x] Hvor meget indbetaler din arbejdsgiver til din pension?

1. Over 15%
2. 10-15%
3. Under 10%
4. Jeg har ikke nogen arbejdsgiverbetalt pension

[Q3l_x] Hvor meget ferie har du ret til?

1. 5 uger
2. 6 uger
3. Mere end 6 uger

[Q3new1_x] I hvilken grad er dit job familievenligt? Fx ift. barselsvilkår, hensyn til udfordringer i familien etc.

1. I meget høj grad
2. I høj grad
3. I nogen grad
4. I mindre grad
5. Slet ikke

[Q3m_x] Hvor gode eller dårlige er dine frynsegoder? Frynsegoder kan fx være frokostordning, julegaver, firmafester, mv.

1. Meget gode
2. Gode
3. Hverken gode eller dårlige
4. Dårlige
5. Meget dårlige

[Q3n_x] Hvad er din risiko for at blive afskediget i et typisk arbejdsår?

1. Meget lille risiko
2. Lille risiko
3. Stor risiko
4. Meget stor risiko

[Q3o_x] Hvor ofte har du mulighed for at forhandle med din arbejdsgiver? Fx om lønstigninger udover den almindelige lønregulering?

1. Flere gange om året
2. Én gang om året
3. Hvert andet år cirka
4. Hvert femte år cirka
5. Aldrig

[Q3p_x] Hvor ofte har du mulighed for efteruddannelse?

1. Flere gange om året
2. Én gang om året
3. Hvert andet år cirka
4. Hvert femte år cirka
5. Aldrig

[Q3q_x] Hvor godt eller dårligt er dit fysiske arbejdsmiljø? Fx bygninger, møbler, temperatur, udstyr mv.?

1. Meget godt
2. Godt
3. Hverken godt eller dårligt
4. Dårligt
5. Meget dårligt

[Q3r_x] Hvor støttende er dine kolleger?

1. Meget støttende
2. Støttende
3. Hverken støttende eller ikke støttende
4. Ikke støttende
5. Slet ikke støttende
6. Jeg har ikke nogen kolleger

[Q3new2_x] Hvor støttende er din chef?

1. Meget støttende
2. Støttende
3. Hverken støttende eller ikke støttende
4. Ikke støttende
5. Slet ikke støttende
6. Jeg har ikke nogen chef

[Q3s_x] Hvor respekteret føler du dig generelt set på din arbejdsplads?

1. Meget respekteret
2. Respekteret
3. Hverken respekteret eller ikke respekteret
4. Ikke respekteret
5. Slet ikke respekteret

[Q3t_x] Hvor ofte føler du dig stresset pga. dit arbejde?

1. Hver dag
2. Et par gange om ugen
3. Et par gange om måneden
4. Et par gange om året
5. Aldrig

Blok 3: Evaluering af jobs

[Intro_c]

Vi vil nu spørge til din samlede vurdering af dit nuværende og forrige job.

Bemærk venligst, at siden du skiftede job, kan din personlige situation have ændret sig, og du har måske også fået et bedre kendskab til dit nye job. Besvar venligst følgende spørgsmål ud fra din situation og viden i dag.

[Q4a_x] Taget alle aspekter af dit forrige og nuværende job (inklusiv løn) i betragtning, hvordan vil du bedømme jobbene?

1. Det ideelle job
2. Meget tæt på ideelt
3. Tæt på ideelt
4. Hverken langt fra eller tæt på ideelt
5. Langt fra ideelt
6. Meget langt fra ideelt

[Q4b_x] Taget alle aspekter af dit forrige og nuværende job (inklusiv løn) i betragtning, hvordan tror du, at en typisk person med de samme kompetencer som dig, vil bedømme jobbene?

1. Det ideelle job
2. Meget tæt på ideelt
3. Tæt på ideelt
4. Hverken langt fra eller tæt på ideelt
5. Langt fra ideelt
6. Meget langt fra ideelt

[Hvis undertype2=1]

[Q5a] Forestil dig nu, at du kunne få dit forrige job igen, som det var, før du forlod det. Alt andet i dit liv var ellers som i dag, dvs. familiesituation, bopæl mv.

Forsøg at se bort fra engangsomkostninger eller besværligheder ved at skifte jobs, såsom at skifte arbejdsplads, lære nye arbejdsgange, mv.

Hvad er den laveste løn, der ville gøre dig villig til at tage dit forrige job tilbage?

Vi definerer løn som din månedlige bruttoløn, før skat og inklusiv pensionsbidrag. Vælg det udsagn, der passer bedst.

Jeg ville tage mit forrige job tilbage…

1. selv hvis lønnen var over 20% lavere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
2. selv hvis lønnen var 10-20% lavere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
3. selv hvis lønnen var 1-10% lavere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
4. hvis lønnen var den samme som lønnen i mit nuværende job.
5. hvis lønnen var 1-10% højere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
6. hvis lønnen var 10-20% højere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
7. hvis lønnen var over 20% højere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.

[Hvis undertype2=1 og Q5a=1]

[Q5a1] Du angav at være villig til at tage dit forrige job tilbage, selvom lønnen var over 20% lavere end lønnen i dit nuværende job.

Hvad er den største lønnedgang (over 20%), du ville acceptere for at tage dit forrige job tilbage?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal.

[xx]%

[Hvis undertype2=1 og Q5a=2,3]

[Q5b] Du angav at være villig til at tage dit forrige job tilbage, selvom lønnen var [xx-xx%] lavere end lønnen i dit nuværende job. Hvad er den største lønnedgang i intervallet [xx-xx%] , du ville acceptere for at tage dit forrige job tilbage?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal.

[xx]%

[Hvis undertype2=1 og Q5a=5,6]

[Q5c] Du angav at være villig til at tage dit forrige job tilbage, hvis lønnen var [xx-xx%] højere end lønnen i dit nuværende job. Hvad er den mindste lønstigning i intervallet [xx-xx%], du ville kræve for at tage dit forrige job tilbage?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal.

[xx]%

[Hvis undertype2=1 og Q5a=7]

[Q5c1] Du angav at være villig til at tage dit forrige job tilbage, hvis lønnen var 20% højere end lønnen i dit nuværende job.

Hvad er den mindste lønstigning (over 20%), du ville acceptere for at tage dit forrige job tilbage?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal.

[xx]%

[Hvis undertype2=1 og Q5a1>=50]

[Q5a1a] Du angav at være villig til at tage dit forrige job tilbage, hvis lønnen var [answer from Q5a1]% lavere end lønnen i dit nuværende job.

Kan du kort forklare, hvorfor du ville tage dit forrige job tilbage trods en så stor lønnedgang?

[fritekst]

[Hvis undertype2=1 og Q5c1>=50]

[Q5c1a] Du angav at være villig til at tage dit forrige job tilbage, hvis lønnen var [answer from Q5c1]% højere end lønnen i dit nuværende job.

Kan du kort forklare, hvorfor du ville kræve en så stor lønstigning for at tage dit forrige job tilbage?

[fritekst]

[Hvis undertype2=2]

[Q5d] Forestil dig nu, at du stadig var ansat i dit forrige job og havde muligheden for at skifte til dit nuværende job. Alt andet i dit liv var ellers som i dag, dvs. familiesituation, bopæl, mv.

Forsøg at se bort fra engangsomkostninger eller besværligheder ved at skifte jobs, såsom at skifte arbejdsplads, lære nye arbejdsgange, mv.

Hvad er den laveste løn, der ville have gjort dig villig til at blive i dit forrige job og ikke skifte til dit nuværende job?

Vi definerer løn som din månedlige bruttoløn, før skat og inklusiv pensionsbidrag. Vælg det udsagn, der passer bedst.

Jeg ville være blevet i mit forrige job…

1. selv hvis lønnen var over 20% lavere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
2. selv hvis lønnen var 10-20% lavere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
3. selv hvis lønnen var 1-10% lavere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
4. hvis lønnen var den samme som lønnen i mit nuværende job.
5. hvis lønnen var 1-10% højere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
6. hvis lønnen var 10-20% højere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
7. hvis lønnen var over 20% højere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.

[Hvis undertype2=2 og Q5d=1]

[Q5d1] Du angav at være villig til at blive i dit forrige job, selvom lønnen var over 20% lavere end lønnen i dit nuværende job.

Hvad er den <u>største</u> lønnedgang (over 20%), du ville acceptere for at blive i dit forrige job?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal.

[xx]%

[Hvis undertype2=2 og Q5d=2,3]

[Q5e] Du angav at være villig til at blive i dit forrige job, selvom lønnen var [xx-xx%] lavere end lønnen i dit nuværende job. Hvad er den <u>største</u> lønnedgang i intervallet [xx-xx%], du ville acceptere for at blive i dit forrige job?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal.

[xx]%

[Hvis undertype2=2 og Q5d=5,6]

[Q5f] Du angav at være villig til at blive i dit forrige job tilbage, hvis lønnen var [xx-xx%] højere end lønnen i dit nuværende job. Hvad er den <u>mindste</u> lønstigning i intervallet [xx-xx%], du ville kræve for at blive i dit forrige job?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal.

[xx]%

[Hvis undertype2=2 og Q5d=7]

[Q5f1] Du angav at være villig til at blive i dit forrige job tilbage, hvis lønnen var over 20% højere end lønnen i dit nuværende job.

Hvad er den mindste lønstigning (over 20%), du ville acceptere for at blive i dit forrige job?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal

[xx]%

[Hvis undertype2=2 og Q5d1>=50]

[Q5d1a] Du angav at være villig til at blive i dit forrige job, selvom lønnen var [answer from Q5d1]% lavere end lønnen i dit nuværende job.

Kan du kort forklare, hvorfor du ville være villig til at blive i dit forrige job trods en så stor lønnedgang?

[fritekst]

[Hvis undertype2=2 og Q5f1>=50]

[Q5f1a] Du angav at være villig til at blive i dit forrige job, hvis lønnen var [answer from Q5f1]% højere end lønnen i dit nuværende job.

Kan du kort forklare, hvorfor du ville kræve en så stor lønstigning for at blive i dit forrige job?

[fritekst]

[Q6] Tænk på en typisk person med de samme kompetencer som dig. Forestil dig, at du skulle rådgive personen om at vælge imellem dit forrige eller nuværende job. Antag, at personen er kvalificeret til begge stillinger.

Hvad er den laveste løn, hvor du vil anbefale dit forrige job?

Vi definerer løn som din månedlige bruttoløn, før skat og inklusiv pensionsbidrag. Vælg det udsagn, der passer bedst.

Jeg ville anbefale mit forrige job i stedet for mit nuværende job…

1. selv hvis lønnen var over 20% lavere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
2. selv hvis lønnen var 10-20% lavere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
3. selv hvis lønnen var 1-10% lavere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
4. hvis lønnen var den samme som lønnen i mit nuværende job.
5. hvis lønnen var 1-10% højere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
6. hvis lønnen var 10-20% højere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.
7. hvis lønnen var over 20% højere end lønnen i mit nuværende job.

[Hvis Q6=1]

[Q6a] Du angav at ville anbefale dit forrige job i stedet for dit nuværende job, selvom lønnen var over 20% lavere end lønnen i dit nuværende job.

Hvad er den <u>største</u> lønnedgang (over 20%), hvor du ville anbefale dit forrige job?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal.

[xx]%

[Hvis Q6=2,3]

[Q6b] Du angav at ville anbefale dit forrige job i stedet for dit nuværende job, selvom lønnen var [xx-xx%] lavere end lønnen i dit nuværende job. Hvad er den <u>største</u> lønforskel i intervallet [xx-xx%], hvor du ville anbefale dit forrige job?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal.

[xx]%

[Hvis Q6=5,6]

[Q6c] Du angav at ville anbefale dit forrige job i stedet for dit nuværende job, hvis lønnen var [xx-xx%] højere end lønnen i dit nuværende job. Hvad er den <u>mindste</u> lønforskel i intervallet [xx-xx%], hvor du ville anbefale dit forrige job?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal.

[xx]%

[Hvis Q6=7]

[Q6d] Du angav at ville anbefale dit forrige job i stedet for dit nuværende job, hvis lønnen var over 20% højere end lønnen i dit nuværende job.

Hvad er den <u>mindste</u> lønstigning (over 20%), hvor du ville anbefale dit forrige job?

Du bedes angive dit svar i hele tal

[xx]%

[Hvis Q6a>=50]

[Q6a1a] Du angav at ville anbefale dit forrige job i stedet for dit nuværende job, selvom lønnen var [answer from Q6a]% lavere end lønnen i dit nuværende job.

Kan du kort forklare, hvorfor du ville anbefale dit forrige job trods en så stor lønnedgang?

[fritekst]

[Hvis Q6d>=50]

[Q6d1a] Du angav at ville anbefale dit forrige job i stedet for dit nuværende job, hvis lønnen var [answer from Q6d]% højere end lønnen i dit nuværende job.

Kan du kort forklare, hvorfor du ville kræve en så stor lønstigning for at anbefale dit forrige job?

[fritekst]

Blok 4: Planer om fremtidige jobskift

[Q7] Søger du aktivt efter et nyt job?

1. Ja
2. Nej

[Q8] Hvor længe forventer du at blive i dit nuværende job?

1. Mindre end seks måneder
2. Mellem seks måneder og et år
3. Mellem et og tre år
4. Mere end tre år

[Outro]

Vi har nu modtaget dine svar – mange tak for din deltagelse.

Du kan nu lukke vinduet eller du kan klikke videre herunder, og læse mere om undersøgelser hos Danmarks Statistik.