Intergenerational Mobility by Same-Sex and Different-Sex Attraction*

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Abstract

Existing research documents substantial disparities in life outcomes between same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals, typically disadvantaging same-sex attracted individuals. In this paper, we explore these disparities from an intergenerational mobility perspective, analysing how parental background relates to adult children's earnings, health, fertility, and family dynamics, comparing same-sex and different-sex attracted adult children. To do so, we develop a new strategy to identify both same-sex and different-sex couples in population-wide administrative data, using two decades of data on joint financial commitments from Denmark. This strategy alleviates limitations related to non-representative surveys and cross-sectional data on same-sex couples. We find a positive income gap for same-sex attracted women and a negative income gap for same-sex attracted men. These gaps persist across the parental income distribution, that is, the "gay penalty" and the "lesbian premium" are not mediated by parental income. However, the small premium for same-sex attracted women converts to a large penalty when considering household, rather than personal, income. We explore potential drivers of these persistent income gaps, including differences in education, fertility, health, household composition, and location choices; we also document large and persistent gaps across the parental income distribution in many of these dimensions. Furthermore, we consider heterogeneity across childhood regions and cohorts, and finally, we verify that our results are robust to controlling for unobserved parental heterogeneity through sibling fixed effects.

JEL classifications: D64, J10, J16
Keywords: sexual attraction, couples, intergenerational mobility

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"I will never forget what it was like coming out and having nobody to look up toward. I remember the lack of hope – and our friends can't fulfil it... And the young gay people who are coming out... The only thing they have to look forward to is hope... Hope for a better world, hope for a better tomorrow, hope for a better place to come to if the pressures at home are too great."

The Hope Speech, Harvey Milk, 25 June 1978, four months before he was assassinated.[1]

1 Introduction

Since Badgett's canonical work was published in 1995, economic and demographic research has continued to document substantial gaps in outcomes between same-sex and different sex attracted individuals. These gaps extend to labour market outcomes, fertility, and health, and almost always in the form of 'same-sex penalties', that is, lower earnings, lower fertility, and worse (in particular mental) health outcomes amongst same-sex attracted individuals. The primary exemption to this general picture is the earnings of same-sex attracted women – these are often found to be higher than that of different-sex attracted women. (Badgett, 1995, 2020; Klawitter, 2015; Mize, 2016). In recent years, the fight for equal opportunities for sexual minority individuals has occupied a prominent role in the public discourse, and yet, we remain far from understanding the underlying mechanisms by which those who choose partners of the same sex experience vastly different health and economic outcomes compared to the heterosexual majority. Understanding these mechanisms is not only vital to improving the life trajectories of sexual minorities, but would also have a significant and positive impact on aggregate economic outcomes (Badgett, 2020).

Empirical explorations of economic and health disparities between same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals have been undertaken primarily by the use of cross-sectional data, often based on surveys. This is because sexuality is generally unobservable in administrative data. Survey data, however, often only allow for relatively static analyses of these outcomes because individuals cannot be observed over a long time, let alone across generations. In this paper, we analyse the origins of same-sex disparities in a perspective of intergenerational mobility, harnessing Danish population-wide administrative data. We develop a new proxy for sexual attraction based on newly released data on shared financial commitments in Denmark, which allows us to identify couples beyond marriage registers. With these new data, we identify same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals and observe them both before and after relationship spells. We link each individual with information about their parents (and siblings) to explore the relationship between parental earnings and labour market outcomes, health, fertility, and household outcomes by sexuality. As such, we explore the underlying intergenerational patterns of the

[1]The full speech is available here: https://www.speech.almeida.co.uk/harvey-milk

vastly different life trajectories of same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals, focusing on where all life trajectories start: with the parents.

Whereas sexuality will often play an important role in the relationship between romantic partners, it may also affect the relationship between a person and their parents. Sexual minority individuals may experience less closeness with parents (Hank and Salzburger, 2015), may move out earlier and further away from parents (Fischer and Kalmijn, 2021), they face the risk that parents do not accept their sexuality (Mills-Koonce *et al.*, 2018), and they are at increased risk of conflicts with parents that lead to youth homelessness (Dempsey *et al.*, 2020). In other words, same-sex attracted individuals may experience reduced or different parental support compared to heterosexual individuals. It is unknown if this means that they benefit less from parental characteristics, such as high parental earnings, known to be associated with better health and economic outcomes later in life (see e.g. Chetty *et al.*, 2014, 2020). Therefore, considering intergenerational mobility is particularly important if we want to better understand the potential challenges faced by sexual minorities throughout the life-course.

Observing sexual minorities in population-wide data is notoriously challenging, thus far, leaving it unclear how to best obtain valid information about sexuality at a large scale and in a longitudinal setting. Sexuality may refer to sexual identity, sexual desires, and/or sexual practises, and such information is generally unavailable in register-based, population-wide data. Therefore, researchers tend to use surveys to assess sexuality, often asking about sexual identity (straight, gay, bi, other, etc.). However, surveys often include only small samples of sexual minorities (compromising the precision of empirical work) and can be affected by social desirability bias (with non-straight individuals withholding information on their sexuality).[2] Additionally, self-declared sexual identity is increasingly difficult to interpret as more people identify with labels that are not useful in terms of understanding their sexual practises or desires, including 'other' (Julian *et al.*, 2024b). Statistical agencies and demographers therefore call for more inclusive practises when identifying sexual minorities, suggesting cohabitation history as a potential best-practise proxy for sexuality (Julian *et al.*, 2024a). However, for co-habitation to be a useful proxy of sexuality, we must distinguish housemates from cohabiting partners. Same-sex cohabiting couples can be identified in surveys, but typically not in datasets that cover entire populations over time. Statistical agencies typically categorise two different-sex cohabitants as a couple, and same-sex cohabitants as housemates (Statistics Denmark, 2024; Statistics Finland, 2024). This statistical practise induces misclassification and, ultimately, erases sexual minorities from population data on couples. Even analyses using census data that include information on sexual identity and cohabitation are limited by the fact that individuals cannot be tracked and observed over time.

To overcome – at least partially – these data limitations, we take advantage of recently re-

[2]See e.g. a discussion on limitations of current data sources in Badgett *et al.* (2024).

leased population-wide data on individuals' financial commitments (shared bank accounts, joint bank loans, joint mortgages, and jointly owned properties) from Statistics Denmark. We can identify cohabiting couples by exploiting that almost all cohabiting couples in Denmark have at least one shared financial commitment; this is not the case for housemates. Using this strategy, we obtain population-wide data on cohabiting couples, including same-sex couples. We observe individuals before, during, and after each spell of cohabitation, and with Danish register data spanning from 1980 to today, we can consider an abundance of outcomes in an intergenerational perspective, beyond the scope of small, cross-sectional, or community-generated datasets on sexual minorities. We observe people over time, in all cohabitating relationships they form, enabling a dynamic sexuality measure, which means that we do not have to assume that sexuality is static or binary. In this paper, we focus primarily on individuals who have cohabited only with same-sex or different-sex partners. As we are the first to use these data on financial commitments to identify couples, we undertake a series of validation exercises to ensure that we correctly identify couples.

The primary contribution of this paper is our analyses of intergenerational mobility by sexual attraction, but our new population-wide cohabitation measure also offers interesting information on difference in mean outcomes between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals in the labour market, education, fertility, health, and more – all within the same geographical setting and within the same population. Interestingly, we find that same-sex and different-sex attracted adult children are equally represented across the parental income distribution, i.e., we find no evidence of economically meaningful selection by parental background. Despite this lack of selection by parental background, we find substantial differences between same-sex and different-sex attracted adult children across almost all outcomes. For example, we show that, on average, same-sex attracted individuals experience higher educational attainment, lower household income, more psychiatric hospital visits, and more mental health prescriptions when compared to the different-sex attracted majority.

To study intergenerational relationships and mobility, we follow the approach by Chetty *et al.* (2014, 2020), allowing us to compare child-parent intergenerational relationships for adult children who are or have been in relationship(s) with same-sex *or* different-sex partners. Like Chetty *et al.* (2014, 2020), we distinguish between gaps in absolute and relative mobility. In a rank-rank regression, absolute mobility gaps reflect differences in outcomes between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals at the intercept, i.e., for those with the lowest earning parents. Relative mobility gaps reflect differences in slopes, i.e., the value with which the outcome of interest changes when parental income rank increases. In our setting, we can interpret differences in absolute mobility (the intercept), as the "same-sex attraction penalty/premium" at the lowest level of parental income. The difference in relative mobility (the slope) shows if and to what extent

this premium/penalty depends on parental income. As such, our first intergenerational analyses consider the rank-rank relationship between parental and adult children's labour market income ranks. We find substantial differences in absolute mobility, with same-sex attracted men having lower income ranks compared to different-sex attracted men across the entire parental income distribution; that is, not even the same-sex attracted men from the most financially resourceful backgrounds overcome the "gay penalty". The premium for same-sex attracted women, on the other hand, decrease across the parental income distribution, with the largest premium for those growing up with the parents at the bottom of the income distribution. We explore the variation in child personal income conditional on parental income rank by calculating individual-level residuals from the rank-rank regression, and we find that same-sex attracted individuals do not only experience different mean levels in income (higher for women, lower for men), but their income levels also vary to a larger extent.

When considering household income for same-sex attracted women, we see that a combination of fewer years in relationship and the overall lower earnings of women results in a striking gap in absolute mobility equivalent to more than -18 rank points at the intercept and widening across the parental income distribution compared to different-sex attracted women. As such, what is gained individually is lost manifold at the couple-level. For same-sex attracted men, household income at the intercept is roughly equal to that of different-sex attracted men but falling increasingly behind as parental income rank increases, even though the partners of different-sex attracted men (i.e., women) have substantially lower income on average. We show that the reason for this is a combination of lower earnings (relative to different-sex attracted men), longer time spent out of relationship, and less assortative matching.

To explore potential drivers of the substantial gaps in intergenerational mobility in terms of earnings, we consider a number of potentially related factors. Fist, we consider education and find no differences in relative mobility between different-sex attracted and same-sex attracted individuals, rather, same-sex attracted individuals have higher educational attainment across the entire parental income distribution compared to different-sex attracted individuals of the same sex. As such, this does not offer any explanation for different-sex attracted men outperforming same-sex attracted men in intergenerational mobility in terms of earnings. Next, we consider fertility through an intergenerational lens. As same-sex couples endure legal and practical barriers to parenthood that are likely easier to overcome by those with more financial means, fertility rates may be higher among those whose parents are most financially resourceful. Indeed, we find this pattern for same-sex attracted women, although, even at the high end of the parental income distribution, they are still far less likely to have children compared to different-sex attracted women. The absence of children, and thus, absence of child penalties in earnings (see e.g. Kleven *et al.*, 2019; Adams *et al.*, 2024), may contribute to their higher individual income. Like

with income, fertility differences between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted women are particularly pronounced at the low end of the parental income distribution. Less than 5% of all same-sex attracted men have children and we see a marginal but significant decrease across the parental income distribution. This is important as it highlights that barriers to parenthood for same-sex attracted men may not be easily mitigated by financial resources, but it does not offer any explanation for their lower intergenerational mobility in terms of income.

To explore further potential drivers of difference in labour market outcomes, we progress to consider several health outcomes, focusing on medical prescriptions and health visits to private practitioners and hospitals. We find few differences in terms of physical health, and most of these are likely to be explained by the different fertility-related behaviours of different-sex attracted and same-sex attracted individuals. In contrast, when considering mental health, we find that both same-sex attracted men and women are more likely to have been prescribed mental health medications compared to different-sex individuals of the same sex – this is true across the entire parental income distribution. When considering psychiatric hospital visits, reflecting more serious cases of mental health conditions, we find that the gap widens between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals at the bottom of the parental income distribution. In other words, same sex-individuals of the lowest earning parents are not simply facing a fixed same-sex penalty together with an increased risk associated with low parental income – here, the intersection of being same-sex attracted and having low parental income yields an additionally increased risk of serious mental health conditions.

Our final set of potential drivers of income differences include outcomes related directly to the parent-child relationship. We consider the age of moving out from parents as well as the geographical proximity to parents after moving out. We see that same-sex individuals are less likely to live near their parents across the entire parental income distribution, especially same-sex attracted men at the lowest end of the parental income distribution.

We use a simplified Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to show that differences in absolute (rather than relative) mobility generally explain more of the intergenerational gaps between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted. This informs our heterogeneity analyses, in which we explore differences in absolute mobility across cohorts and regions. Among other interesting findings, these analyses show that the income premium of same-sex attracted women disappear in younger cohorts, as these same-sex attracted women also become more likely to have children.

Finally, we exploit that we observe sibling links in Danish administrative data and undertake analyses of absolute mobility controlling for sibling fixed effects (FEs). This exercise is possible because sexuality tends to vary between siblings, unlike previous stratifiers in intergenerational mobility research, such as race and immigration status. The inclusion of sibling FEs controls non-parametrically for family characteristics beyond parental income, such as variation in ge-

netics and family environment. Thus, our sibling FEs strategy yields estimates of differences by sexual attraction that approach the causal effect of sexuality on outcomes in early adulthood. All estimates of absolute mobility gaps between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals are robust to the inclusion of sibling FEs.

The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the existing literatures to which we consider this paper a contribution. Section 3 describes the institutional setting and data, including how we observe same-sex and different-sex couples. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics on the characteristics of same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals. Section 5 includes estimates of differences in intergenerational mobility in earnings, and explores potential underlying dynamics in the observed intergenerational mobility gaps between same-sex attracted vs. different-sex attracted individuals. Section 6 decomposes the gaps in outcomes, formally showing to what extent the gaps are due to differences in absolute or relative mobility. Section 7 explores heterogeneity across regions and cohorts, and extends the usual rank-rank analyses by also considering variation income outcomes along the parental income distribution. Section 8 further explores selection by parental background by controlling for sibling FEs. Finally, Section 9 concludes.

2 Related literature

Our findings contribute to three literatures. The first is the large and growing literature on the economic and demographic outcomes of sexual minority individuals. The second literature is that on intergenerational mobility and comparisons in mobility between demographic groups. Finally, we add to the demographic and sociological literature on the identification of sexual minorities in population data.

Economic and demographic outcomes of sexual minorities: A meta-analysis of studies published between 1995 and 2012 found an overall 9% earnings *premium* for lesbian women compared to straight women, and an overall -11% earnings penalty for gay men compared to straight men (Klawitter, 2015). A more recent meta-analysis found similar patterns, albeit slightly smaller penalties and premiums (Drydakis, 2022). Our results align with the findings of these meta-analyses, in that we also identify an average penalty for same-sex attracted men and an average premium for same-sex attracted women, the latter of which closes in younger cohorts. We expand on this by considering income in an intergenerational perspective, and show that these differences persist across the entire parental income distribution. Hence, not even the same-sex attracted men from the most financially resourceful families overcome the "gay penalty", despite consistently higher educational attainment. Our findings of higher educational attainment

amongst same-sex attracted individuals aligns with findings in Black *et al.* (2000), although recent studies of contemporary samples have started to question this for same-sex attracted women (Mittleman, 2022).

We also build on the existing literature on same-sex assortative matching which has found that same-sex couples, and same-sex male couples in particular, are less homogamous (Verbakel and Kalmijn, 2014; Ciscato *et al.*, 2020). We show that this is also true in intergenerational terms, as parental income is not as strongly correlated with partner income for same-sex attracted individuals, especially same-sex attracted men.

For decades, mental health has been identified as a particular area of concern for sexual minorities. A recent meta-analysis of population-based studies found that the risk of depression and anxiety in same-sex attracted individuals were more than double that of different-sex attracted individuals (Wittgens *et al.*, 2022). Many studies have ascribed this increased risk of mental health issues to "minority stressors" in the environment, such as discrimination or prejudice events (Meyer, 1995). We add to this by showing that the increased risk of mental health conditions persist even among same-sex attracted individuals from the most financially resourceful families. We also show that the combination of low parental income and same-sex attraction constitutes a particularly vulnerable intersection, further increasing the risk of severe mental illness for same-sex attracted individuals growing up in low-income families.

In recent years, there has been a rise in the number of families headed by two parents of the same sex in countries where the legal environment permits this (Evertsson *et al.*, 2023). This has made quantitative research on same-sex attracted individuals fertility behaviours possible (van der Vleuten *et al.*, 2024), as well as studies of the outcomes of the children growing up in these families (Mazrekaj *et al.*, 2020; Manning *et al.*, 2014). These studies show that same-sex attracted men are particularly unlikely to become parents (Badgett *et al.*, 2021). We add to the growing literature on same-sex couple's family formation by showing that high parental income is associated with an increased likelihood of having children among same-sex attracted women, contrary to different-sex attracted individuals. Furthermore, we show that less than 5% of same-sex attracted men transition into parenthood and that high parental income does not aid same-sex attracted men in overcoming barriers to parenthood.

Comparing intergenerational mobility between groups: Chetty *et al.* (2014) popularised the use of rank-rank regressions to study intergenerational relationships between child and parent income. Chetty *et al.* (2014) also consider heterogeneity in intergenerational mobility between regions in the US, and Eriksen and Munk (2020) undertakes a similar regional exercise using Danish data. However, more recently, rank-rank regressions have also been used to compare levels of intergenerational mobility across demographic characteristics, such as race (see e.g. Chetty *et al.*,

2020) and parental migration status (see e.g. Abramitzky *et al.*, 2021). Typically, these demographic characteristics are assumed to be fixed within a given family. We add to this literature by considering differences in intergenerational mobility by sexual attraction, a characteristic that often varies within families. This within-family variation allows us to undertake a robustness check, controlling for unobserved parental heterogeneity using sibling FEs.

Measuring sexual attraction: Measuring sexuality and sexual attraction is notoriously complicated. In addition, the usefulness of self-declared sexual orientation in survey responses has come into question, as an increasing number of individuals do not identify with traditional labels (e.g. gay and straight) or choose not to declare a sexual identity (Julian *et al.*, 2024b). The removal of legal barriers to the official recognition of same-sex relationships in several countries over the last three decades has made it possible to observe sexual minorities in marriage registers (e.g. Kolk and Andersson, 2020; Andersson *et al.*, 2006). This approach has expanded our knowledge on sexual minority demographics and economic outcomes, but it also comes with certain challenges. For example, the uptake of marriage is still much lower for same-sex couples (Carpenter, 2020; Compton and Kaufman, 2024), those same-sex couples who do get married are likely to be of higher socio-economic status (Manning and Payne, 2021), and more same-sex couples than different-sex couples cohabit without getting married (Manning *et al.*, 2022). Demographers suggest to identify sexual minorities using other strategies, highlighting cohabitation (Julian *et al.*, 2024a) as a way of tackling some of these recurrent issues. Sexual attraction based on cohabitation can be derived from surveys when asking respondents if they cohabit with a partner, and if so, the sex of that partner. However, surveys are often not available at the population level, and if they are, they only allow for a snapshot of cohabitation status. Therefore, it is important to consider how cohabitation can be observed in administrative data without misclassifying same-sex couples as housemates or automatically assuming that cohabiting individuals of different sexes are partners, as is currently the practise adopted by many statistical agencies, e.g Statistics Denmark (2024); Statistics Finland (2024). We present and validate an empirical strategy that allows researchers to identify cohabiting partners at the population level, overcoming some of the major obstacles as to observing non-married same-sex couples in administrative data.

3 Institutional setting and data

Throughout the paper, we rely on administrative data from Denmark which cover the entire Danish population. Before describing these data in detail, we first summarise the institutional context in Denmark, considering both the legal rights and recognition of same-sex couples as well as more

general policies like access to health care. Many of the relevant administrative datasets start in 1980 and are available until 2022. To observe cohabitation of same-sex and different-sex couples, we rely on data on financial commitments, which are available from 2003 onward. Importantly, individuals and their parents can be linked and tracked over time, so when we observe a 34-year-old in a cohabiting relationship in 2015, we can link them with their parental income in the 1980s. In what follows, we first give a brief overview of the legal and institutional conditions in Denmark to provide readers with relevant contextual information. Second, we outline how we construct our population-wide measure of cohabiting couples. Third, we validate our couples measure and relate it to alternative measures of couples and sexuality. Finally, we describe our data on parental characteristics and child outcomes.

3.1 Institutional setting

Throughout the paper, we consider fertility and health outcomes. Therefore, it is important to understand that Denmark is generally a country with a high level of government support for families with children, and that health care is almost exclusively provided at no or low cost at the point of use (see e.g. Danish Ministry of Health, 2017; Olejaz *et al.*, 2012, for details on the health care system).

In Denmark, Consultations with GPs and specialists practitioners as well as hospital care involves no costs for patients. Specialist practitioners care for patients in need of specialist care that cannot be handled by a GP, but not with symptoms sufficiently acute or severe to require hospital treatment. There are two main exceptions to the free health care provision as patients pay co-payments on: 1) prescriptions of medicine up to a certain threshold (DKK 4,110 $\approx$ USD 590 in 2019) and 2) treatment by psychologists, physiotherapists, and similar care not provided by medical doctors. However, if people are sufficiently income-constrained, municipalities tend to cover these costs.

Fertility is financially incentivised through multiple government policies in Denmark, including: 1) extensive parental leave with high salary replacement rates (see e.g. Adams *et al.*, 2024), 2) a high level of child benefits, unrelated to income (see e.g. Jensen and Blundell, 2024), and 3) heavily subsidised childcare with local municipalities typically covering 75% or more of the cost of childcare until school age (see e.g. European Commission, 2022; Naumann *et al.*, 2013). Schooling is provided at no cost. As such, the direct costs of having children are relatively low in Denmark. Today, subsidised fertility treatment is also available for different-sex couples, single women, and women in same-sex relationships, but this has not always been the case.

Like it is the case in other Western European countries, same-sex couples in Denmark only recently gained basic legal rights. Denmark was the first country in the world to legalise same-sex

registered partnerships in 1989 (Søland, 1998). In 2012, same-sex couples obtained equal rights to civil marriage, as well as marriage within the Danish state church. Since 1999, it has been possible, under certain circumstances, for a same-sex partner to adopt the (potentially adopted) child of their partner, but not until 2010 could same-sex couples adopt jointly (Kjær, 2017). Although the right to adoption has technically been the same for same-sex couples (and single individuals) as different-sex couples since 2010, a number of practical barriers significantly limit the access to adoption for same-sex couples. Hence, between 2011-2020, only 175 native children were put up for adoption in Denmark, and only one other country (South Africa) has ever allowed same-sex couples from Denmark to adopt (Adoptionsnævnt, 2024; Adoption, 2021). Surrogacy was technically unregulated in Denmark until 1997, but evidence suggests that only very few same-sex couples (of which only one person could be registered as a parent of the child) have ever made use of this (Nordisk Ministerråd, 2006). Since 1997, surrogacy has been effectively prohibited in Denmark. Although individuals are legally allowed to act as surrogates, they are not allowed to undergo fertility treatment, neither within the public healthcare system nor at a private clinic (thus requiring the surrogate to be the biological parent of the child). Additionally, surrogates are not allowed to receive financial compensation.(og Sunhedsministeriet, 2019). As such, a number of legal and practical barrier still limit the access to parenthood for (especially male) same-sex couples in Denmark.

3.2 Observing couples and sexuality

To obtain a population-wide measure of sexuality, we want to identify cohabiting couples – and specifically, we must be able to distinguish these couples from housemates. Based on the sex composition of an observed couple, we can derive an individual-level measure of sexual attraction. However, Statistical agencies typically classify two cohabiting people of different sexes as a couple and same-sex cohabitants as housemates (Statistics Denmark, 2024; Statistics Finland, 2024). This induces misclassification because same-sex couples make up a non-negligible share of the population, and because housemates can be of different sexes. In the following, we describe how we can observe couples (different-sex *and same-sex*) at the population-level.

To identify couples, we start by identifying two-adult households, using the Danish population register (BEF) from 2003 to 2022. In the population register, we observe the full Danish population and the address at which they reside. We focus on people living at the same address (house/apartment) and drop very large household.[3] Next, we drop children (i.e. we keep the parent-generation of multi-generation households) and drop sibling pairs. We focus on all remaining two-adult households; these can either be cohabiting couples or housemates.[4]

[3]With more than 10 people living at the same address; these are typically institutionally provided housing.

[4]To avoid households made up by an individual and, e.g., a step-parent who would not be legally registered as the

To overcome this misclassification and to identify same-sex cohabiting couples, we use recently released population-level data covering 2003-2022 on individuals' financial commitments. We use data on shared bank accounts (IRTEPERS/URTEPERS), joint bank loans and mortgages (PANTPERS), and jointly owned properties (EJER) from Statistics Denmark. We identify all financial commitments with two registered owners.

We can now separate our two-person households into cohabiting couples and housemates by exploiting that almost all cohabiting couples in Denmark have at least one shared financial commitment (data validation follows below). As such, we classify a two-adult household as a couple only if they share at least one financial commitment. We supplement the data on financial commitments by also classifying two-adult households as couples if they are married to each other, or if they are legal parents of the same child.

We use the registered sex (which in Denmark is strictly binary, i.e. male or female) of each individual in a couple to derive as measure of sexual attraction at the individual level. Men who are observed in couples with women and, equally, women observed in couples with men, we refer to as *different-sex attracted*. Men observed in couples with men, and women observed in relationships with women, we refer to as *same-sex attracted*. We also observe a small number of people who have lived in cohabiting couples with people of different sexes across two or more relationships. In our main analyses, we exclude this group as the small sample size rules out reliable statistical inference on intergenerational relationships in outcomes. We do, however, report various descriptive statistics for this group in Appendix B. We discuss the exclusion of this group in further detail in Section 3.2.2.

By combining data on cohabitation and joint financial commitments, we obtain population-level data on sexuality, including often overlooked same-sex attraction. We link our measures of same-sex and different-sex attraction to individuals also before and after their spells of cohabitation, enabling us to consider their outcomes and characteristics in adulthood as well as in childhood, including parental earnings during their upbringing.

3.2.1 Couples measure validation

Before presenting summary statistics on the derived samples of same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals, we need to establish that our combination of cohabitation and shared financial commitments effectively distinguish couples from housemates. Therefore, we undertake a series of analyses to validate our new couples measure. First, we show that financial commitment works as a couples measure among married couples and couples with children. Hence, in

individual's parent but with whom they share financial responsibilities, we do not consider a two-person household a couple if the age-difference is greater than 12 years (corresponding to the 95th percentile). In addition, we focus on people in cohabiting couples when they are older than 25 to exclude other cohabitation with potential caregivers.

Table 1, we see that financial commitments are highly prevalent among cohabiting couples who are married or parents of the same child, regardless of the sex composition of the couple. This shows that same-sex and different-sex couples observed through more conservative methods, i.e., marriage and co-parenthood, are equally likely to share financial responsibilities. Because we see that joint financial commitments are widespread amongst both same-sex and different-sex couples, joint financial commitment are likely to effectively capture both same-sex and different-sex couples, even in absence of children and marriage. We use this insight as we proceed with using joint financial commitments to also capture cohabitating couples, including those who are not married or co-parents.


Table 1: Married or co-parenting cohabiting couples who share financial responsibilities

	(1) Different-sex, married	(2) Different-sex, with joint child	(3) Same-sex, married	(4) Same-sex, with joint child
Financial match	0.933	0.915	0.882	0.928
	(0.000339)	(0.000344)	(0.00546)	(0.00626)
N	542,948	659,257	3,486	1,706

Notes: This table reports the share of married and co-parenting cohabiting couples who share at least one financial responsibility when observed at age 35, from 2003 to 2022. Financial responsibilities include joint owned properties, joint credit accounts, joint debit accounts, and joint mortgages; see Section 3.2 for further details. Standard errors in parentheses.

Next, we show that the observation of joint financial commitments allow us to distinguish same-sex and different-sex couples from two-person households made up by housemates. In Figure 1, we show the percentage of age cohorts that cohabit, by sex composition, and with and without shared financial responsibilities. Panel (a) visualises the percentages of each cohort that cohabit with someone of a different sex; Panel (b) visualises the percentages of each cohort that cohabit with someone of the same sex; Panel (c) visualises the percentages of each cohort that cohabit with someone of a different sex, conditional on shared financial responsibilities; and Panel (d) shows visualises the percentages of each cohort that cohabit with someone of the same sex, conditional on shared financial responsibilities. In Panel (b), we see that unconditional on shared financial responsibilities, more than 6% of individuals at age 25 cohabit with someone of the same sex. This share decreases steeply across the age distribution until age 35, after which the curve flattens. This indicates that using cohabitation alone to identify couples would include a large number of non-partnering housemates; a phenomena that decreases with age. In Panel (c), we condition on cohabitation *and* a joint financial commitment, resulting in a significant drop in the number of identified individuals in same-sex cohabitation (from around 2% to 0.5% at age 35). We also see the age distribution peaking around age 35-45, as we would expect if correctly identifying couples. Comparing Panels (a) and (c), we see a relatively much smaller drop in the

Figure 1: Cohabitation and financial match



Notes: This figure plots the share of individuals in cohabiting two-person households across age. Panels (a) and (b) show the share unconditional on financial commitments. Panels (c) and (d) condition on at least one shared financial responsibility. Panels to left consider different-sex cohabitants, panels to the right same-sex cohabitants. We consider the full Danish population aged 25-85 in 2019.

observed percentages in different-sex cohabitation when conditioning on shared financial responsibilities (from just more than 60% to around 50% at age 35), reflecting that proportionately fewer different-sex cohabitations occur without shared financial responsibilities compared to same-sex cohabitations. Hence, more often than not, same-sex cohabitation is likely to reflect housemates, whereas different-sex cohabitation more often than not reflects different-sex couples, highlighting the importance of distinguishing these groups.

Finally, when comparing Panels (c) and (d), we see similar age patterns for different-sex couples and same-sex couples until age 50, after which the proportion of individuals in same-sex relationships decreases steadily. This mirrors the consistent finding that younger cohorts are more likely to identify as non-heterosexual (e.g., ONS, 2023) and the historically lower life expectancy for same-sex attracted individuals (Frisch and Simonsen, 2013; Hogg *et al.*, 1997).

To further verify that we are indeed observing partnering couples when conditioning on cohabitation *and* a joint financial commitment, we consider relationship trajectories. If the same-sex couples observed with joint financial commitments are in fact housemates, we would expect

a large number of them to sort into different-sex relationships over time, whereas only a small fraction would sort into other types of same-sex relationships (i.e., same-sex marriage and/or parenting with a person of the same sex). If we reliably capture cohabiting same-sex couples, we would expect to see that the majority remain in same-sex relationships over time. We show trajectories for same-sex attracted men and women separately in Figure 2.


Five years after a same-sex cohabiting relationship is first observed, more than 70% of women and 60% of men are still in a same-sex relationship. For both men and women, the majority of these relationships have transferred into same-sex marriage or parenting with a same-sex partner. More men than women are not in observable relationship five years after observed same-sex cohabitation, indicating shorter relationship durations among same-sex attracted men compared to same-sex attached women (this finding is in line with previous findings by e.g. Lau, 2012). A small proportion have sorted into a difference-sex marriage or parenting with a different-sex partner, and even fewer are in cohabiting relationship (i.e. cohabiting and shared financial commitments) with a different-sex partner. This small fraction of people moving from same-sex to different-sex partnerships reflect that part of the population have partners of different sexes throughout the life cycle. The small fraction of transfers from same-sex relationships to different-sex relationships rules out any widespread misclassification when we condition on cohabitation *and* joint financial commitments. We find similar results for different-sex couples; see Figure A.1 in Appendix A for visualisations.

As a final validation of our couples measure, we consider contraceptive use among women in different types of cohabiting households. We expect to find that women in same-sex couples are less likely to use contraceptives than women in different-sex relationships, as they are less likely to engage in sexual activity that can lead to pregnancy. If our strategy, relying on joint financial commitments, effectively captures couples and not housemates, we should expect women in same-sex relationships identified through joint financial commitments to be equally likely to use contraceptives as women in same-sex marriage or same-sex shared parenthood.[5] We make this comparison using an OLS regression, including age FEs as controls. As shown in Table 2, we find that women in same-sex relationships are 19.5-23.1 percent less likely to use contraceptives (this is in line with previous findings, e.g. Ela and Budnick, 2017). We find no statistically significant differences in contraceptive use between women in same-sex relationships based on the route of identification (marriage vs. joint child vs. cohabitation with joint financial commitment). Again, these findings support that we effectively capture couples and not housemates when conditioning on both cohabiting *and* a financial commitment. Finally, notice that the rate of contraceptive use varies substantially between women in the various types of different-sex relationships. This


[5]We only use women's contraceptives as these are recorded in population-wide data on medical prescriptions. Female contraceptions require prescriptions (e.g. pills and IUD's).

Figure 2: Trajectories of same-sex cohabiting couples

(a) Women



(b) Men



Notes: This figure plots the couple trajectories of individuals who cohabit and share financial responsibilities with a person of the same sex in year 0. SSC = same-sex couple, DSC = different-sex couple. We consider all cohabitation spells with shared financial responsibilities starting from 2004 to 2017. We use data from 2003 to determine if a spell starts in 2004. We use data till 2022 to determine the outcomes of those in spells in 2017 or earlier. For equivalent trajectories for those starting different-sex couples, see Figure A.1.

Table 2: Take-up of contraceptives by measure of sexual attraction

	(1) Contraceptive use
Single, with roomie	0.0327***
	(0.00242)
In different-sex relationship	
Co-parents	-0.0544***
	(0.00141)
Married	-0.0887***
	(0.00301)
Financial commitment	0.0805***
	(0.00254)
In same-sex relationship	
Co-parents	-0.231***
	(0.0115)
Married	-0.230***
	(0.0167)
Financial commitment	-0.195***
	(0.0137)
Constant	0.313***
	(0.00104)
N	528,490
Adjusted R-squared	0.0428
Prob > F, SSC equality	0.103

Notes: This table reports take-up of any medical contraceptive in 2019 by women aged 26-40, based on observed sexual attraction and type of couple information. "Single, with roomie" refer to those in two-person households with no shared financial responsibility. The reference group / omitted category is women with no housemate/cohabiting partner. The couple categories are mutually exclusively. If a couple are both married and co-parents, they are categorised as co-parents. A couple is only categorised as identified through a "Financial commitment" if they are neither married nor co-parents. Age FEs are included as controls. Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

reflects that contraceptive use decreases when couples plan pregnancies.

3.2.2 Measurement discussion

By observing joint financial responsibilities, we overcome some of the key data as to identify couples, especially same-sex couples, in population data appropriate for intergenerational analyses. As such, we construct a measure of sexual attraction that is not sensitive to differential sorting into marriage for people of different sexualities, nor to the inconsistent terminology that may arise when using self-identification measures of sexual identity.

Generally, sexuality tends to be observed in quantitative data in two ways: self-identification measures and behavioural measures. Behavioural measures can be based on sexual history or sex

of one's spouse; the latter has the advantage of being available through marriage registers in administrative datasets. Regardless of the choice of strategy, behavioural measures do not provide accurate measures of sexual *identity*. Firstly, sexual and romantic behaviour does not necessarily correspond to a person's desires, as they may decide not to, or fail to, live them out. Second, and even more importantly, terms used for self-identification of sexuality mean different things to different people. As such, the same term may refer to a range of experiences. Examples of this include straight men who regularly have sex with other men (Silva, 2017). Therefore, behavioural measures and self-identifying measures of sexuality do not identify the same individuals as same-sex attracted and, as a consequence, nor the same sample characteristics within the same data set (Martell and Eschelbach Hansen, 2017; Mishel, 2019; Curley, 2018). The increasing diversity in gender and sexual identities, especially in younger cohorts, has led researchers specialising in the measurement of sexuality and gender to recommend the inclusion of questions related to couples' gender composition and cohabitation to construct behavioural measures of sexuality within surveys, even when self-identification questions are available (Julian *et al.*, 2024a,b). Although cohabiting couples may be identified in survey data, identification remains difficult in datasets that cover an entire population. Census data may include information on both sexual identity and the gender of cohabiting partners. But in a census, cohabitation is only observed once. As same-sex relationships may be shorter (Lau, 2012), and there are breaks between relationships, same-sex couples will be observed less frequently in the cross-section. Therefore, we need repeated observations of couples to better identify same-sex attracted individuals. We explore such household dynamics directly in our data in Section 5.6.

The same-sex attracted individuals we observe in our data all have a history of cohabiting relationships or marriage with someone of the same sex. This has the same advantages as previous behavioural strategies without suffering from the unequal access or differential sorting into marriage of same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals. This is an advancement from previous behavioural measures of same-sex attraction because it effectively identifies cohabiting same-sex couples. However, as all measures of sexual attraction, also our measure has limitations.

Firstly, our measure does not capture the multitude of ways in which individuals may organise relationships (Compton and Kaufman, 2024). For example, we cannot observe the sexual attraction of individuals who never form romantic relationships that lead to cohabitation (we provide descriptive information on this group in Table B.2).

Second, we do not assess sexual identity, so we cannot distinguish between identity categories such as gay/lesbian, bisexual/pansexual, and heterosexual. For the same reason, we adopt the terminology "same-sex attracted" and "different-sex attracted". We focus our analyses on individuals who have only been in either same-sex or different-sex relationships, thus excluding

individuals observed with both female and male partners across different relationships. This is primarily because of the limited sample size of the bi-attracted group, but also because this group is inherently different from the identified same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals. We can observe same-sex and different-sex attraction as soon as an individual has been in *one* cohabiting relationship, whereas observation of bi-attraction, must necessarily rely on the observation of *at least two* relationships. However, some of the individuals we observe as different-sex attracted or same-sex attracted will experience attraction towards people of various sexes. As a consequence, a minority of same-sex attracted individuals, including those who identify as gay or lesbian, may enter different-sex relationships later in life (Mernitz *et al.*, 2024).

Finally, as we observe sex based on legal sex (which is strictly binary) our analyses remain blind to gender identity and as such also to those who do not identify within the gender binary, as well as the non-negligent share of trans individuals who have not changed their legal sex (Thomsen *et al.*, 2024).

3.3 Child characteristics

For all the analyses that follow, we consider all children born in Denmark from 1974 to 1988.[6] Our latest data are from 2022 allowing us to observe our latest cohort in the year they turn 34. Our final sample of children includes those we observe in at least one cohabiting relationship at some point from 2003 to 2022 as described in Section 3.2. Based on their observed relationship(s), we derive a binary measure of sexuality, categorising individuals of interest as either different-sex attracted or same-sex attracted. For a discussion on this measure of sexuality we refer to Section 3.2.2 above.

When considering labour market outcomes, such as income and unemployment, we need to observe children when they are sufficiently old to have finished education. We therefore observe labour income and public transfers/benefits from the children are 29 to 34 years old, i.e. over 6 years (in the IND-register, we adjust all measures of income for inflation). Child income ranks are subsequently determined within each child cohort of the population. For each adult child, we also calculate an average unemployment rate from age 29 to 34 (employment status is from the AKM-register).

We also consider several demographic outcomes for the adult children: marriage, cohabitation, parental status, home region, and education level (in the BEF- and UDDA-registers). We observe all of these outcomes in the year the children turn 34 years old.

Next, we consider a variety of health outcomes. Measures of all health outcomes are available from 1995 onwards. To measure health outcomes over the same age range for each child cohort,

[6]We exclude children born abroad, as we need to be able to observe parental income in childhood.

we consider health outcomes from age 21 to 34 (those born in 1974 turn 21 years old in 1995). We observe all medical prescriptions of contraceptives, opioid painkillers, non-opioid painkillers, and prescriptions related to substance abuse (in the LMDB-register). We also observe visits to hospitals, and whether each visit takes place at a hospital ward specialised in the treatment of psychiatric or somatic conditions (LPR_ADM, PSYK_ADM and LPR_F_FORLOEB). For each hospital visit, we use precise diagnosis codes to determine if the visit is related to substance abuse (LPR_DIAG, PSYK_DIAG, and LPR_F_DIAGNOSER). Finally, we observe patient visits to non-hospital practitioners, including GPs, psychologists, and psychiatrists (SYSI/SSSY). Non-hospital practising psychiatrists tend to care for patients with less acute and less complex conditions that do not require in-patient care.

3.4 Parental characteristics

Our primary parental characteristic is labour market income in the first 21 years of children's lives (from the IND-register).[7] For all analyses, we consider the sum of parental labour income of both parents. After adjusting parental income for inflation and taking the sum over the relevant 21 years, we rank parental income from 0 to 100 within child cohorts. This follows the approach of Chetty *et al.* (2014), but we exploit that the Danish data on parental income are available further back in time so that we consider parental income throughout children's upbringing.

In addition, we consider at which age children cease to live at the same address as their parents, and if children live in the same region as at least one parent by age 34. We observe potential cohabitation with parents and parental home region in the BEF-register, spanning 1985 to 2022.[8]

4 Descriptive analyses

In Table 3, we include means of all the outcomes of interest as well as relevant parental characteristics by sex and sexual attraction. This serves the purpose of providing an overview before we proceed to intergenerational analyses. Given our new strategy to identify same-sex attracted individuals, these descriptives also offer new information on the characteristics of same-sex attracted individuals at the population level beyond the marriage registers.

We generally divide child outcomes and parental characteristics into six broad categories: 1) family and household characteristics of the adult children, 2) education and labour market out-

[7] Danish income registers only start in 1980. For our earliest cohorts, born in 1974 to 1979, we therefore do not observe parental income in the very first year of life. For example, for those born in 1974, we observe parental income from 1980 to 1994, year 7 to year 21. Parental income ranks are determined within child cohorts to reflect this.

[8] As BEF is only available from 1985, information on children's cohabitation with their parents is not observable prior to age 11 for our fist child cohort, born in 1974. As such, when considering the age of the child when ending cohabitation with parents, we truncate the values below 11 and set them equal to 10 for all cohorts for consistency.

comes, 3) health outcomes, 4) parental characteristics, and 5) parent-child relationship dynamics. We consider differences in means across the five categories below.

Family and household: In Table 3, we see that both same-sex attracted women and men are less likely to be married, less likely to have children, and more likely to live in the capital compared to different-sex attracted individuals of the same sex. Whereas 51.2% different sex attracted men are married, and 76.9% have children, only 30.1% of same-sex attracted men are married and only 4.8% have children. Same-sex attracted men are almost double as likely to live in the capital compared to different-sex attracted men. Differences between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted women are smaller albeit still substantial and statistically significant, with 47.0% being married (57.2% for different-sex attracted women), 49.0% having children (85.2% for different-sex attracted women) and 43.8% living in the capital (31.6% of different-sex attracted women). These differences between same-sex and different-sex attracted are interesting in a demographic perspective, but they also underscore the benefits of observing same-sex attracted individuals also through cohabitation and joint financial commitments, rather than through parenting and marriage alone.

We find that the average time spent in a cohabiting relationship is shorter for same-sex attracted women and even shorter for same-sex attracted men, compared to both different-sex attracted men and women. We also find that the mean annual income of partners is substantially smaller from same-sex attracted women and men, resulting in a lower household income for same-sex attracted individuals. We also calculate the mean annual income of partners for years in relationship only. Under these conditions, the mean annual income of same-sex attracted men were significantly higher than that of the partners of different-sex attracted men. That is, the lower unconditional partner income and household income for same-sex attracted men is due to longer periods of not being in a relationship. In contrast, the mean annual partner income for same-sex attracted women is lower than that of different-sex attracted women even when based on years in relationship only. The results reflect differences in income by sex; a female partner tends to have lower income than a male partner in both same-sex and different-sex relationships.

Education and labour market: We continue to show that same-sex attracted women and men have significantly higher educational attainment compared to different-sex attracted women and men respectively.

We see that same-sex attracted women have higher labour income ranks (+3.11 percentile points), corresponding to a larger mean annual labour income of 11,820 DKK. We see that same-sex attracted women are equally likely to be unemployed but that different-sex attracted women receive more public benefits, including unemployment benefits; most like due to the higher fer-

Table 3: Summary statistics

	Women			Men		
	Same-sex	Dif.-sex	Difference	Same-sex	Dif.-sex	Difference
Family & household (30-35)						
Living in Copenhagen	0.438	0.316	0.123***	0.597	0.321	0.276***
Married	0.470	0.572	-0.102***	0.301	0.512	-0.211***
Have children	0.490	0.852	-0.362***	0.048	0.769	-0.721***
No. of children if parent	1.522	1.962	-0.440***	1.193	1.807	-0.615***
Age at first birth	29.950	27.644	2.306***	29.319	28.823	0.495*
Years in cohab. relationship	3.089	4.407	-1.318***	2.678	4.055	-1.377***
Household income rank	43.527	57.697	-14.170***	50.620	55.133	-4.513***
Partner income rank	45.381	65.465	-20.084***	45.073	49.518	-4.445***
Partner income rank (in relationship only)	44.170	62.728	-18.558***	53.755	36.643	17.112***
Education and labour market (30-35)						
Years of education	15.311	15.135	0.176***	14.968	14.728	0.240***
Labour income rank	47.232	44.122	3.109***	57.980	62.485	-4.505***
Labour income (1000 DKK)	272.017	260.197	11.820***	337.590	360.325	-22.735***
Public transfers/benefits (1000 DKK)	39.648	59.465	-19.817***	20.573	18.565	2.008***
Unemployment benefits (1000 DKK)	22.910	32.301	-9.391***	12.748	13.155	-0.406
Unemployed, share	0.150	0.150	0.000	0.101	0.085	0.017***
Mental health (22-35)						
- visits						
Psychologist (any)	0.208	0.185	0.023***	0.106	0.066	0.040***
Psychologist (no.)	2.196	1.745	0.450***	0.956	0.490	0.466***
Psychiatrist (any)	0.113	0.075	0.038***	0.084	0.046	0.038***
Psychiatrist (no.)	1.997	1.397	0.601***	1.423	0.689	0.734***
Psychiatric hospital (any)	0.187	0.118	0.069***	0.126	0.072	0.054***
Psychiatric hospital (no.)	0.980	0.421	0.559***	0.464	0.231	0.232***
Substance abuse hospital (any)	0.067	0.042	0.026***	0.062	0.054	0.007*
Substance abuse hospital (no.)	0.177	0.081	0.096***	0.135	0.108	0.027*
- prescriptions						
Mental health (any)	0.371	0.317	0.053***	0.310	0.202	0.108***
Mental health (no.)	10.850	6.136	4.714***	6.074	3.492	2.582***
Substance abuse (any)	0.019	0.007	0.012***	0.016	0.024	-0.008***
Substance abuse (no.)	0.155	0.102	0.053	0.201	0.160	0.041
Alcohol abuse (any)	0.016	0.005	0.011***	0.014	0.022	-0.008***
Alcohol abuse (no.)	0.040	0.013	0.027***	0.054	0.054	-0.000
General health (22-35)						
- visits						
GP visits (no.)	85.607	112.608	-27.001***	53.012	43.705	9.307***
Hospital (any)	0.965	0.990	-0.026***	0.904	0.932	-0.029***
Hospital (no.)	11.388	13.972	-2.584***	6.610	7.298	-0.688***
Hospital, ex. fertility (no.)	9.457	9.722	-0.265*	6.038	6.986	-0.948***
- prescriptions						
Opioid analgesics (any)	0.276	0.252	0.024***	0.209	0.203	0.006
Opioid analgesics (no.)	1.691	1.483	0.207	0.969	1.112	-0.143
Non-opioid analgesics (any)	0.766	0.736	0.030***	0.651	0.662	-0.011
Non-opioid analgesics (no.)	5.529	4.546	0.983***	3.157	2.890	0.267**
Contraceptive (any)	0.559	0.962	-0.403***			
Contraceptive (no.)	8.906	26.081	-17.176***			
Parental characteristics (1-21)						
Parental income rank	51.582	51.015	0.567	50.332	51.761	-1.429***
Father income rank	50.870	50.891	-0.021	51.038	51.531	-0.492
Mother income rank	52.210	50.793	1.417***	49.332	51.359	-2.027***
Parent-child relationship (35)						
Min. years when living without parents	20.101	19.872	0.228***	20.381	20.970	-0.589***
Max. years living with parents	21.028	20.268	0.760***	21.112	21.817	-0.706***
Same municipality as parents	0.295	0.432	-0.136***	0.212	0.442	-0.230***
Same minor region as parents	0.470	0.641	-0.171***	0.343	0.638	-0.295***
Same major region as parents	0.623	0.762	-0.139***	0.522	0.761	-0.238***
N	4,122	339,594		2,800	331,818	

Notes: This table reports means of outcomes by sex and sexuality. Numbers in parentheses state the years in which an outcome is observed, i.e., 30-35 refers to the 30th-35th years of life. For parental outcomes, numbers in parentheses refer to child years. *Min. years when living without parents* refers to the year when first observed in a household different than one's parents. Values below 11 are sat equal to 10, as habitation information is not observable prior to year 10 for our fist child cohort. *Max years living with parents* refers to the year last observed living in a household with parents until year 35. See Section 3 for further details on variables and data construction.

tility rate amongst different-sex attracted women resulting in higher levels of maternity leave benefits and child benefits.


In contrast, same-sex attracted men experience lower annual labour incomes (-4.50 percentile points or - 22,739 DKK) compared to different-sex attracted men. This is despite the higher educational attainment and lower fertility rates in same-sex attracted men, but in line with slightly higher unemployment rates. At the same time, same-sex attracted men receive fewer unemployment benefits, but more public benefits overall. These patterns are consistent with lower fertility rates (resulting in fewer days on unemployment/parental leave benefits) and higher educational attainment (meaning more days on universal educational government scholarships) amongst same-sex attracted men.

Health: As a measure of general health, we consider visits to GPs and hospitals. We see that different-sex attracted women have more GP visits than same-sex attracted women which is likely to be related to their higher fertility rates and to their higher demand for prescription contraceptives (rates of contraceptive prescriptions are reported under *health prescriptions*. Considering non-psychiatric hospital visits, we again see higher rates for different-sex attracted women, but this difference reduces substantially when disregarding visits related to fertility and reproduction, suggesting that fertility is the primary driver of differences in hospital visits. In contrast, same-sex attracted men are more likely to visit GPs, but less likely to visit non-psychiatric hospitals.

Across measures related to mental health, we generally see that same-sex attraction is associated with increases in health visits and medical prescriptions. For example, we see that compared to different-sex attracted women, same-sex attracted women are more likely to have been treated by clinical psychologists and psychiatrists, they are more likely to have had psychiatric hospital visits, and they are more likely to have received mental health related medical prescriptions. Same-sex attracted women are also more likely to have had hospital visits or prescriptions related to substance abuse, alcohol abuse, and opioid abuse compared to different-sex attracted women. We see similar trends at the extensive margin across all mental health outcomes (although not statistically significant for numbers of opioid abuse and substance abuse prescriptions). Compared to different-sex attracted women, same-sex attracted women are also more likely to have been prescribed opioid and non-opioid analgesics.

We see a similar pattern when comparing same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted men, with increased likelihood of visiting clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, psychiatric hospitals and for having hospital visits related to substance abuse (again, also with increases at the extensive margin). More same-sex attracted men are prescribed mental health medication, but contrary to same-sex attracted women, same-sex attracted men are less likely than different-sex attracted

Figure 3: Distribution of same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals across parental income ranks



Notes: This figure plots the share of different-sex and same-sex attracted children across the parental income distribution. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Parental income is measured over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables.

men to have been prescribed medicine related to the treatment of substance and alcohol abuse. For non-opioid analgesics we find statistically significant higher levels in same-sex attracted men but only at the intensive margin.

Parental characteristics: Table 3 reports very similar parental income ranks for same-sex and different-attracted attracted children (albeit slightly lower for same-sex attracted men). In Figure 3, we explore potential differences in selection by parental income by plotting the distribution of same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals across the parental income distribution. Parental income distributions are based on parental earnings from the child is 1-21 years of age and ranked within child cohorts. Figure 3 show a close to identical distribution of children by sexual attraction (same-sex vs. different-sex). However, Table 3 shows that, on average, mothers of same-sex attracted women have slightly higher labour market income compared to mothers of different-sex attracted women. For men, we find the reverse, with Table 3 showing a slightly higher average maternal income rank among different-sex attracted men compared to same-sex attracted men.

Parent-child dynamics: We consider a number of outcomes related to the parent-child relationship. First, we consider the number of (calendar) years in which children cohabit with their parent. We do this in two different ways, to reflect that people may move back in with their parents after having moved out. First we consider the lowest number of years at which a child is

observed on a different address than their parents, and find that same-sex attracted women move out 0.23 years later than different-sex attracted women. Men generally move out later, but unlike women, same-sex attracted men first move out 0.59 years earlier than different-sex attracted men. We then consider the last time a child has been observed living with their parents, and find that same-sex attracted women are last observed living with their parents 0.76 years later than different-sex attracted. Again, men are generally older when last living with their parents, but different-sex attracted men a last observed living with their parents 0.71 years later than same-sex attracted men when last living with their parents. We also consider proximity to parents at child's age 35 at three different geographical levels. At all levels, same-sex attracted individuals are less likely to live in proximity to their parents than different-sex attracted individuals. Same-sex attracted men are least likely to live in proximity to their parents, with only 21.2% living in the same municipality as their parents and 52.2% living within the same major region as their parents.

5 Estimates of intergenerational mobility by sexuality

After documenting substantial differences in mean outcomes between same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals, we want to explore to what extent these differences depend on parental background, and particularly, on parental income. As such, we want to assess whether intergenerational mobility in terms of earnings, demographic outcomes, health, and parent-child dynamics differ between adults depending on their sexual attraction. When estimating differences in intergenerational mobility by sexuality, we generally follow the strategy of Chetty *et al.* (2020) and Abramitzky *et al.* (2021) who compare intergenerational mobility across race and parental immigration status in the US. Their strategy allows us to separately consider differences in absolute and relative as we estimate the following specification for daughters and sons, respectively:

$$y_{i,c} = \alpha + \beta_p y_{i,p} + \beta_s \text{same_sex}_i + \beta_{sp} y_{i,p} \cdot \text{same_sex}_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

where $y_{i,c}$ is the outcome of interest of the adult child, e.g. their income rank, parental income rank is denoted by $y_{i,p}$, and same_sex_i for same-sex attraction. α is the absolute mobility and β_p the relative mobility for different-sex attracted. In our comparison between different-sex and same-sex attracted individuals, lower/higher absolute mobility is given by the difference in the intercept, β_s. Differences in relative mobility (the slope of the rank-rank relationship) is given by β_{sp}.

Generally, we can interpret differences in the intercept, β_s, as what is often referred to as the "gay/lesbian penalty/premium" at the lowest level of parental income. The difference in slopes,

β_{sp}, shows if and to what extent this premium/penalty depends on parental income.

We consider a wide range of outcomes, $y_{i,c}$, ranging from income ranks to the use of mental health prescriptions. When considering income, we calculate income ranks for both children and parents within child cohorts, capturing any beyond-inflation trends in income across cohorts. However, other outcomes, such as the extensive margin use of mental health prescriptions, cannot be naturally ranked within cohorts, and results may be affected by trends across cohort. Thus, we report results including cohort FEs as controls throughout Appendices C to D. Furthermore, we consider an extension to the model when controlling for unobserved parental heterogeneity by including sibling FEs in Section 8.

5.1 Individual income

We start by considering differences in individual labour market outcomes. The following sections then seek to better understand the drivers behind the differences we document here.

Figure 4 illustrates the intergenerational mobility in terms of labour market outcomes for men and women based on their sexuality. Panel (a) shows the income rank of different-sex attracted and same-same attracted individuals across the parental income distribution. For women we see that those who are same-sex attracted show higher absolute mobility compared to different-sex attracted women (β_s = 4.70). Same-sex attracted women also have higher relative mobility (β_{sp} = -0.160). Together, this shows that the "lesbian premium" found in previous studies of the labour market outcomes of sexual minorities exists across the entire parental income distribution but to a decreasing degree as parental income increases. Hence, the premium for same-sex attracted women so is especially pronounced for those with parents at the lowest end of the income distribution (see e.g. Klawitter, 2015, for an overview of estimates of earnings gaps). We find no difference in the relative mobility between same-sex attracted men and different-sex attracted men, but we see a difference in absolute mobility, with a higher level for different-sex attracted men (β_s = 3.633). Hence, we find lower earnings for same-sex attracted men across the entire parental income distribution, showing that even same-sex attracted men who grow up with the most financially resourcefully parents do not overcome the "gay penalty" in earnings (Klawitter, 2015). Despite the relatively lower earnings of same-sex attracted men and the relatively higher earnings of same-sex attracted women (compared to different-sex attracted individuals of the same sex and same parental income), the overall "gender pay gap" persists with men earning more than women across the entire parental income distribution regardless of their sexuality (see e.g. the review by Blau and Kahn, 2017). As such, different-sex attracted women represents the lower extreme and different-sex attracted men represents the higher extreme when considering the absolute mobility in terms of income.

Panel (b) considers unemployment as the differences in Panel (a) could be driven by the extensive margin. Panel (b) shows no differences between same-sex attracted individuals and different-sex attracted individuals in absolute mobility, but minimally higher relative mobility in terms of unemployment for same-sex attracted women compared to different-sex attracted women and same-sex attracted men compared to different-sex attracted men. This indicates a marginally weaker relationship between parental income and unemployment for same-sex attracted individuals. However, since we see no difference in absolute mobility in terms of unemployment across sexuality, unemployment rates do not appear to drive differences in absolute mobility in terms of income.

Panel (c) considers the sum of public transfers and benefits received from age 29 to 34. We find that same-sex attracted women have higher relative mobility (β_{sp} = 0.094), i.e., a relatively lower decrease in received benefits as parental income increases compared to different-sex attracted women. Similarly, the substantial difference in absolute mobility, with different-sex attracted women receiving much more benefits across the entire parental income distribution (β_s = -24.42), is likely driven by an increased likelihood of having children compared to same-sex attracted women. We find no differences in the relative mobility nor absolute mobility in terms of received public transfers and benefits between same-sex attracted men and different-sex attracted men.

Same-sex absolute income mobility premiums and penalties (for women and men respectively) must be seen in the context of other resources and behaviours which may vary across the parental income distribution. We therefore consider household income below, before we continue to other potential drivers of the persistent differences in labour market income across the parental income distribution, such as education, fertility, health, and parent-child relationship.


5.2 Household income

A couple of two women would – on average – experience a lower household income than a couple consisting of a man and woman due to the gender pay gap. The positive gap in absolute income mobility for same-sex attracted women may, however, mitigate these expected differences in household income. In contrast, for couples of two men, we should expect higher household incomes than a couple consisting of a man and woman, even if same-sex attracted men have lower labour market income than different-sex attracted men; on average, same-sex attracted men still experience higher labour market income than women. However, these conclusions depend on the relative matching of same-sex individuals and the number of years spent in cohabiting relationships.


Figure 5, Panel (a), confirms that partner earnings are substantially lower across the parental income distribution for same-sex attracted women compared to different-sex attracted women;

Figure 4: Intergenerational mobility, individual income


(a) Labour income rank



(b) Unemployment



(c) Public transfers/benefits



Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of Specification 1. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. See Tables C.4 to C.10 for point estimates with standard errors from all specifications.

the opposite is true for men. For both same-sex attracted men and women, we see slightly higher relative mobility (a flatter slope), showing less assortative matching (understood here as the relationship between parental and partner's earnings), compared to different-sex individuals. Nevertheless, the most notable difference is in absolute mobility, just as in personal income.

To understand household income dynamics, we also need to understand relationship dynamics. Figure 5, Panel (b), shows that, same-sex attracted men spend less than half of the six years with a cohabiting partner. Hence, across the entire parental income distribution, same-sex attracted men spend 1.26 fewer years in relationships than different-sex attracted men during the relevant six years. Similarly, same-sex attracted women spend 1.32 fewer years in relationship compared to different-sex attracted women; a pattern that is also consistent across the parental income distribution.


In periods outside relationships, partner income is, by definition, zero, which substantially lowers average household income. The influence of time without a partner is evident from Panel (c), where we consider household income relative to parental income, including periods outside relationships. Despite the absolute mobility premium endured by same-sex attracted women in terms of their individual income, the combination of fewer years in relationships and the generally lower earnings of their female partner(s) results in a striking gap in absolute mobility equivalent to -18.24 rank points at the intercept. The gap in household income between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted women widens as parental income increases due to their lower levels of assortative matching. For same-sex attracted men, the combination of lower earnings, longer time spent outside relationships, and less assortative matching means that their household income at the intercept is roughly equal to that of different-sex attracted men, but with a widening gap as parental income rank increases, even though the partners of different-sex attracted men (i.e. women) have substantially substantially lower labour market income.

5.3 Education


Intergenerational mobility in terms of educational attainment may crucially affect intergenerational mobility in terms of labour market income, given the positive returns to education in terms of income (Blundell *et al.*, 2005; Björklund and Salvanes, 2011). Figure 6 plots child educational attainment, understood as years of education, across the parental income distribution. We see that women generally have higher educational attainment than men, and that same-sex attracted women have higher educational attainment across the parental income distribution (β_s = 0.232) compared to different-sex attracted women. Similarly, same-sex attracted men have higher educational attainment than different-sex attracted men (β_s = 0.396) across the entire parental income distribution. We find no differences in the relative mobility when considering education.

Figure 5: Intergenerational mobility, household income


(a) Partner income when in relationship



(b) Years in relationship



(c) Household income




Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of Specification 1. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child, child's partner, and child's household income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. See Tables C.4 to C.10 for point estimates with standard errors from all specifications.

With this we confirm the persistent finding in previous studies that same-sex attracted individuals have higher educational attainment (Badgett *et al.*, 2024). We add to these findings when showing that this finding holds for same-sex individuals across the entire parental income distribution; even the same-sex attracted children from the bottom of the parental income distribution outperform their different-sex attracted peers with respect to education. The higher educational attainment among same-sex attracted women may contribute to their relatively higher earnings, but as same-sex attracted men educationally outperform different-sex attracted men across the parental income distribution whilst facing an equally consistent income penalty, we still need to consider other potential drivers behind this persistent income gap.

Figure 6: Intergenerational mobility, educational attainment

(a) Years of education



Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of Specification 1. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child educational outcome is measured at 35th year of life See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. See Tables C.4 for point estimates with standard errors from all specifications.

5.4 Fertility

Having a child is a life-changing event with immediate and long-lasting effects on especially mothers' earnings; these effects are often referred to as a "child penalty" (Adams *et al.*, 2024; Kleven *et al.*, 2019; Lalive and Zweimüller, 2009; Lundborg *et al.*, 2017). To understand if fertility plays a role in the intergenerational mobility gaps in income observed between same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals, we also consider fertility in an intergenerational perspective. In Figure7, Panel (a), we consider the share of parents (that is, among those who we refer to as children in our intergenerational analyses). For different-sex attracted men and women, parental rates are consistently high, although slightly decreasing across the parental income distribution. The share of same-sex attracted women who are parents is substantially lower than for

different-sex attracted women but, contrary to different-sex attracted women, we see an increasing probability of having a child across the parental income rank for same-sex attracted women (β_{sp} = 0.00077). In panel (b), we consider the number of children an individual has, conditioned on having at least one child. In women, we see a large absolute mobility gap, also at the intensive fertility margin. The absolute mobility gap at the intensive fertility margin is also largest at the low end of the income distribution. Finally, in Panel (c), we see that, across the entire parental income distribution, same-sex attracted women are more than two years older than different-sex attracted women when having their first child. Again, the difference is slightly larger at the low end of the income distribution. As the child penalties on women's lifetime earnings are particularly high for women who have their first child at a young age, older,(Leung *et al.*, 2016), the relatively older age of same-sex attracted women at first child is likely to also contribute to their relatively higher earnings.

The higher age at first child, as well as the lower fertility at both the extensive and intensive margins among same-sex attracted women at the bottom of the parental income distribution may contribute to the observed higher absolute mobility in terms of income in these women. As these mobility gaps narrow across the parental income distribution, so does the gap in labour market income between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted women.

At the extensive margin, the fertility of same-sex attracted men is vastly different from that of different-sex attracted men across the entire parental income distribution ($\beta_s = 0.71$), and contrary to women, we do not see higher relative mobility in same-sex attracted men compared to different-sex attracted men when considering fertility (rather, we find a marginal decrease across the parental income distribution (β_{sp} = -0.00030)). The small number of same-sex attracted men who do become parents also have fewer children across the entire parental income distribution compared to different-sex attracted men. Compared to different-sex attracted men, the few same-sex attracted men who are parents, get relative older at the birth of their first child as their parental income increases (β_{sp} = 0.036).

The overall lower fertility among same-sex attracted individuals is not surprising due to legal and practical barriers to having children with a same-sex partner. Such barriers may be easier overcome by individuals with fewer financial constraints, potentially explaining the fertility increase of same-sex attracted women across the parental income distribution. The lack of fertility increase in same-sex attracted men across the parental income distribution shows that same-sex attracted men appear not to benefit from the increase in parental resources as to overcome barriers to parenthood. These findings align with the higher mean household income but lower fertility amongst same-sex attracted men, compared to same-sex attracted women (as shown in Table 3 above). These findings suggest that barriers to parenthood for same-sex attracted men are not easily mitigated by financial resources. This is likely to be the case because surrogacy is

de facto not permitted in Denmark (Tanderup *et al.*, 2024; og Sunhedsministeriet, 2019), while all women and different-sex couples are eligible for reproductive assistance through both the public and private healthcare systems.

5.5 Health


Health has been identified as an area of particular concern in sexual minorities (Zeeman and Aranda, 2020), but this is yet to be explored in an intergenerational perspective relative to parental income. At the same time, health and earnings are linked through a bidirectional relationship as poor health may have negative effects on labour market outcomes (Halla and Zweimüller, 2013) and vice versa (Thomson *et al.*, 2022). As such, exploring the health of sexual minorities in an intergenerational framework may both shed lights on mechanisms contributing to the increased risk of health conditions in sexual minorities as well as on the differences in the intergenerational mobility of earnings.

In Figure 8, Panel (a), we consider number of GP visits from age 21 to 34, and we see a substantial difference in the absolute mobility of women, with different-sex attracted women having substantially more GP visits at the intercept (β_s = 29.49) across the entire parental income distribution. This should be seen in light of the much higher fertility rates in different-sex attracted women and pregnancy increases the demand for GP visits. Furthermore, as we show in Section 3.2.1, different-sex attracted women show substantially higher demand for prescription contraceptives for which monitoring GP visits may be needed, compared to same-sex attracted women. For men, we find the reverse, with equal levels of relative mobility, but with lower absolute mobility of same-sex attracted men (β_s = 10.48) resulting in a consistently higher number of GP visits across the entire parental income distribution for same-sex attracted men. We do not observe relevant diagnoses for GP visits, and as such, we consider other health outcomes to further understand these dynamics.


Figure 8, Panel (b), shows the number of somatic hospital visits, excluding fertility-related visits. For women, we see no differences between same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals, indicating that the higher number of GP visits among different-sex attracted women (for which we do not know the cause) is likely explained by differential fertility behaviour. We see that same-sex attracted men have fewer somatic hospital visits, again, across the entire parental income distribution compared to different-sex attracted men (β_s= 0.98), and also that they do not receive more prescription painkillers. As such, the higher number of GP visits across the parental income distribution is not likely to be related to an increased risk of somatic symptoms. In contrast, same-sex attracted women receive more painkiller prescriptions across the full parental income distribution despite their lower fertility rates (β_s= 1.10).

Figure 7: Intergenerational mobility, fertility


(a) Have at least one child



(b) Number of children, conditional on having at least one child



(c) Age at first child



Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of Specification 1. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. See Tables C.4 to C.10 for point estimates with standard errors from all specifications.

After consider the treatment of somatic health conditions, we turn to mental health. In Figure 9, Panel (a), we first show intergenerational mobility in terms of mental health prescriptions. Prescriptions may be issued by an individual's GP (e.g., in cases of depression and anxiety) or specialised medical doctor at a hospital or in private practice. We see substantially higher levels of mental health prescriptions among same-sex attracted individuals across the entire parental income distribution, but no differences in relative mobility. These results indicate a same-sex attraction mental health penalty that is not overcome irrespective of parental financial resources.

In Figure 9, Panel (b), we consider the number of psychiatric hospital visits that indicate more serious or persistent cases of mental health conditions. For same-sex attracted individuals we again find substantially lower levels of absolute mobility (i.e., more psychiatric hospital visits) compared to different-sex individuals of the same sex, but now we also see a small but significant difference in relative mobility. This shows that the relatively higher demand for psychiatric treatment among same-sex attracted individuals increases as parental income decreases. For women, we see a similar pattern when considering hospital visits related to substance abuse in Panel (c), with more visits among same-sex attracted women across the entire parental income distribution, but with the relatively higher risk further amplifying at the lower end of the income distribution (β_s = 0.045, β_{sp} = 0.00300). Thus, we find a persistent "mental health penalty" among same-sex attracted individuals regardless of parental income levels, but the higher risk of *severe* mental health conditions at the lower end of the parental income distribution may intersect with same-sex attraction, resulting in same-sex attracted children with low-income parents being particularly likely to experience severe mental health conditions.


We present intergenerational analyses of other health-related outcomes in Tables C.5, C.6, and C.7 in Appendix C. We see similar trends in most outcomes, i.e., higher numbers of visits and prescriptions related to mental health across the entire parental income distribution when comparing same-sex attracted individuals to different-sex attracted individuals.

5.6 Moving away from parents


As a potential driver behind differences in income ranks between same-sex and different-sex attracted indiviudals, we consider intergenerational mobility in terms of parent-child relationships in adulthood. In Figure 10, Panel (a), we plot age when last living with parents. We see that same-sex attracted women are older when last living with their parents compared to different-sex attracted women. This is true across there entire parental income distribution, with a marginal difference in relative mobility (β_s = 0.992, β_{sp} = - 0.0046). For men, we find the reverse as different-sex attracted men generally live longer with their parents and show almost perfect relative mobility (a flat slope), whereas same-sex attracted men in general stay shorter with their parents

Figure 8: Intergenerational mobility, general health outcomes


(a) GP visits



(b) Somatic hospital visits, excl. fertility




(c) Analgesic prescriptions




Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of Specification 1. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. See Tables C.4 to C.10 for point estimates with standard errors from all specifications.

Figure 9: Intergenerational mobility, mental health outcomes


(a) Mental health prescriptions



(b) Psychiatric hospital visits



(c) Substance abuse



Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of Specification 1. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. See Tables C.4 to C.10 for point estimates with standard errors from all specifications.

and display lower relative mobility. This means that the relative earlier age when moving out is especially pronounced for the same-sex attracted men at the lower end of the parental income distribution (β_s = - 1.088, β_{sp} = - 0.0077).

In Figure 10, Panel (b), we consider distance to parents at age 35. We see that for women, regardless of sexuality, a higher parental income rank is associated with a lower probability of living in the same geographical region as parents. With a substantial difference in absolute mobility (β_s = - 0.165), same-sex attracted women are much less likely to live near their parents, although they are older when they move out. Different-sex attracted men show a pattern almost identical to that of different-sex attracted women, whereas same-sex attracted men are the least likely to live in the same geographical region as their parents. This is most pronounced at the bottom of the parental income distribution (β_s = - 1.088). For same-sex attracted men only, we observe a decrease in the probability of living in same geographical region as parents when parental income rank decreases (β_{sp} = - 0.0077). Together, this shows that the same-sex attracted men growing up with low-income parents are the most likely to move out early and move further away from parents. These dynamics may be explained by same-sex attracted men preferring greater distance to their parents, but also by the low-income parents being less likely to live near locations of preference. These results highlight the importance of considering geographical heterogeneity in the estimated parameters, and as such, we further consider geographical and cohort differences in Section 12.

6 Decompositions

To understand the drivers behind the – often stark – differences in mean outcomes between different-sex attracted and same-attracted individuals, we have so far considered three factors: 1) differences in parental income, 2) differences in absolute mobility, and 3) differences in relative mobility. As a next step, we want to assess the relative importance of these three factors. A standard approach to decompose differences in means between two groups is a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.[9] A detailed Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition yields the following:


$$\underbrace{\bar{y}_{sc} - \bar{y}_c}_{\text{A: Total gap}} = \underbrace{\hat{\beta}_s}_{\text{B: Unexplained from absolute mob.}} + \underbrace{\hat{\beta}_{sp}\bar{y}_{sp}}_{\text{C: Unexplained gap from relative mob.}} + \underbrace{(\bar{y}_{sp} - \bar{y}_p)\hat{\beta}_p}_{\text{D: Explained gap}} \tag{2}$$

where $\bar{y}_{sc}$ and $\bar{y}_c$ denotes the mean income ranks same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals, respectively. Similarly, $\bar{y}_{sp}$ and $\bar{y}_p$ are the mean income ranks of the parents of each group. $\hat{\beta}_s$, $\hat{\beta}_{sp}$, and $\hat{\beta}_p$ are the coefficients estimated from Specification 1, where $\hat{\beta}_s$ is the difference


[9] This methods was developed in Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), and is described in Fortin *et al.* (2011). We follow the terminology of Fortin *et al.* (2011).

Figure 10: Intergenerational mobility, parent-child relationship

(a) Age when last living with parents



(b) Living in same region as parents



Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of Specification 1. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. See Tables C.4 to C.10 for point estimates with standard errors from all specifications.

in intercept/absolute mobility between same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals, and $\hat{\beta}_{sp}$ the difference in slope on parental income/relative mobility, and $\hat{\beta}_p$ the slope/relative mobility for different-sex attracted individuals. Following Fortin *et al.* (2011), we refer to the sum of B and C as the "unexplained" part of the differences in means (that is, unexplained by differences in parental income ranks between the two groups). The term D yields the "explained" gap (that is, explained by differences in parental income ranks between the two groups). However, Table 3 and Figure 3 shows that there is little difference in parental income ranks between same-sex and different-sex individuals, i.e. $\bar{y}_{sp} \approx \bar{y}_p \approx y_{p,50}$, where $y_{p,50}$ is the median parental income rank. As such, $\bar{y}_{sp} - \bar{y}_p \approx 0$, and we can disregard term D and simplify Equation 2 to:

$$\underbrace{\bar{y}_{sc} - \bar{y}_c}_{\text{A: Total gap}} \approx \underbrace{\hat{\beta}_s}_{\text{B: Unexplained from absolute mob.}} + \underbrace{\hat{\beta}_{sp}\bar{y}_{p,50}}_{\text{C: Unexplained gap from relative mob.}} \tag{3}$$

We illustrate this simplified decomposition in Figure 11 by plotting the following two terms:

$$\text{Dif}_{p,50} = \frac{B + C}{\bar{y}_c} \times 100 = \frac{\hat{\beta}_s + \hat{\beta}_{sp}\bar{y}_{p,50}}{\bar{y}_c} \times 100 \tag{4}$$

$$\text{Dif}_{\text{abs.}} = \frac{B}{\bar{y}_c} \times 100 = \frac{\hat{\beta}_s}{\bar{y}_c} \times 100 \tag{5}$$

$\text{Dif}_{p,50}$ gives the percentage difference in means at the median parental income level, including both differences due to absolute and relative mobility (indicated by blue circles in Figure 11). $\text{Dif}_{\text{abs.}}$ gives the percentage difference in means due to absolute mobility differences (indicated by pink circles in Figure 11). As such, any distance between the pink and blue circles in Figure 11 is due to differences in relative mobility measured at the median ($\approx$ the mean for both groups) parental income.

Figure 11 summarises the findings from Sections 4 and 5, but with differences between same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals now expressed in percent relative to the relevant mean for different-sex individuals. In Figure 11, Panel (a) we include the results for women, and in Panel (b), the results for men. As before, we see that same-sex attracted women have higher earnings relative to different-sex attracted women, and that the opposite is true for men. However, Figure 11 also reveals that earnings differences are small relative to differences in health outcomes, partnership dynamics, and location choices. However, the main takeaway from Figure 11 is that for the vast majority of outcomes, differences between same-sex and different-sex individuals are driven by differences in absolute mobility (i.e. the distances between the pink and blue circles tend to be small). This conclusion is important as it highlights that (dis)advantage in outcomes experienced by same-sex attracted individuals is similar independently of parental income. In

other words, higher parental income tend not to alleviate the (dis)advantage experienced by same-sex attracted individuals. The main exception to this general conclusion is in psychiatric and substance abuse treatment, especially for women, where higher relative mobility for same-sex attracted individuals (a flatter slope in rank-health relationship) reduce the difference in outcomes between same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals at the median parental income rank.

As we identify differences in absolute mobility as the primary driver of differences in means, this will be the focus of our cohort and region analyses.

7 Heterogeneity and extensions


In Section 5, we report comparisons between all our observed same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals. However, to better understand the underlying dynamics behind our results and for policy purposes, the potential heterogeneity *within* the group of same-sex attracted individuals is also crucial to understand. In the following, we explore heterogeneity across two key dimensions: childhood regions and cohorts.

Same-sex individuals (men, in particular) remain more concentrated in metropolitan areas than different-sex attracted individuals (Wimark and Fortes De Lena, 2022). Therefore, we may expect that same-sex attracted individuals growing up in metropolitan areas are less likely to face certain minority stressors which may affect their outcomes in terms of earnings, health, and relationships. In addition, our data consist of 15 cohorts (born 1974-1988), allowing us to consider if differences in mobility parameters between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals change over time as Denmark (at the same time as many other OECD countries) have changed policies to become inclusive of same-sex attracted individuals (see e.g. Evertsson *et al.*, 2020). Informed by the discussion in Section 6, we focus primarily on differences in intercepts, i.e. absolute mobility, in the following sections, but we report heterogeneity in all parameters in Appendix D. In addition, we focus on six representative outcomes: labour income rank, number of GP visits, any mental health prescriptions, years in relationship, partner income rank when in relationship, and finally, whether individuals live in the same region as their parents. Results for the remaining outcomes are included in Appendix D.


Finally, in Section 7.3, we extend our analysis of income differences between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals by also considering variation in child income ranks conditional on parental income rank. Differences in conditional mean child income ranks between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals do not inform us about the dispersion of child income.

Figure 11: Decomposition of differences in means

(a) Women



(b) Men



Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of Equation 4 (blue circles) and Equation 5 (pink circles) which are differences in outcomes between same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals. Blue circles give the percentage difference in means at the median parental income level, including both differences due to absolute and relative mobility. Pink circles give the percentage difference in means due to absolute mobility differences. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables.

7.1 Regional differences

We start by considering differences in levels of intergenerational mobility between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals who grew up in the same geographical region. An extensive literature documents the importance of childhood home region for economic outcomes (for results from the US, see e.g. Chetty et al. 2014; for results from Denmark, see e.g. Eriksen & Munk 2020). Regional persistence in outcomes may be influenced by schools and peers, but regions may also represent different sets of norms, where metropolitan areas may provide norms that correlate less with discrimination and social exclusion of sexual minorities. As such, same-sex attracted individuals may experience particularly large gaps in norms between themselves and their childhood region in less metropolitan areas. Thus, a comparison of the intergenerational mobility of children from the same childhood location, but with different sexualities, allows us to assess whether norms and identity play a role in regional persistence in results.

Denmark consists of five major regions (NUTS-2 level): North Jutland, Central Jutland, Southern Denmark, Zealand, and Copenhagen. Copenhagen is the capital of Denmark and represents the only region with a major metropolis.[10] We start our regional analysis by dividing our sample of children into five groups based on the region in which they lived at age 13, that is, before the children themselves would be able to choose where to live. Next, we estimate Specification 1 separately for each of these five groups. Figure 12 plots, β_s, i.e. the difference in intercept/absolute mobility between same-sex attracted and different-sex attract individuals, for each region in black circles. In addition, the black dashed line shows the mean estimate for aggregate sample (and its 95%-confidence interval in shaded grey). Generally, our region-level estimates hover close around the mean estimate from the aggregate sample. However, a few interesting patterns are worth highlighting. In Panel (a), we consider labour income ranks. For same-sex attracted women, we consistently see positive and generally statistically significant gaps in absolute mobility across regions. For men, we see that the negative gap in absolute mobility may be particularly large for those who grew up in Copenhagen. Panel (b) considers years in relationship, and indicates that same-sex attracted women who grew up in Copenhagen may spend marginally longer time in relationship. Panel (c) shows absolute mobility gaps at the extensive fertility margin, and shows that the identified mobility gaps persists across all regions, although it seems to be slightly smaller for women who grew up in Copenhagen. When considering health outcomes in Panels (d) and (e), we see that, for men, the absolute mobility gaps in health appear to be largely driven by specific areas of the country. For example, same-sex attracted men who grew up in Copenhagen tend not to experience significantly different absolute mobility in health outcomes compared to

[10] In 2020, more than 2 million people lived in the city of Copenhagen, more than four times the number of people in Aarhus, the second biggest city in Denmark. OECD city-specific population counts: https://regions-cities-atlas.oecd.org/metroregional/EFUA/DNK/229/T_T/2020/1.

different-sex attracted men. Lastly, when considering the probability of living in the same region as parents in Panel (f), we see smaller gaps in absolute mobility between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted for those who grew up in Copenhagen. This is in line with same-sex attracted individuals being more likely to live in Copenhagen and their parents continuing to live in their children's childhood region.


The regional variation in gaps in absolute mobility suggested by the six representative outcomes included in Figure 12 are generally representative of the remaining outcomes included in Figure D.3 and Tables **??** to **??**.

7.2 Cohort differences


To consider differences in mobility parameters over time – that is, across cohorts – we first by divide our sample of children into three groups based on their birth year, considering separately those born in 1974-1978, 1979-1983, and 1984-1988. Thus, each cohort group contains children born across five years, allowing us to consider changes in mobility parameters over 15 birth years. Next, we estimate Specification 1 separately for each of these three cohort groups. Figure 13 plots, β_s, i.e. the difference in intercept/absolute mobility between same-sex attracted and different-sex attract individuals, for each cohort group in black circles. Similar to our region-level analysis, the black dashed line shows the mean estimate for aggregate sample (and its 95%-confidence interval in shaded grey). We find a number of interesting patterns in our cohort-levels results. First, in terms of income ranks, Panel (a) of Figure 13 shows little development in absolute mobility gaps in earnings between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted men over time, suggesting a persistent 'gay penalty' for men across cohorts. For women, however, the absolute mobility gap in earnings (favouring same-sex attracted women) appears to be narrowing in younger cohorts, suggesting that the 'lesbian premium' is shrinking. Interestingly, Panel (c) shows a significant decrease in the absolute gap in fertility at the extensive margin between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted women in younger birth cohorts. This aligns with previous findings (Kolk and Andersson, 2020) and it is to be expected given the gradual removal of legal barriers to parenthood for women in same-sex couples in Denmark (Evertsson *et al.*, 2020). This increase in same-sex attracted women's fertility is likely to be part of the explanation for the convergence of same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted women's income, as same-sex attracted women increasingly will be affected by the 'child penalty' (Andresen and Nix, 2022; Kleven *et al.*, 2019). Panel (b) shows a clear reduction in the gap in years spent in a cohabiting relationship for the most recent cohorts for both women and men. Panels (d) and (e) suggest an increasing gap in both GP visits and mental health prescriptions over time, but only for women. The increased gap in GP visits may be partly explained by the higher fertility of same-sex attracted

Figure 12: Absolute mobility, regional differences


(a) Labour income rank




(b) Years in relationship




(c) Having at least one child




(d) Number of GP visits



(e) Any mental health prescriptions



(f) Living in same region as parents



Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of β_s from Specification 1, but dividing our sample of children into five groups based on the region in which they lived at age 13. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. 95%-level confidence intervals indicated, based on standard errors clustered at the sibling level.

women in younger cohorts. Panel (f) shows a weak trend of a closing gap in absolute mobility in terms of living in the same region as parents.

The cohort-development in gaps in absolute mobility between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals suggested by the six representative outcomes included in Figure 13 Panel a-f are generally representative of the remaining outcomes included in Figure D.4 and Tables **??** to **??**.

7.3 Income variation


As in many existing analyses of intergenerational rank-rank relationships between child and parent income, we consider the sum of income in a given age range for both parents and children in Section 5.1. Graphically, in Figure 4, we consider the average child income rank within each parental income ventile in a scatter plot combined with linear regressions of the rank-rank relationship. One key dimension of income dynamics that this analysis ignores is variation in income – e.g. within each parental income ventile, we show mean income ranks for same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted adult children, but does the variation in child income also differ between these two groups? Even if the means within parental income ventiles are identical between the two groups, the underlying distributions of child incomes could look very different. To further understand variation in child income ranks across the parental income distribution, we calculate the individual-level residuals from our rank-rank regression given by Specification 1:

$$r_{i,c} = y_{i,c} - \hat{y}_{i,c} = y_{i,c} - (\hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_p y_{i,p} + \hat{\beta}_s \text{same_sex}_i + \hat{\beta}_{sp} y_{i,p} \cdot \text{same_sex}_i) \tag{6}$$


where $\hat{\alpha}$, $\hat{\beta}_s$, $\hat{\beta}_{sp}$, and $\hat{\beta}_p$ are coefficients estimated from Specification 1. Next, we take the absolute value of the residuals, $r_{i,c}$, and use these as the dependent variable in Specification 1, still with parental income as the independent variable. This exercise allows us to see how variation in child income rank evolves across the parental income distribution differentially for same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals; results are plotted in Figure 14. First, Figure 14 reveals unequal residual variance, i.e. heteroscedasticity, as the absolute value of residuals are larger at bottom and top of the parental income distribution (this is a typical finding from rank-rank regressions, see e.g. Björklund and Jäntti 2009). In our case, concerns about biased standard errors due to heteroscedasticity are addressed by relying on cluster-robust standard errors only, clustering at the sibling-level. Second, and more interesting, we see that residuals are larger for same-sex attracted individuals compared to different-sex individuals across the entire parental income distribution, and for both women and men. This suggests that, conditional on parental income, same-sex attracted individuals do not only experience different mean levels in income (higher for women, lower for men), but their income levels also vary to a larger extent. This findings suggest rela-

Figure 13: Absolute mobility, cohort differences


(a) Labour income rank




(b) Years in relationship




(c) Having at least one child




(d) Number of GP visits



(e) Any mental health prescriptions




(f) Living in same region as parents



Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of β_s from Specification 1, but dividing our sample of children into three groups based on their year of birth. We consider children born in 1974-1978, 1979-1983, and 1984-1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. 95%-level confidence intervals indicated, based on standard errors clustered at the sibling level.

Figure 14: Intergenerational mobility, income variation: Absolute value of residuals from rank-rank regression



Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of Specification 1 where the dependent variable is the absolute value of the individual-level residuals from our rank-rank regression of child income on parental income. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. See Table D.11 for point estimates with standard errors from all specifications.

tively higher levels of inequality *within* the group of same-sex attracted individuals conditional on parental income.

To show how inequality conditional on parental income translates into population-level differences in income distributions between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals, we calculate within-sex income ranks and plot the relative shares of same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals in each ventile in Appendix Figure D.5. Figure D.5 confirms that also unconditional on parental income, the population-level income distributions of both same-attracted women and men are more dispersed, with underrepresentation at the middle of the sex-specific income distributions.

These results provide suggestive evidence of why we observe relatively modest mean income rank gaps between same-sex attracted and different-sex attracted individuals, despite relatively large differences in others, e.g., in mental health outcomes. The high income of some individuals masks the low income of others when considering only differences in means and rank-rank regressions. These results also suggest that future research on same-sex attracted individuals should consider both means and variance in income, leaving causal identification of factors driving within-group inequalities as an interesting topic for further research.

8 Selection by parental background

Selection is a key concern when considering the outcomes of sexual minorities, as researchers only observe those who choose to disclose their sexuality (in surveys), to marry / co-parent with a same-sex partner (many existing studies using administrative data), or in the context of this paper, to be in a same-sex relationship. Although we show that using our sample definition, same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals generally have similar parental backgrounds in terms of income (see Figure 3 and Table 3), same-sex attracted individuals who choose to live in a same-sex relationship (and thus, be open about their sexuality and part of our sample) may have an atypical parental background, even conditional on parental income. For example, same-sex attracted individuals who choose to live in a same-sex relationship could have particularly supportive parents, but such factors are difficult to observe, especially in large-scale datasets, including in Danish administrative data.

However, the long time span and the rich information on family structures in Danish administrative data allow us to control for such unobserved heterogeneity in parental characteristics as we can compare the outcomes of siblings, i.e. with identical parental backgrounds, but with different sexualities. Specifically, we can control for sibling FEs when estimating the relationship between child outcomes and parental background. In most studies considering differences in intergenerational mobility across groups, e.g. Chetty *et al.* (2020) and Abramitzky *et al.* (2021), one cannot control for sibling FEs as the group identifier (e.g. ethnicity and parental migration status) is fixed within families. In contrast, sexuality tends to vary within groups of siblings.

When including sibling FEs in our model of intergenerational mobility, we want all sets of siblings included in our estimation sample, also those of different sexes. As such, we cannot estimate our specification separately for daughters and sons as we do for Specification 1. Therefore, in addition to adding sibling FEs, we further expand Specification 1 to include a full set of sex interaction terms:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{if,c} = \alpha + \beta_f + \beta_p y_{i,p} + \beta_s \text{same_sex}_i + \beta_{sp} y_{i,p} \cdot \text{same_sex}_i + \beta_g \text{sex}_i \\ + \beta_{pg} \text{sex}_i \cdot y_{i,p} + \beta_{sg} \text{sex}_i \cdot \text{same_sex}_i \\ + \beta_{spg} \text{sex}_i \cdot \text{same_sex}_i \cdot y_{i,p} + \varepsilon_{if} \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

Notation follows that of Specification 1, but with the added subscript f to indicate family-level variation. β_f are sibling FEs, and sex_i is an indicator for individual i's sex being different from that of the reference group.[11] The specification also includes controls for year-of-birth FEs and

[11]This specification assumes that the sibling fixed effect, β_f, is not sex specific. As such, we assume that a daughter and a son of the same mother will experience a similar effect of their parental background compared to peers of the same sex. An alternative would be to focus on sets of siblings of the same sex to estimate brother and sister FEs separately, but this would substantially limit our sample size and disproportionally include children with

their interaction with sex_i, but these are not shown here for brevity. We vary the reference group to be sons and daughters, respectively, to make results comparable to those from Specification 1. The coefficients β_s (difference in absolute mobility) and β_{sp} (difference in absolute mobility) for the reference sex remain the main objects of interest.

Note that the coefficients on ($y_{i,p}$) are now only identified from differences in parental income rank between siblings. For each child, we observe parental income over 21 years, so parental income ranks tend to be stable across siblings: A simple regression of parental income rank on the set of sibling FEs yields an $R^2 = 0.97$. Thus, parental income rank and our sibling FEs will be strongly correlated / collinear, and controlling for parental income rank will be redundant when including sibling FEs. Therefore, our preferred model with sibling FEs excludes controls for parental income rank:

$$y_{if,c} = \alpha + \beta_f + \beta_s \text{same_sex}_i + \beta_g \text{sex}_i + \beta_{sg} \text{sex}_i \cdot \text{same_sex}_i + \varepsilon_{if} \tag{8}$$

This specification only allows for comparisons of absolute mobility (β_s) as sibling FEs controls non-parametrically for time-invariant parental characteristics across siblings, including parental income rank. However, our previous results show that the differences in relative mobility across same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals are small and most often insignificant, which further motivates Specification 8.[12]

To be able to estimate the sibling FEs in Specifications 7 and 8, we need to impose one additional restriction on our sample: that each child in our sample has at least one sibling also observed in our sample – this is the case for 57% of children in main sample.

8.1 Results with sibling fixed effects

Tables C.4 to C.10 in Appendix C include estimates for all outcomes from: 1) Our main specification as shown in Figures 5 to 10. 2) Our main specification with cohort FEs to control for time trends – this is particularly relevant for all outcomes that are not expressed in within-cohort ranks, e.g. the uptake of mental health prescriptions. 3) Our main specification estimated on the 57% of children with at least one sibling in our sample to assess whether selection based on the number of siblings affect our estimates. 4) Specification 7 estimated on the sibling sample. 5) Specification 8 estimated on the sibling sample. We generally find that our results are robust across all these specifications.

To summarise our results controlling for sibling FEs, Figure 15 concentrates on six key out-

three or more siblings.

[12] As in Specification 7, we include controls for year-of-birth FEs and their interaction with sex_i, but these are not shown here for brevity.


comes and compare estimates of the difference in absolute mobility between same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals (β_s) across our two preferred models, Specifications 1 and 8.

Panel (a) includes estimates of differences in absolute mobility in terms of income rank. We first see that same-sex attracted women experience higher levels of absolute mobility – at around 5.5 rank points – across Specification 1 and Specification 8 where we control non-parametrically for family background using sibling FEs. Similarly, we see a negative gap in absolute mobility between same-sex and different-sex attracted men of the same size across specifications. Notice also that the precision of the estimates (here shown as 95%-confidence intervals) is very similar across specifications. Panel (b) considers years in cohabiting relationship – our key outcome on household dynamics. Again, we see that our estimated results from Specification 1 are very similar to those from Specification 8 where we control for sibling FEs. Panel (c) shows a similar picture when considering fertility, suggesting the lower fertility rates amongst same-sex attracted women and men are not driven by unobserved heterogeneity in parental characteristics. Panel (d) focuses on our main general health outcome, GP visits. Again, we see that estimates are similar across specifications, although the positive gap in absolute mobility is slightly smaller for men when controlling for sibling FEs. Panel (e) shows a similar picture when we consider instead the use of mental health prescriptions. We see a slightly larger estimated gap in absolute mobility (0.03 vs. 0.04 percentage point) for women when controlling for sibling FEs, although this difference is not statistically significant. Lastly, Panel (f) considers probability of living in the same region as parents by age 35 – again we find similar estimates across Specifications 1 and 8, albeit a slightly smaller estimated for same-sex attracted men when controlling for sibling FEs.

We conclude that our estimates from Specification 1 – which uses parental income as the only parental control – generally are very similar to those from Specification 8 where we control non-parametrically for family background using sibling FEs across outcomes. As such, our estimates are not sensitive to selection by parental background beyond what can be explained by parental income. This finding is relevant in many other contexts as alternative data sources on the outcomes of sexual minority typically do not include data on siblings and their outcomes and therefore render a fixed-effects approach infeasible.

Finally, specification 8 yields estimates that approach the *causal* effect of sexuality on outcomes in early adulthood. Sibling FEs control – to a large extent – for variation in both genetics and family environment across individuals (see e.g. an extended discussion on within- vs. between-family variation between children in Ronda *et al.*, 2022). One threat to identification of causal effects of sexuality is potential within-sibling links between genetics and sexuality. However, current evidence suggests only weak links between sexuality and genetics (see e.g. Ganna *et al.*, 2019).

Figure 15: Comparing results from main specification to those with sibling fixed effects



Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of β_s from Specification 1 (blue bars) and Specification 8 (pink bars) respectively. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. See Tables C.4 to C.10 for point estimates with standard errors from all specifications. 95%-level confidence intervals indicated, based on standard errors clustered at the sibling level.

9 Conclusions

Research on sexual minorities has long been held back by the limited available data on sexual attraction in combination with comprehensive information on relevant outcomes. We develop a new way to identify both same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals in population-wide administrative data from Denmark using joint financial commitments in couples. As such, we alleviate concerns about selection/reporting bias in surveys on sexual minorities, and we avoid relying only on measuring sexuality through relatively rare outcomes amongst same-sex couples, such as marriage and co-parenthood. Another primary advantage of our measure of sexual attraction is that we can link observed sexual attraction to both the outcomes of adult children and to their parents' income during the childhood of the children in question. Thus, the richness and long time span of the Danish administrative data allow us to analyse differences in the relationship between parents' and adult children's income, i.e. intergenerational mobility, by the adult children's sexual attraction.

We start by documenting that same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals are equally represented across that parental income distribution. That is, same-sex attraction is not meaningfully related to parental income. This result is not trivial: one could imagine that openness about sexuality, and thus, the probability of being observed in a same-sex couple, would be related to parental income if a higher level of income is positively correlated to progressiveness, parental support, etc.

We continue to show that across the entire parental income distribution, same-sex attracted men experience inferior labour market outcomes when compared to different-sex attracted men, indicating that parental financial resources do not mitigate the labour market penalties endured by same-sex attracted men. To a large extent, this picture is reversed for women, where same-sex attracted women have higher earnings and lower rates of unemployment across the entire parental income distribution. That is, the "gay/lesbian penalty/premium" is not related to parental income. We believe that this finding is new to the literature where differences in income by sexual attraction have not been considered in the context of parental income, most likely due to the lack of appropriate data.

To suggest potential drivers of these persistent income gaps across the parental income distribution, we explore several child outcomes that are related to labour market outcomes. We consider differences in education, fertility, health, household composition, and location choices by sexual attraction and by parental income. In doing so, we document large and persistent gaps across the parental income distribution for many of the outcomes, but not always in the direction the relevant income gaps would suggest. For example, we find consistently higher levels of education, lower fertility rates, lower numbers of hospital visits (also excluding fertility-related visits),

and more regional mobility across the parental income distribution for both same-sex attracted women and men, which should predict higher earnings. These factors are likely to contribute to the "lesbian premium", but they do not help us to understand the drivers of the "gay penalty", which both persist throughout the parental income distribution. In contrast, we find substantially higher levels of mental health conditions and lower levels of cohabitation among same-sex attracted individuals. The higher prevalence of mental health treatments among same-sex attracted individuals is evident across the entire parental income distribution, but severe mental health conditions (observed as treatment in psychiatric hospitals) are particularly prevalent at the bottom of the parental income distribution for same-sex attracted individuals. Together, these findings suggest that higher parental income does not mitigate the mental health challenges faced by sexual minorities, with the exception of the most severe types of illness.

Generally, we find little regional and cohort variation in intergenerational relationships, but with two notable exceptions: Same-sex attracted women from more recent cohorts have higher fertility rates, whilst their positive income gap to different-sex attracted individuals decreases across cohorts. This indicates that women in more recent cohorts benefit from improved access to fertility services for single and same-sex partnered women. In line with this finding, the higher levels of income amongst same-sex attracted women converge towards zero for more recent cohorts, potentially because they are increasingly affected by the "child penalty".

Finally, we consider that our results may be affected by heterogeneity in parental characteristics beyond parental income. Other papers that estimate differences in intergenerational mobility by demographics groups typically consider demographic characteristics that are fixed within families, e.g. race (Chetty *et al.*, 2020) and immigration status (Abramitzky *et al.*, 2021; Jensen and Manning, 2023). In our setting, we can exploit that sexual attraction often varies among siblings, allowing us to control non-parametrically for additional parental heterogeneity (which could be both observed and unobserved) by including sibling FEs in our model. We find that our results are robust to controlling for additional parental heterogeneity when including sibling FEs. Controlling for sibling FEs brings us closer to causal estimates of the effect of sexual attraction on outcomes in early adulthood.

Together, our results suggest that the disadvantages faced by same-sex attracted individuals only to a limited extent are mitigated by high parental income. The fact that parental resources and their correlates do not mitigate gaps in outcomes between same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals suggest that non-pecuniary factors play a significant role in explaining differences in the lived experiences between same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals. The fact that mental health conditions are much more prevalent among same-sex attracted individuals across the parental income distribution also suggests that cultural factors, such as discrimination, may not be mitigated by parental resources.

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ONLINE APPENDIX:

Intergenerational Mobility by Same-Sex and Different-Sex Attraction

A Data details

A.1 Validation of couple's measure

Table A.1: Shared responsibilities of identified couples


	Different sex	Same-sex	Both sexes
Property ownership w. SS		0.508	0.286
		(0.00311)	(0.00716)
Credit account w. SS		0.764	0.671
		(0.00264)	(0.00744)
Debit account w. SS		0.820	0.777
		(0.00239)	(0.00659)
Mortgage w. SS		0.485	0.288
		(0.00311)	(0.00718)
Child w. SS		0.190	0.0835
		(0.00244)	(0.00438)
Married to SS		0.605	0.286
		(0.00304)	(0.00716)
Property ownership w. DS	0.518		0.517
	(0.000260)		(0.00792)
Credit account w. DS	0.768		0.798
	(0.000220)		(0.00637)
Debit account w. DS	0.783		0.812
	(0.000215)		(0.00619)
Mortgage w. DS	0.539		0.532
	(0.000260)		(0.00790)
Child w. DS	0.793		0.691
	(0.000211)		(0.00732)
Married to DS	0.838		0.609
	(0.000192)		(0.00773)
N	3,688,402	25,866	3,986

Standard errors in parentheses


Notes: This table reports the share of couples with a given commitment from 2003 to 2022. Different sex / same sex/ both sexes attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one of the listed commitments between 2003 to 2022 with partner(s) of the relevant sex; see Section 3.2 for details.

Figure A.1: Trajectories of cohabiting couples

(a) Women



(b) Men



Notes: This figure plots the couple trajectories of individuals who cohabit and share financial responsibilities with a person of the same sex in year 0. SSC = same-sex couple, DSC = different-sex couple. We consider all cohabitation spells with shared financial responsibilities starting from 2004 to 2017. We use data from 2003 to determine if a spell starts in 2004. We use data till 2022 to determine the outcomes of those in spells in 2017 or earlier. For equivalent trajectories for those starting different-sex couples, see Figure A.1.

A.2 Data descriptions

B Descriptives

Table B.2: Summary statistics, different-sex attracted vs. no observable attraction

	Women			Men		
	Different-sex attracted	No attraction	Diff.	Different-sex attracted	No attraction	Diff.
Family & household (30-35)						
Living in Copenhagen	0.316	0.428	-0.112***	0.321	0.370	-0.049***
Married	0.572	0.078	0.494***	0.512	0.020	0.491***
Have children	0.852	0.319	0.533***	0.769	0.119	0.650***
No. of children if parent	1.962	1.656	0.307***	1.807	1.418	0.389***
Age at first birth	27.644	25.393	2.251***	28.823	25.991	2.832***
Household income rank	57.697	18.958	38.739***	55.133	20.624	34.509***
Education and labour market (30-35)						
Years of education	15.135	14.172	0.962***	14.728	13.358	1.371***
Labour income rank	44.122	33.296	10.826***	62.485	35.962	26.523***
Labour income (1000 DKK)	260.197	192.556	67.641***	360.325	207.556	152.768***
Public transfers/benefits (1000 DKK)	59.465	78.591	-19.126***	18.565	60.894	-42.329***
Unemployment benefits (1000 DKK)	32.301	38.233	-5.933***	13.155	32.479	-19.324***
Unemployed, share	0.150	0.284	-0.134***	0.085	0.274	-0.189***
Mental health (22-35)						
- visits						
Psychologist (any)	0.185	0.209	-0.024***	0.066	0.079	-0.013***
Psychologist (no.) visits	1.745	2.195	-0.450***	0.490	0.658	-0.169***
Psychiatrist (any)	0.075	0.160	-0.084***	0.046	0.125	-0.079***
Psychiatrist (no.)	1.397	3.669	-2.273***	0.689	2.271	-1.582***
Psychiatric hospital (any)	0.118	0.266	-0.147***	0.072	0.236	-0.164***
Psychiatric hospital (no.)	0.421	1.717	-1.296***	0.231	1.420	-1.188***
Substance abuse hospital (any)	0.042	0.102	-0.060***	0.054	0.151	-0.097***
Substance abuse hospital (no)	0.081	0.337	-0.257***	0.108	0.632	-0.524***
- prescriptions						
Mental health (any)	0.317	0.472	-0.155***	0.202	0.383	-0.181***
Mental health (no)	6.136	20.895	-14.759***	3.492	17.796	-14.304***
Substance abuse (any)	0.007	0.028	-0.021***	0.024	0.067	-0.043***
Substance abuse (no.)	0.102	0.547	-0.445***	0.160	1.313	-1.153***
Alcohol abuse (any)	0.005	0.019	-0.014***	0.022	0.054	-0.032***
Alcohol abuse (no.)	0.013	0.072	-0.059***	0.054	0.189	-0.135***
General health (22-35)						
- visits						
GP visits (no.)	112.608	109.628	2.980***	43.705	49.484	-5.779***
Hospital (any)	0.990	0.940	0.050***	0.932	0.901	0.031***
Hospital (no.)	13.972	12.281	1.691***	7.298	8.039	-0.740***
Hospital, ex. fertility (no.)	9.722	10.048	-0.326***	6.986	7.767	-0.781***
- prescriptions						
Opioid analgesics (any)	0.252	0.290	-0.039***	0.203	0.211	-0.008***
Opioid analgesics (no.) .	1.483	3.123	-1.639***	1.112	1.860	-0.748***
Non-opioid analgesics (any)	0.736	0.740	-0.004**	0.662	0.611	0.052***
Non-opioid analgesics (no.)	4.546	6.935	-2.388***	2.890	3.740	-0.850***
Contraceptive (any)	0.962	0.842	0.119***			
Contraceptive (no.)	26.081	22.788	3.293***			
Parental characteristics (1-21)						
Parental income rank	51.015	44.226	6.789***	51.761	42.847	8.914***
Father income rank	50.891	44.921	5.970***	51.531	43.807	7.724***
Mother income rank	50.793	45.485	5.308***	51.359	44.446	6.912***
Parent-child relationship (35)						
Min. age living without parents	19.872	20.289	-0.416***	20.970	21.516	-0.546***
Max. age living with parents	20.268	21.922	-1.654***	21.817	23.881	-2.064***
Same municipality as parents	0.432	0.488	-0.057***	0.442	0.556	-0.114***
Same minor region as parents	0.641	0.644	-0.002	0.638	0.702	-0.065***
Same major region as parents	0.762	0.767	-0.006***	0.761	0.810	-0.049***
N	339,594	59,349		331,818	83,462	

Notes: This table reports means of outcomes by sex and sexuality. Numbers in parentheses state the years in which an outcome is observed, i.e., 30-35 refers to the 30th-35th years of life. For parental outcomes, numbers in parentheses refer to child years. *Min. years when living without parents* refers to the year when first observed in a household different than one's parents. Values below 11 are sat equal to 10, as habitation information is not observable prior to year 10 for our fist child cohort. *Max years living with parents* refers to the year last observed living in a household with parents until year 35. See Section 3 for further details on variables and data construction.

Table B.3: Summary statistics, different-sex attracted vs. both-sex attracted

	Women			Men		
	Different-sex attracted	Both-sex attracted	Diff.	Different-sex attracted	Both-sex attracted	Diff.
Family & household (30-35)						
Living in Copenhagen	0.316	0.362	-0.047***	0.321	0.428	-0.107***
Married	0.572	0.412	0.160***	0.512	0.339	0.173***
Have children	0.852	0.683	0.169***	0.769	0.573	0.196***
No. of children if parent	1.962	1.710	0.252***	1.807	1.541	0.266***
Age at first birth	27.644	28.260	-0.616***	28.823	30.633	-1.810***
Years in cohab. relationship	4.407	3.601	0.806***	4.055	3.470	0.585***
Household income rank	57.697	49.751	7.946***	55.133	52.680	2.453***
Partner income rank	65.465	55.469	9.996***	49.518	47.460	2.058***
Partner income rank (in relationship only)	62.728	54.081	8.647***	36.643	39.452	-2.809***
Education and labour market (30-35)						
Years of education	15.135	15.382	-0.248***	14.728	15.258	-0.529***
Labour income rank	44.122	45.875	-1.753**	62.485	61.379	1.106
Labour income (1000 DKK)	260.197	268.682	-8.485**	360.325	361.748	-1.423
Public transfers/benefits (1000 DKK)	59.465	50.847	8.618***	18.565	18.269	0.295
Unemployment benefits (1000 DKK)	32.301	26.650	5.650***	13.155	12.474	0.681
Unemployed, share	0.150	0.143	0.007	0.085	0.092	-0.007
Mental health (22-35)						
- visits						
Psychologist (any)	0.185	0.213	-0.029**	0.066	0.063	0.003
Psychologist (no.)	1.745	2.105	-0.360**	0.490	0.430	0.060
Psychiatrist (any)	0.075	0.092	-0.017**	0.046	0.035	0.012*
Psychiatrist (no.)	1.397	1.639	-0.243	0.689	0.505	0.184
Psychiatric hospital (any)	0.118	0.153	-0.035***	0.072	0.064	0.009
Psychiatric hospital (no.)	0.421	0.876	-0.455***	0.231	0.247	-0.016
Substance abuse hospital (any)	0.042	0.061	-0.019***	0.054	0.049	0.005
Substance abuse hospital (no.)	0.081	0.163	-0.083***	0.108	0.082	0.026
- prescriptions						
Mental health (any)	0.317	0.344	-0.026*	0.202	0.179	0.023*
Mental health (no.)	6.136	9.913	-3.777***	3.492	4.067	-0.576
Substance abuse (any)	0.007	0.014	-0.006**	0.024	0.025	-0.000
Substance abuse (no.)	0.102	0.199	-0.097	0.160	0.114	0.045
Alcohol abuse (any)	0.005	0.012	-0.007***	0.022	0.024	-0.002
Alcohol abuse (no.)	0.013	0.043	-0.030***	0.054	0.071	-0.016
General health (22-35)						
GP visits (no.)	112.608	111.682	0.926	43.705	46.307	-2.602**
Hospital visits (any)	0.990	0.985	0.006*	0.932	0.933	-0.000
Hospital visits (no.)	13.972	13.688	0.285	7.298	7.034	0.265
Hospital visits, ex. fertility (no.)	9.722	10.169	-0.447*	6.986	6.633	0.353
- prescriptions						
Opioid analgesics (any)	0.252	0.274	-0.023*	0.203	0.189	0.014
Opioid analgesics (no.)	1.483	2.307	-0.823**	1.112	1.273	-0.161
Non-opioid analgesics (any)	0.736	0.744	-0.008	0.662	0.608	0.054***
Non-opioid analgesics (no.)	4.546	5.890	-1.344***	2.890	2.862	0.028
Contraceptives (any)	0.962	0.941	0.021***			
Contraceptives (no.)	26.081	24.039	2.042***			
Parental characteristics (1-21)						
Parental income rank	51.015	49.720	1.295	51.761	53.863	-2.102**
Father income rank	50.891	49.413	1.477*	51.531	52.490	-0.959
Mother income rank	50.793	50.804	-0.012	51.359	53.678	-2.320**
Parent-child relationship (35)						
Min. age living without parents	19.872	19.677	0.195***	20.970	20.792	0.179*
Max. age living with parents	20.268	20.485	-0.217**	21.817	21.766	0.051
Same municipality as parents	0.432	0.365	0.067***	0.442	0.286	0.156***
Same minor region as parents	0.641	0.550	0.091***	0.638	0.460	0.177***
Same major region as parents	0.762	0.688	0.073***	0.761	0.644	0.117***
N	339,594	1,181		331,818	893	


Notes: This table reports means of outcomes by sex and sexuality. Numbers in parentheses state the years in which an outcome is observed, i.e., 30-35 refers to the 30th-35th years of life. For parental outcomes, numbers in parentheses refer to child years. *Min. years when living without parents* refers to the year when first observed in a household different than one's parents. Values below 11 are sat equal to 10, as habitation information is not observable prior to year 10 for our fist child cohort. *Max years living with parents* refers to the year last observed living in a household with parents until year 35. See Section 3 for further details on variables and data construction.

C Main regressions

C.1 Figures

Figure C.2: Demographics

(a) Years of education



Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of Specification 1. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. See Tables C.4 to C.10 for point estimates with standard errors from all specifications.

C.2 Tables

Table C.4: Regressions, demographics

		Women					Men				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Living in Copenhagen	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.114***	0.114***	0.103***	0.0566*	0.0984***	0.263***	0.263***	0.262***	0.239***	0.254***
		(0.0155)	(0.0155)	(0.0218)	(0.0282)	(0.0145)	(0.0189)	(0.0189)	(0.0267)	(0.0397)	(0.0186)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	0.00275***	0.00275***	0.00276***	0.000315*		0.00281***	0.00281***	0.00284***	0.000368*	
		(0.0000312)	(0.0000312)	(0.0000443)	(0.000156)		(0.0000317)	(0.0000317)	(0.0000447)	(0.000157)	
	SSA # PIR	0.000132	0.000140	0.000460	0.000782		0.000332	0.000328	0.000405	0.000298	
		(0.000263)	(0.000263)	(0.000363)	(0.000488)		(0.000311)	(0.000311)	(0.000435)	(0.000666)	
	Constant	0.175***	0.169***	0.143***	0.260***	0.275***	0.176***	0.173***	0.144***	0.261***	0.280***
		(0.00175)	(0.00311)	(0.00464)	(0.00935)	(0.00524)	(0.00179)	(0.00316)	(0.00466)	(0.00942)	(0.00525)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0293	0.0295	0.0305	0.552	0.552	0.0321	0.0322	0.0334	0.552	0.552
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Married	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-0.0820***	-0.0774***	-0.0773***	-0.0212	-0.0691***	-0.152***	-0.153***	-0.172***	-0.173***	-0.237***
		(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0227)	(0.0405)	(0.0192)	(0.0176)	(0.0176)	(0.0246)	(0.0441)	(0.0213)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	0.00113***	0.00114***	0.00111***	0.000250		0.00112***	0.00113***	0.00106***	0.000287	
		(0.0000303)	(0.0000302)	(0.0000412)	(0.000226)		(0.0000310)	(0.0000309)	(0.0000421)	(0.000227)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.000399	-0.000416	-0.000288	-0.000891		-0.00114***	-0.00112***	-0.00106*	-0.00124	
		(0.000268)	(0.000267)	(0.000372)	(0.000668)		(0.000303)	(0.000303)	(0.000416)	(0.000754)	
	Constant	0.514***	0.574***	0.586***	0.644***	0.656***	0.454***	0.500***	0.519***	0.566***	0.580***
		(0.00179)	(0.00326)	(0.00485)	(0.0137)	(0.00781)	(0.00183)	(0.00338)	(0.00500)	(0.0137)	(0.00783)
	Adjusted R^2	0.00470	0.00988	0.00945	0.102	0.102	0.00551	0.00844	0.00771	0.102	0.102
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Parent	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-0.401***	-0.403***	-0.396***	-0.420***	-0.358***	-0.705***	-0.706***	-0.704***	-0.689***	-0.710***
		(0.0158)	(0.0157)	(0.0225)	(0.0372)	(0.0175)	(0.00946)	(0.00942)	(0.0140)	(0.0312)	(0.0146)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.000190***	-0.000194***	-0.000255***	-0.000193		-0.000226***	-0.000236***	-0.000281***	-0.000139	
		(0.0000218)	(0.0000218)	(0.0000286)	(0.000176)		(0.0000262)	(0.0000261)	(0.0000347)	(0.000178)	
	SSA # PIR	0.000771**	0.000760**	0.000730*	0.00117		-0.000309*	-0.000300*	-0.000505*	-0.000398	
		(0.000267)	(0.000266)	(0.000371)	(0.000617)		(0.000148)	(0.000148)	(0.000211)	(0.000515)	
	Constant	0.862***	0.849***	0.869***	0.880***	0.870***	0.781***	0.762***	0.777***	0.789***	0.782***
		(0.00126)	(0.00244)	(0.00350)	(0.0106)	(0.00603)	(0.00153)	(0.00291)	(0.00424)	(0.0111)	(0.00669)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0122	0.0143	0.0131	0.0847	0.0846	0.0240	0.0285	0.0277	0.0847	0.0846
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
No. of children	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-0.553***	-0.546***	-0.550***	-0.491***	-0.411***	-0.575***	-0.575***	-0.588***	-0.670*	-0.630***
		(0.0312)	(0.0313)	(0.0452)	(0.104)	(0.0452)	(0.0844)	(0.0843)	(0.119)	(0.319)	(0.175)
	Rank, parental income, 1-21	-0.00246***	-0.00246***	-0.00264***	-0.000136		-0.00153***	-0.00153***	-0.00175***	0.000759	
		(0.0000518)	(0.0000518)	(0.0000709)	(0.000456)		(0.0000534)	(0.0000534)	(0.0000728)	(0.000459)	
	SSA # PIR	0.00222***	0.00219***	0.00219**	0.00149		-0.00135	-0.00128	-0.00104	0.00123	
		(0.000512)	(0.000512)	(0.000714)	(0.00161)		(0.00148)	(0.00148)	(0.00232)	(0.00595)	
	Constant	2.088***	2.109***	2.172***	2.099***	2.092***	1.886***	1.897***	1.938***	1.838***	1.876***
		(0.00320)	(0.00572)	(0.00869)	(0.0277)	(0.0160)	(0.00329)	(0.00597)	(0.00898)	(0.0281)	(0.0167)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0110	0.0118	0.0139	0.0895	0.0892	0.00390	0.00405	0.00512	0.0895	0.0892
	N	291328	291328	167328	315130	315130	255273	255273	147802	315130	315130
Age at first birth	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	2.761***	2.728***	3.042***	2.798***	2.275***	-0.767	-0.782	-0.877	-0.283	0.277
		(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.263)	(0.517)	(0.220)	(0.757)	(0.756)	(0.989)	(1.362)	(0.827)
	Rank, parental income, 1-21	0.0345***	0.0344***	0.0366***	0.0119***		0.0229***	0.0229***	0.0245***	-0.00126	
		(0.000249)	(0.000249)	(0.000339)	(0.00212)		(0.000245)	(0.000245)	(0.000331)	(0.00213)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.00981***	-0.00975***	-0.0137***	-0.00998		0.0364**	0.0362**	0.0348	0.0115	
		(0.00279)	(0.00280)	(0.00394)	(0.00783)		(0.0134)	(0.0134)	(0.0188)	(0.0258)	
	Constant	25.89***	25.74***	25.42***	26.45***	27.04***	27.64***	27.59***	27.44***	28.63***	28.56***
		(0.0158)	(0.0279)	(0.0411)	(0.126)	(0.0703)	(0.0154)	(0.0278)	(0.0406)	(0.129)	(0.0742)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0716	0.0723	0.0819	0.239	0.237	0.0359	0.0362	0.0409	0.239	0.237
	N	291328	291328	167328	315130	315130	255273	255273	147802	315130	315130
Years of education	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.232**	0.200*	0.106	0.0809	0.0949	0.396***	0.396***	0.311*	0.242	0.313**
		(0.0784)	(0.0785)	(0.109)	(0.177)	(0.0764)	(0.0967)	(0.0967)	(0.137)	(0.216)	(0.102)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	0.0290***	0.0289***	0.0308***	0.00718***		0.0286***	0.0285***	0.0302***	0.00720***	
		(0.000145)	(0.000144)	(0.000200)	(0.000983)		(0.000154)	(0.000154)	(0.000212)	(0.000989)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.00140	-0.00144	0.000601	0.000287		-0.00226	-0.00227	-0.00125	0.00134	
		(0.00126)	(0.00126)	(0.00169)	(0.00275)		(0.00166)	(0.00166)	(0.00231)	(0.00353)	
	Constant	13.66***	13.27***	13.25***	14.56***	14.91***	13.25***	13.06***	13.02***	14.36***	14.72***
		(0.00887)	(0.0152)	(0.0227)	(0.0581)	(0.0310)	(0.00921)	(0.0158)	(0.0234)	(0.0588)	(0.0319)
	Adjusted R^2	0.121	0.132	0.142	0.391	0.391	0.111	0.115	0.125	0.391	0.391
	N	343257	343257	194767	385199	385199	333427	333427	190432	385199	385199
Cohort-year FEs		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling sample		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling FEs		No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: In this table, we report estimates of Specification 1 in Column 1. Column 2 adds cohort FEs. Column 3 consider only those with siblings in the sample. Column 4 includes estimates of Specification 7, and Column 5 estimates of Specification 8. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. Standard errors clustered at the sibling level, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.5: Regressions, hospital visits

		Women					Men				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
No. of hospital visits	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-3.093***	-3.246***	-3.176***	-3.679***	-2.993***	-0.977**	-0.974**	-1.243*	-0.558	-0.739*
		(0.422)	(0.419)	(0.581)	(0.964)	(0.405)	(0.341)	(0.340)	(0.499)	(0.873)	(0.358)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.0510***	-0.0513***	-0.0558***	-0.0271***		-0.0377***	-0.0379***	-0.0401***	-0.0105*	
		(0.000677)	(0.000673)	(0.000938)	(0.00430)		(0.000501)	(0.000500)	(0.000693)	(0.00421)	
	SSA # PIR	0.0105	0.0107	0.0101	0.0129		0.00473	0.00463	0.00774	-0.00306	
		(0.00659)	(0.00655)	(0.00861)	(0.0142)		(0.00518)	(0.00517)	(0.00736)	(0.0133)	
	Constant	16.58***	14.58***	14.96***	13.38***	12.02***	9.252***	8.595***	8.627***	6.931***	6.433***
		(0.0437)	(0.0654)	(0.0991)	(0.254)	(0.139)	(0.0324)	(0.0502)	(0.0741)	(0.242)	(0.124)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0195	0.0309	0.0321	0.271	0.270	0.0190	0.0216	0.0232	0.271	0.270
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
No. of hospital visits, ex. fertility	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-0.249	-0.370	-0.249	-0.571	-0.537	-1.309***	-1.305***	-1.560***	-1.135	-1.071***
		(0.382)	(0.381)	(0.528)	(0.873)	(0.372)	(0.319)	(0.318)	(0.460)	(0.802)	(0.324)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.0380***	-0.0382***	-0.0414***	-0.0176***		-0.0373***	-0.0374***	-0.0395***	-0.0150***	
		(0.000561)	(0.000558)	(0.000777)	(0.00373)		(0.000484)	(0.000484)	(0.000671)	(0.00368)	
	SSA # PIR	0.000149	0.000353	-0.000158	0.000611		0.00616	0.00606	0.00836	0.00138	
		(0.00597)	(0.00595)	(0.00781)	(0.0128)		(0.00486)	(0.00485)	(0.00676)	(0.0122)	
	Constant	11.66***	10.11***	10.32***	8.936***	8.060***	8.915***	8.368***	8.396***	6.953***	6.212***
		(0.0363)	(0.0541)	(0.0827)	(0.218)	(0.119)	(0.0314)	(0.0489)	(0.0720)	(0.214)	(0.114)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0152	0.0255	0.0268	0.192	0.192	0.0199	0.0215	0.0232	0.192	0.192
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Any psych. hospital visits	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.0984***	0.0951***	0.110***	0.0805*	0.0609***	0.0728***	0.0729***	0.0769***	0.0786*	0.0543***
		(0.0135)	(0.0135)	(0.0194)	(0.0322)	(0.0135)	(0.0143)	(0.0143)	(0.0202)	(0.0351)	(0.0150)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.00107***	-0.00108***	-0.00110***	-0.000775***		-0.000934***	-0.000940***	-0.000960***	-0.000630***	
		(0.0000206)	(0.0000205)	(0.0000277)	(0.000148)		(0.0000172)	(0.0000172)	(0.0000232)	(0.000146)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.000560**	-0.000558**	-0.000685*	-0.000366		-0.000398	-0.000401	-0.000388	-0.000464	
		(0.000213)	(0.000212)	(0.000298)	(0.000486)		(0.000228)	(0.000227)	(0.000320)	(0.000559)	
	Constant	0.173***	0.137***	0.137***	0.115***	0.0759***	0.121***	0.0961***	0.0968***	0.0793***	0.0483***
		(0.00129)	(0.00198)	(0.00291)	(0.00859)	(0.00447)	(0.00112)	(0.00160)	(0.00233)	(0.00829)	(0.00397)
	Adjusted R^2	0.00964	0.0149	0.0146	0.0931	0.0928	0.0109	0.0145	0.0146	0.0931	0.0928
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
No. of psych. hospital visits	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.905***	0.890***	1.005***	1.038**	0.485**	0.386***	0.386***	0.417***	0.376	0.243**
		(0.178)	(0.177)	(0.237)	(0.397)	(0.158)	(0.0903)	(0.0902)	(0.117)	(0.238)	(0.0897)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.00480***	-0.00484***	-0.00488***	-0.00319**		-0.00373***	-0.00375***	-0.00384***	-0.00230*	
		(0.000151)	(0.000151)	(0.000194)	(0.000990)		(0.000113)	(0.000113)	(0.000142)	(0.000976)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.00664**	-0.00664**	-0.00789*	-0.0103		-0.00315*	-0.00316*	-0.00297	-0.00255	
		(0.00252)	(0.00252)	(0.00314)	(0.00609)		(0.00129)	(0.00129)	(0.00169)	(0.00339)	
	Constant	0.666***	0.501***	0.513***	0.414***	0.255***	0.425***	0.333***	0.325***	0.229***	0.116***
		(0.00984)	(0.0125)	(0.0187)	(0.0547)	(0.0288)	(0.00775)	(0.0103)	(0.0116)	(0.0532)	(0.0239)
	Adjusted R^2	0.00460	0.00666	0.00674	0.0481	0.0478	0.00463	0.00572	0.00626	0.0481	0.0478
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Any substance abuse hospital visits	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.0416***	0.0405***	0.0461***	0.0425	0.0267**	0.00511	0.00515	0.0128	0.0117	0.00158
		(0.00924)	(0.00923)	(0.0132)	(0.0234)	(0.00934)	(0.0104)	(0.0104)	(0.0147)	(0.0256)	(0.0108)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.000610***	-0.000613***	-0.000632***	-0.000351**		-0.000730***	-0.000731***	-0.000743***	-0.000473***	
		(0.0000130)	(0.0000130)	(0.0000177)	(0.000112)		(0.0000149)	(0.0000149)	(0.0000202)	(0.000113)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.000300*	-0.000299*	-0.000358	-0.000296		0.0000253	0.0000223	-0.000120	-0.000197	
		(0.000138)	(0.000138)	(0.000192)	(0.000342)		(0.000161)	(0.000161)	(0.000220)	(0.000382)	
	Constant	0.0728***	0.0594***	0.0600***	0.0451***	0.0277***	0.0922***	0.0790***	0.0767***	0.0628***	0.0392***
		(0.000857)	(0.00124)	(0.00182)	(0.00632)	(0.00304)	(0.000978)	(0.00148)	(0.00210)	(0.00651)	(0.00327)
	Adjusted R^2	0.00784	0.00966	0.00987	0.0528	0.0526	0.00835	0.00908	0.00915	0.0528	0.0526
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
No. of substance abuse hospital visits	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.176***	0.174**	0.227*	0.117	0.0866	0.00704	0.00710	0.0134	0.0461	0.0338
		(0.0534)	(0.0534)	(0.0911)	(0.156)	(0.0497)	(0.0380)	(0.0380)	(0.0404)	(0.0630)	(0.0335)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.00150***	-0.00151***	-0.00152***	-0.000777*		-0.00200***	-0.00201***	-0.00207***	-0.00136***	
		(0.0000553)	(0.0000553)	(0.0000612)	(0.000335)		(0.0000649)	(0.0000649)	(0.0000863)	(0.000342)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.00153*	-0.00152*	-0.00211	-0.000567		0.000347	0.000338	0.000239	-0.000245	
		(0.000751)	(0.000750)	(0.00129)	(0.00220)		(0.000589)	(0.000589)	(0.000715)	(0.00103)	
	Constant	0.157***	0.132***	0.142***	0.108***	0.0696***	0.211***	0.178***	0.175***	0.131***	0.0625***
		(0.00372)	(0.00497)	(0.00873)	(0.0200)	(0.0121)	(0.00447)	(0.00554)	(0.00677)	(0.0197)	(0.0104)
	Adjusted R^2	0.00351	0.00402	0.00503	0.0503	0.0501	0.00428	0.00457	0.00507	0.0503	0.0501
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Cohort-year FEs		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling sample		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling FEs		No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: In this table, we report estimates of Specification 1 in Column 1. Column 2 adds cohort FEs. Column 3 consider only those with siblings in the sample. Column 4 includes estimates of Specification 7, and Column 5 estimates of Specification 8. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. Standard errors clustered at the sibling level, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.6: Regressions, health practitioners

		Women					Men				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
No. of GP visits	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-29.94***	-30.52***	-33.27***	-34.15***	-28.02***	10.48***	10.48***	9.045***	10.28*	7.999***
		(2.016)	(2.002)	(2.805)	(4.640)	(1.905)	(1.957)	(1.953)	(2.521)	(4.417)	(1.944)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.297***	-0.298***	-0.316***	-0.161***		-0.176***	-0.176***	-0.182***	-0.0160	
		(0.00398)	(0.00397)	(0.00554)	(0.0228)		(0.00230)	(0.00230)	(0.00316)	(0.0222)	
	SSA # PIR	0.0607	0.0604	0.109*	0.116		-0.0279	-0.0280	-0.00649	-0.0409	
		(0.0317)	(0.0314)	(0.0435)	(0.0697)		(0.0303)	(0.0302)	(0.0387)	(0.0700)	
	Constant	127.7***	120.9***	121.5***	112.2***	104.0***	52.79***	50.55***	50.24***	40.14***	39.55***
		(0.253)	(0.426)	(0.638)	(1.406)	(0.822)	(0.149)	(0.245)	(0.357)	(1.278)	(0.643)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0209	0.0257	0.0277	0.474	0.473	0.0209	0.0227	0.0244	0.474	0.473
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Any psychologist visits	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.0213	0.0197	0.00647	-0.00197	-0.000946	0.0450***	0.0452***	0.0493**	0.0388	0.0385**
		(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0185)	(0.0303)	(0.0140)	(0.0123)	(0.0123)	(0.0171)	(0.0317)	(0.0147)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.000458***	-0.000461***	-0.000456***	-0.000151		-0.000245***	-0.000246***	-0.000223***	0.0000685	
		(0.0000238)	(0.0000238)	(0.0000322)	(0.000158)		(0.0000155)	(0.0000155)	(0.0000206)	(0.000155)	
	SSA # PIR	0.0000376	0.0000449	0.000217	0.0000214		-0.000108	-0.000114	-0.000150	-0.000000726	
		(0.000218)	(0.000218)	(0.000302)	(0.000493)		(0.000206)	(0.000206)	(0.000281)	(0.000518)	
	Constant	0.208***	0.153***	0.146***	0.119***	0.111***	0.0785***	0.0550***	0.0500***	0.0317***	0.0354***
		(0.00142)	(0.00235)	(0.00343)	(0.00942)	(0.00527)	(0.000947)	(0.00147)	(0.00207)	(0.00873)	(0.00426)
	Adjusted R^2	0.00116	0.00411	0.00340	0.120	0.120	0.000997	0.00228	0.00185	0.120	0.120
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
No. of psychologist visits	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.627**	0.617**	0.182	0.0818	0.152	0.545***	0.546***	0.454*	0.397	0.344*
		(0.205)	(0.204)	(0.247)	(0.380)	(0.198)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.180)	(0.318)	(0.161)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.00272***	-0.00273***	-0.00264***	0.000399		-0.00132***	-0.00132***	-0.00119***	0.00195	
		(0.000311)	(0.000311)	(0.000408)	(0.00195)		(0.000155)	(0.000155)	(0.000204)	(0.00189)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.00339	-0.00329	0.00354	0.00134		-0.00158	-0.00164	-0.00102	-0.00101	
		(0.00334)	(0.00334)	(0.00430)	(0.00676)		(0.00231)	(0.00231)	(0.00301)	(0.00539)	
	Constant	1.884***	1.256***	1.191***	0.914***	0.932***	0.558***	0.364***	0.338***	0.172	0.271***
		(0.0183)	(0.0280)	(0.0399)	(0.114)	(0.0615)	(0.00936)	(0.0141)	(0.0205)	(0.105)	(0.0482)
	Adjusted R^2	0.000336	0.00279	0.00210	0.115	0.115	0.000531	0.00150	0.00107	0.115	0.115
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Any psychiatrist visits	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.0624***	0.0624***	0.0603***	0.0370	0.0349**	0.0422***	0.0422***	0.0544**	0.0548*	0.0399***
		(0.0114)	(0.0114)	(0.0162)	(0.0256)	(0.0108)	(0.0117)	(0.0117)	(0.0168)	(0.0273)	(0.0118)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.000534***	-0.000534***	-0.000529***	-0.000270*		-0.000437***	-0.000439***	-0.000423***	-0.000193	
		(0.0000168)	(0.0000168)	(0.0000223)	(0.000121)		(0.0000139)	(0.0000139)	(0.0000184)	(0.000119)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.000471**	-0.000470**	-0.000330	-0.0000392		-0.0000974	-0.0000983	-0.000346	-0.000285	
		(0.000180)	(0.000180)	(0.000251)	(0.000399)		(0.000191)	(0.000191)	(0.000267)	(0.000446)	
	Constant	0.103***	0.0995***	0.0964***	0.0766***	0.0631***	0.0690***	0.0620***	0.0599***	0.0495***	0.0401***
		(0.00104)	(0.00179)	(0.00262)	(0.00721)	(0.00405)	(0.000882)	(0.00139)	(0.00201)	(0.00680)	(0.00339)
	Adjusted R^2	0.00366	0.00370	0.00370	0.0679	0.0679	0.00375	0.00430	0.00406	0.0679	0.0679
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
No. of psychiatrist visits	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.901**	0.895**	0.757	0.196	0.561	0.660*	0.660*	0.837*	1.160	1.079***
		(0.347)	(0.347)	(0.432)	(0.680)	(0.312)	(0.294)	(0.294)	(0.417)	(0.679)	(0.305)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.00672***	-0.00673***	-0.00637***	-0.00208		-0.00517***	-0.00521***	-0.00472***	-0.00139	
		(0.000529)	(0.000529)	(0.000708)	(0.00328)		(0.000352)	(0.000352)	(0.000480)	(0.00326)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.00574	-0.00571	-0.00173	0.00680		0.00134	0.00132	-0.000918	-0.00154	
		(0.00609)	(0.00609)	(0.00750)	(0.0116)		(0.00513)	(0.00513)	(0.00679)	(0.0111)	
	Constant	1.739***	1.502***	1.406***	1.178***	1.074***	0.956***	0.770***	0.711***	0.599**	0.531***
		(0.0317)	(0.0506)	(0.0704)	(0.194)	(0.106)	(0.0217)	(0.0318)	(0.0438)	(0.185)	(0.0900)
	Adjusted R^2	0.000586	0.000723	0.000629	0.0544	0.0544	0.000902	0.00133	0.00110	0.0544	0.0544
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Cohort-year FEs		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling sample		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling FEs		No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: In this table, we report estimates of Specification 1 in Column 1. Column 2 adds cohort FEs. Column 3 consider only those with siblings in the sample. Column 4 includes estimates of Specification 7, and Column 5 estimates of Specification 8. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. Standard errors clustered at the sibling level, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.7: Regressions, prescriptions

		Women					Men				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any mental health prescription	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.0333*	0.0315*	0.0247	0.0333	0.0415*	0.101***	0.101***	0.106***	0.131**	0.103***
		(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0224)	(0.0365)	(0.0173)	(0.0184)	(0.0184)	(0.0259)	(0.0444)	(0.0207)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.00197***	-0.00197***	-0.00203***	-0.000915***		-0.00167***	-0.00167***	-0.00170***	-0.000665**	
		(0.0000287)	(0.0000287)	(0.0000392)	(0.000203)		(0.0000255)	(0.0000255)	(0.0000347)	(0.000202)	
	SSA # PIR	0.000408	0.000415	0.000645	0.000153		0.000103	0.0000976	0.000140	-0.000529	
		(0.000260)	(0.000260)	(0.000363)	(0.000598)		(0.000311)	(0.000310)	(0.000431)	(0.000741)	
	Constant	0.418***	0.382***	0.381***	0.312***	0.266***	0.288***	0.258***	0.253***	0.200***	0.168***
		(0.00174)	(0.00308)	(0.00457)	(0.0123)	(0.00694)	(0.00160)	(0.00266)	(0.00387)	(0.0119)	(0.00638)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0146	0.0159	0.0164	0.140	0.140	0.0145	0.0154	0.0159	0.140	0.140
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
No. of non-opioid painkiller prescr.	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	1.097**	0.997**	0.877	1.035	0.658*	0.310	0.317	0.514	0.621	0.263
		(0.384)	(0.383)	(0.556)	(0.894)	(0.332)	(0.333)	(0.333)	(0.508)	(0.845)	(0.337)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.0384***	-0.0386***	-0.0419***	-0.0246***		-0.0251***	-0.0253***	-0.0271***	-0.0107*	
		(0.000645)	(0.000645)	(0.000904)	(0.00459)		(0.000460)	(0.000460)	(0.000634)	(0.00449)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.00176	-0.00180	-0.00293	-0.00695		-0.00153	-0.00156	-0.00491	-0.00657	
		(0.00555)	(0.00553)	(0.00792)	(0.0127)		(0.00517)	(0.00516)	(0.00791)	(0.0125)	
	Constant	6.504***	5.596***	5.774***	4.724***	3.490***	4.190***	3.773***	3.833***	2.692***	2.183***
		(0.0436)	(0.0589)	(0.0886)	(0.262)	(0.128)	(0.0316)	(0.0425)	(0.0657)	(0.251)	(0.124)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0114	0.0161	0.0181	0.115	0.115	0.0101	0.0133	0.0155	0.115	0.115
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Any opioid painkiller prescription	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.00632	0.00502	0.000330	0.00398	0.0192	-0.00364	-0.00339	-0.00743	-0.00831	-0.00662
		(0.0146)	(0.0146)	(0.0208)	(0.0370)	(0.0167)	(0.0165)	(0.0165)	(0.0234)	(0.0422)	(0.0191)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.00163***	-0.00164***	-0.00173***	-0.000559**		-0.00155***	-0.00155***	-0.00165***	-0.000461*	
		(0.0000266)	(0.0000265)	(0.0000363)	(0.000197)		(0.0000251)	(0.0000250)	(0.0000342)	(0.000197)	
	SSA # PIR	0.000368	0.000377	0.000363	0.000284		0.000157	0.000149	0.000241	0.0000374	
		(0.000238)	(0.000238)	(0.000330)	(0.000586)		(0.000271)	(0.000271)	(0.000380)	(0.000683)	
	Constant	0.335***	0.301***	0.303***	0.234***	0.206***	0.283***	0.249***	0.249***	0.174***	0.152***
		(0.00163)	(0.00284)	(0.00422)	(0.0118)	(0.00658)	(0.00157)	(0.00264)	(0.00386)	(0.0117)	(0.00638)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0115	0.0126	0.0138	0.0999	0.0998	0.0120	0.0133	0.0145	0.0999	0.0998
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Any substance abuse prescription	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.0236***	0.0236***	0.0186*	0.00215	0.00535	-0.0199***	-0.0199***	-0.0240**	-0.0198	-0.00676
		(0.00564)	(0.00564)	(0.00733)	(0.0145)	(0.00507)	(0.00589)	(0.00589)	(0.00802)	(0.0142)	(0.00577)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.000130***	-0.000130***	-0.000130***	0.0000751		-0.000481***	-0.000480***	-0.000491***	-0.000281***	
		(0.00000580)	(0.00000580)	(0.00000786)	(0.0000621)		(0.0000105)	(0.0000104)	(0.0000143)	(0.0000643)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.000229**	-0.000229**	-0.000180	0.0000556		0.000225*	0.000225*	0.000302*	0.000246	
		(0.0000841)	(0.0000841)	(0.000106)	(0.000206)		(0.0000885)	(0.0000885)	(0.000124)	(0.000215)	
	Constant	0.0138***	0.0134***	0.0136***	0.00493	0.00896***	0.0492***	0.0502***	0.0503***	0.0388***	0.0244***
		(0.000385)	(0.000609)	(0.000911)	(0.00353)	(0.00164)	(0.000716)	(0.00116)	(0.00169)	(0.00401)	(0.00235)
	Adjusted R^2	0.00225	0.00228	0.00224	0.0543	0.0526	0.00785	0.00805	0.00820	0.0543	0.0526
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Cohort-year FEs		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling sample		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling FEs		No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: In this table, we report estimates of Specification 1 in Column 1. Column 2 adds cohort FEs. Column 3 consider only those with siblings in the sample. Column 4 includes estimates of Specification 7, and Column 5 estimates of Specification 8. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. Standard errors clustered at the sibling level, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.8: Regressions, labour market outcomes

		Women					Men				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Rank, labour income	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	4.700***	4.524***	6.126***	6.711**	4.311***	-3.633***	-3.632***	-4.296**	-2.732	-3.309**
		(0.819)	(0.822)	(1.146)	(2.053)	(0.954)	(1.093)	(1.093)	(1.527)	(2.448)	(1.177)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	0.249***	0.248***	0.259***	0.103***		0.221***	0.221***	0.225***	0.0732***	
		(0.00154)	(0.00154)	(0.00210)	(0.0115)		(0.00175)	(0.00175)	(0.00239)	(0.0117)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.0335*	-0.0329*	-0.0482*	-0.0448		-0.0108	-0.0101	0.00433	-0.0122	
		(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0195)	(0.0345)		(0.0189)	(0.0189)	(0.0258)	(0.0417)	
	Constant	31.43***	29.04***	28.56***	37.30***	42.44***	51.07***	52.23***	52.38***	61.04***	64.62***
		(0.0866)	(0.160)	(0.238)	(0.686)	(0.376)	(0.104)	(0.184)	(0.272)	(0.706)	(0.403)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0799	0.0831	0.0892	0.300	0.299	0.0525	0.0536	0.0549	0.300	0.299
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Labour income (1000 DKK)	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	19.32***	18.73***	29.77***	35.97**	20.02***	-12.94*	-13.16*	-22.54*	-16.22	-18.24**
		(4.526)	(4.529)	(6.329)	(12.37)	(5.557)	(6.601)	(6.601)	(8.931)	(14.38)	(7.031)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	1.332***	1.331***	1.384***	0.519***		1.432***	1.429***	1.445***	0.621***	
		(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.0147)	(0.0760)		(0.0134)	(0.0133)	(0.0185)	(0.0763)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.160*	-0.163*	-0.292**	-0.294		-0.153	-0.145	0.00261	-0.0397	
		(0.0796)	(0.0794)	(0.107)	(0.205)		(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.165)	(0.267)	
	Constant	192.2***	179.3***	177.6***	224.5***	250.2***	286.2***	284.7***	284.8***	332.8***	363.7***
		(0.524)	(0.869)	(1.335)	(4.437)	(2.235)	(0.694)	(1.214)	(1.812)	(4.661)	(2.715)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0712	0.0741	0.0746	0.256	0.256	0.0439	0.0479	0.0465	0.256	0.256
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Public transfers/benefits (1000 DKK)	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-24.42***	-24.64***	-28.44***	-32.82***	-24.11***	1.054	1.073	3.104	1.861	2.193
		(1.840)	(1.837)	(2.598)	(4.469)	(1.708)	(1.797)	(1.796)	(2.611)	(4.902)	(1.854)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.436***	-0.437***	-0.457***	-0.233***		-0.248***	-0.249***	-0.255***	-0.0372	
		(0.00325)	(0.00325)	(0.00449)	(0.0210)		(0.00241)	(0.00241)	(0.00332)	(0.0207)	
	SSA # PIR	0.0943***	0.0946***	0.121**	0.164*		0.0121	0.0104	-0.0184	0.0111	
		(0.0280)	(0.0279)	(0.0384)	(0.0648)		(0.0269)	(0.0269)	(0.0382)	(0.0722)	
	Constant	81.72***	80.21***	82.26***	70.86***	59.09***	31.43***	28.36***	28.14***	17.20***	15.63***
		(0.214)	(0.345)	(0.509)	(1.256)	(0.709)	(0.163)	(0.234)	(0.337)	(1.173)	(0.562)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0612	0.0628	0.0683	0.332	0.328	0.0406	0.0440	0.0455	0.332	0.328
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Unemployed, share	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-0.0154	-0.0170	-0.0382**	-0.0665**	-0.0236*	-0.00136	-0.00124	0.00921	0.0107	0.0162
		(0.00990)	(0.00988)	(0.0138)	(0.0242)	(0.00944)	(0.00921)	(0.00919)	(0.0139)	(0.0247)	(0.0102)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.00182***	-0.00183***	-0.00190***	-0.00122***		-0.00101***	-0.00101***	-0.00102***	-0.000375**	
		(0.0000175)	(0.0000175)	(0.0000240)	(0.000115)		(0.0000142)	(0.0000141)	(0.0000192)	(0.000114)	
	SSA # PIR	0.000327*	0.000328*	0.000575**	0.000806*		0.000330*	0.000324*	0.000166	0.000128	
		(0.000154)	(0.000154)	(0.000213)	(0.000365)		(0.000148)	(0.000148)	(0.000219)	(0.000381)	
	Constant	0.243***	0.242***	0.244***	0.208***	0.146***	0.137***	0.128***	0.125***	0.0919***	0.0745***
		(0.00114)	(0.00180)	(0.00265)	(0.00682)	(0.00377)	(0.000923)	(0.00135)	(0.00195)	(0.00650)	(0.00313)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0372	0.0394	0.0429	0.161	0.158	0.0198	0.0212	0.0219	0.161	0.158
	N	343696	343696	194966	385965	385965	334599	334599	190999	385965	385965
Cohort-year FEs		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling sample		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling FEs		No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: In this table, we report estimates of Specification 1 in Column 1. Column 2 adds cohort FEs. Column 3 consider only those with siblings in the sample. Column 4 includes estimates of Specification 7, and Column 5 estimates of Specification 8. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. Standard errors clustered at the sibling level, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.9: Regressions, partner characteristics

		Women					Men				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Years in cohab. relationship, 30-35	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-1.316***	-1.321***	-1.277***	-1.062***	-1.203***	-1.263***	-1.266***	-1.445***	-1.379***	-1.367***
		(0.0729)	(0.0727)	(0.105)	(0.186)	(0.0875)	(0.0897)	(0.0888)	(0.125)	(0.219)	(0.105)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	0.00406***	0.00405***	0.00421***	0.00180		0.00411***	0.00406***	0.00388***	0.00208*	
		(0.000130)	(0.000130)	(0.000176)	(0.000990)		(0.000137)	(0.000137)	(0.000185)	(0.000992)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.0000608	-0.000144	-0.00104	-0.00262		-0.00214	-0.00206	-0.000707	0.000235	
		(0.00123)	(0.00122)	(0.00170)	(0.00302)		(0.00154)	(0.00153)	(0.00211)	(0.00370)	
	Constant	4.200***	4.244***	4.301***	4.467***	4.557***	3.842***	3.796***	3.862***	3.994***	4.098***
		(0.00774)	(0.0140)	(0.0206)	(0.0595)	(0.0336)	(0.00818)	(0.0151)	(0.0222)	(0.0605)	(0.0350)
	Adjusted R^2	0.00773	0.0102	0.00959	0.0923	0.0923	0.00609	0.0118	0.0106	0.0923	0.0923
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Rank, household income	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-11.46***	-11.63***	-10.11***	-8.394***	-12.51***	-1.215	-1.219	-2.530	-1.655	-3.055**
		(0.763)	(0.762)	(1.095)	(2.012)	(0.958)	(1.050)	(1.046)	(1.422)	(2.376)	(1.161)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	0.243***	0.242***	0.253***	0.0949***		0.224***	0.224***	0.228***	0.0752***	
		(0.00168)	(0.00168)	(0.00229)	(0.0120)		(0.00165)	(0.00164)	(0.00224)	(0.0120)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.0550***	-0.0552***	-0.0744***	-0.0767*		-0.0590**	-0.0586**	-0.0383	-0.0279	
		(0.0134)	(0.0133)	(0.0185)	(0.0337)		(0.0184)	(0.0183)	(0.0245)	(0.0406)	
	Constant	45.31***	44.36***	44.40***	53.02***	57.76***	43.52***	42.65***	42.75***	51.47***	55.17***
		(0.0994)	(0.183)	(0.270)	(0.723)	(0.410)	(0.0955)	(0.176)	(0.261)	(0.718)	(0.401)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0662	0.0682	0.0724	0.210	0.209	0.0592	0.0629	0.0642	0.210	0.209
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Rank, partner income	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-18.24***	-18.40***	-17.94***	-15.99***	-19.18***	-1.053	-1.059	-2.436	-2.272	-3.573**
		(0.749)	(0.744)	(1.086)	(1.998)	(0.956)	(1.045)	(1.033)	(1.436)	(2.492)	(1.211)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	0.130***	0.129***	0.135***	0.0457***		0.123***	0.123***	0.126***	0.0424***	
		(0.00164)	(0.00164)	(0.00221)	(0.0113)		(0.00139)	(0.00138)	(0.00186)	(0.0112)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.0371**	-0.0377**	-0.0467*	-0.0593		-0.0638***	-0.0638***	-0.0498*	-0.0255	
		(0.0130)	(0.0129)	(0.0182)	(0.0334)		(0.0182)	(0.0181)	(0.0247)	(0.0433)	
	Constant	58.85***	58.93***	59.34***	64.10***	66.38***	43.13***	40.69***	40.76***	45.61***	47.71***
		(0.0958)	(0.179)	(0.265)	(0.695)	(0.410)	(0.0795)	(0.148)	(0.218)	(0.668)	(0.371)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0259	0.0294	0.0299	0.193	0.193	0.0249	0.0351	0.0347	0.193	0.193
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Rank, partner income, in relationship only	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-16.29***	-16.21***	-15.37***	-15.57***	-17.78***	20.86***	20.82***	20.28***	21.10***	19.16***
		(0.977)	(0.977)	(1.392)	(2.789)	(1.292)	(1.423)	(1.422)	(2.013)	(3.777)	(1.728)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	0.176***	0.176***	0.182***	0.0524***		0.177***	0.177***	0.185***	0.0573***	
		(0.00178)	(0.00178)	(0.00241)	(0.0138)		(0.00162)	(0.00162)	(0.00217)	(0.0137)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.0457**	-0.0461**	-0.0553*	-0.0404		-0.0692**	-0.0694**	-0.0459	-0.0374	
		(0.0168)	(0.0168)	(0.0235)	(0.0462)		(0.0246)	(0.0246)	(0.0342)	(0.0633)	
	Constant	53.71***	54.98***	54.72***	61.22***	63.84***	27.41***	26.08***	25.39***	32.05***	34.92***
		(0.106)	(0.187)	(0.276)	(0.832)	(0.472)	(0.0912)	(0.169)	(0.248)	(0.821)	(0.454)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0384	0.0389	0.0406	0.302	0.302	0.0454	0.0460	0.0494	0.302	0.302
	N	310955	310955	177101	345923	345923	294051	294051	168822	345923	345923
Cohort-year FEs		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling sample		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling FEs		No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: In this table, we report estimates of Specification 1 in Column 1. Column 2 adds cohort FEs. Column 3 consider only those with siblings in the sample. Column 4 includes estimates of Specification 7, and Column 5 estimates of Specification 8. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. Standard errors clustered at the sibling level, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.10: Regressions, parent-child dynamics

		Women					Men				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Max. age living with parents	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.992***	0.986***	1.008***	1.173***	0.799***	-1.088***	-1.089***	-1.388***	-0.932*	-0.682***
		(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.206)	(0.322)	(0.142)	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.249)	(0.389)	(0.170)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	0.0115***	0.0115***	0.0107***	0.0136***		0.000102	0.000117	-0.00162***	0.00136	
		(0.000236)	(0.000236)	(0.000318)	(0.00178)		(0.000273)	(0.000273)	(0.000371)	(0.00180)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.00457*	-0.00460*	-0.00607	-0.00708		0.00767**	0.00767**	0.0107**	0.00456	
		(0.00232)	(0.00232)	(0.00310)	(0.00500)		(0.00295)	(0.00295)	(0.00400)	(0.00638)	
	Constant	19.68***	19.58***	19.55***	19.41***	20.10***	21.81***	21.81***	21.88***	21.68***	21.73***
		(0.0147)	(0.0247)	(0.0364)	(0.105)	(0.0558)	(0.0174)	(0.0286)	(0.0421)	(0.107)	(0.0590)
	Adjusted R^2	0.00867	0.00888	0.00788	0.200	0.198	0.000269	0.000336	0.000668	0.200	0.198
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Min. age living without parents	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	0.151	0.157	0.156	0.542**	0.358***	-0.699***	-0.700***	-0.742***	-0.360	-0.397***
		(0.0920)	(0.0919)	(0.124)	(0.184)	(0.0771)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.171)	(0.254)	(0.104)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	0.0164***	0.0164***	0.0166***	0.0120***		0.0123***	0.0123***	0.0119***	0.00807***	
		(0.000150)	(0.000150)	(0.000205)	(0.00104)		(0.000192)	(0.000192)	(0.000263)	(0.00106)	
	SSA # PIR	0.00130	0.00131	0.000210	-0.00344		0.00259	0.00255	0.00296	-0.000859	
		(0.00142)	(0.00141)	(0.00186)	(0.00279)		(0.00194)	(0.00194)	(0.00260)	(0.00393)	
	Constant	19.04***	18.98***	18.88***	19.05***	19.65***	20.33***	20.33***	20.24***	20.34***	20.73***
		(0.00960)	(0.0163)	(0.0235)	(0.0612)	(0.0331)	(0.0125)	(0.0212)	(0.0308)	(0.0650)	(0.0384)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0459	0.0467	0.0504	0.346	0.345	0.0167	0.0191	0.0182	0.346	0.345
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Same municipality as parents	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-0.138***	-0.137***	-0.150***	-0.116**	-0.129***	-0.292***	-0.292***	-0.318***	-0.278***	-0.210***
		(0.0150)	(0.0151)	(0.0214)	(0.0367)	(0.0166)	(0.0161)	(0.0161)	(0.0219)	(0.0428)	(0.0198)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.00172***	-0.00172***	-0.00185***	0.000167		-0.00187***	-0.00187***	-0.00199***	0.0000371	
		(0.0000306)	(0.0000306)	(0.0000424)	(0.000211)		(0.0000312)	(0.0000312)	(0.0000432)	(0.000212)	
	SSA # PIR	0.0000536	0.0000504	0.000111	-0.000230		0.00117***	0.00117***	0.00141***	0.00132	
		(0.000244)	(0.000244)	(0.000338)	(0.000576)		(0.000270)	(0.000270)	(0.000362)	(0.000703)	
	Constant	0.520***	0.529***	0.538***	0.443***	0.451***	0.539***	0.541***	0.548***	0.446***	0.448***
		(0.00182)	(0.00334)	(0.00502)	(0.0128)	(0.00726)	(0.00187)	(0.00339)	(0.00505)	(0.0128)	(0.00724)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0107	0.0109	0.0123	0.244	0.244	0.0132	0.0133	0.0146	0.244	0.244
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Same minor region as parents	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-0.165***	-0.165***	-0.174***	-0.0987**	-0.144***	-0.337***	-0.337***	-0.372***	-0.328***	-0.274***
		(0.0159)	(0.0159)	(0.0229)	(0.0371)	(0.0171)	(0.0185)	(0.0184)	(0.0256)	(0.0448)	(0.0207)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.00208***	-0.00208***	-0.00228***	0.000275		-0.00220***	-0.00220***	-0.00242***	0.000190	
		(0.0000302)	(0.0000302)	(0.0000417)	(0.000206)		(0.0000308)	(0.0000308)	(0.0000423)	(0.000207)	
	SSA # PIR	-0.0000829	-0.0000879	-0.0000262	-0.000847		0.000777*	0.000778*	0.00114**	0.00104	
		(0.000266)	(0.000266)	(0.000373)	(0.000604)		(0.000310)	(0.000310)	(0.000425)	(0.000736)	
	Constant	0.747***	0.752***	0.770***	0.652***	0.666***	0.752***	0.752***	0.771***	0.643***	0.652***
		(0.00172)	(0.00319)	(0.00478)	(0.0124)	(0.00693)	(0.00176)	(0.00325)	(0.00480)	(0.0125)	(0.00698)
	Adjusted R^2	0.0168	0.0170	0.0197	0.262	0.262	0.0199	0.0199	0.0231	0.262	0.262
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Same major region as parents	Same-sex attracted (SSA)	-0.149***	-0.149***	-0.158***	-0.0948**	-0.131***	-0.305***	-0.305***	-0.324***	-0.305***	-0.241***
		(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0219)	(0.0343)	(0.0163)	(0.0191)	(0.0191)	(0.0267)	(0.0422)	(0.0198)
	Parents' income rank (PIR)	-0.00104***	-0.00104***	-0.00126***	0.000193		-0.00108***	-0.00108***	-0.00130***	0.000191	
		(0.0000271)	(0.0000271)	(0.0000375)	(0.000183)		(0.0000275)	(0.0000275)	(0.0000380)	(0.000184)	
	SSA # PIR	0.000202	0.000199	0.000113	-0.000669		0.00129***	0.00129***	0.00140**	0.00123	
		(0.000260)	(0.000260)	(0.000364)	(0.000561)		(0.000329)	(0.000329)	(0.000454)	(0.000692)	
	Constant	0.815***	0.814***	0.825***	0.757***	0.767***	0.817***	0.816***	0.829***	0.754***	0.763***
		(0.00151)	(0.00286)	(0.00430)	(0.0111)	(0.00634)	(0.00155)	(0.00290)	(0.00431)	(0.0112)	(0.00633)
	Adjusted R^2	0.00609	0.00631	0.00837	0.250	0.250	0.00769	0.00776	0.00986	0.250	0.250
	N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Cohort-year FEs		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling sample		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling FEs		No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: In this table, we report estimates of Specification 1 in Column 1. Column 2 adds cohort FEs. Column 3 consider only those with siblings in the sample. Column 4 includes estimates of Specification 7, and Column 5 estimates of Specification 8. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. Standard errors clustered at the sibling level, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$


D Heterogeneity

D.1 Regions


D.1.1 Figures

Figure D.3: Absolute mobility, regional differences


(a) Marriage



(b) Fertility




(c) Unemployment




(d) Public transfers/benefits

Women




Men




(e) Household income

Women




Men




(f) Partner income unconditional on relationship status


Women




Men




(g) Somatic hospital visits




(h) Analgesic prescriptions




(i) Psychiatric hospital visits



(j) Substance abuse



(k) Age when first moving out




Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of β_s from Specification 1, but dividing our sample of children into five groups based on the region in which they lived at age 13. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. 95%-level confidence intervals indicated, based on standard errors clustered at the sibling level.

D.2 Cohorts


D.2.1 Figures

Figure D.4: Absolute mobility, cohorts differences

(a) Marriage




(b) Unemployment




(c) Public transfers/benefits

Women



Men




(d) Household income

Women




Men




(e) Partner income unconditional on relationship status


Women




Men




(f) Somatic hospital visits




(g) Analgesic prescriptions




(h) Psychiatric hospital visits



(i) Substance abuse



(j) Age when first moving out



Notes: In this figure, we plot estimates of β_s from Specification 1, but dividing our sample of children into three groups based on their year of birth. We consider children born in 1974-1978, 1979-1983, and 1984-1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. 95%-level confidence intervals indicated, based on standard errors clustered at the sibling level.


D.3 Income variation

Table D.11: Regressions, absolute value of residuals, income rank-rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Same-sex attracted	2.691***	2.685***	1.793**	0.831	1.271*	0.722	0.719	0.895	1.999	2.115***
	(0.420)	(0.420)	(0.600)	(1.105)	(0.519)	(0.534)	(0.535)	(0.746)	(1.350)	(0.642)
Parents' rank	0.0364***	0.0364***	0.0371***	0.0295***		-0.0260***	-0.0259***	-0.0256***	-0.0333***	
	(0.000814)	(0.000814)	(0.00110)	(0.00651)		(0.000924)	(0.000924)	(0.00125)	(0.00658)	
Same-sex attracted # rank	-0.0142*	-0.0141	-0.000838	0.00752		0.0220*	0.0218*	0.0166	0.000981	
	(0.00720)	(0.00720)	(0.00991)	(0.0184)		(0.00921)	(0.00921)	(0.0126)	(0.0232)	
Constant	18.22***	18.07***	17.88***	18.37***	19.89***	23.80***	23.69***	23.58***	24.22***	22.48***
	(0.0472)	(0.0878)	(0.130)	(0.390)	(0.218)	(0.0531)	(0.0986)	(0.146)	(0.399)	(0.231)
Adjusted R^2	0.00632	0.00637	0.00652	0.0841	0.0799	0.00274	0.00349	0.00366	0.0841	0.0799
N	343698	343698	194968	385971	385971	334604	334604	191003	385971	385971
Cohort-year FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling sample	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: In this table, we report estimates of Specification 1 in Column 1 where the dependent variable is the absolute value of the individual-level residuals from our rank-rank regression of child income on parental income. Column 2 adds cohort FEs. Column 3 consider only those with siblings in the sample. Column 4 includes estimates of Specification 7, and Column 5 estimates of Specification 8. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life), and parental income over 21 years (1st-21st year of each child's life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables. Standard errors clustered at the sibling level, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure D.5: Distribution of same-sex and different-sex attracted individuals across gender-specific child income ranks



Notes: This figure plots the share of different-sex and same-sex attracted children across the gender-specific child income distributions. We consider children born from 1974 to 1988. Same-sex/different-sex attraction is determined by observing cohabiting relationships with at least one financial commitment; see Section 3.2 for details. Child income is measured over 6 years (30th-35th year of life). All income measures are inflation-adjusted, and income ranks, 0-100, are determined within child cohorts. See Section 3 for details on data construction and variables.