Majority in 40 Countries Support Unprecedented Coordinated Billionaire Tax Discussed by G20*

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Preliminary version, please do not circulate.

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Abstract

Recent G7 and G20 discussions have considered the unprecedented step of globally coordinating the taxation of individuals. The main proposal is a globally coordinated annual minimum tax of 2% on the wealth of dollar billionaires. Political support for the proposal is divided, while public opinion has, until now, remained unexplored. We present results from a survey of 44,977 respondents across 40 countries measuring public support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax. The policy is supported by 70% of respondents, opposed by only 9%, and has majority support in every surveyed country. It is also backed by a majority of voters in 161 of 164 represented political parties, including all Western political parties. In the West, the billionaire tax is significantly more popular than broad domestic redistribution due to high support among right-leaning and high-income voters. Governmental support for the billionaire tax is only weakly associated with public support for the tax itself. It is strongly associated with public support for broad domestic redistribution, however, indicating that governments opposing the tax may be unaware of the strong public support for taxing top-end wealth within their countries. Overall, our study shows that any lack of political will for this initiative does not reflect the will of citizens, and represents a significant step forward in understanding individuals' preferences for redistribution across the globe.

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Main

The growing concentration of wealth among the world's richest individuals has intensified debates over economic inequality.[1,2,3,4,5] In response, recent G7 and G20 summits have considered the step of coordinating a global tax targeting individuals. Central to these discussions is a proposal of a coordinated 2% minimum tax on dollar billionaires' net wealth, with the stated goal of tackling the challenges posed by "*the international mobility of ultra-high-net-worth individuals*".[6] Participating countries would independently decide their method of taxation and use of revenue, as the primary aim is to prevent the race to the bottom on top-end taxes – a race which has led to the number of OECD countries with wealth taxes decreasing from 12 in 1992 to just 3 in 2024.[7] The proposal is also motivated by recent analysis showing that billionaires pay a lower net effective income tax rate than all other citizens in a number of countries, including in the United States, France, Italy, and the Netherlands.[8] To date, no country has independently devised an effective method to tax top-end wealth.


Although technically challenging, the global minimum tax is described as "*feasible*" in a report commissioned by the G20 presidency,[9] and the implementation as "*a question of political will*." The report projects annual revenues as $200-$250 billion from approximately 3,000 taxpayers, and discusses how non-participation could be deterred via exit taxes and "tax collector of last resort" mechanisms. These mechanisms align with the OECD/G20 framework for a globally coordinated 15% minimum corporate income tax rate (the *Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules*), agreed upon by 136 countries in 2021 after two years of formal discussion. This agreement highlights both the feasibility and the potential pace of global tax cooperation.

The globally coordinated billionaire tax has been discussed in the G7, the G20, and the United Nations, and has been covered by media outlets such as *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Guardian*, and *The Financial Times*.[6,10,11,12,13,14] Although momentum has been growing rapidly, the policy goal remains contentious. G20 members such as Brazil, France, and South Africa have voiced clear support, while others, notably the United States, Japan, and Germany, remain opposed or skeptical.[11,12,15,16]

Despite the intensifying international debate, no evidence exists regarding public support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax. Existing literature has predominantly focused on people's preferences for broad redistribution within their country, where the vast majority of studies explore country-specific data. We summarize this evidence in Appendix B.1. Support for a globally coordinated billionaire tax may not align with support for broad domestic redistribution, however, as both moral and self-interest considerations could differ in these two contexts. The global nature of the billionaire tax may lead to less support among people with communitarian values[17] or those wary of centralized global governance, for instance. Conversely, the policy may garner more support from individuals with significant tax burdens who are not targeted by the billionaire tax,[18] or from individuals who are hesitant to endorse top-end taxation due to concerns over tax-induced migration. Overall, we contribute by providing the first evidence on public preferences for a globally coordinated billionaire tax, while also expanding on the limited number of studies exploring redistributive preferences in a global context.

Here we present novel evidence from an online survey with 44,977 respondents across 40 countries, examining public support for a globally coordinated minimum tax on dollar billion-

Figure 1: Global support for a globally coordinated 2% tax on dollar billionaires



Note. This figure reports the distribution of responses from 44,977 respondents in 40 countries on whether they support or oppose a globally coordinated billionaire tax. The globally coordinated billionaire tax is described to respondents as a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". The data are weighted to ensure equal representation for each country. Supplementary Figure C2 presents results when each country is instead weighted by global population. Supplementary Figure C3 presents results adjusted for country-specific demographic weights.

aires. The survey initiative was executed in partnership with the leading survey companies Norstat and Dynata, frequently used in the recent academic literature.[19,20,21] The survey's phrasing was pre-tested to ensure clarity and neutrality, and all translations were professionally conducted to ensure consistency across cultures. The large majority of translations were also examined by native academics with expertise in the respective languages and local contexts. The survey is broadly representative of each country's population across key demographics such as age, gender, and political affiliation (see Supplementary Figure C1 and Supplementary Table D1). We note that highly educated respondents are over-sampled, particularly in developing countries, reflecting an intrinsic feature of online survey panels. Results are robust to weighting for demographic representativity. Methods are outlined in Appendix A.

The main question of interest measures individual support for a globally coordinated minimum tax on dollar billionaires set at 2% of their wealth:

International organizations and governments have recently proposed a coordinated tax targeting the world's wealthiest individuals. This tax would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year.


Do you support or oppose this policy?

[Strongly support / Somewhat support / Neither support nor oppose / Somewhat oppose / Strongly oppose / Do not understand]

We define support for the policy as indicating "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" in response to this question. Results are robust to using a cardinal 1-5 scale.

We summarize the responses in Figure 1. In our sample, 70% of respondents support the policy, 18% neither support nor oppose it, and 9% oppose it. Only 2% of respondents indicate that they do not understand the question. The data are weighted to ensure that each country is equally represented; when weights are adjusted to reflect the global population distribution,

Figure 2: Global support for a coordinated 2% tax on dollar billionaires by country and region



Note. This figure reports the share of respondents who support the globally coordinated billionaire tax across (a) countries, and (b) regions (where data are weighted to ensure equal representation for each country). Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Supplementary Figure C4 presents results adjusted for country-specific demographic weights. Supplementary Figure C5 shows results under a cardinal scale from -2 (strongly disagree) to 2 (strongly agree). Supplementary Figure C6 shows opposition by country and region. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.


strong support in China and India increases the estimated overall support from 70% to 75% (Supplementary Figure C2). Overall, our results provide strong evidence of widespread global support for a coordinated tax on dollar billionaires.

In Figure 2a, we show the share of respondents who support the policy by country. A majority in all 40 countries express support for the policy. Support is highest in Indonesia (83%), Germany (82%), China (80%), and India (79%), and is lowest in the Czech Republic (51%), Poland (57%), and Japan (58%). Support is relatively low in the United States (63%). In Figure 2b we show the corresponding analysis by region. Countries in Western Europe (78%) and South-East Asia (76%) are most likely to support the policy, while countries in Eastern Europe (62%) are least likely. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is not significantly correlated with economic factors such as GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient, or the per capita number of billionaires, nor with demographic factors like the share of college-educated respondents, the share of religious respondents, or the share of right-leaning respondents (Supplementary Table D2).[1] Cultural attitudes surrounding fairness, inequality, and governmental trust appear more influential. A one percentage point increase in the share of respondents who perceive inequality as unfair is associated with a 0.34 p.p. increase in support for the billionaire tax across countries (95% C.I. [0.11,0.58]; p=0.006). Similarly, a one percentage point increase in the share of respondents who believe that inequality leads to negative societal consequences is associated with a 0.33 percentage-point rise in support (95% C.I. [0.09, 0.58]; p=0.012), and a one percentage point rise in the share of respondents who trust their national government correlates with a 0.24 percentage-point increase in support (95% C.I. [0.07, 0.42]; p=0.009).

In Figure 3, we explore which individual characteristics are associated with support within

[1]To define the political leaning of parties, we largely follow the classifications of the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database (WPID); see Appendix A.9.

Figure 3: Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax: Individual-level associations



Note. This figure reports regression coefficients from separate and joint regressions of support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax with the stated demographic variables. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9. In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). Supplementary Table D3 shows the corresponding regression analysis. Supplementary Figure C7 presents results adjusted for country-specific demographic weights. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

countries, controlling for country-specific fixed effects (Supplementary Table D3). We observe that right-leaning voters are 11 percentage points less likely to support the policy than left-leaning voters (95% C.I. [10.0,12.0]; p<0.001). This difference is larger in Western countries (16 p.p., 95% C.I. [14.1,17.1]; p<0.001) than in non-Western countries (7 p.p., 95% C.I. [5.8,8.6]; p<0.001), perhaps because non-Western political cleavages often lie on dimensions that are challenging to map onto the Western left-right spectrum. Still, a majority of right-leaning respondents support the billionaire tax in every country surveyed – including 53% of U.S. respondents who voted for Donald Trump in 2020 and 62% of U.K. respondents who voted for the Conservative Party in 2024.[2] Overall, 161 of 164 represented political parties have a majority of their voters expressing support for the policy, including all 79 political parties in Western countries.[3]

Other demographic covariates have relatively small explanatory power. Notably, we find no significant association between support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and being in the top 10% of income earners in a country (0.5 p.p., 95% C.I. [-1.0,1.9]; p=0.531).[4] We find small but statistically significant associations between support and having a higher education (4.1 p.p., 95% C.I. [3.2,5.1]; p<0.001), being of male gender (3.0 p.p., 95% C.I. [2.2,3.8]; p<0.001), and being above 40 years of age (5.3 p.p., 95% C.I. [4.4,6.2]; p<0.001). No significant association is observed with religious affiliation (-0.7 p.p., 95% C.I. [-1.7,0.3]; p=0.169).


The cultural attitudes linked to the cross-country variation in support also play a key role within countries. Respondents who perceive inequality in their country as unfair or believe that inequality leads to negative societal consequences are approximately 28 p.p more likely to

[2]This compares to 76% of respondents who voted for Joe Biden and 80% of respondents who voted for the Labour Party.

[3]The three parties without majority support among their voters are Konfederacja in Poland (41%), Citizens' Movement in Mexico (48%), and Jair Bolsanaro's Liberal Party in Brazil (49%).

[4]We show support across the entire relative income distribution in Supplementary Figure C8.

Figure 4: Relative support of the global billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution



Note. This figure reports support for the global billionaire tax (p.p.) minus support for broad domestic redistribution (p.p.) across (a) Western and non-Western countries (where data are weighted to ensure equal representation for each country), and (b) all countries. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". See Appendix A.7 for a list of Western and non-Western countries. Supplementary Figure C13 presents results adjusted for country-specific demographic weights. Supplementary Figure C14 replicates Figure 2 for broad domestic redistribution. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.


support the globally coordinated billionaire tax (unfair: 27.5 p.p., 95% C.I. [26.5,28.5]; $p<0.001$; societal consequences: 28.1 p.p., 95% C.I. [27.1,29.1]; $p<0.001$). Views on government also appear to matter; respondents who trust their government are 9.8 p.p. more likely to support the tax (95% C.I. [8.9,10.7]; $p<0.001$). In a Gelbach decomposition, we show that roughly half of the left-right difference in support can be attributed to individual variation across these cultural attitudes, driven by fairness views and beliefs about the societal consequences of inequality in roughly equal proportions (Appendix B.3).

To study whether respondents' support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax can be explained by their general views on redistribution, we asked respondents whether they agree with the statement, "The government should reduce income inequalities in society."[5] While the globally coordinated billionaire tax differs from the broad domestic redistribution described in this question on several dimensions – notably in its geographic scope, instrument, and incidence – comparing the two offers valuable insights into the nature of support for the billionaire tax. People's support for broad domestic redistribution is also a widely studied concept, often engaged with in political and social debates, and may therefore shape governments' perceptions of public support for the billionaire tax.

Although support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is positively associated with support for broad domestic redistribution ($p<0.001$, Supplementary Table D6), many individuals hold opposing views on these two forms of redistribution. Among all respondents, 15.2% support the globally coordinated billionaire tax but not broad domestic redistribution, while 14.6% support broad domestic redistribution but not the globally coordinated billionaire tax. This compares to 55.2% who support both and 15.1% who support neither. We show this analysis for all 40 countries in Supplementary Figure C10, which highlights that a large share of individuals

[5]We present country-level regression analysis for this question in Supplementary Table D4. Individual-level regression analysis is presented in D5 and Supplementary Figure C9.

Figure 5: Support among right-leaning and top-income individuals in Western countries



Note. This figure reports (a) net support for right-leaning respondents in the West for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution (countries weighted equally), (b) the same, across all countries in the West, (c) net support for individuals in the top 10% of relative incomes within each country in the West for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution (countries weighted equally), and (d) the same, across all countries in the West. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9. Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Supplementary Figure C15 replicates the entire figure for non-Western countries. Supplementary Figure C16 shows the data in (a) and (b) for left-leaning voters. Supplementary Figure C17 shows the data in (a) and (b) for both right- and left-leaning voters, and Supplementary Figure C18 uses this data to show comparative political polarization on the two types of redistributive measures. Supplementary Figure C19 shows the data in (c) and (d) for respondents with relative incomes in the bottom 50%. Supplementary Figure C20 presents results adjusted for country-specific demographic weights. Supplementary Figure C21 shows support for both types of redistribution across the income distribution in Western countries. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

support one but not the other form of redistribution across all countries (also illustrated in Supplementary Figures C11-C12).

The relative popularity of the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution varies across the world. In Figure 4a we show that respondents in Western countries are more likely to favor the billionaire tax, while non-Western respondents are more likely to favor domestic redistribution. In Figure 4b we illustrate this pattern across countries. There is more support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax than for broad domestic redistribution in 13 of 17 Western countries ($p<0.05$ in 13 of 13). In non-Western countries, *domestic* redistribution is more popular in 21 of 23 countries ($p<0.05$ in 12 of 21).

The greater support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax than for broad domestic redistribution in Western countries is associated with two main factors. The first is greater support among right-leaning voters. In Figure 5a, we show that there is significantly more

support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax than for broad domestic redistribution among right-leaning voters in the West (66% against 52%). Right-leaning voters are more likely to support the globally coordinated billionaire tax than broad domestic redistribution in 16 of 17 Western countries (Figure 5b, $p<0.05$ in 15 of 16). Left-leaning voters are generally more supportive of both forms of redistribution, but differentiate less between the two (Supplementary Figure C16). This pattern leads to both high support and low political polarization for the globally coordinated billionaire tax in the West (Supplementary Figures C17-C18). In the United Kingdom, for example, the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution are equally popular among Labour Party voters (80% support for each), while Conservative voters are significantly more supportive of the globally coordinated billionaire tax (62%) than broad domestic redistribution (38%). Supplementary Tables E1-E38 report net support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution across all 164 political parties in our sample.

The second factor associated with the greater support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax in the West is larger support among high-income individuals. In Figure 5c, we show that there is significantly more support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax than for broad domestic redistribution among the top 10% of income earners in Western countries (70% against 54%). Top-income earners are more likely to support the globally coordinated billionaire tax than broad redistribution in 16 of 17 Western countries (Figure 5d, $p<0.05$ in 13 of 16). Among the bottom 50% of income-earners, each type of redistribution is roughly equally supported (70% against 68%, Supplementary Figure C19). We hypothesize that self-interested motives may drive some top-decile earners in Western countries to oppose broad domestic redistribution while being in favor of the globally coordinated billionaire tax, as very few individuals in the top 10% of income-earners would be directly affected by the billionaire tax. We summarize demographic differences in support between the two forms of redistribution in the West in Supplementary Figure C22.

The patterns we observe for political divides and top-income respondents only emerge in Western countries (Supplementary Figure C15). A possible reason could be that Western countries have more established systems of domestic redistribution, which right-leaning and high-income individuals already perceive as burdensome or inefficient. Alternatively, cultural or ideological factors unique to Western countries might influence attitudes, such as greater exposure to global inequality debates or distinct fairness norms.[22,23,24]

We conclude by asking whether governments' support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax aligns with their citizens' preferences, addressing the timeless question of whether governments represent the will of their citizens.[25,26,27,28,29] We classify every country in our dataset as either in favor, neutral, or opposed to the globally coordinated billionaire tax, based on an extensive analysis of the official transcripts from the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee debates on the topic, public statements by government officials, and a 2024 United Nations vote on broad international tax cooperation. We list government positions as defined by this approach in Table 1; in Appendix A.11 we discuss these classifications in detail and show that the our results are robust across competing definitions.

In Figure 6a, we examine the association between country-level support for the globally

Table 1: Governmental position on the globally coordinated billionaire tax

In Favor	Neutral	Opposed
Brazil, Chile, China†, Colombia, France, India†, Indonesia†, Italy, Malaysia†, Mexico†, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan†, Philippines†, South Africa, Spain, Thailand†, Vietnam†	Austria†, Czech Republic†, Finland†, Greece†, Hungary†, Ireland†, Poland†, Portugal†, Romania†, Slovakia†, Sweden†, Turkey†	Argentina, Australia†, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand†, United States

Note. This table reports the positions of 39 governments on the globally coordinated billionaire tax as defined through the methodology discussed in Appendix A.11. Taiwan is not classified due to not being a member of the United Nations. Countries denoted by † are classified based on their vote on the United Nations August 2024 *Terms of Reference* (ToR) for the first Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, in the absence of official public statements; these classifications should be viewed as less definitive. Our results are robust to excluding these countries from the analysis (Appendix A.11.1).


coordinated billionaire tax and the corresponding government position of each country. The share of citizens supporting the globally coordinated billionaire tax in countries where the government supports the tax is only 4.9 p.p. higher than where governments are opposed (95% C.I. [-0.4,10.1]; p=0.080). This highlights that citizens' support for the the globally coordinated billionaire tax provide little insight into their governments' positions on the same policy. In Figure 6b, we present the equivalent analysis with citizens' support for broad domestic redistribution. Here we find a stronger association, as the share of citizens supporting broad domestic redistribution in countries where the government supports the globally coordinated billionaire tax is 13.2 p.p. higher than where governments are opposed (95% C.I. [7.5,19.0]; p<0.001). In Supplementary Table D7, we present a joint regression analysis incorporating both types of public support, demonstrating that governments' positions on the globally coordinated billionaire tax are significantly associated only with citizens' support for broad domestic redistribution (p=0.001), but not with citizens' support for the global billionaire tax itself (p=0.721).

A possible explanation for this finding is that governments may have relied on citizens' preferences for broad domestic redistribution as a proxy to inform their positions on the global billionaire tax – likely due to the lack of available information about citizens' preferences for the tax itself. As the billionaire tax is popular among groups that often oppose domestic redistribution, this may have led some governments to oppose this initiative even though it has popular support in their country. While we stress that this hypothesis is based on suggestive evidence, our findings underscore the challenges governments face in aligning their policies with public opinion in the context of rapidly shifting and unprecedented policy landscapes.

Discussion

Our study provides unique evidence on public support for a globally coordinated billionaire tax. We find that 70% of respondents across 40 countries support implementing such a tax, including a majority of voters in 161 of 164 represented political parties, which suggests that any lack of political will for this initiative does not reflect the will of citizens. In Western countries, this strong support is partly driven by the tax's relative popularity among right-leaning and high-income individuals. Governmental support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is

Figure 6: Government positions on coordinated billionaire tax and public support



Note. This figure reports, across governmental positions on the globally coordinated billionaire tax, (a) the shares of respondents who support the globally coordinated billionaire tax, and (b) the shares of respondents who support broad domestic redistribution. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". See Appendix A.11 for detailed explanations of how we classify governmental support and various robustness checks. The data are weighted to ensure equal representation for each country. Supplementary Figure C25 presents results adjusted for country-specific demographic weights. 95% CIs, standard errors clustered on the country level.

more closely tied to public support for domestic redistribution than to direct public support for the tax itself, however, highlighting the importance of understanding people's views on this policy. Future research should explore the factors influencing governments' decisions to support or oppose this ambitious initiative, as well as the potential economic impacts of implementing such a tax on a global scale.

End Notes

Supplementary Information is available for this paper. Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to Morten Nyborg Støstad (morten.stostad@nhh.no). The authors declare no competing interests. The datasets generated during and analysed during the current study will be publicly available for the final version, and are currently available upon request. All three authors contributed equally to the project.

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Appendix

Contents

A Methods **19**

A.1 Overview . . . 19
A.2 Pre-specification . . . 19
A.3 Institutional review board . . . 19
A.4 Number of respondents and attrition . . . 19
A.5 Variables . . . 19
A.6 Representativity . . . 22
A.7 Countries . . . 23
A.8 Translations . . . 23
A.9 Political parties . . . 23
A.10 Attention checks . . . 27
A.11 Government positions on the globally coordinated billionaire tax . . . 27
A.11.1 Robustness of results to alternative classification schemes . . . 28
A.12 Remainder of survey . . . 34
A.13 Changes from the pre-analysis plan . . . 34

B Further Discussion and Analysis **38**

B.1 Global redistributive preferences: Existing evidence . . . 38
B.2 Other robustness . . . 38
B.3 Gelbach decomposition . . . 39

C Figures **42**

D Tables **62**

E Tables: Support across political parties **71**

List of Figures in Appendix

A1 Government positions and citizens' redistributive support: Only governments with specific quotes about the billionaire tax (see Supplementary Tables A1-A2) 30
A2 Government positions and citizens' redistributive support: Only governments that strongly favor or oppose the billionaire tax . . . 30
A3 Terms of Reference vote and citizens' redistributive support . . . 31
C1 Representativity across gender, age, political leaning, and education . . . 42
C2 Global support for a globally coordinated 2% tax on dollar billionaires, weighted to be proportional to global population . . . 43
C3 Global support for a globally coordinated 2% tax on dollar billionaires, weighted to be demographically representative within countries . . . 43

C4 Support for a global wealth tax, weighted by country demographics 44
C5 Global support for a coordinated 2% tax on dollar billionaires by country and region, cardinal scale 44
C6 Global opposition for a coordinated 2% tax on dollar billionaires by country and region 45
C7 Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax: Individual-level associations, weighted by country demographics 45
C8 Relative support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax across relative incomes 46
C9 Support for broad domestic redistribution: Individual-level associations 46
C10 Types: Support for domestic redistribution and global tax 47
C11 Support for only one type of redistribution 48
C12 Scatter plot: Support for only domestic or only global taxation 48
C13 Relative support of global billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution weighted for demographic representativity within countries 49
C14 Global support for a broad domestic redistribution by country and region 49
C15 Support among right-leaning and top-income individuals in non-Western countries 50
C16 Support among left-leaning individuals in Western countries 51
C17 Support for the globally coordinated tax and broad domestic redistribution across political leaning in Western countries 51
C18 Political divides for support of the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution in Western countries 52
C19 Western countries: Support among respondents in bottom 50% of relative incomes 52
C20 Support among right-leaning and top-income individuals in Western countries, weighted for demographic representativity within countries 53
C21 Relative support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and domestic redistribution across relative incomes in Western countries 54
C22 Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution: Individual-level associations (West) 55
C23 Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution: Individual-level associations 55
C24 Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution: Individual-level associations (non-West) 56
C25 Government positions on coordinated billionaire tax and citizens' support, data weighted by demographic representativity on the country-level 56
C26 Comparing survey results to the *World Values Survey* 57
C27 Global support for a globally coordinated 2% tax on dollar billionaires, weighted to be proportional of the global population and demographically representative within countries 58
C28 Country-level correlations, demographic variables and support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax I 59
C29 Country-level correlations, demographic variables and support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax II 60

C30 Expected support for the global coordinated tax within respondents' own country 61

List of Tables in Appendix

A1 Government positions on global tax, I 32
A2 Government positions on global tax, II 33
A3 Final classifications and Terms of Reference vote 34
B4 Gelbach decomposition of right-left difference: Full sample 40
B5 Gelbach decomposition of right-left difference: Western countries 40
B6 Gelbach decomposition of right-left difference: Non-Western countries 41
D1 Demographic representativity 62
D2 Associations: Country-level support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax . 63
D3 Associations: Individual-level support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax, separate and joint regressions 64
D4 Associations: Country-level broad domestic redistributive support 65
D5 Associations: Individual-level support for broad domestic redistribution, separate and joint regressions 66
D6 Associations: Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution 66
D7 Associations: Government support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and country-level public support for types of redistribution 67
D8 Associations: Individual-level support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax, separate and joint regressions (West) 67
D9 Associations: Individual-level support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax, separate and joint regressions (non-West) 68
D10 Associations: Individual-level support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax, separate and joint regressions (pre-specified regression) 69
D11 Associations: Government support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and country-level public support for types of redistribution (including neutral countries) 70
E1 Argentina: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties 71
E2 Australia: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . 71
E3 Austria: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . 71
E4 Brazil: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . . 71
E5 Canada: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . 72
E6 Chile: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . . 72
E7 Colombia: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . 72
E8 Czech Republic: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties 72
E9 Finland: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . 73
E10 France: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . 73
E11 Germany: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . 73
E12 Great Britain: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties 73
E13 Greece: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . 74

E14 Hungary: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . 74
E15 India: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . . 74
E16 Indonesia: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . 74
E17 Ireland: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . 75
E18 Italy: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . . 75
E19 Japan: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . . 75
E20 Malaysia: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . 75
E21 Mexico: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . 76
E22 Netherlands: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties 76
E23 New Zealand: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties 76
E24 Norway: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . 76
E25 Pakistan: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . 77
E26 Philippines: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties 77
E27 Poland: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . 77
E28 Portugal: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . 77
E29 Romania: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . 78
E30 Slovakia: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . 78
E31 South Africa: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties 78
E32 South Korea: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties 78
E33 Spain: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . . 79
E34 Sweden: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . 79
E35 Taiwan: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . 79
E36 Thailand: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . 79
E37 Turkey: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties . . 80
E38 United States: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties 80

A Methods

A.1 Overview

The data underlying the analysis were collected between August 9th and September 15th 2024 through a pre-specified survey conducted with leading survey providers Norstat and Dynata. 44,977 respondents are included in our final data set. The study was provided in a total of 28 languages, and is broadly representative on age, gender, and political affiliation. The median survey duration was 15 minutes and 25 seconds.

A.2 Pre-specification

The study was pre-specified as AsPredicted #185351. We discuss changes from the pre-specification in Appendix A.13.

A.3 Institutional review board

Our questionnaire was considered exempt from full institutional review board (IRB) review from the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) on August 4th 2024 using the framework approval NHH-IRB 42/22 for non-invasive surveys and experiments. Participants reviewed a consent form approved under this framework approval, which outlined relevant information about the study and discussed the anonymization of study data.

A.4 Number of respondents and attrition

57,900 subjects began the survey. 45,826 respondents reach the question on the globally coordinated billionaire tax, 45,074 respondents finished the survey, and 44,977 respondents remain in the final data set after routine data quality checks.[6]

The number of respondents was generally 1,000 in Europe and the Americas, and 1,300 in Asia and Africa. In Greece, Poland, Sweden, France, Germany, and Finland the number of respondents was increased to meet representativity quotas. In Pakistan the final number of respondents was 1170 due to a limited sampling pool, which also reduced the representativity of the data (see Appendix A.6).

A.5 Variables

Below we outline the main variables used in the main body, showing the exact question text presented to U.S. respondents.

Support: Globally coordinated billionaire tax

International organizations and governments have recently proposed a coordinated tax targeting the world's wealthiest individuals. This tax would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year.

[6] A total of 584 respondents (1.3% of the final sample) exit the survey during the question on the globally coordinated billionaire tax, which was towards the end of the survey.

Do you support or oppose this policy?

[Strongly support / Somewhat support / Neither support nor oppose / Somewhat oppose / Strongly oppose / Do not understand]

Support: Broad domestic redistribution

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The government should reduce income inequalities in society.

[Strongly agree / Somewhat agree / Neither agree nor disagree / Somewhat agree / Strongly disagree / Do not agree]

Political leaning

Who did you vote for in the [INSERT LAST ELECTION IN COUNTRY]?

If you were under the legal voting age at the time, please select what you otherwise would have done. We remind you that the responses to this survey are anonymous.

[Options will vary based on country, but denote all political parties receiving over 5% of the vote in the last election, "I did not vote", and "Prefer not to answer". See Appendix A.9 for lists of political parties. Question not shown in China and Vietnam.]

Income

What was your total household income before taxes in 2023? [Income values were changed to local currency using World Bank PPP values]

[$0 – $999 / $1,000-$4,999 / $5,000-$14,999 / $15,000-$24,999 / $25,000-$34,999 / $35,000-$49,999 / $50,000-$74,999 / $75,000-$99,999 / $100,000-$149,999 / $150,000-$199,999 / $200,000-$999,999 / $1,000,000 +]

Relative income

We define relative income as participants' percentile position in income (1-100) within survey respondents from their country. If 6% of respondents from USA are in the bottom income bracket, for example, these respondents are defined as having a relative income at the 3rd percentile.

Top 10% income

Respondents in the top 10 percentiles of relative incomes within their country using the definition above.

Gender

What is your gender?

[Male / Female / Other / Not listed / Prefer not to answer]

Age

What is your age?

[18 ... 100 +]

Education
What is your highest educational level?

[No formal education (0 years) / Primary education (less than 7 years) / Lower secondary education (7-10 years) / Upper secondary education (10-13 years) / Higher education (13+ years, e.g., university or college)]

Religion
Is religion important in your life?

[Very important / Somewhat important / Not too important / Not important at all]

Inequality is unfair
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- *In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair.*

[Strongly agree / Somewhat agree / Neither agree nor disagree / Somewhat agree / Strongly disagree / Do not agree]

Trusts government
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- *I usually trust the national government to do what is right.*

[Strongly agree / Somewhat agree / Neither agree nor disagree / Somewhat agree / Strongly disagree / Do not agree]

Ineq = country functions worse
We are interested in whether you think economic differences cause changes to society, and if so, how.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- *Larger economic differences cause societies to function worse overall.*

[Strongly agree / Somewhat agree / Neither agree nor disagree / Somewhat agree / Strongly disagree / Do not agree]

GDP per capita
A country's GDP per capita measured in PPP-adjusted 2024 international U.S. dollars. The data is obtained from the World Bank. Taiwan is excluded from analyses involving GDP per capita due to missing data in the World Bank database.

Gini (pre-tax, 0-1)
The Gini coefficient reflects the level of income inequality within a country, based on pre-tax national income. The data is obtained from wid.world.

Billionaires per 1,000,000

The billionaire rate is calculated as the number of billionaires per 1,000,000 citizens. The number of billionaires is obtained from Forbes' Billionaire List, while population data is obtained from the World Bank.

A.6 Representativity

We show summary statistics in Supplementary Table D1.

The sample is generally representative on age, gender, and political affiliation. All surveyed countries have gender ratios between 45% and 55%, with the exception of Pakistan (60% male), which we show in Supplementary Figure C1a. The median age among survey respondents is within 10 years of the median age of the population in all countries, and within 5 years for 27 of 40 countries, which we show in Supplementary Figure C1b. We note that our dataset skews toward older respondents, a result consistent with our methodological exclusion of individuals under the age of 18.

We do not detect any clear bias towards a larger proportion of left- or right-leaning voters in the overall sample. The percentage of right-leaning respondents, as defined in Appendix A.9, was within 10 percentage points of the actual value in the last election in 29 of 40 countries. 12 of 17 Western countries are within 5 percentage points. We show this in Supplementary Figure C1c. We note that actual political support may have shifted since these elections, as the furthest elections occurred up to five years before the survey.

Highly educated respondents are over-sampled, particularly in developing countries. We show this in Supplementary Figure C1d. To ensure the robustness of our result to this intrinsic feature of online survey panels, and to correct for any other non-representative sampling, we present all figures shown in the main body when weighted for demographic representativity on gender, age, college attendance, and political affiliation in the Appendix. Specifically, we weight results such that for each country, our sample matches the share of male citizens among the 18+ population (data from the U.S. Census Bureau's International Database), the share of citizens among those above 18 aged 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, and 70+ (data from the U.S. Census Bureau's International Database), the share who have attended 13+ years of formal education (data from UNESCO), and the distribution of right- and left-leaning voters (data from various official sources), adjusted for self-reported voter turnout. That is, we match the actual left- and right-leaning shares from official election data to the left- and right-leaning shares among survey respondents who reported voting, ensuring that the weighted political composition reflects the partisan balance in the general population. To prevent extreme weighting effects, we cap individual weights at a maximum threshold of 5.

Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax remains at 70% under this change. There are no other noteworthy changes to our results. We replicate all figures from the main text with demographically weighted data in Supplementary Figure C3, Supplementary Figure C4, Supplementary Figure C7, Supplementary Figure C13, Supplementary Figure C20, and Supplementary Figure C25. As we did not pre-specify the use of demographic weights and they have small effects on our results, we do not use these weights in the main text.

Comparison to the World Values Survey To explore the reliability of our online sample we also compare our data set to the publicly available World Values Survey (WVS) data set for the one question that overlaps in the two surveys.[30] The WVS uses random probability representative samples of the adult population, and notes in their methodology that the "[vast] majority of surveys were conducted using face-to-face interview (PAPI/CAPI) as the data collection mode". The question that overlaps both our sample and the WVS asks "*Is religion important in your life?"* under the response scale: [*Very important, Somewhat important, Not too important, Not important at all*]. We show the share of respondents who indicate "Very important" or "Somewhat important" in our sample and in the WVS in Supplementary Figure C26. We note that the relationship is exceedingly strong.

A.7 Countries

West: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States of America.
Non-West: Argentina, Brazil, China, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam.

A.8 Translations

The baseline survey was written in English and Norwegian. It was then translated by certified translators to a total of 27 more languages; Afrikaans (South Africa), Czech, Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hindi (India), Hungarian, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Malay, Polish, Portugese, Romanian, Simplified Chinese (China), Slovak, Spanish, Swedish, Tagalog (Philippines), Thai, Traditional Chinese (Taiwan), Turkish, Urdu (Pakistan), and Vietnamese.

The translations were subsequently reviewed by native academics to ensure consistency and accuracy, with the exception of Afrikaans, Indonesian, Malay, Romanian, Thai, Traditional Chinese, and Vietnamese, where suitable back-translators could not be secured within the allotted timeframe.

In Indonesia (Indonesian), India (Hindi), Malaysia (Malay), the Philippines (Tagalog), Pakistan (Urdu), Thailand (Thai), Vietnam (Vietnamese), and South Africa (Afrikaans), respondents were given the choice between answering the survey in their domestic language or English.

The value US $1 billion was kept across all translations. We note that the question text explicitly specifies the number of individuals affected, reducing the likelihood of cross-country differences in interpreting the policy implications tied to the concept of US $1 billion.

A.9 Political parties

We have gathered data from previous elections in 38 of the 40 countries (China and Vietnam are excluded). All parties, or the respective party of a presidential candidate, with more than 5% share of the votes is categorized into either left or right in their political standpoint. This categorizaton is largely based on data from the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database

(WPID).

We have made minor changes to certain WPID definitions to ensure greater consistency and alignment with established political classifications in each context:

- Defining AKP as right and CHP as left in Turkey,
- Defining DPK as left in South Korea,
- Defining Petr Pavel and Danuše Nerudová as left and Pavel Fischer as right in the Czech Republic, and
- Defining the EFF as left in South Africa.

These changes have no significant effects on our results.

In certain countries the WPID does not include all relevant political parties. In such cases, indicated with an asterisk in the list below, we have made the categorization ourselves. We note that the left-wing designation is often less clear outside of Western democracies.

We include the following political parties, where the left- or right-wing designation is in parenthesis:

Argentina (2023 Argentine Primary Elections, PASO): La Libertad Avanza* (Right), Juntos por el Cambio (Right), Union por la Patria (Left).

Australia (2022 Australian Federal Election): Labor Party (Left), Liberal Party (Right), Greens (Left), Liberal National Party (Right), Independent, One Nation* (Right).

Austria (2019 National Council "Nationalratswahl", i.e. 'parliamentary elections'): Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) (Right), Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich (SPÖ) (Left), Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) (Right), Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative (GRÜNE) (Left), Das neue Österreich (NEOS) (Left).

Brazil (2022 General Election - Election for Camara dos Deputados (Brazilian Chamber of Deputies)): Liberal Party* (Partido Liberal) (Right), Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) (Left), Brazil Union (União Brasil) (Right), Progressives* (Progressistas) (Right), Social Democratic Party* (Partido Social Democratico) (Right), Brazilian Democratic Movement* (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro) (Right), Republicans* (Republicans) (Right).

Canada (2021 Federal Election): Liberal Party (Left), Conservative (Right), Bloc Québécois (Left), New Democratic Party (NDP) (Left).

Chile (Elección del Consejo Constitucional de 2023): Convergencia Social* (Right), Partido Comunista de Chile* (Left), Partido De la Gente* (Right), Partido Republicano de Chile* (Right), Union Democrata Independiente* (Left).

Colombia (2022 Colombian Parliamentary Elections): Historic Pact for Colombia* (Pacto Histórico por Colombia) (Left), Colombian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Colombiano) (Right), Colombian Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Colombiano) (Left), Green Alliance-Hope Center (Coalición Alianza Verde y Centro Esperanza) (Left), Democratic Center (Centro Democratico) (Right), Radical Change (Cambio Radical) (Right), Union Party for the People (Partido de la Unión por la Gente) (Left).

Czech Republic (2023 Czech Presidential Election, General (Round 1)): Petr Pavel (Left), Andrej Babis (ANO 2011) (Right), Danuše Nerudova (Mayors and Independents (STAN))

(Left), Pavel Fischer (Right).

Finland (2024 Presidential Election): Alexander Stubb (Kansallinen Kokoomus, Samlingspartiet) (Right), Pekka Haavisto (Vihreä liitto, Grönä förbundet) (Left).

France (2024 France Legislative Election. Final Round): New Popular Front (NFP) (Left), Ensemble* (ENS) (Right), National Rally Alliance (RN) (Right), Les Républicains (LR) (Right).

Germany (2021 Bundestag election (Second Votes)): Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) (Right), Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) (Left), Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) (Right), Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) (Right), Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU) (Right), Bündnis 90 - Die Grünen (Left).

Greece (2023 National Elections): Néa Dimokratía* (Right), Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras - Proodeftiki Symmachia* (Left), Pasok-Kinima Allagis* (Left), Kommounistiko Komma Elladas* (Left).

Hungary (2022 Hungarian Parliamentary Election): Alliance of Hungarian Solidarity (Fidesz-KDNP) (Right), Egységben Magyarországért (DK, JOBBIK, LMP, MSZP, MOMENTUM, PÁRBESZÉD) (Left), Mi Hazánk* (Right).

India (2024 General Election to Parliamentary Constituencies): Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Right), Indian National Congress (INC) (Left).

Indonesia (2024 National legislative election): PDIP (Left), Golkar (Right), Gerindra (Right), PKB (Right), Nasdem (Left), PKS (Right), Demokrat (Right), PAN (Right).

Ireland (2024 Local Elections): Fine Gael (FG) (Right), Fianna Fáil (FF) (Left), Independent, Sinn Féin (SF) (Left), Labour Party (Left).

Italy (2022 Italian General Election, Senate): Brothers of Italy (FdI) - Fratelli d'Italia (Right), League (Lega) (Right), Forza Italia (FI) (Right), Democratic Party - IDP (PD-IDP) (Left).

Japan (2021 General elections - Japanese House of Representatives): Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyuminshuto) (Right), Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (Left), Nippon Ishin no Kai (Left), Komeito (Hoshu Shinto) (Left).

Malaysia (2022 General Election, Malaysian House of Representatives): Alliance of Hope (Pakatan Harapan) (Left), National Alliance* (PN) (Right), National Front (Barisan Nasional) (Right).

Mexico (2024 Federal Elections, Presidency): Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo (Juntos Hacemos Historia*) (Left), Bertha Xóchitl Gálvez Ruíz (Va por México) (Right), Jorge Álvarez Máynez (Movimiento Ciudadano*) (Left).

Netherlands (2023 Dutch General Election): Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) (Right), GroenLinks - Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) (Left), Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) (Right), Nieuw Sociaal Contract* (NSC) (Right), Democraten 66 (D66) (Left).

New Zealand (2023 General Election): National Party (Right), Labour Party (Left), Green Party (Left), ACT New Zealand (Right), New Zealand First Party (Right).

Norway (2023 Kommunevalg): Høyre (H) (Right), Arbeiderpartiet (Ap) (Left), Fremskrittspartiet (Frp) (Right), Senterpartiet (SP) (Left), Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV) (Left), Venstre (V) (Left).

Pakistan (2024 ECP PAK general elections): Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) / PTI-backed Independents (Left), Pakistan Muslim League N (PML-N) (Right), Pakistan People's Party (PPP) (Left), Other independent candidates.
Philippines (2022 Presidential Election): Bongbong Marcos (PFP*) (Right), Leni Robredo (Left), Manny Pacquiao (PROMDI) (Right).
Poland (2023 Polish General Election): Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) (Right), Civic Coalition (KO) (Left), Lewica* (Left), Third Way (TD) (Left), Konfederacja (Right).
Portugal (2024 Legislative Election): Socialist Party - Partido Socialista (PS) (Left), Chega! (CD) (Right), Aliança Democrática* (Right).
Romania (2020 General Election): PSD* (Left), PNL* (Right), USR PLUS* (Right), AUR* (Right), UDMR* (Right).
Slovakia (2024 Presidential Election. 1. Round): Ivan Korčok* (Right), Peter Pellegrini* (Hlas–SD) (Left), Stefan Harabin* (Right).
South Africa (2024 National election): African National Congress (ANC) (Left), Democratic Alliance (DA) (Right), Spear of the Nation* (M.K.) (Left), Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) (Left).
South Korea (2024 National Assembly Elections): Democratic Party (DPK) (Left), People's Power Party (PPP) (Right), Rebuilding Korea Party* (Left).
Spain (2023 General election - Congresso): Partido Popular (PP) - Peoples Party (Right), Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)- Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Left), VOX (Right), SUMAR* (Left).
Sweden (2022 Election to the Riksdag): Arbetarepartiet Socialdemokraterna (Left), Sverigedemokraterna (Right), Moderaterna (Right), Vänsterpartiet (Left), Centerpartiet (Right), Kristdemokraterna (Right), Miljöpartiet (Left).
Switzerland (2023 Swiss Federal Election): Die Liberalen (FDP) - Les Libéraux-Radicaux (PLR) (Right), Die Mitte - Le Centre (Right), Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (SP) - Parti socialiste suisse (Left), Schweizerische Volkspartei* (SVP) - Union démocratique du centre (Right), Grünliberale Partei (GLP) - Parti vert'libéral (PVL) (Left), GRÜNE Schweiz* - Les VERT-E-S suisses* (Left).
Taiwan (2024 Presidential Election): Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (Lai Ching-te) (Left), Kuomintang (KMT) (Hou Yu-ih) (Right), Independent.
Thailand (2023 General Election): Move Forward (Left), Pheu Thai (Left), United Thai Nation (Right).
Turkey (2024 Turkey Local Election): Republican Peoples Party (CHP) (Left), Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Right), New Welfare Party* (YRP) (Right), Democrat Party* (DP) (Right).
United Kingdom (2024 General Election): Labour (Left), Conservative (Right), Liberal Democrat (Left), Reform UK* (Right), Green Party* (Left).
United States of America (2020 President Election): Joseph R. Biden (Democrat) (Left), Donald J. Trump (Republican) (Right).

A.10 Attention checks

We conduct various attention checks. The first of these attention checks, asked immediately after the consent screen, removes respondents with incorrect answers. We also pre-specified eight other factual questions about the survey methodology that function as attention checks, strategically integrated within the survey flow. These checks all come within one survey experiment and ask the respondent a simple question based on previously provided instructions. As an example, respondents are matched with another survey respondent and awarded $3, then asked how much they were given. Not answering $3 is classified as failing the attention check. In the latter portion of the survey we also ask two opposite questions, specifically whether the respondent agrees with the statements that "Larger economic differences lead to [less/more] economic growth". Respondents who agree to both statements are classified as failing the attention check. 69.5% of respondents answer all these attention checks correctly.

Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is not statistically significantly different among respondents who succeed on all attention checks. Further, excluding respondents who fail attention checks has no clear effect on our other main results, and secondary results are also not significantly affected. Under a broader check for consistent answers, which was not pre-specified, the net support increases from 70% to 73%, net opposition increases from 9% to 10%, and the share who neither support nor oppose the policy falls from 18% to 15%. Other results are not significantly impacted.

A.11 Government positions on the globally coordinated billionaire tax

Here we detail how we classify countries as in favor, neutral, or against the global coordinated minimum tax (as of September 2024, when the survey was finalized). We show the final classifications with their reasoning for every country in Supplementary Tables A1-A2. Below we detail our method.

There has not been a specific vote on the policy, and we thus proceed in two steps. First, countries with unambiguous official statements in a public forum were classified based on these statements. Here we define statements as support if the statement clearly denotes support to the global coordinated tax or cooperation towards a similar policy goal (e.g. the Norwegian Finance Minister noting that "Norway has a fundamentally positive attitude towards the global wealth tax"). We define statements as opposition if the statement clearly denotes opposition towards either the policy goal or the coordination required to reach such a policy goal (e.g. the U.S. Treasury Secretary stating that "Tax policy is very difficult to coordinate globally, and we don't see a need or really think it's desirable to try to negotiate a global agreement on that"). Statements were taken from various media outlets and the official transcripts of the UN Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) First Round Session, where the globally coordinated billionaire tax was directly addressed. We also designate two countries despite the lack of a clear quote – Argentina against and South Africa in favor – based on multiple news reports discussing them as key players in the debate.

Second, for countries without clear public positions we use the United Nations August 2024 vote on the *Terms of Reference* (ToR) for the first Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation. In brief, the vote aimed to create a United Nations mandate for international

tax cooperation, and includes a clause that calls to address the "effective taxation" of "high-net worth individiuals". 140 countries were in favor, 40 countries abstained, and 8 countries were in opposition – notably the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. Although the vote itself was on broader international tax cooperation, significant portions of the surrounding debate concerned the taxation of the ultra-rich, and countries that we attribute as having a position on the minimum tax itself either vote in accord with this position or abstain. All abstentions in our data set are from countries in the European Union, which abstained as a block due to the lack of broad consensus support. Among these countries, we classify 8 countries as either for or against based on public statements. To summarize this discussion we tabulate all ToR votes and final classifications in Supplementary Table A3.

The classifications and sources are shown in Tables A1-A2. We note that a statement in this table is a clear statement of support or opposition; countries that are listed as "N/A" for statements have also often discussed the global tax publicly. There may also be comments of support or opposition by governments that we have missed in our analysis. We note that Taiwan was not classified on account of not being a United Nations member and having no public statements on the issue that we know of.

A.11.1 Robustness of results to alternative classification schemes

Classifying politicians' positions is difficult by nature, and there are many variations of support for global taxation of billionaires. It is often unclear whether a government is in favor of the global coordinated tax or general cooperation on taxing top wealth, for example. Governments' vote on the ToR is also an imperfect proxy for their position on the globally coordinated billionaire tax. To ensure that our results hold across different definitions of support and opposition we run three specific robustness checks.

Excluding the *Terms of Reference* vote The ToR is an imperfect proxy for support of the globally coordinated billionaire tax, as countries may support or oppose a continued debate on global tax cooperation in the United Nations independently of their position on the globally coordinated billionaire tax. Here we explore whether our results are robust to excluding the use of the ToR vote for classification, using only public statements to define countries. This leaves our sample as the following 16 countries (see Tables A1-A2 for the relevant quotes):

In favor: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain.

Opposed: Argentina, Canada, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States of America.

In Supplementary Figure A1 we replicate Supplementary Figure 6 with this sample. Our original results are robust to this change.

Only using countries with widely publicized positions Although all the 16 countries listed above have accompanying quotes justifying our classification, the strength of these classifications differ. Some countries are clearly defined – such as Brazil, who introduced the globally coordinated billionaire tax to the international community through their G20 presidency, or

Germany, where quotes from high-ranking government officials indicate clear opposition. Other classifications, such as those for Italy, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, are not as clear, relying on quotations with weakly identified support or opposition, or statements by lower-level government officials. Here we only classify the countries that have been described as main proponents or detractors of the proposal in several media outlets. These countries are:


In favor: Brazil, South Africa, France, Spain.

Opposed: Argentina, Germany, and the United States.

In Supplementary Figure A2 we replicate Supplementary Figure 6 for these 7 countries. Our original results are robust to this change.


Using only the *Terms of Reference* vote Third, we take the opposite approach and use *only* the ToR vote to classify countries. Our intention here is to remove the possibility of any selection bias, as we cannot exclude the possibility of incompleteness in our collection of government positions. In Supplementary Figure A3 we replicate Supplementary Figure 6, using only governments votes on the ToR. These classifications are shown in Supplementary Table A3. Our original results are robust to this change.

Figure A1: Government positions and citizens' redistributive support: Only governments with specific quotes about the billionaire tax (see Supplementary Tables A1-A2)




Note. This figure complements Figure 6 while only using countries where we do not rely on the *Terms of Reference* vote to classify support or opposition. The countries included are the countries with quotes or specific sources for their positions in Tables A1-A2. As Figure 6, this figure reports, across governmental positions on the globally coordinated billionaire tax, (a) the shares of respondents who support the globally coordinated billionaire tax, and (b) the shares of respondents who support broad domestic redistribution. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". See Appendix A.11 for detailed explanations of how we classify governmental support and various robustness checks. The data are weighted to ensure equal representation for each country. 95% CIs, standard errors clustered on the country level.

Figure A2: Government positions and citizens' redistributive support: Only governments that strongly favor or oppose the billionaire tax



Note. This figure complements Figure 6 while only using the countries that have been classified in media articles as the main proponents or detractors of the global billionaire tax. These countries are (in favor) Brazil, South Africa, France, and Spain, and (in opposition) the United States, Germany, and Argentina. As Figure 6, this figure reports, across governmental positions on the globally coordinated billionaire tax, (a) the shares of respondents who support the globally coordinated billionaire tax, and (b) the shares of respondents who support broad domestic redistribution. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". See Appendix A.11 for detailed explanations of how we classify governmental support and various robustness checks. The data are weighted to ensure equal representation for each country. 95% CIs, standard errors clustered on the country level.

Figure A3: Terms of Reference vote and citizens' redistributive support



Note. This figure complements Figure 6 while only using the United Nations August 2024 vote on the *Terms of Reference* for the first Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (Source). Taiwan is not classified due to not being a member of the United Nations. As Figure 6, this figure reports, across the United Nations member states' voting positions on the *Terms of Reference* for the first Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, (a) the shares of respondents who support the globally coordinated billionaire tax, and (b) the shares of respondents who support broad domestic redistribution. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". See Appendix A.11 for detailed explanations of how we classify governmental support and various robustness checks. The data are weighted to ensure equal representation for each country. 95% CIs, standard errors clustered on the country level.

Table A1: Government positions on global tax, I

	Position	Vote on ToR	Explanation of Position	Source
Argentina	Against	Abstained	"Argentine negotiators, led by the president's representative, Federico Pinedo, informed other countries that they had received "new instructions" from the Casa Rosada and opposed the inclusion of a proposal to tax the super-rich."	Source
Australia	Against	Against	N/A	
Austria	Neutral	Abstained	N/A	
Brazil	For	For	"It is about time the super-rich pay their fair share in taxes. The excessive concentration of power and income poses a risk to democracy" - President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	Source
Canada	Against	Against	"It's difficult to see that a one size fits all solution would be the best approach and the most efficient approach to make a tax system more progressive in every tax system of every one country." - Canada delegate UN AHC Session	Source
Chile	For	For	"We would very much like to support the intervention by Brazil and many other colleagues who have given us their views on this" - Chile delegate UN AHC Session	Source
China	For	For	N/A	
Colombia	For	For	"It is very important to strengthen the internal tax system, both its regulations, application, auditing, and tax collection. But this alone will not guarantee the mobilization of resources. This is the opportunity that we have and must take to review and improve international systems, focusing in total on those of greater justice" - Colombian delegate in UN AHC Session	Source
Czech Republic	Neutral	Abstained	N/A	
Finland	Neutral	Abstained	N/A	
France	For	Abstained	"I am totally determined to move forward" - French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire	Source
Germany	Against	Abstained	"We do not think it is suitable...We have an appropriate taxation of income" - German Finance Minister Christian Lindner	Source
Greece	Neutral	Abstained	N/A	
Hungary	Neutral	Abstained	N/A	
India	For	For	N/A	
Indonesia	For	For	N/A	
Italy	For	Abstained	"Building on the existing works, it is also useful to reflect on how to improve strategies to realise taxation of high-net worth individuals" - Italian contribution to Terms of Reference for UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation	Source
Ireland	Neutral	Abstained	N/A	

Note. This table reports sources for our classification of governments' positions on the global tax shown in Table 1. "Position" denotes our final classification listed in Table 1. "Vote on ToR" denotes the vote of the country on the United Nations *Terms of Reference* (ToR). Note that countries have their position automatically classified based on support or opposition for the ToR in the absence of other public statements on the globally coordinated billionaire tax. Supplementary Figure A1 shows our main results when these countries are instead classified as neutral.

Table A2: Government positions on global tax, II

	Position	Vote on ToR	Explanation of Position	Source
Japan	Against	Against	"Second, we should recognize that taxation is an issue of sovereignty. Each country has its own right to tax and to decide what it adopt our new international tax rule...we are not sure the effective taxation by high net worth individuals is appropriate as high level commitments" - Japanese delegate in UN AHC Session	Source
Malaysia	For	For	N/A	
Mexico	For	For	N/A	
Netherlands	For	Abstained	Parliament vote on commitment to a globally coordinated billionaire tax (October 2023): 132 votes in favor and 16 votes against	Source
New Zealand	Against	Against	N/A	
Norway	For	Abstained	"Norway has a fundamentally positive attitude toward the proposal for a global wealth tax" – Norwegian Finance Minister Trygve Slagsvold Vedum	Source
Pakistan	For	For	N/A	
Philippines	For	For	N/A	
Poland	Neutral	Abstained	N/A	
Portugal	Neutral	Abstained	N/A	
Romania	Neutral	Abstained	N/A	
Slovakia	Neutral	Abstained	N/A	
South Africa	For	For	"While France, Spain, South Africa, Colombia and other countries support taxing the super-rich..."	Source
South Korea	Against	Against	"With respect to the super rich tax, I'd like to echo the U. S. statements regarding this issue. This is basically a domestic issue." - Republic of Korea delegate in UN AHC Session	Source
Spain	For	Abstained	"Spain supports the proposals made by the G20 Presidency, Brazil, in relation, above all, to the implementation of a global minimum tax on the wealth of multimillionaires" - Spanish delegate in UN AHC Session	Source
Sweden	Neutral	Abstained	N/A	
Thailand	For	For	N/A	
Turkey	Neutral	Abstained	N/A	
United Kingdom	Against	Against	"The UK would welcome views from more member states on specifically what they think a convention could add on taxing the richest." - UK delegate UN AHC Session	Source
USA	Against	Against	"Tax policy is very difficult to coordinate globally, and we don't see a need or really think it's desirable to try to negotiate a global agreement on that." - U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen	Source
Vietnam	For	For	N/A	

Note. This table reports sources for our classification of governments' positions on the global tax shown in Table 1. "Position" denotes our final classification listed in Table 1. "Vote on ToR" denotes the vote of the country on the United Nations *Terms of Reference* (ToR). Note that countries have their position automatically classified based on support or opposition for the ToR in the absence of other public statements on the globally coordinated billionaire tax. Supplementary Figure A1 shows our main results when these countries are instead classified as neutral.

Table A3: Final classifications and Terms of Reference vote

Final designation	Vote on ToR: For	Vote on ToR: Abstained	Vote on ToR: Against
For	Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Vietnam	France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain	
Neutral		Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey	
Against		Argentina, Germany	Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States of America

Note. This table reports votes on the United Nations August 2024 vote on the *Terms of Reference* for the first Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (Source) and designated governments' positions as shown in Table 1 and used in the main body. See Tables A1 and A2 for sources for any country that is not classified as the ToR vote, and for cases when public statements back up the ToR vote. Taiwan is not classified due to not being a member of the United Nations.

A.12 Remainder of survey

A total of 43 seconds were spent on the questions pertaining to the globally coordinated tax. The remainder of the survey included three survey experiments and various demographic and socioeconomic questions. Answers to the global tax questions were not significantly affected by any of the prior survey experiment treatments, indicating that the prior survey experience had a limited effect on answers.

A.13 Changes from the pre-analysis plan

We have made two main changes from the pre-analysis plan, which we discuss here.

Comparing to support for broad domestic redistribution Comparisons to support for broad domestic redistribution were included to contextualize our results for the global tax. We note that the question we use to define support for broad domestic redistribution (agreeing or disagreeing to "The government should reduce income inequalities in society.") is the only other question on redistributive preferences in the survey, and has been pre-specified as one of two redistributive preferences questions along with the question on the globally coordinated billionaire tax in other pre-analysis plans for projects in this survey (see e.g. AsPredicted #185352). We also note that our results for support for broad domestic redistribution are similar to those found in the literature, as support for broad domestic redistribution usually

declines with income,[31] and are more divided across left- and right-leaning respondents than the 16 p.p. we find for the globally coordinated billionaire tax.[32]

Governmental support and redistributive support The classification and discussion of governmental support was not included in the pre-specification. We included this discussion to connect public redistributive preferences with government positions more effectively. The analysis extends upon the methodology of notable work on the domestic level,[26,27,28,29] and was introduced to provide deeper insights into the relationship between citizens' support and governments' positions. In Appendix A.11 we show that our results are strongly robust to different classifications of governmental support.

Other changes In addition we have made various smaller changes, including:

- We made certain changes to the regressions for methodological preciseness and ease of exposition. Changes in results are minimal for any of the changes below, and we show the full pre-specified regression in Supplementary Table D10. We detail what changes we have made here:
  - The pre-analysis plan states that we would use the cardinal 5-point scale for regressions on support. We have instead used the binary version to remain consistent with the remaining analysis and to improve expositional simplicity.
  - The pre-analysis plan states that we would use a full set of controls (e.g. age below 30, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60+). We instead report regressions with demographic variables in binary form (e.g. age above or below 50) to improve expositional simplicity.
  - We use relative incomes instead of absolute incomes, as absolute incomes combined with country fixed effects yield a relative measure with a less analytically clear meaning. We report separate regressions for both in Table D3; results are similar.
  - The pre-analysis plan stated that "We will cluster regressions on the country level". Following in-depth consultations with statisticians, we determined that clustering standard errors at the country level is unnecessary for regressions where cross-country comparisons are not the primary focus. We thus use robust standard error in several analyses to ensure that our analysis precisely captures within-country variation.
- The final amount of observations were larger than the pre-specified 1,000 in Asia, Africa, and selected other countries. In Asia and Africa this was done to increase sample size, and was reported in other pre-specifications for the survey before significant data collection had been finished in these countries (see AEARCTR-0014110). In all other countries this was done to improve representativity. Excluding all results after $N = 1,000$ does not significantly change results.
- The below pre-specified political definitions have been changed for the data analysis. None of these changes have any clear effect on our results, and were made to improve precision.
  - South Korea's DPK party was designated as left-leaning (right-leaning in the PAP).

  - The Czech Republic: Petr Pavel and Danuše Nerudová were defined as left-leaning (were defined as independent and right-leaning respectively). Pavel Fischer was defined as right-leaning (was defined as independent).
  - The Philippines: Leni Robredo was designated as left-leaning.
  - PSD, CDS, and PPM in Portugal were shown as three separate party options in Portugal instead of the correct Aliança Democrática. These options were merged for the analysis. All three parties were right-leaning; we also classify Aliança Democrática as right-leaning. Note that all three original choices have a majority of voters in favor of the globally coordinated billionaire tax.

- In order to ensure consistency and clarity in our grouping of "Western" countries, we simplified our definition to use pre-specified regions. Specifically, the new definition includes only Western/Northern/Southern European and Anglophone countries. As compared to the pre-specification this excludes Hungary and the Czech Republic. This change was primarily motivated by Hungary and the Czech Republic being classified as Central (or Eastern) European states, both in our pre-specification and in popular usage. The adjustment allows for a more straightforward regional delineation and maintains alignment with standard geographic/cultural definitions. Our results on Western and non-Western countries are not significantly affected by this change.
- In the pre-analysis plan we stated that we would use whether respondents agreed with the statement "*Large income redistribution hurts the economy.*" as a determinant for redistributive preferences, similarly to the other three cultural attitudes discussed in the text. This belief has small or insignificant associations with the outcomes we study, which was expected based on the related literature on inefficiency concerns.[19,33,34] In a number of cases, however, the association to main redistributive preference-outcomes is small but statistically significantly positive, e.g. 2.8 p.p. (95% C.I. [2.0,3.7]; p<0.001) in a separate regression copying the methodology in Supplementary Table D3. Thus we find the counter-intuitive result that larger efficiency concerns is associated with larger redistributive preferences. After exploring this result we believe it to be a spurious finding based on attention issues, as the sign of the association flips when either (i) only including respondents who succeed on all attention checks (-1.1 p.p., 95% C.I. [-2.2,-0.0]; p=0.047), or (ii) using a joint regression with the other beliefs as in Supplementary Table D3, where noisy responses in line with the other noted attitudes, e.g. indicating "Agree" to all questions, are more likely to be filtered out (-1.8 p.p., 95% C.I. [-2.7,-0.9]; p<0.001). As the magnitude of the coefficient is very small compared to the other factors we explore in all specifications, and has no significant impact on the remainder of our results, we have excluded it from the analysis to avoid confusion. It is included in the pre-specified regression in Supplementary Table D10. We note that none of our other results are noticeably affected by excluding attention check failures (see Appendix A.10).
- We placed less emphasis on the role of *expected* support among other respondents as compared to the pre-specified analysis, as the results were deemed to be of limited general significance. We report the results in Supplementary Figure C30. Respondents themselves

have accurate expectations of the net support within their own country, contrasting to recently uncovered misperceptions of others' willingness to pay to reduce environmental costs.[35]

- We pre-specified to exclude respondents who indicated that they did not understand the main globally coordinated billionaire tax question from all analysis. We decided against this, as we believe it would unnecessarily overstate support for the billionaire tax. Given the small share of such respondents (2%), this has a negligible effect on results.
- In the pre-specification we discuss using both the Gini coefficient and the top 10% income share in different analyses. In the text we only use the Gini coefficient for consistency. This has no effect on our results.
- We included various societal-level indicators in Supplementary Table D2 beyond the pre-specified GDP per capita and Gini coefficient (e.g. the rate of billionaires per country and the average age). Beyond showing that these variables have no significant correlations with country-level support, this choice has no effect on our results.
- Due to a coding mistake, the wrong PPP exchange rates were used in the survey questionnaire presented to respondents in Malaysia and Mexico. This made the data we collected on respondent incomes from these countries unusable. As such, any result that uses respondents' individual incomes exclude these countries.
- In the pre-analysis plan, disagreeing with both the statement "Larger economic differences cause more economic growth." and the statement "Larger economic differences cause less economic growth." was classified as failing an attention check. As respondents may reasonably disagree with both statements, we no longer classify this as failing an attention check. This has no effect on our results.

B Further Discussion and Analysis

B.1 Global redistributive preferences: Existing evidence

No evidence exists regarding public support for the globally coordinated minimum billionaire tax. The existing evidence on broader global redistributive preferences is largely derived from large-scale institutional survey programs, such as the World Values Survey and the Gallup World Poll, where the evidence is mixed. 39% of respondents in the World Values Survey lean towards "Incomes should be made more equal" as compared to "There should be greater incentives for individual effort".[30] 45% of respondents to the International Social Survey Programme believe that taxes on those with high incomes are "too low" in their country.[36] 79% of respondents to the Gallup World Poll agree that "the government should reduce income inequality" – a similar but somewhat higher share than what we find in our survey.[37]

Although the specific form of taxation is decided on the domestic level, the globally coordinated billionaire tax can be viewed as a form of supranational redistributive policy. There are a small number of studies showing preferences for other supranational redistributive policies. Particularly relevant in our case is the large support across 20 high- and medium-income countries for a global tax on millionaires to fund climate action in low-income countries (an average support of 82% and 92% in high- and low-income countries respectively).[38] A number of other studies explore other preferences for global environmental policies, generally finding large support that is also underestimated by citizens themselves.[35,38,39] A recent survey also finds support for at least some global redistribution among 90% of German citizens.[40]

Preferences for redistributive policies are more commonly explored within countries, or within a small set of comparable countries. Various papers discuss preferences for domestic wealth taxes in developed countries, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom.[41,42,43,44] In these studies, 50-80% of the population typically support various types of wealth taxes. The threshold level has been argued to be particularly salient for policy support.[18] Other notable determinants for broad redistributive preferences include income maximization,[33,45] fairness views and fairness beliefs,[19,46] beliefs about inequality's externality effects,[34] governmental trust,[47] racial attitudes and immigration,[48] perceptions of the income distribution and tax systems,[41,49,50,51,52] and, less strongly than often expected, the inefficiency effects of taxation.[19,41,33]

Despite substantial efforts to estimate the causal impact of top-end taxation on international migration,[53,54] there are to the best of our knowledge no studies exploring how such concerns could influence public support for redistributive policies. Theoretically, perceptions of tax flight could significantly erode support for wealth taxation independently of actual migration responses. As the globally coordinated billionaire tax mitigates these concerns by globally coordinating the tax instrument, the absence of such concerns may explain differences in public support between global and domestic redistribution policies.

B.2 Other robustness

Our results are robust to using a 5-point cardinal scale to classify support for the global tax and domestic redistribution. The change has no clear effects on the dynamics discussed in the

main text, although we note that a larger share of respondents "Strongly support" the global tax (40%) than "Strongly agree" that governments should reduce income inequalities (33%).

We pre-specified that we would explore results after removing the 5% fastest respondents. This has a negligible effect on results.

B.3 Gelbach decomposition

Here we use the Gelbach method[55] to explore how the association between having voted for a right-leaning political party and support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is affected by three pre-specified determinants of redistributive support frequently discussed in the related academic literature. We explore fairness principles, governmental trust, and inequality externality beliefs (or the belief that inequality has negative consequences[34]). Specifically, these terms denote whether respondents agree with, in order, "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair.*" (fairness principles), "*I usually trust the national government to do what is right.*" (governmental trust), and "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are causing society to function worse.*" (inequality externality beliefs).

In Supplementary Tables Supplementary Table B4a we show the effect of adding each belief individually on the right-leaning coefficient in a regression on support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax, and the joint regression with all three beliefs. In Supplementary Table B4b we show the Gelbach decomposition of the change in the right-left association for these three beliefs. We replicate this figure for Western and non-Western countries in Supplementary Tables B5 and B6 respectively. In all cases, roughly half of the association between support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and having voted for a right-leaning political party can be explained by the three beliefs we study. This is divided almost equally between fairness principles and inequality externality beliefs in both Western and non-Western countries. Governmental trust has small effects.

Table B4: Gelbach decomposition of right-left difference: Full sample

(a) Associations

	(1) Support b/se	(2) Support b/se	(3) Support b/se	(4) Support b/se	(5) Support b/se
Right-leaning	-11.02***	-7.62***	-10.99***	-7.75***	-6.40***
	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.50)
Ineq. is unfair		26.93***			18.70***
		(0.53)			(0.59)
Trusts govt			8.09***		6.98***
			(0.46)		(0.44)
Ineq = country functions worse				27.34***	18.74***
				(0.54)	(0.60)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	0.040	0.105	0.047	0.105	0.136
Observations	42376	42376	42376	42376	42376

(b) Gelbach decomp.

	(1) Decrease: R-L diff b/se
Right-leaning	-
	-
Ineq. is unfair	-2.36
	(0.12)
Trusts govt	-0.02
	(0.04)
Ineq = country functions worse	-2.24
	(0.12)
Initial R-L diff	-11.02
Final R-L diff	-6.40
Observations	42376

Note. This table reports results from (a) separate and joint regressions of the listed covariates on support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax, and (b) the effects on the right-leaning dummy from a Gelbach decomposition. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*" (units in percentage points support). In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). China and Vietnam are excluded as one-party systems. Three variables are pre-specified measures of determinants of redistributive preferences frequently discussed in the related academic literature, representing fairness principles, governmental trust, and inequality externality concerns respectively. Specifically, they denote whether respondents agree with, in order: Ineq is unfair: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair.*" Ineq = country functions worse: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are causing society to function worse.*". Trusts govt: "*I usually trust the national government to do what is right.*" Supplement to Supplementary Table D3. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

Table B5: Gelbach decomposition of right-left difference: Western countries

(a) Associations

	(1) Support b/se	(2) Support b/se	(3) Support b/se	(4) Support b/se	(5) Support b/se
Right-leaning	-15.63***	-9.62***	-15.66***	-10.04***	-7.60***
	(0.77)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.75)	(0.75)
Ineq. is unfair		27.65***			19.51***
		(0.78)			(0.86)
Trusts govt			6.23***		6.07***
			(0.68)		(0.65)
Ineq = country functions worse				28.02***	19.14***
				(0.80)	(0.88)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	0.037	0.113	0.041	0.112	0.146
Observations	18061	18061	18061	18061	18061

(b) Gelbach decomp.

	(1) Decrease: R-L diff b/se
Right-leaning	-
	-
Ineq. is unfair	-4.24
	(0.24)
Trusts govt	0.03
	(0.05)
Ineq = country functions worse	-3.82
	(0.23)
Initial R-L diff	-15.63
Final R-L diff	-7.60
Observations	18061

Note. This table reports results in Western countries from (a) separate and joint regressions of the listed covariates on support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax, and (b) the effects on the right-leaning dummy from a Gelbach decomposition. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*" (units in percentage points support). In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). China and Vietnam are excluded as one-party systems. Three variables are pre-specified measures of determinants of redistributive preferences frequently discussed in the related academic literature, representing fairness principles, governmental trust, and inequality externality concerns respectively. Specifically, they denote whether respondents agree with, in order: Ineq is unfair: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair.*" Ineq = country functions worse: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are causing society to function worse.*". Trusts govt: "*I usually trust the national government to do what is right.*" Supplement to Supplementary Table D3. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

Table B6: Gelbach decomposition of right-left difference: Non-Western countries

(a) Associations

	(1) Support b/se	(2) Support b/se	(3) Support b/se	(4) Support b/se	(5) Support b/se
Right-leaning	-7.19***	-5.92***	-7.10***	-5.81***	-5.30***
	(0.70)	(0.69)	(0.70)	(0.69)	(0.68)
Ineq. is unfair		25.85***			17.68***
		(0.74)			(0.81)
Trusts govt			9.65***		7.83***
			(0.61)		(0.59)
Ineq = country functions worse				26.30***	18.16***
				(0.75)	(0.82)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	0.044	0.098	0.054	0.099	0.127
Observations	24315	24315	24315	24315	24315

(b) Gelbach decomp.


	(1) Decrease: R-L diff b/se
Right-leaning	-
	-
Ineq. is unfair	-0.87
	(0.12)
Trusts govt	-0.07
	(0.06)
Ineq = country functions worse	-0.95
	(0.13)
Initial R-L diff	-7.19
Final R-L diff	-5.30
Observations	24315

Note. This table reports results in non-Western countries from (a) separate and joint regressions of the listed covariates on support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax, and (b) the effects on the right-leaning dummy from a Gelbach decomposition. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*" (units in percentage points support). In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). China and Vietnam are excluded as one-party systems. Three variables are pre-specified measures of determinants of redistributive preferences frequently discussed in the related academic literature, representing fairness principles, governmental trust, and inequality externality concerns respectively. Specifically, they denote whether respondents agree with, in order: Ineq is unfair: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair.*" Ineq = country functions worse: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are causing society to function worse.*". Trusts govt: "*I usually trust the national government to do what is right.*" Supplement to Supplementary Table D3. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

C Figures

Figure C1: Representativity across gender, age, political leaning, and education


(a) Gender



(b) Age


(c) Political leaning

(d) Education




Note. This graph plots, for each country: (a) The share of male respondents in the survey (green) and the share of males in the population among those above 18 years of age (navy). Country data is from the U.S. Census Bureau's International Database. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs. (b) The median age in the survey (y-axis) against the median age in the population (x-axis). Country data is from the U.S. Census Bureau's International Database. Note that our data collection excludes individuals below 18. (c) The share of respondents who voted for a right-leaning party among those who voted in our survey (y-axis), against the share of votes parties defined as right-leaning in our data set received in the last election (x-axis). Election data is from various official sources for elections implemented between 2019 and 2024. China and Vietnam are not included, as they do not hold democratic elections. Respondents who said they did not vote or preferred not to say their political party are excluded. Right-leaning definitions are shown in Appendix A.9. (d) The share of respondents who report to have 12+ years of formal education in our survey (y-axis), against the share of citizens who completed at least a short-cycle tertiary education among individuals aged 25 or above in the country, from UNESCO data (x-axis). Exact values are shown in Table D1.

Figure C2: Global support for a globally coordinated 2% tax on dollar billionaires, weighted to be proportional to global population




Note. This figure complements Figure 1, with data from each country weighted to be representative of the global population. As Figure 1, this figure reports the distribution of responses from 44,977 respondents in 40 countries on whether they support or oppose a globally coordinated billionaire tax, with data weighted to be proportional to global population. The globally coordinated billionaire tax is described to respondents as a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Population data is from the U.S. Census Bureau's International Database. Supplementary Figure C27 weights the results for country-specific demographics in addition to the global population.

Figure C3: Global support for a globally coordinated 2% tax on dollar billionaires, weighted to be demographically representative within countries




Note. This figure complements Figure 1, with data weighted to be demographically representative within each country. As Figure 1, this figure reports the distribution of responses from 44,977 respondents in 40 countries on whether they support or oppose a globally coordinated billionaire tax. The data are also weighted to ensure equal representation for each country in the sample. Demographic representativity within each country is defined as matching country-specific statistics on gender, age, education, and political affiliation as described in Appendix A.6. The globally coordinated billionaire tax is described to respondents as a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Supplementary Figure C27 weights the results for global population in addition to country-specific demographics.

Figure C4: Support for a global wealth tax, weighted by country demographics




Note. This figure complements Figure 2 with data weighted for demographic representativity within each country. As Figure 2, the figure reports the support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax by country. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Demographic representativity within each country is defined as matching country-specific statistics on gender, age, education, and political affiliation as described in Appendix A.6. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C5: Global support for a coordinated 2% tax on dollar billionaires by country and region, cardinal scale




Note. This figure complements Figure 2 with data for support on a five-point scale from strongly disagree (-2) to strongly agree (2). As Figure 2, the figure reports the support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax by country and region. The globally coordinated billionaire tax is described to respondents as a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Respondents who answer "Do not understand" are excluded. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C6: Global opposition for a coordinated 2% tax on dollar billionaires by country and region




Note. This figure complements Figure 2 by reporting the share of respondents who "Somewhat oppose" or "Strongly oppose" the globally coordinated billionaire tax across (a) country, and (b) region (where data are weighted to ensure equal representation for each country). The globally coordinated billionaire tax is described to respondents as a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C7: Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax: Individual-level associations, weighted by country demographics




Note. This figure complements Figure 3 with data weighted for demographic representativity within each country. As Figure 3, the figure reports regression coefficients from separate and joint regressions of support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax with the stated demographic variables. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9. In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). Demographic representativity within each country is defined as matching country-specific statistics on gender, age, education, and political affiliation as described in Appendix A.6. Top 10% income is defined by the respondent's income being within the top decile of respondent incomes in the country. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C8: Relative support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax across relative incomes




Note. This figure complements Figure 3 by reporting the relative support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax across relative income percentiles in Western countries, where data points are the coefficient estimates from a regression of support for the redistributive type on the relative income dummies, country-level fixed effects, and robust standard errors. Specifically, the regression we run is of the form $RP_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_j RelInc_{ij} + \alpha_k + \varepsilon_{ijk}$, where RP_{ijk} defines the support of respondent i in income decile j in country k for the redistributive policy in question, β_0 is a constant, β_j are the plotted coefficients, $RelInc_j$ is a dummy for belonging to the income decile in question, α_k is a country-level fixed effect, and ε_{ijk} are robust standard errors. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C9: Support for broad domestic redistribution: Individual-level associations




Note. This figure reports regression coefficients from separate and joint regressions of support for broad domestic redistribution with the stated demographic variables. The corresponding regression is shown in Supplementary Table D5. Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9. In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). Top 10% income is defined by the respondent's income being within the top decile of respondent incomes in the country. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C10: Types: Support for domestic redistribution and global tax




Note. This figure reports, across countries, the share of respondents who support any combination of the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Figure C11: Support for only one type of redistribution




Note. This figure reports (a) shares of each type of respondent, where types are defined based on the individuals' support of the globally coordinated billionaire tax and/or domestic redistribution, and (b) the share of respondents per country that supports only one of two types of redistribution across countries. See Supplementary Figure C12 for a scatter plot of which type of redistribution is more popular in which countries. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Figure C12: Scatter plot: Support for only domestic or only global taxation




Note. This figure reports the share of respondents who only support the globally coordinated billionaire tax (y-axis), plotted against the share of respondents who only support broad domestic redistribution (x-axis). Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Figure C13: Relative support of global billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution weighted for demographic representativity within countries




Note. This figure complements Figure 4 with data weighted for demographic representativity within each country. As Figure 4, this figure reports support for the global billionaire tax (p.p.) minus support for broad domestic redistribution (p.p.) across (a) Western and non-Western countries (where data are weighted to ensure equal representation for each country), and (b) all countries. Demographic representativity within each country is defined as matching country-specific statistics on gender, age, education, and political affiliation as described in Appendix A.6. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". See Appendix A.7 for a list of Western and non-Western countries. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C14: Global support for a broad domestic redistribution by country and region




Note. This figure reports the share of respondents who supports broad domestic redistribution across (a) country, and (b) region (where data are weighted to ensure equal representation for each country). This is a replication of Figure 2 for support for broad domestic redistribution. Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C15: Support among right-leaning and top-income individuals in non-Western countries




Note. This figure complements Figure 5 with non-Western countries. As Figure 5, the figure reports (a) net support for right-leaning respondents in non-Western countries for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution (countries weighted equally), (b) the same, across all non-Western countries, (c) net support for individuals in the top 10% of relative incomes within each non-Western country for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution (countries weighted equally), and (d) the same, across all non-Western countries. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9. Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C16: Support among left-leaning individuals in Western countries




Note. This figure complements Figure 5a-5b with data for left-leaning respondents. Similarly to Figure 5, the figure shows (a) net support for left-leaning respondents in the West for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution (countries weighted equally), (b) the same, across all countries in the West. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C17: Support for the globally coordinated tax and broad domestic redistribution across political leaning in Western countries




Note. This figure combines Figure 5b and Supplementary Figure C16b, showing support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution for both left- and right-leaning respondents for each Western country. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9.

Figure C18: Political divides for support of the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution in Western countries




Note. This figure complements Figure 5 by reporting the net political polarization in Western countries across the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution, defined as the left-right difference in support for the global billionaire tax (p.p.) minus the left-right difference in support for broad domestic redistribution (p.p.). Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C19: Western countries: Support among respondents in bottom 50% of relative incomes




Note. This figure complements Figure 5a-5b with data for respondents with incomes in the bottom 50%. Similarly to Figure 5, the figure reports (a) net support for individuals in the bottom 50% of relative incomes within each country in the West for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and domestic redistribution, and (b) the same, across all countries in the West. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C20: Support among right-leaning and top-income individuals in Western countries, weighted for demographic representativity within countries




Note. This figure complements Figure 5 with data weighted for demographic representativity within each country. As Figure 5, the figure reports (a) net support for right-leaning respondents in the West for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution (countries weighted equally), (b) the same, across all countries in the West, (c) net support for individuals in the top 10% of relative incomes within each country in the West for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution (countries weighted equally), and (d) the same, across all countries in the West. Demographic representativity within each country is defined as matching country-specific statistics on gender, age, education, and political affiliation as described in Appendix A.6. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9. Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C21: Relative support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and domestic redistribution across relative incomes in Western countries




Note. This figure complements Figure 5 by reporting the relative support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution across relative income percentiles in Western countries, where data points are the coefficient estimates from a regression of support for the redistributive type on the relative income dummies, country-level fixed effects, and robust standard errors. Specifically, the regression we run is of the form $RP_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_j RelInc_{ij} + \alpha_k + \varepsilon_{ijk}$, where RP_{ijk} defines the support of respondent i in income decile j in country k for the redistributive policy in question, β_0 is a constant, β_j are the plotted coefficients, $RelInc_j$ is a dummy for belonging to the income decile in question, α_k is a country-level fixed effect, and ε_{ijk} are robust standard errors. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C22: Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution: Individual-level associations (West)




Note. This figure complements Figure 3 and Supplementary Figure C9, reporting regression coefficients from a joint regression of support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax (navy) and broad domestic redistribution (green) with the stated demographic variables in Western countries. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9. In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Supplementary Figure C23 replicates the analysis for the full sample. Supplementary Figure C24 replicates the analysis for non-Western countries. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C23: Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution: Individual-level associations




Note. This figure complements Figure 3 and Supplementary Figure C9, reporting regression coefficients from a joint regression of support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax (navy) and broad domestic redistribution (green) with the stated demographic variables for the full sample. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9. In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Supplementary Figure C22 replicates the analysis for Western countries. Supplementary Figure C24 replicates the analysis for non-Western countries. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C24: Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution: Individual-level associations (non-West)



Note. This figure complements Figure 3 and Supplementary Figure C9, reporting regression coefficients from a joint regression of support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax (navy) and broad domestic redistribution (green) with the stated demographic variables in non-Western countries. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9. In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Supplementary Figure C23 replicates the analysis for the full sample. Supplementary Figure C22 replicates the analysis for Western countries. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.


Figure C25: Government positions on coordinated billionaire tax and citizens' support, data weighted by demographic representativity on the country-level



Note. This figure complements Figure 6 with data weighted for demographic representativity within each country. As Figure 6, this figure reports, across governmental positions on the globally coordinated billionaire tax, (a) the shares of respondents who support the globally coordinated billionaire tax, and (b) the shares of respondents who support broad domestic redistribution. Demographic representativity within each country is defined as matching country-specific statistics on gender, age, education, and political affiliation as described in Appendix A.6. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". See Appendix A.11 for detailed explanations of how we classify governmental support and various robustness checks. Each included country is weighted equally. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.


Figures Not Referenced in the Main Text

Figure C26: Comparing survey results to the *World Values Survey*




Note. This figure compares results from our survey to results from the predominantly in-person World Values Survey for the one identical question on religion asked in both surveys. The question asked in both surveys was: "*Is religion important in your life?*" with the response options being 'Very important,' 'Somewhat important,' 'Not too important,' and 'Not important at all'.

Figure C27: Global support for a globally coordinated 2% tax on dollar billionaires, weighted to be proportional of the global population and demographically representative within countries



Note. This figure complements Figure 1, with data weighted to be demographically representative within each country, and data from each country weighted to be representative of the global population. As Figure 1, this figure reports the distribution of responses from 44,977 respondents in 40 countries on whether they support or oppose a globally coordinated billionaire tax. Demographic representativity within each country is defined as matching country-specific statistics on gender, age, education, and political affiliation as described in Appendix A.6. The globally coordinated billionaire tax is described to respondents as a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*".

Figure C28: Country-level correlations, demographic variables and support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax I




Note. This figure reports correlations between support for the global tax and being right-leaning (including a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning), being in the top 10% of relative incomes, and being of male gender. Note the different scale for right-leaning. Also note that some data points have large standard errors due to small shares of the population being in a specific group (e.g. right-leaning in Pakistan). All regressions are separate (e.g. correlation between the male dummy and support for the global tax in Argentina). Political leaning is defined as in Appendix A.9. Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C29: Country-level correlations, demographic variables and support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax II



Note. This figure reports correlations between support for the global tax and having at least some post-secondary education, an age above 40, and stating that religion is "Very important" or "Somewhat important" for the respondent. Note the different scale on the religion figure. Also note that some data points have large standard errors due to small shares of the population being in a specific group (e.g. non-religious in Indonesia). All regressions are separate (e.g. correlation between the age dummy and support for the global tax in Argentina). Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

Figure C30: Expected support for the global coordinated tax within respondents' own country



Note. This figure reports both the average share of respondents who support the globally coordinated billionaire tax, and the average *expected* share of respondents to support the globally coordinated billionaire tax across countries. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Expected support is defined as the average of respondent answers to the following question: "*We have completed this study with a large number of participants in your country. Out of 100 participants who answered the previous question, how many do you think support the coordinated tax on the world's wealthiest individuals? If your answer is correct you will be awarded $1. This is true for all participants. [Write in 0-100]*" Robust standard errors, 95% CIs.

D Tables

Table D1: Demographic representativity

	(1) Male (%)		(2) Median age		(3) Right-leaning (%)		(4) Higher education (%)	
	Survey	Actual	Survey	Actual	Survey	Actual	Survey	Actual
Argentina	49%	49%	38	34	78%	58%*	57%	N/A
Australia	47%	49%	43	38	37%	37%	67%	54%
Austria	47%	48%	50	44	49%	54%	39%	33%
Brazil	47%	49%	37	35	45%	55%*	65%	N/A
Canada	47%	49%	45	42	33%	34%	74%	68%
Chile	46%	49%	38	38	74%	49%*	68%	28%
China	46%	50%	35	40	.%	.%*	58%	16%
Colombia	50%	48%	39	32	37%	35%*	68%	27%
Czech Republic	48%	49%	44	44	45%	42%*	28%	23%
Finland	47%	49%	41	43	50%	52%	42%	39%
France	45%	49%	50	42	66%	67%	64%	35%
Germany	46%	49%	54	46	46%	46%	34%	40%
Great Britain	48%	49%	45	40	36%	38%	76%	43%
Greece	51%	48%	44	46	36%	41%	62%	37%
Hungary	46%	48%	43	44	60%	60%*	19%	32%
India	53%	51%	35	29	70%	37%*	88%	13%
Indonesia	52%	50%	36	31	66%	62%*	65%	12%
Ireland	48%	49%	43	40	24%	23%	72%	60%
Italy	49%	48%	51	48	41%	43%	53%	18%
Japan	50%	48%	48	49	50%	61%*	49%	42%
Malaysia	48%	51%	35	31	44%	52%*	80%	26%
Mexico	47%	48%	35	30	29%	28%*	79%	19%
Netherlands	49%	49%	50	42	49%	52%	45%	39%
New Zealand	47%	50%	43	37	51%	53%	68%	51%
Norway	49%	50%	44	40	36%	37%	62%	43%
Pakistan	61%	51%	32	22	87%	55%*	89%	9%
Philippines	48%	50%	34	25	65%	66%*	80%	26%
Poland	47%	47%	44	42	30%	43%*	55%	32%
Portugal	51%	47%	43	46	45%	47%	37%	26%
Romania	50%	47%	49	45	65%	55%*	63%	20%
Slovakia	50%	47%	41	42	54%	54%*	37%	28%
South Africa	47%	49%	33	30	39%	22%*	68%	14%
South Korea	49%	50%	41	46	37%	37%*	87%	48%
Spain	49%	48%	45	46	40%	45%	57%	35%
Sweden	45%	50%	44	41	51%	52%	54%	51%
Taiwan	50%	49%	40	44	37%	33%*	81%	N/A
Thailand	47%	48%	35	41	11%	13%*	70%	N/A
Turkey	52%	50%	37	33	33%	47%*	62%	21%
United States	47%	49%	45	39	47%	47%	45%	49%
Vietnam	53%	49%	35	33	.%	.%*	78%	26%

Note. This table reports demographic representativity across countries. N/A indicates that data is not available from the given source. The percent of right-leaning respondents is denoted by * for countries where the right- and left-definition is unclear (see Appendix A.9). Right-leaning data is not available for China and Vietnam due to their one-party political systems. Survey data for right-leaning individuals indicates the share of respondents who voted for a right-leaning party (see Appendix A.9) in the last election among respondents who report having voted. The corresponding real data is collected from various official sources. Age and gender data is from the U.S. Census Bureau's International Database. Note that our data collection excludes individuals below 18, which means that the median age in the survey is expected to be above the median age in the country. Data for educational attainment is from UNESCO.

Table D2: Associations: Country-level support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax

	(1) Support b/se	(2) Support b/se	(3) Support b/se	(4) Support b/se	(5) Support b/se	(6) Support b/se	(7) Support b/se	(8) Support b/se	(9) Support b/se	(10) Support b/se	(11) Support b/se
log(GDP/c)	-1.98										4.02
	(1.32)										(2.46)
Gini (pre-tax, 0-1)		11.29									-3.82
		(11.03)									(14.18)
Billionaires per 1,000,000			-0.48								0.59
			(0.70)								(0.92)
Male (%)				0.46							0.86*
				(0.28)							(0.32)
Religious (%)					0.03						-0.03
					(0.02)						(0.03)
College educated (%)						0.07					0.01
						(0.08)					(0.09)
Right-leaning (%)							0.04				-0.01
							(0.08)				(0.08)
Ineq. is unfair (%)								0.34**			0.78*
								(0.12)			(0.35)
Ineq = country functions worse (%)									0.33*		-0.25
									(0.13)		(0.29)
Trusts government (%)										0.24**	0.33***
										(0.09)	(0.09)
R2	0.037	0.029	0.006	0.036	0.090	0.031	0.008	0.203	0.148	0.201	0.530
Observations	39	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	39

Note. This table reports results from a regression of the listed covariates on country-level support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*" (units in percentage points support). log(GDP/c) is defined as the logarithm of the country's GDP per capita in PPP-adjusted 2024 international U.S. dollars, sourced from the World Bank. Taiwan is not included in analysis using GDP per capita due to missing data from the World Bank. The Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient in pre-tax national income, sourced from wid.world. The rate of billionaires is defined as the number of billionaires per 1,000,000 citizens, where the number of billionaires is sourced from Forbes' Billionaire List and population is sourced from the World Bank. In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). Three variables are pre-specified measures of determinants of redistributive preferences frequently discussed in the related academic literature, representing fairness principles, governmental trust, and inequality externality concerns respectively. Specifically, they denote whether respondents agree with, in order: Ineq is unfair: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair.*" Ineq = country functions worse: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are causing society to function worse.*". Trusts govt: "*I usually trust the national government to do what is right.*" We note that the joint regression should be interpreted with caution due to a high ratio of controls to observations. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

Table D3: Associations: Individual-level support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax, separate and joint regressions

	(1) Support b/se	(2) Support b/se	(3) Support b/se	(4) Support b/se	(5) Support b/se	(6) Support b/se	(7) Support b/se	(8) Support b/se	(9) Support b/se	(10) Support b/se	(11) Support b/se
Right-leaning	-11.02***									-11.58***	-6.78***
	(0.52)									(0.54)	(0.52)
Top 10% income		0.46								-1.36	0.46
		(0.73)								(0.76)	(0.72)
College			4.12***							3.58***	3.32***
			(0.48)							(0.50)	(0.48)
Male				3.00***						2.20***	3.10***
				(0.43)						(0.45)	(0.43)
Age 40+					5.29***					5.82***	5.36***
					(0.45)					(0.47)	(0.45)
Religious						-0.69				-0.46	-1.30**
						(0.50)				(0.53)	(0.50)
Ineq. is unfair							27.50***				19.05***
							(0.51)				(0.60)
Ineq = country functions worse								28.11***			18.70***
								(0.52)			(0.62)
Trusts govt									9.82***		6.77***
									(0.45)		(0.45)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	0.040	0.022	0.024	0.023	0.026	0.022	0.092	0.093	0.033	0.046	0.143
Observations	42376	42670	44977	44977	44977	44977	44977	44977	44977	40069	40069

Note. This table complements Figure 3, reporting results from separate and joint regressions of the listed covariates on support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*" (units in 0-1). In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Individual income measures are not available for Malaysia and Mexico due to a coding error. Three variables are pre-specified measures of determinants of redistributive preferences frequently discussed in the related academic literature, representing fairness principles, governmental trust, and inequality externality concerns respectively. Specifically, they denote whether respondents agree with, in order: Ineq is unfair: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair.*" Ineq = country functions worse: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are causing society to function worse.*". Trusts govt: "*I usually trust the national government to do what is right.*" Supplementary Figures C28-C29 presents the corresponding separate regressions by country for each demographic predictor. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

Table D4: Associations: Country-level broad domestic redistributive support

	(1) Support b/se	(2) Support b/se	(3) Support b/se	(4) Support b/se	(5) Support b/se	(6) Support b/se	(7) Support b/se	(8) Support b/se	(9) Support b/se	(10) Support b/se	(11) Support b/se
log(GDP/c)	-9.21***										-1.60
	(1.48)										(2.44)
Gini (pre-tax, 0-1)		42.83**									-12.65
		(12.15)									(12.14)
Billionaires per 1,000,000			-4.98***								-1.33
			(1.31)								(0.96)
Male (%)				1.31**							0.48
				(0.43)							(0.42)
Religious (%)					0.10***						-0.00
					(0.01)						(0.03)
College educated (%)						0.15					-0.03
						(0.10)					(0.07)
Right-leaning (%)							0.05				-0.14*
							(0.11)				(0.06)
Ineq. is unfair (%)								0.84***			0.51
								(0.15)			(0.26)
Ineq = country functions worse (%)									0.98***		0.46
									(0.21)		(0.23)
Trusts government (%)										0.33**	0.23*
										(0.11)	(0.09)
R2	0.371	0.194	0.281	0.136	0.389	0.061	0.006	0.562	0.607	0.168	0.828
Observations	39	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	39

Note. This table reports results from a regression of the listed covariates on country-level support for broad domestic redistribution. Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*" (units in percentage points support). log(GDP/c) is defined as the logarithm of the country's GDP per capita in PPP-adjusted 2024 international U.S. dollars, sourced from the World Bank. Taiwan is not included in analysis using GDP per capita due to missing data from the World Bank. The Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient in pre-tax national income, sourced from wid.world. The rate of billionaires is defined as the number of billionaires per 1,000,000 citizens, where the number of billionaires is sourced from Forbes' Billionaire List and population is sourced from the World Bank. In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). Three variables are pre-specified measures of determinants of redistributive preferences frequently discussed in the related academic literature, representing fairness principles, governmental trust, and inequality externality concerns respectively. Specifically, they denote whether respondents agree with, in order: Ineq is unfair: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair.*" Ineq = country functions worse: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are causing society to function worse.*". Trusts govt: "*I usually trust the national government to do what is right.*" We note that the joint regression should be interpreted with caution due to a high ratio of controls to observations. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

Table D5: Associations: Individual-level support for broad domestic redistribution, separate and joint regressions

	(1) Support b/se	(2) Support b/se	(3) Support b/se	(4) Support b/se	(5) Support b/se	(6) Support b/se	(7) Support b/se	(8) Support b/se	(9) Support b/se	(10) Support b/se	(11) Support b/se
Right-leaning	-14.98***									-15.53***	-7.72***
	(0.52)									(0.54)	(0.48)
Top 10% income		-6.44***								-6.71***	-3.52***
		(0.75)								(0.78)	(0.67)
College			0.22							-0.03	-0.42
			(0.48)							(0.50)	(0.43)
Male				-1.88***						-1.99***	-0.16
				(0.43)						(0.45)	(0.39)
Age 40+					-0.05					0.61	-0.21
					(0.44)					(0.47)	(0.40)
Religious						1.66***				2.77***	2.17***
						(0.50)				(0.53)	(0.46)
Ineq. is unfair							43.68***				29.63***
							(0.49)				(0.60)
Ineq = country functions worse								45.77***			32.10***
								(0.50)			(0.61)
Trusts govt									7.41***		3.90***
									(0.45)		(0.41)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	0.066	0.050	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.221	0.232	0.053	0.072	0.311
Observations	42376	42670	44977	44977	44977	44977	44977	44977	44977	40069	40069

Note. This table complements Supplementary Figure C9, showing results from separate and joint regressions of the listed binary covariates on support for broad domestic redistribution. Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*" (units in 0-1). In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Individual income measures are not available for Malaysia and Mexico due to a coding error. Three variables are pre-specified measures of determinants of redistributive preferences frequently discussed in the related academic literature, representing fairness principles, governmental trust, and inequality externality concerns respectively. Specifically, they denote whether respondents agree with, in order: Ineq is unfair: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair.*" Ineq = country functions worse: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are causing society to function worse.*". Trusts govt: "*I usually trust the national government to do what is right.*" Supplementary Table D8 shows the identical analysis while restricting the data to Western countries. Supplementary Table D9 shows the identical analysis while restricting the data to non-Western countries. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

Table D6: Associations: Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution

	(1) Supports global tax b/se	(2) Supports global tax b/se	(3) Supports global tax b/se
Support for broad domestic redistribution	0.29***	0.29***	0.27***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	No	No	Yes
R2	0.085	0.101	0.116
Observations	44977	44977	40069

Note. This table shows results from a regression analysis of the association between the globally coordinated billionaire tax and broad domestic redistribution. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*" (units in 0-1). Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*" (units in 0-1). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

Table D7: Associations: Government support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and country-level public support for types of redistribution

	(1) Government support b/se	(2) Government support b/se	(3) Government support b/se
Support for domestic redist.	3.25***		3.08**
	(0.54)		(0.85)
Support for global tax		2.65	0.58
		(1.46)	(1.60)
R2	0.431	0.129	0.436
Observations	27	27	27

Note. This table complements Supplementary Figure 6, showing results from a regression of government support for the globally coordinated tax (0-1) on the country-level share of support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax (0-1) and the country-level share of support for broad domestic redistribution (0-1). Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". See Appendix A.11 for detailed explanations of how we classify governmental support and various robustness checks. The data are weighted to ensure equal representation for each country. Taiwan is not classified due to not being a member of the United Nations. Only countries classified as supporting or opposing the globally coordinated billionaire tax included in the data. Supplementary Table D11 adds neutral countries; results are robust. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

Tables Not Referenced in the Main Text

Table D8: Associations: Individual-level support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax, separate and joint regressions (West)

	(1) Support b/se	(2) Support b/se	(3) Support b/se	(4) Support b/se	(5) Support b/se	(6) Support b/se	(7) Support b/se	(8) Support b/se	(9) Support b/se	(10) Support b/se	(11) Support b/se
Right-leaning	-15.63***									-15.69***	-7.76***
	(0.77)									(0.77)	(0.75)
Top 10% income		-2.59*								-2.96**	-0.18
		(1.15)								(1.14)	(1.07)
College			2.67***							2.61***	2.53***
			(0.70)							(0.70)	(0.66)
Male				0.36						0.50	1.75**
				(0.67)						(0.66)	(0.62)
Age 40+					5.49***					6.38***	6.02***
					(0.71)					(0.71)	(0.67)
Religious						-4.43***				-3.19***	-3.43***
						(0.73)				(0.72)	(0.68)
Ineq. is unfair							29.29***				19.52***
							(0.76)				(0.86)
Ineq = country functions worse								29.75***			19.18***
								(0.79)			(0.88)
Trusts govt									6.85***		6.16***
									(0.69)		(0.66)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	0.037	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.014	0.013	0.100	0.099	0.016	0.043	0.152
Observations	18061	18061	18061	18061	18061	18061	18061	18061	18061	18061	18061

Note. This table reports results from separate and joint regressions of the listed covariates on support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax in Western countries. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*" (units in 0-1). In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Individual income measures are not available for Malaysia and Mexico due to a coding error. Three variables are pre-specified measures of determinants of redistributive preferences frequently discussed in the related academic literature, representing fairness principles, governmental trust, and inequality externality concerns respectively. Specifically, they denote whether respondents agree with, in order: Ineq is unfair: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair.*" Ineq = country functions worse: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are causing society to function worse.*". Trusts govt: "*I usually trust the national government to do what is right.*" Supplement to Supplementary Table D3. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

Table D9: Associations: Individual-level support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax, separate and joint regressions (non-West)

	(1) Support b/se	(2) Support b/se	(3) Support b/se	(4) Support b/se	(5) Support b/se	(6) Support b/se	(7) Support b/se	(8) Support b/se	(9) Support b/se	(10) Support b/se	(11) Support b/se
Right-leaning	-7.19***									-7.72***	-5.81***
	(0.70)									(0.74)	(0.71)
Top 10% income		2.88**								0.46	1.29
		(0.95)								(1.02)	(0.98)
College			5.38***							4.66***	4.33***
			(0.65)							(0.72)	(0.69)
Male				4.95***						4.01***	4.40***
				(0.56)						(0.62)	(0.59)
Age 40+					5.14***					5.27***	4.71***
					(0.58)					(0.63)	(0.61)
Religious						2.74***				2.61***	1.12
						(0.70)				(0.77)	(0.74)
Ineq. is unfair							25.97***				18.13***
							(0.69)				(0.86)
Ineq = country functions worse								26.76***			18.03***
								(0.70)			(0.87)
Trusts govt									12.04***		7.35***
									(0.59)		(0.63)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	0.044	0.029	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.029	0.085	0.087	0.043	0.052	0.135
Observations	24315	24609	26916	26916	26916	26916	26916	26916	26916	22008	22008

Note. This table reports results from separate and joint regressions of the listed covariates on support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax in non-Western countries. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*" (units in 0-1). In regressions including the right-leaning dummy, a dummy for not being left- or right-leaning is also included (not shown). Relative income is defined on the country-level as the income percentile of the individual compared to others in the survey. Individual income measures are not available for Malaysia and Mexico due to a coding error. Three variables are pre-specified measures of determinants of redistributive preferences frequently discussed in the related academic literature, representing fairness principles, governmental trust, and inequality externality concerns respectively. Specifically, they denote whether respondents agree with, in order: Ineq is unfair: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair.*" Ineq = country functions worse: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are causing society to function worse.*". Trusts govt: "*I usually trust the national government to do what is right.*" Supplement to Supplementary Table D3. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

Table D10: Associations: Individual-level support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax, separate and joint regressions (pre-specified regression)

	(1) Support (1-5) b/se	(2) Support (1-5) b/se	(3) Support (1-5) b/se	(4) Support (1-5) b/se	(5) Support (1-5) b/se	(6) Support (1-5) b/se	(7) Support (1-5) b/se	(8) Support (1-5) b/se	(9) Support (1-5) b/se
Left-leaning	0.44***						0.44***	0.28***	0.30***
	(0.04)						(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Income: $15k-$25k		0.09***					0.04	0.03	0.04
		(0.02)					(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income: $25k-$50k		0.10***					0.05**	0.04*	0.04*
		(0.02)					(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Income: $50k-$100k		0.06*					0.00	0.02	0.01
		(0.02)					(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income: $100k+		0.04					-0.01	0.02	-0.01
		(0.03)					(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Male			0.05*				0.03	0.06***	0.06***
			(0.02)				(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Age 30-39				0.10***			0.09***	0.07***	0.07***
				(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Age 40-49				0.13***			0.14***	0.11***	0.10***
				(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 50-59				0.18***			0.19***	0.17***	0.18***
				(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 60 and above				0.30***			0.31***	0.28***	0.30***
				(0.04)			(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
<7 yrs education					-0.18***		-0.15***	-0.13**	-0.16***
					(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
7-10 yrs education					-0.07*		-0.08*	-0.06*	-0.04
					(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
10-13 yrs education					-0.04**		-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.05**
					(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Religious						-0.05	-0.04	-0.04*	-0.03
						(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ineq. is unfair								0.47***	0.49***
								(0.02)	(0.02)
Trusts govt								0.15***	0.17***
								(0.02)	(0.03)
Redistribution hurts economy								-0.12***	-0.12***
								(0.02)	(0.02)
Ineq = country functions worse								0.44***	0.44***
								(0.02)	(0.02)
log(GDP/c), PPP, 2024 $									-0.06
									(0.03)
Gini (pre-tax, 0-1)									0.11
									(0.24)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
R2	0.044	0.029	0.029	0.036	0.029	0.029	0.055	0.153	0.138
Observations	44116	41844	44116	44116	44116	44116	41844	41844	40587

Note. This table reports results from the pre-specified separate and joint regressions, where the listed covariates are regressed on support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax in cardinal form (1-5) with country-level clustered standard errors. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*" (units in 0-1). log(GDP/c) is defined as the logarithm of the country's GDP per capita in PPP-adjusted 2024 international U.S. dollars, sourced from the World Bank. Taiwan is not included in analysis using GDP per capita due to missing data from the World Bank. The Gini is defined as the Gini coefficient in pre-tax national income, sourced from wid.world. The rate of billionaires is defined as the number of billionaires per 1,000,000 citizens, where the number of billionaires is sourced from Forbes' Billionaire List and population is sourced from the World Bank. Individual income measures are not available for Malaysia and Mexico due to a coding error. Three variables are pre-specified measures of determinants of redistributive preferences frequently discussed in the related academic literature, representing fairness principles, governmental trust, and inequality externality concerns respectively. Specifically, they denote whether respondents agree with, in order: Ineq is unfair: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair.*" Ineq = country functions worse: "*In my country, the economic differences between the rich and poor are causing society to function worse.*". Trusts govt: "*I usually trust the national government to do what is right.*" *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

Table D11: Associations: Government support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax and country-level public support for types of redistribution (including neutral countries)

	(1) Government support b/se	(2) Government support b/se	(3) Government support b/se
Support for domestic redist.	4.08***		3.95**
	(0.96)		(1.44)
Support for global tax		3.45	0.36
		(1.76)	(2.26)
R2	0.265	0.089	0.266
Observations	39	39	39

Note. This table complements Supplementary Table D7, showing results from a regression of government support for the globally coordinated tax (0=Against, 1=Neutral, 2=In favor), on the country-level share of support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax (0-1) and the country-level share of support for broad domestic redistribution (0-1). Results are robust to classifying neutral countries as against and using a 0-1 scale. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*". See Appendix A.11 for detailed explanations of how we classify governmental support and various robustness checks. The data are weighted to ensure equal representation for each country. Taiwan is not classified due to not being a member of the United Nations. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Significance levels*: *5%, **1%, ***0.1%.

E Tables: Support across political parties

Table E1: Argentina: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	La Libertad Avanza	Juntos por el Cambio	Unión por la Patria	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	58.3%	65.7%	88.7%	57.5%	54.1%
Domest. redist (%)	62.0%	67.1%	89.3%	74.7%	71.4%
Sample size	429	213	177	87	98

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Argentina. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E2: Australia: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Labor Party	Liberal Party	Greens	Liberal National Party	Independent candidates	One Nation	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	70.0%	64.4%	68.6%	62.8%	62.9%	60.0%	54.0%	72.2%
Domest. redist (%)	63.4%	49.8%	71.4%	41.9%	67.7%	53.3%	66.0%	55.6%
Sample size	410	247	105	43	62	45	50	36

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Australia. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E3: Austria: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	ÖVP	SPÖ	FPÖ	GRÜNE	NEOS	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	68.1%	88.0%	71.4%	86.0%	87.1%	78.6%	88.6%	55.7%
Domest. redist (%)	54.6%	77.1%	66.4%	73.4%	61.3%	63.4%	74.3%	57.4%
Sample size	251	175	140	143	62	131	35	61

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Austria. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E4: Brazil: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Liberal Party	PT	Brazil Union	Pro-gres-sives	PSDB	BDM	Repub-licans	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	48.7%	78.7%	57.5%	60.0%	67.4%	71.8%	78.6%	56.2%	65.3%	46.5%
Domest. redist (%)	74.8%	89.9%	87.5%	70.0%	88.4%	89.7%	78.6%	69.7%	80.2%	62.0%
Sample size	230	366	40	20	43	39	14	89	101	71

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Brazil. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E5: Canada: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Liberal Party	Conservative	Bloc Québécois	New Democratic Party (NDP)	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	81.4%	59.5%	93.8%	81.2%	64.7%	57.9%
Domest. redist (%)	64.0%	37.5%	75.0%	78.2%	62.0%	43.9%
Sample size	344	264	16	170	150	57

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Canada. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E6: Chile: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Partido Republicano de Chile	Partido Comunista de Chile	Union Democrata Independiente	Partido De la Gente	Convergencia Social	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	64.0%	83.9%	72.2%	68.1%	86.2%	60.7%	70.1%
Domest. redist (%)	62.1%	93.5%	72.2%	74.3%	85.3%	66.8%	68.6%
Sample size	261	62	108	113	109	214	137

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Chile. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E7: Colombia: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Historic Pact for Colombia	Colombian Conservative Party	Colombian Liberal Party	Green Alliance-Hope Center	Democratic Center	Radical Change	Union Party for the People	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	77.2%	70.6%	73.7%	84.4%	64.5%	71.9%	66.7%	62.4%	58.0%
Domest. redist (%)	82.8%	74.5%	76.3%	76.6%	66.5%	84.4%	75.0%	68.5%	66.7%
Sample size	337	51	76	64	200	32	12	149	81

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Colombia. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E8: Czech Republic: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Petr Pavel	Andrej Babiš	Danuše Nerudová	Pavel Fischer	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	51.1%	53.4%	60.0%	50.0%	41.8%	53.1%	18.8%
Domest. redist (%)	45.9%	64.1%	53.3%	38.9%	53.7%	62.5%	56.2%
Sample size	327	348	105	36	134	32	16

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Czech Republic. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E9: Finland: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Alexander Stubb	Pekka Haavisto	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	62.8%	79.5%	61.8%	58.6%
Domest. redist (%)	44.9%	79.3%	63.0%	65.7%
Sample size	530	527	165	70

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Finland. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E10: France: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP)	Ensemble (ENS)	Rassemblement National (RN)	Les Républicains (LR)	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	86.7%	79.9%	68.3%	74.6%	69.2%	71.4%	65.3%
Domest. redist (%)	88.3%	51.8%	64.7%	55.3%	66.1%	76.2%	74.5%
Sample size	264	139	391	114	221	63	98

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in France. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E11: Germany: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	CDU	SPD	AfD	FDP	CSU	Die Grünen	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	79.1%	88.9%	72.5%	75.8%	72.0%	91.4%	66.7%	89.0%	82.2%
Domest. redist (%)	56.4%	70.6%	61.3%	54.5%	56.0%	79.7%	58.3%	80.0%	70.0%
Sample size	234	262	142	99	25	187	108	145	90

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Germany. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E12: Great Britain: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Labour	Conservative	Liberal Democrat	Reform UK	Green Party	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	80.0%	65.2%	75.9%	63.9%	77.4%	67.3%	67.6%
Domest. redist (%)	75.7%	37.6%	64.7%	47.4%	74.2%	46.7%	41.2%
Sample size	375	210	116	97	62	107	34

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Great Britain. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E13: Greece: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Néa Dimokratía	SYRIZA	Pasok-KINAL	KKE	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	80.3%	81.4%	78.8%	75.7%	65.6%	76.2%	66.7%
Domest. redist (%)	78.1%	91.7%	91.2%	87.8%	75.0%	83.5%	79.0%
Sample size	310	145	80	74	64	261	105

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Greece. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E14: Hungary: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Fidesz-KDNP	United for Hungary	Mi Hazánk	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	62.1%	82.9%	68.1%	57.0%	55.8%
Domest. redist (%)	80.0%	87.7%	87.9%	81.6%	78.8%
Sample size	280	269	116	223	113

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Hungary. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E15: India: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	BJP / N.D.A	Congress / I.N.D.I.A	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	81.7%	77.4%	77.0%	68.9%	64.3%
Domest. redist (%)	81.8%	87.5%	75.4%	77.8%	72.9%
Sample size	818	305	61	45	70

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in India. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E16: Indonesia: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	PDIP	Golkar	Gerindra	PKB	Nas-dem	PKS	Demokrat	PAN	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	84.8%	84.9%	84.4%	82.5%	88.3%	83.1%	90.0%	71.9%	69.8%	79.1%	67.4%
Domest. redist (%)	87.8%	82.1%	84.4%	75.0%	83.3%	87.3%	86.2%	65.6%	88.9%	88.4%	71.7%
Sample size	296	106	384	40	60	142	80	32	63	43	46

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Indonesia. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E17: Ireland: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Fine Gael (FG)	Fianna Fáil (FF)	Independent candidates	Sinn Féin (SF)	Labour Party	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	81.6%	79.4%	74.3%	76.0%	75.0%	64.2%	53.8%
Domest. redist (%)	57.3%	59.8%	67.5%	69.4%	78.8%	60.9%	53.8%
Sample size	185	97	237	196	52	179	52

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Ireland. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E18: Italy: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Brothers of Italy	Lega	Forza Italia	Democratic Party	M5S	Az-IV	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	72.4%	66.7%	62.7%	81.6%	84.7%	80.9%	63.2%	79.4%	62.1%
Domest. redist (%)	56.8%	73.7%	55.9%	80.9%	90.0%	76.6%	73.7%	87.3%	67.0%
Sample size	192	57	59	152	190	47	133	63	103

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Italy. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E19: Japan: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	LDP	CDP	Nippon Ishin no Kai	Komeito	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	59.8%	75.3%	69.2%	58.0%	46.7%	63.7%	40.2%
Domest. redist (%)	54.7%	71.4%	58.9%	68.0%	55.3%	67.5%	48.9%
Sample size	428	154	146	50	351	80	92

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Japan. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E20: Malaysia: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Pakatan Harapan	Perikatan Nasional	Barisan Nasional	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	79.3%	80.1%	80.2%	59.2%	61.3%	55.5%
Domest. redist (%)	78.3%	82.5%	77.6%	66.3%	71.0%	68.1%
Sample size	576	291	192	98	31	119

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Malaysia. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E21: Mexico: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo (Juntos Hacemos Historia)	Bertha Xóchitl Gálvez Ruiz (Va por México)	Jorge Álvarez Máynez (Movimiento Ciudadano)	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	68.5%	53.3%	48.4%	50.5%	57.4%
Domest. redist (%)	79.6%	62.3%	76.9%	60.8%	57.4%
Sample size	514	244	91	97	54

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Mexico. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E22: Netherlands: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	PVV	GroenLinks-PvdA	VVD	NSC	D66	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	73.3%	86.2%	68.1%	85.9%	83.9%	62.0%	84.0%	72.9%
Domest. redist (%)	54.4%	85.1%	28.4%	69.4%	62.5%	58.7%	69.1%	60.4%
Sample size	206	174	116	85	56	121	194	48

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Netherlands. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E23: New Zealand: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	National Party	Labour Party	Green Party	ACT New Zealand	New Zealand First Party	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	61.9%	76.0%	91.5%	51.9%	69.6%	62.2%	66.7%
Domest. redist (%)	41.9%	70.7%	83.1%	31.2%	55.4%	62.2%	56.4%
Sample size	315	304	118	77	56	90	39

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in New Zealand. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E24: Norway: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Høyre (H)	Arbeider-partiet (Ap)	Frem-skrittspar-tiet (Frp)	Senter-partiet (SP)	Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV)	Ven-stre (V)	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	58.2%	75.0%	52.8%	73.7%	93.0%	74.2%	56.7%	75.9%	64.3%
Domest. redist (%)	32.3%	68.1%	45.4%	67.1%	88.0%	64.5%	56.7%	73.0%	35.7%
Sample size	201	160	108	76	100	31	120	174	28

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Norway. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E25: Pakistan: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	PTI	PML-N	PPP	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	77.1%	84.0%	71.0%	73.3%	74.7%	59.1%
Domest. redist (%)	84.4%	85.5%	74.2%	78.8%	77.3%	71.3%
Sample size	582	131	31	236	75	115

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Pakistan. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E26: Philippines: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Bongbong Marcos (PFP)	Leni Robredo (IND)	Manny Pacquiao (PROMDI)	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	75.4%	76.4%	87.5%	68.1%	59.4%	45.9%
Domest. redist (%)	79.8%	83.6%	70.0%	77.3%	72.5%	70.3%
Sample size	699	335	40	119	69	37

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Philippines. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E27: Poland: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)	Koalicja Obywatelska (KO)	Lewica	Trzecia Droga (TD)	Kon-feder-acja	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	63.9%	61.2%	69.1%	63.0%	41.1%	35.9%	53.3%	35.3%
Domest. redist (%)	64.9%	47.7%	57.7%	46.2%	42.2%	48.7%	60.0%	47.1%
Sample size	191	369	149	119	90	117	15	51

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Poland. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E28: Portugal: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Partido Socialista (PS)	Chega! (CH)	Aliança Democrática	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	85.1%	70.8%	78.5%	55.4%	82.1%	53.2%
Domest. redist (%)	87.7%	81.6%	79.5%	72.3%	79.7%	80.9%
Sample size	261	185	200	101	207	47

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Portugal. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E29: Romania: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	PSD	PNL	USR PLUS	AUR	UDMR	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	75.2%	76.6%	72.4%	60.0%	84.0%	64.3%	76.3%	62.5%
Domest. redist (%)	76.4%	75.4%	68.5%	78.7%	80.0%	70.5%	81.6%	62.5%
Sample size	250	252	181	75	25	129	38	48

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Romania. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E30: Slovakia: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Ivan Korčok	Peter Pellegrini (Hlas–SD)	Štefan Harabin	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	64.5%	68.2%	66.2%	57.6%	76.2%	44.4%
Domest. redist (%)	62.1%	72.1%	67.7%	57.6%	61.9%	55.6%
Sample size	377	362	65	158	21	18

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Slovakia. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E31: South Africa: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	African National Congress (ANC)	Demokratiese Alliansie (DA)	Spies van die Nasie (M.K.)	Ekonomiese Vryheidsvegters (EFF)	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	71.9%	70.4%	75.5%	75.5%	63.4%	69.6%	46.4%
Domest. redist (%)	71.6%	62.0%	79.2%	69.2%	64.9%	66.7%	64.3%
Sample size	327	432	106	143	131	102	56

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in South Africa. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E32: South Korea: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	DPK	PPP	Rebuilding Korea Party	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	71.2%	56.7%	75.0%	47.3%	51.3%	46.9%
Domest. redist (%)	80.0%	66.4%	91.7%	64.1%	79.5%	60.2%
Sample size	556	381	48	167	39	113

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in South Korea. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E33: Spain: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Partido Popular (PP)	PSOE	VOX	SUMAR	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	56.3%	81.0%	51.1%	86.7%	58.6%	77.4%	55.6%
Domest. redist (%)	57.2%	82.6%	54.3%	84.3%	64.3%	84.0%	73.3%
Sample size	229	305	94	83	140	106	45

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Spain. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E34: Sweden: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Social Democrats	Sweden Democrats	Moderates	Left Party	Center Party	Christian Democrats	Greens	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	80.4%	60.6%	50.7%	91.5%	65.7%	54.4%	82.1%	57.1%	78.9%	50.0%
Domest. redist (%)	77.9%	45.7%	34.5%	96.2%	61.2%	38.2%	83.9%	50.0%	62.0%	46.2%
Sample size	276	175	229	106	67	68	56	56	71	52

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Sweden. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E35: Taiwan: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	DPP	KMT	Independent candidates	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	75.1%	70.9%	68.5%	68.4%	48.1%
Domest. redist (%)	67.5%	76.7%	69.9%	66.2%	64.2%
Sample size	381	347	216	272	81

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Taiwan. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E36: Thailand: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Move Forward	Pheu Thai	United Thai Nation	I did not vote	Other	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	80.2%	79.1%	83.2%	60.0%	88.5%	52.1%
Domest. redist (%)	84.6%	85.4%	83.2%	73.6%	86.5%	73.1%
Sample size	635	287	125	110	52	119

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Thailand. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E37: Turkey: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)	Yeniden Refah Partisi (YRP)	Demokrat Parti (DP)	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	76.2%	76.9%	77.8%	85.7%	68.9%	64.7%
Domest. redist (%)	89.1%	82.1%	77.8%	64.3%	77.0%	76.5%
Sample size	705	312	27	14	122	119

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in Turkey. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".

Table E38: United States: Support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across parties

	Joseph R. Biden (Democrat)	Donald J. Trump (Republican)	I did not vote	Prefer not to answer
Global tax (%)	75.6%	52.7%	58.1%	52.2%
Domest. redist (%)	65.1%	32.9%	45.6%	45.7%
Sample size	390	347	217	46

Note. This table reports the support for the global tax and domestic redistribution across political parties in United States. See Table A.9 for more on the political parties and election. Support for the globally coordinated billionaire tax is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support" a globally coordinated policy that "*would require those with a wealth exceeding US $1 billion, or the approximately 3000 richest individuals in the world, to pay a minimum of 2% of their wealth in taxes every year*". Support for broad domestic redistribution is defined as the respondent indicating that they either "Somewhat agree" or "Strongly agree" with the statement that "*The government should reduce income inequalities in society*".