Women in Editorial Boards: An Investigation of Female Representation in Top Economic Journals*

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Abstract

We study the evolution of female representation in editorial roles for 15 top journals in economics from 1960 to 2019. We first document that the share of women in editorial roles has steadily increased over the past six decades. Second, we investigate whether this increase is due to an expansion of the pool of qualified female economists, or due to a change in the preference for appointing women. We find evidence for both using a large database on detailed CVs of more than 37,000 economists. Third, we study the implications of female editors on topic diversity, the quality of accepted papers and potential trickle down effects on female authors' publishing prospects. Finally, to understand whether there are gender gaps in the probability of being offered and/or of accepting editorial positions, we administer a large-scale survey among most prominent scholars in economics. We only find evidence for the offering channel.

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1 Introduction

Despite considerable progress in recent decades, women continue to be underrepresented in the field of economics (Lundberg and Stearns, 2019). As documented for more than 200 top research institutions in economics, only 25% of senior economists and 37% of junior economists are female (Auriol et al., 2022). Prior evidence suggests that women may face hurdles in their academic careers, such as disadvantages in promotions (Ginther and Kahn, 2021), insufficient recognition of co-authorship (Sarsons, 2017), a hostile climate (Wu, 2020), and higher standards when publishing (Card et al., 2020; Hengel, 2022).

Journal editors play a key role in determining which type of research gets published. Given the strong evidence that female and male researchers have different preferences for research topics (evidence exists at the undergraduate level, Beneito et al. 2021; PhD level, Fortin et al. 2021; as well as at the advanced research level, Dolado et al. 2012; Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham 2017; Ayarza and Iriberri 2024), an adequate representation of women on editorial boards may be crucial for ensuring the publication of topics particularly relevant to female economists.

In this paper we investigate whether the process leading to the appointment of journal editors in economics has been gender neutral in the past 60 years, and if not, its implications for the profession. We distinguish between two important editorial roles that journals publish in their front pages: editors (including co-editors) and associate editors. Editors select referees and ultimately decide which papers are being published, therefore shaping the frontier of knowledge in the economic science. Associate editors commit to providing a high number of reviews per year, thereby serving as the primary source of referee reports. In light of the importance of editorial tasks, studying whether equally qualified male and female scholars have had the same likelihood of holding these positions is pressing, both from an efficiency and fairness point of view.

Despite the relevance of this question, scientific research has made little progress beyond

measuring the share of women in editorial boards. In various fields, such as psychology, neuroscience, medicine, political science and mathematics, studies have documented that the presence of women in editorial positions is far from parity (Palser et al., 2022; Amrein et al., 2011; Stegmaier et al., 2011; Topaz and Sen, 2016), which is probably not too surprising given that women are strongly under-represented in the pool of active researchers in many of these fields (Ceci and Williams, 2011; Commission, 2021). For a large sample of economics journals, Baccini and Re (2024) also document similar gender patterns on editorial boards, next to exploring geographical and institutional affiliation. While measuring female representation in editorial roles is an important starting point, this paper takes a significant step forward by investigating whether female and male economists with similar academic profiles and qualifications have had the same probability of getting appointed to editorial roles.

To answer this question, we hand-collected information on editorial positions for the most prestigious economic journals and combine it with a large dataset on dynamically evolving CVs of active economists, created by Card et al. (2022). We cover more than 37,000 economists from the year of their first publication until 11 years after their last publication (or their death) and measure on a yearly basis: the number of publications in each of 36 high-impact journals (see Appendix Table A1 for the complete list of journals), as well as the number of cites accumulated by publications in the top-5 journals (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *Journal of Political Economy*, *American Economic Review*, *Review of Economic Studies* and *Econometrica*). For all active economists in year t, we pose the question: conditional on academic CV (cumulative publications in each journal, cites for the top-5 journals, and years since first publication as a proxy for academic age), does gender play any role for getting appointed to an editorial role in the most prestigious economic journals?

We distinguish in our analysis between the top-5 journals plus three important general interest journals (*Economic Journal*, *Review of Economics and Statistics* and *Journal of the European Economic Association*), which we refer to as the *top-8 general interest journals*, and seven major top-field journals (*Journal of Finance*, *Journal of Monetary Economics*,

Journal of Economic Theory, *Journal of Econometrics*, *Journal of Development Economics*, *Journal of Public Economics* and *Journal of Labour Economics*).[1]

Consistent with prior evidence from different disciplines, our raw data indicate that, despite an increasing female presence on editorial boards, women only hold a minority of editorial positions in economic journals. However, conditional on academic CV, we do not find any evidence that women had a lower likelihood of being selected in editorial boards. For the top-8 general interest journals, starting from the 1980s, we even find that women had significantly higher chances to get appointed for an editorial position, a phenomenon to which we will refer as *over-selection*.[2] Over-selection is mostly observed and largest in magnitude in the role of associate editors (women being almost 3 times more likely to be appointed in the 80s, 1.5 times more likely in the 2000s and 1.3 times more likely in the 2010s). For the role of editors, we only observe over-selection in the last decade, and although lower in magnitude, it is still substantive (women being almost 2 times more likely to be appointed). However, for the role of editor in 2010s, the effect becomes insignificant once we control for their experience as associate editors, which is an important determinant for becoming editor. In contrast, we cannot rule out that the selection process at top-field journals has always been gender-neutral conditional on academic CV.

Additional results show that we do not observe any gender differences in the duration in editorial positions, which consequently translates into a higher conditional representation of women at the top-8 journals (and no gender differences at top-field journals). Also, and consistent with previous findings, connections to editors via co-authorship are important determinants for selection into editorial roles (see Card et al. 2022 for becoming Fellow of the Econometric Society, and Colussi 2018, Ductor and Visser 2022 and Carrell et al. 2024 for publishing). However, our results are robust to controlling for network effects. Finally,

[1]We exclude the AEJ journals, as well as *Theoretical Economics* and *Quantitative Economics* as they were founded very recently (2009, 2006 and 2010, respectively). From now on we will use abbreviations (see Appendix Table A2) to refer to the journals.

[2]Note that over-selection based on CV may not imply favoritism, if, for example, there are publishing hurdles for females. We will provide a careful interpretation of the results later on.

note also that the observed gender differences are a priori compatible with general interest journals looking for field diversity. To address whether general interest journals are looking for field or gender diversity, we test whether gender differences in selection persist, even when controlling for predicted selection based on authors' previous publication titles (as a proxy for field and topic). We find that field diversity does play a role but is not the main reason behind the over-selection of women into editorial positions in the top-8 journals.

What are the possible interpretations behind the observed over-selection of women? First, given the evidence that female researchers face certain barriers in the publishing process (Card et al., 2020; Hengel, 2022), it is possible that publication and citation accomplishments under-estimate the quality of female scholars. If directors of journals take this into account when inviting scholars to take up editorial positions, this could explain the over-selection of women (see Bohren et al. (2019) for a theoretical argument). Second, female scholars could also outperform men in personal characteristics (i.e. diligence) that are better suited for editorial roles; or alternatively, journal directors *expect* female scholars to outperform men. This channel could then explain over-selection of women as well. Importantly, these two explanations (gender-biased CVs and unobserved characteristics) are consistent with over-selection of women, but may not imply favoritism of female researchers in the allocation of editorial positions. Finally, general interest journals may simply appoint women in order to get more gender balanced editorial boards, for example due to a taste for diversity.

What are the implications of having more gender diverse editorial boards? Using the sample of published papers for which we know the editors' name, we examine three potential implications of having female editors: diversity in topics and subfields, quality of publications and trickle-down effects on female authors. We are aware, however, that establishing causality is not possible due to non-random assignment of papers to editors and non-random selection of editors. First, we demonstrate that the topics of accepted papers, as indicated by the detailed JEL code classification and the words used in abstracts, differ considerably by the gender of the editor-in-charge. We complement this analysis by showing that having female

scholars entering editorial boards is associated with an increase in topic diversity within journals. Second, using ex-post accumulated citations as a proxy for quality, we show that conditional on factors influencing the citation count of a paper (e.g. 2-digit JEL codes), female editors perform just as well as their male colleagues in maximizing the citation count of their journal. Third, female editors are not more likely to publish papers by female authors, once we control for paper characteristics such as JEL codes. We conclude that having more female editors can help women get published, even though merely through the field in which they are active. Finally, we also test for the potential consequences on those authors who hold editorial positions: on their own research productivity. Performing an event study, we find that, while serving editorial positions, research productivity, measured by the number of published papers by year, goes down by 0.7. Even though we do not find differential effects by gender, the observed over-selection of women implies higher productivity losses for female scholars in the short run.

In the last part of the paper, we take a first step to understand better different aspects of editorial work, by using a large-scale survey administered to a sample of prominent economists. In particular, we wonder whether the higher presence of women in editorial positions (conditional on their CVs) is the result of a larger likelihood of being *offered* an editorial position, or of a higher propensity to *accept* a given offer. The survey allows us to distinguish between these two competing mechanisms.[3] With more than 1,000 obtained responses, we find that female economists were more likely to be offered editorial positions conditional on demographic characteristics. On the other hand, women did *not* exhibit a greater acceptance rate for a given offer. Moreover, the survey also allows us to understand potential gender differences in motivations to accept or reject those positions, as well as gender gaps in the difficulties and time devoted to editorial work.

Our paper contributes to a small but growing literature investigating the role of gender in various domains in economics: in the publication process (Card et al., 2020; Hengel, 2022); in

[3]To deal with possible response bias, we use the weekdays of the survey as well as the number of reminders sent as instruments in a Heckman correction model.

conference acceptance rates (Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2017; Hospido and Sanz, 2021); in getting authorship in research teams (Ross et al., 2022); in the recognition of co-authored work (Sarsons et al., 2021); in job applications and promotions (Casarico and Rizzica, 2022; Hospido et al., 2022; Eberhardt et al., 2023); in teaching evaluations (Boring, 2017; Mengel et al., 2019); in the general climate in the profession (Wu, 2020; Dupas et al., 2021; Handlan and Sheng, 2023; Seré, 2023); in visibility (Venus, 2024); in citation patterns (Koffi, 2021); and in peer recognition (Card et al., 2022, 2023).

However, the empirical evidence on gender disparities in editorial boards of academic journals is so far very limited. As mentioned before, there are a handful of studies mostly from disciplines outside economics, which measure the share of women in editorial boards. Lacking detailed data on research performance, these studies are confined to comparing female representation in editorial boards to the share of women in a reference population. Addis and Villa (2003) is one exception in the field of economics. Their paper, however, is confined to Italian journals and merely measures the female share among editorial board members, comparing it with the proportion of women among faculty members in Italy. Another approach, followed by Johannesen and Muchardt (2024), is to focus *only* on already appointed editors and to compare the academic achievements between men and women at the time of this career step. Their study, although including a larger set of journals, is limited to the role of editors and the years 2004-2022. In contrast, we take a historical perspective going back to the 60s, and also distinguish between different editorial roles. More importantly, our paper uses detailed publication and citation data for a large pool of potential candidates (the risk set) for editorial positions. This allows us to see whether researchers (e.g. men and women) with the same academic achievement had the same election probabilities.[4] Apart from the different identification strategy, we condition on more factors potentially relevant

[4]An example illustrates why it is important to consider selected and non-selected candidates: assume that female and male editors are equal in terms of academic achievement, but that in the pool of non-selected researchers, there are female researchers with equal (or better) achievements than the editors (while non-selected male researchers have worse CVs than the editors). In this case, our approach correctly identifies a disadvantage for women, while the approach in Johannesen and Muchardt (2024) does not estimate any gender differences.

for editorial appointments: scientific contributions as measured by publication records and citations, academic age, academic field and connections to editors through co-authorship, all of which are important determinants for qualifying for such positions. Finally, our study is broader in that we also discuss the implications of a higher presence of women in editorial roles, and elaborate on various aspects of editor work through a large-scale survey.

The subsequent sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data sources and contains details on how we obtained and classified information on editorial positions. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics on economists in editorial roles and documents the development of the unconditional female representation among editorial roles over time. Section 4 presents estimates of the conditional gender gap in selection, including a series of robustness and additional results. Section 5 tests for the implications of having female scholars in editorial roles. Section 6 presents survey evidence. Finally, section 7 concludes and discusses a series of explanations for the observed results.

2 Data

We combine data on editorial positions which we hand-collected from the front pages of the most relevant journals in economics (15 journals in total) with data on a large sample of actively publishing economists, hereafter referred to as the *publication dataset* (Card et al., 2022).

2.1 Editorial Positions

For each of the 15 journals we consider, we manually collected the names of all scholars holding editorial positions from the front matter pages of each issue with editorial information. This allows us to keep track of when they were appointed and for how long they kept the position. The journals we consider are the top-5 plus three general interest journals (QJE, JPE, AER, REStud, ECMA, EJ, REStat and JEEA), as well as seven top-field journals (JDE, JME, JF, JEc, JOLE, JET and JPubE). The top-field journals were selected such that, on the one hand, a variety of fields and, on the other hand, both fields with a stronger male

and female representation are included. We cover the years from the start of each journal up to 2019, the last year in our publication dataset.

Since titles of editorial roles differ across journals and years, we classify editorial positions according to their main tasks. We distinguish between two types of roles. First, editors (including co-editors) select referees and make final decisions upon the acceptance of a paper. Second, associate editors commit to writing a larger number of referee reports each year. General interest top-8 journals typically follow this structure. Some of the field journals have a different organizational structure and were classified according to the logic above. The exact mapping between editorial titles and roles is documented in the Appendix Table A2.

All scholars in editorial positions were then matched to the publication dataset. Fewer than 5% of authors holding editorial positions at top-8 and less than 3% of those holding positions at top-field journals could not be matched to authors in the publication dataset.[5]

2.2 Publication Records and Citations

Card et al. (2022) contain publication and citation data for over 40,000 economists over time. This allows us to construct dynamically evolving CVs for all economists in our sample. For each author and year, we observe the number of publications in each of 36 journals (see Appendix Table A1 for the complete list of journals) and the number of citations in each of the top-5 journals. In this dataset we observe the titles of publications (but not the abstracts), as well as the coauthors in each of the publications (but not institutional affiliations). This dataset also includes the identification of gender of all authors, as described in detail in Figure 1 Online Appendix at Card et al. (2020) and validated as shown in Online Appendix A1 at Card et al. (2022). Authors are included starting from the year of their first publication, up to 11 years after their last publication or upon their death.[6]

[5]These percentages include two cases: 1) names that are not at all contained in the publication dataset and 2) names that could not be matched for all the years in which they were holding editorial positions.

[6]The large majority of authors, slightly over 90%, hold editorial roles while they are actively publishing. However, a still relevant fraction holds those positions after their last publication in the set of 36 journals. We chose the threshold of +11 years, such that we only leave out 1% of the editorial positions. Results are robust when considering different thresholds. Additional analysis (available upon request) confirms that the results remain robust when reducing the threshold to include authors up to five years after their last

2.3 Connections to Editors

To control for network effects, we create a measure of connections based on the paper-level data used to build the dataset in Card et al. (2022). For each journal, the variable indicates whether the author has, up to a given year, co-authored a paper with a current editor or associate editor of that journal. This variable increases by 1 in the year in which a (previous or current) co-author becomes editor or associate editor for a given journal, or in which the economist co-authors for the first time with a current editor or associate editor, and decreases by 1 as soon as the co-author leaves the editorial position.[7]

3 Descriptive Statistics

3.1 Number of Economists in Editorial Positions

Figure 1 shows the number of economists in our sample who were editor or associate editor at any of the journals considered (top panel), at any top-8 (lower left panel), and at any of the field journals (lower right panel).[8] Up to the 1930s, the number of economists serving as editors and associate editors remained stable and below ten. The foundation of REStud and ECMA (both in 1933) and the re-launch of REStat (in 1936) initiated a significant increase in the number of economists in editorial positions. In the late 1940s the number of editors experienced a slight decrease due to an organizational switch at REStat, while the number of associate editor positions began a steady ascent.

Starting from the 1960s, also the number of economists serving as editors began rising continuously, fueled by the introduction of several field journals. Since the 1950s, the total

publication or when excluding all authors who were not actively publishing in that year.

[7]Therefore, we measure the extensive margin i.e. the number of journals to which an author is connected through co-authoring with a member of the editorial board, but not the intensive margin, i.e. the *number* of co-authors through whom an author is connected to a particular journal.

[8]The total number of editor and associate editor positions is shown in Appendix Figure A1. Note that in Figure 1 the unit of observation is the economist in our sample while in Appendix Figure A1 the unit of observation is the position. Therefore, if the same economist occupies two positions, these positions are counted twice in Appendix Figure A1 but only once in Figure 1. Furthermore, Appendix Figure A1 also includes positions occupied by economists who could not be matched to our sample or whose gender is indeterminate.

number of editors has consistently stayed below the number of associate editors. This is driven by the top-8 journals, all of which gradually introduced associate editors over time. In contrast, top-field journals relied predominantly on editors, with only two out of the seven journals having associate editors. Since both the count of editors and associate editors was steadily increasing since 1960, we choose this year as the starting point of our analysis.

3.2 Summary Statistics on Editors and Associate Editors

Table 1 reports summary statistics on economists for those years in which they were actively serving as editors or associate editors at least at one of the top-8 general interest journals. In the last 20 years, men in editorial roles in the top-8 journals had on average more top-5 publications (across all journals) than women. For both editors and associate editors, the gender difference is smallest at the QJE and largest at ECMA. A similar picture arises from the number of citations of top-5 publications at all journals except for the QJE, in which female editors are cited more frequently than male editors. Turning to publications outside the top-5, the gender gap is largest in theory journals, and even reversed in field journals of development, health, labor and public economics. Women in editorial roles are on average academically younger than men.

Table 2 shows the summary statistics on economists for those years in which they were editors or associate editors at the top-field journals. We observe very similar patterns in publications as for the editors and associate editors in the top-8 journals, even though they have on average fewer publications than the authors in editorial positions in top-8 journals. While the average male scholar was more than 9 years younger than his female counterparts in the 1960s and 1970s, this pattern has since reversed, with female editors now being, on average, around 4 years younger than male editors. A similar trend can be observed for associate editors at top-field journals.

3.3 Female Share among Actively Publishing Economists, Editors and Associate Editors

Clearly, the sample of editors is a highly selected sample. Summary statistics on the pool of actively publishing economists (Appendix Table A3) show that very few economists hold editorial positions in the most relevant 15 journals in economics. By gender, the likelihood for a male economist to be editor remained relatively stable around 1.8%, while for female economists it increased from 0.6% to 0.9%. At the same time, men's probability to serve as associate editor decreased over time, from 3.2% to 2.0% in the last two decades, whereas women's remained constant over time at around 1.5%.

Figure 2a shows how the proportion of women in the pool of actively publishing economists (green line) has developed over time. While in the 60s, the share of women among active economists was around 5 percent, it steadily increased up to more than 20 percent by 2020. Did the development of women in editorial positions follow the overall increase in the share of women among active researchers? Figure 2a shows two main patterns with respect to the female share among editorial roles. First, the share of women in both editor and associate editor positions (blue and red lines, respectively) started to increase steadily, and at an accelerated pace around the year 2000. Second, the female share among the associate editors has been consistently above the female share among the editors since the 1970s. Figure 2b and 2c further split the female share of editorial positions by journal type. The two main patterns remain but with a few distinctive features. For top-general interest journals, the female share among editors shows a higher increase from 2010, reaching almost the female share among associate editors by 2019. For top-field journals, the female share for the two editorial positions have shown a similar level and increasing trend until 2000 but after 2000 the female share among associate editors shows a steeper trend compared to the editors.

How does the development of the share of women in editorial positions compare with the share of female researchers in the pool of potential editors? Note that we cannot simply compare the share of female editors (blue and red lines) with the share of active researchers (green line) in Figure 2a. Journal editors have much stronger CVs than the average economist

(compare the number of publications of editors and associate editors, Tables 1 and 2, with the publications of active economists, Appendix Table A3). To get a better benchmark for the economists with CVs more similar to actual editors, we plot the female share among the more prominent economists (with at least 3 top-5 publications - brown line). As documented in Card et al. (2022) and Ayarza and Iriberri (2024), the share of female economists decreases the more we restrict the journal sample to higher quality journals.

Figure 2a shows that in the 70s the share of female economists holding positions as editors or associate editors started off from the same level as the female share of economists with at least three top-5 publications. Subsequently, the proportion of women in associate editor roles exhibited a steeper increase compared to the proportion of women among highly published economists. A similar trend was observed for editors around the mid-1990s. Hence, this simple benchmark shows that women, if anything, have been over-represented in editorial positions, specifically among associate editors since the 70s and among editors since 2000.

While suggestive, we cannot rule out that other factors such as academic age or varying impacts of the number of publications by journal might explain the over-representation of women in editorial positions evident in our descriptive analysis. We therefore proceed by rigorously conditioning on the researchers' academic CVs in the regression analysis in the subsequent section.

4 Main Results: Gender and Selection into Editorial Roles

4.1 Methodology

In the main analysis, we focus on the role of gender in the selection of economists into editorial positions. We construct an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist is first appointed as editor or associate editor and 0 otherwise. Then we predict this indicator variable conditional on authors' gender as well as their publication record, impact as measured by the number of citations, and academic age.[9] This yields an estimate of the conditional

[9]This specification is a discrete-time approximation of the Cox hazard model (Efron, 1988).

gender gap in selection i.e. whether women are, conditional on their academic CV, equally likely to be selected into an editorial position compared to their male colleagues. In other words, we estimate

$$Y_{it} = G(\alpha + \beta F_i + \gamma X_{it} + \delta_t) + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where $Y_{it} = 1$ if i is first appointed as editor or associate editor in year t and 0 otherwise, F_i is an indicator equal to 1 if author i is female, X_{it} is a set of variables controlling for author i's academic CV in year t and δ_t are year fixed-effects. We estimate regression 1 as a logistic model, i.e. $G()$ is a logistic function, and cluster standard errors at the author-level. We restrict the sample to those economists at risk i.e. who have never been in an editorial position up to the year before in a given set of journals. To allow the controls to have varying effects over time, we estimate the model separately for the years 1960–1979, 1980–1999 and 2000–2019.

For each sample period, we present three specifications. First, we control for the cumulative number of publications in the top-5 journals and year fixed-effects. Next, we additionally condition on the number of publications in all other 31 journals and the number of citations in the top-5 journals.[10] In the third specification, we add non-parametric controls for the number of top-5 publications and, as a proxy for academic age, the number of years since first publication. We always report the estimates from the latent variable model, along with standard errors in parenthesis.

4.2 Baseline Results: Role of Gender in Selection

We start with the top-8 general interest journals. Our main finding shown in Table 3 is clear: We do not find any indication that female economists were less likely to be appointed to editorial positions, compared to their male colleagues, conditional on their academic CV. Independent of the set of controls and sample period we consider, the point estimates of the

[10]For the number of citations, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (asinh) to approximate the natural logarithm while allowing for zeros. For $x > 2$, $asinh(x) \approx \ln(2x)$.

gender indicator are never significantly negative. To the contrary, in the most comprehensive specification (columns 3, 6 and 9) we even find evidence for a significant over-selection of female economists in editorial positions in the 1980s and from 2000 onwards, once controlling for academic achievements and academic age.

To give some interpretation to the coefficients, take the estimated gender effects for the period 2000 to 2009 (0.388; SE = 0.168), and period 2010 to 2019 (0.314; SE = 0.144) in column 9. These coefficients imply that in the period 2000-2009, a female candidate is $\exp(0.388) = 1.47$ times more likely to be elected than a male with the same publication and citation record, whereas this ratio is $\exp(0.314) = 1.37$ for the period 2010-2019.

With respect to the other variables, and as expected, the number of top-5 publications is a strong predictor of selection. Particularly in the first specification, in which we – other than on publications – only condition on year fixed effects (columns 1, 4 and 7), these coefficients are strongly associated with a higher probability of being appointed to an editorial position in the top-8 general interest journals. When adding more controls, their individual influence vanishes and citation counts are the most important determinants, particularly in the last two decades. Finally, when we introduce non-parametric controls for the total number of top-5 publications (columns 3, 6 and 9), these take up a lot of predictive power and help us to further improve our model fit.

Overall, conditional on academic performance, women have been over-selected into editorial roles, but there could be heterogeneity among the different positions. Indeed, differentiating by editorial role, (Table 5, upper part), we see that women were significantly more likely to be selected into associate editor positions in the 1980s (almost 3 times more likely to be selected) and from 2000 onward (1.5 times more likely in the 2000s and 1.3 times more likely in the 2010s). For the role of editor, we only observe over-selection for the very last decade, the 2010s (almost 2 times more likely to be selected). However, when we control for their previous experience as associate editors in predicting selection as editor, the effect loses significance (Table 5, lower part).

Finally, we repeat these baseline estimations for each of the top-8 journals separately over the last two decades. Appendix Table A4 shows that the significant conditional over-selection of female candidates was particularly evident across four (AER, QJE, EJ and REStat) of the top-8 journals.

We perform exactly the same analyses for the top-field journals as well. Table 4 reports the predictors of selection at any of the top-field journals we consider. When only conditioning on the number of publications in each of the top-5 journals, women appear to be significantly under-selected in the 90s and 2010s. However, once we add more controls such as citations, this conditional under-selection vanishes. Table 6 shows that this result holds when separating for editor and associate editor positions. Finally, re-estimating the most comprehensive specification for each journal separately from 2000 to 2019 (see Appendix Table A5) we do not find any gender differences in selection probabilities for any of the top-field journals.

4.3 Additional Results and Robustness

In this section we provide results on additional outcomes: duration in editorial roles, and representation. Also, we provide robustness tests on the main baseline results we found in Tables 3 and 4, when adding additional controls.

4.3.1 Gender Differences in the Duration of Editorial Services and Representation

We found that women were conditionally over-selected for editorial positions in general interest journals, but we could not rule out gender neutrality for appointments in top field journals. What about the duration in editorial services? If men and women differ in their time serving for these editorial roles this could affect male and female representation in the journals.

Appendix Tables A6 and A7 show the results for the outcome of duration in holding editorial roles. For the top-8 journals, shown in Appendix Table A6, conditioning on the same sets of controls as for selection, we find that from the 1960s up to the 1990s women served for fewer years than men. However, only in the 1980s the gender differences in duration are

significantly different from 0 at the 10% level. Therefore, even though women were quite heavily over-selected in the 1980s (Table 3), they served on average around fewer 1.7 years than men. In contrast, for the 2000s we find a conditional over-selection of female economists, but no evidence for gender differences in the duration. Finally, for the top-field journals, there are no significant gender differences in the duration in editorial roles (see Appendix Table A7).

In the next step, we examine the gender gap in the representation on editorial boards i.e. we now set the dependent variable equal to 1 if author i is editor or associate editor in year t and 0 otherwise. Appendix Table A8 shows that - as expected, the conditional over-selection of women translates into an over-representation of women on editorial boards of the top-8 journals from the 1980s onwards. Similar to the results regarding selection, we do not observe any gender differences in representation at top-field journals (Appendix Table A9).

4.3.2 Role of Connections to Authors in Editorial Positions

One potential threat to the validity of the baseline results presented above could be that, for the likelihood to be offered an editorial position, not only the publication record matters, but also one's connections to authors holding editorial roles. If there are gender differences in connections, and connections affect editorial appointments, omitting a measure of connections would bias the gender coefficients in the baseline regressions.

Appendix Table A10 allows comparing the estimates from the most comprehensive specification in Table 3 with one conditioning additionally on connections. As a measure of connection we use the number of journals among the top-8 journals with which the economist is connected through co-authorship. To account for varying degrees of power in connections, we differentiate between connections to editors and associate editors.

Undoubtedly, connections play a significant role. Since the 1980s the number of journals an author is connected with, has been strongly positively associated with being selected for an editorial position. Furthermore, and notably, connections to editors matter much more

than connections to associate editors. However, including measures for connections hardly changes the conditional gender gap in selection. Similar patterns emerge when predicting selection at the top-field journals we consider, confirming that gender did not play any role in the probability of being appointed editor or associate editor at top-field journals (see Appendix Table A11).

4.3.3 Gender or Field Diversity?

The conditional over-selection of women into editorial positions, as documented above, can be driven by two motives: On the one hand, journals might aim to increase gender diversity by appointing female candidates. On the other hand, considering that female economists tend to specialize in different fields, journals might also over-select women to enhance their expertise in specific topics.

To determine the extent to which these factors are at play, we compare male and female candidates with the same selection probability predicted based on their research topic. Since we do not have JEL codes for all papers in our publication dataset, we follow a similar approach as Iaria et al. (2022). We predict selection into editorial roles based on words in the titles of previous publications as if the researcher would be male, and then use the predicted selection probabilities as additional control variables. In other words, we control for differences in selection probabilities driven by field differences across gender. If gender differences in selection persist, this indicates that field is not the only factor behind the over-selection of women into editorial positions.

To estimate the selection probabilities we first concatenate the titles of each researcher by decade. The words in the titles are stemmed, cleaned from stopwords[11], vectorized into uni- and bi-grams and re-weighted by inverse document-frequency. For each decade, we then regress a dummy indicating selection in decade $d+1$ based on the titles of a researcher in the previous decade d. We combine a logistic model with lasso regularization to reduce the

[11]The stopwords are listed in Appendix Table A12.

dimensionality of the vectorized set of titles. To find the optimal regularization parameter, we use 10-fold cross-validation choosing the model with the best performance based on McFadden's Pseudo-Rsquared.[12] The model is trained separately for selection at the top-8 and top-field journals for each decade from the 1960s to the 2010s based on the male sample.

The top-10 predictors of selection by journal type and decade are reported in Appendix Table A14. As an example, top keywords indicate a shift of importance from (classical) *keynesian* models in the 1960s and 1970s, to *input-output* analysis in the 1980s, monetary macro topics such as *exchange rates* and *monetary policy* in the 1990s and 2000s, and finally to non-*parametric* estimation of *marginal* effects in the 2010s. Similarly, the importance of research topics for predicting selection at the top-field journals (lower panel of Appendix Table A14) has changed in an expected way. The top-predictors by journal are reported in Appendix Table A15.

Next, we use the predictors obtained from the male sample, to predict selection separately by decade and journal type for all researchers in our sample. This is a measure of the predicted likelihood to be selected into an editorial position based on authors' research field (proxied by the titles of their publications), evaluated as if they were male. Table A16 replicates the main results of Table 3, additionally conditioning on predicted selection probabilities based on field. This reduces the estimate of the gender indicator in the 1990s and 2000s, making the gender differences in selection in the 2000s statistically not differentiable from zero. The over-selection in the 1980s and 2010s, however, remains significant.

As such, we conclude that field differences between male and female editors were not the only reason for the recent over-selection of women into editorial roles. For top-field journals (Table A17), on the other hand, conditioning on predicted selection probabilities based on field does not affect the main results: We find no evidence for gender-differences in selection across any specification and decade.

[12]The optimal regularization parameters and in- and out-of-sample performance of the trained model are shown in Appendix Table A13.

4.3.4 Summary of the Robustness of the Role of Gender

Figure 3 and Table A18 summarize the robustness of the main results when controlling for connections and field. As can be observed from the central figure in Figure 3, diversity of topics matters, and makes the female coefficient in the 2000s insignificant, while leaving the female coefficients for the other decades unchanged. Also, as shown by the right figure of Figure 3, additionally controlling for connections hardly changes the estimated gender dummies, suggesting that even though connections clearly matter (Table A18), they do not work differently for men and women.

In sum, we conclude that women were conditionally over-selected in editorial roles for general interest journals, mostly happening in the role of associate editors, in particular for the 80s and the 2010s. For top-field journals, on the other hand, appointments into editorial roles appear gender neutral.

5 Potential Impact of Women in Editorial Roles

A natural question that arises from the results above is: Which implications does the conditional over-representation of women at top-8 journals have for the journals and for the profession? We explore three of these implications: diversity in topics of published research, quality of published research, and potential trickle-down effects for publishing female authors. At the end, we will also investigate the effects of taking on editorial activities on research productivity of the editors themselves.

In order to test for these implications we need to identify which editor handles which published paper. In recent years, a number of journals started publishing the name of the editor who has been in charge of the editorial decision of the published paper. In the following analysis, we combine information on the editor-in-charge[13] with the two-digit JEL classification of each paper. We consider all journals examined in our main analysis for the years in which they published the editor-in-charge.[14] We obtained the JEL codes, if available,

[13]This information is directly taken either from the first or last page of the paper.

[14]I.e. the AER from 2017, the JEEA from 2008, REStud from 2018, REStat from 2014, ECMA from 2017,

directly from the paper,[15] and otherwise, from EconLit.[16] In total, our dataset comprises 2,322 papers.

5.1 Topic Diversity: Do Male and Female Editors Publish Different Papers?

As shown in the descriptive evidence above, female editors tend to publish in different journals than male editors. But do they also focus their editorial work on different fields?

Figure 4 compares the ranks of the frequencies of JEL letters of papers accepted by male and female editors. Clearly, and as expected given their different research profiles, there are considerable gender differences in the fields in which editors publish papers. For instance, female editors more frequently accept papers in the fields of labor and demographic economics or health, education and welfare, and much less often in the fields of mathematical and quantitative methods. A more detailed tabulation of JEL codes by rank (see Appendix Tables A19 and A20) shows that even within specific sub-fields there are considerable gender differences. Out of 20 sub-fields, there is overlap in around half of them, meaning that both male and female editors publish papers in these 10 sub-fields (e.g. J24 or D72), although they are ranked differently. However, in the other half, there is no overlap at all, suggesting that male and female editors specialize in different types of topics (e.g. male editors publish papers in D82, Mechanism Design, and female editors publish papers in J13, Fertility).

Finally, Figure 5 shows the most frequent words in abstracts published by male (upper panel) and female editors (lower panel). The word clouds are based on the stemmed nouns of the paper abstracts, with larger font size indicating higher frequency.[17] While male and female editors share the most common words (e.g. *model*, *effect*, *data*, *firm*), less frequent words differ substantially between editor gender.

Some examples clearly illustrate these differences. The top-50 terms in abstracts published by female editors include words such as *student*, *school*, *health*, *women* and *family*. In contrast,

EJ from 2020 and the JPE from 2022 onwards.

[15] I.e. AER, JEEA and REStud

[16] I.e. REStat, ECMA and EJ. Note that EconLit only publishes JEL codes up to the year 2020, so the years 2021 and 2022 are excluded for these journals.

[17] Before stemming, stopwords (shown in Table A12) are removed from the corpus of nouns.

these words are absent from the word cloud of abstracts published by male editors. On the other hand, top-50 terms in titles published by male editors contain words such *theory*, *agent* and *contract*, which do not appear in the word cloud for female editors.

We therefore conclude that female editors publish (and likely handle) papers of different fields and topics, compared to male editors. However, we cannot claim that female editors *cause* an increase in diversity, as editors are not randomly selected. Rather, we observe an association between editor gender and paper topic.

To better understand the relationship between editor gender and topic diversity, we use a different data encompassing all the 15 journals from 1960 to 2019 (for this large sample, we have the titles of the papers, but not the abstracts). First, we construct a measure of the number of topics published by a journal in a given year. We classify the title of each paper using a transformer-based topical model. We use an S-BERT transformer to convert titles into numerical representations, so-called embeddings, which also capture the contextual meaning of words.[18] This procedure enables us to assign each paper to the most likely topic out of 156 potential topics (the number of topics is determined by the model). Appendix Table A21 showcases the 20 most frequent topics along with their representative keywords.

To measure topic diversity, we count the number of distinct topics published by a journal in a given year. Table 7 presents estimates from a Poisson model, regressing the number of topics on the number of new editors joining a journal's board in a given year. To understand whether female scholars entering editorial boards is associated with greater topic diversity, we also interact the number of new editors with the female editor's dummy.

Considering all journals (column 1) and only top-field journals (column 3), neither the total number of new editors nor the gender interaction is significantly associated with topic diversity. However, for top-8 journals (column 2), we find that an increase in female editors corresponds to a rise in the number of topics published. These results remain robust when using a one-year lag after a new editor joins the board (columns 4 and 5).

[18]We use as a transformer "all-MiniLM-L6-v2" with a WordPiece tokenizer. To reduce the dimensionality of embeddings we use UMAP and cluster the embeddings into topics with HDBSCAN.

While it is still possible that female editors are appointed with the goal to increase topic diversity, our analysis in Section 4.3.3 suggests that this is not the whole story. At least part of the female editor appointments appear to be driven by the goal to increase gender diversity, and topic diversity is a consequence thereof.

5.2 Quality: Do Male and Female Editors Publish Different Quality Papers?

We have demonstrated that male and female editors select papers from different fields and topics in economics. However, do men and women editors differ in the quality of the papers they select? Measuring the quality of papers is not a straightforward task. Ex-post accumulated citations have been established as a good proxy of quality (Card and DellaVigna, 2020; Card et al., 2020).

In the following analysis, we predict citations in March 2024 conditional on (publication) year and journal fixed effects, paper and author characteristics as well as the gender of the editor-in-charge. This allows us to understand if, conditional on other factors influencing the citation count of a paper, female editors do equally well in maximizing the citation count of their journal. If the estimated coefficient of editor gender is equal to zero, this would indicate that there are no gender differences in the citation-performance between male and female editors. A positive/negative female editor dummy, on the other hand, would imply that female/male editors out-perform male/female editors in terms of citations.

We use two measures of citations as outcome variables, both in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (asinh)[19]: first, the number of times cited in all databases and second, as a narrower citation count, times cited in Web-of-Science.[20] We merge the paper characteristics with authors' characteristics from our publication dataset. In all our regressions we include journal-year fixed effects.

As shown in Table 8, papers edited by women accumulate significantly more cites (columns

[19]Additional analysis (available upon request) shows that the main result, i.e. female editors do equally well in maximizing a paper's citation count conditional on its field, is robust to using a Poisson specification with citation counts in levels.

[20]I.e. cites accumulated up to the date of data collection in March 2024.

1 and 4 i.e. under both definitions of the outcome variable). However, as soon as we also control for JEL code fixed effects (columns 2 and 5), we do not find any significant differences by editor gender anymore. Adding further paper and author characteristics such as the page count, number of authors, the maximum number of top-5 as well as the maximum number of publications over all authors, yields to very similar results (columns 3 and 6). This indicates that, in fact, female and male editors perform equally well in maximizing their journal's citation count and hence, their impact factor.[21]

5.3 Trickle-down Effects for Female Authors

Do female editors tend to publish more papers by female authors? This is a relatively natural question to ask, given existing work in related settings (see Bagues and Esteve-Volart 2010, Bagues et al. 2017 and Vattuone and Zinovyeva 2022). We study this question using two dependent variables, the fraction of female authors per published paper, and whether the published paper has at least one female author. The coefficient of interest is the one by the female editor.

Table 9 shows the results. With no paper level controls, we find that female editors tend to publish more papers by female authors. This is compatible with gender differences across topics and fields. However, once we control for paper level characteristics (in particular JEL codes), we find no evidence of any trickle-down effects.

5.4 Research Productivity during Editorial Service

Finally, we explore the implications of holding editorial positions for the (over-)selected female editors themselves. Does holding editorial positions hurt or benefit academic productivity? On the one hand, the time spent on editorial duties may come at the expense of research. On the other hand, editorial service might also benefit academic productivity,

[21] There is a related paper which predicts citations based on variation in the share of female editors in the top-5 journals (Bransch and Kvasnicka, 2022). The authors find a positive correlation between female editorship and future citations of articles. However, they control for field through the 1-digit JEL code, while we control for the 2-digit JEL codes.

for instance, by providing networking opportunities. In the following analysis, we examine if editorial service is associated with a change in academic productivity and whether these changes vary by the gender of the editor.

For this analysis, we again rely on our database of active researchers from 1960-2019 (see Section 2.2), but focus on the selected sample of scholars who have served in an editorial position at least once. We consider a time window spanning up to four years before and 5 years after the start of the first editorial service in a journal and estimate 5 different specifications, varying the set of journals and editorial roles we consider. In the first specification, we consider all journals and editorial roles. In specifications 2 and 3, we distinguish between top-8 and top-field journals. In specifications 4 and 5, we again consider all 15 journals, but differentiate between editor and associate editor roles. Scholars may switch positions within the respective set of journals and roles, but as soon as their first editorial service ends, they drop from our sample. We perform an event-study analysis, where the event is taking on an editorial position, and the main outcome variable is the number of papers a scholar publishes in a given year. Each specification conditions on author, year and academic age fixed effects. This means that we compare researchers who all eventually serve in editorial positions but differ in the timing of their first appointment, and exploit within-scholar variation in performance, netting out life-cycle and time effects.

Figure 6 presents the event-time estimates for each of the five specifications mentioned above, relative to the year before their first appointment. Reassuringly, there are no visible pre-trends in academic performance prior to the appointment. When considering all journals and years (panel a), scholars begin to publish considerably less starting from the first year after the appointment, a pattern that persists throughout the five-year window. Given that publication dates often lag behind the completion of a publishable draft, this delayed decline is in line with expectations. Overall, the drop in academic output associated with the take-up of an editorial position amounts to around 0.7 fewer papers over the first 5 years. This decline in publications is more pronounced for top-8 journals (panel b) than for top-field

journals (panel c). Likewise, editors suffer a consistently stronger reduction in publications (panel d) compared to associate editors (panel e). Appendix Table A22 shows the results from interacting the event-time indicators with the female dummy. Clearly, the decline in publication output, following the start of an editorial position, does not differ between male and female scholars.[22]

6 A Glimpse into Editorial Work: Evidence from a Large-Scale Survey

One of the main results documented thus far is the conditional over-selection of women into editorial roles in general interest journals. This higher probability of women getting appointed can arise from two sources: On the one hand, female economists might be more likely to be offered these positions than comparable male colleagues. On the other hand, women might be, given the offer to hold an editorial position, more likely to accept. To understand to which degree the two factors contribute to the conditional gender gap in selection, we conducted a large-scale survey. We also intended to understand potential gender differences in motivations to accept and reject editorial positions and experienced difficulties while holding editorial positions.

The survey design was approved by the Ethics Committee of Università della Svizzera italiana. The authors received the survey invitation by email, where they could access the actual survey through a link in the email.

6.1 Survey Design

The survey was carried out in two waves. We conducted the first wave of the survey between October and November 2023. We selected those economists from the sample of active researchers who had published at least five times between 2000 and 2019 in any of the 36 journals in our dataset (listed in Appendix Table A1) and at least once in any of the top-8 or top-field journals that we consider in our regressions (Appendix Table A2 column 1). In

[22]Considering only top-5 publications as a measure of academic productivity, we also find significant (though mechanically smaller) drops in publications, in particular for the general interest journals and for editors. These results are available upon request.

total 4,520 economists were invited to complete the anonymous questionnaire online, to which we will refer to as survey authors.[23] To promote participation, we offered the opportunity to participate in a lottery with three prizes of 1,000 CHF each. We randomized survey authors across different sub-samples to induce variation in response rates: each day, from Monday to Friday, 20% of the sample received the survey invitation. Survey authors who did not fill it in received a first reminder one week after their first email invitation. In week three, the second reminder was sent only to half of the sub-sample of those who did not yet fill in the survey. Finally, four weeks later, a last reminder was sent to all survey authors who did not fill in the survey yet reminding them that the survey will close within a week, such that the survey closed four weeks after the first email invitation. The randomization (over week days and the second reminder) was designed in order to use it as an instrument for controlling for selection into answering the survey (see the analysis in subsection 6.2).

The second wave was conducted between December 2023 to January 2024, following the same procedure and randomization as in the first wave. This time, we included those economists with three or four publications between 2000 and 2019 in any of the 36 journals in our dataset and at least one in any of the top-8 or top-field journals. The sample consisted of 2,736 economists and the lottery was one prize of 1,000 CHF.[24]

In the survey, we asked survey authors whether they received an offer to serve as editor or associate editor at any top-8, top-field or other journals and whether they accepted it. Furthermore, authors were requested to specify their motivations to accept or reject those offers (in case they had an offer) or their expected motivation (in case they did not have an offer), as well as their actual experiences (in case they had one) or expectations (in case they did not have any experience) in editorial positions. Finally, survey authors were also requested to state their gender (men, women, prefer not to say), location (USA, Europe, other), field of research (macro/finance, theory/econometrics, applied/empirical micro and

[23]This number excludes those authors to whom we could not send the email because we found no available email or because the email was returned to us.

[24]Again, this number excludes those authors to whom we could not send the email because we found no available email or because the email was returned to us.

other) and academic age indicating when they finished their PhDs (before the 80s, 80s, 90s, 2000s and 2010s). For the complete list of questions included in the survey, see Section B in the Appendix.

Overall, we received 1,121 responses of which 987 were complete, such that they answered every item in the questionnaire. Excluding incomplete responses, we collected 643 responses in the first and 344 in the second wave. This amounts to response rates of 14.3% and 12.6%, respectively. These response rates are below those obtained in surveys targeted individually at a small set of scholars in economics (i.e. 40% in Card et al. 2020) but well above similar surveys to ours which target a large set of scholars in economics (2.7% in Shastry and Shurchkov 2024, 3.4% in Chopra et al. 2024).

The demographic characteristics of our survey respondents are shown in Table 10. Around 18% of our respondents identified as female and around 2/3 completed their PhDs in the 1990s and 2000s. More than half of the respondents are based in Europe and 1/3 in the US. Around 50% works in applied/empirical microeconomics, followed by theory/econometrics and macro/finance. Male respondents were on average more senior, more frequently based in Europe and less likely to work in applied micro. The share of women among respondents is very close to the share in our sample of economists considered actively-publishing in the years from 2000 to 2019 (17%, see Appendix Table A3). Assuming the first publication occurs around the year of PhD completion, the respondents and our regression sample are also comparable in academic seniority.

6.2 Survey Main Results: Probability of Being Offered and Probability of Acceptance

Table 11 (upper panel) shows the gender differences in the probability of being offered an editorial position.[25] Female respondents are more likely to be offered to serve as associate editor at top-8 journals while male respondents more frequently reported offers for associate editor positions at top-field journals. In the next step, we examine if these gender differences in

[25]Appendix Table A23 reports the number of respondents who have ever been offered (upper panel) and ever accepted (lower panel) editorial positions. As expected, the probability to have been offered a position is lower for higher-ranked journals than top-field journals, and also for editors than for associate editors.

the probabilities to be offered editorial positions also hold when conditioning on demographics. We find that female respondents are significantly more likely to be offered to serve as associate editor at top-8 journals and as editor at top-field journals.[26]

To confirm that the results on gender gaps in offerings are not due to survey response bias, we estimate a Heckman selection model (with weekdays and number of reminders as instruments). As shown in Appendix Table A27, we obtain very similar results.

Could these differences in offerings potentially being generated by gender differences in accepting referee requests, which in turn may affect the probability of being offered an editorial position? We consider this explanation unlikely, as Card et al. (2020) found no evidence for gender differences in accepting referee requests, based on editorial data from four leading journals.

Table 11 (lower panel) shows results for the probability to accept an editorial position (conditional on getting an offer).[27] Regarding unconditional acceptance probabilities, we do not find any evidence for gender differences in the probability to accept editorial positions at top-8 or top-field journals. This result also holds when conditioning on demographics.[28] We also asked respondents whether they would hypothetically accept a position which was not actually offered to them. As shown in Table A26 in the Appendix, and consistent with the probability of accepting actual offers, we do not find any significant gender differences in the hypothetical acceptance probability conditional on the same controls as before.

The survey evidence for associate editors at top-8 journals is in line with the main regression results in Section 4.2. If our respondents are representative for our regression sample, the survey data suggest that the conditional advantage in selection is related to a higher probability of receiving an offer, and not to gender differences in the likelihood of accepting a given offer. The survey evidence for editors at top-field journals is not consistent

[26] Appendix Table A24 reports the full set of control variables. Since respondents selected for wave 1 of the survey had more publications than those in wave 2, they were significantly more likely to be offered any of the positions considered. For most positions, more senior economists had a significant conditional advantage.

[27] Respondents, who have both accepted and rejected offers within the same category of journals, are classified as having "ever accepted" an offer.

[28] Appendix Table A25 shows the coefficients of all control variables.

with the result that women are equally likely to be selected for editorial positions conditional on their academic CVs as their male colleagues. This divergence could stem from a variety of reasons. First, we only consider a sub-sample of top field journals in the regressions compared to the survey. Second, the survey data offers fewer controls.

6.3 Survey on Motivations and Experienced Difficulties in Editorial Positions

Finally, we show survey respondents' views on the motivations to accept and reject editorial positions, as well as their experienced difficulties in those editorial positions. Figure 7 includes respondents who have been offered an editorial position at least once in the last 20 years.

The figures on the top panel comprise survey respondents for those positions that they had accepted, as editors (left figure) or associate editors (right figure). Note that for ease of exposition, we group top-8 general interest journals and top-field journals together. Disaggregated responses by journal type can be found in the appendix (Figure A2). Figure 7 top panel shows how important five different motives (shaping field, serving profession, prestige, improving conditions, and financial) were in the decision to accept a given editorial position. As can be seen therefrom, men and women agree on assigning very little importance to financial motivations, as well as to the motivation of using these editorial positions to reduce other administrative tasks in their daily academic life. Both men and women assign high value to serving the profession, and to the prestige associated with the editorial jobs. The most notable gender difference is that women, compared to men, tend to give more importance to the motivation of shaping the field than to serving the profession. While these answers reflect decisions to accept editorial positions of those researchers who accepted them, we also analyzed the same (hypothetical) motivations for researchers who had never been offered these positions (Figure A3). Interestingly, the three most important motivations are exactly the same, and even in the hypothetical answers, women are relatively more inclined to accept editorial positions with the purpose to shape the field.

What about the motivations for rejecting positions? The central panel of Figure 7 shows the reasons behind rejecting editorial positions. Both, men and women, agree on the two main motivations for rejecting editorial positions: the work involved with editorial duties and the fact of already holding enough editorial positions. Note also that especially for associate editor positions, women are more likely than men to state that they already hold enough positions and mention this as a reason for rejecting editorial positions. Figure A4 shows the split by editorial role as well as journal (top-8 general interest versus top-field). Figure A3 in the Appendix shows the same importance ranking of motivations for rejecting editorial positions but restrict to those survey authors who have never been offered. Interestingly, the two most important motivations are exactly the same ones but there are some notable differences, both in the ranking levels and ordering when compared to the actually experienced motivations. For both men and women, the responsibility involved in accepting these positions gains importance in the hypothetical responses relative to the actual motivations.

With respect to difficulties experienced in editorial positions, shown in the bottom panel of Figure 7, both men and women mainly mention time cost and the difficulty in recruiting referees. When dis-aggregated by journal type and editorial role (Appendix Figure A5), female editors in top-8 general interest journals suffer more than male editors from the time cost associated with editorial work. We also asked respondents to provide an estimate of the percent of editorial decisions that came back in the form of complaints. Appendix Table A28 shows that if anything male editors report a higher percent of complaints than female editors.

Finally, based on previous studies showing that women tend to devote more time to non-promotable tasks than men (Babcock et al., 2017a; Babcock et al., 2017b), we also asked our survey respondents to describe their time devoted to each of the academic task: administration, editorial duties, research, student supervision and teaching. As shown in Figure A6 in the Appendix, our results go in the expected direction: men tend to devote slightly more time to research while women to administrative tasks, although the differences are very minor.

7 Conclusions

Our paper offers a comprehensive analysis of gender gaps in editorial roles at 15 highly-regarded journals in economics. We first combine newly-collected information on editorial positions with a dataset on publication records, citations and connection through co-authorship of 37,000 active economists. In addition, we construct a dataset where we can identify the editor in charge of the published papers, a norm recently adopted by a small set of journals, to test for implications of having female over male authors in editorial positions. Finally, we complement these data sets with detailed information obtained from a large-scale online survey. This data set allows us to estimate gender differences in the likelihood of receiving and accepting editorial positions. Furthermore, we gain insights into the underlying motivations driving these decisions and the challenges faced by editors and associate editors in their roles.

Despite an evident unconditional under-representation of women in editorial positions, we do not find any indication that women face obstacles in becoming editor and associate editors once accounting for their academic CVs. On the contrary, when comparing women and men with similar publication and citation records, we find that, if anything, women have had higher chances to be selected for editorial positions. This pattern is only evident for editorial boards of the top-8 general interest journals and mostly observed in the role of associate editors (women being up to 3 times more likely to be selected), which started to manifest itself as early as in the 1980s. Our survey evidence further shows that the conditional over-selection of women into editorial roles stems from journals being more likely to offer these positions to female economists.

What are the implications of having more female editors? We find that female editors, on average, handle and accept papers in different sub-fields than their male colleagues. Moreover, we show that female scholars entering editorial boards is associated with greater topic diversity. Female authors benefit from female editors mainly through the field of research. When controlling for the field of research, we find no evidence that female editors are more

likely to publish articles written by female authors. Neither do female editors differ from male editors in terms of quality of decisions (measured by future citations), once the research field is properly accounted for. How does this over-selection affect female editors themselves? While the survey suggests a particularly strong motivation of women to shape the field, the costs of editorial activities manifest themselves in terms of lower research productivity in the short run.

Finally, what are the possible explanations for the over-selection of women into editorial boards? First, we argue that field diversity is unlikely to be the sole driver of this over-selection. By controlling for research topic using the titles of authors' past publications, we show that field preferences play some role, but they are not the only motive to appoint female researchers to editorial roles. Second, note also that the higher preference for women is consistent with a motivation where journals are aware of potential publishing (and other) hurdles that female economists face, making them realize that among two competing candidates with a comparable CV, the female candidate may actually be the stronger one. In a similar vein, women could also be better suited (or perceived to be better suited) for editorial roles as women are for example expected to outperform men in attributes such as responsibility and diligence. However, we believe these two explanations cannot be the main drivers because we only observe the over-selection in general interest journals, while these two potential drivers for the over-selection of women should be equally important for all types of journals. Third and finally, although speculative, it is possible that the over-selection of women could respond to general interest journals making an active effort to increase female representation in their editorial boards, to foster gender parity in the profession.

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
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
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Figures and Tables


Figure 1: Number of Economists in Editorial Positions



(a) All 15 journals




(b) Top-8 general interest journals




(c) Top-field journals

Notes: The figures show the number of economists holding at least one position as editor or associate editor in our sample of actively publishing economists. An economist is considered active from the year of first publication in one of the 36 journals until up to 11 years after the last publication or the year in which death was recorded.


Figure 2: Female Share in Active Economists, in Editors and Associate Editors



(a) All 15 journals




(b) Top-8 general interest journals



(c) Top-field journals


Notes: The figure 2a) shows the share of women in the sample of actively publishing economists (green line), in the sample of economists with at least three top-5 publications (brown line), and in the sample of editors and associate editors at 15 journals (blue and red lines, respectively). Figure 2b) shows the share of women by different editorial roles for top-8 general interest journals. Figure 2c) shows the share of women by different editorial roles for top-field journals.

Figure 3: Robustness of Female Coefficients for General Interest Journals: Additional Controls




Notes: The figure plots the reduced-form female coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals in the baseline for general interest journals (Table 3), with field controls (Table A17) and when including controls for field and connections (Table A18).

Figure 4: JEL Codes by Gender of Editors




Notes: The figure shows the ranks of JEL codes fields of accepted papers by the gender of editors.

Figure 5: Most Frequent Words in Abstracts: by Gender of Editor




(a) Male Editors




(b) Female Editors

Notes: The figure shows the most frequent nouns in the abstracts of papers published by male (upper panel) and female (lower panel) editors. Larger font size indicates higher frequency. The data set contains all papers published by AER (2017-2022), JEEA (2008-2022), REStud (2018-2022), REStat (2014-2020), ECMA (2017-2020) and EJ (2020-2020).


Figure 6: Productivity – Number of Published Papers during Editorial Service




(a) All journals




(b) Top-8 journals



(c) Top-field journals




(d) Editors



(e) Associate Editors

Notes: The dependent variable is the number of publications per year. The sample consists of all active scholars who have held an editorial position in any of the 15 journals (a), top-8 (b) or top-field journals (c), or an editor or associate editor (d) position at any of the 15 journals at least once. Scholars enter the sample up to four years before their editorial service begins and remain in the sample for up to five years or until their service ends. Subsequent editorial appointments are not considered. All specifications control for author, year and academic age fixed effects. Event study dummies are defined relative to the year before the start of service. Vertical lines indicate the standard errors (clustered at the author-level) of the 95% confidence intervals of the mean

Figure 7: Motivations to Accept, Reject and Experienced Difficulties in Editorial Roles



Notes: The figures show the survey respondents' motivations to accept (top panel), to reject (central panel) editorial positions, and their experienced difficulties (bottom panel). The circles indicate the mean of the answers "Very important" (scaled as 1), "Important" (scaled as 0.5) and "Not Important" (scaled as 0). Horizontal lines indicate the standard errors of the 95% confidence intervals of the mean.

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Editors and Associate Editors at Top-8 General Interest Journals

	Editors						Associate Editors					
	1960-1979		1980-1999		2000-2019		1960-1979		1980-1999		2000-2019	
Ratio Female	0.028		0.015		0.104		0.022		0.059		0.148	
Ratio Unknown Gender	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
A. Cum. publications in top-5												
Econometrica	1.68	0.00	2.30	0.50	2.19	0.41	1.68	0.21	1.95	0.51	1.43	0.65
REStud	1.53	0.00	1.46	1.88	1.72	0.76	1.11	0.07	1.10	0.40	1.01	0.38
AER	1.31	0.11	1.41	0.25	2.25	1.85	1.20	0.74	1.48	0.61	1.52	1.20
QJE	0.94	0.00	0.95	1.75	2.31	2.26	1.28	0.49	1.22	0.71	1.15	0.99
JPE	2.02	0.22	2.16	1.63	2.03	0.75	0.91	0.42	1.19	0.73	0.74	0.53
B. Cum. citations in top-5												
Econometrica	18.13	0.00	94.25	49.88	332.61	51.64	15.77	2.95	64.40	7.54	90.30	49.54
REStud	5.77	0.00	26.85	10.38	106.30	44.90	6.31	0.02	21.31	4.56	35.17	22.42
AER	12.00	0.67	64.46	6.38	191.00	169.38	11.64	8.72	43.88	11.05	89.29	58.26
QJE	3.11	0.00	19.78	40.25	303.64	489.56	7.00	4.49	26.66	8.72	114.43	64.42
JPE	20.91	0.56	133.20	82.63	347.29	69.74	6.66	1.35	39.39	22.10	42.12	28.53
C. Cum. publications in other journals												
JEP+JEL	0.03	0.00	0.33	0.00	1.08	0.98	0.03	0.02	0.36	0.22	0.41	0.51
AER (AEA) Papers and Proceedings	1.03	0.11	1.32	0.75	2.02	2.41	0.94	0.28	1.21	0.61	0.89	1.09
JEEA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.98	1.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.44	0.39
EJ	1.86	1.78	0.99	0.38	1.22	0.37	0.74	0.14	0.57	0.10	0.52	0.32
REStat	1.44	0.00	0.58	0.00	0.70	0.55	1.69	0.95	1.21	0.11	0.46	0.40
Economica+IER	1.05	0.00	0.93	0.75	0.82	0.51	0.93	0.00	0.94	0.45	0.41	0.14
Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMathE)	0.30	0.00	1.61	1.25	3.09	0.39	0.30	0.02	1.09	1.06	2.13	0.63
Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA)	0.36	0.00	0.85	0.00	1.12	0.18	0.46	0.14	1.23	0.00	1.08	0.83
Micro (AEJMicro)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.06
Macro (AEJMacro+JME)	0.02	0.00	0.44	0.63	1.21	0.50	0.03	0.00	0.32	0.22	0.48	0.32
AEJApplied	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.22
QE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.05
Development (JDE)	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.38	0.26	0.48	0.01	0.23	0.11	0.11	0.20	0.31
Finance (JF)	0.15	0.00	0.37	0.00	0.44	0.30	0.19	0.21	0.39	0.05	0.25	0.14
Health (JHE)	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.06	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.07	0.15
History (JEH)	0.00	0.89	0.04	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.17	0.21	0.12	0.60	0.05	0.36
International (JIE)	0.18	0.00	0.13	0.75	0.34	0.43	0.04	0.00	0.35	0.20	0.30	0.35
Industrial Organization (RAND)	0.12	0.00	0.44	0.50	0.56	0.32	0.09	0.35	0.54	0.69	0.47	0.30
Labor (JoLE)	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.00	0.56	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.30	0.19	0.32
Public (JPubE+AEJPolicy)	0.13	0.00	0.62	0.00	0.71	1.42	0.13	0.09	0.59	0.28	0.62	0.64
Years since first publication	17.78	15.44	15.63	15.38	18.46	15.10	14.48	11.37	15.46	11.03	13.55	11.86
Observations	308	9	527	8	866	100	1912	43	2995	186	4155	721
Number of Authors	58	2	109	3	164	23	306	11	470	37	721	129

Notes: The data set contains author-year observations on the set of economists serving on editorial boards of a top-5 or general interest journal.

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Editors and Associate Editors at Top-field Journals

	Editors						Associate Editors					
	1960-1979		1980-1999		2000-2019		1960-1979		1980-1999		2000-2019	
Ratio Female	0.014		0.026		0.098		0.036		0.052		0.163	
Ratio Unknown Gender	0.010		0		0		0.068		0.010		0.020	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
A. Cum. publications in top-5												
Econometrica	1.33	0.00	2.13	0.70	1.55	0.94	0.88	0.75	1.27	0.28	0.48	0.26
REStud	0.97	0.00	0.89	0.42	0.87	0.42	1.48	0.00	1.13	0.26	0.87	0.45
AER	0.60	0.00	0.85	0.48	0.93	0.71	1.92	3.00	1.47	1.56	1.14	1.03
QJE	0.55	0.00	0.49	0.52	0.55	0.51	1.39	1.50	1.14	1.23	1.28	1.20
JPE	0.78	0.45	1.01	0.91	0.72	0.28	1.72	0.00	1.41	0.28	0.65	0.32
B. Cum. citations in top-5												
Econometrica	15.57	0.00	56.97	8.74	90.82	95.72	8.40	17.88	46.57	8.91	38.80	7.91
REStud	5.85	0.00	13.77	3.06	23.97	18.75	12.75	0.00	24.04	0.16	42.72	19.40
AER	6.75	0.00	37.20	7.83	54.16	51.82	25.71	59.63	46.57	36.14	112.03	44.19
QJE	4.77	0.00	8.32	4.83	46.72	40.58	12.23	30.88	15.25	17.21	158.76	60.82
JPE	6.76	0.00	43.03	7.79	59.21	12.94	15.75	0.00	35.37	2.72	59.09	12.69
C. Cum. publications in other journals												
JEP+JEL	0.01	0.00	0.16	0.03	0.25	0.31	0.23	0.00	0.38	0.33	0.67	0.45
AER (AEA) Papers and Proceedings	0.28	0.00	0.50	0.73	0.61	0.53	0.88	1.38	1.15	1.26	0.96	0.96
JEEA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.59	1.08
EJ	0.22	0.00	0.23	0.08	0.30	0.15	0.86	1.50	0.88	0.51	0.90	0.30
REStat	0.56	0.91	0.33	0.82	0.39	0.41	1.12	1.50	0.75	0.67	0.62	0.36
Economica+IER	0.82	0.00	0.96	0.15	0.78	0.15	1.19	0.25	1.14	0.30	0.61	0.01
Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMathE)	1.03	0.00	2.08	0.82	2.80	0.72	0.34	0.25	0.91	1.42	0.79	0.46
Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA)	0.64	0.00	1.81	0.17	3.22	2.23	0.08	1.50	0.37	0.58	0.19	0.00
Micro (AEJMicro)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00
Macro (AEJMacro+JME)	0.12	0.09	0.69	1.03	0.72	0.58	0.01	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.46	0.10
AEJApplied	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.54
QE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.04
Development (JDE)	0.02	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.16	0.11	0.19	0.75	0.81	1.26	1.59	1.41
Finance (JF)	1.42	1.09	1.81	0.36	1.16	1.19	0.26	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.09	0.04
Health (JHE)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.09	0.09	0.24
History (JEH)	0.02	0.91	0.05	0.73	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.13	0.13	0.44	0.01	0.05
International (JIE)	0.10	0.00	0.15	0.02	0.17	0.16	0.29	0.00	0.41	0.00	0.52	0.89
Industrial Organization (RAND)	0.12	0.00	0.27	0.20	0.30	0.11	0.37	0.00	0.33	0.91	0.23	0.20
Labor (JoLE)	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.44	0.04	0.24
Public (JPubE+AEJPolicy)	0.19	0.00	0.40	0.02	0.69	0.34	0.67	0.00	2.45	1.65	2.40	1.05
Years since first publication	10.01	19.27	14.70	17.39	17.68	13.71	14.22	15.75	16.95	13.26	16.50	10.19
Observations	755	11	2512	66	3669	399	198	8	771	43	911	181
Number of Authors	174	2	346	11	576	67	39	2	111	7	138	26

Notes: The data set contains author-year observations on the set of economists serving on editorial boards of a top-field journal.

Table 3: Selection into Editors or Associate Editors at Top-5 and General Interest Journals

	1960-1979			1980-1999			2000-2019		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	0.158	0.227	0.365						
	(0.290)	(0.288)	(0.297)						
Female Economist*(1980-89)				0.550**	0.562**	0.993***			
				(0.264)	(0.259)	(0.284)			
Female Economist*(1990-99)				0.150	0.432*	0.381			
				(0.250)	(0.253)	(0.243)			
Female Economist*(2000-09)							0.219	0.201	0.388**
							(0.164)	(0.163)	(0.168)
Female Economist*(2010-19)							0.147	0.230	0.314**
							(0.135)	(0.149)	(0.144)
Cumulative publications in									
Econometrica	0.241***	0.123*	0.184*	0.325***	0.141*	0.085	0.203***	0.258***	0.179
	(0.043)	(0.070)	(0.096)	(0.042)	(0.081)	(0.117)	(0.051)	(0.062)	(0.122)
REStud	0.542***	0.522***	0.593***	0.229***	0.257*	0.053	0.243***	0.153	0.131
	(0.084)	(0.122)	(0.140)	(0.079)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.070)	(0.106)	(0.133)
AER	0.222***	-0.075	0.082	0.116	-0.023	-0.067	0.259***	0.090	0.031
	(0.065)	(0.106)	(0.137)	(0.080)	(0.093)	(0.133)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.105)
QJE	0.077	-0.071	-0.079	0.366***	0.241*	-0.011	0.343***	0.064	0.044
	(0.061)	(0.084)	(0.118)	(0.080)	(0.133)	(0.135)	(0.111)	(0.103)	(0.126)
JPE	0.103*	0.068	0.122	0.209***	-0.052	-0.080	0.008	-0.002	0.135
	(0.063)	(0.076)	(0.110)	(0.045)	(0.079)	(0.141)	(0.064)	(0.089)	(0.109)
EJ		-0.078	0.120		0.022	0.322***		0.000	0.348***
		(0.095)	(0.103)		(0.112)	(0.084)		(0.076)	(0.068)
JEEA								0.698***	0.445***
								(0.084)	(0.080)
REStat		0.158***	0.244***		-0.082	0.102		-0.031	0.097
		(0.056)	(0.062)		(0.081)	(0.083)		(0.063)	(0.075)
Cumulative citations in									
Econometrica		0.068	0.138*		0.154***	0.039		0.095**	0.007
		(0.087)	(0.078)		(0.059)	(0.055)		(0.038)	(0.037)
REStud		-0.150	-0.103		-0.090	-0.008		0.135**	-0.033
		(0.146)	(0.119)		(0.102)	(0.071)		(0.054)	(0.045)
AER		0.185**	0.089		0.056	-0.001		0.163***	-0.044
		(0.077)	(0.076)		(0.060)	(0.054)		(0.035)	(0.033)
QJE		0.286***	0.303***		0.052	0.010		0.184***	0.011
		(0.091)	(0.101)		(0.078)	(0.071)		(0.040)	(0.037)
JPE		0.244***	0.161**		0.222***	0.122**		0.016	-0.102**
		(0.080)	(0.077)		(0.053)	(0.053)		(0.045)	(0.040)
Number of observations	62721	62721	62721	152366	152366	152366	286195	286195	286195
Pseudo R-squared	0.08	0.12	0.18	0.08	0.13	0.26	0.07	0.13	0.32
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor at a top-5 or general interest journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 4: Selection into Editors or Associate Editors at Top-Field Journals

	1960-1979			1980-1999			2000-2019		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	-0.785	-0.390	-0.276						
	(0.509)	(0.503)	(0.510)						
Female Economist*(1980-89)				-0.616	-0.365	-0.160			
				(0.415)	(0.416)	(0.419)			
Female Economist*(1990-99)				-0.637*	0.008	-0.125			
				(0.366)	(0.374)	(0.366)			
Female Economist*(2000-09)							-0.133	0.041	0.195
							(0.190)	(0.192)	(0.194)
Female Economist*(2010-19)							-0.281*	-0.032	-0.012
							(0.163)	(0.173)	(0.170)
Cumulative publications in									
Econometrica	0.188***	-0.074	-0.064	0.194***	-0.037	-0.151	0.104***	-0.087**	-0.347***
	(0.038)	(0.074)	(0.095)	(0.030)	(0.066)	(0.123)	(0.023)	(0.044)	(0.133)
REStud	0.316***	0.400***	0.352**	0.166**	0.002	-0.196	0.157***	0.118*	-0.172
	(0.052)	(0.118)	(0.139)	(0.079)	(0.101)	(0.142)	(0.053)	(0.069)	(0.196)
AER	-0.023	-0.463***	-0.482***	0.015	-0.044	-0.344**	0.152***	0.012	-0.460***
	(0.078)	(0.139)	(0.159)	(0.068)	(0.117)	(0.160)	(0.046)	(0.065)	(0.175)
QJE	-0.008	0.194*	0.217	0.046	0.092	-0.272*	0.210***	-0.191**	-0.695***
	(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.148)	(0.089)	(0.153)	(0.158)	(0.057)	(0.089)	(0.222)
JPE	0.094**	0.089	0.050	0.121***	0.062	-0.023	-0.189**	-0.092	-0.303
	(0.041)	(0.077)	(0.104)	(0.043)	(0.079)	(0.182)	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.185)
JDE		2.103***	1.894***		0.708***	0.734***		0.285***	0.361***
		(0.344)	(0.390)		(0.091)	(0.095)		(0.057)	(0.062)
JME		1.924***	1.662***		0.309***	0.201*		0.048	0.216***
		(0.387)	(0.348)		(0.108)	(0.110)		(0.062)	(0.060)
JF		0.564***	0.664***		0.369***	0.539***		0.318***	0.476***
		(0.051)	(0.068)		(0.035)	(0.041)		(0.028)	(0.044)
JOLE					0.530***	0.422***		0.197**	0.228**
					(0.180)	(0.157)		(0.085)	(0.093)
JET		0.698***	0.588***		0.214***	0.220***		0.226***	0.240***
		(0.127)	(0.112)		(0.060)	(0.059)		(0.040)	(0.040)
JE		1.671***	1.396***		0.358***	0.371***		0.193***	0.203***
		(0.181)	(0.191)		(0.069)	(0.068)		(0.029)	(0.040)
JPubE		0.770***	0.580**		0.461***	0.523***		0.182***	0.275***
		(0.275)	(0.263)		(0.055)	(0.056)		(0.051)	(0.061)
Cumulative citations in									
Econometrica		0.281***	0.246***		0.247***	0.121**		0.156***	-0.019
		(0.087)	(0.088)		(0.055)	(0.059)		(0.035)	(0.045)
REStud		0.089	0.112		0.013	-0.031		0.033	-0.169***
		(0.123)	(0.113)		(0.095)	(0.090)		(0.048)	(0.056)
AER		0.338***	0.225**		0.020	0.024		0.119***	-0.072*
		(0.099)	(0.102)		(0.070)	(0.069)		(0.037)	(0.042)
QJE		-0.004	-0.022		-0.087	-0.032		0.258***	0.086*
		(0.116)	(0.125)		(0.091)	(0.093)		(0.039)	(0.050)
JPE		0.184**	0.155		0.203***	0.096		-0.034	-0.172***
		(0.092)	(0.101)		(0.056)	(0.072)		(0.046)	(0.057)
Number of observations	58441	58441	58441	154616	154616	154616	289399	289399	289399
Pseudo R-squared	0.10	0.22	0.25	0.05	0.14	0.21	0.03	0.11	0.23
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor at a top-field journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 5: Selection into Editors or Associate Editors at Top-5 and General Interest Journals: By Editorial Role

	Editor			Associate Editor		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	-0.474			0.325		
	(1.191)			(0.306)		
Female Economist*(1980-89)		-0.214			1.087***	
		(1.077)			(0.286)	
Female Economist*(1990-99)		-0.035			0.369	
		(0.713)			(0.243)	
Female Economist*(2000-09)			0.230			0.417**
			(0.469)			(0.168)
Female Economist*(2010-19)			0.676**			0.303**
			(0.285)			(0.146)
Number of observations	61467	159494	298521	63048	152880	286758
Pseudo R-squared	0.21	0.27	0.37	0.18	0.26	0.32
	Editor					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	-0.478					
	(1.196)					
Female Economist*(1980-89)		-0.582				
		(1.099)				
Female Economist*(1990-99)		-0.438				
		(0.712)				
Female Economist*(2000-09)			-0.089			
			(0.472)			
Female Economist*(2010-19)			0.444			
			(0.295)			
Past ass. editor (top5/gi)	2.693***	2.348***	1.943***			
	(0.563)	(0.366)	(0.281)			
Number of observations	61467	159494	298521			
Pseudo R-squared	0.27	0.32	0.40			
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor at a top-5 or general interest journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 6: Selection into Editors or Associate Editors at Top-Field Journals: By Editorial Role

	Editor			Associate Editor		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	-0.564			0.299		
	(0.722)			(0.677)		
Female Economist*(1980-89)		-0.600			0.498	
		(0.589)			(0.602)	
Female Economist*(1990-99)		-0.058			-0.329	
		(0.421)			(0.750)	
Female Economist*(2000-09)			0.167			0.273
			(0.228)			(0.348)
Female Economist*(2010-19)			-0.114			0.403
			(0.189)			(0.353)
Number of observations	58608	151164	291759	18923	115616	264688
Pseudo R-squared	0.28	0.23	0.26	0.21	0.28	0.29
	Editor					
	(1)	(2)	(3)			
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	-0.560					
	(0.722)					
Female Economist*(1980-89)		-0.609				
		(0.591)				
Female Economist*(1990-99)		-0.069				
		(0.423)				
Female Economist*(2000-09)			0.101			
			(0.236)			
Female Economist*(2010-19)			-0.208			
			(0.197)			
Past ass. editor (field)	0.598	0.338	1.522***			
	(0.902)	(0.449)	(0.226)			
Number of observations	58608	151164	291759			
Pseudo R-squared	0.28	0.23	0.26			
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor at a top-field journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 7: Topic Diversity - Number of Topics

	All journals	Top-8	Top-Field	Top-8	Top-Field
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
New Editor	-0.001	-0.005	0.002		
	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.004)		
New Editor x Female	0.026	0.071**	-0.024		
	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.023)		
Lagged New Editor				-0.006	0.002
				(0.018)	(0.004)
Lagged New Editor x Female				0.069***	-0.014
				(0.021)	(0.030)
Number of observations	771	437	325	429	318
Pseudo R-squared	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.24	0.28
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Journal FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The data set contains journal-year observations of all 15 journals for which we have collected editorial information from 1960-2019. The dependent variable is the number of topics published by a journal per year. Standard errors clustered at journal-level are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 8: Citation Count by Editor Gender

	Asinh times cited in all databases			Asinh times cited in Web of Science		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female Editor	0.214***	0.039	0.027	0.198***	0.033	0.022
	(0.057)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Number of pages			0.016***			0.016***
			(0.003)			(0.003)
Number of authors			0.113***			0.124***
			(0.027)			(0.027)
Max. number of top-5 pub			0.022***			0.019**
			(0.008)			(0.008)
Max. number of total pub			-0.005			-0.004
			(0.003)			(0.003)
Number of observations	2322	2322	2322	2322	2322	2322
R-squared	0.33	0.59	0.61	0.32	0.59	0.61
Year x journal FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
JEL-code FE	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from a linear regression model. The data set contains all papers published by AER (2017-2022), JEEA (2008-2022), REStud (2018-2022), REStat (2014-2020), ECMA (2017-2020) and EJ (2020-2020). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 9: Female-authored Papers by Editor Gender

	Fraction of authors female			At least one female author		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female Editor	0.063***	0.013	0.011	0.081***	0.002	-0.003
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Number of pages			0.001			0.001
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Number of authors			-0.009			0.075***
			(0.006)			(0.011)
Max. number of top-5 pub			-0.004**			-0.007**
			(0.002)			(0.003)
Max. number of total pub			0.001			0.002
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Number of observations	2322	2322	2322	2322	2322	2322
R-squared	0.04	0.36	0.37	0.03	0.35	0.37
Year x journal FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
JEL-code FE	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from a linear regression with journal×year fixed effects. The data set contains all papers published by AER (2017-2022), JEEA (2008-2022), REStud (2018-2022), REStat (2014-2020), ECMA (2017-2020) and EJ (2020-2020). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 10: Demographics of Survey Respondents

Characteristic	**Overall**	**Female**	**Male**	**Other/prefer not to say**
Number of observations	987	157	802	28
When did you complete your PhD?				
Before the 1980s	57 (5.8%)	5 (3.2%)	52 (6.5%)	0 (0%)
In the 1980s	107 (11%)	9 (5.7%)	94 (12%)	4 (14%)
In the 1990s	252 (26%)	32 (20%)	212 (26%)	8 (29%)
In the 2000s	428 (43%)	86 (55%)	330 (41%)	12 (43%)
In the 2010s or later	143 (14%)	25 (16%)	114 (14%)	4 (14%)
Where are you based in?				
Europe	528 (54%)	71 (45%)	442 (55%)	15 (54%)
Other	113 (11%)	18 (11%)	93 (12%)	2 (7.1%)
US	344 (35%)	68 (43%)	265 (33%)	11 (39%)
Unknown	2	0	2	0
Which broad field do you work on?				
Applied-Empirical Micro	488 (49%)	104 (66%)	374 (47%)	10 (36%)
Econometrics-Theory	201 (20%)	14 (8.9%)	182 (23%)	5 (18%)
Macro-Finance	162 (16%)	22 (14%)	136 (17%)	4 (14%)
Other	135 (14%)	17 (11%)	109 (14%)	9 (32%)
Unknown	1	0	1	0

Notes: The table shows the survey respondents' demographic characteristics from waves 1 and 2, excluding incomplete responses. Percentages indicate the share in the number of respondents.


Table 11: Offer vs. Acceptance Rates

	Top-8				Top-Field			
	Editor		Associate Editor		Editor		Associate Editor	
Have you ever received an offer in the last 20 years?								
Female	-0.338	-0.268	0.379*	0.428**	0.278	0.439**	-0.320*	-0.099
	(0.368)	(0.373)	(0.206)	(0.213)	(0.203)	(0.215)	(0.186)	(0.197)
Field, PhD decade & round	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
N	959	958	959	958	959	958	959	958
(If offered) Have you ever accepted such offer in the last 20 years?								
Female	-0.975	-1.805	-0.252	-0.347	-0.150	0.300	-0.219	-0.473
	(0.792)	(1.107)	(0.694)	(0.784)	(0.427)	(0.474)	(0.475)	(0.507)
Field, PhD decade & round	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
N	72	65	187	142	205	205	364	329


Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains only complete survey responses. In the upper panel, the outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent has ever been offered an editorial position in the last 20 years, and zero otherwise. In the lower panel, the outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent has ever accepted (conditional on being offered) an editorial position in the last 20 years, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

A Additional Figures and Tables


Figure A1: Number of Editorial Positions



(a) All 15 journals




(b) Top-8 general interest journals



(c) Top-field journals


Notes: The figures show the number of positions as editor and associate editors in our sample.

Figure A2: Motivations to Accept: by Editorial Role and Journal Type




Notes: The figure shows the survey respondents' motivations to accept editorial positions. The circles indicate the mean of the answers "Very important" (scaled as 1), "Important" (scaled as 0.5) and "Not Important" (scaled as 0). Horizontal lines indicate the standard errors of the 95% confidence intervals of the mean.

Figure A3: Hypothetical Motivations to Accept and to Reject Editorial Positions




Notes: The figure shows the survey respondents' motivations to accept and reject editorial positions *if they would have been offered*. The circles indicate the mean of the answers "Very important" (scaled as 1), "Important" (scaled as 0.5) and "Not Important" (scaled as 0). Horizontal lines indicate the standard errors of the 95% confidence intervals of the mean.

Figure A4: Motivations to Reject: by Editorial Role




Notes: The figure shows the survey respondents' motivations to reject editorial positions. The circles indicate the mean of the answers "Very important" (scaled as 1), "Important" (scaled as 0.5) and "Not Important" (scaled as 0). Horizontal lines indicate the standard errors of the 95% confidence intervals of the mean.

Figure A5: Experiences: by Editorial Role



Notes: The figure shows the survey respondents' experienced difficulties in editorial service. The circles indicate the mean of the answers "Very important" (scaled as 1), "Important" (scaled as 0.5) and "Not Important" (scaled as 0). Horizontal lines indicate the standard errors of the 95% confidence intervals of the mean.

Figure A6: Share of Time Devoted to Different Academic Tasks



Notes: The figure shows the share of average hours by task in total average hours reported by survey respondents by editor's gender.

Table A1: List of Journals

A. Top-5 journals	
American Economic Review	Quarterly Journal of Economics
Econometrica	Review of Economic Studies
Journal of Political Economy	
B. General interest journals	
Economic Journal	Review of Economics and Statistics
Journal of European Economic Association	
C. Selected top-field journals	
Journal of Development Economics	Journal of Labor Economics
Journal of Econometrics	Journal of Monetary Economics
Journal of Economic Theory	Journal of Public Economics
Journal of Finance	
D. Other journals	
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics	International Journal of Game Theory
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy	Journal of American Statistical Association
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics	Journal of Economic History
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics	Journal of Economic Literature
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings	Journal of Economic Perspectives
Econometric Theory	Journal of Health Economics
Economic Theory	Journal of International Economics
Economica	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Games and Economic Behavior	Quantitative Economics
International Economic Review	Rand Journal of Economics
Theoretical Economics	

Notes: The table lists all 36 journals included in the dataset of the actively publishing economists ordered by prominence, created by Card et al. (2022).

Table A2: Mapping of Editorial Titles to Editorial Roles of Editor and Associate Editor

Journal	Years	Role: Editor	Role: Associate Editor
American Economic Review (AER)	1983-2019	editor, co-editor	board of editors
	1911-1982	editor	board of editors
Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE)	1985-2019	board of editors	associate editors
	1894-1984	editor	
Econometrica (ECMA)	1933-2019	editor, co-editor	associate editors
Journal of Political Economy (JPE)	2016-2019	lead editor, editor	associate editors
	2003-2015	lead editor, editor	
	1892-2002	editor	
Review of Economic Studies (REStud)	2003-2019	managing editor	editorial board, foreign editor chair, board of directors
	1980-2002	managing editor	assistant editor,editorial board foreign editor, chair
	1961-1979	managing editor	editorial adviser, assistant editor editorial board, foreign editor, chair
	1933-1960	managing editor	associate editor
Economic Journal (EJ)	2012-2019	joint managing editor	associate editor
	2005-2011	editor	associate editor
	1989-2004	managing editor	associate editor
	1981-1988	editor, managing editor	
	1968-1980	editor	
	1951-1967	editor, associate editor	
	1944-1950	editor	
	1934-1943	editor, assistant editor	
	1920-1933	editor	
Review of Economics and Statistics (REStat)	1949-2019	editor	associate editor
	1936-1948	board of editors	
Journal of the European	2004-2019	editor, co-editor	associate editors Economic
Association (JEEA)	2003	editor	associate editors
Journal of Monetary Economics (JME)	2014-2019	editor, senior associate editor, associate editor	
	2010-2013	editor, coeditor, senior associate editor, associate editor	
	2008-2009	editor, senior associate editor, associate editor	
	1995-2007	editor, associate editor	
	1985-1994	editor, editorial board	
	1983-1984	editor, coeditor, editorial board	
	1975-1982	editor, editorial board	
Journal of Economic Theory (JET)	2012-2019	lead editor, editor, associate editor	
	2000-2012	editor, associate editor	
	1969-1999	editor, associate editor	
Journal of Econometrics (JEc)	2019-2019	managing editor, editor, associate editor	
	1992-2019	editor, associate editor	
	1973-1991	editor, associate editor	
Journal of Development Economics (JDE)	2004-2019	editor, coeditor	associate editor
	1974-2003	editor, coeditor	associate editor
Journal of Finance (JF)	1996-2019	editor, coeditor, associate editor	
	1977-1995	editor, associate editor	
	1974-1977	managing editor, coeditor, associate editor	
	1964-1974	editor, associate editor	
	1948-1963	editor, associate editor, editorial board	
	1946-1947	editor	
Journal of Labor Economics (JOLE)	2009-2019	chief editor, board of editors, associate editor	
	1993-2009	chief editor, editor	
	1983-1992	editor, associate editor	
Journal of Public Economics (JPubE)	2013-2019	editor, coeditor	
	1998-2012	editor, coeditor	associate editor
	1994-1998	editor, coeditor	advisory board
	1972-1993	editor, coeditor	associate editor

Notes: Column 1 lists the 15 journals. Column 2 contains the periods of years for which different editorial titles existed. Column 3 includes the mapping between different editorial titles into the role of editor. Column 4 includes the mapping between different editorial titles into the role of associate editor.

Table A3: Summary Statistics for Actively Publishing Economists

	1960-1979			1980-1999			2000-2019		
	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female
Ratio Female	0.042	0.000	1.000	0.086	0.000	1.000	0.176	0.000	1.000
Ratio First Initial Only (Unknown Gender)	0.073	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.000	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.000
Ratio Full Name (Unknown Gender)	0.026	0.000	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.000
Editor (in at least one out of 15)	0.015	0.017	0.006	0.018	0.020	0.005	0.016	0.018	0.009
Associate Editor (in at least one out of 15)	0.029	0.032	0.015	0.023	0.025	0.014	0.019	0.020	0.015
A. Cum. publications in top-5									
Econometrica	0.29	0.31	0.10	0.31	0.35	0.07	0.24	0.29	0.06
REStud	0.18	0.19	0.11	0.18	0.21	0.06	0.16	0.19	0.06
AER	0.34	0.38	0.21	0.31	0.35	0.14	0.29	0.33	0.15
QJE	0.26	0.29	0.16	0.18	0.20	0.08	0.16	0.18	0.08
JPE	0.33	0.37	0.15	0.26	0.29	0.09	0.18	0.21	0.06
B. Cum. citations in top-5									
Econometrica	1.94	2.15	0.59	7.84	9.01	1.01	20.96	25.44	3.66
REStud	0.58	0.62	0.33	2.58	2.95	0.46	7.51	8.94	2.12
AER	1.81	2.04	1.01	7.50	8.50	2.29	21.05	24.15	9.94
QJE	0.84	0.92	0.65	2.65	2.97	1.10	14.86	17.14	6.70
JPE	1.44	1.62	0.58	6.66	7.59	1.75	16.31	19.55	4.01
C. Cum. publications in other journals									
JEP+JEL	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.12	0.13	0.08
AER (AEA) Papers and Proceedings	0.25	0.28	0.14	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.25	0.22
JEEA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.05
EJ	0.24	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.20	0.09	0.22	0.24	0.12
REStat	0.35	0.38	0.30	0.32	0.34	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.15
Economica+IER	0.27	0.27	0.14	0.29	0.32	0.13	0.25	0.29	0.12
Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMathE)	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.36	0.39	0.16	0.82	0.94	0.37
Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA)	0.20	0.21	0.15	0.36	0.39	0.15	0.49	0.56	0.20
Micro (AEJMicro)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.01
Macro (AEJMacro+JME)	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.09	0.10	0.05	0.17	0.19	0.09
AEJApplied	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03
QE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
Development (JDE)	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.15	0.16	0.15
Finance (JF)	0.31	0.34	0.17	0.30	0.33	0.11	0.24	0.27	0.11
Health (JHE)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.14	0.14	0.17
History (JEH)	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.07	0.07	0.05
International (JIE)	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.10	0.11	0.07	0.15	0.16	0.12
Industrial Organization (RAND)	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.12	0.13	0.09	0.12	0.14	0.07
Labor (JoLE)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.07
Public (JPubE+AEJPolicy)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.15	0.16	0.09	0.26	0.29	0.19
Number of years since the first publication	9.30	9.60	8.40	10.03	10.49	6.99	11.27	12.14	7.85
Observations	74419	63932	3126	171415	146415	14736	309906	247224	54532
Number of Authors	8508	7167	414	16867	13969	1753	30844	23712	6021

Notes: The data set contains author-year observations on the sample of actively publishing economists. An economist is considered active from the year of first publication in one of the 36 journals until up to 11 years after the last publication or the year in which death was recorded.

Table A4: Selection into Editors or Associate Editors at Top-5 and General Interest Journals: By Journal

	ECMA	AER	JPE	QJE	EJ	JEEA	REStat	REStud
Female Economist*(2000-09)	0.395	1.102***	1.268	0.398	0.718**	-0.001	0.754**	0.113
	(0.433)	(0.275)	(0.905)	(0.672)	(0.349)	(0.300)	(0.347)	(0.375)
Female Economist*(2010-19)	-0.106	0.486*	-0.535	0.950**	0.517	0.431*	0.392	0.395
	(0.429)	(0.270)	(0.616)	(0.430)	(0.360)	(0.246)	(0.397)	(0.244)
Cumulative number of papers in Econometrica	0.054	0.018	0.026	0.204	-0.324	-0.261	0.053	0.062
	(0.123)	(0.102)	(0.215)	(0.237)	(0.251)	(0.167)	(0.312)	(0.090)
Asinh citations in Econometrica	0.242***	0.007	0.026	0.084	0.051	0.040	0.085	0.016
	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.111)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.056)	(0.124)	(0.056)
Cumulative number of papers in REStud	-0.053	-0.064	-0.454	-0.571***	0.308*	-0.030	0.290	0.440***
	(0.124)	(0.098)	(0.303)	(0.205)	(0.177)	(0.165)	(0.298)	(0.162)
Asinh citations in REStud	0.006	0.041	-0.056	0.219**	-0.172	0.038	-0.115	-0.146*
	(0.074)	(0.054)	(0.140)	(0.093)	(0.110)	(0.067)	(0.117)	(0.078)
Cumulative number of papers in AER	0.009	0.133*	0.177	0.585***	-0.156	-0.192	0.127	-0.253*
	(0.116)	(0.071)	(0.151)	(0.119)	(0.194)	(0.157)	(0.133)	(0.133)
Asinh citations in AER	-0.073	0.056	-0.183*	-0.229***	-0.136	-0.067	0.047	0.017
	(0.071)	(0.046)	(0.108)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.059)
Cumulative number of papers in QJE	-0.119	-0.181**	-0.314*	0.449***	0.032	0.049	0.455***	0.174
	(0.228)	(0.083)	(0.165)	(0.162)	(0.221)	(0.138)	(0.173)	(0.148)
Asinh citations in QJE	-0.043	0.068	0.074	0.158*	0.015	-0.086	0.054	-0.124**
	(0.069)	(0.047)	(0.078)	(0.094)	(0.091)	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.062)
Cumulative number of papers in JPE	-0.111	0.014	0.337**	0.171	-0.015	-0.148	0.082	-0.114
	(0.194)	(0.090)	(0.158)	(0.165)	(0.229)	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.185)
Asinh citations in JPE	-0.026	-0.062	-0.128	-0.036	-0.237***	-0.135**	-0.033	-0.006
	(0.073)	(0.051)	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.085)	(0.065)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Cumulative number of papers in EJ	-0.108	-0.186	-0.138	0.208*	0.427***	0.327***	-0.249	0.237*
	(0.172)	(0.129)	(0.239)	(0.124)	(0.091)	(0.080)	(0.267)	(0.126)
Cumulative number of papers in JEEA	0.221	0.090	-0.173	0.116	0.300**	0.550***	0.291	0.295**
	(0.157)	(0.086)	(0.249)	(0.121)	(0.131)	(0.100)	(0.205)	(0.146)
Cumulative number of papers in REStat	0.134	-0.016	0.199	-0.214	0.175	0.069	0.359***	-0.110
	(0.131)	(0.090)	(0.187)	(0.189)	(0.158)	(0.127)	(0.137)	(0.177)
Number of observations	305644	305162	204122	241840	259124	258174	178077	282958
Pseudo R-squared	0.38	0.34	0.37	0.40	0.24	0.29	0.34	0.31
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Pubs in general interest/field journals	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor at the respective journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A5: Selection into Editors or Associate Editors at Top-Field Journals: By Journal

	JDE	JME	JF	JOLE	JET	JoEC	JPubE
Female Economist*(2000-09)	-0.112	0.134	0.648*	0.128	-1.063	-0.020	0.743*
	(0.511)	(0.639)	(0.389)	(0.588)	(1.028)	(0.646)	(0.412)
Female Economist*(2010-19)	0.171	-0.314	-0.268	0.961*	0.145	-0.153	-0.332
	(0.348)	(0.752)	(0.435)	(0.582)	(0.521)	(0.475)	(0.593)
Cumulative number of papers in Econometrica	-0.343	0.781*	-13.396***	-0.642	-0.049	-2.220***	-11.575***
	(0.310)	(0.410)	(1.472)	(0.677)	(0.122)	(0.696)	(1.915)
Asinh citations in Econometrica	0.099	-0.213	0.016	0.167	0.023	-0.007	0.061
	(0.120)	(0.214)	(0.127)	(0.158)	(0.091)	(0.121)	(0.155)
Cumulative number of papers in REStud	0.805***	0.769**	-12.716***	-0.107	0.165	-3.053***	-11.078***
	(0.229)	(0.365)	(1.364)	(0.356)	(0.126)	(0.918)	(1.689)
Asinh citations in REStud	-0.262*	-0.019	-0.454***	0.036	-0.135	-0.027	-0.185
	(0.145)	(0.150)	(0.164)	(0.120)	(0.086)	(0.139)	(0.173)
Cumulative number of papers in AER	-0.047	0.535*	-13.847***	0.030	-0.183	-2.193***	-11.696***
	(0.164)	(0.280)	(1.500)	(0.449)	(0.201)	(0.835)	(1.791)
Asinh citations in AER	0.016	0.092	0.064	-0.046	-0.088	-0.380***	0.085
	(0.082)	(0.116)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.087)	(0.108)	(0.103)
Cumulative number of papers in QJE	0.445**	0.387	-14.475***	-0.521	-0.716	-5.050***	-11.740***
	(0.198)	(0.419)	(1.621)	(0.363)	(0.442)	(1.104)	(1.906)
Asinh citations in QJE	0.109	0.107	0.437***	0.147	-0.010	0.308	0.080
	(0.095)	(0.153)	(0.121)	(0.096)	(0.157)	(0.232)	(0.121)
Cumulative number of papers in JPE	-0.522*	1.322***	-13.759***	-0.309	0.237	-2.323**	-11.168***
	(0.309)	(0.369)	(1.581)	(0.459)	(0.336)	(0.982)	(1.925)
Asinh citations in JPE	0.134	-0.448***	-0.189	-0.061	-0.186	-0.302	-0.064
	(0.121)	(0.163)	(0.217)	(0.125)	(0.127)	(0.197)	(0.150)
Cumulative number of papers in JDE	0.709***	-0.678	-0.289	-0.091	-0.723	-2.224	-0.385
	(0.089)	(0.538)	(0.527)	(0.155)	(0.553)	(1.670)	(0.393)
Cumulative number of papers in JME	0.143	0.609***	0.497***	-0.992*	0.193	0.188	-0.819*
	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.125)	(0.528)	(0.119)	(0.176)	(0.430)
Cumulative number of papers in JF	-1.385***	0.030	0.915***	-0.597	0.168**	0.163	-0.481
	(0.491)	(0.182)	(0.071)	(0.475)	(0.082)	(0.128)	(0.358)
Cumulative number of papers in JOLE	-0.957		-0.328	0.665***	-0.668	0.247	-0.383
	(0.624)		(0.567)	(0.111)	(0.547)	(0.236)	(0.439)
Cumulative number of papers in JET	0.227	0.271	0.100	-1.088*	0.373***	-0.252	0.087
	(0.162)	(0.249)	(0.163)	(0.567)	(0.058)	(0.157)	(0.192)
Cumulative number of papers in JE	-0.052	-0.045	0.105	-0.041	-0.866*	0.379***	
	(0.173)	(0.218)	(0.121)	(0.205)	(0.493)	(0.055)	
Cumulative number of papers in JPubE	-0.097	-0.348	-0.187	-0.244	-0.470*	-1.266**	0.731***
	(0.158)	(0.395)	(0.306)	(0.244)	(0.264)	(0.560)	(0.100)
Number of observations	235715	71834	238605	204376	226197	230156	228289
Pseudo R-squared	0.31	0.34	0.35	0.34	0.42	0.41	0.36
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Pubs in general interest/field journals	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor at the respective journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A6: Duration of Editors and Associate Editors at Top-8 General Interest Journals

	1960-1979			1980-1999			2000-2019		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	-0.779	-0.987	-0.222						
	(0.778)	(0.865)	(1.029)						
Female Economist*(1980-89)				-1.831**	-1.788**	-1.684*			
				(0.901)	(0.848)	(0.900)			
Female Economist*(1990-99)				-0.211	-0.113	-0.220			
				(0.337)	(0.381)	(0.485)			
Female Economist*(2000-09)							0.636	0.473	0.334
							(0.569)	(0.543)	(0.536)
Female Economist*(2010-19)							0.106	0.097	0.063
							(0.135)	(0.171)	(0.198)
Cumulative publications in									
Econometrica	0.386***	0.510**	0.495**	0.145	0.163	-0.004	0.070	0.094	0.134
	(0.125)	(0.218)	(0.224)	(0.115)	(0.198)	(0.220)	(0.076)	(0.106)	(0.118)
REStud	-0.110	0.495	0.618**	-0.248	-0.260	-0.447*	-0.015	0.028	0.003
	(0.237)	(0.311)	(0.311)	(0.162)	(0.227)	(0.232)	(0.130)	(0.211)	(0.213)
AER	-0.066	-0.596	-0.582	0.040	-0.060	-0.148	-0.025	0.432***	0.371**
	(0.216)	(0.401)	(0.381)	(0.149)	(0.247)	(0.244)	(0.116)	(0.167)	(0.174)
QJE	0.443*	0.671**	0.922***	0.340*	0.207	0.076	0.261**	0.510***	0.430*
	(0.226)	(0.333)	(0.345)	(0.180)	(0.334)	(0.295)	(0.123)	(0.186)	(0.225)
JPE	-0.132	0.090	0.237	0.043	0.290	0.307*	-0.284**	-0.116	-0.195
	(0.154)	(0.257)	(0.288)	(0.130)	(0.178)	(0.168)	(0.125)	(0.191)	(0.195)
Cumulative citations in									
Econometrica		-0.095	0.182		-0.114	-0.053		-0.068	0.010
		(0.241)	(0.246)		(0.138)	(0.142)		(0.076)	(0.079)
REStud		-0.732**	-0.767**		0.180	0.271		-0.008	0.093
		(0.356)	(0.337)		(0.170)	(0.168)		(0.107)	(0.107)
AER		0.592*	0.740**		-0.125	-0.042		-0.285***	-0.163*
		(0.302)	(0.304)		(0.162)	(0.168)		(0.077)	(0.087)
QJE		-0.345	-0.317		-0.003	0.063		-0.161*	-0.086
		(0.234)	(0.246)		(0.201)	(0.193)		(0.089)	(0.097)
JPE		-0.443*	-0.305		-0.206	-0.196		-0.029	0.070
		(0.241)	(0.281)		(0.132)	(0.140)		(0.102)	(0.114)
Number of observations	331	331	331	541	541	541	901	901	901
R-squared	0.39	0.43	0.48	0.28	0.34	0.40	0.29	0.37	0.41
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from an OLS regression. The data set contains for each author the year of first appointment. The outcome variable is the maximum number of years, an economist served as editor or associate editor at a top-5 or general interest journal. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A7: Duration of Editors and Associate Editors at Top-Field Journals

	1960-1979			1980-1999			2000-2019		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	0.582**	0.287	0.019						
	(0.277)	(0.619)	(0.609)						
Female Economist*(1980-89)				-0.942	-1.831	-2.083			
				(1.677)	(1.601)	(1.590)			
Female Economist*(1990-99)				-0.051	-0.618	-0.681			
				(0.343)	(0.555)	(0.749)			
Female Economist*(2000-09)							0.002	-0.163	-0.226
							(0.696)	(0.704)	(0.716)
Female Economist*(2010-19)							0.172	0.013	-0.038
							(0.236)	(0.280)	(0.315)
Cumulative publications in									
Econometrica	-0.019	-0.235	-0.201	0.229*	0.300	0.068	-0.071	-0.185	-0.169
	(0.113)	(0.261)	(0.210)	(0.134)	(0.200)	(0.229)	(0.102)	(0.166)	(0.194)
REStud	0.043	0.041	-0.255	-0.007	-0.165	-0.283	0.221	0.090	0.159
	(0.097)	(0.211)	(0.220)	(0.204)	(0.357)	(0.369)	(0.157)	(0.279)	(0.324)
AER	0.088	0.759***	0.733***	0.089	0.121	-0.050	-0.237*	-0.035	-0.057
	(0.127)	(0.220)	(0.265)	(0.217)	(0.332)	(0.361)	(0.129)	(0.220)	(0.253)
QJE	-0.011	-0.189	-0.372	-0.063	-0.394	-0.519	-0.078	0.136	0.043
	(0.173)	(0.332)	(0.312)	(0.291)	(0.472)	(0.488)	(0.129)	(0.238)	(0.236)
JPE	0.104	0.056	-0.342	0.074	0.196	0.013	-0.318**	-0.264	-0.230
	(0.110)	(0.241)	(0.301)	(0.158)	(0.210)	(0.264)	(0.127)	(0.183)	(0.187)
Cumulative citations in									
Econometrica		0.223	0.205		-0.340**	-0.344**		-0.096	-0.045
		(0.155)	(0.140)		(0.156)	(0.172)		(0.116)	(0.119)
REStud		-0.126	-0.091		0.192	0.190		0.032	0.034
		(0.218)	(0.226)		(0.220)	(0.227)		(0.134)	(0.141)
AER		-0.466***	-0.539***		-0.059	-0.098		-0.116	-0.066
		(0.154)	(0.197)		(0.225)	(0.239)		(0.106)	(0.109)
QJE		0.212	0.101		0.209	0.235		0.074	0.103
		(0.204)	(0.232)		(0.287)	(0.299)		(0.115)	(0.122)
JPE		0.040	0.051		-0.299**	-0.302*		0.034	0.042
		(0.197)	(0.219)		(0.152)	(0.173)		(0.105)	(0.114)
Number of observations	207	207	207	457	457	457	766	766	766
R-squared	0.42	0.47	0.56	0.27	0.34	0.36	0.28	0.37	0.40
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from an OLS regression. The data set contains for each author the year of first appointment. The outcome variable is the maximum number of years, an economist served as editor or associate editor at a top-field journal. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A8: Representation among Editors and Associate Editors at Top-8 General Interest Journals

	1960-1979			1980-1999			2000-2019		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	-0.484	-0.314	-0.061						
	(0.438)	(0.386)	(0.380)						
Female Economist*(1980-89)				-0.158	-0.053	0.538*			
				(0.280)	(0.283)	(0.306)			
Female Economist*(1990-99)				-0.016	0.393*	0.569**			
				(0.225)	(0.220)	(0.221)			
Female Economist*(2000-09)							0.040	0.142	0.473***
							(0.152)	(0.147)	(0.154)
Female Economist*(2010-19)							0.103	0.388***	0.410***
							(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.132)
Cumulative publications in									
Econometrica	0.300***	0.157**	0.189***	0.266***	-0.008	-0.021	0.148***	-0.007	0.007
	(0.043)	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.057)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.037)
REStud	0.471***	0.355***	0.238**	0.185**	-0.099	-0.157**	0.181***	-0.200***	-0.110**
	(0.068)	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.074)	(0.097)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.054)
AER	0.136*	-0.376***	-0.313***	0.090	-0.247***	-0.198**	0.226***	-0.023	0.007
	(0.073)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.083)	(0.089)	(0.079)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.053)
QJE	0.312***	0.094	0.079	0.428***	0.188**	0.071	0.404***	0.163**	0.071
	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.099)	(0.072)	(0.093)	(0.085)	(0.049)	(0.070)	(0.086)
JPE	0.013	-0.026	-0.023	0.136***	-0.072	-0.035	-0.093*	-0.076	0.032
	(0.044)	(0.076)	(0.106)	(0.049)	(0.091)	(0.108)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.063)
Cumulative citations in									
Econometrica		0.126	0.033		0.278***	0.080**		0.182***	0.045*
		(0.086)	(0.077)		(0.041)	(0.040)		(0.028)	(0.026)
REStud		0.120	0.140		0.222***	0.147***		0.282***	0.091***
		(0.106)	(0.085)		(0.066)	(0.050)		(0.036)	(0.031)
AER		0.360***	0.198***		0.172***	0.001		0.219***	-0.032
		(0.075)	(0.068)		(0.050)	(0.043)		(0.027)	(0.028)
QJE		0.169*	0.110		0.112*	-0.006		0.168***	0.001
		(0.092)	(0.093)		(0.059)	(0.058)		(0.032)	(0.029)
JPE		0.170**	0.041		0.178***	-0.001		0.044	-0.059**
		(0.077)	(0.075)		(0.053)	(0.054)		(0.033)	(0.030)
Number of observations	67058	67058	67058	161151	161151	161151	301756	301756	301756
Pseudo R-squared	0.16	0.22	0.27	0.15	0.24	0.34	0.12	0.23	0.44
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist is editor or associate editor at a top-5 or general interest journal, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A9: Representation among Editors and Associate Editors at Top-field Journals

	1960-1979			1980-1999			2000-2019		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	-0.758	-0.108	0.009						
	(0.553)	(0.531)	(0.539)						
Female Economist*(1980-89)				-0.680*	-0.367	-0.048			
				(0.406)	(0.392)	(0.397)			
Female Economist*(1990-99)				-0.765**	-0.070	-0.068			
				(0.311)	(0.338)	(0.337)			
Female Economist*(2000-09)							-0.505**	-0.224	0.022
							(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.205)
Female Economist*(2010-19)							-0.276*	0.169	0.153
							(0.150)	(0.158)	(0.156)
Cumulative publications in									
Econometrica	0.173***	-0.233***	-0.195**	0.283***	0.008	-0.002	0.147***	-0.200***	-0.213***
	(0.046)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.037)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.034)	(0.050)	(0.058)
REStud	0.395***	0.343***	0.270**	0.189***	-0.130	-0.166*	0.191***	-0.003	0.065
	(0.062)	(0.115)	(0.130)	(0.067)	(0.096)	(0.087)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.070)
AER	-0.010	-0.300**	-0.246*	0.013	-0.135	-0.168**	0.075	-0.134***	-0.187***
	(0.092)	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.072)	(0.102)	(0.083)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.068)
QJE	0.084	0.105	0.080	0.011	0.051	-0.028	0.150***	-0.196***	-0.274***
	(0.093)	(0.120)	(0.131)	(0.118)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.077)
JPE	0.129***	0.035	0.007	0.208***	-0.118	-0.093	0.034	-0.189***	-0.088
	(0.047)	(0.077)	(0.105)	(0.055)	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.090)
Cumulative citations in									
Econometrica		0.404***	0.319***		0.241***	0.085*		0.205***	0.044
		(0.090)	(0.087)		(0.049)	(0.044)		(0.032)	(0.032)
REStud		0.087	0.091		0.146**	0.076		0.128***	-0.072*
		(0.111)	(0.096)		(0.073)	(0.059)		(0.040)	(0.040)
AER		0.205**	0.083		0.087	-0.018		0.137***	-0.060*
		(0.091)	(0.085)		(0.062)	(0.055)		(0.030)	(0.032)
QJE		0.157	0.109		0.022	-0.051		0.237***	0.074**
		(0.119)	(0.119)		(0.077)	(0.073)		(0.036)	(0.036)
JPE		0.213**	0.141		0.225***	0.097*		0.093***	-0.052
		(0.090)	(0.094)		(0.054)	(0.054)		(0.036)	(0.040)
Number of observations	67058	67058	67058	161151	161151	161151	301756	301756	301756
Pseudo R-squared	0.12	0.32	0.34	0.10	0.28	0.31	0.06	0.20	0.30
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist is editor or associate editor at a top-field journal, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A10: Selection into Editor and Associate Editor in Top-8 General Interest Journals: The Role of Connections

	1960-1979		1980-1999		2000-2019	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	0.365	0.325				
	(0.297)	(0.310)				
Female Economist*(1980-89)			0.993***	0.979***		
			(0.284)	(0.280)		
Female Economist*(1990-99)			0.381	0.416*		
			(0.243)	(0.242)		
Female Economist*(2000-09)					0.388**	0.366**
					(0.168)	(0.173)
Female Economist*(2010-19)					0.314**	0.326**
					(0.144)	(0.146)
No. Journals with Connections to Editors		0.345		0.602***		0.476***
		(0.377)		(0.154)		(0.088)
No. Journals with Connections to Associate Editors		0.183		0.145*		0.132***
		(0.152)		(0.081)		(0.047)
Number of observations	62721	62721	152366	152366	286195	286195
Pseudo R-squared	0.18	0.18	0.26	0.26	0.32	0.33
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications and cites in top-5 journals	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for those actively publishing economists who have not yet been in an editorial position up to the year before. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor at a top-5 and general interest journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A11: Selection into Editor and Associate Editor in Top-Field Journals: The Role of Connections

	1960-1979		1980-1999		2000-2019	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	-0.276	-0.256				
	(0.510)	(0.512)				
Female Economist*(1980-89)			-0.160	-0.141		
			(0.419)	(0.418)		
Female Economist*(1990-99)			-0.125	-0.091		
			(0.366)	(0.363)		
Female Economist*(2000-09)					0.195	0.140
					(0.194)	(0.196)
Female Economist*(2010-19)					-0.012	-0.056
					(0.170)	(0.173)
No. Journals with Connections to Editors		0.686***		0.676***		0.583***
		(0.179)		(0.119)		(0.082)
No. Journals with Connections to Associate Editors		0.176		0.176		0.705***
		(0.439)		(0.239)		(0.150)
Number of observations	58441	58441	154616	154616	289399	289399
Pseudo R-squared	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.24
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications and cites in top-5 journals	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for those actively publishing economists who have not yet been in an editorial position up to the year before. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor at a top-field journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A12: Stopwords

a, about, above, according, across, actual, added, after, against, ahead, all, almost, alone, along, also, among, amongst, an, and, and-or, and/or, anon, another, any, are, arising, around, as, at, award, away, be, because, become, becomes, been, before, behind, being, below, best, better, between, beyond, birthday, both, but, by, can, certain, come, comes, coming, completely, concerning, consider, considered, considering, consisting, de, department, der, despite, discussion, do, does, doesnt, doing, down, dr, du, due, during, each, either, especially, et, few, for, forward, from, further, get, give, given, giving, has, have, having, his, honor, how, in, inside, instead, into, is, it, its, japanese, japan, just, let, lets, little, look, looks, made, make, makes, making, many, meet, meets, more, most, much, must, my, near, nearly, next, not, now, of, off, on, only, onto, or, other, our, out, outside, over, overall, per, possibly, post, pt, put, really, regarding, reprinted, same, seen, several, should, shown, since, so-called, some, spp, studies, study, such, take, taken, takes, taking, than, that, the, their, them, then, there, therefrom, these, they, this, those, through, throughout, to, together, toward, towards, under, undergoing, up, upon, upward, various, versus, very, via, vol, vols, vs, was, way, ways, we, were, what, whats, when, where, which, while, whither, who, whom, whos, whose, why, with, within, without, yet, you, your, 1990s, 1990, 2000, ex, bad

Notes: Stopwords are based on the Web of Science catalogue.

Table A13: Model Performance

	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Chosen regularization parameter	9.4444	17.8889	13.6667	11.5556	17.8889	5.2222
Out-of-sample Pseudo-Rsquared	0.0609	0.1035	0.3605	0.3362	0.3868	0.2399
In-sample Pseudo-Rsquared	0.8970	0.9358	0.8969	0.8446	0.8384	0.4877

Notes: Results are based on logistic regressions with lasso regularization. The optimal regularization parameter was chosen over the interval $[1, 20]$. The in-sample Pseudo-Rsquared is based on the whole data set used in the cross-validation (i.e. over all 10 folds, both the data used to train and to evaluate the model). The out-of-sample Pseudo-Rsquared is computed based on data that was not used in the cross-validation.

Table A14: Top-10 Word Predictors of Selection

Rank	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
			Top-8 journals			
1	keynesian	incid	joint	exchang rate	monetari polici	paramet
2	monopolist	sensit	equilibria	vari	interact	margin
3	invest criteria	surplus	term structur	subsidi	advers select	commit
4	econometr	activ	intern trade	equival	good	infer
5	share	analysis	input output	integr	multipl	rise
6	oligopoli	technolog chang	function form	influenc	qualiti	open
7	product	invest behavior	theorem	consumpt	import	partial
8	industri growth	optimum	major	likelihood estim	sid	semiparametr
9	wage	specif	random	school	explain	vote
10	save	keynesian	survey	common	natur	health
			Top-field journals			
1	predict	budget	distribut lag	surplus	depend	instrument variabl
2	coeffici	incent	regress model	busi	asymmetr inform	busi cycl
3	treasuri	harrod	diversif	process	treatment	field
4	econom polici	uncertainty	incent	debt	world	form
5	expans	empir evid	uncertain	social secur	nation	right
6	factor	choic	imperfect	group	sid	area
7	general theori	power	goods	linear regress	fund	consumpt
8	debt	optim	fiscal	equival	nonparametr	india
9	professor	construct	equilibrium	hazard	capital	semiparametr
10	fix	simultan	order	reserv	consumpt	term

Notes: The table shows the top-10 uni- and bi-grams predicting selection at the top-8 and top-field journals.

Table A15: Top-10 Predictors of Selection by Journal

rank	ECMA	AER	JPE	QJE	EJ	JEEA	REStat	REStud
1	commit	instrument variabl	generat	unit state	human capit	immigr	micro	asymptot
2	belief	compar	differ	correl	shock	hypothesi	health	cycl
3	nomin	subject	product	belief	imperfect	asymptot	monetari polici	skill
4	vote	cycl	mix	subject	skill	vari	sampl	identifi
5	compar	predict	instrument variabl	secur	strateg	infer	evolut	labor
6	health	aggreg	fund	long	evolut	conflict	predict	variat
7	polit economi	information	institut	inform	union	stock market	error	collect
8	entri	hypothesi	manag	american	theoret	institut	poor	financ
9	school	govern	balanc	debt	nonparametr	collus	form	institut
10	monoton	consum	hazard	world	household	monetari	product	age
rank	JDE	JME	JF	JOLE	JET	JoEC	JPubE	
1	evolut	consumpt	consumpt	bootstrap	skill	equal	predict	
2	war	contract	converg	generat	cycl	monoton	instrument variabl	
3	outcom	macroeconom	identif	peer	agent	model	size	
4	credit	hypothesi	discret	interact	polici	form	foreign direct	
5	india	educ	busi cycl	immigr	belief	estim	network	
6	moral hazard	rate	vari	work	knowledg	regress	impact	
7	alloc	sector	home	multipl	coordin	time seri	relat	
8	imperfect	default	valu	labour	theori	futur	secur	
9	exchang rate	theori evid	market	status	competit	test	field	
10	cross	bargain	optim	low	rank	factor	benefit	

Notes: The table shows the top-10 uni- and bi-grams predicting selection at each of the 15 journals.

Table A16: Selection into Editors and Associate Editors at Top-5 and General Interest Journals with Field Controls

	1960-1979			1980-1999			2000-2019		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	0.183	0.244	0.567*						
	(0.354)	(0.338)	(0.295)						
Female Economist*(1980-89)				0.590*	0.753***	1.107***			
				(0.306)	(0.268)	(0.281)			
Female Economist*(1990-99)				0.138	0.283	0.300			
				(0.315)	(0.327)	(0.361)			
Female Economist*(2000-09)							-0.015	-0.027	0.296
							(0.243)	(0.229)	(0.215)
Female Economist*(2010-19)							0.168	0.228	0.356**
							(0.136)	(0.144)	(0.140)
Cumulative publications in									
Econometrica	0.223***	0.206***	0.302**	0.220***	0.201**	0.036	0.227***	0.270***	0.130
	(0.040)	(0.075)	(0.119)	(0.048)	(0.081)	(0.101)	(0.044)	(0.062)	(0.104)
REStud	0.459***	0.548***	0.717***	0.153	0.230*	-0.049	0.177**	0.082	0.091
	(0.075)	(0.120)	(0.152)	(0.103)	(0.136)	(0.128)	(0.071)	(0.117)	(0.112)
AER	0.100	-0.098	0.098	-0.015	-0.213*	-0.195*	0.198***	0.061	-0.017
	(0.075)	(0.113)	(0.153)	(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.106)	(0.067)	(0.079)	(0.075)
QJE	0.051	-0.049	-0.097	0.422***	0.268**	0.023	0.340***	0.065	0.065
	(0.081)	(0.115)	(0.154)	(0.083)	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.083)	(0.097)	(0.092)
JPE	0.091*	-0.002	0.087	0.142**	-0.068	-0.135	-0.033	0.026	0.148*
	(0.050)	(0.090)	(0.132)	(0.061)	(0.082)	(0.100)	(0.060)	(0.092)	(0.085)
Cumulative citations in									
Econometrica		-0.060	0.028		0.074	-0.013		0.081**	0.008
		(0.108)	(0.101)		(0.062)	(0.059)		(0.039)	(0.040)
REStud		-0.163	-0.108		-0.061	0.062		0.131**	-0.042
		(0.157)	(0.139)		(0.090)	(0.069)		(0.056)	(0.049)
AER		0.162**	0.114		0.084	0.015		0.158***	-0.030
		(0.081)	(0.082)		(0.064)	(0.058)		(0.035)	(0.034)
QJE		0.138	0.264**		0.091	0.017		0.176***	0.001
		(0.101)	(0.113)		(0.075)	(0.071)		(0.039)	(0.038)
JPE		0.152	0.121		0.166***	0.096*		-0.009	-0.115***
		(0.098)	(0.101)		(0.057)	(0.054)		(0.046)	(0.043)
Predicted Prob. field	4.763***	4.624***	4.558***	6.136***	6.257***	5.464***	5.854***	5.797***	4.162***
	(0.234)	(0.244)	(0.265)	(0.310)	(0.297)	(0.288)	(0.314)	(0.298)	(0.332)
Number of observations	62705	62705	62705	152356	152356	152356	286193	286193	286193
Pseudo R-squared	0.20	0.22	0.27	0.21	0.24	0.34	0.13	0.19	0.35
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor at a top-5 or general interest journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A17: Selection into Editors and Associate Editors at Top-Field Journals with Field Controls

	1960-1979			1980-1999			2000-2019		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	-1.362	-0.759	-0.727						
	(1.055)	(0.812)	(0.872)						
Female Economist*(1980-89)				-0.476	-0.288	-0.064			
				(0.488)	(0.466)	(0.434)			
Female Economist*(1990-99)				-0.748	-0.158	-0.091			
				(0.499)	(0.445)	(0.400)			
Female Economist*(2000-09)							-0.399	-0.214	-0.249
							(0.258)	(0.253)	(0.321)
Female Economist*(2010-19)							-0.359*	-0.160	-0.004
							(0.187)	(0.197)	(0.179)
Cumulative publications in									
Econometrica	0.046	-0.091	-0.090	0.158***	-0.047	-0.145	0.049*	-0.091*	-0.263*
	(0.039)	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.032)	(0.061)	(0.100)	(0.026)	(0.048)	(0.145)
REStud	0.325***	0.501***	0.442***	-0.023	-0.275**	-0.429***	0.148**	0.153*	-0.121
	(0.057)	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.066)	(0.116)	(0.137)	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.214)
AER	-0.145	-0.614***	-0.643***	-0.087	0.010	-0.262	0.100	0.053	-0.387**
	(0.102)	(0.154)	(0.164)	(0.078)	(0.127)	(0.161)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.182)
QJE	-0.023	0.280***	0.274*	-0.028	0.190	-0.205	0.136*	-0.286***	-0.603***
	(0.117)	(0.089)	(0.141)	(0.109)	(0.162)	(0.180)	(0.078)	(0.091)	(0.218)
JPE	0.007	-0.009	-0.069	0.173***	0.102	0.159	-0.090	-0.026	-0.277
	(0.069)	(0.124)	(0.142)	(0.041)	(0.077)	(0.144)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.187)
Cumulative citations in									
Econometrica		0.065	0.036		0.208***	0.155***		0.116***	-0.063
		(0.116)	(0.121)		(0.057)	(0.060)		(0.036)	(0.047)
REStud		-0.051	0.043		0.077	0.076		-0.032	-0.209***
		(0.151)	(0.130)		(0.084)	(0.087)		(0.055)	(0.067)
AER		0.285***	0.203*		-0.050	-0.010		0.097**	-0.059
		(0.100)	(0.111)		(0.077)	(0.088)		(0.038)	(0.042)
QJE		-0.180	-0.207		-0.177*	-0.060		0.276***	0.086*
		(0.135)	(0.157)		(0.102)	(0.104)		(0.040)	(0.047)
JPE		0.183	0.187		0.143**	0.037		-0.047	-0.144**
		(0.121)	(0.124)		(0.073)	(0.077)		(0.047)	(0.057)
Predicted Prob. field	6.745***	6.052***	6.153***	6.380***	5.765***	5.458***	6.006***	5.664***	4.772***
	(0.330)	(0.379)	(0.431)	(0.226)	(0.248)	(0.277)	(0.240)	(0.235)	(0.284)
Number of observations	58428	58428	58428	154606	154606	154606	289397	289397	289397
Pseudo R-squared	0.28	0.35	0.37	0.25	0.30	0.34	0.13	0.20	0.29
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor at a top-field journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A18: Selection into Editors or Associate Editors at Top-5 and General Interest Journals: Field Controls and Controls for Connections

	1960-1979		1980-1999		2000-2019	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	0.365	0.566*				
	(0.297)	(0.295)				
Female Economist*(1980-89)			0.993***	1.098***		
			(0.284)	(0.278)		
Female Economist*(1990-99)			0.381	0.348		
			(0.243)	(0.354)		
Female Economist*(2000-09)					0.388**	0.287
					(0.168)	(0.217)
Female Economist*(2010-19)					0.314**	0.369***
					(0.144)	(0.142)
Predicted Prob. field		4.558***		5.473***		4.041***
		(0.267)		(0.287)		(0.334)
No. Journals with Connections to Editors		0.066		0.671***		0.397***
		(0.466)		(0.168)		(0.104)
No. Journals with Connections to Associate Editors		-0.023		0.017		0.109**
		(0.164)		(0.095)		(0.049)
Number of observations	62721	62705	152366	152356	286195	286193
Pseudo R-squared	0.18	0.27	0.26	0.34	0.32	0.35
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Publications in general interest/field journals	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Levels of top5 pubs/citations/yrs since first pub	no	no	no	no	no	no

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains author-year observations for the universe of actively publishing economists of that year. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the year in which an economist becomes editor or associate editor at a top-5 or general interest journal for the first time, and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the author-level: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A19: 20 Most Frequent JEL Codes of Papers Edited by Male Editors

Rank	Frequency	JEL code	Description
1	144	D83	Search - Learning - Information and Knowledge - Communication - Belief - Unawareness
2	136	D82	Asymmetric and Private Information - Mechanism Design
3	85	D72	Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
4	81	E32	Business Fluctuations - Cycles
5	65	J24	Human Capital - Skills - Occupational Choice - Labor Productivity
6	62	D91	Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
7	61	D12	Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
8	56	E24	Employment - Unemployment - Wages - Intergenerational Income Distribution - Aggregate Human Capital - Aggregate Labor Productivity
9	54	E52	Monetary Policy
10	54	J31	Wage Level and Structure - Wage Differentials
11	50	E21	Consumption - Saving - Wealth
12	49	E44	Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
13	45	D81	Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
14	45	G21	Banks - Depository Institutions - Micro Finance Institutions - Mortgages
15	42	C91	Laboratory, Individual Behavior
16	42	D86	Economics of Contract: Theory
17	39	C72	Noncooperative Games
18	38	C78	Bargaining Theory - Matching Theory
19	38	D03	Distribution
20	37	C73	Stochastic and Dynamic Games - Evolutionary Games - Repeated Games

Notes: Column 1 shows the rank in terms of frequency, from highest to lowest. Column 2 shows the frequency. Column 3 lists the JEL code and column 4 lists the actual labels of the JEL codes.

Table A20: 20 Most Frequent JEL Codes of Papers Edited by Female Editors

Rank	Frequency	JEL code	Description
1	37	J24	Human Capital - Skills - Occupational Choice - Labor Productivity
2	30	O15	Human Resources - Human Development - Income Distribution - Migration
3	29	J31	Wage Level and Structure - Wage Differentials
4	27	D72	Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
5	25	E32	Business Fluctuations - Cycles
6	24	J16	Economics of Gender - Non-labor Discrimination
7	23	D83	Search - Learning - Information and Knowledge - Communication - Belief - Unawareness
8	23	J13	Fertility - Family Planning - Child Care - Children - Youth
9	19	O17	Formal and Informal Sectors - Shadow Economy - Institutional Arrangements
10	18	J15	Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants - Non-labor Discrimination
11	17	D22	Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
12	17	E21	Consumption - Saving - Wealth
13	17	I21	Analysis of Education
14	16	E52	Monetary Policy
15	16	I18	Government Policy - Regulation - Public Health
16	16	R23	Regional Migration - Regional Labor Markets - Population - Neighborhood Characteristics
17	15	J22	Time Allocation and Labor Supply
18	15	K42	Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
19	14	E24	Employment - Unemployment - Wages - Intergenerational Income Distribution - Aggregate Human Capital - Aggregate Labor Productivity
20	14	E44	Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

Notes: Column 1 shows the rank in terms of frequency, from highest to lowest. Column 2 shows the frequency. Column 3 lists the JEL code and column 4 lists the actual labels of the JEL codes.

Table A21: 20 Most Frequent Topics

Topic rank	Count	Representative Keywords
1	1788	tax, taxation, taxes, income, optimal
2	1090	education, school, college, schooling, schools
3	1143	price, monopoly, monopolistic, pricing, competition
4	1256	estimators, simultaneous, estimation, moment, least
5	849	games, repeated, nash, equilibria, game
6	657	insurance, health, care, hospital, medical
7	813	trade, tariff, tariffs, international, intermediate
8	501	auctions, auction, bidding, firstprice, bidders
9	953	equilibria, equilibrium, existence, economies, stability
10	472	migration, immigration, immigrants, remittances, immigrant
11	479	retirement, pension, security, social, pensions
12	499	voting, elections, media, voter, electoral
13	614	interest, rates, term, rate, structure
14	402	housing, rent, house, rentseeking, seeking
15	611	public, goods, provision, good, local
16	563	contracts, incentive, contracting, renegotiation, contract
17	744	growth, balanced, twosector, economic, endogenous
18	552	unemployment, duration, insurance, involuntary, benefits
19	507	fiscal, budget, deficits, government, spending
20	460	inflation, inflationary, targeting, price, expectations

Notes: Representative topic words are extracted using class-based TF-IDF (c-TF-IDF).

Table A22: Productivity: Number of Papers published during Editorial Service

	All	Top-8	Top-field	Editors	Associate Editors
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
4 yrs before	-0.052	-0.018	-0.097	-0.115*	-0.031
	(0.053)	(0.067)	(0.083)	(0.064)	(0.077)
3 yrs before	-0.012	0.030	-0.045	-0.066	0.027
	(0.044)	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.061)
2 yrs before	-0.016	0.017	-0.017	-0.080	0.029
	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.049)
Year of appointment	-0.031	-0.016	-0.039	-0.110**	0.032
	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.046)
1 yr after	-0.090**	-0.112**	-0.008	-0.098*	-0.036
	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.057)
2 yr after	-0.168***	-0.184***	-0.057	-0.110*	-0.124*
	(0.050)	(0.063)	(0.082)	(0.060)	(0.069)
3 yrs after	-0.125**	-0.181**	-0.023	-0.144**	-0.078
	(0.062)	(0.077)	(0.103)	(0.070)	(0.090)
4 yrs after	-0.162**	-0.128	-0.087	-0.145*	-0.037
	(0.076)	(0.092)	(0.127)	(0.083)	(0.111)
5 yrs after	-0.157*	-0.209*	-0.049	-0.134	-0.045
	(0.089)	(0.106)	(0.152)	(0.095)	(0.134)
4 yrs before × Female=1	0.065	0.181	0.089	0.301**	0.013
	(0.101)	(0.117)	(0.150)	(0.142)	(0.118)
3 yrs before × Female=1	0.068	0.026	0.118	0.104	-0.067
	(0.091)	(0.107)	(0.146)	(0.167)	(0.097)
2 yrs before × Female=1	0.002	0.051	-0.016	0.313*	-0.082
	(0.098)	(0.112)	(0.167)	(0.183)	(0.108)
Year of appointment × Female=1	-0.001	0.123	-0.108	0.135	0.018
	(0.094)	(0.113)	(0.134)	(0.151)	(0.109)
1 yr after × Female=1	0.165	0.116	0.175	0.257	0.054
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.186)	(0.192)	(0.114)
2 yr after × Female=1	0.065	0.164	-0.035	0.213	0.058
	(0.089)	(0.104)	(0.141)	(0.148)	(0.101)
3 yrs after × Female=1	-0.088	-0.121	0.177	0.335**	-0.142
	(0.090)	(0.111)	(0.143)	(0.162)	(0.103)
4 yrs after × Female=1	0.102	0.132	-0.019	0.208	0.060
	(0.114)	(0.134)	(0.171)	(0.179)	(0.131)
5 yrs after × Female=1	-0.072	-0.114	0.043	0.277	-0.139
	(0.103)	(0.128)	(0.170)	(0.207)	(0.121)
Number of observations	15991	10566	8780	8728	11239
Adjusted R-squared	0.23	0.23	0.26	0.27	0.22
Author FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Age FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The dependent variable is the number of publications per year. The sample consists of all active scholars who have held an editorial position in any of the 15 journals (a), top-8 (b) or top-field journals (c), or an editor or associate editor (d) position at any of the 15 journals at least once. Scholars enter the sample up to four years before their editorial service begins and remain in the sample for up to five years or until their service ends. Subsequent editorial appointments are not considered. All specifications control for author, year and academic age fixed effects. Event study dummies are defined relative to the year before the start of service. Standard errors clustered at author-level are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A23: Unconditional Offers and Acceptance Probabilities

In the last 20 years have you ...		**Overall**	**Female**	**Male**	***p*-value**
... been offered a position as...?	Editor at top-8 journal	72 (7.5%)	9 (5.7%)	63 (7.9%)	0.4
	Associate editor at top-8 journal	187 (19%)	39 (25%)	148 (18%)	0.065
	Editor at top field journal	205 (21%)	40 (25%)	165 (21%)	0.2
	Associate editor at top field journal	364 (38%)	50 (32%)	314 (39%)	0.085
	Editor at other journal	382 (40%)	78 (50%)	304 (38%)	0.006
	Associate editor at other journal	552 (58%)	91 (58%)	461 (57%)	>0.9
ever accepted a position as...?	Editor at top-8 journal	59 (82%)	6 (67%)	53 (84%)	0.3
	Associate editor at top-8 journal	175 (94%)	36 (92%)	139 (94%)	0.7
	Editor at top field journal	163 (80%)	31 (78%)	132 (80%)	0.7
	Associate editor at top field journal	327 (90%)	44 (88%)	283 (90%)	0.6
	Editor at other journal	273 (71%)	48 (62%)	225 (74%)	0.030
	Associate editor at other journal	438 (79%)	64 (70%)	374 (81%)	0.020

Notes: The table shows the mean survey responses from waves 1 and 2 excluding incomplete responses. In the upper panel, percentages indicate the share in the number of respondents. In the lower panel, percentages indicate the share in the number of those respondents who were offered a position (in each of the journals/roles).

Table A24: Probability of Being Offered an Editorial Position

	Top-8				Top-Field			
	Editor		Associate Editor		Editor		Associate Editor	
Female	-0.338	-0.268	0.379*	0.428**	0.278	0.439**	-0.320*	-0.099
	(0.368)	(0.373)	(0.206)	(0.213)	(0.203)	(0.215)	(0.186)	(0.197)
Round 1		1.924***		1.185***		1.050***		0.987***
		(0.472)		(0.218)		(0.205)		(0.161)
Micro		0.212		0.184		0.387		-0.036
		(0.423)		(0.262)		(0.269)		(0.230)
Macro		0.800*		0.247		0.061		0.262
		(0.450)		(0.308)		(0.318)		(0.266)
Metrics		0.044		-0.330		-0.241		0.174
		(0.475)		(0.313)		(0.308)		(0.253)
Before the 1980s		0.728		0.081		1.275***		1.143***
		(0.800)		(0.433)		(0.385)		(0.364)
In the 1980s		1.283*		0.312		1.089***		1.002***
		(0.673)		(0.346)		(0.345)		(0.299)
In the 1990s		0.838		-0.183		0.502		0.362
		(0.641)		(0.307)		(0.306)		(0.251)
In the 2000s		0.815		-0.077		-0.074		-0.045
		(0.624)		(0.278)		(0.298)		(0.236)
Number of observations	959	958	959	958	959	958	959	958
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.07

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains all complete survey responses. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent has ever been offered an editorial position, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A25: Probability of Accepting an Actual Offer

	Top-8				Top-Field			
	Editor		Associate Editor		Editor		Associate Editor	
Female	-0.975	-1.805	-0.252	-0.347	-0.150	0.300	-0.219	-0.473
	(0.792)	(1.107)	(0.694)	(0.784)	(0.427)	(0.474)	(0.475)	(0.507)
Round 1				-1.024		1.241***		0.338
				(0.946)		(0.419)		(0.444)
Micro		-1.108		0.782		0.040		0.060
		(1.462)		(0.680)		(0.524)		(0.483)
Macro		-0.050		1.050		1.647*		0.613
		(1.555)		(0.933)		(0.939)		(0.675)
Metrics		-0.166				0.094		-0.366
		(1.493)				(0.671)		(0.511)
Before the 1980s		-3.042**		-1.349		0.082		-1.148**
		(1.208)		(0.999)		(0.679)		(0.533)
In the 1980s		-2.179**		-0.525		0.548		-0.442
		(0.933)		(0.959)		(0.699)		(0.540)
In the 1990s		-1.191		-0.862		0.947		-0.586
		(1.040)		(0.795)		(0.650)		(0.454)
In the 2000s						0.218		
						(0.573)		
Number of observations	72	65	187	142	205	205	364	329
Pseudo R-squared	0.02	0.16	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.04

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains all complete survey responses. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent has ever accepted an editorial position, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A26: Probability of Accepting a Hypothetical Offer

	Top-8				Top-Field			
	Editor		Associate Editor		Editor		Associate Editor	
Female	0.437**	0.277	0.245	0.100	0.199	-0.000	0.109	-0.006
	(0.191)	(0.200)	(0.233)	(0.247)	(0.217)	(0.223)	(0.255)	(0.276)
Round 1		0.469***		0.428**		0.231		-0.110
		(0.157)		(0.186)		(0.172)		(0.213)
Micro		0.022		-0.446		-0.223		-0.380
		(0.228)		(0.291)		(0.272)		(0.336)
Macro		-0.005		-0.197		-0.380		-0.277
		(0.274)		(0.343)		(0.309)		(0.387)
Metrics		-0.362		-0.125		-0.464		0.062
		(0.255)		(0.323)		(0.296)		(0.383)
Before the 1980s		-1.926***		-3.424***		-2.804***		-2.938***
		(0.361)		(0.461)		(0.482)		(0.608)
In the 1980s		-2.023***		-2.559***		-1.387***		-1.170***
		(0.316)		(0.386)		(0.342)		(0.427)
In the 1990s		-0.761***		-1.162***		-0.642**		-0.578*
		(0.250)		(0.342)		(0.272)		(0.336)
In the 2000s		-0.585**		-0.872***		-0.206		-0.056
		(0.230)		(0.323)		(0.250)		(0.309)
Number of observations	887	886	772	771	754	753	595	594
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.07

Notes: The table shows the estimates from the latent model of a logistic regression. The data set contains all complete survey responses. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent has ever accepted an editorial position, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A27: Probability of Being Offered an Editorial Position: LPM vs Heckman

	Top-8				Top-Field			
	Editor		Associate Editor		Editor		Associate Editor	
Female	-0.009	-0.010	0.072**	0.067*	0.074**	0.085**	-0.015	-0.006
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.045)
First stage								
Tuesday		0.068		0.068		0.068		0.068
		(0.058)		(0.058)		(0.058)		(0.058)
Wednesday		0.061		0.061		0.061		0.061
		(0.058)		(0.058)		(0.058)		(0.058)
Thursday		-0.057		-0.057		-0.057		-0.057
		(0.060)		(0.060)		(0.060)		(0.060)
Friday		0.017		0.017		0.017		0.017
		(0.059)		(0.059)		(0.059)		(0.059)
Extra reminder		0.075**		0.075**		0.075**		0.075**
		(0.037)		(0.037)		(0.037)		(0.037)
Round 1		0.120***		0.120***		0.120***		0.120***
		(0.039)		(0.039)		(0.039)		(0.039)
Female		0.048		0.048		0.048		0.048
		(0.051)		(0.051)		(0.051)		(0.051)
Number of observations	938	7,559	938	7,559	938	7,559	938	7,559

Notes: The table shows the estimates from a linear regression model (odd-numbered columns) and a Heckman two-step selection model. The sample includes all active researchers who had published at least three times between 2000 and 2019 in any of the 36 journals in our dataset and at least once in any of the top-8 or top-field journals that we consider in our regression. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent has ever been offered an editorial position, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A28: Number of Complaints

	Top-5/general interest		Top-field		Other journals	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mean	1.0	3.3	3.6	2.8	1.8	2.5
Median	1	2	2	2	0.3	1
Maximum	2	15	15	20	15	20
n	6	51	30	130	48	222

Notes: The table shows the share of decisions (in percent) the editor reported to come back as complaints.

B Survey Questions

This survey is carried out with the objective of measuring expectations about and experiences with editorial roles in journals. We distinguish between two types of roles (which describe well the structure of most top journals, although not all of them):

1. Editors / Co-editors: they are the main decision makers, i.e. they choose referees and write decision letters

2. Associate editors: their main task is providing referee reports

When answering the questions on your past experience, please think of the last 20 years. Before starting the questions on the editorial roles, please fill out 4 demographic questions. All answers remain anonymous. The survey should take at most 15 minutes. Please do not share this link with others.

Please indicate below that you have read and consent to the terms and conditions of this survey.

- ◦ I consent
- ◦ I do not consent

— Start of the survey —

Demographic questions

a. When did you complete your PhD?

- ◦ Before the 1980s
- ◦ In the 1980s
- ◦ In the 1990s
- ◦ In the 2000s
- ◦ In the 2010s or later

b. Gender

- ○ Male
- ○ Female
- ○ Other/prefer not to say

c. Where are you based in?

- ○ US
- ○ Europe
- ○ Other

d. Which broad field do you work in?

- ○ Applied-Empirical Micro
- ○ Macro-Finance
- ○ Econometrics-Theory
- ○ Other

Main questionnaire

1. Have you ever been offered an editorial position in the last 20 years? Please select "Yes" or "No" in each of the boxes below.

	Top-5 or top general interest journal		Top-field journal		Other journal	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Editor / Co-editor	○	○	○	○	○	○
Associate editor	○	○	○	○	○	○

In the following we first focus on experiences and motivations related to the positions you have been offered.

2. Did you say "Yes" or "No" to the offer(s), or "Yes" to some and "No" to others?

	Yes	No	Yes to some/ No to others
Editor / Co-editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal	○	○	○
Associate editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal	○	○	○
Editor / Co-editor at top-field journal	○	○	○
Associate editor at top-field journal	○	○	○
Editor / Co-editor at other journal	○	○	○
Associate editor at other journal	○	○	○

3. For those offers you accepted, what was your main motivation to accept?

[Respondent asked to select "Very important", "Important" or "Not important" for a. Editor and b. Associate Editor positions at i. top-5 and general interest ii. top-field journals]

- Prestige associated with the job title
- Duty: Serving the profession
- Impact in the profession: Shaping the field
- Financial (please leave blank if the position is unpaid)
- To improve conditions at home institution (e.g. teaching buyouts, decrease admin work etc.)
- Other important motive: if any please specify

4. For those offers you rejected, what was your main motivation to reject?

[Respondent asked to select "Very important", "Important" or "Not important" for a. Editor and b. Associate Editor positions at i. top-5 and general interest ii. top-field journals]

- It involves too much work
- Don't feel competent enough/too much responsibility
- Fear of complaints from submitting authors

- Journal/role not prestigious enough
- Already have enough editorial positions
- Other important motive: if any please specify

5. While in the editorial role(s) you indicated before: what were the difficulties you encountered?

[Respondent asked to select "Very important", "Important" or "Not important" for a. Editor and b. Associate Editor positions at i. top-5 and general interest ii. top-field journals]

- Too much work
- Don't feel competent enough/too much responsibility
- Difficulty in agreeing/communicating with other members in editorial roles
- Complaints from submitting authors
- Difficulty with the administration/technical staff of the journal
- Difficulty in recruiting referees
- Other important difficulty: if any please specify

6. How many hours per week did you spend on editorial work? Please specify an estimate of the number of hours per week for each position.

Position	Hours per week
Editor / Co-editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal	☐
Associate editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal	☐
Editor / Co-editor at top-field journal	☐
Associate editor at top-field journal	☐
Editor / Co-editor at other journal	☐
Associate editor at other journal	☐

7. Out of all the decisions you made, what is the percentage that came back in the form of complaints?

Position	# Complaints
Editor / Co-editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal	☐
Editor / Co-editor at top-field journal	☐
Editor / Co-editor at other journal	☐

Next we focus on expectations related to positions that you have not been offered.

8. If you were offered, would you be inclined to say "Yes" or "No" to the offer(s)?

	Yes	No
Editor / Co-editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal	○	○
Associate editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal	○	○
Editor / Co-editor at top-field journal	○	○
Associate editor at top-field journal	○	○
Editor / Co-editor at other journal	○	○
Associate editor at other journal	○	○

9. If you were offered, what would be your main motivation to accept the offer(s)?

[Respondent asked to select "Very important", "Important" or "Not important" for a. Editor and b. Associate Editor positions at i. top-5 and general interest ii. top-field journals]

- Prestige associated with the job title
- Duty: Serving the profession
- Impact in the profession: Shaping the field
- Financial (please leave blank if the position is unpaid)
- To improve conditions at home institution (e.g. teaching buyouts, decrease admin work etc.)
- Other important motive: if any please specify

10. If you were offered, what would be your main motivation to reject the offer(s)?

[Respondent asked to select "Very important", "Important" or "Not important" for a. Editor and b. Associate Editor positions at i. top-5 and general interest ii. top-field journals]

- It involves too much work
- Don't feel competent enough/too much responsibility
- Fear of complaints from submitting authors
- Journal/role not prestigious enough
- Already have enough editorial positions
- Other important motive: if any please specify

11. Now we focus on positions you have not been offered or have been offered but rejected. How many hours per week do you think you would spend on editorial work? Please specify an estimate of the number of hours per week for each position.

Position	Hours per week
Editor / Co-editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal	☐
Associate editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal	☐
Editor / Co-editor at top-field journal	☐
Associate editor at top-field journal	☐
Editor / Co-editor at other journal	☐
Associate editor at other journal	☐

12. Again, we focus on positions you have not been offered or have been offered but rejected. Out of all decisions you would need to make, what percentage would you expect to come back in the form of complaints?

Position	# Complaints
Editor / Co-editor at top-5 or top general-interest journal	☐
Editor / Co-editor at top-field journal	☐
Editor / Co-editor at other journal	☐

13. Did or does your institution consider any of the following positions for a teaching reduction and/or for a reduction in admin tasks?

	Top-5 or top general interest journal		Top field journal		Other journal	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Editor / Co-editor	○	○	○	○	○	○
Associate editor	○	○	○	○	○	○

14. How many hours per week do you spend on each of the following tasks?

Task	Hours per week
Teaching	☐
Student supervision (undergrad, grad, post doc etc)	☐
Administration	☐
Own research	☐
Editorial duties	☐

15. We thank you for your time spent taking this survey.

Do you wish to participate in the lottery?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No