The Protective Effects of a Healthy Spouse: Medicare as the Family Member of Last Resort*

Itzik Fadlon† Tal Gross‡ Alex Hoagland§ Tim Layton¶

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Abstract

Using novel Medicare data that link spouses, we examine how one spouse's sudden incapacitation affects their partner's need for formal care. A spouse's health shock causes their partner to be 19% more likely to visit a skilled nursing facility. That pattern reflects both a change in health and a shift from informal care to formal care. In response, couples become less sensitive to the price of formal care. We explore the implications for optimal health insurance contracts. These types of within-household spillovers justify household-level deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums.

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†UC San Diego and NBER. fadlon@uscd.edu

‡Boston University and NBER. talgross@bu.edu

§University of Toronto. alexander.hoagland@utoronto.ca

¶University of Virginia and NBER. timothyjlayton@virginia.edu

1 Introduction

One of the challenges that an aging population presents is the growing need for elderly care (Johnson et al., 2021; Dall et al., 2013). When the elderly cannot care for themselves, then care must be provided, either formally or informally. Formal care for the elderly consists of nursing homes, skilled nursing facilities, home-based health aids, and other types of care often paid by Medicare or Medicaid. Informal care consists of the time and resources that a person's family members invest to care for their needs.

The measurement of formal care is straightforward: it can be directly observed in insurance claims and financial statements. Informal care, by contrast, is difficult to measure and even more difficult to value. When providing care, family members do not clock in, track their hours, or log their effort. As a result, informal care is typically unobserved and unmeasured.[1] Further, the opportunity cost of the time informal caregivers devote to caregiving activities is even more opaque and difficult to value, and differences in the quality and valuation of formal versus informal care are hard to assess. This has led to a strikingly wide range of estimates of the value of informal care, ranging from $86 billion (Gruber and McGarry, 2023) to over $500 billion (Chari et al., 2015).

In this paper, we study one of the most important sources of informal elderly care: care from a healthy spouse. In the US, care delivered by spouses accounts for roughly one-third of all informal care (Gruber and McGarry, 2023). Among married individuals, spouses provide the majority of informal care (Mommaerts, 2024). We identify the effects of receiving informal care from a healthy spouse and its valuation by leveraging plausibly exogenous changes in the availability of that care. Specifically, we identify Medicare beneficiaries who are hospitalized for a heart attack or stroke, and we then use event-study methods to recover the causal effects of that spouse's incapacitation on their partners. Our analysis relies on novel data that allow us to link American couples covered by Medicare and study formal elderly-care outcomes using administrative Medicare claims.

Event-study regressions reveal large effects of the incapacitation of an individual, the "index spouse," on their spouse's utilization of formal care, the "focal spouse."[2]

[1] Some household surveys, such as the Health and Retirement Survey, collect self-reported measures of informal care among surveyed households.

[2] We restrict the sample to opposite-sex couples, because, in this dataset, it is difficult to distinguish same-sex couples from aging siblings or people of the same sex who share an address.

In the months following an index spouse's health shock, their partners become 19.1% more likely to be admitted to a skilled nursing facility (SNF).

We explore two potential channels that drive the increase in SNF utilization: a health effect and a substitution effect. First, one spouse's health shock can directly lead to a worsening of their partner's health, which induces a need for formal care. Indeed, we find that affected spouses exhibit an 18.7% increase in emergency department visits and are 8.9% more likely to be hospitalized. Second, a substitution effect describes those who shift from receiving informal care to formal care because informal care, previously provided by their partner, is no longer available. Indeed, people with chronic conditions that require care are 3–4 times more likely to visit a SNF after their spouses are incapacitated than those without such conditions. Similarly, we find that focal spouses are more likely to visit a SNF the more incapacitating their partner's health shock.

We then assess the implications of those findings. The impact on social welfare involves two components: the implications for the government's budget, that is, the "fiscal externality," and households' valuation of formal and informal care. To assess the fiscal externality, we estimate the effects of index spouses' health shocks on total Medicare spending for focal spouses. The incapacitation of an index spouse leads to a 5% increase in spending for focal spouses in the year of the event, which increases to 12% when the event is fatal. Overall, healthy spouses lower US healthcare spending by $1.26 billion each year.

To assess households' valuation of informal care, we develop two complementary methods. The two methods involve revealed-preference exercises that measure households' choices of formal care when the index spouse is incapacitated versus when the index spouse remains healthy. The first method evaluates how the marginal valuation of SNF days varies across states of the world. It relies on within-state first-order conditions of SNF days and the fact that the price schedule is invariant to the index spouse's incapacitation. Across a plausible range of risk aversion, focal spouses value an additional day in a SNF 19% to 76% more once their partner has been incapacitated.

As a complementary method to assess the valuation of informal care, we exploit Medicare's discontinuous change in the out-of-pocket price of a night in a SNF. On the 20^{th} day of a SNF visit, Medicare recipients' out-of-pocket costs shift from 0% to 20% coinsurance. Those whose partners recently experienced a health shock are 64% less likely to leave the SNF upon facing co-payments, exhibiting a more-inelastic

demand for formal care. This pattern implies a higher willingness-to-pay for formal care in the absence of a healthy spouse, which in turn reveals the option value of a spouse's informal care. We use these estimates to plot demand curves for SNF care and to estimate consumer surplus. Affected households are willing to pay roughly 3.5 times more for formal care.

Finally, we consider the implications for the design of optimal insurance policies. We estimate differential slopes of demand curves, which map directly to the magnitude of moral hazard in the consumption of formal care. The ratio of those slopes determines the relative deadweight loss from subsidies to formal care across households with and without healthy spouses. The estimates imply a 64% reduction in efficiency loss among affected households. Medicare can provide higher levels of coverage for SNF care with lower deadweight loss due to moral hazard when a beneficiary's spouse is incapacitated versus when their spouse is healthy. This in turn provides strong support for the design of insurance contracts with family-level deductibles or a shared out-of-pocket maximum.

Our work contributes to three areas of inquiry. First and foremost, we contribute to research on elderly and long-term care in the US, particularly informal care. Gruber and McGarry (2023) estimate that formal care expenditures totaled $280 billion in 2018, which were financed mostly by the public sector, and that informal care plays a critical role in providing for the elderly, showing that at every age and disability level they receive informal care more frequently than formal care. Studies have also found that informal care may delay entry into formal care (Bergeot and Tenand, 2023; Bonsang, 2009; Charles and Sevak, 2005) and significantly affects the labor supply and earnings of caregivers, having effects on households that go beyond health (Maestas et al., 2024). We contribute to this literature by providing, to the best of our knowledge, the first analysis of intra-family interactions in the demand for elderly care in the US using administrative data at the population level. We provide novel analysis and estimates for the value of informal care by isolating the causal relationships in these interactions, evaluating the monetary value of the spousal relationship in elderly care, and assessing beneficiaries' valuation of formal care when their spouse becomes incapacitated.

Second, this paper contributes to a broad academic literature on the economics of risk sharing within the household. Since the pioneering work of Becker (1974), there has been significant progress in understanding the dynamics of risk-sharing within families, particularly how health shocks to one member of the family can

affect the others. This body of research has explored joint learning about health risks (Hoagland, 2025), the interdependence of family members' risks (Fadlon and Nielsen, 2019a), and the implications for public policy (Fadlon and Nielsen, 2019b; Gross et al., 2024). Additional work has highlighted the role of economic and health shocks on household labor supply and family stability (Fadlon and Nielsen, 2021; Hodor, 2021; Arteaga et al., 2024; Fontes et al., 2024). We contribute to this literature by providing novel evidence on the value of a healthy spouse via the intra-household interactions between formal and informal care among elderly American couples.

Third, this paper uncovers healthcare dynamics that can inform how health insurance contracts ought to be structured. When one person experiences a health shock, the risks that their spouse faces change. And yet, the Medicare program offers individual health insurance plans that make no adjustment for the rest of the household. Many employer-provided plans also feature individual-specific rather than household-specific out-of-pocket limits or deductibles, despite evidence that household-specific cost-sharing features meaningfully shapes consumption decisions (Anderson et al., 2024). This paper provides new evidence that can help assess the optimality of such arrangements. Our work is therefore related to previous work estimating optimal levels of social insurance (Baily, 1978; Chetty, 2006; Chetty and Finkelstein, 2013), where we provide novel findings with respect to the design of healthcare policies which are large and growing.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3 describes the data we analyze and the empirical framework we use. Section 4 presents event-study estimates of the effects of an index spouse's health shock on their partner's health and healthcare utilization. Section 5 assesses how an index spouse's health shock affects focal spouse's responses to the out-of-pocket price of formal care. Section 6 explores the implications of those estimates for policy and estimates the implied valuation of informal care. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

2 Economic Framework

We develop a simple economic framework in which a spouse's health shock affects their partner's demand for formal care. The framework then allows us to interpret the event-study estimates below into distinct behavioral responses. We also use the framework to interpret the magnitudes of the estimates and trace out their implications.

An elderly individual lives for a single period and decides whether to be cared for by their spouse, visit a SNF and so consume formal care, or else live independently. They face a price p^F for each night in a SNF, where the "F" superscript denotes formal care. We assume that the price of either informal care or living independently is zero.

Denote the person's willingness to pay for informal care from his spouse to be w^S and his willingness to pay for an evening in the SNF as w^F. That minimal notation leads to simple decision rules. The person will visit the SNF so long as it provides more consumer surplus than care under his spouse and more consumer surplus than living independently:

$$w^F - p^F > w^S \text{ and } w^F - p^F > 0. \tag{1}$$

Therefore, the probability that the person will visit a SNF is $P(w^F > p^F + w^S)$.

When the person's spouse is incapacitated, then the option of receiving informal care is no longer available. That alone suggests that the person is more likely to visit a SNF. In addition, the loss of a spouse may itself lead to a deterioration in the person's health, which, in the language of this framework, would raise the person's willingness to pay for formal care. We denote that shift as a change from w^F to $\bar{w}^F$.

Overall, the change in the probability of visiting a SNF is

$$P(\bar{w}^F > p^F) - P(w^F > p^F + w^S).$$

We can further decompose this as:

$$\underbrace{P(\bar{w}^F > w^F)}_{\text{Health effect}} + P(w^F > p^F) - \underbrace{P(w^F > p^F + w^S)}_{\text{Substitution effect}}. \tag{2}$$

Equation (2) decomposes the overall change in the probability of formal care into two effects: a health effect and a substitution effect. Focal spouses are more likely to end up in formal care after the index event because either they switch to formal care or their health deteriorates.

3 Empirical Framework

3.1 Data

We use Medicare claims data that cover all types of care, including primary and specialty care, inpatient and outpatient care, and formal care such as utilization of

skilled nursing facilities. We have created a novel dataset of couples in Medicare using a custom crosswalk from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The dataset includes beneficiaries' addresses as tracked by CMS. We then group beneficiaries who live at the same address and identify spouses by selecting residences with a maximum of two Medicare recipients of the opposite sex living at the same address. This allows us to study Medicare-covered healthcare among American couples with large scale administrative data. Gross et al. (2024) validate this identification of spouses.

Our outcome measures are drawn from fee-for-service claims for traditional Medicare enrollees from 2010 to 2017. We use information on 100% of hospital inpatient stays and qualifying SNF stays using the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MedPAR) file, as well as beneficiary summary information and annual measures of utilization for each enrollee. In addition, we observe detailed outpatient, carrier claims, and Part D (pharmaceutical) utilization for the 20% sample of enrollees.

In our analysis, we require households to have full Medicare eligibility throughout the window of observation, and we assign spouses in the year prior to the index health event. We also exclude households where the index event has accompanying external injuries so as to avoid capturing joint events affecting both members of the household (for example, vehicle accidents). Finally, following the work of Dobkin et al. (2018), we limit the sample to index spouses who have not been admitted to a hospital in the two years preceding their index admission.

3.2 Research Design

A macabre thought experiment that would identify the impacts of a spouse's health shock would randomly assign such shocks to couples and track the responses and outcomes of partners over time. We take a quasi-experimental approach that aims to approximate this thought experiment by restricting the analysis to couples that have experienced a health event—specifically, a heart attack or stroke—and identifying the treatment effect using variation in the timing of when the event was realized. We follow the work of Fadlon and Nielsen (2019a, 2021) and construct counterfactual outcomes for affected families using families that experience the same event but in the future.

We construct a treatment group, composed of spouses in households that experience the event in a particular calendar month, and a matched control group composed of spouses in households that also experience the event, but 12 months later. We as-

sign a placebo event to control households to match the calendar month of the event experienced by the treatment group. We then recover the treatment effect with a dynamic difference-in-differences estimator, identifying the event's impact from the change in the differences in outcomes across the two groups over time. We can estimate the effects of shocks up to 12 months after the event, because the control group becomes "treated" 12 months later. The analysis is not subject to potential challenges involved in having units that switch in and out of experimental arms as posed by recent work (De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille, 2024). Similarly, the results are also robust to using estimators that explicitly model heterogeneous treatment effects, specifically the local-projection difference-in-differences estimator developed by Dube et al. (2023).

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the analysis sample. Index spouses are slightly older and more likely to have a chronic condition. Those differences are unsurprising—the older and less healthy spouse is the one more likely to experience the first health shock. Beyond those differences, the index and focal spouses are relatively similar.

We estimate the following event-study regression:

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \theta_n + \sum_{n \neq -1} \delta_n \times I_n \times \text{treat}_i + \lambda X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \tag{3}$$

where $y_{i,t}$ denotes an outcome for household i at calendar month t, treat_i denotes an indicator for whether a household belongs to the treatment group, and I_n are indicators for months relative to the assigned event period. Equation (3) includes household fixed effects, α_i; relative-time fixed effects, θ_n; and a vector of time-varying controls, $X_{i,t}$. The key parameters of interest are the δ_n coefficients, which estimate the period n treatment effects relative to the pre-period $n = -1$.

This empirical strategy rests on the standard parallel-trends identifying assumption. It assumes that, absent the realization of the health shock, the outcomes of the treatment and control groups would evolve in parallel. To test the validity of this assumption, we study the evolution of the treatment and the control groups' outcomes in the periods prior to the event. In order to calculate average effects over several periods, we estimate the following difference-in-differences specification:

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \theta \times \text{post}_{i,t} + \delta \times \text{treat}_i \times \text{post}_{i,t} + \lambda X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \tag{4}$$

Table 1. Summary Statistics

	Index Spouses	Focal Spouses
Panel A: Demographics		
Age	76.39	75.72
Female	0.38	0.63
White	0.89	0.89
Black	0.06	0.06
Hispanic	0.01	0.01
FFS Status	0.68	0.67
HMO Status	0.31	0.31
Dual Eligibility Status	0.07	0.07
Panel B: Healthcare Utilization		
Has a Chronic Condition	0.45	0.42
Predicted Risk of SNF Visit	0.00	0.00
Any SNF Stay	0.00	0.02
Conditional # of SNF Stays	1.11	1.36
Any Inpatient Admission	0.00	0.11
Conditional # of Inpatient Admissions	1.18	1.54
Total Spending	$5,311	$8,430

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the analytical sample, $N = 624{,}901$. Index spouses are those who experienced a first heart attack or stroke as discussed above; focal spouses are their partners whose outcomes we study. Total spending indicates the sum of Medicare and beneficiary annual payments. Averages with standard errors in parentheses are presented for the year prior to the true index event.

where $\text{post}_{i,t}$ is an indicator for whether the observation belongs to a period after the shock occurred, and δ measures the average treatment effect.

4 Event-Study Analyses

This section presents an empirical analysis of the effects of a spouse's health shock on their partner's healthcare utilization and health. We study index spouses of both genders together. Appendix B provides stratified results, showing little variation across the gender of the index spouse.

4.1 Utilization of Formal Care

Figure 1 examines the risk of a focal spouse visiting a SNF after the index spouse's health event. This figure and the subsequent event-study figures plot the δ_n coefficients from estimates of equation (3). The horizontal axis plots time relative to the index event in months, and the vertical axis plots the estimated coefficients. Average baseline levels in the 6 months prior to the event are reported in the subtitle of the plot, and we normalize the outcome variables such that plotted coefficients are presented in percent relative to baseline.


The figure suggests no systemic differentials across groups in the periods prior to the event, supporting the research design. Then, the figure presents a sharp increase in the risk of a focal spouse's visit to a SNF immediately following the index health shock. This increased utilization remains persistent throughout the analysis horizon of 4 months.

The first column of Table 2 reports the effects for the month of the shock using equation (4). The risk of an SNF visit increases by 19.1% after an index event. The observed increases persist for the entire year following the index event, reverting back to baseline only by month 12.

4.2 Health Effect

We next evaluate the potential mechanisms that drive the increase in utilization. We first assess the presence of a health effect. That is, motivated by prior work (e.g., Arteaga et al. 2024; Bünnings et al. 2021), we test the hypothesis that adverse health shocks to one spouse can lead to a worsening of the other spouse's health and thus translate to a greater need for care. Health effects may arise from deteriorating health over the long run, but may also be the result of short-term disruption effects associated

Figure 1. Effect of a Spouse's Major Cardiovascular Event on Risk of a SNF Visit




Notes: This figure plots estimates of the δ_n coefficients from equation (3), difference-in-differences estimates that track the months since an index spouse's first heart attack or stroke. The outcome of interest is an indicator for whether the focal (spillover) spouse visited a SNF. We re-scale all coefficients such that they indicate the change relative to the initial baseline risk of hospitalization or SNF stay. The error bars plot 95-percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the household level. The estimation includes calendar month fixed effects and person-specific fixed effects.

with a spouse's health shock, which may destabilize a focal spouse's health in the short-run. Disruption effects may arise from emotional distress, sleep disruption, environmental disruption, or the transition to a new equilibrium of care provision at home. Hence, we examine the potential presence of health effects as well as estimated dynamics to get a sense of if health effects are short- or long-term on average.

Figure 2 studies how an index event affects the focal spouse's probability of being hospitalized. We plot estimates of equation (3) when the outcome is an indicator for visiting a hospital in the given period. We find clear increases in the probability of a hospitalization immediately following the shock. The increased risk peaks in the immediate period and persists for the horizon of at least 4 months. Column 2 of Table 2 reports the treatment effect in the first month, showing an increased hospitalization risk of 8.9%. These effects, however, are more transient than SNF effects, and only persist through the first four months post-event.

To focus on a more acute health proxy, the third column of Table 2 reports estimates of a regression in which the outcome of interest is the focal spouse's Emergency Department (ED) encounters. The risk of an ED visit increases by 18.7% in

Figure 2. Effect of a Spouse's Major Cardiovascular Event on Risk of Hospitalization



Notes: This figure plots estimates of the δ_n coefficients from equation (3), difference-in-differences estimates that track the months since an index spouse's first heart attack or stroke. The outcome of interest is an indicator for whether the focal (spillover) spouse was hospitalized in a month. We re-scale all coefficients such that they indicate the change relative to the initial baseline risk of hospitalization or SNF stay. The error bars plot 95-percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the household level. The estimation includes calendar month fixed effects and person-specific fixed effects.

the month of a spouse's health shock, providing further support for the presence of a health effect.

Finally, the fourth column in Table 2 provides a direct test for a health effect, as proxied by hospitalization, in driving the increased utilization of formal care. It provides estimates of the causal effect on the joint event that the focal spouse is hospitalized and visits a SNF. In the month following the spouse's incapacitation, focal spouses are 15.6% more likely to be hospitalized and then consume formal care at a SNF.

Table 2 offers an additional stratification in order to assess whether the increase in SNF visits is driven by the focal spouse's diminished health. The second row of the table reports estimates of equation (4) when the sample is limited to health shocks in which the index spouse passed away—the third row of the table reports estimates when the index health shock was non-fatal. We observe larger increases in utilization for focal spouses after fatal index events versus non-fatal index events. This is consistent with the work of Fadlon and Nielsen (2019a), who find that a spouse's death is more likely to lead to health effects.

Table 2. Impact of Spouses' Major Cardiovascular Events on Partners' Risk of a Visit

	(1) SNF	(2) Hospitalization	(3) ED Visits	(4) Hospitalization & SNF
Treatment Effect, Month 0	0.191***	0.089***	0.187***	0.156***
	(0.0221)	(0.0139)	(0.0458)	(0.0307)
Fatal Events Only, Month 0	0.404***	0.187**	0.491**	0.215
	(0.1190)	(0.0702)	(0.2051)	(0.1650)
Nonfatal Events Only, Month 0	0.181***	0.085***	0.173***	0.153***
	(0.0225)	(0.0141)	(0.0470)	(0.0312)
Baseline Rate per 1,000	10.1	32.4	31.5	6.8
N	5,828,740	5,823,590	1,049,460	5,824,880

Notes: This table presents pooled difference-in-differences coefficients estimating the effect of a focal spouse's first heart attack or stroke on the spillover spouse's health outcomes (indicated in each column). "Hospitalization & SNF" indicates that a spouse both was hospitalized and visited a SNF in the same month. ED Visits are measured as total number of visits. All other outcomes are binary. Note that ED visits are measured using the 20% sample of Medicare beneficiaries, hence the reduced sample size. Treatment effects are estimated in month 0, capturing the effect for the first four weeks post-event. We re-scale all coefficient such that they indicate the change relative to the initial baseline risk of diagnosis in each category, and we cluster standard errors at the household level. Regressions include calendar month fixed effects and person-specific fixed effects. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$


Overall, this provides some evidence for the presence of a health effect. We then assess whether this effect is transient—indicating health effects arising from disruption around the time of a health shock—or persistent—alluding to more substantial deterioration in individual health. Figure 3 illustrates the transience of our estimated health effects for two key outcomes: hospitalizations from falls and ED visits. In both panels, we observe that a spouse's health shock leads to increased risk of these events only in the short run, suggesting that health effects, on their own, do not fully explain our observed results.

4.3 Substitution Effect


We next measure the substitution effect. Focal spouses with existing needs for care may switch from receiving informal care from their incapacitated partners to utilizing

Figure 3. Effect of a Spouse's Major Cardiovascular Event on Risk of Acute Health Events

(a) Pr(Hospitalization for Fall)



(b) Pr(ED Visit)




Notes: This figure plots estimates of the δ_n coefficients from equation (3), difference-in-differences estimates that track the months since an index spouse's first heart attack or stroke. The outcome of interest is an indicator for whether the focal (spillover) spouse visited a hospital for a fall (panel A) or an emergency department for any reason (panel B). We re-scale all coefficients such that they indicate the change relative to the initial baseline risk of these events. The error bars plot 95-percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the household level. The estimation includes calendar month fixed effects and person-specific fixed effects.

formal care. We provide two exercises to test for such an effect. First, we stratify couples based on the focal spouse's underlying need for care prior to the index event. Second, we stratify households based on the degree of incapacitation of the index spouse.

Figure 4 plots estimates of equation (3) for visits to SNFs separately by whether the focal spouse suffered from a chronic condition before the index event, particularly conditions that are most likely to require care from a spouse.[3] In that fashion, chronic conditions act as a proxy for a pre-existing, underlying need for care. Focal spouses with no underlying conditions exhibit an attenuated—but still statistically significant—increase in SNF visits. By contrast, focal spouses with chronic conditions exhibit a much larger increase in the risk of visit a SNF. The effect for focal spouses with chronic conditions is roughly 4 times as large as that for those with no conditions. The differences in estimated effects are even more pronounced when examining specific diagnosis categories. Appendix Figure A1 highlights that our es-

[3]For this measure, we rely on Medicare's Chronic Conditions file, which catalogs for each Medicare beneficiary the presence of one of 27 chronic conditions. We focus on chronic conditions that are likely to require informal caregiving, including ADRD, cancer (colorectal, lung, or prostate), chronic kidney disease, COPD, hip fractures, and strokes.

Figure 4. Effect on Risk of a SNF Visit by Focal Spouse's Pre-Existing Chronic Conditions



Notes: This figure plots estimates of the δ_n coefficients from equation (3), tracking the months since an index spouse's first heart attack or stroke. The outcome is an indicator for whether the focal (spillover) spouse visited a SNF. We stratify the sample based on whether the focal spouse had a documented chronic condition one year prior to the index spouse's event. Chronic conditions include ADRD, cancer (colorectal, lung, or prostate), chronic kidney disease, COPD, hip fractures, and strokes. We re-scale coefficients to indicate changes relative to the initial baseline risk in each category. Error bars plot 95-percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the household level.


timated effects on visits to SNFs are roughly 10 times larger for focal spouses with a pre-existing ADRD diagnosis than those without.

We then stratify by the severity of the index health shock. This aims to capture the degree of incapacitation in terms of the potential to provide informal care. To do so, we divide households based on whether the index spouse was discharged home or to a medical facility (which could be either a rehabilitation facility or a SNF).[4] We limit this comparison to non-fatal index shocks, because Table 2 demonstrates that spousal death is much more likely to induce a health effects.[5] Figure 5 presents a clear pattern in which focal spouses are much more likely to utilize formal care following

[4]Previous work has shown that the presence of a spouse has a large impact on the likelihood that an older adult will return home after a hospitalization rather than be discharged to a SNF (Lage et al., 2018).

[5]We also limit this sample to households whose focal spouse who did not recently experience a health event: those who have not been hospitalized in weeks -12 to -1. This restriction addresses potential contamination from reverse causality: the severity of an index spouse's health event could be worse due to a recent health event inflicted on the focal spouse.

Figure 5. Effect on Risk of a SNF Visit by Severity of Index Health Event



Notes: This figure plots estimates of the δ_n coefficients from equation (3), tracking the weeks since a index spouse's first heart attack or stroke. Here, analysis is restricted to non-fatal index events only. We also exclude households whose focal (spillover) spouses experienced a hospitalization in the 12 weeks prior to the index event to avoid bias from anticipatory SNF stays from precedent hospitalizations. The outcome of interest is an indicator for whether the focal spouse visited a SNF during that week, where effects are split based on the discharge status of the index event. We re-scale all coefficients such that they indicate the change relative to the initial baseline risk of diagnosis in each category. The error bars plot 95-percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the household level.

their partner's event when the incapacitation is more severe. The increases are up to a threefold increase over the pre-event baseline mean when the index spouse is also discharged to formal care, compared to much smaller increases following a home discharge.

Figures 4 and 5 together provide consistent support for a substitution effect. We observe an increased risk of SNF stays when focal spouses are less healthy and require care ex-ante and when the health event leads to greater incapacitation of the index spouse ex-post.

4.4 Decomposition of Health and Substitution Effects

The results above provide evidence in support of both a health effect and a substitution effect. This section offers a decomposition in order to characterize how much of focal spouses' increased SNF visits is driven by substitution into formal care versus a deterioration in their health.

For all hospitalizations, we predict the probability that an individual with a given set of observable characteristics will be discharged to a SNF. We then evaluate how


those predicted probabilities evolve around their partners' health shock. That is, we generate a "predicted SNF stay" variable that is equal to zero for anyone who did not have a hospitalization in the given time period and, for those who were hospitalized, is equal to the probability of a hospitalization with similar observable characteristics ending in discharge to a SNF. The prediction captures how we would expect focal spouse's SNF use to change after the index spouse's health shock based solely on pre-existing characteristics. We then compare the actual change in the risk of a SNF visit after the index event to the predicted change.

We rely on the following procedure in order to predict visits to SNFs. First, we randomly segment all hospitalizations into a 90% estimation sample and a 10% validation sample. We then run a lasso regression of a binary indicator variable for any SNF discharge on the patient's age, sex, race, Medicaid eligibility, and the Diagnosis-related Groups (DRGs) for the hospitalization (Ellis et al., 2022), as well as pairwise interaction terms. We rely on a lasso regression given the large dimensionality of our covariate space (Abadie and Kasy, 2019). Appendix Figure A2 plots the predicted values for the 10% validation sample of hospitalizations. Those ending in SNF stays have considerably higher predicted values than those ending in another form of discharge.

Figure 6 presents estimates of equation (3) when the outcome of interest is the focal spouse's predicted probability of visiting a SNF. In the month following the index shock, a focal spouse's predicted probability of a SNF stay increases by roughly 9%, up from a baseline risk of 0.3%. This estimated increase (0.26 stays/1,000) constitutes roughly 13.5% of the 1.92 stays/1,000 estimated overall. We would thus expect around 13.5% of the marginal SNF stays to have occurred solely due to the deterioration of the focal spouse's health.

The remaining 86.5% of SNF stays may arise solely from the substitution of formal care for informal care. In addition, in the long run, health effects dissipate, indicating that the bulk of observed effects are attributable to substitution. However, this assumes that the only pathway from worsening health to a SNF is via hospitalization. We view this exercise as suggestive—though not conclusive—evidence that a majority of the rise in SNF stays we catalog is driven by a substitution from informal to formal care.

Figure 6. Change in Focal Spouse's Predicted Probability of SNF Discharge



Notes: This figure plots estimates of the δ_n coefficients from equation (3), difference-in-differences estimates that track the weeks since a wife's first heart attack or stroke. The outcome of interest is the predicted probability of a SNF discharge based on hospitalization and patient characteristics using LASSO regression; see Section 4.2 and Appendix Figure A2 for more discusion. We re-scale all coefficient such that they indicated the change relative to the pre-treatment average predicted probabilities. The error bars plot 95-percent confidence intervals based on standard errors that have been clustered on each Medicare household. The regression includes calendar month fixed effects and person-specific fixed effects.

4.5 New Diagnoses

This section studies medical diagnoses. The results above document an abrupt transition in the lives of focal spouses, especially a transition into formal care. Those transitions may prompt a reassessment of the focal spouse's health needs. And that reassessment may lead to the detection of previously undiagnosed conditions. Such new diagnoses are more likely for medical conditions that develop gradually over time, making them unrelated to the immediate health event. New diagnoses are also more likely when the conditions are harder to detect due to the absence of clear objective tests and measures.

Two main classes of diseases among the Medicare population, which often require the type of elderly care that we consider, are Alzheimer's Disease and Related Dementias (ADRD) and cancer. Both ADRD and cancer are serious conditions that develop over time, so we would not expect an index spouse's health event to immediately result in these conditions. In addition, the two conditions substantially differ in the degree to which they can be directly and accurately diagnosed. Diagnosis of ADRD

is notoriously difficult and requires multiple mental and physical tests. Cancer, in contrast, can be accurately diagnosed via biopsy (Chandra et al., 2023).

Table 3 reports estimates of equation (4) when the outcomes of interest are new diagnoses of ADRD and cancer. The likelihood of a focal spouse being diagnosed with ADRD increases by nearly 40% following an index spouse's health shock. The risk of ADRD diagnosis remains elevated for six months following the shock. By contrast, we observe no statistically significant effect on cancer diagnoses, despite these being nearly twice as prevalent at baseline. These patterns suggest that focal spouses may be living with latent, undiagnosed conditions such as ADRD, whose detection is triggered by the changes in care following the index event.

Table 3. Impact of Spouses' Major Cardiovascular Events on Partners' New Diagnoses

	New ADRD Diagnosis	New Cancer Diagnosis
Month of index event	0.399***	-0.054
	(0.1381)	(0.0963)
Six months since index event	0.391***	-0.091
	(0.0756)	(0.0556)
Baseline Rate per 1,000	1.6	3.2
N	2,055,820	1,830,930

Notes: This table presents pooled difference-in-differences coefficients estimating the effect of a focal spouse's first heart attack or stroke on spousal diagnoses. The outcomes of interest are indicators for whether the focal spouse received a new diagnosis for ADRD or cancer. Sample is restricted to beneficiaries consistently observed without an ADRD or cancer diagnosis during the first year of the analytical sample to correctly identify new diagnoses (which leads to the change in the sample size across columns). We re-scale all coefficients such that they indicate the change relative to the initial baseline risk of a diagnosis in each category, and we cluster standard errors at the household level. Regressions include calendar month fixed effects and person-specific fixed effects. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

5 Sensitivity to the Price of Formal Care

This section explores how a spouse's incapacitation affects how their partners respond to the price of formal care. It studies the discontinuous change in coinsurance for Medicare residents in SNFs on day 20 of their stay. On that day, the copayments they

must pay rise from 0% to 20%.[6] We study responses to these discontinuous changes in a regression discontinuity (RD) framework, and we recover the difference in the RD parameter across the index spouse's health shock via a difference-in-discontinuities design (Grembi et al., 2016).

Figure 7 illustrates the variation we exploit. Panels (a) and (b) plot the distribution of LOS conditional on SNF stays. Here, the bunching around day 20 can be clearly seen for both groups, but appears to be much more significant for focal spouses with a healthy spouse at home. In addition, in panel (c) we plot mean residuals from a regression of discharge from the SNF on day-of-week-specific fixed effects and a linear trend for days in the SNF so far. We then calculate deviations in length of stay relative to this trend around the discontinuous change in cost-sharing at day 20. First and foremost, the figure demonstrates that Medicare recipients are much less likely to stay in the SNF after cost sharing increases on day 20. More importantly, Medicare recipients with a healthy spouse are more likely to leave the SNF after day 20 than those whose index spouse has just experienced a major health event.

As a complementary exercise, consider Figure 8, which presents event-study estimates similar to those in Section 4, but with the outcome of interest being a stay in a SNF beyond 20 days. The figure suggests a doubling in the likelihood that focal spouses stay in SNFs beyond 20 days after their partners experience a major cardiovascular event. That implies that nearly one-quarter of focal spouses' SNF stays following an index spouse's event required some patient cost-sharing.[7] Importantly, note that these effects are concentrated within the first 100 days of the spousal health shock.

In order to measure how index events affect responses to cost-sharing, we estimate an RD design. Consider the following specification:

$$y_{i,t} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 D^*_{i,t} + S_{i,t}(\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 D^*_{i,t}) + T_{i,t}\left[\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D^*_{i,t} + S_{i,t}(\beta_0^{\text{D-Disc}} + \beta_1 D^*_{i,t})\right] + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (5)$$


where $y_{i,t}$ represents an indicator for whether focal spouse i resides in a SNF on day t, $D^*_{i,t}$ represents the re-centered running variable of SNF days relative to the 21-day

[6] This increase in copay may not apply to beneficiaries enrolled in Medigap, as most Medigap plans cover the 20% copayments in their entirety. Prior work has found that among beneficiaries entering SNFs for postacute care, around 25% do not have some form of supplemental coverage (Medigap or Medicaid). These individuals thus drive any 'demand-response' that we estimate. Later, when we use these estimates to construct demand curves, we adjust the 'price' to account for the fact that 75% have supplemental coverage that pays these copays.


[7] We also observe significant increases in the average length of stay for a SNF visit, consistent with our prior findings (Appendix Figure A3).

Figure 7. Responses to Cost-Sharing for SNF Stays By Health Event


(a) Sick Spouse Group



(b) Healthy Spouse Group




(c) Regression Discontinuity, First Stage



Notes: This figure plots the intuition and identifying variation for the regression discontinuity design (Equation 5). Panels (a) and (b) show the distribution of length of stay (LOS) for focal spouses visiting SNFs around the time of their index spouse's initial heart attack or stroke. Panel A provides the distribution among beneficiary observations from the first 12 weeks following an actual spousal event (from the "sick spouse" group), and panel B provides the distribution among beneficiary observations from the first 12 weeks following a placebo spousal event (from the "healthy spouse" group). Vertical lines indicate the days at which Medicare payment rates for SNF stays change discontinuously. In panel (c), we plot binscatter coefficients for the residual average share of patients in a SNF on a given day after adjusting for the day of the week and a measure of days covered by Medicare previously. Averages for the group with healthy index spouses (no health events) are shown in blue, while those whose index spouse has experienced an adverse health shock are shown in red. The vertical line indicates the day after which 20% coinsurance is applied to each additional day the focal spouse remains in the SNF.

Figure 8. Effect of a Spouse's Major Cardiovascular Event on the Fraction of SNF Stays Not Fully Covered by Medicare



Notes: This figure plots estimates of the δ_n coefficients from equation (3), difference-in-differences estimates that track the months since an index spouse's first heart attack or stroke. The outcome of interest is an indicator that equals one if at least part of that SNF stay was not fully covered by Medicare. All focal spouses without SNF stays in both treatment and control groups are assigned values of 0 when no SNF admission occurred in a month. We re-scale all coefficients such that they indicate the change relative to the initial unconditional mean values. Error bars plot 95-percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered on each Medicare household.

cutoff, $S_{i,t}$ indicates a post-cutoff dummy, and $T_{i,t}$ indicates a post-treatment dummy of an index spouse's health shock. We estimate Equation (5) for SNF stays of duration within a certain bandwidth of the cutoff, $D^* \in [-h, h]$, and uses a triangular kernel to weight observations more heavily if they are closer to the cutoff. The parameter β_0 indicates the difference in responses across the experimental groups.

We estimate equation (5) using observations within four months of both the treated and placebo index events and adjust for Medicare couple and time-of-event fixed effects. Table 4 presents the results. Prior to the index spouse's event, the discontinuous change in Medicare payment for SNF stays induces a significant negative effect on the length of a focal spouse's stay, decreasing the probability that they will remain in the SNF on the first day they will face copayments by 1.4 percentage points. In contrast, the focal spouse's response to copayments is reduced to 0.9 percentage points when they have been admitted following the index spouse's event.

Comparing the differences in the estimated responses, we find that households

affected by a shock are 0.5 percentage points more likely to remain in care across this threshold, absorbing roughly 36% of the pre-treatment price responses. Appendix Table A3 further stratifies these findings by the type of index event; as one might expect, price sensitivity is lowest among beneficiaries whose spouses died following their cardiovascular event. Among this group, we observe no price responsiveness, a significant difference compared to those whose spouse survived their index event ($p < .001$).

Table 4. Effects of a Spouse's Major Cardiovascular Event on SNF Price Sensitivity

	(1)	(2)
RD, healthy spouse	-0.014***	-0.014***
	(0.0031)	(0.0017)
RD, sick spouse	-0.009**	-0.009**
	(0.0043)	(0.0024)
Difference in discontinuities	0.005	0.005*
	(0.0053)	(0.0031)
Couple FEs		✓
Calendar Month FEs		✓
Bandwidth	11.22	11.22
N	783,840	783,840

Notes: This table presents regression-discontinuity and differences-in-discontinuities estimators identifying the effect of ending Medicare coverage for SNF stays, which ends on day 21 for qualifying stays. The first two rows present the estimated effect of losing coverage on the probability a focal spouse will remain in the SNF, stratified by before or after the index event. The third row presents the difference-in-discontinuities estimator as discussed in the text. SNF stays within 4 months of the treatment and placebo events are included in the regression. "FE" is an abbreviation for fixed effects.

6 Implications of the Estimates

This section examines the welfare implications of the event-study estimates above. It assesses the fiscal externality, develops methods to recover household's valuation of different modes of care, and discusses the implications for the design of optimal health insurance contracts.

6.1 The Fiscal Value of a Healthy Spouse

The event-study estimates demonstrate increases in focal spouses' healthcare utilization: SNF admissions, hospitalizations, and ED visits. Those results naturally lead to the question of how much the index spouse's health shock increases their partner's overall healthcare expenditures.

Table 5 presents estimates of regressions that track the impact of index events on overall Medicare-covered spending for the focal spouse. In order to study spending, we rely on the annual summary measures that are tracked for all fee-for-service Medicare recipients in the data.[8] In the year of an index event, total Medicare payments increase by roughly 5% ($317), and by an average of 12% ($773) for fatal index events. The table suggests increases in healthcare expenditure across categories that are large in both absolute and relative terms. For instance, spending on SNFs increases by $112 in the year of the event, roughly a 33% increase over the baseline mean. Those effects are more than doubled when the index spouse passes away. We observe similarly large increases in the use of home health and hospice care, as well as across various measures of inpatient hospitalizations.[9]

One can view the estimates in Table 5 as describing the spillover effects of an index health shock on the overall Medicare budget. In aggregate, this burden is substantial. Consider that 65.7 million Americans are covered by Medicare. The incidence rate of heart attacks and strokes is roughly 5% annually, 15% of which are fatal within 30 days. The estimates in Table 5 thus translate into a national spillover effect of $1.26 billion annually.

6.2 Valuation of Informal Care

In this section, we attempt to estimate the value of informal care from a healthy spouse from the beneficiary's point of view. To do so, we use a revealed preference approach built on the elasticity estimates from Section 5. In that section, we estimate the elasticity of an additional day of SNF care with respect to price separately for the treatment (incapacitated spouse) and control (healthy spouse) groups. We now show

[8] The regressions in Table 5 are at the annual level, and so involve only indicator variables for year relative to the index event.

[9] The results suggest these increases may crowd out other, less urgent health expenditures, such as hospital outpatient care (2.3%), elective surgeries (8.0%), and outpatient payments to physicians (3.3%). We also find *declines* in spending on prescription medication (2.4%). That decline may be mechanical, to the extent that patients receive medications directly while in a SNF, and those medications are not not reported in the data.

Table 5. Effect of Spouse's Major Cardiovascular Event on Annual Medicare Spending

		Year of Index Event	
Spending Measure	Pre-Treatment Average	(1) All	(2) Fatal Events
Panel A: Total Spending			
	\$6,446	\$317***	\$773***
		(33.02)	(166.40)
Panel B: Long-term Care			
SNF	\$341	\$112***	\$267***
		(7.66)	(42.60)
Home Health	\$291	\$23***	\$61***
		(3.32)	(17.05)
Hospice	\$123	\$55***	\$77***
		(4.98)	(26.74)
Panel C: Hospital & Surgical Care			
Acute Inpatient	\$1,465	\$136***	\$225***
		(13.98)	(69.75)
Other Inpatient	\$178	\$33***	\$55*
		(5.90)	(29.14)
Hospital Outpatient	\$979	-\$17***	\$35
		(6.53)	(29.42)
Ambulatory Surgical Center	\$75	-\$6***	-\$8*
		(0.99)	(4.40)
Panel D: Other Care			
Physician Payments	\$333	-\$10***	\$5*
		(0.66)	(3.16)
Evaluation & Management	\$245	\$30***	\$53***
		(1.98)	(9.84)
Part D Spending	\$907	-\$20***	-\$42**
		(4.14)	(20.41)

Notes: This table plots estimates of pooled post-treatment effects tracking the year following an index event's first heart attack or stroke. The outcome of interest is annual Medicare payments per beneficiary, across the spending categories indicated in each row. Regressions include calendar month fixed effects and person-specific fixed effects. Column (1) reports the estimate for all events, while column (2) reports the estimate only for fatal index events. Estimates are scaled by the time remaining in the year following the index event, and standard errors are clustered at the household level.

that these two elasticities, plus some additional structure, reveal the beneficiary's willingness-to-pay for informal care from a healthy spouse.

Sick Spouse Demand Curve: Consider a SNF resident who is considering leaving the SNF. This resident faces a discrete choice among three forms of care, indexed by c: Formal (SNF) care ($c = F$), informal care from a spouse ($c = S$) and the outside option ($c = O$), which could consist of self-care or informal care from some other source (i.e., an adult child). Denote the beneficiary's willingness-to-pay (WTP) for informal care from his spouse relative to the outside option as w^S and his WTP for formal care (an additional evening in the SNF) as w^F.

We start by considering the choice of the set of beneficiaries whose spouses are incapacitated. This set of beneficiaries really only has two choices: Formal (SNF) care or the outside option. They thus have a very simple decision rule: They will remain in the SNF so long as it provides more consumer surplus than the outside option. Formally, the beneficiary choose F if and only if:

$$w^F - p^F > 0 \tag{6}$$

With this structure, we know that any beneficiary who chooses F at price p^F but chooses O at price $\bar{p}^F > p^F$ has $p^F < w^F < \bar{p}^F$. Let an index $s^F \in [0, 1]$ order consumers according to w^F and let $w^F(s)$ be the w^F of a type-s consumer. Denote the s-type on the margin between F and O at price p^F as $s^F(p^F)$ so that $w^F(s^F(p^F)) = p^F$. The indirect demand curve for F is thus given by $w^F(s^F(p^F))$. If we assume linear demand, we can estimate this curve using variation in p^F combined with the value $w^F(s^F(p^F = 0))$, which we observe in the data. This curve thus allows us to infer w^F for all beneficiaries, and this approach is standard in the literature (Einav et al., 2010; Brot-Goldberg et al., 2023; Lieber and Lockwood, 2019).

Figure 9 presents this curve as the red 'sick spouses' curve. The point $(a, \$0)$ is the x-intercept, and $a = w^F(s^F(p^F = 0))$ is specified as the portion of Medicare beneficiaries whose spouses recently had a health shock who have a SNF stay that lasts at least 20 days, which is observed in the data. The point $(b, \$37.50)$ combines with $(a, \$0)$ to define the line. \$37.50 represents the average out-of-pocket price paid by SNF residents for an additional day in the SNF starting on day 21.[10] b is estimated by

[10]This value is determined by taking the median Medicare SNF daily copay in 2013–2014 of \$150 and multiplying it by 0.25, the portion of Medicare post-acute SNF residents that do not have any supplemental coverage. This portion was estimated in prior work, work that also showed that

taking $w^F(s^F(p^F = 0))$ and subtracting the change in the SNF discharge rate between the 20th and 21st days, which we estimate to be 0.009 for this group in Table 4. We extrapolate the curve linearly to the y-axis to define the full demand curve and thus also willingness-to-pay for the 21st day of formal SNF care for the full population.

While the 'sick spouse' curve provides estimates of willingness-to-pay for formal SNF care relative to the outside option, it does not tell us anything about our parameter of interest: WTP for informal care from a spouse (S). We thus next show how the sick spouse curve can be combined with (a modification of) the healthy spouse curve in order to back out this parameter.

Healthy Spouse Demand Curve: As with the sick spouses group, we can also use our elasticity estimates from Table 4 to define a demand curve for F among beneficiaries with healthy spouses. In Figure 9 we show the demand curve for formal care for those with healthy spouses in blue. We construct this curve in the same way we construct the sick spouses demand curve. Point $(c, \$0)$ is the x-intercept, and c comes directly from the data, as it is just the portion of Medicare beneficiaries whose spouses recently did not recently have a health shock who have a SNF stay that lasts at least 20 days. Combined with point $(d, \$37.50)$, we define the linear demand curve. As before, d is just c minus the change in the SNF discharge rate between the 20th and 21st days, which we estimate to be 0.014 for this group in Table 4. We extrapolate the curve linearly to the y-axis to define the full demand curve for the 21st day of formal SNF care for the full population.

The interpretation of this curve is not as clear, however. While it does describe demand for F among this group, it does not necessarily describe WTP for F versus O because these beneficiaries also face a third option: informal care from a spouse S. We thus add S as an option to our framework in order to understand what this demand curve tells us, if anything, about WTP for S, our parameter of interest.

Unlike the beneficiaries with incapacitated spouses, the beneficiaries with healthy spouses face all three options for care: Formal (SNF) care (F), informal care from their spouse (S), and the outside option (O). These beneficiaries thus face a slightly more complicated (though still simple) decision rule. Formally, the beneficiary chooses F if and only if:

$$w^F - p^F > w^S \text{ and } w^F - p^F > 0. \tag{7}$$

essentially everyone with supplemental coverage paid \$0 out-of-pocket for additional SNF days for days 21 through 100 (McGarry et al., 2021).

Panel A of Figure XX illustrates this choice graphically. Beneficiaries are described by the ordered pair (w^S, w^F), and w^S is on the y-axis and w^F is on the x-axis. The dotted red line represents the price of formal care, p^F. Beneficiaries in the blue area have $w^S > 0$ and $w^S > w^F - p^F$ and thus choose informal care from their spouse. Beneficiaries in the green area have $w^F > 0$ and $w^F - p^F > w^S$ and thus choose formal care. The remaining beneficiaries (in the orange area) have $w^s < 0$ and $w^F - p^F < 0$ and thus choose the outside option.

Now, based on this structure, we can determine what our estimates of demand-response to price from Section 5 tell us (if anything) about w^S, our target parameter. Suppose that p^F increases to $\bar{p}^F$ (as in Section 5). Panel B of Figure XX illustrates that for any (marginal) beneficiary who opts out of formal care due to this increase in price, one of two things must be true: The lower consumer surplus from formal care due to the higher price he must pay to access it must now fall below either (1) the consumer surplus from informal care from his spouse ($w^F - \bar{p}^F < w^S$) or (2) the consumer surplus from the outside option (normalized to zero so that $w^F < \bar{p}^F$). There are thus two groups of marginal beneficiaries: Those on the margin of formal care and informal care from their spouse and those on the margin of formal care and the outside option. The figure also clearly shows that the groups are defined by w^S with those for whom $w^S > 0$ being on the margin between F and S and those for whom $w^S < 0$ being on the margin between F and O.

It is now useful to specify another index ordering consumers, this time based on their *incremental* WTP for F versus S. Call this index $\hat{s} \in [0, 1]$, and let $w^{FS}(\hat{s}) = w^F(\hat{s}) - w^S(\hat{s})$ be the incremental WTP for F versus S for a type-$\hat{s}$ consumer. As before, define the marginal $\hat{s}$-type consumer as the $\hat{s}$-type for whom $w^{FS}(\hat{s}^{FS}(p^F)) = p^F$. This is the $\hat{s}$-type who is indifferent between F and S at formal price p^F.

Now, to connect this back to the data, while the demand curve for F among beneficiaries with sick spouses clearly describes $w^F(s)$, the demand curve for F among beneficiaries with healthy spouses actually represents the combination of two demand curves, one describing w^F for those beneficiaries for whom $w^S < 0$ and one describing w^{FS} for those for whom $w^S > 0$. To proceed, we must thus define two more s indices that order consumers *within these respective groups*. The first one is denoted $s_0 \in [0, 1]$ and it orders *only consumers for whom* $w^S < 0$ according to w^f. The second one is denoted $\hat{s}_0$ and it orders *only consumers for whom* $w^S > 0$ according to $w^F S$. And again we can define the marginal types as $s_0^F(p^F)$ and $\hat{s}_0^{FS}(p^F)$ where $w^F(s_0^F(P^F)) = p^F$ and $w^{FS}(\hat{s}_0^{FS}(P^F)) = p^F$. And we know that for any price increase

from p^F to $\bar{p}^F$, the marginal consumers for whom $w^S > 0$ have $p^F < w^{FS} < \bar{p}^F$ and the marginal consumers for whom $w^S < 0$ have $p^F < w^F < \bar{p}^F$. Thus, when we measure the demand-response for F among those with $w^S < 0$ we trace out the demand curve for F versus O for those with $w^S < 0$, $D_0^{FO}(p^F) = s_0^F(P^F)$. And when we measure the demand-response for F among those with $w^S > 0$ we trace out the *incremental* demand curve for F versus S for those with $w^S > 0$, $D_0^{FS}(p^F) = \hat{s}_0^{FS}(P^F)$.

However, we do not know w^S, so we do note know who is in which group. Instead, we can just measure a single demand-response for F, which represents a weighted average of the demand-response across the groups and thus a weighted average of the demand curves. Our demand curve among beneficiaries with a healthy spouse is thus given by $D_0^F(p^F) = \alpha D_0^{FO}(p^F) + (1-\alpha) D_0^{FS}(p^F)$

Next: Demand curve for F among healthy spouse group is weighted average of w^F and w^{FS} curves Assuming that a consumer's s type is also their s_0 type, we know that the w^F curve that contributes to healthy spouse curve is the same as the sick spouse curve Then, if

For beneficiaries for whom either

Suppose that p^F increases to $\bar{p}^F$, and he leaves the SNF. The higher price, $\bar{p}^F$, leads him to leave the SNF based on either of the inequalities in (1) failing to hold. He may leave the SNF because now care from his spouse is more valuable: $w^F - \bar{p}^F < w^S$. Alternatively, he may leave the SNF because living independently is now more attractive: $w^F < \bar{p}^F$.

A challenge here is that the change from p^F to $\bar{p}^F$ does not identify w^S. The existence of independent living complicates this analysis. Still, this framework can clarify the cases at play. Suppose that the SNF resident chooses to leave the SNF in order to receive informal care from his spouse. In that case, $w^F - p^F > w^S$ and $w^F - \bar{p}^F < w^S$, which implies that $p^F < w^S < \bar{p}^F$. In other words, for residents with healthy spouses who leave a SNF to be cared for by their spouse, the change in price provides bounds on their valuation of informal care by their spouse.

That said, the resident may also leave the SNF because the increase in price from p^F to $\bar{p}^F$ forces the second inequality in (1) to fail. In that case, $w^S < 0$ and the increase in price forces the resident into independent living. We do not learn about w^S, but we still gain information about w^F relative to p^F and $\bar{p}^F$. Specifically, since the resident was initially willing to pay at least p^F but ultimately not willing to pay $\bar{p}^F$, we have that $p^F < w^F < \bar{p}^F$.

We can think of the values of willingness to pay in this setting as random variables.

When a price change for formal care occurs, the share of residents who leave the SNF is equal to

$$\alpha \cdot P(p^F < w^S < \bar{p}^F) + (1-\alpha) \cdot P(p^F < w^F < \bar{p}^F,\ w^S < 0). \tag{8}$$

The term α in (8) captures the relative prevalence of the two margins: exits of SNFs to care by a spouse and exits of SNFs to independent living.

Suppose that we also observe a similar person whose spouse has been incapacitated. That person faces a simpler decision rule, because informal care from a spouse is unavailable. They stay in the SNF so long as: $w^F - p^F > 0$.

If that person leaves the SNF because the price increased from p^F to $\bar{p}^F$, then it must be the case that $p^F < w^F < \bar{p}^F$ for them. The share of these people who leave the SNF after the price increase is:

$$P(p^F < w^F < \bar{p}^F). \tag{9}$$

Given a change in the price of a night in a SNF, we can then empirically observe the share of Medicare recipients who leave the SNF across those two categories, (8) and (9). If we also have an estimate of α, then (8) minus $(1-\alpha)$ times (9) yields: $\alpha \cdot P(p^F < w^S < \bar{p}^F)$. That is to say, we can convert these empirical estimates into bounds on the willingness to pay for informal care by a spouse.

6.3 Household Valuation of Care

We now turn to develop our two revealed preference approaches to infer measures of v_S, i.e., the average money-metric valuation of informal care. We assess the option value of a healthy spouse via households' "willingness to pay," based on revealed preference methods that leverage households' choices of formal care within and across the two states of the world. Section 2 modeled the transitions across states of nature. In this section we extend the model to analyze the within-state household choices as needed for the moment we want to identify. In subsection 6.3.1, we extend the framework to model the household decision of total SNF days, so we can analyze the value of a marginal SNF day for a given household. In subsection 6.3.2, we extend the framework to include heterogeneous households and model households' binary decision to utilize formal care in each day in the post event horizon, so we can analyze marginal entrants and market demand.

6.3.1 Marginal Rate of Substitution

The first method evaluates how the marginal valuation of SNF days relative to $1 varies across states of the world. It relies on within-state first order conditions of SNF days and the fact the price schedule is invariant to the index spouse's incapacitation.

We index the focal spouse's utility by the state of the index spouse's incapacitation. Incapacitation is modeled by t in the conceptual framework, where $t = 0$ corresponds to periods prior to the index event and $t = 1$ corresponds to periods after the index event. We let the focal spouse's utility, $U_t(x_t, m_t)$, take the following form:

$$U_t(x_t, m_t) = u_t(x_t) + m_t,$$

where x_t is the consumption of formal care and m_t is "money" so that the utility from care, $u_t(x_t)$, is relative to the within-state valuation of resources. A similar formulation can be obtained instead by writing the Lagrangian of the problem and normalizing it by the shadow value of the household's resources. In both cases we achieve a money-metric valuation of the utility from care. These valuations map to the household value functions that were presented in Section 2, where here we provide an explicit formulation for them.

Within-state optimality conditions imply that

$$u_t'(x_t) = P(x_t)$$

where $P(x_t)$ is the marginal price of a SNF day (capturing the non-linearity in pricing of SNF days). The optimality conditions within each state imply the the following holds across states:

$$u_0'(x_0) = u_1'(x_1).$$

That is, the marginal state-dependent utility from a SNF day is equated across states of nature, as the marginal price is similar across states. A first-order expansion (of the left-hand side) leads to the following welfare formula:

$$1 + \gamma(x_1)\frac{x_1 - x_0}{x_1} = \sigma(x_1),$$

where $\gamma(x_1) \equiv -\frac{u_0''(x_1)}{u_0'(x_1)}x_1$ represents relative risk aversion and can be calibrated from previous work to roughly vary from 1 to 4 (Schechter, 2007). The parameter $\sigma(x_1) \equiv \frac{u_1'(x_1)}{u_0'(x_1)}$ represents the state-dependence valuation parameter we want to assess. It

captures how the marginal (money-metric) valuation of a SNF day changes across states of nature. As such, it represents the ratio of the willingness to pay for care across the two states. In other words, it is the marginal rate of substitution of care across states of spousal ability to provide informal care.

This approach evaluates welfare based on changes in the curvature of the indirect utility from care. When an input into the household production function is missing in the constrained optimization, it would lead to a higher curvature of the indirect utility from any other input since there are fewer choice variables to smooth across marginal decisions. It has a similar effect as in consumption commitments, where there is a margin you cannot freely adjust on (Chetty and Szeidl, 2016). This approach relies on our quasi-experimental source of variation alone, but it is constrained to marginal assessments and requires calibration of risk aversion.

The term $\sigma(x_1) - 1$ represents the household valuation of a healthy spouse via the marginal value of formal care: it is the excess valuation of the marginal SNF day in the transition across the spousal incapacitation status. Based on our findings, we have that $\frac{x_S - x_H}{x_S} = 0.191$, and we provide values for a range of relative risk aversion parameters that vary from 1 to 4 in Appendix Table A2. We assess that, on average across the calibration, an additional day of SNF is valued (relative to income) by 48% more following the spousal incapacitation event.

6.3.2 Consumer Surplus

The second method evaluates the overall willingness to pay for formal care across the two states of the world. It evaluates the option value of spousal informal care by the excess valuation of formal care when this option vanishes. We explicitly model willingness to pay for formal care compared to the alternatives, where it is the set of alternatives that changes across states. We leverage price variation from the non-linear schedule of the cost of SNF days. We use the responses to the price variation to back out demand curves in each state and impute the excess valuation of formal care in a given day due to the spousal event. We then calculate the change in consumer surplus for each SNF day and aggregate over days to get the total option value of spousal informal care. Since we aggregate over households, we need to explicitly add heterogeneity in valuations into the model.

We let beneficiaries be indexed by $s_t \in [0, 1]$, where s_t orders consumers according to their willingness-to-pay for formal care (when $c_t = 1$) relative to informal care (when $c_t = 0$) if they have an underlying need (that is, $h_t = 1$). The subscript t

again characterizes the index spouse's incapacitation state, where $t = 0$ corresponds to periods prior to the index event and $t = 1$ corresponds to periods after the index event. We order consumers such that $s_t = 0$ is the consumer with highest willingness-to-pay and $s_t = 1$ is the consumer with lowest willingness-to-pay, which will simplify the formulas.[11] We denote the willingness-to-pay for formal care (relative to the available alternative) by $u_t(s_t)$ for an s_t-type consumer. $P(x_t)$ again denotes be the daily out-of-pocket price charged for formal care, which is similar across states of nature but can vary for based on the length of stay (x_t). In what follows, we drop the notation of x_t for notational convenience. Finally, let $s_t^*(P)$ represent the s_t-type consumer who is on the margin between purchasing and not purchasing formal care at price P, characterized by satisfying the condition $u_j(s_t^*(P)) = P$.

With this setup, we can write the consumer surplus for a given day as:

$$CS_t(P) = \int_0^{s_t^*(P)} [u_t(s_t) - P]\, f_t(s_t)\, ds_t$$

We note that since the probability density function is not conditional on takeup, it captures the option value of the alternative mode of care. Calculation of $CS_t(P)$ relies on the known fact that it is the integral of the inverse demand function since:

$$\frac{dCS_t}{dP} = \frac{ds_t^*(P)}{dP} [u_t(s_t^*(P)) - P]\, f_t(s_t^*(P)) - \int_0^{s_t^*(P)} f_t(s_t)\, ds_t = -F_t(s_t^*(P)).$$

We then infer the mean valuation of spousal informal care by

$$v_S = CS_1(0) - CS_0(0).$$

That it, we use the excess valuation of formal care in the absence of the option of spousal care to infer the option value of spousal care.

Figure 9 illustrates the intuition of the approach. In our data, we can observe level differences in the demand for SNF care among focal spouses with spouses either affected or unaffected by health events. By identifying the fraction of focal spouses in a SNF at day 20 (the day before the price change) in each group, we identify the x-intercepts for each demand curve (points $(c, \$0)$ and $(a, \$0)$). The slope of the demand curve is then identified based on the estimated percentage change in demand for formal care between days 20 and 21 when cost-sharing for formal care increases

[11] This allows us to work with the CDF instead of one minus the CDF in imputing demand.

discontinuously. The RD estimates allow us to identify the values b and d. Demand curves are then extrapolated using linear approximation based on these two points for each group.

From these estimated inverse demand curves, we estimate consumer surplus for each additional day of SNF coverage.[12] Through day 20, we estimate that $CS_0(0) = \$8,141$ for the healthy spouse group, and $CS_1(0) = \$29,061$ for the sick spouse group. That is, focal spouses facing a reduction in the availability of informal care derive roughly 3.6 times the consumer surplus from receiving formal care at a given price. Appendix Figure A4 illustrates how these differences in consumer surplus accumulate over days in a SNF. By the end of day 100—the day at which consumers face full cost-sharing for a SNF stay—focal spouses with an incapacitated spouse have a total consumer surplus of $62,808, roughly 3.8 times larger than the estimated consumer surplus of the group with healthy spouses.

6.4 Design of Optimal Insurance Policies

Optimal health insurance involves a trade-off between the welfare benefits of risk protection and the deadweight loss from moral hazard (Zeckhauser, 1970). Increasing insurance coverage induces welfare gains from equalizing marginal utility across states of the world, but comes at the cost of the over-consumption of care.

Total social welfare with respect to Medicare's formal care now takes the following explicit form:

$$W_t(P) = \int_0^{s_t^*(P)} [u_t(s_t) - P]\, f_t(s_t)\, ds_t + P \int_0^{s_t^*(P)} f_t(s_t)\, ds_t.$$

Accordingly, the welfare cost of a price change, the deadweight loss (DWL), is captured by


$$\frac{dW_t(P)}{dP} = P \frac{dF_t(s_t^*(P))}{dP}.$$

Importantly, this implies that the ratio of elasticities governs the relative DWL from subsidies to formal care across households with and without healthy spouses.

With the demand elasticities identified above, the estimated ratio is 36%. This

[12] Throughout, our work highlights the relative differences in valuations across individuals living with an incapacitated spouse relative to a healthy one. These estimates do not require a credible estimate of the OOP associated with SNF care. However, to obtain estimates for the levels of consumer surplus, we use a price of $150 per day. This price applies to the 25% of the Medicare population who do not have Medigap coverage; those with Medigap are fully covered and do not face cost-sharing. The expected increase in daily OOP payments after day 20 is therefore $37.50.

Figure 9. Estimating Demand for Formal Care across Groups



Notes: This figure shows the intuition for estimating linear inverse demand curves using variation in prices that husbands face for formal long-term care. Demand curve estimation relies on identifying differences in levels of demand (values a and c) and the relative change in this demand as a function of the RD estimates presented in Section 6.3. These changes identify b and d. The chosen daily OOP price for SNF care of \$37.50 is justified in the text in Section 6.3.2.

implies that efficiency losses are reduced by 36% when subsidizing formal care for individuals without readily available informal care provided by a spouse. It captures that idea that people whose partners just experienced a shock have less access to informal care, and so exhibit a less elastic demand for formal care. As a result, generous coverage leads to less moral hazard among them.

This estimated difference in efficiency loss effectively provides a strong motivation to differential pricing for elderly care based on household structure. In particular, policymakers may consider family deductibles—which are more likely to bind if a spouse becomes incapacitated—as a means to charge different out-of-pocket costs to consumers with and without the option of informal care provided by a spouse or a family member.

7 Conclusion

We study couples enrolled in the Medicare program and find that when one spouse experiences a severe cardiac event, their partner's healthcare utilization increases by roughly five percent. Much of the increase is driven by a shift from informal care to formal care that must be covered by Medicare. This then amounts to a fiscal externality of the index event. In aggregate, Medicare pays $1.26 billion in care driven by that externality each year. More importantly, we estimate that people are willing to pay roughly four times more for formal care when their spouses become incapacitated.

These results demonstrate the importance of the public provision of formal elderly care when spouses cannot provide informal care. One policy response is a family-specific deductible. Such a deductible would effectively provide formal care at lower prices to households with an incapacitated spouse. As a result, family-specific deductibles would lower copayments for those whose demand curves for formal care have become more inelastic, and thus whose consumption is less driven by moral hazard. In fact, some countries do indeed adjust support for formal care based on the availability of family members who may provide informal care. The Dutch system, as one example, explicitly limits eligibility for formal care based on whether an able spouse is present (Ilinca et al., 2017). Medicare, by contrast, makes no adjustment for family structure in determining cost sharing, eligibility, or coverage.

Finally, our findings also speak to to the long-term secular trends in the aging of the population. Gerontologists sometimes refer to elderly patients who lack a family

member to care for them as "elder orphans." As the population ages, elder orphans are predicted to become more prevalent (Roofeh et al., 2020). And, in turn, the increasing number of elder orphans may translate to greater need for more resources to be devoted to formal care.

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
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A Appendix Tables and Figures

Appendix Figure A1. Effect on Risk of a SNF Visit by Focal Spouse's Pre-Existing ADRD Status



Notes: This figure plots estimates of the δ_n coefficients from equation (3), tracking the months since an index spouse's first heart attack or stroke. The outcome is an indicator for whether the focal (spillover) spouse visited a SNF. We stratify the sample based on whether the focal spouse had a diagnosis of ADRD at any time prior to the index spouse's event. We re-scale coefficients to indicate changes relative to the initial baseline risk in each category. Error bars plot 95-percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the household level.

Appendix Table A1. Matrix of Transitions across States of Nature

	Healthy in $t=1$	Sick in $t=1$	
		Informal care	Formal care
	$(h_1=0)$	$(h_1=1, c_1=0)$	$(h_1=1, c_1=1)$
$(h_0=0)$	$p_{0,0}$	0	$p_{0,(1,1)}$
$(h_0=1, c_0=0)$	0	0	1
$(h_0=1, c_0=1)$	0	0	1

Notes: Table shows calibrated values for the state dependence of the marginal valuation of SNF days relative to \$1 (σ, as described in Section 6.3). Based on our data, we have that $\frac{x_S - x_H}{x_S} = 0.43$. We then calculate σ for a range of relative risk aversion parameters shown above. That is, each column of the table shows the marginal valuation of an additional day of SNF care relative to income, for a different relative risk aversion parameter γ.

Appendix Table A2. Model Calibration

γ	1	2	3	4	
$\sigma - 1$	19.1%	38.2%	57.3%	76.4%	Mean: 47.75%

Notes: Table shows calibrated values for the state dependence in the marginal valuation of SNF days relative to \$1 ($\sigma(x_1) - 1$, as described in Section 6.3). Based on our data, we have that $\frac{x_1 - x_0}{x_1} = 0.191$. We then calculate $\sigma(x_1) - 1$ for a range of relative risk aversion parameters shown above. Each column of the table shows the excess marginal valuation of an additional day of SNF care relative to income for a different relative risk aversion parameter γ and the average across the range.

Appendix Table A3. Effects of a Spouse's Major Cardiovascular Event on SNF Price Sensitivity, Stratified by Event Outcome

	(1)	(2)
Panel A: RD, Healthy Spouse Group		
Overall	-0.014***	-0.014***
	(0.0031)	(0.0017)
Panel B: RD, Sick Spouse Group		
Overall	-0.009**	-0.009**
	(0.0043)	(0.0024)
Fatal Event	0.003	0.003
	(0.0127)	(0.0062)
Event Ending in Discharge to SNF/Rehab	-0.011	-0.011**
	(0.0073)	(0.0041)
All Other Events	-0.010*	-0.010**
	(0.0058)	(0.0031)
Couple FEs		✓
Calendar Month FEs		✓
Bandwidth	11.22	11.22
N	783,840	783,840


Notes: Compare to Table 4. This table presents regression-discontinuity estimators identifying the effect of ending Medicare coverage for SNF stays, which ends on day 21 for qualifying stays. Panel A presents the estimated effect of losing coverage on the probability a focal spouse will remain in the SNF prior to a spousal cardiovascular event. Panel B reports the post-event estimates stratified by the time of index event. SNF stays within 4 months of the treatment and placebo events are included in the regression. The differences in Panel B between fatal and nonfatal events are statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level. "FE" is an abbreviation for fixed effects.

Appendix Table A4. Effects of a Spouse's Major Cardiovascular Event on SNF Price Sensitivity, Duals Only

	(1)	(2)
RD, healthy spouse	-0.018	-0.018**
	(0.0119)	(0.0063)
RD, sick spouse	-0.011	-0.011*
	(0.0114)	(0.0060)
Difference in discontinuities	0.007	0.007
	(0.0164)	(0.0097)
Couple FEs		✓
Calendar Month FEs		✓
Bandwidth	11.22	11.22
N	74,244	74,244


Notes: This table presents regression-discontinuity and differences-in-discontinuities estimators identifying the effect of ending Medicare coverage for SNF stays, which ends on day 21 for qualifying stays. The first two rows present the estimated effect of losing coverage on the probability a focal spouse will remain in the SNF, stratified by before or after the index event. The third row presents the difference-in-discontinuities estimator as discussed in the text. SNF stays within 4 months of the treatment and placebo events are included in the regression. "FE" is an abbreviation for fixed effects.

Appendix Figure A2. Predicted Probability of Discharge to SNF: Validation on 100% Sample




Notes: This figure plots the distribution of the predicted probability of a given hospitalization ending in a discharge to a SNF across a 100% validation sample of husband hospitalizations in the Medicare data, for two groups: those that did not end with a discharge to a SNF (in red), and those which did (in blue). Predicted values are modeled using LASSO prediction, with a binary predicted outcome for all hospital stays in the 100% Inpatient claims files from 2011 to 2017. Covariates include patient age, sex, race, dual Medicaid eligibility, Medicare enrollment type, and DRG indicators.

Appendix Figure A3. Effect on Unconditional Average LOS for a SNF Stay



Notes: This figure plots estimates of the δ_n coefficients from equation (3), tracking the weeks since a index spouse's first heart attack or stroke. The outcome of interest is a measure of days per month spent in a SNF across the entire sample, including 0-day months. We re-scale all coefficients such that they indicate the change relative to the initial baseline average LOS. The error bars plot 95-percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the household level. Regression include calendar-time fixed effects and person-specific fixed effects.

Appendix Figure A4. Cumulative Consumer Surplus by Index Health Events




Notes: This figure plots estimated cumulative consumer surplus following the methodology of Section 6.3.2 and the framework presented in Section 2. The cumulative consumer surplus from a SNF stay for focal spouses with a healthy partner; the same values for those with a sick index spouse (for whom demand curves have shifted) are plotted in red.

B Appendix: Symmetry by Gender

This appendix stratifies the paper's main results by gender. A priori, one might expect the main estimates to differ based on whether the index spouse is male or female. Previous studies have found differences in the burden of caretaking by gender (Arber and Ginn, 1995; Tramonti et al., 2015; Pillemer et al., 2018).

Appendix Figure B1 presents estimates of equation (3) separately by gender when the outcome of interest is the focal spouse's visit to a SNF. The figure suggests remarkably similar effects regardless of gender.


Appendix Figure B1. Spillover Effects by Gender: Visits to Skilled Nursing Facilities



Notes: This figure plots dynamic difference-in-differences coefficients that track the months since the index event of a heart attack or stroke in the household, stratified by whether the event occurred to a husband or wife. The outcome of interest is an indicator for whether the other partner was hospitalized or visited a SNF, and we re-scale all coefficients such that they indicated the change relative to the initial baseline risk of hospitalization or SNF stay. The joint tests of different post-treatment effects across focal spouse sex had p-values of 0.23 for SNF stays and 0.13 for hospitalizations. The error bars plot 95-percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the household lever. Regressions include calendar-time fixed effects and person-specific fixed effects.

Appendix Table B1 presents a version of Table 4 but separately by gender. That is, it presents RD estimates of the price elasticity of demand for a night in a SNF separately whether the focal spouse is male or female. The individual estimates are somewhat noisy, given that they involve half of the sample. They do not suggest a

Appendix Figure B2. Spillover Effects by Gender: New ADRD Diagnoses



Notes: This figure plots dynamic difference-in-differences coefficients that track the months since the index event of a heart attack or stroke in the household, stratified by whether the event occurred to a husband or wife. The outcome of interest is an indicator for whether the other partner obtained a new ADRD diagnosis, and we re-scale all coefficients such that they indicated the change relative to the initial baseline risk of hospitalization or SNF stay. The error bars plot 95-percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the household lever. Regressions include calendar-time fixed effects and person-specific fixed effects.

statistically significant gap in price sensitivity across genders.

Appendix Table B1. Effects of Index Spouse Health Event on Focal Spouse's Price Sensitivity for SNF Length-of-Stay Decision

	(1) All	(2) Focal Husbands	(3) Focal Wives
τ_{pre}	-0.014***	-0.012***	-0.015***
	(0.0017)	(0.0027)	(0.0023)
τ_{post}	-0.009***	-0.009**	-0.008***
	(0.0024)	(0.0037)	(0.0030)
$\beta_{\text{D-Disc}}$	0.005*	0.003	0.007*
	(0.0031)	(0.0048)	(0.0040)
Couple FEs	✓	✓	✓
Time FEs	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	11.22	11.22	11.22
N	783,840	330,694	453,146

Notes: This table presents regression-discontinuity and differences-in-discontinuities estimators identifying the effect of ending Medicare coverage for SNF stays, which ends on day 21 for qualifying stays. The first two rows present the estimated effect of losing coverage on the probability a focal spouse will remain in the SNF, stratified by before or after the index event. The third row presents the difference-in-discotinuities estimator as discussed in the text. SNF stays within 4 months of the treatment and placebo events are included in the regression.