Does Employment Shift Mothers' Voting Behavior and Political Identity?

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Abstract

While the correlation between employment and voting is positive, this paper shows that the causal relationship is negative. Instrumenting for working using EITC expansions and welfare reform, I find that working leads lower-income mothers to vote less and become more politically conservative and Republican. Consistent with these effects, I find declines in voter registration, political knowledge, and time spent on civic participation, alongside increased preferences for conservative government policies. Effects are consistent across six data sources spanning five decades and are driven by unmarried, younger, lower-educated mothers, and those who did not have a working mother growing up, while null effects are found among married and higher-educated mothers. While these policies increase employment across all racial groups, White women show a much larger shift toward Republican and conservative identities, driven by the larger shock of entering the workforce for those who did not have a working mother (consistent with Kuziemko et al. (2018)) and by sorting into occupations and industries where coworkers are more likely to be Republican and conservative. These results suggest that the growing gender partisan gap in recent decades would have been even larger if not for decades of pro-work public policies targeting lower-income mothers.

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Workers are more likely to vote than non-workers (Figure 1): does this correlation reflect group composition or the causal effect of working on voting? Surprisingly little evidence exists on this topic, with most research relying on correlations or aggregate county-level data. This paper is the first to examine how plausibly exogenous increases in employment affect individual voting behavior and political preferences. Using six data sources spanning five decades, I find that working causes women to vote less and identify more as conservative and Republican. These changes appear to be driven by the increased opportunity cost of workers' time, reduced political knowledge, and preferences for conservative government policies. On net, fewer women vote Democrat, and more women vote Republican. While recent decades have seen more women voting Democrat (Cascio and Shenhav, 2020), even more would have done so if not for decades of pro-work policies targeting lower-income mothers.

While existing research examines how working affects various important outcomes for adults and children,[1] little evidence exists on how working affects voting—one of the most important responsibilities in a democracy. Charles and Stephens (2013) examines how strong versus weak labor markets affect county-level voter turnout, but little research exists on how exogenous changes in individual employment affect voting and political identity.

Whether working increases or decreases voting is theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, working and higher time costs may reduce voting (Downs, 1957) and stronger labor markets can also reduce political knowledge and voting (Charles and Stephens, 2013). On the other hand, workers may gain a stronger sense of agency and civic duty: Corman et al. (2017) finds that welfare reform increased voting. Cebula and Toma (2006) finds a positive correlation between female working and voting (as I find for various groups of women in Figure 1), and attributes this pattern to increased knowledge and awareness of the economy.

The impact of working on political preferences is also theoretically ambiguous, and the raw correlation between employment and political identity is close to zero (Figure 2). Workers' attitudes toward government policies and political parties may be shaped by factors such as coworkers, paying taxes, and financial circumstances, with new workers potentially devel-

[1] Working reduces fertility, stress, poverty, and criminal activity (Jensen, 2012; Evans and Garthwaite, 2014; Blattman et al., 2017; Hoynes and Patel, 2018; Agan and Makowsky, 2018), improves health (Hoynes et al., 2015; Averett and Wang, 2018; Braga et al., 2020), and improves the education, earnings, and well-being of their children (Blau, 1999; Rege et al., 2011; Majlesi, 2016; Bastian and Michelmore, 2018).

oping preferences for lowering taxes, increasing childcare subsidies, and expanding parental leave. Overall, working could influence women's political identities in various ways.

To examine the causal impact of employment on voting behavior, I exploit plausibly exogenous policy changes that increased maternal employment: five decades of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) expansions and 1990s welfare reform. These policies significantly boosted employment among unmarried mothers (Figure 3), with EITC expansions and welfare reform each accounting for about one-third of the large 1990s increase in employment among this group (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; Grogger, 2003, 2004; Bastian and Jones, 2021).

I begin by examining whether voting was influenced by the large EITC expansions and welfare reform of the 1990s by plotting voting trends by number of kids (Figure 4). Before these policy changes, mothers voted at higher rates than women without kids—and those with 2 or more kids voted more than those with 1 kid—with parallel flat trends (p-value = 0.53). During the 1990s—after these policies began to take effect—mothers with 1 and 2 or more kids became 2.2 and 3.1 percentage points less likely to vote, relative to women without kids (p-values < 0.001). I find a similar 1990s pattern that mothers became less likely to identify as Democrat and more likely to identify as Republican (Figures 5–6). These trends look similar for presidential and midterm elections, with or without controls, and suggest that something in the 1990s affected the voting and political identity of mothers.

In addition to the large 1990s policy changes, I analyze the 2009 federal EITC expansion and dozens of state EITC policy changes that I show led to smaller employment increases. Before 2009, voting trends by number of kids were parallel (p-value = 0.64). After 2009, I find a 1.8 percentage point decrease in voting among treated mothers with 3+ kids. For state EITCs, I use a stacked event-study approach (Cengiz et al., 2019) to account for variation in treatment timing, mitigating potential confounding effects from other periods (Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021). Prior to a state EITC expansion, voting trends by number of children were parallel (p-value = 0.99). After an expansion, voting declines by 0.9 and 2.6 percentage points for mothers with 1 and 2 or more children (Figure 7).

Next, I aggregate these effects into a single estimate using the continuous treatment variable $MaxEITC$, which represents a family's maximum possible federal and state EITC benefits. Determined by year, state, and the number and age of children, $MaxEITC$ is

independent of income and actual EITC eligibility, which are endogenous with socioeconomic status and the outcomes of interest. I also create the variable $Waiver$, which equals one for families living in states that had implemented a welfare waiver. For both $MaxEITC$ and $Waiver$, I use OLS and IV approaches to estimate average and subgroup effects.

I find that EITC expansions and welfare reform caused mothers to work more, vote less, and become more Republican and conservative. Each $1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreased voting by 0.5 percentage points, decreased identifying as a Democrat and a liberal (-1.8 and -1.2 percentage points), and increased identifying as a Republican and a conservative (1.1 and 0.6 percentage points). I also find that $Waiver$ decreased voting by 1.1 percentage points, decreased being a Democrat and a liberal (-3.9 and -1.1 percentage points), and increased being a Republican and a conservative (4.5 and 1.3 percentage points). I find that mothers shifted their political identity, as well as who they actually voted for.

Various IV approaches show that working is the mechanism through which these outcomes are affected. Working reduces voting among marginal workers by 1.0–1.4 percentage points, reduces identifying as a Democrat and a liberal (-1.4 and -1.0 percentage points), and increases identifying as a Republican and conservative (0.9 and 0.5 percentage points).

Consistent with these results, I also find decreases in being registered to vote, civic participation, political knowledge, and increased preferences for conservative government policy. Results are consistent across six data sources: Current Population Survey data show decreased voting and voter registration. General Social Survey, American National Election Survey, Cooperative Election Study, and Roper data show decreased voting, political knowledge, and identifying as a liberal and Democrat, and increased identifying as a conservative and Republican. American Time Use Survey data show decreased civic participation.

Across outcomes, effects are largest among mothers most impacted by the EITC and welfare reform, including younger, lower-income, and less-educated mothers, with impacts fully concentrated among unmarried mothers and null for married mothers. While the largest policy changes occurred in the 1990s, I also find effects from post-2000 EITC expansions, suggesting that recent federal and state changes continue to influence voting behavior.

Interestingly, while these policies increase mothers' employment across all races and ethnicities (Figure 3), I find a much larger shift toward Republican and conservative identities

among White women. I show that two factors help explain these racial differences. First, White women are less likely to have grown up with a working mother, making the transition to work a greater psychological adjustment, since those without a working mother often underestimate the difficulties of balancing work and parenting (Kuziemko et al., 2018). Second, White women sort into occupations and industries with more Republican and conservative coworkers, such as construction and office and administrative support. These findings shed new light on the interplay between work, race, and political identity.

This paper contributes to the literature by providing the first causal evidence on how exogenous changes in individual employment affect voting and political preferences. I extend prior work, such as Charles and Stephens (2013), by examining individual-level effects on women's voting behavior and political identity over four decades, extending through the 2020 election. I conclude that policies increasing employment among lower-income mothers reduce voter turnout, while increasing Republican and conservative support, leading to more total votes for Republicans and fewer votes for Democrats.

1. Review of Voting Research

Female voter turnout increased significantly over the last century. Since receiving the right to vote in 1920, women initially voted less than men through the 1970s, reached parity in 1980, and have since voted at higher rates (Cascio and Shenhav, 2020). This rise reflects evolving norms, more education, and generational shifts favoring voting among women.

Voting is associated with various demographic traits, policies, and economic conditions. Voting is positively associated with education (Dave et al., 2016), age (Cebula and Toma, 2006), and marriage (Wolfinger and Wolfinger, 2008). Research has found that Food Stamps increase voter registration (Sugie and Conner, 2020), welfare reform increased voting (Corman et al., 2017), and cash assistance is not associated with voting (Wolfinger and Wolfinger, 2008). People losing jobs during strong economies are less likely to vote, perhaps due to stress (Incantalupo, 2011). However, voting increases when unemployment is high, possibly as a way to voice economic concerns (Burden and Wichowsky, 2014).

The evidence on how working affects voting is mixed and theoretically ambiguous. Work-

ers may have less time to vote and follow elections but may also gain a stronger sense of agency and civic duty. Cebula and Toma (2006) finds a positive correlation between female employment and voting, attributing it to greater economic awareness. Rosenstone (1982) finds higher wages and employment increase turnout, while Charles and Stephens (2013) finds this correlation turns negative when analyzing within-county changes, with decreased turnout for most elections—except presidential elections—due to reduced media intake and political knowledge. Working leads mothers to spend less time on civic activities, which includes voting, with their children (Bastian and Lochner, 2020). An older literature also explores the link between strong labor markets and voter turnout (Arcelus and Meltzer, 1975; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Southwell, 1988; Radcliff, 1992). For broader reviews of the economics of voting, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) and Hibbs (2005).

Political Preferences: Two important trends in recent decades are the rise of working women and women increasingly identifying as liberal, creating a growing political gender gap (Conover, 1988; Welch and Hibbing, 1992; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006). Men and women had similar party affiliations between the 1940s and 1970s.[2] Since 1980, women have steadily shifted to the political left of men (Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2004; Gillion et al., 2020). The gender gap in Democratic-party affiliation has recently climbed to 12 percentage points, driven by changes in women's employment, education, and marriage rates (Cascio and Shenhav, 2020).[3]

The modern political gender gap reflects female preferences for more government assistance for families, education, job creation, childcare and eldercare, and protection against unemployment, adverse health, and personal finance troubles (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Chaney et al., 1996). While women and men have similar egalitarian, individualistic, and race attitudes, women are generally more altruistic and more committed to helping disadvantaged groups (Alvarez and McCaffery, 2000; Aaronson et al., 2014). Consequently, women's suffrage increased education spending and improved children's outcomes (Kose et al., 2021).

[2]If anything, women in earlier decades voted to the right of men due to family values and religion (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006). E.g., Prohibition was supported by women and pro-family groups.

[3]Non-working women are more likely to support policies that promote greater take-home pay for their partners (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006); women become less liberal after marriage (Edlund and Pande, 2002); and unmarried women have become more liberal over time (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2004).

2. Data Sources & Trends in Voting, Politics, Working

Table A.1 panel A summarizes the 1976–2020 November Current Population Survey (CPS) for the full sample of 780,035 women ages 18–59 (Flood et al., 2023). The average age is 37.7, 58% are married, and they have 0.9 children on average. Education levels are 12% below 12 years, 55% exactly 12 years, and 33% above 12 years. The sample is 82% White, 13% Black, and 5% Other race. Overall, 59% voted in the last election (68% in presidential elections, 49% in midterms). Among the subset of 307,445 unmarried women (columns 5–8), they are younger (average age 33.8), less educated, have fewer children (0.5), are less likely to be White, and vote less: 51% overall, 62% in presidential elections, and 40% in midterms.

Table A.1 panel B summarizes restricted 1975–2014 General Social Survey (GSS) data with state identifiers for the full sample of 19,319 women ages 18–59 (Davern et al., 2024). The average age is 39.4, 62% are married, and they have 1.15 children on average. Education levels are 16% below 12 years, 59% exactly 12 years, and 25% above 12 years. The sample is 78% White, 16% Black, and 6% Other race, and 63% voted in the last presidential election. The subset of 8,004 unmarried women are younger (average age 38.7), have fewer children (0.92), voting less (59%), and are less White and more Black.

I also use 775 datasets from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research (Roper data) spanning 1980 to 2020 (Roper Center, 2024). This analysis involved downloading over 2,000 public opinion surveys, each requiring extensive cleaning and harmonizing. Restricting to surveys compatible with Stata or convertible formats, I find 1,803 surveys with 2.9 million observations. Variables include year, age, children, state, race, gender, education, marital status, political party affiliation, political views, and employment, though not all surveys provide each variable. After narrowing the sample to women aged 18–59, I identify 775 surveys (458 of which are Gallup) with 345,363 observations containing data on party affiliation and 647 surveys with 292,085 observations with political views. Table A.20 shows summary statistics; Figure A.1 shows datasets and observations per year.

I also analyze 1974–2004 American National Election Survey (ANES, 2021), 2008–2020 Cooperative Election Study (CES, 2022), and 2003–2018 American Time Use Survey data (BLS, 2023) in sections 6.3 and 7.2.

Voting Patterns and Trends: I use CPS data to show female voter turnout by age, kids, age of youngest child, education, race/ethnicity, and income in Figure 8. Panel A shows a steep age gradient: 35% of young women vote, compared to 75% of older women. Panel B shows that 60% of women without kids vote, 55% and 65% of women with one and two kids vote, and voting declines with more kids—only 52% of women with 6+ kids vote. Panel C shows voting increases as the youngest child gets older: 45% of mothers with infants vote, compared to 70% of mothers with older teenagers. Panel D shows a large education gradient: 30–35% of women with less than 12 years of education vote, compared to over 80% for women with an advanced degree. Panel E shows similar voting rates among Black, White, and Hispanic women, but lower rates for Asian and multi-racial women. Finally, panel F shows voting rates rising with income among higher-income women, but are steady at about 60% for incomes below $150,000—which is relevant for the IV approaches in sections 5.6 and 6.5 and disentangling the effect of employment and income.

Figure A.2 shows CPS voting trends by state and by year. Across years, panel A shows that state-level voting ranges from about 45% to 75%, with the lowest rates in West Virginia and Texas, and the highest rates in Oregon and Minnesota.[4] Trends over time in panel B show a slight increase starting in 2004. Panel B also shows that midterm election turnout is consistently 15–20 percentage points lower than for presidential elections.

Voting trends over time and by number of kids are key to understanding how policy changes (which varied by number of kids) may have affected voting. In Figures 4 and A.3, I examine voting trends by number of kids. Unadjusted trends for women with 1 and 2 or more kids are shown relative to women without kids (Figure A.4 shows trends in levels). In the 1980s, women with 1 and 2 or more kids were 2 and 5 percentage points more likely to vote than women without kids. After 1992, voting by mothers decreased and remained stable through 2020. Mothers with 1 and 2 or more kids became 2.1 and 3.2 percentage points less likely to vote, both for presidential and midterm elections.

Trends in Political Identity: I show unadjusted trends in female political identity using GSS and Roper data. Figure 5 relies on GSS data and shows that after 1992, mothers with two or more children became less likely to identify as Democrat or liberal and more

[4]Related, people that move to higher-turnout areas become more likely to vote (Cantoni and Pons, 2022).

likely to identify as Republican or conservative, compared to women with zero or one child. Similarly, Figure 6 uses Roper data and reveals that after the early 1990s, mothers became more likely to identify as Republican (panels A and C) and as moderate or conservative, rather than liberal (panels B and D).[5] Together, Figures 4–6 suggest a significant shift in the voting behavior and political identity of mothers in the 1990s.

Employment Trends: Figure 3 shows 1980–2020 employment trends by marital status and number of kids using CPS data. Panels A and B use the sample of unmarried and married women; panels C–F divide unmarried women into White, Black, Hispanic, and Other. These six panels show a large increase in working among unmarried mothers of all races and ethnicities starting in the mid-1990s, with no such increase among married mothers. Employment increases are largest among non-White and unmarried mothers with 2 or more kids and have been extensively studied (Nichols and Rothstein, 2016).

Exploring the Correlation between Working and Voting: Between 1980 and 2020, the percentage of women voting in presidential elections rose 20 percentage points, from about 60% to 80%, while the percentage working increased 15 points, from about 45% to 60% (Figure A.5). This figure also shows trends for women who worked and voted, worked but did not vote, did not work but voted, and neither worked nor voted. The largest increase was among the working-and-voting group, rising from about 30% to 50%, while the working-and-not-voting group remained steady at about 30%. Women who either voted without working or neither worked nor voted declined from about 20% to 10%.

Figure 1 panel A shows that voting rates are lowest for non-working women (58%), highest for those working fewer than 20 hours per week (62%), and slightly lower for women working over 50 hours per week (60%). Overall, working women vote more than non-working women, but conditional on working, those who work more hours vote less. This pattern is consistent for mothers, unmarried women, and all education levels (panels B, D, E, and F). The negative relationship between work hours and voting is strongest for mothers (panel B). Interestingly, voting rates for women without kids (panel C) do not vary by work hours, suggesting that working mothers may face greater constraints in balancing work and voting.

Do these patterns reflect the effect of working or differences in group composition? Table

[5] I combine all mothers since only about a third of Roper datasets include number of children.

A.2 compares the unadjusted and demographics-adjusted association between working and voting. Columns 1–2 show the bivariate association is positive (evident in Figure 1), but negative when adjusting for demographics.[6] These correlations suggest that group composition explains why workers vote more than non-workers.

State-Level Changes in Working and Voting: I now examine whether state-level associations between working and voting corroborate the individual-level associations discussed above. Figure 9 compares 1976–1988 and 2000–2020 state-level changes in working, voting, and political identity. Bivariate regressions suggest that each percentage-point increase in female employment is associated with a 0.4 percentage-point decline in voting (panel A) and a 0.9 percentage-point increase in identifying as a Republican.[7] While descriptive, these trends may foreshadow the causal effect of working on voting and political identity.

3. Federal and State EITC Policy Details

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) distributes over $60 billion annually to almost 30 million low-income families, lifting 6 million people out of poverty (CBPP, 2019). Abundant research shows that the EITC improves short- and longer-run outcomes for parents and their children (Hoynes et al., 2015; Nichols and Rothstein, 2016; Bastian and Black, 2021).

EITC benefits depend on earnings, kids, state of residence, and marital status. Figure A.7 illustrates 2019 federal EITC benefits by earnings, kids, and marital status, showing three regions: benefits increase with earnings, remain constant, and then decrease. Households with no earnings or those above the phase-out range are not eligible for the EITC.

Maximum EITC benefits by family size have changed significantly over time (Figure A.8). Notable policy changes include the 1975 introduction, a small 1986 expansion, major 1993–1996 expansions (especially for families with 2 or more kids), and a 2009 expansion for

[6] The working-voting relationship has evolved over time with the composition of female workers. Figure A.6 shows that the association between working and voting has become more positive over time (both the unadjusted and demographics-adjusted association). Working women were 1.5 percentage points less likely to vote in the 1970s, and this association has increased by 0.2–0.6 percentage points per decade. Columns 3–14 in Table A.2 show a similar positive-then-negative pattern among married, unmarried, higher- and lower-education women, and non-mothers. Interestingly, the pattern for mothers and lower-education women is negative and stable, with and without controls, suggesting that children and education are important reasons that the unadjusted and demographics-adjusted working-voting association is opposite signed.

[7] I weight by the 1980 state female population; unweighted estimates are similar: -0.7 (0.3) and 0.9 (0.7).

families with 3 or more kids. For low-income families with 3 or more kids, federal benefits are worth \$0.45 per \$1 earned, peaking at about \$6,500 for earnings between \$14,000 and \$24,000. For families with 2, 1, and 0 kids, benefits are \$0.40, \$0.34, and \$0.08 per \$1 earned, up to maximums of about \$5,500, \$3,500, and \$500. As of 2020, 31 states offered their own EITCs, typically as a percentage of the federal benefits, ranging from 3% to 40%.[8] Figure A.9 shows the growth of state EITC rates over time. Combined federal and state EITCs can exceed \$9,000, with the average recipient receiving about \$2,500 (Figure A.10).

I combine households' maximum state and federal EITC benefit amounts into the variable $MaxEITC$.[9] $MaxEITC$ is determined by year, state, and kids but is independent of income or actual receipt. Figure A.10 shows the evolution of $MaxEITC$, illustrating policy variation by family size, across both states and years.[10] Figure A.11 shows a histogram of $MaxEITC$ for the CPS sample. Average $MaxEITC$ for women with 0, 1, 2, and 3 or more kids is \$320, \$2,770, \$4,050, and \$4,080, with maximums of \$840, \$5,610, \$8,620, and \$9,700.

Two key EITC features create rich policy variation at the state-year-kids level: (1) larger federal benefits for families with more kids and (2) state EITCs that are generally proportional to federal EITC amounts. For example, the 2009 federal EITC expansion raised maximum benefits for families with 3+ kids, increasing state EITCs proportionally to state EITC rates. Similarly, states that raise EITC rates increase maximum benefits more for larger families due to the federal structure.

3.1. Parallel Voting Trends Before/After Federal and State EITC Changes

Since $MaxEITC$ is created using both federal and state EITC expansions, preexisting voting trends by number of kids could undermine my identification strategy. Figures 4 and A.3 shows that before 1992, mothers voted more than women without kids, and those with 2 or more kids voted more than those with 1 kid, with parallel, flat trends (p-value = 0.53). After 1992, following EITC expansions and welfare reform, mothers with 1 and 2 or more kids became 2.2 and 3.1 percentage points less likely to vote, relative to women without

[8] Distinguishing between refundable and non-refundable state credits yields similar results.

[9] Dollar amounts adjusted to 2018 values using the CPI-U. While $MaxEITC$ is one of several EITC parameters, it intuitively summarizes EITC expansions over time. Section 5.3 explores alternative measures.

[10] Previous research uses $MaxEITC$ (e.g., Hoynes et al., 2015; Bastian and Lochner, 2020) as it captures policy variation better than a binary DD (e.g., Kleven, 2019) as discussed in Agostinelli et al. (2020).

kids (p-values < 0.001). These patterns are consistent for both presidential and midterm elections. A similar 1990s shift occurred for political identity, with mothers identifying less as Democrat and more as Republican (Figures 5–6). Before the 2009 federal EITC expansion, voting trends by number of kids were parallel (p-value $= 0.64$), but after 2009, mothers with 3 or more kids became 1.8 percentage points less likely to vote (Figure A.12).

Figures 7 and A.13 show voting trends before and after state EITC expansions, using an event-study approach. Panel A shows trends among the 31 states (including D.C.) with an EITC, similar to the approach in Deshpande and Li (2019); panel B shows trends among 31 "stacks", where each EITC state is compared to the 20 non-EITC states, following the approach in Cengiz et al. (2019). These two approaches yield very similar trends. In the 8 years prior to an expansion, mothers with 1 and 2 or more kids were 1 and 4 percentage points more likely to vote than women without kids, with parallel pre-trends (p-value 0.99). In the 8 years following an expansion, mothers with 1 and 2 or more kids became 0.8–0.9 and 1.9–2.6 percentage points less likely to vote. These unadjusted trends suggest that EITC expansions reduced voting among mothers, particularly those with multiple kids.

I examine whether state EITC expansions are predicted by state policies, economic conditions, or demographics. Covariates include unemployment rate, minimum wage, GDP, GDP growth, maximum welfare benefits, and whether a state had a welfare waiver. Demographics include average age, number of kids, and the fraction married, White, Black, and with 12 or less than 12 years of education. I run regressions with and without one year lags of these variables. Outcomes include maximum state EITC benefits and state match rate for federal EITC benefits. Regressions include year FE, state FE, and state time trends. Across the four specifications, only 3 of 90 covariates are significant at the 95% level (Table A.3). While I find little evidence that state factors predict state EITC policy changes, I show results with and without controls for these state factors interacted with marital status.

4. Empirical Strategy

I now describe my empirical strategy for estimating the effects of EITC expansions and welfare reform on women's voting behavior and political preferences. First, I use equation

(1) to estimate an event study of the 1990s federal policy changes by number of children:

$$Y_{ist} = \sum_{j=[1978,2020]} \sum_{k=[1,2]} \alpha_k^j \mathbb{1}(\#kids = k, year = j) + X'_{ist}\alpha_2 + \gamma_s^1 + \gamma_t^2 + \epsilon_{ist}. \quad (1)$$

Subscripts i, s, and t refer to women, state, and year. I describe controls below. Estimates of α_k^j are the annual impact on voting—relative to women without kids—allowing me to examine pre- and post-trends. I expect to see parallel voting trends by number of kids up through the early 1990s, after which states began carrying out welfare reform and the federal government began expanding the EITC between 1990 and 1996, which impacted mothers, especially those with 2 or more kids.[11] I also estimate equation (1) in event time, where years are normalized to zero in the year of a state EITC expansion (discussed in section 3.1).

Next, I combine these annual effects—by state and number of children—using a continuous treatment variable, $MaxEITC$. Equations (2) and (3) estimate the effects of $MaxEITC$ on various outcomes for all women and for women by marital status:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha_1 MaxEITC_{ist} + X'_{ist}\alpha_2 + \gamma_s^1 + \gamma_t^2 + \epsilon_{ist}, \quad (2)$$

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha_1 MaxEITC_{ist} \cdot Mar_{ist} + \alpha_2 MaxEITC_{ist} \cdot Unmar_{ist} + X'_{ist}\alpha_3 + \gamma_s^1 + \gamma_t^2 + \epsilon_{ist}. \quad (3)$$

Mar_{ist} and $Unmar_{ist}$ denote married and unmarried mothers. (I also estimate other subgroup effects by replacing Mar and $Unmar$ with indicators for education, race, age, etc.) X_{ist} controls for number of kids fixed effects (FE), married, race/ethnicity, age, education. State and year FE are denoted by γ_s^1 and γ_t^2. I examine whether results are robust to state $\times$ year FE, state $\times$ number of kids FE, and interacting controls with marital status. Full controls listed in Table 1 notes; alternate controls used in Table A.4. The idiosyncratic error, ϵ_{ist}, is assumed to be independent of $MaxEITC_{ist}$ and marital status, conditional on other covariates X_{ist}, state FE, and year FE. I use CPS weights; standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.[12]

Because the EITC has larger effects on the employment of unmarried women (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Bastian and Jones, 2021), I estimate separate effects of $MaxEITC$ by marital status in equation (3). Married mothers should not be considered an unaffected control

[11] There was a small EITC expansion in 1986 that could have had a small effect.
[12] Alternative clustering and standard error specifications yield similar results.

group—at least *ex ante*—although it would not be surprising to find weaker effects on this group. While equation (3) interacts marital status with $MaxEITC$ to gain precision, I also show estimates separately for the samples of married and unmarried mothers in section 5.3. Based on prior research, I assume marital status and fertility is largely unaffected by the EITC (Nichols and Rothstein, 2016).

I leverage changes in the amount of treatment ($MaxEITC$) experienced by different families based on their number of kids, state of residence, and year. Women without kids can be thought of as the control group. I estimate intent-to-treat effects of $MaxEITC$ and not treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effects of actual EITC amounts received by families.[13]

5. Results: Voting Behavior (CPS Data)

5.1. Event Study Analysis of Federal and State EITC Expansions

To investigate whether voting is affected by EITC expansions and welfare reform, I first use equation (1) and plot annual voting trends, by number of kids. Figures 4 and A.3 show that mothers voted at higher rates than women without kids—before the large policy changes of the 1990s—and those with 2 or more kids voted more than those with 1 kid, but with parallel flat trends from 1980–1990 (p-value=0.53). After 1992—when these policies began to take effect—mothers with 1 and 2 or more kids became 2.1 and 3.2 percentage points less likely to vote, relative to women without kids (p-values < 0.001). Figure A.3 shows that both unadjusted and regression-adjusted trends look similar. Using the full set of controls, mothers with 1 and 2 or more kids became 1.4 and 2.6 percentage points less likely to vote after 1992, relative to women without kids (p-values < 0.001).

If 1990s policy changes are the reason for these changes in voting behavior, then the voting behavior of groups not affected by these policies should not be affected. Figure A.14 replicates Figure 4 panel A for the sample of married men, known to be largely unaffected by these policies (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004). I find no evidence of changes in male voting behavior by number of children between 1980 and 2020 (p-value = 0.54).

[13] I do not calculate TOT effects since $MaxEITC$ reflects changes in benefit levels, and changes in phase-in and phase-out rates. Families with different pre-tax income levels often face very different changes in after-tax wage rates when the EITC expands, and the EITC "treatment" is not the same for everyone.

In addition to federal policy changes, I also examine state EITC policy changes in Figure 7. Since these changes represent staggered treatment, I look at voting trends in event time, before and after state EITC expansions. I show event-time trends for the 31 states (including D.C.) in panel A; and for 31 "stacks" in panel B, where each EITC state is compared to the 20 non-EITC states (Cengiz et al., 2019).[14] Unadjusted trends show that mothers with 1 and 2 or more kids became 0.8–0.9 and 1.9–2.6 percentage points less likely to vote after a state EITC expansion. These trends look similar with the full set of controls, with voting declines of 0.4–0.6 and 1.6–2.2 percentage points (with parallel pre-trends p-value of 0.40).

5.2. Effects of MaxEITC on Voting

I estimate the impact of $MaxEITC$ on voting, for the full sample and various subgroups, using the full set of controls. Table 1 column 1 shows that each $1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreases voting by a significant 0.5 percentage points (or 0.8 percent). Column 2 shows that this effect is entirely driven by unmarried women, with estimates of -1.5 and 0.1 percentage points for unmarried and married women. Column 3 shows large effects for White women (-0.7 percentage points) but insignificant effects on non-White women (-0.1 percentage points). Column 4 shows large effects among women with 12 or fewer years of education (-2.0 percentage points), and null effects among women with more than 12 years of education. Column 5 shows larger effects among women under age 35 compared to those over 35 (-1.4 vs. -0.1 percentage points). Finally, column 6 shows slightly larger effects before 2000 than after (-0.9 vs. -0.6 percentage points), indicating that federal and state EITC expansions since 2000 continued to influence female voting behavior. Column 7 shows the largest effects for women earning below $40,000, smaller effects for middle earners, and no effects above $80,000. Overall, effects are largest for groups most affected by the EITC and small or null for women less affected (Bastian, 2020).

Next, I test whether women most likely to receive the EITC are also most likely to change their voting behavior. I predict each woman's probability of being EITC-eligible (or eligible for over $1,000 in benefits), divide them into quantiles, and estimate equation (3) with $MaxEITC$ interacted with quantile indicators, using the full set of controls. Relative

[14] While some states change policy more than once, I focus on the first time a state changes its policy.

to the lowest quantile, Table 2 shows that across EITC measures and using 2–5 quantiles, women in higher EITC-eligible quantiles see a monotonic decrease in voting. For example, column 2 shows women in the second and third terciles are 0.87 and 1.32 percentage points less likely to vote than those in the lowest tercile, per $1,000 of $MaxEITC$.

5.3. Robustness and Alternate Specification

Alternate Controls: Table A.4 examines whether these results are robust to alternate sets of controls. Panels A and B look at average effects and effects by marital status. Columns 1–8 progressively add the following controls. Column 1 controls for state FE, year FE, number of kids FE, and married. Column 2 adds controls for age cubic, race, and education. Column 3 adds controls for married interacted with state, year, race, and education. Column 4 adds annual state factors (from section 3.1). Column 5 is the main set of controls and adds controls for married interacted with annual state factors. Columns 6–8 add state × year FE, state × year × married FE, and state × number of kids FE.

Across controls, the average impact of $MaxEITC$ on voting is between -0.44 and -0.77 percentage points (panel A). In panel B, the estimates are particularly stable in columns 3–8: between 0.02 and 0.17 percentage points for married women and between -1.38 and -1.49 percentage points for unmarried women.[15]

Alternate Sample Years: Table A.5 shows the impact of $MaxEITC$ using different sample periods. Columns 1–5 use 1976–2020 (the full sample), 1976–1992, 1982–1992, 1988–1998, and 2000–2020. While magnitudes differ a bit, results consistently show that EITC expansions over time decrease voting, with effects concentrated among unmarried women.

Isolating the 2009 EITC Expansion: I estimate the impact of the 2009 EITC expansion on mothers with 3+ kids compared to (1) all other women, (2) all other moms, and (3) moms with 2 kids. I show binary DD estimates using alternate controls, comparing pre- and post-2009 outcomes. Table A.6 shows that the expansion increased employment (not always significantly) while reducing voting (I cannot reject equal magnitudes on working and voting). Figure A.12 corroborates these findings, showing 1998–2020 voting trends by number of kids, with DD estimates of -1.8 to -2.1 percentage points (p-value < 0.01) and

[15] Results are similar across controls for presidential vs. midterm elections (Table A.7).

parallel pretrends (p-values 0.35–0.75). These findings suggest the 2009 expansion decreased voting among moms with 3+ kids, consistent with its link to a small employment increase for this group (Bastian and Jones, 2021; Bastian and Lochner, 2020).

Restricting Sample by Marital Status: I also run separate regressions on the samples of married and unmarried women. Columns 1 and 3 use the full set of controls, and columns 2 and 4 use the additional controls used in Table A.4 column 8. Table A.8 shows significant effects of $MaxEITC$ on unmarried women (-0.49 and -0.51 percentage points), and largely insignificant effects on married women (-0.19 and -0.08 percentage points).

Alternate Specifications: Table A.9 uses four measures of the EITC: $MaxEITC$ defined by federal, state, and federal plus state, as well as the federal plus state EITC phase-in rate. Each measure shows EITC expansions decrease voting (panel A) with effects concentrated among unmarried women (panel B). Logit and probit specifications yield $MaxEITC$ estimates similar to OLS (Table A.10). Figure A.16 shows a double residual regression, where two sets of residuals are created for each individual, averaged into centiles, and plotted against each other (Cleveland, 1979). One set of residuals comes from regressing voting on the full set of controls (excluding $MaxEITC$); and the other comes from regressing $MaxEITC$ on the full set of controls. This locally weighted non-parametric regression down-weights observations with larger residuals. Panel A shows relatively linear effects of $MaxEITC$ on voting, except for the endpoints, which are often noisy with this approach.

I also estimate a version of equation (2) that interacts $MaxEITC$ with indicators for all 50 states and D.C. Figure A.15 illustrates the distribution of $MaxEITC$ estimates from this regression, with a mean of -0.5 and 25th and 75th percentiles of -0.9 and -0.1.

5.4. EITC's Impact on Both Working and Voting

Table 3 restricts the sample to women with work and earnings data (March CPS) and also voting data (November CPS).[16] For this sample, the estimate of $MaxEITC$ is -0.44 percentage points (similar to the full-sample estimate of -0.50) and increases employment, labor force participation (LFP), and positive work hours last week (0.34, 0.36, and 0.25

[16]This reduces the sample from 780,035 to 411,241. CPS sampling has a 4–8–4 approach, where people are surveyed for four months, not surveyed for eight months, and then surveyed again for four months.

percentage points). Estimates on labor supply are not statistically different from estimates on voting (95% level). Interacting work outcomes with voting or not voting (columns 3–4, 6–7, and 9–10) shows that work increases can be fully explained by non-voting women.

5.5. Welfare Reform's Impact on Working and Voting

If working leads women to vote less, then other policies—besides the EITC—that affect work should also affect voting behavior. In Table 4, I look at whether 1990s welfare reform—which has been shown to increase maternal employment (Schoeni and Blank, 2000; Grogger and Michalopoulos, 2003; Grogger, 2003)—affected working and voting. State and federal welfare reform occurred in the 1990s and reduced available benefits and the length of time that families could receive them. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was replaced with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) in 1996. States experimented with various types of welfare waivers in the years leading up to the federal policy change in 1996. Welfare reform is described in more detail in Appendix B.

I restrict the sample to 1980–2004 and estimate equation (4):

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha_1 Waiver_{ist} + \alpha_2 Waiver_{ist} \times (\geq 2Kids_{ist}) + X'_{ist}\alpha_3 + \gamma_s^1 + \gamma_t^1 + \epsilon_{ist}. \tag{4}$$

Y_{ist} includes voting and the three working outcomes in Table 3. I focus on α_2, which captures the effect of living in a state with a welfare waiver and having 2 or more kids. I focus on mothers with 2 or more kids since welfare reform had a larger effect on this group. I pool 2 or more kids versus 0 or 1 kids to increase power, since the binary treatment variable here has less identifying variation than $MaxEITC$. I show each estimate with just demographic controls, and also with controls for state-year factors (including $MaxEITC$).

Table 4 shows that welfare waivers decreased voting among women with 2 or more kids (columns 1–2) and increased employment (columns 3–8). I conclude that both welfare reform and EITC expansions increased maternal employment and decreased maternal voting.[17]

[17] My results differ from Corman et al. (2017) that finds welfare reform increased voting, using NLSY data.

5.6. *Impact of Working on Voting: IV Approach*

So far, OLS results show EITC expansions and welfare reform increased work and reduced voting, consistent with the employment and voting trends in Figures 3 and 4. While suggestive, I now investigate this causal relationship with an IV approach. I instrument for working in three ways: with $MaxEITC$, the EITC's phase-in rate, and welfare reform.

While the OLS approach above could reflect effects from both employment and income (e.g., EITC benefits for already-working women), an IV approach focuses on newly working women. However, it could still reflect increased employment and income for those on the margin of working, complicating the interpretation that employment is the primary channel. However, prior research shows these pro-work policies lead to increases in earnings that are largely offset by decreases in public assistance.[18] Moreover, Figure 8 shows that voting and income are uncorrelated below $150,000. Since EITC recipients typically earn below $50,000, the IV approach should primarily reflect changes in employment rather than income.

Table 5 uses the full set of controls and shows that working reduces voting for the marginal worker by 1.0–1.4 percentage points. I present nine results based on combinations of the three IVs and the three employment measures from Tables 3–4. The first-stage estimates align with the work estimates in these tables, with Wald F-statistics ranging from 12.1 to 24.0 for the EITC IVs and a weaker 3.6 to 6.8 for the welfare-waiver IV. Various IV approaches indicate that working is the mechanism through which voting behavior is affected.

6. Results: Political Identity

6.1. *Exploring the Correlation between Working and Political Identity*

It is unclear whether working influences female political identity; this section explores the correlation between the two factors. Figure 2 shows fraction Democrat, Republican, and Independent by weekly work hours of 0, 1–20, 21–30, 31–40, 41–50, and 51+. I find no clear link between (extensive- or intensive-margin) labor supply and political identity, in contrast to the strong relationship with voting in Figure 1. Table A.11 extends Figure 2 and shows no

[18] Bollinger et al. (2009) finds that increased earnings from EITC expansions and welfare reform were more than offset by decreased transfer income. Studying EITC expansions, Hoynes and Patel (2018) and Bastian and Jones (2021) find that each $1 in earnings is offset by about $0.50 of decreased transfers.

clear association between employment and political identity, with and without demographic controls. While these patterns only reflect correlations, they suggest that working may have little influence on shaping political identity.

6.2. Event Study of 1990s Policy Changes on Political Identity

To investigate whether political identity is affected by EITC expansions and welfare reform, I first use GSS data and equation (1) to plot trends in political identity. I show the annual difference in political identity between women with 2 or more kids vs. those with 0 or 1 kids, normalized to 1992 levels, with and without the full set of controls. Figure 5 panels A–D show parallel pre-trends between 1984 and 1992 for identifying as Democrat, Republican, liberal, and conservative (p-values of 0.56, 0.46, 0.76, and 0.69). After 1992, mothers became less likely to be Democrat and liberal (-5.8 and -2.6 percentage points), and more likely to be Republican and conservative (3.9 and 1.8 percentage points).

Similarly, Figure 6 uses Roper data and reveals that after the early 1990s, mothers became more likely to identify as Republican and as moderate or conservative.

6.3. Effects of MaxEITC on Political Identity

Using GSS data and the full set of controls, Table 6 shows that each \$1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreases identifying as a Democrat and a liberal (-1.75 and -1.18 percentage points), increases identifying as an Independent and a moderate (0.61 and 0.24 percentage points), and increases identifying as a Republican and a conservative (1.09 and 0.58 percentage points).[19] Columns 7–9 show that women work more—as found in Table 3 with CPS data—and are less politically informed (as also found by Charles and Stephens (2013)).[20]

Using Roper data and two sets of controls, Table 7 panels A and B show that each \$1,000 increase in $MaxEITC$ increases employment (by 1.85–2.05 percentage points), decreases identifying as a Democrat and liberal (by 0.80–1.31 and 1.40–1.58 percentage points),

[19]The GSS variables include seven categories ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican, and strong liberal to strong conservative. Figure A.17 shows decreases in Democrat, slightly Democrat, and slightly Republican, increases in Independent, Republican, and strong Republican, and no effect on strong Democrat (panel A); and decreases in slightly liberal, increases in moderate, conservative, and strong conservative, and no effect on strong liberal, liberal, or slightly conservative (panel C).

[20]I define politically informed by averaging 11 standardized variables (e.g., interested in politics, discuss politics, sought political information). Full details and individual-component regressions in Table A.12.

increases identifying as a Republican and moderate (1.97–2.10 and 1.87–2.18 percentage points), decreased identifying as an Independent (0.79–1.17 percentage points), and had an insignificant negative effect on being conservative (0.20–0.33 percentage points).[21] Both GSS and Roper data reveal decreases in Democrat and liberal identity, alongside increases in Republican identity.

Subgroups: Becoming less Democrat and more Republican is concentrated among White, less-educated, and younger women, with smaller and generally insignificant effects among non-White, college-educated, and older women (Figure 10; Table 7 panels C and D).[22] Notably, the EITC increases the employment of non-White mothers with minimal effect on their political identity (discussed more in section 8).

Having Had a Working Mother: Table 8 restricts the GSS sample to women reporting whether they had a working mother (14,008 of the 19,319 observations). Panel A shows similar average effects of $MaxEITC$ on each outcome as the full sample in Table 6. Panel B shows effects by whether women had a working mother. Women without a working mother show larger decreases in being Democrat (-2.3 vs. -1.7 percentage points) and liberal (-0.7 vs. -0.3 percentage points), larger increases in being Independent (1.2 vs. 0.5 percentage points), Moderate (0.8 vs. 0.4 percentage points), and Conservative (1.1 vs. 0.4 percentage points), and similar changes in labor supply and being Republican (1.2 percentage points), though results are somewhat imprecise.

Kuziemko et al. (2018) argues that women raised by working mothers have more realistic expectations about being working mothers, suggesting the impact of employment on political preferences may differ. The larger changes in political identity among women without a working mother during childhood align with this argument: such women may underestimate the challenges of working as a parent, leading them to become more politically conservative, perhaps viewing working mothers as negatively affecting families (Kuziemko et al., 2018).

Whether one had a working mother helps explain why White women become more conservative and Republican than Black and non-White women. In the GSS sample, only 66%

[21] Since state is often missing in Roper data, I define $MaxEITC$ based on the federal EITC only. I also use a subset of the 775 datasets used for Figure 6 since only 546 datasets have demographic traits.

[22] I show less subgroup analysis with Roper data as these variables are not consistently available.

of White women report having a working mother, compared to 75% of non-White women and 80% of Black women, who are 21% more likely than White women to have had one.

Alternate Controls and Specifications: Table A.13 examines the robustness of the results across the eight sets of controls used in Table A.4, showing stable effects on identifying as a Democrat (-1.4 to -1.8 percentage points), identifying as a Republican (0.9–1.4 percentage points), being employed (0.8–1.3 percentage points), and being politically informed (-0.03 to -0.06 standard deviations). Table A.14 demonstrates that logit and probit specifications yield estimates similar to OLS. Figure A.16 panels B–D present double residual regressions (details in section 5.3), with locally weighted regressions indicating quite linear effects of $MaxEITC$ on identifying as a Democrat, Republican, or liberal.

Cooperative Election Study (CES) Data: I use 2008–2020 CES data and the sample of all women aged 18–59. Table A.15 shows summary statistics. Using equation (2) and various sets of controls, Table A.16 shows that each $1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreases identifying as a liberal (-0.6 to -1.1 percentage points), increases identifying as a conservative (0.3 to 0.7 percentage points), and does not affect being a moderate (-0.1 to 0.1 percentage points).

American National Election Survey (ANES) Data: While the ANES spans 1948–2020, I focus on 1974–2004, where number of kids is available for 1956–2004 (except 1972) and consistent political ideology is provided for 1972–2020. Summary statistics for all women aged 18–59 are shown in Table A.17. Although ANES provides rich data on voting and political ideology, it only includes about 800 annual female observations. Table A.18 examines the impact of $MaxEITC$ on voting and political identity, with demographics controls, both with and without state-year FE. While not all results are statistically significant, I find $MaxEITC$ is associated with decreased voting, identification as a liberal, Democrat, moderate, and Independent, and increased identification as a conservative and Republican. Results from CES and ANES are consistent with CPS, GSS, and Roper data analysis.

6.4. State EITCs and Political Identity (GSS Data)

I also analyze the impact of state EITC expansions on the political identity of mothers with 1 and 2 or more children in Table A.19. Following the stacked event-study approach in section 5.1, I present binary DD estimates with and without the full set of controls.

The results suggest that state EITCs increase employment and identifying as Republican and conservative, while decreasing identifying as Democrat and liberal. The effects are consistently larger for mothers with 2 or more children compared to those with only one child. Although some results are not statistically significant, the findings suggest that state EITC policies influence mothers in ways similar to federal EITC policies.

6.5. Impact of Working on Political Identity: IV Approach

Using GSS and Roper data, I follow the IV approach discussed in section 5.6 to estimate the impact of working on political identity for women on the margin of working, instrumenting with $MaxEITC$ and using the full set of controls. Panel A in Table 9 shows that the first stage estimate is 0.012 (0.004), with a first stage F-statistic of 12.3. Working decreases identifying as a Democrat and a liberal (-1.4 and -1.0 percentage points); and increases identifying as a Republican, Independent, conservative, and moderate (0.9, 0.5, 0.5, and 0.2 percentage points). Roper data in Table 7 panels E and F yield broadly similar effects: working decreases identifying as Democrat, Independent, and liberal (-0.4, -0.4, and -0.7 percentage points); increases identifying as a Republican and moderate (0.9 and 1.0 percentage points); and has an insignificant effect on being conservative (-0.1 percentage points). Various IV approaches suggest working is the mechanism affecting political identity.

6.6. Welfare Reform's Impact on Political Identity (GSS Data)

If working affects political identity, then other policies—beyond the EITC—that affect work should also affect identity. I use 1980–2004 GSS data and equation (4) to examine whether state welfare waivers—see section 5.5 for more details—affected these outcomes.

Table 10 shows that welfare reform significantly decreased the likelihood of identifying as Democrat and increased the likelihood of identifying as Republican, among women with 2 or more kids. Table 10 also shows insignificant negative effects on being Independent, liberal, or moderate, and insignificant positive effects on being conservative.

6.7. Net Impact of Turnout and Political Identity on Partisan Voting

So far, I have shown decreases in voting and changes in political identification, but the net effect on Democrat and Republican vote totals remains unclear, as these effects may offset each other. Table 11 examines partisan voting using GSS data, equation (2), and the full controls. Results are presented for the full sample and a younger subsample of women aged 18–45 (panels A and B). I consider two similar but distinct outcomes: (1) voting by presidential party, and (2) voting interacted with political identity. These two outcomes only differ for those who identify with one party but vote for another.

Among younger women, $MaxEITC$ decreases voting and voting Democrat (-0.76 and -1.24 percentage points), increases voting Republican (1.24 percentage points), and does not affect voting third party. Voting by political identity—not necessarily equal to the party women actually vote for—shows a similar decrease in voting by Democrats (-1.91 percentage points) and increase in voting by Republicans and Independents (0.75 and 0.33 percentage points). For all women (panel A), the effects are similar, including a decrease in voting Democrat and voting by Democrats (-1.46 and -1.44 percentage points), and an increase in voting Republican and voting by Republicans (1.24 and 0.75 percentage points).

Results suggest that EITC expansions since 1980 have reduced female voting for Democrats by 8.0% and increased voting for Republicans and third parties by 7.5% and 12.2% (implying aggregate numbers of -2.6, 1.7, and 0.7 million).[23] Even though recent decades have seen more women voting Democrat (Cascio and Shenhav, 2020), pro-work reforms to the safety net have pushed against these trends.

7. Channels and Related Outcomes

7.1. Being Registered to Vote

I use CPS data and equations (2) and (4) to examine whether the EITC or welfare reform affected being registered to vote. I find that $MaxEITC$ and $Waiver$ decreased being registered to vote by an insignificant 0.10 and 0.75 percentage points (Table A.21). These

[23] Average $MaxEITC$ increased by $2,000 between 1980 and the 2010s. First set of calculations come from multiplying effects in columns 3, 6, and 9 by two and dividing by means in Table 11. Aggregate numbers based on there being 89 million women ages 18–59 in 2020 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021).

policies also decreased being registered and voting, and increased being registered and not voting. Not being registered explains at most a small fraction of the decrease in voting.

If not registering contributes to lower turnout, states could mitigate this by making registration easier. Election Day Registration (EDR) allows eligible voters to register and vote on the same day, simplifying the voting process by removing the need to register in advance (Xu, 2017). However, I find nearly identical effects of working on voting for states with and without EDR, using OLS or IV approaches (results available upon request).[24]

7.2. Decreased Civic Participation: Evidence from Time-Use Data

Policies that increase labor supply raise the opportunity cost of non-work time and decrease time available for other activities, including learning about political issues, registering to vote, and voting. Table 6 column 9 showed $MaxEITC$ reduces being politically informed, consistent with Charles and Stephens (2013).[25] Numerous descriptive and lab studies also show that more political knowledge is associated with being more likely to vote (Palfrey and Poole, 1987; Wattenberg et al., 2000; Coupé and Noury, 2004; Battaglini et al., 2010). Lower political knowledge is also associated with voting more Republican (O'Donnell, 2024).

I examine whether EITC expansions affect time spent on civic participation using 2003–2018 American Time Use Survey (ATUS) data, equation (2), and three sets of controls.[26] Columns 1–3 in Table A.23 examine time spent working, and columns 4–6 look at time spent on civic participation (i.e., the narrowest ATUS category that includes voting-related activities). Across specifications, each \$1,000 in $MaxEITC$ increases working by 0.8–1.5 weekly hours and decreases civic participation by 0.2–0.3 weekly hours (or 10%).

7.3. Conservative Social Views

In Table 12, I explore beliefs and social attitudes that may drive (or co-move with) changes in political identity. Over the sample period (1975–2014), the GSS asks hundreds of

[24] EDR was implemented by Maine in 1973, Minnesota in 1974, Wisconsin in 1975, Idaho in 1994, Wyoming in 1994, New Hampshire in 1996, Montana in 2006, Iowa in 2008, and Connecticut in 2012.

[25] Charles and Stephens (2013) use a small ANES panel (1,300 individuals surveyed twice, 20 years apart in the 1970s and 1990s) to show that employment reduces political awareness.

[26] Table A.22 shows ATUS summary statistics for the sample of women ages 18–49 (matching Bastian and Lochner (2020)). Civic activities "include government-required duties—such as serving jury duty or appearing in court [and] voting and attending town hall meetings" (BLS, 2021).

relevant questions, though many are only asked once or to a small subset of respondents, and vary in structure (e.g., binary or categorical). I select dozens of variables asked in at least three years, standardize them so larger values denote more conservative views, and average them into five categories: government policy, feminism, views on race, other hot-button issues, and religion. Tables A.24–A.28 describe and show regressions for each subcomponent of these outcomes. These variables could, of course, be combined and categorized differently.

Each $1,000 increase in $MaxEITC$ leads women to be 0.018 standard deviations more conservative on government policy and 0.019 standard deviations more racist (panel A in Table 12). These results are driven by views on guaranteeing jobs, reducing income inequality, providing healthcare for all, helping unemployed, cutting government spending, and reducing middle-income taxes (Table A.24); and views on affirmative action and why racial outcome gaps exist (Table A.26). While these two results are statistically significant, I find no impact on the other three categories of feminism, hot-button issues, or religion.[27]

8. White Women Show Larger Conservative Shift

EITC expansions increased the employment of all mothers (Figure 3; Tables 3 and 7), but had a much larger effect on the voting and political identity of White women (Tables 1 and 7; Figure 10). Why?

In panel B of Table 12, I interact $MaxEITC$ with indicators for White and non-White to estimate the effect of $MaxEITC$—by race—on social and political views. I find that White women became more conservative about government policy and race (0.021 and 0.022 standard deviations). For non-White women, I find small insignificant effects on government policy and race (0.006 and 0.008 standard deviations).[28] These results are consistent with White women becoming more Republican and conservative (Figure 10 and Table 7).

Before estimating IV regressions to assess the causal effect of working on political identity by race, I examine the correlation between working and political identity by race. Panel B in Figure 2 shows that work hours and political identity are largely uncorrelated for both

[27] Figure A.18 shows insignificant negative estimates on six measures of religiosity, consistent with Silveus and Stoddard (2020). Subcomponents of hot-button issues reveal insignificant positive effects on abortion and gay rights, and insignificant negative effects on gun permits (Table A.27).

[28] For both groups, I find insignificant effects on feminism, hot button issues, and religion.

Black and White women. Using the same eight sets of controls from Table A.4, I show that working is associated with a 4 percentage point lower likelihood of identifying as a Democrat for White women compared to non-White women, and a 4 percentage point higher likelihood of identifying as a Republican (Table A.29). These patterns suggest significant racial differences in how political identity correlates with working.

I now use an IV approach with GSS and Roper data to estimate the causal effect of working on the political identity of White and non-White women on the margin of working.[29]

For White women, Table 9 panel B uses GSS data and shows working reduces voting, and identifying as Democrat and liberal (-1.1, -1.7, and -1.1 percentage points), while increasing identifying as Republican, Independent, conservative, and moderate (1.1, 0.5, 0.6, and 0.2 percentage points). I find similar effects using Roper data and two sets of controls: Table 7 panels E and F shows that working reduces identifying as Democrat and liberal (by 0.53–0.63 and 0.78–1.77 percentage points), increases Republican and moderate (0.96–1.45 and 0.63–1.06 percentage points), and has largely insignificant effects on Independent and conservative (-0.18 to -0.43 and -0.13 to 0.03 percentage points).

In contrast, I find smaller, largely insignificant effects on non-White women. Using GSS data, Table 9 panel C shows that the IV estimate for voting is actually positive (1.1 percentage points), while estimates on Democrat, Republican, liberal, and conservative are negative (-0.07, -0.52, -0.55, and -0.29 percentage points), and estimates on Independent and moderate are positive (0.69 and 0.80 percentage points). Using Roper data, Table 7 panels G and H show insignificant effects on Democrat (-0.10 to -0.15 pp), Independent (-0.18 to -0.45 pp), Republican (0.28 to 0.60 pp), and conservative (-0.08 to 0.03), and marginally significant effects on liberal (-0.54 to -1.50 pp) and moderate (0.63 to 1.94).

Table 9 columns 8–9 use an IV approach to examine how working affects social and political views. Employment increases White women's conservatism on government policy and race (0.015 and 0.021 standard deviations), with small insignificant effects for Black women (0.006 and 0.007 standard deviations). OLS and IV approaches consistently show

[29] Table 9 Panel C focuses on Black women, as including non-White-Non-Black women yields a noisier first stage. The first-stage point estimates are similar for both groups, but sample sizes and first-stage F-statistics are smaller for Black vs. White women (3,266 vs. 14,884 and 1.9 vs. 10.7).

that working has a significant impact on White women's political identity.

Two Channels that Explain Differential Responses by White Women: While working leads White women to be more conservative on policy and race—helping explain their Republican shift—why is this effect unique to them? One reason is that Black women are 21% more likely than White women to have had a working mother, making working a greater shock to White women's views and identity (see section 6.3). Another explanation may be that White women enter occupations and industries with more conservative coworkers, which I examine below using GSS data on political identity by occupation and industry and CPS data on employment responses by occupation.[30]

I use CPS data to examine which occupations newly employed White and Black women enter. Each estimate is derived from a version of equation (2), with the outcome defined as working interacted with one of 23 two-digit occupations. Figure 11 ranks occupations by the probability that White women enter them. The four most common occupations for newly working White women are construction, office and administrative support, building maintenance, and business and finance. For Black women, the four most common occupations are sales, arts and entertainment, healthcare, and building maintenance.

I use GSS data to calculate the political identity of each two-digit occupation (matching the 23 from CPS) to proxy coworker partisanship for new workers, measuring the fraction Republican and Democrat among all workers. Figure 12 ranks occupations by fraction Republican (left axis) and divides them into terciles, showing the probability that White vs. Black women enter each occupation (right axis). In the lowest fraction-Republican tercile, Black women are 4 percentage points more likely to work; in the second tercile, the gap is about zero; and in the highest tercile, White women are 6 percentage points more likely to work. On average, Black and White women have coworkers with different political views.

Table 13 summarizes Figures 11 and 12, showing that 46.4% and 38.9% of White women's coworkers identify as Democrat and Republican (columns 2 and 4–5), compared to 48.9% and 35.2% for Black women (columns 3–5). Overall, White women enter occupations where

[30] Another explanation is "last place aversion" (Kuziemko et al., 2014) and the desire to preserve relative economic standing. Despite benefiting from programs like the EITC, White mothers may oppose policies aiding even poorer families to preserve—or widen—the income gap between themselves and those worse off.

coworkers are 10.5% more Republican and 5.1% less Democrat than for Black women.

Results above use 1975–2014 GSS data to define occupational partisanship, but these patterns may vary over time. To address this, I also calculate occupational partisanship using 1990–2014 and 2000–2014 GSS data. These two approaches yield nearly identical effects, showing that White women enter occupations where coworkers are 10.3–10.7% more Republican and 4.5–4.6% less Democrat than Black women (Table 13 columns 6–9).

Next, I replicate the previous occupation analysis at the industry level (19 industries) and find a similar pattern: White women are more likely to enter conservative, Republican-leaning industries. Figure A.19 shows the industries newly working Black and White women enter. The most common industries for Black women are healthcare and professional services, while for White women, they are manufacturing and finance/insurance. Figure A.20 ranks industries by the share of Republican workers. Table A.30 summarizes Figures A.19 and A.20, showing that 44.0% and 39.6% of White women's coworkers identify as Democrat and Republican (columns 2 and 6–7), compared to 45.5% and 37.1% for Black women (columns 3 and 6–7). White women enter industries with coworkers who are 6.5% more Republican and 3.3% less Democrat than those of Black women.

These results show that newly working women sort into different occupations and industries by race, shaping their partisanship and political views. White women are more likely to enter conservative, Republican-leaning industries, helping drive the observed racial differences in how working impacts political views through peer effects in the workplace.

9. Conclusion

This study provides the first causal evidence on how exogenous increases in employment affect women's voting behavior and political identity. Across six data sources spanning five decades, I show that two pro-work policies—EITC expansions and welfare reform—reduced voter turnout and shifted women toward conservative and Republican political preferences. Results are robust to event study, OLS, and IV approaches, alternative specifications and sets of controls, and multiple measures of the treatment variables, including separately analyzing state and federal EITC expansions. I provide new evidence about the link between labor

market participation and political engagement among lower-income mothers.

Employment reduces civic participation and political knowledge, and also leads to more conservative attitudes towards government policy, contributing to lower Democratic support and higher Republican support among mothers on the margin of working. Effects are concentrated among unmarried, younger, less-educated, and lower-income mothers, with a null impact on married mothers. Effects persist in more recent years, suggesting that post-2000 EITC expansions continued to shape mothers' voting behavior and political identity.

While recent decades have seen more women voting (Figure A.2) and voting Democrat (Cascio and Shenhav, 2020), my results show that pro-work reforms to the safety net have pushed against these trends. For example, EITC expansions since 1980 reduced female voting by 1.9%, reduced total votes for Democrats by 3.2%, and increased total votes for Republicans by 2.3% (implying aggregate numbers of -0.9, -2.6, and 1.7 million).[31]

While women of all races and ethnicities increase their labor supply, only the political views of White women are impacted. I find two relevant channels that help explain this trend. First, White women are less likely to have grown up with a working mother than non-White women; and as a result, entering the workforce likely represented a larger cultural and social shift for White women, consistent with Kuziemko et al. (2018). Second, newly employed White and Black women sort into different occupations, with White women entering more Republican-leaning workplaces. Coworker peer effects likely help explain why newly working White women become more conservative and Republican.

This study highlights an underexplored relationship between labor market policies, voting, and political preferences. These results contribute to a literature explaining American political ideology (Alesina et al., 2021; Chinoy et al., 2023). My findings focus on lower-income mothers, a demographic targeted by EITC expansions and welfare reform; it is important to recognize that other contexts or groups may react differently. Future research should investigate how these patterns vary across income levels, demographics, and countries, providing deeper insights into how employment shapes democracy and political behavior.

[31] Average $MaxEITC$ increased by \$2,000 between 1980 and the 2010s. Aggregate numbers based on 53 of 89 million women aged 18–59 voting in 2020 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021), and 81.3 and 74.2 million Democrat and Republican vote totals in the 2020 election.

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Table 1: EITC's Effects on Voting, Average and Subgroup Effects (CPS Data)

Subgroup:	All	Marital Status	Race	Education	Age	Years	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
MaxEITC	-0.50						
	(0.10)						
MaxEITC		0.08					
× Married		(0.09)					
MaxEITC		-1.45					
× Unmarried		(0.13)					
MaxEITC			-0.65				
× White			(0.10)				
MaxEITC			-0.07				
× Non-White			(0.11)				
MaxEITC				-0.43			
× ≤ 12 Years Educ				(0.15)			
MaxEITC				0.07			
× > 12 Years Educ				(0.09)			
MaxEITC					-1.38		
× < Age 35					(0.13)		
MaxEITC					-0.14		
× ≥ Age 35					(0.08)		
MaxEITC						-0.85	
× Year < 2000						(0.16)	
MaxEITC						-0.56	
× Year ≥ 2000						(0.10)	
MaxEITC							-0.50
× Low Income							(0.08)
MaxEITC							-0.21
× Middle Income							(0.20)
MaxEITC							-0.01
× Higher Income							(0.34)
R-squared	0.180	0.181	0.181	0.183	0.181	0.180	0.180
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035
Equal Effects (P-Val)		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.011	0.000

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. Sample include all women ages 18–59. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. P-values from F-test for equal effects within each column. Full controls include: state FE, year FE, number of kids FE, married, age cubic, Black, White, years of education, married interacted with state FE, year FE, race, and education; annual state factors (unemployment rate, GDP, GDP growth rate, minimum wage, welfare waiver, and maximum welfare benefits for families with 1, 2, and 3 kids); and annual state factors interacted with married. Low, middle, and higher incomes defined as having individual earnings of $0–$39,999, $40,000–$79,999, and over $80,000.

Table 2: Effects on Voting by Predicted Likelihood of Receiving the EITC, Relative to Lowest-Likelihood Group (CPS Data)

EITC Measure:	Any EITC				Over $1,000			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MaxEITC	-0.48				-0.73			
× Quantile 2	(0.24)				(0.23)			
MaxEITC		-0.87				-0.98		
× Tercile 2		(0.31)				(0.33)		
MaxEITC		-1.32				-1.30		
× Tercile 3		(0.38)				(0.36)		
MaxEITC			-1.07				-1.28	
× Quartile 2			(0.51)				(0.39)	
MaxEITC			-1.40				-1.85	
× Quartile 3			(0.48)				(0.39)	
MaxEITC			-1.71				-2.14	
× Quartile 4			(0.53)				(0.43)	
MaxEITC				-2.08				-1.76
× Quintile 2				(0.71)				(0.46)
MaxEITC				-2.47				-2.09
× Quintile 3				(0.69)				(0.45)
MaxEITC				-2.90				-2.41
× Quintile 4				(0.70)				(0.46)
MaxEITC				-3.11				-2.65
× Quintile 5				(0.74)				(0.48)
R-squared	0.178	0.178	0.178	0.179	0.178	0.178	0.179	0.179
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035
Equal Effects (p-val)	0.054	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.000	0.000

Notes: See notes in Table 1 for data, sample, and full set of controls. I predict each binary measure of EITC with the full set of controls. I then group the predicted values into quantiles—where higher quantiles are more likely to receive the EITC—and estimate equation (3) with the full set of controls where I interact $MaxEITC$ with a binary for being in a given quantile. Each estimate is relative to the impact on the lowest quantile group (i.e., the group least likely to receive the EITC).

Table 3: EITC's Impact on Working and Voting (CPS Data)

Outcome:	Voting	Working			LFP	LFP	LFP	Work Hrs >0		
			and Voting	and Not Voting		and Voting	and Not Voting		and Voting	and Not Voting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Average Effects										
MaxEITC	-0.44	0.34	-0.07	0.41	0.36	-0.06	0.42	0.25	-0.12	0.37
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Panel A: Effects by Race										
MaxEITC	-0.45	0.36	-0.08	0.44	0.40	-0.07	0.47	0.26	-0.14	0.40
× White	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
MaxEITC	-0.40	0.27	-0.03	0.30	0.22	-0.04	0.27	0.23	-0.04	0.27
× Non-White	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)
R-squared	0.182	0.006	0.076	0.089	0.006	0.082	0.098	0.006	0.072	0.085
Mean Dep Var	60.1	61.5	36.9	24.6	65.4	39.2	26.2	59.2	35.5	23.7

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 March and November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 1 notes. N=411,241 in each column. Sample restricted to women in both the March ASEC and November voting supplement. Working and LFP (labor force participation) defined based on work status in year $t-1$, positive working hours defined based on work status last week.

Table 4: Welfare Reform's Impact on Working and Voting (CPS Data)

Outcome:	Voting		Working		LFP		Work Hrs >0	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
State Welfare Waiver	-1.09	-1.49	1.63	1.07	1.98	1.44	1.43	1.16
× 2+ Kids	(0.56)	(0.79)	(0.57)	(0.75)	(0.56)	(0.74)	(0.54)	(0.73)
R-squared	0.178	0.178	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
Observations	279,898	279,898	279,898	279,898	279,898	279,898	279,898	279,898
Mean Dep Var	57.8	57.8	60.6	60.6	64.5	64.5	58.3	58.3
Controls								
Demographics	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
State-Year Factors		X		X		X		X

Notes: Data source: 1980–2004 March and November CPS. Sample restricted to women in both the March ASEC and November voting supplement (as in Table 3). Outcomes defined in Table 3 notes. Demographics refer to controls in Table A.4 columns 1–2; state-year factors refer to controls in Table A.4 column 4. Welfare waivers are described in Appendix B.

Table 5: Using Labor Supply as an Instrument for Voting (CPS Data)

Instrument:	*MaxEITC*			EITC's Phase-In Rate			Welfare Waiver		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Employed	-1.29			-1.33			-1.39		
	(0.33)			(0.42)			(1.14)		
LFP		-1.21			-1.28			-1.04	
		(0.31)			(0.41)			(0.68)	
Pos. Earnings			-1.08			-1.02			-1.30
			(0.29)			(0.28)			(0.92)
Full controls	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Observations	411,241			411,241			279,898		
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic	16.5	10.2	12.0	8.0	8.4	11.0	2.7	2.8	1.7
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic	18.4	17.9	24.0	12.8	12.1	21.7	4.2	6.8	3.6
First-Stage Estimate	0.34	0.36	0.40	0.48	0.50	0.62	1.15	1.44	1.07
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.59)	(0.74)	(0.75)

Notes: Sample for columns 1–6 described in Table 3; sample for columns 7–9 described in Table 4. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Phase-in rate in 10 percentage point units, and equal to federal plus state rate. *MaxEITC* is highly correlated with the EITC's phase-in rate. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 1 notes. Welfare waivers are described in Appendix B.

Table 6: EITC and Political Identity (GSS Data)

	Political Party Affiliation			Political Ideology			Behavior Changes		
	Democrat	Indep	Republican	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Employed	Weekly Work Hours	Politically Informed
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
MaxEITC	-1.75	0.61	1.09	-1.18	0.24	0.58	1.22	0.50	-0.055
	(0.33)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.51)	(0.35)	(0.14)	(0.029)
R-squared	0.093	0.053	0.093	0.060	0.047	0.041	0.094	0.114	0.725
Obs.	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	2,399
Mean D.V.	49.2	16.9	33.3	25.0	35.6	27.5	65.4	25.3	1.75

Notes: Data source: 1975–2014 GSS data. Sample includes all women 18–59 years old. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 1 notes. I define politically informed by averaging 11 standardized variables (e.g., interested in politics, discuss politics, sought political information). Many observations have information on political affiliation and ideology, but not on politically informed. See Table A.12 for more details on this outcome and individual-component regressions.

Table 7: EITC and Political Identity (Roper Data)

		Political Party Affiliation			Political Ideology		
Outcome:	Working	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Average Effect of MaxEITC, OLS, No Controls							
MaxEITC	1.85	-1.31	-0.79	2.10	-1.40	1.87	-0.20
	(0.21)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.31)
Panel B: Average Effect of MaxEITC, OLS, Demographic Controls							
MaxEITC	2.05	-0.80	-1.17	1.97	-1.58	2.18	-0.33
	(0.26)	(0.38)	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.31)
Panel C: Effect of MaxEITC by Race, OLS, No Controls							
MaxEITC	1.95	-1.15	-0.92	2.07	-1.50	2.05	-0.28
× White	(0.21)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.31)
MaxEITC	2.24	-0.38	-0.49	0.87	-1.21	1.44	0.05
× Non-White	(0.22)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.31)
Panel D: Effect of MaxEITC by Race, OLS, Demographic Controls							
MaxEITC	1.91	-1.00	-1.32	2.32	-1.68	2.42	-0.46
× White	(0.26)	(0.38)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.31)
MaxEITC	2.37	-0.32	-0.83	1.15	-1.34	1.64	-0.01
× Non-White	(0.27)	(0.38)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.31)
Panel E: Average Effect of MaxEITC, IV, No Controls							
Working	–	-0.45	-0.39	0.84	-0.72	0.95	-0.09
	–	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.16)
Panel F: Average Effect of MaxEITC, IV, Demographic Controls							
Working	–	-0.39	-0.57	0.96	-0.75	1.04	-0.15
	–	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.15)
Panel G: Effect of MaxEITC by Race, IV, No Controls							
Working	–	-0.63	-0.81	1.45	-1.77	2.44	-0.30
× White	–	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(1.00)	(1.24)	(0.43)
Working	–	-0.15	-0.45	0.60	-1.50	1.94	-0.08
× Non-White	–	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.94)	(1.16)	(0.41)
Panel H: Effect of MaxEITC by Race, IV, Demographic Controls							
Working	–	-0.53	-0.43	0.96	-0.78	1.06	-0.13
× White	–	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.16)
Working	–	-0.10	-0.18	0.28	-0.54	0.63	0.03
× Non-White	–	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.14)
Observations	276,257	276,257	276,257	276,257	245,462	245,462	245,462
Mean Dep Var	68.3	31.3	34.2	34.5	21.2	41.5	37.1

Notes: While Figure 6 uses 775 datasets from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research (Roper data) spanning 1980 to 2020, I restrict to the 546 datasets that have consistent outcome and demographic variables (marital status is the most commonly missing variable). Liberal, moderate, and conservative outcomes are available in 524 datasets. Since state is often missing in Roper data, I define $MaxEITC$ based on the federal EITC only. Since number of kids is only available in about a third of Roper datasets, I assign $MaxEITC$ values to all mothers based on having two kids.

Table 8: EITC and Political Identity (GSS Data)

Outcome:	Political Party Affiliation			Political Ideology			Behavior Changes	
	Democrat	Indep	Republican	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Employed	Weekly Work Hours
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Average Effects								
MaxEITC	-1.85	0.62	1.21	-0.37	-0.44	0.55	1.02	0.44
	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.44)	(0.52)	(0.65)	(0.54)	(0.21)
Panel B: Effects by Having Had a Working Mother								
MaxEITC × Had Working Mom	-1.71	0.47	1.22	-0.29	-0.36	0.40	1.06	0.47
	(0.39)	(0.33)	(0.38)	(0.44)	(0.53)	(0.64)	(0.52)	(0.21)
MaxEITC × Did Not Have Working Mom	-2.34	1.17	1.15	-0.67	-0.75	1.05	0.88	0.35
	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.53)	(0.70)	(0.65)	(0.24)
Equal Effects (P-Val)	0.058	0.004	0.773	0.095	0.142	0.021	0.522	0.292
R-squared	0.100	0.053	0.098	0.066	0.051	0.042	0.083	0.103
Observations	14,008	14,008	14,008	14,008	14,008	14,008	14,008	14,008
Mean Dep Var	48.5	17.0	34.0	25.3	34.6	27.3	67.6	26.3

Notes: See notes to Table 6. 68% of women report having had a working mom at some point during childhood, with 66% and 80% of White and Black women, respectively. Baseline means across groups are similar.

Table 9: Voting & Political Identity: *MaxEITC* as IV for Employment (CPS & GSS Data)

Data:	CPS	GSS							
Outcome:	Voting	Democrat	Indep	Republican	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Gov. Policy	Race
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: All Women									
Employed	-1.29	-1.44	0.50	0.89	-0.97	0.19	0.48	1.67	2.16
	(0.33)	(0.53)	(0.25)	(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.29)	(0.44)	(0.93)	(1.44)
Observations	411,241	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	14,242	16,909
Mean Dep Var	60.1	0.49	0.17	0.33	0.25	0.36	0.27	-0.055	-0.027
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic = 8.6									
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic =12.3									
First-Stage Estimate of Employed on *MaxEITC* = 0.012 (0.003)									
Panel B: White Women									
Employed	-1.12	-1.65	0.49	1.11	-1.08	0.21	0.55	1.45	2.11
	(0.27)	(0.55)	(0.26)	(0.48)	(0.41)	(0.33)	(0.49)	(0.82)	(1.37)
Observations	345,202	14,884	14,884	14,884	14,884	14,884	14,884	11,060	13,128
Mean Dep Var	60.4	0.43	0.17	0.40	0.24	0.36	0.29	0.048	0.083
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic = 7.4									
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic =10.7									
First-Stage Estimate of Employed on *MaxEITC* = 0.013 (0.004)									
Panel C: Black Women									
Employed	1.21	-0.07	0.69	-0.52	-0.55	0.80	-0.29	0.57	0.74
	(2.20)	(0.75)	(0.84)	(0.75)	(1.04)	(1.16)	(0.78)	(1.61)	(1.56)
Observations	47,711	3,266	3,266	3,266	3,266	3,266	3,266	2,382	2,801
Mean Dep Var	60.9	0.77	0.13	0.083	0.30	0.35	0.21	-0.50	-0.53
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic = 1.8									
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic = 1.9									
First-Stage Estimate of Employed on *MaxEITC* = 0.011 (0.008)									

Notes: MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 1 notes. The first stage estimate and statistics refer to columns 2–7 using GSS data. The first and second stage estimates in panel A column 1 is identical to column 1 in Table 5. The point estimates for the first stage in column 1 in panels B and C are similar to that in panel A, but noisier and with smaller Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics (especially panel C). In columns 2–9, N=1,169 for non-White-non-Black women and the estimated impact on this group is noisy and insignificant, so I do not show these results. Combining these non-White-non-Black women with Black women results in noisier results than Black women alone.

Table 10: Welfare Reform's Impact on Political Identity (GSS Data)

	Political Party Affiliation			Political Ideology		
Outcome:	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
State Welfare Waiver	-3.86	-0.78	4.49	-1.05	-1.03	1.26
× 2+ Kids	(1.69)	(1.46)	(1.95)	(1.53)	(1.49)	(1.82)
R-squared	0.091	0.042	0.092	0.065	0.057	0.045
Observations	13,116	13,116	13,116	13,116	13,116	13,116
Controls						
Demographics	X	X	X	X	X	X
State-Year Factors		X		X		X

Notes: Data source: 1980–2004 GSS data. See notes to Table 6. Welfare waivers are described in Appendix B.

Table 11: Net Effect on Partisan Voting (GSS Data)

Outcome:	Voted	Voted	Democrat		Voted	Independent		Voted	Republican	
		for Dem.	× Voted	× Not Voted	for 3rd Prty	× Voted	× Not Voted	for Rep.	× Voted	× Not Voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Full Sample of Women, Ages 18–59										
MaxEITC	-0.03	-1.46	-1.44	-0.31	0.28	0.40	0.18	1.18	0.98	0.14
	(0.38)	(0.59)	(0.41)	(0.33)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.61)	(0.35)	(0.22)
R-squared	0.159	0.183	0.099	0.059	0.077	0.019	0.071	0.180	0.106	0.042
Observations	16,578	11,532	16,578	16,578	11,532	16,578	16,578	11,532	16,578	16,578
Mean Dep Var	69.0	51.6	36.0	13.3	6.02	6.58	9.39	42.4	26.2	8.14
Panel B: Younger Sample of Women, Ages 18–45										
MaxEITC	-0.76	-1.24	-1.91	-0.31	-0.00	0.33	0.45	1.24	0.75	0.60
	(0.48)	(0.64)	(0.50)	(0.46)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.34)	(0.59)	(0.36)	(0.33)
R-squared	0.153	0.190	0.099	0.059	0.090	0.019	0.074	0.187	0.108	0.044
Observations	11,203	7,351	11,203	11,203	7,351	11,203	11,203	7,351	11,203	11,203
Mean Dep Var	64.4	51.1	33.3	15.0	6.54	6.02	10.9	42.4	24.9	9.51

Notes: See notes to Table 6. Voted in GSS data refers to last presidential election. Outcomes in columns 2, 5, and 8 are self-reported. I construct outcomes in columns 3–4, 6–7, and 9–10 by interacting voting with political party affiliation.

Table 12: Impact of EITC Expansions on Social and Political Attitudes (GSS Data)

Views on:	Government Policy	Race	Feminism	Other Hot Button Issues	Religion
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Average Effects					
MaxEITC	1.83	1.92	0.13	0.20	-0.56
	(0.93)	(0.93)	(0.56)	(0.77)	(0.78)
Panel B: Effects by Race					
MaxEITC	2.15	2.21	-0.18	0.45	-0.77
× White	(0.98)	(1.10)	(0.65)	(0.89)	(0.91)
MaxEITC	0.64	0.81	1.33	-0.73	0.22
× Non-White	(2.18)	(1.22)	(1.19)	(1.48)	(1.33)
R-squared	0.104	0.165	0.148	0.150	0.143
Observations	14,242	16,909	12,182	13,059	19,254
Mean Dep Var	-5.47	-2.68	-14.8	-2.33	-2.88

Notes: See notes to Table 6. Positive values denote more conservative views. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 1 notes. Outcomes are created as the average of several standardized variables (with means of zero and standard deviations of one). Tables A.24–A.28 describe and show regressions for each subcomponent of these outcomes, along with number of observations and means.

Table 13: Occ. of Newly Working Women (CPS Data), Political Identity by Occ. (GSS Data)

Description:	Prob(Entering Occ.)			Workers' Political Identity by Occ.					
Data:	CPS Data			GSS Data (Alt. Sample Years Below)					
	Sample of Women			1975–2013		1990–2013		2000–2013	
	All	White	Black	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
Occupation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Education & Training	-0.065	-0.038	-0.011	0.540	0.383	0.543	0.373	0.572	0.328
Arts, Design, Entertainment	-0.026	-0.029	-0.030	0.493	0.389	0.482	0.394	0.476	0.390
Protective Service	0.003	-0.004	0.001	0.536	0.290	0.515	0.291	0.504	0.294
Food Preparation & Serving	0.004	0.006	0.012	0.439	0.429	0.387	0.479	0.356	0.490
Transportation & Moving	0.005	0.050	-0.035	0.534	0.297	0.484	0.317	0.434	0.327
Installation & Repair	0.007	0.011	-0.013	0.484	0.329	0.426	0.346	0.406	0.321
Legal	0.008	0.010	0.007	0.541	0.336	0.535	0.341	0.525	0.334
Farming, Fishing, Forestry	0.019	0.013	0.060	0.464	0.384	0.449	0.382	0.455	0.356
Community & Social Service	0.021	0.015	0.015	0.520	0.350	0.542	0.324	0.537	0.310
Life, Physical Sciences	0.025	0.033	-0.005	0.358	0.506	0.327	0.529	0.307	0.546
Armed Forces	0.029	0.023	0.034	0.496	0.311	0.449	0.330	0.426	0.320
Architecture & Engineering	0.031	0.037	-0.002	0.405	0.464	0.393	0.472	0.382	0.472
Production	0.035	0.035	-0.021	0.482	0.342	0.428	0.366	0.422	0.351
Management	0.046	0.051	0.045	0.380	0.516	0.372	0.521	0.380	0.514
Personal Care & Service	0.053	-0.027	0.343	0.563	0.246	0.496	0.260	0.476	0.243
Computer & Math	0.061	0.065	0.068	0.417	0.476	0.400	0.481	0.402	0.456
Sales & Related	0.124	0.098	0.077	0.483	0.323	0.454	0.334	0.428	0.321
Healthcare Support	0.149	0.095	0.393	0.455	0.423	0.456	0.412	0.464	0.396
Healthcare Practitioners	0.151	0.115	0.325	0.501	0.354	0.503	0.362	0.500	0.373
Business & Finance	0.153	0.190	-0.022	0.431	0.450	0.434	0.443	0.445	0.421
Building & Maintenance	0.180	0.198	0.289	0.510	0.277	0.478	0.274	0.452	0.276
Office & Admin Support	0.260	0.274	0.150	0.425	0.427	0.403	0.434	0.396	0.420
Construction & Extraction	0.551	0.629	0.132	0.479	0.385	0.459	0.392	0.449	0.382
$\Sigma_{i=1}^{23}$ ($Prob$(Entering Occupation i) $\times$ Political Identity of Occupation i) reveals that:									
White women enter occupations that are:									
46.4% Democrat and 38.9% Republican (using columns 2 and 4–5)									
44.6% Democrat and 39.4% Republican (using columns 2 and 6–7)									
43.7% Democrat and 38.4% Republican (using columns 2 and 8–9)									
Black women enter occupations that are:									
48.9% Democrat and 35.2% Republican (using columns 3 and 4–5)									
46.7% Democrat and 35.6% Republican (using columns 3 and 6–7)									
45.8% Democrat and 34.8% Republican (using columns 3 and 8–9)									
Relative to Black women, White women enter occupations where coworkers are:									
10.5% more Republican and 5.1% less Democrat (using columns 2–3 and 4–5)									
10.7% more Republican and 4.5% less Democrat (using columns 2–3 and 6–7)									
10.3% more Republican and 4.6% less Democrat (using columns 2–3 and 8–9)									

Notes: 1976–2020 November CPS data used for columns 1–3. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. 1975–2014 GSS data used for columns 4–9. Standard errors suppressed for space but shown in Figures 11 and 12. Columns 1–3 are in percentage points and are estimates of $MaxEITC$ in equation (2).




Fig. 1. **Fraction of Women Voting by Weekly Work Hours (CPS Data)**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 March and November CPS data. Sample described in Table 3 notes. Panels A–F suggest that working women with kids find it difficult to both work and vote, while women without kids do not face the same constraints.




Fig. 2. **Political Identity by Weekly Work Hours (GSS Data)**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1984–2014 GSS data. See notes to Table 6.





Fig. 3. **Unadjusted Female Employment Trends by Number of Kids (CPS Data)**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1980–2020 CPS ASEC data. Sample includes all women aged 18–59 years old.






Fig. 4. **Unadjusted Voting Trends by Number of Kids (CPS Data)**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1980–2020 November CPS data. Regression-adjusted trends use full set of controls, listed in Table 1 notes. Post1992 includes 1992.




Fig. 5. **Political Identity Trends by Number of Kids (GSS Data)**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1984–2014 GSS data. See notes to Table 6. This figure normalizes the gap to 1992 levels, and shows unadjusted and regression-adjusted annual trends with the full set of controls.




Fig. 6. **Political Identity Trends: Mothers vs. Women without Kids (Roper Data)**

Notes: Author's calculation from 775 Roper datasets spanning 1980–2017. I combine all mothers since only about a third of Roper datasets include number of children.




Fig. 7. **State EITCs and Event Time Voting by Number of Kids (CPS Data)**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 1 notes. Panel B normalizes the gap in panel A to event time -2 levels. Post years begin in event time 0. CPS voting data is only available every two years. For expansions during odd years, I normalize to year $t-1$. While this figure could be normalized to year $t=0$ for each state, this results in different states represented in even and odd years, yielding similar but noisier figures.




Fig. 8. **Unadjusted Female Voting Patterns by Subgroup (CPS Data)**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data. Panel F shows that voting rates are steady at around 60% for income below $150,000—relevant for the IV approach in section 5.6 and disentangling the impact of employment vs. income on voting.




Fig. 9. **State Changes in Female Employment, Voting, GOP (CPS & GSS Data)**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 March and November CPS data (panel A) and and 1975–2014 GSS data (panel B). I compare state averages in 1976–1988 with years after 2000. Since GSS sample is small, both panels use CPS estimates of change in female working and weights. Figure weights by the 1980 state female population. Unweighted estimates are similar: -0.7 (0.3) and 0.9 (0.7). Circle sizes reflect 1980 state female population. These bivariate regressions are descriptive and not causal.




Fig. 10. **Effects of EITC on Political Party Affiliation, by Subgroup**

Notes: See notes to Table 6.




Fig. 11. **Black and White Women Enter Different Occupations (CPS Data)**

Notes: 1980–2020 CPS ASEC data. See notes in Table 1 for sample and list of full set of controls.




Fig. 12. **White Women Enter More-Republican Occupations (GSS Data)**

Notes: 1975–2014 GSS data. Sample includes all adults (men and women) to calculate average partisaship by occupation.

Online Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables

"Does Employment Shift Mothers' Voting Behavior and Political Identity?"

Jacob Bastian[1]

Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures

Appendix B: Welfare Reform Details

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Table A.1: Summary Statistics (CPS and GSS Data)

Sample:	All Women				Unmarried Women			
	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: 1976–2020 CPS Data								
Age	37.7	11.9	18.0	59.0	33.8	12.5	18.0	59.0
Married	0.58	0.49	0.0	1.0	0.00	0.00	0.0	0.0
Number of Kids	0.90	1.21	0.0	9.0	0.52	0.99	0.0	9.0
<12 Years Educ	0.12	0.32	0.0	1.0	0.13	0.34	0.0	1.0
=12 Years Educ	0.55	0.50	0.0	1.0	0.57	0.49	0.0	1.0
>12 Years Educ	0.33	0.47	0.0	1.0	0.30	0.46	0.0	1.0
White	0.82	0.38	0.0	1.0	0.75	0.43	0.0	1.0
Black	0.13	0.34	0.0	1.0	0.20	0.40	0.0	1.0
Other Race	0.05	0.21	0.0	1.0	0.05	0.22	0.0	1.0
Voted Last Pres. Election	0.59	0.49	0.0	1.0	0.51	0.50	0.0	1.0
Voted Last Midterm Election	0.49	0.50	0.0	1.0	0.40	0.49	0.0	1.0
Observations	780,035				307,445			
Panel B: 1975–2014 GSS Data								
Age	39.4	10.6	18.0	59.0	38.7	11.0	18.0	59.0
Married	0.62	0.49	0.0	1.0	0.00	0.00	0.0	0.0
Number of Kids	1.15	1.26	0.0	9.0	0.92	1.22	0.0	9.0
<12 Years Educ	0.16	0.37	0.0	1.0	0.19	0.39	0.0	1.0
=12 Years Educ	0.59	0.49	0.0	1.0	0.57	0.50	0.0	1.0
>12 Years Educ	0.25	0.43	0.0	1.0	0.24	0.43	0.0	1.0
White	0.78	0.42	0.0	1.0	0.66	0.47	0.0	1.0
Black	0.16	0.37	0.0	1.0	0.27	0.45	0.0	1.0
Other Race	0.06	0.24	0.0	1.0	0.06	0.24	0.0	1.0
Voted Last Pres. Election	0.65	0.48	0.0	1.0	0.61	0.49	0.0	1.0
Democrat	0.49	0.50	0.0	1.0	0.57	0.50	0.0	1.0
Republican	0.33	0.47	0.0	1.0	0.26	0.44	0.0	1.0
Liberal	0.25	0.43	0.0	1.0	0.30	0.46	0.0	1.0
Conservative	0.27	0.45	0.0	1.0	0.23	0.42	0.0	1.0
Observations	19,319				8,004			

Notes: Data sources: 1976–2020 November CPS data and 1975–2014 GSS data. November CPS data include 913,185 women ages 18–59, but when asked whether they voted in the last election, 133,150 have values of 'refused," don't know," no response," or not in universe." I drop these women from the sample, but results are similar when some or all of these answers are interpreted as not voted. In GSS data, only 14,763 (6,329 unmarried) women have data on voting in last presidential eelction

Table A.2: Exploring the Working-Voting Correlation, with and without Demographic Controls (CPS Data)

Sample of Women	All		Mothers		Non-Mothers		Married		Unmarried		≤12 Yrs Ed		≥13 Yrs Ed	
Controls?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Weekly Work Hours	0.48	-0.97	-0.55	-0.41	1.46	-1.00	0.34	-0.39	1.21	-0.95	-0.39	-1.36	0.20	-0.25
(10 Hour Units)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.19)
R-squared	0.000	0.182	0.000	0.202	0.000	0.171	0.000	0.176	0.000	0.168	0.000	0.145	0.000	0.125
Observations	493,048		231,437		261,611		302,051		190,997		332,802		160,246	

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. Controls include demographic controls from Table A.4 column 2.

Table A.3: Testing the Exogeneity of State EITCs

	Max State EITC Benefits				State EITC Rates (% of Federal EITC)			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
State Unemp Rate	1.1	(2.3)	2.0	(2.2)	2.0	(3.7)	3.4	(3.5)
State GDP Growth	1.4	(3.0)	1.3	(3.0)	1.1	(4.8)	0.1	(4.7)
State GDP	2.1	(1.5)	2.1	(1.4)	3.0	(2.3)	3.1	(2.2)
State Welfare Waiver	-1.4	(0.8)	-0.8	(0.6)	-3.1*	(1.3)	-2.1	(1.1)
Max TANF with 1 Child	0.4	(0.9)	0.2	(1.0)	-2.8	(1.5)	-2.9	(1.5)
Max TANF with 2 Children	0.9	(1.0)	1.2	(1.1)	1.7	(1.4)	2.2	(1.5)
Max TANF with 3 Children	-1.0	(0.6)	-1.2	(0.7)	0.5	(1.2)	0.06	(1.2)
State Min Wage	-2.7	(1.4)	-2.3	(1.3)	-4.7*	(2.2)	-4.3*	(2.0)
Avg Number of Kids	-2.5	(4.7)	-2.7	(4.5)	-5.5	(7.3)	-6.0	(6.9)
Avg Age	-1.9	(1.7)	-1.8	(1.6)	-2.7	(2.2)	-2.7	(2.1)
Fraction White	-0.2	(1.1)	-0.4	(1.0)	-0.3	(1.6)	-0.6	(1.5)
Fraction Black	-1.3	(1.1)	-1.6	(1.1)	-1.4	(1.8)	-2.3	(1.7)
Fraction <12 Years Educ	0.1	(0.8)	0.03	(0.8)	0.7	(1.3)	0.6	(1.3)
Fraction =12 Years Educ	-1.2	(0.6)	-1.1	(0.6)	-1.4	(1.0)	-1.3	(1.0)
Fraction Married	0.3	(0.7)	0.1	(0.7)	0.8	(1.0)	0.6	(1.0)
Lagged State Unemp Rate			-1.4	(1.5)			-2.8	(2.4)
Lagged State GDP Growth			-0.9	(3.4)			-2.6	(5.5)
Lagged State GDP			-0.10	(0.6)			-0.3	(0.8)
Lagged State Welfare Waiver			-1.0	(0.6)			-1.6	(1.0)
Lagged Max TANF with 1 Child			0.4	(0.6)			0.04	(1.0)
Lagged Max TANF with 2 Children			-0.1	(1.0)			0.2	(1.6)
Lagged Max TANF with 3 Children			-0.07	(0.8)			-0.06	(1.2)
Lagged State Min Wage			-2.5	(1.9)			-3.4	(3.0)
Lagged Avg Number of Kids			-2.6	(2.9)			-5.5	(4.7)
Lagged Avg Age			1.3	(1.7)			3.7	(2.7)
Lagged Fraction White			0.1	(0.9)			0.02	(1.5)
Lagged Fraction Black			0.1	(1.3)			0.7	(2.0)
Lagged Fraction <12 Years Educ			0.8	(0.8)			1.7	(1.3)
Lagged Fraction =12 Years Educ			1.0	(0.7)			1.5	(1.1)
Lagged Fraction Married			0.9	(0.6)			1.5	(0.9)
R-squared	0.892		0.894		0.906		0.908	
Observations	816		816		816		816	
Mean Dep Var	372.8		372.8		631.3		631.3	
Testing Joint Significance P-Value	0.041		0.033		0.067		0.000	

Notes: Observations at the state-by-year level. Each regression controls for state FE, year FE, and state time trends. All dollars are in real CPI-adjusted 2018 dollars. EITC data from NBER and IRS. Unemployment rates from BLS. GDP from BEA regional data. Minimum wage from the Tax Policy Center's Tax Facts. Welfare benefits from the Urban Institute's Welfare Rules Database. Maximum state EITC benefits are for families with 3+ children. State EITC rates in percentage points. Annual state average demographic traits calculated by author from CPS data using the sample of all adults at least 18 years old. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.4: EITC's Effects on Voting Behavior, Alternate Controls (CPS Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Average Effect on Voting (Mean=58.8)								
MaxEITC	-0.55	-0.77	-0.56	-0.51	-0.50	-0.47	-0.46	-0.44
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
R-squared	0.079	0.178	0.180	0.180	0.180	0.187	0.189	0.189
Panel B: Effect by Marital Status (Married Mean=0.64, Unmarried Mean=0.51)								
MaxEITC × Married	-0.42	-0.51	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.13	0.15	0.17
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
MaxEITC × Unmarried	-0.96	-1.55	-1.49	-1.45	-1.45	-1.41	-1.40	-1.38
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
R-squared	0.079	0.178	0.181	0.181	0.181	0.188	0.189	0.190
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035
Controls								
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age, Race, Educ		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mar × (St, Yr, Race, Ed)			X	X	X	X	X	X
Annual State Factors				X	X	X	X	X
Mar. × State Factors					X	X	X	X
State × Year FE						X	X	X
Mar × St × Year FE							X	X
State × #Kids FE								X

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Column 5 denotes full set of controls used throughout the analysis.

Table A.5: EITC and Voting: Alternate Sample Years (CPS Data)

Sample Years	1976–2020	1976–1992	1982–1992	1988–1998	2000–2020
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Average Effect on Voting					
MaxEITC	-0.51	-1.27	-1.16	-0.40	-0.52
	(0.10)	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.19)	(0.41)
R-squared	0.180	0.174	0.176	0.176	0.187
Observations	780,035	354,509	234,503	211,378	327,689
Panel B: Effects by Marital Status					
MaxEITC × Married	0.07	0.64	0.65	0.18	-0.11
	(0.09)	(0.53)	(0.48)	(0.19)	(0.42)
MaxEITC × Unmarried	-1.45	-4.14	-3.78	-1.59	-1.36
	(0.13)	(0.51)	(0.54)	(0.26)	(0.43)
R-squared	0.181	0.176	0.178	0.177	0.188
Observations	780,035	354,509	234,503	211,378	327,689

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 1 notes.

Table A.6: Isolating Effects of 2009 Federal EITC Expansion (CPS Data)

Outcome:	Voting		Employed		LFP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Mothers with 3+ Kids vs. All Other Women						
3+ Kids × Post2009	-1.62	-2.15	0.98	0.86	1.08	0.98
	(0.69)	(0.63)	(0.98)	(0.97)	(1.01)	(1.01)
R-squared	0.057	0.187	0.002	0.008	0.002	0.008
Observations	279,872	279,872	178,254	178,254	178,254	178,254
Panel B: Mothers with 3+ Kids vs. All Other Mothers						
3+ Kids × Post2009	-1.86	-1.53	1.25	1.28	1.17	1.23
	(0.68)	(0.56)	(0.97)	(0.97)	(1.02)	(1.02)
R-squared	0.057	0.206	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.003
Observations	122,532	122,532	81,081	81,081	81,081	81,081
Panel C: Mothers with 3+ Kids vs. Mothers with 2 Kids						
3+ Kids × Post2009	-1.60	-1.27	0.70	0.72	0.86	0.90
	(0.76)	(0.64)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.04)	(1.04)
R-squared	0.058	0.212	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.003
Observations	80,412	80,412	53,574	53,574	53,574	53,574
Controls						
Year FE, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Full Controls		X		X		X

Notes: Data source: 2000–2016 CPS data. *MaxEITC* increased by about $1,000 for mothers with 3+ kids in 2009. Full set of controls listed in Table 1 notes.

Table A.7: EITC and Voting in Presidential or Midterm Elections, Alt. Controls (CPS Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Voting in Presidential Elections (Mean=68)								
MaxEITC	-0.59	-0.77	-0.53	-0.52	-0.51	-0.46	-0.45	-0.43
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)
R-squared	0.041	0.147	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.153	0.154	0.155
Observations	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047	403,047
Panel B: Voting in Midterm Elections (Mean=49)								
MaxEITC	-0.46	-0.74	-0.60	-0.54	-0.54	-0.52	-0.51	-0.49
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
R-squared	0.048	0.151	0.153	0.154	0.154	0.162	0.163	0.164
Observations	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988	376,988
Controls								
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age, Race, Educ		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mar × (St, Yr, Race, Ed)			X	X	X	X	X	X
Annual State Factors				X	X	X	X	X
Mar. × State Factors					X	X	X	X
State × Year FE						X	X	X
Mar × St × Year FE							X	X
State × #Kids FE								X

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Column 5 denotes full set of controls used throughout the analysis.

Table A.8: Restricting Sample by Marital Status (CPS Data)

Sample:	Unmarried Women		Married Women	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MaxEITC	-0.51	-0.49	-0.19	-0.08
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.11)	(0.12)
R-squared	0.163	0.173	0.179	0.187
Observations	307,445	307,445	472,590	472,590
Controls				
Full Controls	X	X	X	X
State × Year FE		X		X
State × #Kids FE		X		X

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Controls in columns 1 and 3 correspond to controls in Table A.4 column 5; controls in columns 2 and 4 correspond to controls in Table A.4 column 8.

Table A.9: EITC and Voting: Alternate EITC Measures (CPS Data)

	Total MaxEITC	Federal MaxEITC	State MaxEITC	EITC Phase-In Rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Average Effect on Voting				
EITC	-0.50	-0.55	-0.89	-0.84
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.42)	(0.21)
R-squared	0.180	0.180	0.180	0.180
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035
Panel B: Effects by Marital Status				
EITC × Married	0.08	0.11	0.43	0.27
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.38)	(0.21)
EITC × Unmarried	-1.45	-1.56	-3.99	-2.19
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.67)	(0.24)
R-squared	0.181	0.181	0.181	0.181
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Phase-in rate units are 10 percentage points. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 1 notes.

Table A.10: EITC and Voting: Alternate Specifications (CPS Data)

Specification	OLS		Logit		Probit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	-0.51		-0.60		-0.57	
	(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)	
MaxEITC × Married		0.07		0.00		0.02
		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)
MaxEITC × Unmarried		-1.45		-1.46		-1.43
		(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.13)
R-squared	0.180	0.181				
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035	780,035

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 1 notes.

Table A.11: Little Association Between Working and Political Identity (GSS Data)

	All Women			**White Women**			**Black Women**		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Outcome = Democrat									
Working	0.012	0.000	0.010	0.010	-0.001	0.003	0.041	0.013	0.018
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
R-squared	0.000	0.016	0.089	0.000	0.009	0.036	0.002	0.025	0.063
Panel B: Outcome = Republican									
Working	0.013	0.002	-0.008	0.010	0.002	-0.001	-0.011	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
R-squared	0.000	0.029	0.092	0.000	0.019	0.041	0.000	0.008	0.031
Panel C: Outcome = Independent									
Working	-0.025	-0.002	-0.003	-0.020	-0.001	-0.002	-0.031	-0.013	-0.015
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
R-squared	0.001	0.021	0.052	0.001	0.023	0.047	0.002	0.014	0.047
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Controls									
None	X			X			X		
Age, Educ, Married		X			X			X	
Full Controls			X			X			X

Notes: Data source: 1980–2004 GSS data. See notes to Table 6.

Table A.12: Decomposing Politically Informed (from Table 6 Column 9)

Outcome	Interested in Politics?	Ever Demonstrated?	Attended a Rally?	Boycott?	Political Media?	Donated to Political Cause?	Discuss Discuss	Share Political Views?	Signed Petition?	How Int. in Politics?	Politically Informed?
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
MaxEITC	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
R-squared	0.758	0.063	0.081	0.111	0.072	0.069	0.115	0.076	0.075	0.090	0.096
Observations	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399
Mean Dep Var	0.095	0.010	-0.010	0.033	-0.023	0.002	-0.036	-0.037	-0.005	-0.070	-0.060

Notes: See notes to Table 6. Outcomes all measured in standard deviations.

Table A.13: Working, Politically Informed, and Political Identity: Alternate Controls (GSS Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Outcome = Democrat (Mean = 0.49)								
MaxEITC	-1.8	-1.6	-1.4	-1.6	-1.6	-1.4	-1.4	-1.5
	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)
R-squared	0.035	0.091	0.098	0.099	0.099	0.151	0.194	0.201
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Panel B: Outcome = Republican (Mean = 0.33)								
MaxEITC	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.4
	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)
R-squared	0.037	0.093	0.098	0.099	0.100	0.153	0.194	0.200
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Panel C: Outcome = Working (Mean = 0.65)								
MaxEITC	1.1	1.3	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	1.0
	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)
R-squared	0.043	0.093	0.104	0.105	0.106	0.153	0.197	0.203
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Panel D: Outcome = Politically Informed (Units are Standard Deviations)								
MaxEITC	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R-squared	0.722	0.724	0.733	0.734	0.735	0.752	0.767	0.778
Observations	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399	2,399
Controls								
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age, Race, Educ		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married × (St, Yr, Race, Ed)			X	X	X	X	X	X
Annual State Factors				X	X	X	X	X
Married × Annual State Factors					X	X	X	X
State × Year FE						X	X	X
Married × State × Year FE							X	X
State × Number of Kids FE								X

Notes: See notes to Table 6. Politically informed discussed in Table 6 notes.

Table A.14: EITC and Political Identity: Alt. Specifications (GSS Data)

	Democrat		Republican		Liberal		Conservative	
Specification	Logit	Probit	Logit	Probit	Logit	Probit	Logit	Probit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MaxEITC	-1.61	-1.58	0.95	0.95	-1.31	-1.32	0.66	0.66
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.53)	(0.52)
Observations	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317	19,317

Notes: See notes to Table 6.

Table A.15: Summary Statistics (CES Data)

	All Women		All Mothers	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Any Kids	0.34	0.47	1	0
Age	42.6	13.7	37.9	9.78
Married	0.50	0.50	0.65	0.48
HS Dropout	0.036	0.19	0.043	0.20
HS Graduate	0.28	0.45	0.29	0.46
Some College	0.68	0.47	0.66	0.47
White	0.69	0.46	0.64	0.48
Black	0.14	0.35	0.16	0.37
Hispanic	0.099	0.30	0.13	0.34
Other Race	0.072	0.26	0.067	0.25
Max Possible EITC (1,000s)	2.46	2.69	6.19	0.72
Liberal	0.31	0.46	0.26	0.44
Moderate	0.31	0.46	0.33	0.47
Conservative	26.5	44.1	27.2	44.5
Observations	215,462		72,554	

Notes: 2008–2020 CES data. Sample includes all mothers 18–59 years old. All dollars are real CPI-adjusted 2018 dollars. CES does not have number of kids. Political party affiliation is only available for a small subset of observations so I focus on political views.

Table A.16: EITC Expansions and Political Views (2008–2020 CES Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Outcome = Liberal				
MaxEITC	-1.08	-0.60	-0.70	-0.65
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.32)
R-squared	0.020	0.064	0.061	0.070
Panel B: Outcome = Conservative				
MaxEITC	0.70	0.34	0.50	0.48
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.30)
R-squared	0.014	0.056	0.046	0.063
Panel C: Outcome = Moderate				
MaxEITC	0.14	-0.08	-0.09	-0.12
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.33)
R-squared	0.003	0.009	0.009	0.016
Observations	215,462	215,462	215,462	215,462
Controls				
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X
Demographics		X	X	X
Demographics × Year			X	X
State-Year FE, State-Year-Married FE				X

Notes: Data: 2008–2020 CES data. Sample is all women 18–59 years old. Since CES data does not have number of kids (only whether respondents have any kids), I assign two children to women with children to impute the value of $MaxEITC$. Results are similar when I assign one or three children to these women.

Table A.17: Summary Statistics (ANES Data)

	All Women		All Mothers	
	Mean (1)	S.D. (2)	Mean (3)	S.D. (4)
Number of Kids	1.09	1.22	1.93	1.01
Age	36.8	11.3	35.1	9.76
Married	0.62	0.49	0.68	0.47
HS Dropout	0.18	0.39	0.21	0.40
HS Graduate	0.40	0.49	0.43	0.50
Some College	0.41	0.49	0.36	0.48
White	0.78	0.42	0.76	0.43
Black	0.13	0.34	0.14	0.35
Hispanic	0.070	0.26	0.075	0.26
Other Race	0.021	0.14	0.020	0.14
Max Possible EITC (1,000s)	1.13	1.25	1.67	1.24
Voted Last Election	54.0	49.8	51.8	50.0
Liberal	18.1	38.5	16.2	36.9
Moderate	26.3	44.1	26.9	44.3
Conservative	24.8	43.2	24.2	42.8
Democrat	52.4	49.9	52.0	50.0
Independent	14.4	35.1	15.7	36.3
Republican	32.4	46.8	31.6	46.5
Observations	8,052		5,052	

Notes: 1974–2004 ANES data. Sample includes all mothers 18–49 years old. All dollars are real CPI-adjusted 2018 dollars.

Table A.18: EITC's Effects on Voting and Political Affiliation (ANES Data)

Outcome:	Voting	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Democrat	Independent	Republican
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Demographics Controls							
MaxEITC	-0.35	-1.02	-0.10	0.61	-0.91	-1.16	2.04
	(0.97)	(0.83)	(0.99)	(0.94)	(1.08)	(0.72)	(1.04)
R-squared	0.204	0.083	0.032	0.071	0.106	0.064	0.109
Observations	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052
Panel B: Add Control for State-Year FE							
MaxEITC	-0.45	-1.09	-0.03	0.79	-0.77	-1.21	2.16
	(1.00)	(0.87)	(1.03)	(0.98)	(1.10)	(0.75)	(1.06)
R-squared	0.257	0.137	0.079	0.117	0.164	0.121	0.165
Observations	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052	8,052
Mean Dep Var	54.0	18.1	26.3	24.8	52.4	14.4	32.4

Notes: Data source: 1974–2004 ANES data. Sample includes all women 18–59 years old. Demographics refer to controls in Table A.4 columns 1–2.

Table A.19: Impact of State EITCs on Political Identity (GSS Data)

Outcome:	Working		Republican		Democrat		Conservative		Liberal	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Among EITC States Only										
State EITC ×	0.01	-1.08	0.82	0.90	-0.41	-2.52	0.63	0.96	0.39	-0.92
1 Child	(1.03)	(1.13)	(1.07)	(1.26)	(1.12)	(1.31)	(1.00)	(1.16)	(0.98)	(1.21)
State EITC ×	2.11	1.13	1.50	2.09	-1.52	-4.19	0.44	1.29	-1.49	-2.70
2+ Children	(0.89)	(1.06)	(0.97)	(1.18)	(0.98)	(1.17)	(0.92)	(1.14)	(0.66)	(1.02)
R-squared	0.011	0.080	0.004	0.098	0.005	0.104	0.005	0.043	0.012	0.069
Observations	3,826	3,826	3,826	3,826	3,826	3,826	3,826	3,826	3,826	3,826
Panel B: Stacking Each EITC State with All Non-EITC States										
State EITC ×	0.72	0.40	-0.11	1.27	-0.11	-2.62	0.12	2.09	0.33	-1.43
1 Child	(0.82)	(0.92)	(0.84)	(1.03)	(0.89)	(1.06)	(0.79)	(0.92)	(0.78)	(0.97)
State EITC ×	1.13	0.95	0.36	1.86	-0.32	-2.95	-0.84	1.34	-0.61	-2.10
2+ Children	(0.70)	(0.87)	(0.75)	(0.92)	(0.76)	(0.93)	(0.72)	(0.86)	(0.54)	(0.79)
R-squared	0.008	0.074	0.002	0.103	0.002	0.101	0.003	0.050	0.005	0.071
Observations	85,407	85,407	85,407	85,407	85,407	85,407	85,407	85,407	85,407	85,407
Full Controls		X		X		X		X		X

Notes: See notes to Table 6. Panel A sample includes only the 31 states (including D.C.) with an EITC. Panel B sample includes 31 "stacks", where each EITC state is compared to the 20 non-EITC states, following the approach in Cengiz et al. (2019). While some states change policy more than once, I focus on the first time a state changes its policy.

Table A.20: Summary Statistics (Roper Data)

	All Women (N=345,363)				All Mothers (N=168,472)			
	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Year	2008.6	5.61	1980	2017	2009.0	5.66	1980	2017
Age	40.3	12.2	18	59	40.3	10.2	18	59
White	0.76	0.43	0	1	0.75	0.43	0	1
Black	0.098	0.30	0	1	0.10	0.30	0	1
HS Education or Less	0.30	0.46	0	1	0.29	0.45	0	1
Some College	0.21	0.41	0	1	0.20	0.40	0	1
HS Education or Less	0.30	0.46	0	1	0.29	0.45	0	1
Married	0.61	0.49	0	1	0.77	0.42	0	1
Employed	0.64	0.48	0	1	0.68	0.47	0	1
Any Kids	0.49	0.50	0	1	1	0	1	1
Democrat	0.31	0.46	0	1	0.29	0.45	0	1
Republican	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.36	0.48	0	1
Independent	0.36	0.48	0	1	0.36	0.48	0	1
Liberal	0.21	0.41	0	1	0.19	0.39	0	1
Moderate	0.41	0.49	0	1	0.44	0.50	0	1
Conservative	0.37	0.48	0	1	0.37	0.48	0	1
Max Federal EITC	3026.1	2608.8	0	5885.1	5666.2	580.9	1301.1	5885.1
Max State EITC	237.0	511.2	0	2586.2	434.7	665.4	0	2586.2

Notes: 1980–2017 Roper data. Sample includes all women 18–59 years old. Max EITC in real CPI-adjusted 2018 dollars. Not all variables available in each dataset.

Table A.21: EITC's and Welfare Reform's Effects on Being Registered to Vote (CPS Data)

Outcome:	Registered to Vote	Registered and Voted	Registered and Didn't Vote	Registered to Vote	Registered and Voted	Registered and Didn't Vote
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	-0.10	-0.51	0.41			
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)			
State Welfare Waiver				-0.75	-0.95	0.20
× 2+ Kids				(0.76)	(0.82)	(0.46)
R-squared	0.139	0.180	0.053	0.136	0.177	0.046
Observations	780,035	780,035	780,035	477,340	477,340	477,340

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 1 notes.

Table A.22: Summary Statistics (ATUS Data)

	All Women		All Mothers	
	Mean (1)	S.D. (2)	Mean (3)	S.D. (4)
Number of Kids	1.20	1.25	1.86	1.10
Age	33.8	9.26	35.1	8.72
Birth Year	1976.5	10.5	1975.1	9.85
Married	0.52	0.50	0.64	0.48
HS Graduate	0.89	0.32	0.86	0.34
Some College	0.63	0.48	0.58	0.49
College Graduate	0.33	0.47	0.29	0.45
Black	0.13	0.34	0.14	0.34
Hispanic	0.17	0.38	0.20	0.40
Employed	0.71	0.45	0.67	0.47
Individual Earnings (1,000s)	25.8	30.6	23.5	30.1
Household Income (1,000s)	65.8	48.2	66.1	48.6
Max Possible EITC (1,000s)	3.34	2.47	4.86	1.68
EITC Benefit Eligibility (100s)	6.68	15.2	10.2	17.9
EITC Eligible	0.24	0.43	0.34	0.47
Observations	58,090		43,685	

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 18–49 years old. All dollars are real CPI-adjusted 2018 dollars. EITC benefits calculated using TAXSIM. Table is similar to Table B.1 in Bastian and Lochner (2020).

Table A.23: Weekly Hours Spent Working and on Civic Participation (ATUS Data)

Outcome:	Work Hours			Civic Participation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	0.81	0.82	1.45	-0.21	-0.22	-0.25
	(0.43)	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
R-squared	0.061	0.066	0.109	0.014	0.016	0.046
Observations	58,090	58,090	58,090	58,090	58,090	58,090
Mean Dep Var	26.1	26.1	26.1	1.96	1.96	1.96
Controls						
State FE, Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Demographics	X	X	X	X	X	X
Interactions		X	X		X	X
State-Year FE			X			X

Notes: Data source: 2003–2018 ATUS data. MaxEITC is in $1,000s of 2018 dollars. Columns 1–2 control for state FE, year FE, and demographics; columns 3–4 add controls for marital status interacted with demographics; and columns 5–6 add state-year FE and state-year-married FE. These three sets of controls are equal to those in Tables A.4 and A.13 columns 2, 3, and 7.

Table A.24: Decomposing Government Policy (from Table 12 Column 1)

Gov Policy:	Welfare	Jobs for All	Reduce Income Ineq.	Health-Care for All	Help Elderly	Help Unemp.	Cut Spend.	Less Bus. Reg.	Reduce Income Ineq.	Income Ineq. Too High	Taxes on Rich Too High	Middle Inc. Taxes Too High	Rich Should Pay More Taxes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
MaxEITC	0.8	5.0	5.3	6.3	1.3	4.4	6.4	0.8	2.5	2.4	1.0	5.0	0.7
	(1.2)	(2.4)	(2.6)	(3.7)	(2.7)	(2.8)	(3.2)	(2.6)	(2.1)	(3.3)	(2.2)	(4.2)	(4.3)
R-squared	0.106	0.172	0.099	0.131	0.108	0.159	0.117	0.069	0.102	0.064	0.113	0.075	0.068
Obs.	10,312	2,925	2,411	1,575	1,974	1,962	1,593	1,588	3,736	1,879	1,783	1,513	1,328
Unique Years	27	7	6	4	5	5	4	4	7	4	4	3	3
Mean D.V.	-4.05	-12.2	-9.86	-8.27	-13.1	-6.25	-11.4	-13.5	-12.0	-5.92	1.30	5.12	0.17

Notes: See notes to Table 6.

Table A.25: Decomposing Feminism (from Table 12 Column 2)

Attitude about Women:	Should Take Care of Home	Should Not Work	Would Vote Female Pres.	Not Suited for Politics	Should Help Husband's Career	Kids Suffer if Mom Works	Should Tend Home	Divorce Laws
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MaxEITC	-0.5	0.9	0.3	-0.1	-0.3	0.5	2.0	-2.3
	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.0)	(1.3)	(1.5)	(1.2)	(0.9)	(1.0)
R-squared	0.129	0.058	0.056	0.086	0.181	0.076	0.110	0.102
Observations	7,587	7,638	8,499	10,939	5,659	9,629	9,604	11,442
Mean Dep Var	-16.6	-11.7	-11.6	-11.7	-25.8	-23.7	-23.1	-4.35

Notes: See notes to Table 6.

Table A.26: Decomposing Race Views (from Table 12 Column 3)

Attitudes:	Whites Hurt by Affirm. Action	No Black Affirmative Action	Gov't Shouldn't Help Blacks	Racial Outcome Gaps Not due to Discrimination	Racial Outcome Gaps due to Lack of Will	Banning Interracial Marriage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MaxEITC	0.4	4.6	1.0	1.1	3.1	1.5
	(1.8)	(4.1)	(1.4)	(1.9)	(1.3)	(1.2)
R-squared	0.084	0.149	0.177	0.092	0.076	0.188
Observations	5,527	5,687	10,402	9,226	9,168	8,631
Unique Years	12	11	21	19	19	18
Mean Dep Var	-1.76	-5.35	-5.19	-5.65	-9.95	0.0097

Notes: See notes to Table 6.

Table A.27: Decomposing Other Hot Button Issues (from Table 12 Column 4)

Attitude:	Anti Pro-Choice	Anti Gay Rights	Anti Gun Permits
	(1)	(2)	(3)
MaxEITC	0.5	0.7	-0.2
	(0.6)	(1.3)	(0.4)
R-squared	0.099	0.209	0.052
Observations	12,118	10,979	11,701
Unique Years	24	23	24
Mean Dep Var	57.9	-12.4	16.9

Notes: See notes to Table 6.

Table A.28: Decomposing Religious (from Table 12 Column 5)

Religious Outcome:	Attendance	Fundamentalism	Prayer	Faith Over Science
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MaxEITC	-1.7	-0.3	0.8	-0.8
	(1.0)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(4.5)
R-squared	0.083	0.166	0.104	0.127
Observations	17,483	18,537	10,950	1,936
Unique Years	27	27	19	4
Mean Dep Var	-0.64	0.11	-0.064	-0.56

Notes: See notes to Table 6.

Table A.29: Regression-Adjusted Correlation Between Working and Political Identity, Non-White vs. White Women (GSS Data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Outcome = Democrat (Mean = 0.49)								
Working	-5.0	-4.6	-3.8	-3.9	-3.9	-3.8	-3.4	-3.4
× White	(1.5)	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.6)	(1.5)
R-squared	0.074	0.091	0.097	0.099	0.099	0.151	0.193	0.200
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Panel B: Outcome = Republican (Mean = 0.33)								
Working	3.5	4.3	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.8
× White	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.5)	(1.5)
R-squared	0.084	0.093	0.098	0.099	0.100	0.153	0.194	0.200
Observations	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319	19,319
Controls								
State, Year, #Kids FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age, Race, Educ		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Married × (St, Yr, Race, Ed)			X	X	X	X	X	X
Annual State Factors				X	X	X	X	X
Married × Annual State Factors					X	X	X	X
State × Year FE						X	X	X
Married × State × Year FE							X	X
State × Number of Kids FE								X

Notes: See notes to Table 6. Politically informed discussed in Table 6 notes.

Table A.30: Ind. of Newly Working Women (CPS Data), Political Identity by Ind. (GSS Data)

Description:	Prob(Entering Ind.)			Workers' Political Identity by Ind.					
Data:	CPS Data			GSS Data (Alt. Sample Years Below)					
	Sample of Women			1975–2013		1990–2013		2000–2013	
	All	White	Black	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
Occupation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Arts, Entertainment	-0.055	-0.053	0.114	0.500	0.324	0.469	0.352	0.457	0.363
Education	-0.025	0.035	0.135	0.502	0.375	0.484	0.380	0.479	0.367
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	-0.015	-0.016	0.208	0.422	0.434	0.350	0.467	0.328	0.438
Real Estate, Rental, Leasing	0.009	0.016	0.183	0.433	0.408	0.414	0.403	0.424	0.375
Utilities	0.019	0.024	0.189	0.424	0.435	0.389	0.442	0.393	0.425
Construction	0.020	0.025	0.219	0.441	0.383	0.399	0.405	0.384	0.393
Mining, Oil and Gas	0.020	0.024	0.197	0.532	0.351	0.376	0.458	0.321	0.518
Accommodation, Food Services	0.047	0.041	0.296	0.492	0.292	0.459	0.300	0.456	0.284
Information	0.062	0.072	0.178	0.498	0.386	0.492	0.400	0.479	0.401
Professional, Technical Services	0.072	0.032	0.536	0.416	0.450	0.409	0.450	0.412	0.437
Other Services	0.076	0.039	0.368	0.496	0.332	0.440	0.362	0.418	0.352
Transportation, Warehousing	0.088	0.084	0.284	0.498	0.329	0.459	0.354	0.452	0.340
Public Administration	0.088	0.082	0.237	0.486	0.397	0.445	0.427	0.421	0.447
Wholesale Trade	0.100	0.113	0.235	0.408	0.426	0.375	0.443	0.361	0.422
Retail Trade	0.105	0.079	0.297	0.451	0.387	0.432	0.388	0.432	0.362
Administrative, Support Services	0.169	0.160	0.501	0.463	0.345	0.441	0.357	0.430	0.341
Manufacturing	0.310	0.408	-0.085	0.481	0.370	0.440	0.393	0.417	0.399
Finance and Insurance	0.366	0.401	0.343	0.417	0.456	0.409	0.451	0.415	0.432
Health Care, Social Assistance	0.368	0.286	0.977	0.514	0.330	0.501	0.331	0.489	0.326
$\Sigma_{i=1}^{19}$ ($Prob$(Entering Industry i) $\times$ Political Identity of Industry i) reveals that:									
White women enter industries that are:									
46.6% Democrat and 38.4% Republican (using columns 2 and 4–5)									
44.0% Democrat and 39.6% Republican (using columns 2 and 6–7)									
43.0% Democrat and 38.8% Republican (using columns 2 and 8–9)									
Black women enter occupations that are:									
47.5% Democrat and 36.4% Republican (using columns 3 and 4–5)									
45.5% Democrat and 37.1% Republican (using columns 3 and 6–7)									
44.7% Democrat and 36.0% Republican (using columns 3 and 8–9)									
Relative to Black women, White women enter occupations where coworkers are:									
5.4% more Republican and 2.0% less Democrat (using columns 2–3 and 4–5)									
6.5% more Republican and 3.3% less Democrat (using columns 2–3 and 6–7)									
7.6% more Republican and 3.9% less Democrat (using columns 2–3 and 8–9)									

Notes: 1976–2020 November CPS data used for columns 1–3. MaxEITC is in \$1,000s of 2018 dollars. 1975–2014 GSS data used for columns 4–9. Standard errors suppressed for space but shown in Figures A.19 and A.20. Columns 1–3 are in percentage points and are estimates of $MaxEITC$ in equation (2).




Fig. A.1. **Number of Annual Roper Datasets and Observations**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1980–2017 Roper data. Sample includes all women 18–59 years old.




Fig. A.2. **Unadjusted Female Voting Trends by State and Year**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data.




Fig. A.3. **Unadjusted and Adjusted Voting Trends by Number of Kids (CPS Data)**

Notes: See notes in Figure 4. Panel B normalizes the gap to 1990 levels, and shows unadjusted and regression-adjusted annual trends with the full set of controls. Since presidential and midterm elections are combined, this figure is jumpier than Figure 4.




Fig. A.4. **Voting Trends by Number of Children**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1980–2020 November CPS data.




Fig. A.5. **Unadjusted Trends in Female Working and/or Voting, Over Time**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 March and November CPS data. This figure focuses on voting in presidential elections.




Fig. A.6. **Correlation Between Female Working and Voting, Over Time**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 March and November CPS data. Regression adjusted trend uses demographics controls in Table A.4 columns 1–2.




Fig. A.7. Federal EITC Structure, 2017

Notes: Source: Bastian and Lochner (2020).




Fig. A.8. Maximum Possible Federal EITC Over Time

Notes: Source: Bastian and Lochner (2020).




Fig. A.9. State EITC Rates (as a Fraction of Federal Benefits) Over Time

Notes: Source: Bastian and Lochner (2020).




Fig. A.10. Maximum Possible Federal + State EITC ($MaxEITC$) Over Time

Notes: Source: Bastian and Lochner (2020).




Fig. A.11. Histogram of $MaxEITC$

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data.




Fig. A.12. **Effects from the 2009 Federal EITC Expansion, on Moms with 3+ Kids**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1998–2020 November CPS data. Unadjusted trends shown. Voting gap between groups is normalized to 2008 levels.




Fig. A.13. **State EITC Expansions and Unadjusted Event Time Voting Trends by Number of Kids**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data. Full set of controls used, listed in Table 1 notes. Panel B normalizes the gap in panel A to event time -2 levels. Post years begin in event time 0. CPS voting data is only available every two years. For expansions during odd years, I normalize to year $t-1$. While this figure could be normalized to year $t=0$ for each state, this results in different states represented in even and odd years, yielding similar but noisier figures.




Fig. A.14. **Male Voting Trends by Number of Children**

Notes: Author's calculation from 1976–2020 November CPS data.




Fig. A.15. **State-Specific Estimates of** $MaxEITC$

Notes: Author's calculation from 1998–2020 November CPS data. Estimates come from a single regression that interacts $MaxEITC$ with indicators for all 51 states and D.C.




Fig. A.16. **Double Residual Regression: Locally Linear Regression**

Notes: Data source: 1976–2020 November CPS data and 1975–2014 GSS data. Panel A uses CPS data and panels B–D use GSS data. A bandwidth of 0.8 is used, as is running-line least squares smoothing, and a tricube weighting function. I do not show conservative for space reasons: conservative as an outcome yields a relatively flat negative pattern.




Fig. A.17. **Effects of EITC on Political Party Affiliation**

Notes: See notes to Table 6. Panels B and D replicate Table 6.




Fig. A.18. **Religious**

Notes: See notes to Table 6. Figure A.18 looks at four measures of religiosity: religious attendance, religious fundamentalism, whether one believes in a God, how often one prays, and whether society relies too much on science and not enough on faith. Panels A and B show that each \$1,000 in $MaxEITC$ decreases never/rarely attending church, increases sometimes attending church, and has no effect on weekly attendance. Panel C shows suggestive evidence of being less religiously liberal, and more religiously moderate. Panel D shows little effect on believing in a God. Panel E suggests some decrease in how often one prays. Panel F shows little effect on whether society relies too much on science and not enough on faith.




Fig. A.19. **Newly Working Black and White Women Enter Different Industries**

Notes: 1980–2020 CPS ASEC data. See notes in Table 1 for sample and list of full set of controls.




Fig. A.20. **Newly Working White Women Enter More-Republican Industries**

Notes: See notes to Table 6. Sample includes all adults (men and women) to calculate average partisaship by industry.

Appendix B: Welfare Reform

Up through the late 1980s, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits were available to low-income families with children. Benefits varied by state and number of children, and phased-out with earned income. While benefits varied by household size and number of children, the majority of the variation in welfare benefits can be explained by differences by state (65 percent) rather than differences by number of children (20 percent).[2] Most AFDC recipients were unmarried mothers with children. Benefits were paid out every month and there was no time limit on how long households could receive AFDC benefits.

Starting in 1992, states began to implement welfare waivers and limit access to welfare benefits. There were six types of waivers: (1) Time limits on how long families could receive welfare benefits, ranging from 24 to 60 months. (2) Work requirements that went into effect after recipients had received welfare for a specified length of time. (3) Requirements that individuals participate in education, training, and job search activities after recipients had received welfare for a specified length of time. (4) Allowing families with young children (e.g. under age three) to be exempted from waivers #2 and #3; (5) Capping welfare benefits at a certain number of children. (6) Increasing the earnings disregard, in an attempt to reduce the labor supply disincentive. See Table C.1 for details on when states approved and implemented each type of waiver.[3]

In August 1996, AFDC was completely overhauled through Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and was renamed Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). This reform included the six waivers discussed above. Under TANF, states had to follow some federal guidelines, but still had the ability to design their own TANF program. For example, benefit generosity had no limit, but time limits could be no more than 60 months.

Figure C.1 Panels A-D show trends in welfare generosity and caseloads between 1980 and 2018. Panel A shows trends in the state monthly welfare benefits for a family of four. States have steadily decreased welfare generosity over time. The average maximum in state welfare benefits fell from $960 in 1980, to $780 in 1990, to $660 in 2000, to $570 in 2010, to $540 in 2018. The figure also shows trends for the most and least generous states, as well as the 25th and 75th percentiles. Benefits in the most generous state fell from about $1,660 to $1,060, and from about $330 to $190 in the least generous state. Panel B shows trends in the fraction of a state's population receiving welfare benefits. The average fraction fell from 4.2% in 1980, to 4.0% in 1990, to 1.9% in 2000, to 1.2% in 2010, to 0.6% in 2018. In the

[2]Estimates come from the R-squared from regressing maximum welfare benefits on state FE or number of kids FE, using the main sample.

[3]Source for Table C.1: Health and Human Services (1999). https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/state-implementation-major-changes-welfare-policies-1992-1998.

states with the highest and lowest fraction receiving welfare, the fraction fell from 13.3% to 2.0% and 2.1% to 0.1%, respectively. Panels C and D show similar trends for the absolute number of welfare recipients. Overall, welfare benefit generosity has steadily decreased over time, while caseloads also steadily decreased over time, except for a sharp and temporary increase in the early 1990s.




Fig. C.1. Trends in State Welfare Benefits and Welfare Recipients

Notes: 1980–2018 welfare data from University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research: http://ukcpr.org/resources/national-welfare-data.

Table C.1A: Approval and Implementation Dates of AFDC Waivers Policies, 1992-1996

State	Termination/reduction time limit		Changes in JOBS work exemptions		JOBS sanctions	
	Approved	Implemented	Approved	Implemented	Approved	Implemented
Alabama						
Alaska						
Arizona	5/22/95	11/1/95			5/22/95	11/1/95
Arkansas						
California						
Colorado						
Connecticut	12/8/95	1/1/96	8/29/94	1/1/96	8/29/94	1/1/96
Delaware	5/8/95		5/8/95		5/8/95	
Dist. of Columbia						
Florida			6/26/96			
Georgia					11/1/93	1/1/94
Hawaii	8/16/1996	2/1/1997	6/24/94	2/1/97		
Idaho			8/19/96		8/19/96	
Illinois		2/1/96	9/30/95		9/30/95	10/1/95
Indiana	12/15/94		12/15/94	5/1/95	12/15/94	5/1/95
Iowa	8/13/93	10/1/93	8/13/93	10/1/93	8/13/93	10/1/93
Kansas						
Kentucky						
Louisiana						
Maine			6/10/96			
Maryland			8/16/96	10/1/96	8/16/96	10/1/96
Massachusetts			8/4/95	11/1/95	8/4/95	11/1/95
Michigan			10/6/94	10/6/94	10/6/94	10/6/94
Minnesota						
Mississippi						
Missouri					4/18/95	6/1/95
Montana			4/18/95		4/18/95	
Nebraska	2/27/95		2/27/95		2/27/95	
Nevada						
New Hampshire			6/18/96		6/18/96	
New Jersey			7/1/92	10/1/92	7/1/92	10/1/92
New Mexico						
New York						
North Carolina	2/5/96	7/1/96	2/5/96	7/1/96	2/5/96	7/1/96
North Dakota						
Ohio	3/13/96				3/13/96	7/1/96
Oklahoma						
Oregon	3/28/96	7/1/96	7/15/92	2/1/93	3/28/96	7/1/96
Pennsylvania						
Rhode Island						
South Carolina	5/3/96		5/3/96		5/3/96	
South Dakota					3/14/94	6/1/94
Tennessee	7/25/96		7/25/96	9/1/96	7/25/96	9/1/96
Texas	3/22/96		3/22/96	6/1/96	3/22/96	6/1/96
Utah			10/5/92	1/1/93	10/5/92	6/1/96
Vermont			4/12/93	7/1/94	4/12/93	7/1/94
Virginia	7/1/95		7/1/95		7/1/95	
Washington	9/29/95	1/1/96				
West Virginia					7/31/95	2/1/96
Wisconsin			8/14/95	1/1/96	8/14/95	1/1/96
Wyoming						

Table C.1B: Approval and Implementation Dates of AFDC Waivers Policies, 1992-1996

State	Increased earnings disregard		Family Cap		Work requirement time limit	
	Approved	Implemented	Approved	Implemented	Approved	Implemented
Alabama						
Alaska						
Arizona			5/22/95	11/1/95		
Arkansas			4/5/94	7/1/94		
California	10/29/92	12/1/92	8/19/96	9/1/97	9/11/95	9/11/95
Colorado						
Connecticut	8/29/94	1/1/96	12/18/95	1/1/96		
Delaware	5/8/95		10/1/95		5/8/95	10/1/95
Dist. of Columbia						
Florida			6/26/96			
Georgia	6/24/94		11/1/93	1/1/94		
Hawaii	8/16/1996	2/1/1997				
Idaho						
Illinois	11/23/93	11/23/93	9/30/95	12/1/95		
Indiana			12/15/94	5/1/95		
Iowa	8/13/93	10/1/93				
Kansas						
Kentucky						
Louisiana						
Maine						
Maryland	8/16/96	10/1/96	8/14/95	3/1/96		
Massachusetts	8/4/95	11/1/95	8/4/95	11/1/95 8/4/95	11/1/95	
Michigan	8/1/92	10/1/92			8/1/92	
Minnesota						
Mississippi			9/1/95	10/1/95		
Missouri					4/18/95	
Montana	4/18/95				4/18/95	2/1/96
Nebraska	2/27/95		2/27/95	11/1/96		
Nevada						
New Hampshire	6/18/96				6/18/96	
New Jersey	7/1/92		7/1/92	10/1/92		
New Mexico						
New York						
North Carolina			2/5/96	7/1/96		
North Dakota						
Ohio	3/13/96	7/1/96				
Oklahoma						
Oregon						
Pennsylvania						
Rhode Island						
South Carolina			5/3/96			
South Dakota					3/14/94	6/1/94
Tennessee	7/25/96	9/1/96	7/25/96			
Texas						
Utah	10/5/92					
Vermont	4/12/93	7/1/94				
Virginia	7/1/95		7/1/95	7/1/95	7/1/95	7/1/95
Washington						
West Virginia						
Wisconsin			6/24/94	1/1/96	9/30/96	9/30/96
Wyoming						