Threat to Identity and Populism: Evidence from Francoist Street Names

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Abstract

In the context of Western political efforts to protect identity from the impacts of globalization, immigration, and religious change, a key question arises: how does perceived threat to collective identity influence voting behavior? I tackle this question in the context of post-dictatorship Spain, focusing on the renaming of streets honoring Francoist figures. First, I show that Francoist street names can serve as a proxy for local-level Francoist identity and that the decisions to rename these streets highlight the varied preferences and priorities among different political parties. Second, by using a Difference-in-Differences approach, I show that renaming Francoist streets significantly increases the vote shares of extreme right parties. This effect is particularly strong when Francoist streets are highly salient. Third, I conduct a survey revealing polarized reactions to Francoist street renaming, with very Francoist individuals opposing the changes and very anti-Francoist respondents supporting them. These responses, driven by identity concerns, align with shifts in voting behavior.

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1 Introduction

In recent years, the rise of identity-politics and populism, exemplified by the tea party in the US, the National Rally in France, and Alternative for Germany, has become a prominent feature of global politics. Characterized by their rhetoric focused on defending the identity and values of the real people against culpable others (Mudde 2004), these parties can have a significant impact on societal cohesion and the formulation of public policies (Bonikowski & Zhang 2023, Matthes & Schmuck 2017, Zaslove 2004). This trend brings to the forefront the debate over its determinants, particularly the interplay between economic factors and cultural influences. Scholars such as Sides et al. (2019), Norris & Inglehart (2019), and Margalit (2019) argue that economic elements might not fully explain the rise of populism, pointing instead to identity, political distrust, and nationalism as key contributors. While theoretical models have established a connection between cultural factors and the rise of populism (Norris & Inglehart 2019), empirical evidence for these claims remains limited. In particular, there is a lack of causal evidence linking cultural elements, such as perceived threats to identity, with support for populist parties. This paper addresses this gap by estimating the causal impact of perceived identity threat on populist voting behavior.

In this paper, I empirically test whether the rise of populism can be partly explained by a reaction to the fear of identity being under attack. This question is especially pertinent given the frequent use of the concept of threat to collective or local identity as a strategy to increase political outcomes. To do so, I use the removal of Francoist street names in Spain as a proxy for perceived threat to Francoist identity. Removal of street names or symbols representing old regimes is not specific to Spain. Protests pushing for the removal of statues in memory of the colonial past in the Americas, movements aiming to eradicate Confederate symbology in the US, or symbolic policies for removing Soviet statues in Eastern Europe are examples of that (Gensburger & Wüstenberg 2023). These actions are particularly relevant in the context of the increasing "cancel culture" movement, which could add additional meaning to symbolic transitional justice policies, perceived as a threat by some segments of the population.

Francoist street names in Spain are the legacy of Spain's 40-year dictatorship (1939-1975) triggered by a coup led by generals Emilio Mola and Francisco Franco. Consequently, by combining the presence of Francoist street names and their renaming during the democracy, I view them as indicators of potential threats to Francoist identity. Anecdotal evidence supports the connection between the renaming of Francoist streets and perceived threats to identity. For instance, several foundations, including the Francisco Franco Foundation, filed appeals and made statements against decisions to rename Francoist streets:[1]

[1] Other foundations such as the "Hermandad de Defensores de Oviedo" or "Plataforma Patriótica Millán Astray" also filed lawsuits against these changes.

"... in Madrid and throughout Spain, an ideological cleansing of public spaces is underway, with no respect for history, the allocation of public resources, and the opinions of residents ..."

Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco
Madrid, July 26, 2017

Hence, I argue that the seemingly irrelevant renaming of Francoist streets can shape political behavior through the identity component embedded in them.

First, I evaluate to what extent Francoist street names reflect Francoist identity. To do this, I compare the share of Francoist street names with responses from the survey "Memories of the Civil War and Francoism". The survey, conducted in 2008, includes questions reflecting Francoist attitudes (e.g., "What feeling does thinking about Francoism evoke in you?"). I demonstrate that the share of Francoist streets strongly correlates with Francoist attitudes.

Second, I explore if the political orientation of municipal governments influences the renaming of Francoist streets. For that, I combine electoral data with the renaming of Francoist streets. The results show that obtaining an absolute majority in vote share leads the left-wing bloc to rename significantly more Francoist streets than when they do not secure a majority. More specifically, using a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), I find that municipalities governed by a left-wing administration rename three to four more Francoist street names than those not under left-wing governance. The results suggest that Francoist street names not only mirror attitudes towards Francoism but also highlight different renaming behaviors among political parties, emphasizing the ideological significance embedded in Francoist street names.

Third, I estimate the causal effect of perceived threat to identity on right-wing populism. Through an event study, I demonstrate that the renaming of Francoist streets leads to a 0.14 percentage point increase in the vote share of right-wing populist parties. However, this effect dissipates in the medium term. The effect size is 3.5% of the mean right-wing populist vote share. This percentage is calculated against the mean vote share of the extreme right during the election period in which they achieved their highest share. In simpler terms, 1 out of every 30 votes for the extreme right in neighborhoods with a renamed Francoist street can be attributed to a perceived threat to their identity.

One might suggest that the rise in extreme right-wing votes is a reaction not to the perceived identity threat reflected by the renaming of Francoist streets, but rather to the act of renaming itself. In other words, the effect I find could be attributed to a general displeasure among residents faced with the inconvenience of updating their addresses.[2] To test this possibility, I conduct a parallel analysis in neighborhoods adjacent to those directly affected by the street name changes. If the uptick in extreme right-wing votes was

[2]Updates in IDs, Driver licenses, informing the Property Registry, etc. are some of the procedures one must follow if a street changes its name.

solely due to the inconvenience experienced by residents in the directly affected neighborhoods, then such an increase should not be observed in the neighboring areas. Contrary to this expectation, however, the neighboring areas also showed a marked and significant rise in extreme right-wing vote share. This suggests that the increase is likely not attributable solely to the act of renaming itself, as the adjacent neighborhoods experienced a similar uptick in right-wing votes despite not being directly impacted by the street name changes.

Despite showing that extreme right votes share increased in both the directly affected neighborhoods and their adjacent areas, it is still possible to conjecture that this rise could root from a reaction to perceived misuse of public funds[3], a concern that might be more pronounced in areas closer to the renamed streets. To explore this hypothesis, I differentiate Francoist street names by their level of salience. If concerns about public spending were the primary driver, I would anticipate a uniform increase in extreme right-wing vote share, regardless of the Francoist figure's salience associated with the street name. This means the public response should be consistent, whether a street was renamed from a well-known figure like "Francisco Franco" or a less prominent Francoist figure. The findings reveal a pattern contrary to this hypothesis: neighborhoods with streets named after prominent Francoist figures exhibited a threefold increase in extreme right-wing votes compared to the baseline. In contrast, there was no increase in votes for areas with streets named after less prominent Francoist figures. This difference underscores that ideological implications, rather than fiscal concerns, likely had a significant influence on the voting behavior shift.

Finally, I conduct an online survey in the City of Madrid to capture more precise insights into beliefs, preferences, and emotions surrounding the renaming of Francoist streets. The descriptive findings reveal that this issue primarily concerns individuals at the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum—both the very anti-Francoist and the very Francoist—who exhibit strong and opposing preferences regarding how Francoist street names should be addressed. These results align with self-reported emotional responses to the renaming of Francoist streets. Very Francoist individuals display heightened levels of anger, annoyance, and hate compared to the average respondent, while very anti-Francoist participants report greater pride and satisfaction. These emotions appear to translate into differences in voting behavior, particularly among the very Francoist, who are more likely to reconsider their vote, turn out to vote, or even change their vote, potentially toward the extreme right. Furthermore, while identity, social, and practical concerns are all strongly correlated with Francoist attitudes, the analysis suggests that identity concerns play a uniquely significant role in explaining the emotional responses and potential changes in voting behavior related to the renaming of Francoist streets. This underscores the centrality of identity in shaping reactions to this symbolic and contentious issue.

In this paper, I contribute to the literature in three different ways. First, my study

[3]The process of renaming over 40 Francoist street names in the city of Madrid incurred a total expense of 114,683.36 euros (VAT included). source: ABC https://rb.gy/popmec.

contributes to a growing literature that explores the roots of populism. Economic factors such as financial crises (Algan et al. 2017, De Bromhead et al. 2013), automation (Frey et al. 2018, Anelli et al. 2019, Petrova et al. 2024), or cross-border trade (Autor et al. 2020, Colantone & Stanig 2018, Feigenbaum & Hall 2015) have been widely studied as key contributors to the rise of populism. Less is known about the cultural factors involved in that, such as identity, fairness, morality, equality, and status. This branch of the literature is mostly theoretical and descriptive, with few studies demonstrating causal links between them (Guriev & Papaioannou 2022). One of the few causal studies is the one by Ochsner & Roesel (2024), where they find that preexisting cultural divides in political speeches, in this case Turkish pillaging and plundering of villages in Austria during the 16th and 17th centuries, fueled support for populism. In another paper. Ochsner & Roesel (2020) show that post-WWII Nazi migration can explain local differences in extreme-right wing parties today. In a recent paper, Villamil & Balcells (2021) use municipal level data on Francoist street removals to explore the political consequences of street renaming. Their municipal level regressions reveal that Francoist street removals contributed to an increase of electoral support for a new far-right party, Vox. However, municipal level regressions come with the caveat that Francoist street removals might correlate with other omitted municipal characteristics that affect voting behaviour to far-right parties. It could be that municipal governments in place decided to push for other policies correlated with the removal of Francoist street names that triggered an increase in votes to far-right parties like Vox. Additionally, reactions to street renamings may come through different reasons other than the symbolism that they represent, such as, practicalities in the daily life of the citizens. I address these issues by using a more granular approach, namely, by looking at neighborhood level data, which allows me to separate factual ideological reactions to Francoist street removals from election-period-municipal factors as well as other potential reactions to street renamings. Hence, this study fills this gap and explore the mechanism of identity in this equation.

Second, I show that analyzing street renaming actions by political parties reveals valuable insights, such as party identity, that are otherwise difficult to observe. While previous studies have examined policy differences resulting from changes in political parliament compositions (Fiva & Halse 2016, Fiva et al. 2018, Folke 2014), this paper re-contextualizes these changes by focusing on street renaming patterns. Given the symbolism embedded in street names, this approach not only confirms the identities these streets convey but also uncovers potential underlying party identities.

Third, I add to the growing field of using street names as indicators of local identities, demonstrating that street names can offer more insight than simply serving as directional markers. This aligns with extensive work by Rose-Redwood et al. (2010), Faraco & Murphy (1997), Drozdzewski (2014), and Palonen (2008), mainly in the geography literature, which delve into the symbolism embedded in street names and their ability to represent social and cultural values. Not until recently street names have been used in the field of economics. A

key paper in this is Oto-Peralias (2018), which uses the frequency of religious street names as a proxy for local religious identity. Another significant study, Gutierrez-Mora & Oto-Peralias (2022), uses the frequency of female street names as a proxy for gender equality, finding that a higher number of female names correlates with a smaller gender gap. A similar line of research in the field has used town and business names to understand local identities. However, compared to street names, other types of toponyms provide scarcer information, making it more challenging to extract detailed content from them. I thus contribute to the existing literature on the validity of using street names as local-level identity markers.

This paper is presented as follows. In section 2, I provide background information on the history of Spain and the theoretical framework involved in explaining the link between values, political actors, street renamings and reactions. In section 3, I describe the data and empirical methods used in this paper. In section 4, I show the results and in section 5 I present the mechanism. Finally, section 6 provides the concluding remarks.

2 Background

2.1 Francoist street names

The Spanish Civil War was an armed conflict that took place in Spain from July 18, 1936, to April 1, 1939, between the republican (left) faction and the rebel or nationalist (right) faction. It was the result of a long process of political, economic, and social instability during the Spanish Second Republic. The crisis fueled polarization between the left and the right in an international context of increasing ideological tensions. The trigger for the war was the attempted coup d'état carried out by Francisco Franco, among others, who initially only managed to control part of the territory. The rebels won the war in 1939 and established a military dictatorship that ended with Franco's, the dictator, death in 1975, leading to the democracy that goes until today.

After the Civil War, the Francoist regime began symbolically asserting its power. One of the most efficient and rapid methods was by renaming public spaces, streets, and towns. These renamings conveyed the ruling power's values and ideologies, imposed by local authorities with the objective of asserting who holds power (de Andres-Sanz 2006). Some changes honored Franco, generals from the Civil War, Francoist myths (e.g., July 18, the Alcázar of Toledo), the memory of "the Fallen" (e.g., the Civil War, the Blue Division), early Francoist and Falangist martyrs (e.g., Calvo Sotelo, José Antonio, Matías Montero), or their slogans (e.g., Arriba España, Cristo Rey).

The first democratic municipal elections were held in 1979, but Francoist symbols remained largely unchanged as the responsibility for these matters (street names, public monuments, toponymy, etc.) lay entirely with the municipalities. A significant number of municipalities, especially in major cities like Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and Seville,

came under the governance of mayors from the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). This shift in governance was key, as it led to changes in street names and the removal of monuments. However, these changes were carried out in an unsystematic manner, without central government directives, leaving the decision entirely in the hands of mayors.

Over the following forty years of democracy, municipalities retained full control over street names and toponymy, resulting in considerable variation in the frequency of Francoist street names across different areas.

2.2 Street names and local-level identity

Street names have long been a subject of study in the field of geography, where their symbolic significance is well-documented. However, despite the extensive research on the symbolism inherent in street names within the geography literature (Rose-Redwood et al. 2010, Faraco & Murphy 1997, Drozdzewski 2014, Palonen 2008), its application in economics is relatively recent (Oto-Peralias 2018). Following this literature, in this section, I argue that street names can be used as indicators of local level values of the population, and that their renaming could be perceived as potential threats to identity.

One crucial aspect in this emerging field is understanding the conditions under which street names can reflect local-level identity. A key condition is how democratic and open the naming process is. In other words, If the local council, being democratically elected, holds the authority to name streets, it is expected that their commemorative decisions will align with the priorities of the local community. In contrast, if the naming rights reside with the central government or a non-democratically elected ruler (e.g. a dictatorship), street names are more likely to reflect the specific commemorative priorities of these authorities, rather than those of the local population. The latter case could question the suitability of using Francoist street names as representatives of local-level Francoist identity. Based on the previous section, Francoist street names were introduced by a non-democratic regime as a symbolic representation of power. However, even though Francoist streets were named in an authoritarian regime and might not have reflected local values initially, their continued presence raises questions. The fact that these names were changed, or not changed, during forty years of democracy suggests that their persistence could reveal something about the current local values in the municipalities that have kept them. To demonstrate this, I present testable predictions by correlating Francoist values with the presence of Francoist street names long after the dictatorship's end, thereby showing that this relationship persists.

The continued presence of Francoist street names in some municipalities over the years not only offers a chance to explore the correlation between Francoist values and the share of Francoist street names but also to investigate the influence of political parties in decisions to rename these streets. In Spain, the Article 75 of the 'Royal Decree 1690/1986, of July 11, approving the Regulation of Population and Territorial Demarcation of Local

Entities' states that the town councils are responsible for the names of streets, avenues, squares, parks, etc., in the municipalities. This implies that municipal governments possess the complete authority to change street names, including those from the Francoist era. Considering the historical left-right political division that resulted in the Spanish Civil War and the dictatorship, this context provides a suitable setting to study the link between municipal governments of different political leanings and the renaming of Francoist streets. By examining electoral outcomes and patterns in the renaming of Francoist streets, I build upon the research of Oto-Peralias (2018) and add further depth to the understanding of street names. Thus, I present evidence highlighting distinct renaming behaviors among political parties, underscoring an ideological aspect in the persistence or removal of Francoist street names. Such an analysis is key to confirming the previously mentioned narrative.

The decision to rename Francoist streets may reflect the prevailing attitudes and identity of local residents and political parties. As such, the removal of these street names could be perceived as a threat to the identity of those who share values aligned with Francoist symbolism. This perception of identity threat could, in turn, lead to a backlash effect, intensifying support for extreme right-wing parties. To test this hypothesis, I examine the gradual but persistent trend of Francoist street renamings (Figures A1 and A2), finding that these actions significantly contribute to and accelerate the rise of extreme right-wing parties.

The case that connects the persistence of streets and local level identity as well as the political ideological motives to rename them might not be unique to this setting. For example, descriptive evidence in the US shows that Republicans overwhelmingly back efforts to preserve the legacy of the Confederacy (85%), compared with only one in four Democrats (26%). Similarly, Republicans (38%) are particularly likely to say that Confederate monuments make them feel proud, compared with significantly fewer Democrats (14%) (Sands (2022)). These perceptions also seem to be translated into the political realm of renaming Confederate streets[4]. Hence, considering the big societal divide, removal of street names might create a sense of identity threat among certain segments of the population resulting in increased support for extreme right-wing parties.

3 Empirical Analysis

3.1 Data

In this section I briefly describe the main variables of interest and outcomes used in the baseline analyses at the province, municipality and neighbourhood level.

[4]Florida's Republican-controlled Legislature wants to block cities and counties from removing or relocating Confederate monuments, a move that has already sparked intense debates about history, racism and white supremacy. Source: Politico

Francoist values at the province level— For contemporary values towards Francoism in Spain, I use province level aggregated data from a survey conducted by the Centre of Sociological Survey (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas - CIS) in 2008 on "Memories of the Civil War and Francoism". I use this survey for one important reason. This survey serves as the pre-eminent source for understanding the population's attitudes towards the Civil War and the Francoist dictatorship, providing unique and valuable insights. I select several questions from the survey that can be directly associated with current Francoist values of the population for the first analysis.

Francoist street names at the province, municipal, and neighbourhood level— The main variable of interest used in this paper is a street-name indicator of Francoism at the province, municipal, and neighbourhood level. To construct this measure, I use data from the Electoral Census Street Map provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) that contains all information that fully identifies the street branches that belong to each census section. This data is provided for the years 2001-2022. I determine a street name to be Francoist if it contains words related to Francoism, such as Generalísimo, Franco, Caudillo, General Mola, etc. (a full list is provided in the Online Appendix). The variable is defined as:

$$Share_fr = \frac{nb_fr}{N} \tag{1}$$

where the numerator nb_fr refers to the number of streets containing words related to the Francoist period and ideology, and the denominator N to the total number of street names. This indicator is constructed at the province, municipal and neighbourhood level. Figure A2 in the appendix shows the evolution of the indicator by region over the period 2001-2022.

Electoral data at the municipal and neighbourhood level— To study the political implications of party blocs and electoral majorities, I use municipal electoral results provided by the Ministry of the Interior for the period 1991-2019. To do so, I construct a variable indicating the political ideology of each party, divided into three different ideological blocs: right-wing bloc, left-wing bloc, and independent-wing bloc; and two additional subgroups: extreme right and extreme left-wing blocs. For the grouping, I use different methods and sources. First, for the big parties, I use information from different surveys conducted by the CIS on party ideology, where surveyees are asked to rank political parties in a scale from 0 to 10, 0 being extreme left and 10 extreme right. Second, for smaller and local parties, I use a content analysis method. Here, I categorize the party as left, if the party name contains words such as, communist, socialist, left, etc. as right, if the party name contains words such as, liberal, right, etc. and as independent if the party name contains words such as, independent group, neighbour aggrupation, etc. Finally, I use some other local sources to improve the categorization of some parties.

Once the categorization is done, I calculate electoral majorities based on the votes shares obtained per political bloc.

Electoral party-bloc majorities do not necessarily imply that the municipal government will end up in the hands of that bloc, as they depend on negotiations and agreements between the parties within the same ideological bloc. Therefore, by using information on the party of the mayor provided by the Ministry of the Interior, I construct a mayor-bloc variable indicator.

Other controls information— To account for potential factors that may affect the distribution of Francoist street names that are not related to Francoist values, I include information on latitude, longitude, GDP per capita in 2001 and regional languages dummies at the province level.

3.2 Empirical specification

Street-name indicator of Francoist values: assessing validity— To test formally whether Francoist street names represent a good proxy for Francoist values today, I estimate the following specification at the province level:

$$Share_fr_p = \alpha + \beta Franco_Survey_p + \sum_k \alpha_k X_p^k + \lambda_r + \epsilon_p \tag{2}$$

where $Share_fr_p$ is a Francoist street-name indicator in province p. $Surv_question_p$ measures the answers to survey questions referring to Francoist values in province p. X_p^k is a k dimensional vector of controls. I use the same set of controls as in Oto-Peralias (2018). λ_r is a regional fixed effect. ϵ_p is the robust error term clustered at the regional level.

Elected mayor and street renamings— To test whether there exits a distinct Francoist streets renaming behaviour between the political parties, I estimate the following OLS specification, where I measure the effect of having a left-wing mayor on Francoist street renamings:

$$Renamings_{mt} = \alpha + \beta Leftist_mayor_{mt} + \sum_k \alpha_k X_{mt}^k + \lambda_t + \lambda_m + \epsilon_{mt} \tag{3}$$

where $Renamings_{mt}$ measures the number of Francoist streets renamed in municipality m at electoral period t. $Leftist_mayor_{mt}$ is a dummy variable indicating if the mayor is from the left-wing bloc in municipality m at electoral period t. X_{mt}^k is a k dimensional vector of controls in municipality m at time t. λ_t and λ_m are electoral periods and municipal fixed effects. ϵ_{mt} is the robust error term clustered at the municipal level. In the absence of a distinct renaming behaviour between left-wing and right-wing municipal governments, the effect of having a leftist-mayor on renamings should be zero.

Estimating the causal effect of the mayor bloc type on Francoist street renamings in an OLS specification may lead to biased estimates due to other factors being correlated with both renamings and mayor elections. In order to deal with that problem, I use a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (Fuzzy RDD) approach. In simpler words, I instrument the mayor bloc type with the votes share majority of that bloc, that is, I instrument having a leftist mayor with the left-wing bloc obtaining more than 50% of the votes in an election period:

$$Leftist_mayor_{mt} = \alpha + \beta abs_maj_left_{mt} + \theta votes_share_{mt} + \sum_k \alpha_k X^k_{mt} + \lambda_t + \lambda_m + \epsilon_{mt} \tag{4}$$

where $Leftist_mayor_{mt}$ is a dummy indicator of the mayor being leftist or not in municipality m at electoral period t, $abs_maj_left_{mt}$ indicates whether the left-wing bloc obtained an absolute majority in the votes share in municipality m at electoral period t. $votes_share_{mt}$ is a control representing the votes share of the left and X^k_{mt} is a k dimensional vector of controls in municipality m at time t. λ_t and λ_m are electoral periods and municipal fixed effects. ϵ_{mt} is the robust error term clustered at the municipal level.

Street renamings and extreme right votes— To determine whether Francoist street renamings have an effect on extreme right voting behaviour, I estimate a staggered Differences-in-Differences (DiD) specification (Callaway & Sant'Anna 2021). Here, the treatment period is the electoral period in which a Francoist street was renamed. The treatment and control groups are, on the one hand, the neighbourhoods having at least one Francoist street renamed, and on the other hand, the rest of the neighbourhoods. The specification is defined as follows:

$$Ext_Right_vote_{nt} = \alpha + \sum_{t=-q}^{-1} \beta_t D(lead)_{nt} + \sum_{t=0}^{m} \beta_t D(lag)_{nt} + \sum_k \alpha_k X^k_{nt} + \lambda_t + \lambda_n + \gamma_{dt} + \epsilon_{nt} \tag{5}$$

where I allow for q leads, $(\beta_{-1}, \beta_{-2}, ..., \beta_{-q})$ or pre-treatment effects, and m lags $(\beta_{+1}, \beta_{+2}, ..., \beta_{+m})$ or post-treatment effects. Similarly to the previous specifications X^k_{mt} is a k dimensional vector of controls in neighbourhood n at time t. λ_t and λ_n are electoral periods and neighbourhood fixed effects. γ_{dt} is an electoral period times district fixed effect. ϵ_{nt} is the robust error term clustered at the neighbourhood level.

4 Main results


In this section, I start by assessing the validity of using Francoist street names as a proxy for Francoist values at the local level. To do so, first, I correlate the share of Francoist street names with Francoist attitudes. Second, I estimate the causal effect of leftist municipal governments on Francoist streets renamings. Finally, I show that renaming Francoist streets results in an increase of extreme right votes.

4.1 Francoist values and Francoist street names

This section presents empirical evidence supporting the use of Francoist-era street names as a reliable indicator of Francoist values at the local level. The introduction of Francoist street names in Spain, initially as a means of symbolizing the regime's power, casts doubt on the suitability of using Francoist street names as representatives of local-level Francoist identity. Nevertheless, the advent of a fully democratic regime in Spain offered citizens the opportunity to rename Francoist streets in alignment with their values, potentially leading to the removal of Francoist names if desired. The continuous presence of these names, despite the opportunity for change, might therefore be interpreted as indicative of the prevailing local sentiments.

Evolution of Francoist street names in Spain— More than 40 years after the first democratic municipal election in Spain, Francoist street names continue to have a significant presence in Spanish municipalities. For example, in the year 2001, over 30% of municipalities still had at least one Francoist street name (as shown in Figure 1), stricking numbers given the severe consequences that a long lasting dictatorship had in the society. On the contrary, despite the large amount of municipalities containing Francoist street names in the early 2000s, these numbers have shown a decreasing trend over the last two decades, reaching a notable 18% in the year 2023, indicating a gradual shift away from this historical legacy. Figure 1 also shows the yearly evolution of the total number of Francoist street names in Spain. Similarly, this figure shows a decreasing trend in the total number of streets, indicating a continuous removal of Francoist names.

Figure 1: The evolution of Francoist legacy over the years




The figure in the left shows the share of municipalities having at least one Francoist street over the period 2001 - 2022. The figure to the right shows the evolution of the total number of Francoist streets (solid green line) and the yearly number of Francoist street renamed (blue bars) over the period 2001 - 2022

When analyzing these figures by region, notable disparities emerge across the Spanish territory. For instance, in regions like Murcia, the proportion of municipalities with at least one Francoist street name has remained consistently high, around 75%. In contrast, other regions such as the Canary Islands, Galicia, and Extremadura have exhibited a

declining trend in this regard (as illustrated in Figure A1). Additionally, examining the regional distribution of Francoist street names presents a similar narrative. While there is an overall decreasing trend in the prevalence of Francoist streets, the rate of this decline varies significantly among different regions (see Figure A2).

The considerable regional and municipal disparities observed across Spain underscore the narrative of a gradual, selective retention of Francoist street names in contemporary times. Bearing this in mind, I now examine the correlation between the prevalence of Francoist streets and Francoist values. This analysis aims to substantiate the notion that the current presence of Francoist street names can indeed offer insights into the Francoist attitudes of local citizens.

Figure 2: Francoist symbology and identity



These plots show the relationship between (1) the self-reported left-right ideological scale and (2) the share of answers agreeing with the statement "Francoist symbology should be removed from public spaces" with (a) the share of Francoist street names and (b) feelings of nostalgia, patriotism, and pride in Francoism. These regressions are conditioned on the GDP per capita in 2001, geographical characteristics and regional languages. The standard errors are clustered at the region level (CCAA).

In Figure 2, I present the correlation between responses from the "Memories of the Civil War and Francoism" survey and the share of Francoist street names as of the year 2001. Taking into account the historical division between the left and right political blocs that precipitated the Spanish Civil War, and the subsequent oppression by the dictator-

ship towards those of left-wing ideology, I examine the potential correlation between the prevalence of Francoist street names and self-reported political ideology (Top-left graph). I hypothesize that in provinces with a stronger left-wing ideology, the share of Francoist street names would be lower. The graph supports this hypothesis, revealing a robust and positive correlation between right-wing ideology and the prevalence of Francoist street names. In the top-right graph, I show that there is a negative and significant relationship between the share of Francoist streets and the number of respondents who report being in favor of removing Francoist symbology from public spaces. This finding supports the hypothesis that areas opposing Francoist symbols are more likely to have fewer Francoist streets today.

I further explore the correlation between the self-reported feelings of nostalgia, patriotism, or pride towards Francoism and the political ideology of the respondent. The findings reveal that regions with greater feelings of nostalgia, patriotism, or pride towards Francoism tend to be more of right-leaning ideology. Additionally, in the bottom right graph, I correlate feelings of nostalgia, patriotism and pride of Francoism with the number of respondents who report being in favor of removing Francoist symbology from public spaces. The results reveal a pronounced and negative correlation between the two. This indicates that prevalence of Francoist symbology might be influenced by feelings of nostalgia, patriotism, or pride towards Francoism of the local population, indicating that the current share of Francoist streets could be interpreted as a distinct indicator of Francoist attitudes.


To further validate the reliability of these findings, I include in the appendix additional exploratory analyses that validate the correlation of the share of Francoist streets and other measures of Francoist attitudes. Additionally, I add replications of these analyses at various time points. Specifically, I correlate the responses to these questions with the prevalence of Francoist street names across different years: 2007, 2014, and 2021 (see Figures A3, A4, A5, and A6, respectively). These replications reveal a consistent pattern and demonstrate the robustness of the results against variations in the share of Francoist street names over time.

4.2 Municipal governments and Francoist street renamings

The selective removal of Francoist street names brings the additional opportunity to explore the agents responsible for these changes. In this sense, considering the historical left-right political division that resulted in the Spanish Civil War and the dictatorship, this context creates an optimal setting for investigating how the political inclinations of municipal governments influence their decisions to rename Francoist streets. The validation of this pattern would strengthen the previously established significance of Francoist street names as indicators of Francoist attitudes, showing that this relationship extends into the realm of political decision-making.

To investigate this, I explore how the political leaning of the mayor, as the main representative of the municipal government, belonging to either the left or right bloc, plays a role in the decisions to alter Francoist street names. If the impact of having a left-wing mayor compared to a right-wing one is significant and non-zero, this would suggest that the removal of Francoist street names occurs more extensively under left-wing administrations. Table A1 shows the OLS results for the effect of having a left, right, or independent party bloc mayor on Francoist street names changes. The findings indicate that the having a left-wing mayor significantly increases the number of streets with Francoist names renamed, by 0.14 streets. Considering that on average 0.11 Francoist streets are renamed per municipality and election period, having a left-wing mayor effectively exerts a large effort in renaming Francoist streets. Nevertheless, estimating an OLS regression may lead to biased estimates, as there could be factors correlated with being a mayor elected and street renamings. Hence, I perform a Fuzzy RDD design.

Figure 3: First stage and reduced form effects



The figure in the left shows First-Stage effect, that is, the average vote share obtained by the left-wing bloc and the probability of the mayor being from the left-wing bloc. The figure to the right shows the Reduced Form effect, that is, the average vote share obtained by the left-wing bloc and the number of Francoist streets renamed

A Fuzzy RDD provides the necessary random variation in the mayor bloc election for estimating the causal effect of a mayor's political leaning on Francoist street names changes. Therefore, I exploit the natural experiment where a municipality falls marginally above or below the 50% vote share threshold for the different party blocs to instrument the mayor's political bloc. This approach allows me to accurately estimate the causal effect that left-wing mayors have on the renaming of Francoist streets. The results, presented in table A2 and figure 3, indicate that the causal effect of having a left-wing mayor significantly decreases the number of Francoist streets. These estimates are in line with the OLS estimates presented in table A1, but larger in size, demonstrating that there exists a difference in renaming behaviour depending on the governing body in place. Columns 1 to 5 indicate that the effect size remains stable independent to the different selection of bandwidths around the threshold.

To highlight the political and ideological implications of renaming Francoist streets, I

examine whether the changes initiated by the left-bloc are influenced by narrow electoral victories in elections where the left did previously govern. In other words, I investigate if left-wing parties start renaming streets for electoral motives, despite having governed during the previous term. This could suggest that renaming streets is a strategy to mobilize voters and gain electoral advantages in the upcoming elections. Table A2 shows that this might not be the case. Panels 2 and 3 indicate that Francoist street renamings are driven by swing elections, that is, those where a right-wing mayor is narrowly replaced by a left-wing mayor. Similar to panel 1, the effect size remains robust and significant across the different bandwidths.

The validity of these results are dependent upon several conditions. On the one hand, they must satisfy the conditions of an IV, such as having a strong first stage and the exclusion restriction assumption. On the other hand, they also must satisfy the conditions of an RDD such as the lack of change in the density of the running variable at the threshold, or the conditional independence assumption.

Instrumental Variable Assumptions— I begin by testing the first condition of an IV: the relevance of the instrument. This condition states that the instrument, in this case obtaining a 50% of the votes share (namely absolute majority in votes), should considerably increase the probability of the mayor being of that party bloc (First-stage). The results in table A3 indicate that obtaining at least 50% of the votes share significantly increases the probability of the mayor being of that party bloc. The second condition consists on demonstrating that the exclusion restriction holds. Here, the fact of obtaining an absolute majority should not affect Francoist street renamings other than through the election of the mayor. I believe that this assumption holds, as based on the competencies municipalities have, the governing body in the municipality, represented by the mayor, has the absolute power over street renamings. Third, an IV validity is conditioned by the monotonicity assumption. In this scenario, for monotonicity to be violated, it would imply that left-wing parties would only proceed with renaming Francoist street names in cases where they had not achieved an absolute majority, and refraining from doing so otherwise. This situation appears implausible, suggesting that monotonicity is likely to hold. Finally, an IV is conditioned by a fourth condition: the independence assumption. This assumption indicates that reaching 50% of the votes share should be as good as randomly assigned. Reaching an absolute majority in votes, however, cannot be considered as good as random, since numerous factors could influence this outcome beyond the inherent randomness of an election. Nevertheless, the closer to the 50% of the votes share threshold, the harder it becomes to determine that other factors rather than randomness had a role in that. With an RDD I demonstrate that lying just above or below the 50% threshold can be seen as good as randomly assigned.

Balance at the threshold—To corroborate that there is no manipulation around the threshold and that the use of an RDD is valid, I present several graphs and tables

that prove that. First, in figure 3, I show that there is a clear jump at the threshold in the outcome variable, indicating that just obtaining an absolute majority in votes share by a party bloc increases the probability of the mayor becoming of that bloc (First-stage) and affects Francoist street renamings (Reduced-form) (see also figures A7, A8 and A9, and tables A4 and A2). Second, I provide evidence that there is no jump at the threshold in covariates (see figures A11, A12 and A13), implying that the conditional independence assumption holds. Third, I plot the density of the votes share and perform a McCrary test to check if there exists any jump in the density around the threshold (Figure A10). I do not find any evidence to support that hypothesis. In short, I demonstrate that there is no sign of manipulation around the threshold, confirming the validity of the method. In conclusion, I demonstrate that the conditions for a Fuzzy RDD to work are satisfied.

4.3 Political reactions to street renamings

This section explores the causal link between perceived threat to identity and voting behaviour. Given that the continuing presence of Francoist street names serves as a reflection of persistent Francoist sentiments, their removal could be seen by some as a threat to that identity. Therefore, I investigate the causal impact of these renamings on the voting for extreme right-wing parties.


The main results presented in table 1 and figure 4 display the estimates following the state-of-the-art methods in the staggered Differences-in-Differences literature (Callaway & Sant'Anna 2021). Column 1 indicates that renaming Francoist streets led to an immediate 0.14% increase in the extreme-right vote share in treated neighborhoods compared to untreated ones in the following election period (t)[5]. This immediate effect represents at least a 3.5% increase from the mean, based on the average extreme-right vote share during their peak election period. In the medium and long run (t+1 to t+3), the effects appear to dissipate. Prior to the renamings, from t-6 to t-1, both treated and untreated neighborhoods seem to follow parallel trends. Columns 2 to 5 show the effect of renaming Francoist streets on right-wing, left-wing, extreme-left voting, and voter turnout. These results indicate that the removal of Francoist street names did not alter the composition of the right and left voting blocs. Additionally, voter participation in these neighborhoods did not increase.

5 Mechanisms

When exploring the effect of Francoist street renamings on extreme right voting, it is reasonable to acknowledge that several factors, not strictly related to ideology or values, could potentially explain this effect. One potential explanation is the perception that renaming streets misuses public funds. Another is the belief that politicians are focusing

[5]Each election period corresponds to a four-year interval: e.g. t-6 refers to 24 years before the post-renaming election year.

Figure 4: Extreme right vote share. CS estimates



This figure presents Callaway & Sant'Anna (2021) estimates of the impact of renaming Francoist streets on extreme right voting. Each period corresponds to an election year, reflecting four-year intervals.

Table 1: Staggered DiD: Callaway & Sant'Anna (2021) estimator

	Dep Var: Party bloc vote share				**Dep Var: Turnout rate**
	Ext right	Right	Left	Ext left	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
t-6	0.0000	−0.0073***	0.0056**	0.0001	−0.0012
	(0.0002)	(0.0027)	(0.0028)	(0.0014)	(0.0026)
t-5	−0.0004**	−0.0016	0.0012	0.0017	−0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0018)	(0.0019)	(0.0014)	(0.0021)
t-4	−0.0004**	0.0007	0.0007	0.0009	−0.0013
	(0.0001)	(0.0019)	(0.0021)	(0.0011)	(0.0017)
t-3	−0.0002*	−0.0003	−0.0021	0.0009	0.0004
	(0.0001)	(0.0018)	(0.0019)	(0.0008)	(0.0015)
t-2	−0.0003	−0.0015	0.0024	−0.0003	−0.0013
	(0.0002)	(0.0015)	(0.0015)	(0.0008)	(0.0014)
t-1	0.0002	0.0020	−0.0007	−0.0015	−0.0007
	(0.0002)	(0.0015)	(0.0016)	(0.0011)	(0.0015)
t	0.0014***	0.0015	−0.0028	−0.0009	0.0023
	(0.0004)	(0.0017)	(0.0018)	(0.0008)	(0.0015)
t+1	−0.0003	0.0005	−0.0022	−0.0002	0.0027
	(0.0004)	(0.0024)	(0.0026)	(0.0011)	(0.0024)
t+2	0.0010**	0.0045*	−0.0029	−0.0003	0.0040
	(0.0004)	(0.0027)	(0.0030)	(0.0012)	(0.0025)
t+3	−0.0001	0.0014	−0.0025	−0.0012	0.0031
	(0.0008)	(0.0031)	(0.0032)	(0.0014)	(0.0034)
No. of observations	131,620	131,620	131,620	131,620	131,669
No. of neighbourhoods	17,007	17,007	17,007	17,007	17,007
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighbourhood FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighbourhood time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays Callaway and St'Anna estimates of the effect of renaming Francoist streets on voting behaviour. Francoist street names and party blocs are defined in the Appendix. Neighbourhoods affected by a Francoist street renaming are defined by a dummy variable that equals 1 if a neighbourhood n(i) had a Francoist street renamed. Standard errors are clustered at the neighbourhood level. I control for the turnout rate and population size of the neighbourhood. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

on the wrong policies or priorities. These perception alone might drive the observed increase in extreme right vote share in neighborhoods where streets have been renamed, without directly reflecting any underlying perceived threat to Francoist identity. In this section, I will present evidence to demonstrate that the increase in extreme right vote share

is not driven by other concerns, such as the misuse of public funds in street renaming. Instead, I will show that the perceived threat to Francoist values, symbolized by the street renamings, is the main factor behind this effect.

Uncovering the factors leading to the observed increase in extreme right voting is not straightforward. Here, I consider two mechanisms that could be driving this effect: (1) the inconvenience for residents in having to update personal documents like IDs and driving licenses, or learning new street names; and (2) the discontent arising from what might be seen as an inappropriate allocation of municipal funds or perceptions that politicians are focusing on the wrong things. To determine if any of these two channels is in place, I estimate two separate Difference-in-Differences (DiD) empirical specifications.


First, to discern the influence of the inconvenience associated with street renamings, I estimate the effect of Francoist street renamings on areas adjacent to those where Francoist street names were changed. These neighboring areas are likely to be similar in key characteristics such as income, socioeconomic status, and political ideology or values. Hence, it is logical to assume that the citizens in the adjacent neighborhoods may hold Francoist values comparable to those in the treated areas. If this assumption holds, a parallel shift in voting behavior in these bordering neighborhoods, in response to the renaming of Francoist streets, would suggest a similar perception of threat in identity. Conversely, if the increase in extreme right vote share is solely driven by the inconveniences caused by the street name changes, these neighboring areas should show no a significant reaction, as they are not as strongly affected by the renamings.

Secondly, to assess whether the rise in extreme right vote share is a reaction to perceived misallocation of public funds – a factor that might correlate with the proximity to the renamed street – I categorize the renamed streets based on their Francoist name salience. If the driving force behind the observed effect is a response to the use of public funds, then the magnitude of this effect should be independent regardless of how salient the street name is. In simpler terms, the impact on voting behavior should be similar whether the change involves renaming a salient street like "Francisco Franco¨ or a less prominent one such as "Torpedero Tucumán¨ (translated as Tucumán Torpedo Boat)[6].

The case of the City of Madrid— To validate the non-existence of the two proposed channels, I focus on the case of Madrid. As the capital of Spain, Madrid offers an ideal context for examining responses to Francoist street names for several reasons. First, as the capital, the city got subject to a strong Francoist street naming process after the civil war and during the dictatorship (see figure 5). This left the city with a diverse array of Francoist street names. Prominent streets such as Gran Via and La Castellana were renamed after key Francoist figures, like José Antonio (referring to Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera) and Generalísimo Franco (the dictator), respectively. Second, despite

[6] ¨Launched in 1928, it was built at the English shipyards of Cowes on the Isle of Wight. After completing 12 trips, it evacuated 1,250 people sympathetic to the rebels.¨

Figure 5: Francoist street names in the City of Madrid



This figure shows the total number of Francoist streets over the last 100 years in the City of Madrid (solid green line). Each vertical dashed-line represents municipal election years. In red: election periods under left-wing mayors. In blue: election periods under right-wing mayors

several left and right municipal governments in the democracy, there were no big Francoist street renaming processes since the mid 80s until the year 2017 (see figure 5). Third, Madrid provides the complete list of Francoist street names that were renamed in 2017 (see Appendix), which is crucial for categorizing these names based on their level of salience. Unlike the rest of Spain, where the salience of Francoist figures might vary geographically, in Madrid this distinction is clearer and less subject to regional interpretation. Thus, by focusing on Madrid, I address potential issues of classification and ensure a more precise differentiation, avoiding contamination[7].

The results shown in Table 2 (columns 1 and 2) demonstrate that the renaming of Francoist street names led to a similar increase in the extreme right vote share in the adjacent neighbourhoods. Figures A14 and A15 in the appendix show an illustration of the neighbourhoods with Francoist street names before and after their renaming, as well as the sample of adjacent neighbourhoods. The effect of street renamings on extreme right vote share is 0.52% (8% of the average extreme right vote share), larger than the effect observed in the main specification. Hence, these findings suggest that the inconveniences caused by the street names changes do not seem to be the only driver of extreme right votes share.

Table 2 (column 3 and 4) and Figure A19 delve into the hypothesis that the public's reaction might stem from concerns over the misuse of public funds for renaming streets. By evaluating the impact of renaming Francoist streets based on their name salience, I find that extreme right votes increased significantly in the neighborhoods with streets

[7]The distinction between salient and non salient Francoist streets are determined based on the results from Figure A23 in the appendix

Table 2: Mechanisms: TWFE estimates

	Dep var: Extreme Right Voting			
	Main specification	Adjacent neighbourhoods	Salient	Not salient
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
t-6	0.0009*	0.0018	0.0001	0.0011**
	(0.0005)	(0.0015)	(0.0011)	(0.0005)
t-5	0.0010**	0.0003	0.0006	0.0011**
	(0.0005)	(0.0006)	(0.0012)	(0.0005)
t-4	0.0007	0.0005	–0.0007	0.0010**
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0010)	(0.0005)
t-3	0.0002	0.0007	–0.0022*	0.0007
	(0.0006)	(0.0004)	(0.0012)	(0.0006)
t-2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
t-1	0.0010	0.0005	0.0024	0.0006
	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0020)	(0.0008)
t	0.0074***	0.0052***	0.0170***	0.0038*
	(0.0022)	(0.0020)	(0.0054)	(0.0023)
No. of observations	16,167	15,272	15,511	16,008
No. of neighbourhoods	2,046	1,933	1,963	2,026
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighbourhood FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighbourhood time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays TWFE estimates of the effect of renaming Francoist streets on extreme right voting. Francoist street names and extreme right parties are defined in the Appendix. Neighbourhoods affected by a Francoist street renaming are defined by a dummy variable that equals 1 if a neighbourhood n(i) had a Francoist street renamed. Period t-2 is defined as the baseline. Standard errors are clustered at the neighbourhood level. I control for the turnout rate and population size of the neighbourhood. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.


bearing highly prominent Francoist names. However, I find no noticeable effect in areas with streets lacking prominent Francoist connotations. Renaming streets with well-known Francoist associations led to a tripling of the effect compared to the original estimates, an increase in extreme right vote share of 1.7% (approximately 25% of the average extreme right vote share). This disparity in response suggests a strong ideological connection tied to the prominence of Francoist symbols in street names.

In conclusion, these results indicate that neither the inconveniences caused by the street names changes nor the potential improper use of public funds associated with a renaming are driving the rise in extreme right vote share, implying that the only mechanism in place left is the ideological component behind them.

5.1 Origin of the votes

To delve deeper into the origins behind the increase in extreme right votes, I examine potential changes in votes within and between political party blocs. By using a TWFE estimator, in table A6, column 1, I show that there is no conclusive evidence supporting the hypothesis that the overall vote share for the right-wing bloc changed after the renaming of streets. This suggests that the surge in extreme right votes may have originated from an internal shift within the right-wing bloc, moving towards more extreme right positions. Additionally, in column 2, I investigate the possible responses in voting behavior among left-wing parties. The findings show no suggestive evidence on the left-wing voting, indicating that the renaming of Francoist streets predominantly influenced

Figure 6: Extreme right votes by salient Francoist street names



the internal dynamics of the right-wing electorate.

I further investigate whether the increase in support for extreme right parties could have resulted from greater political mobilization, leading to higher voter turnout. Table A8, column 3, suggests this might be the case. The turnout rate increased in neighborhoods where Francoist streets were renamed, indicating that the rise in extreme right votes may have been driven by increased political participation in these areas.

5.2 The extreme right wave: a placebo test

The political situation in Spain and Madrid experienced a big change in the last recent years, going from a persistent two-party system, in which the Popular Party (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE) would alternate power, to a more fragmented political landscape. The emergence of new parties, e.g. Ciudadanos (liberal), Podemos (ext. left) and VOX (ext. right), changed the rules of game and pushed towards a multi-party system where coalitions became the norm.

Focusing on the rise of the extreme right, as shown in Figure A16, it was not until the 2019 elections that the extreme right bloc, primarily represented by the newly established party VOX (founded in 2013), experienced a significant surge, multiplying their vote share by a factor of seven. The timing of VOX's rise coincides with the renaming of Francoist streets in Madrid. Hence, one could infer that neighborhoods with renamed Francoist streets might have already been more extreme-right leaning before the 2019 elections, potentially voting more for the extreme right regardless of the street renamings. To rule out this possibility I perform a placebo test.

In table A6, I analyze extreme right voting behavior in control group neighborhoods

that were in the top quintiles of extreme right voting before the 2019 election. If these neighborhoods exhibited an increase in extreme right voting similar to the treated neighbourhoods, it would indicate that the observed main effects could be attributable to the general rise of VOX rather than the renaming of Francoist streets itself. TWFE estimates in columns 1 to 5 show no evidence that extreme-right-leaning neighborhoods behaved differently from other neighborhoods in the control group. These results are consistent across neighborhoods in different quintiles.

5.3 Heterogeneous effects

Street names have historically been chosen with great intention, often reflecting cultural and historical significance. Major streets and squares are typically named after influential figures or important national events. For example, Plaza España in Madrid and Place de la République in France highlight how urban spaces can commemorate and celebrate a nation's heritage.

Given this context, it is expected that Francoist streets were also selected with deliberate purpose, marking streets of particular importance. Therefore, the effects observed in my main results may be correlated with the prominence of these streets, suggesting a connection between their historical significance and current political dynamics.

To account for this, I examine whether the impact of renaming Francoist streets varies depending on the type of street renamed—whether it is a street, an avenue, a square, or another type. This analysis aims to determine if the effect is primarily driven by renaming more prominent avenues rather than ordinary streets. By assessing the impact on different types of streets, I can evaluate whether their higher visibility or importance influences the results. The results, presented in table A8, indicate that the importance of the street did not have a crucial role in shaping the voting behaviour of the residents ruling out this selection bias.

5.4 Online survey

In this section, I present additional descriptive evidence to offer deeper insights into the mechanisms explored in earlier sections. While the preceding analyses provide substantial support, observational data often lacks the ability to capture nuanced beliefs, preferences, or emotions that can provide further details on the topic. To address these limitations, I conducted an online survey with residents of the City of Madrid[8]. This survey provides compelling evidence that not only reinforces but also broadens the findings established in the earlier analyses.

The survey, conducted in November 2024, includes a representative sample of 500 Madrid residents with Spanish nationality, carefully balanced across gender, age, and

[8]The survey questionnaire and analyses were pre-registered in AsPredicted. The pre-registration numbers are #195566 and #195574.

education levels. The decision to survey only Spanish national residents was based on two key criteria: first, their eligibility to vote in municipal elections, and second, their greater familiarity with the context surrounding the Francoism. Table 3 provides a comparison of the sample's characteristics with those of the broader population of Madrid, highlighting the representativeness of the data.

Table 3: Sample characteristics

	Survey Sample (1)	**Population** (2)
Male	0.48	0.48
Age 18 to 24 years	0.12	0.12
Age 25 to 34 years	0.21	0.22
Age 35 to 44 years	0.22	0.22
Age 45 to 54 years	0.24	0.23
Age 55 to 65 years	0.21	0.21
University studies	0.39	0.39
Sample size	500	—

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the survey sample (column 1) along with the statistics of Madrid (column 2). The source for the data on gender, age distribution and educational attainment are obtained from the Padrón. 4 respondents are missing their age, hence the age categories are calculated out of a total of 496 participants.

The survey results are structured to offer a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between public sentiment toward the renaming of Francoist streets and voting behavior. To do so, first, I construct an index to measure individuals' Francoist attitudes. This index serves as a foundation for examining whether attitudes toward Francoism correlate with opinions on street renaming. Next, I analyze whether residents of Madrid found the renaming of Francoist streets relevant and their opinions about these changes, assessing how these perceptions align with the Francoist index. This establishes a basis for understanding how preferences related to Francoist street names may influence voting reactions. Following this, I explore the emotional responses elicited by the renaming of streets, providing deeper insight into the personal motivations that could drive potential vote changes. I then examine the impact of these dynamics on voting behavior, presenting evidence that reinforces the findings from earlier analyses. Finally, I delve into the mechanisms underlying these voting behaviors, offering a nuanced exploration of how attitudes toward street renaming influence electoral outcomes.

5.4.1 Francoism level indicator

Understanding the extent to which individuals identify with Francoist ideology is essential for analyzing their perceptions and reactions to the renaming of Francoist streets. To achieve this, I construct a measure of Francoist orientation, combining responses to several

survey questions. This index is designed to capture attitudes toward the dictatorship, with higher scores reflecting stronger Francoist leanings.

The index is built using multiple dimensions of participants' responses. First, I examine the emotions elicited when participants think about the Francoist dictatorship. Reporting feelings such as nostalgia, patriotism, or pride is taken as an indication of Francoist alignment. Second, I incorporate self-reported ideological identification. Individuals who describe themselves as Francoist, Falangist, or Nationalist are assigned higher scores on the index. Third, I evaluate responses to specific questions about the dictatorship. For instance, participants were asked how much they agree with the statement, "During the dictatorship, there were no Human Rights violations." Agreement with such statements suggests a positive view of the Francoist regime, further contributing to the index score. Lastly, I include participants' placement on a 10-point ideological scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). A higher score on this scale is interpreted as reflecting a stronger Francoist orientation[9].

Together, these components form a robust measure of Francoist identification. To facilitate analyses, the index is standardized and divided into septiles, categorizing individuals on a scale from 1 (very anti-Francoist) to 7 (very Francoist). This categorization provides a clear and systematic way to analyze how attitudes toward Francoism influence perceptions and behaviors with respect to Francoist street renamings. For the purpose of analyses, level 4 serves as the baseline, representing what can be considered the average individual.

5.4.2 Perceptions of Francoist street renaming

The renaming of Francoist streets serves as a focal point for understanding how historical events continue to shape contemporary public opinion. To better explore this dynamic, Table 4 reveals a strong relationship between the Francoist measure and preferences for these street name changes, offering valuable insights into the relevance of this issue across different ideological groups.

Column 1 and 2 examine how respondents rated the importance of Francoist street renamings on a scale from 1 to 10. On average, individuals demonstrated moderate interest, with a baseline score of 5.5 out of 10. However, the data reveals significant variation at both ends of the ideological spectrum. Respondents classified as very Francoist scored approximately 30% higher than the average, indicating a stronger engagement with the issue. Similarly, individuals identified as very anti-Francoist also assigned greater importance to the renaming of these streets compared to the average respondent.

Columns 3 to 6 present respondents' support for the renaming of Francoist street names and their opinions on what should have been done with them. The results align with

[9]The exact questions used to measure the index are: Q8, Q9, Q10, Q12, Q13, and Q14, provided in the appendix

Table 4: Perceptions about Francoist street names

	Dependent Variables							
	Care about changes		Support changes		What should be done?		Positive for neighbours	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Francoist indicator	0.0181		−0.7511***		−0.6894***		−0.3825***	
	(0.1341)		(0.0514)		(0.0366)		(0.0491)	
Francoist level 1		1.8353***		1.2008***		1.3952***		0.6443***
		(0.4862)		(0.1658)		(0.1447)		(0.1660)
Francoist level 2		0.7730*		0.5303***		0.7767***		0.2007
		(0.4609)		(0.1903)		(0.1703)		(0.1523)
Francoist level 3		0.6503		0.3594**		0.5877***		0.0308
		(0.4295)		(0.1693)		(0.1586)		(0.1551)
Francoist level 5		0.3958		−0.1650		−0.1336		0.0687
		(0.4420)		(0.1775)		(0.1507)		(0.1527)
Francoist level 6		0.3715		−0.2795		−0.2290		0.1115
		(0.4617)		(0.1821)		(0.1534)		(0.1402)
Francoist level 7		1.6740***		−1.3362***		−0.9110***		−0.7662***
		(0.4560)		(0.1845)		(0.1347)		(0.1685)
Constant	6.2080***	5.3929***	3.4560***	3.4092***	2.4340***	2.2193***	3.2300***	3.1874***
	(0.1121)	(0.3164)	(0.0452)	(0.1160)	(0.0385)	(0.1107)	(0.0428)	(0.1001)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variable "care about changes" is an indicator ranging from 1 (respondents do not care at all) to 10 (respondents totally care). The dependent variable "support changes" ranges from 1 (totally against) to 5 (totally in favor). The dependent variable "what should be done?" takes the following values: 1 = street names should be left as they are; 2 = left as they are, but with contextual information added next to the street name plate; 3 = renamed, with the plate removed and placed in a museum; 4 = renamed, with the plate removed and destroyed. The dependent variable "positive for neighbours" ranges from 1 (very negative impact) to 5 (very positive impact). All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

expectations, showing stark ideological divides. Very Francoist individuals are significantly less likely to support the renaming, reporting levels of support 40% lower than the average respondent. In other words, while the average respondent leans slightly toward agreeing with the renaming, very Francoist individuals tend to oppose such changes.

Conversely, very anti-Francoist respondents are much more likely to support the renaming of Francoist streets, with their level of support exceeding the average by 28%. These contrasting views extend to opinions on what actions should be taken regarding Francoist street names. The average respondents fall between "Leaving them as they are but adding contextual information next to the plate" and "Renaming them, removing the plates, and placing them in a museum." In contrast, very Francoist individuals tend to favor "Leaving them as they are," while very anti-Francoist individuals advocate for more decisive actions, such as completely renaming the streets and either putting the plates in a museum or destroying them outright.


Finally, columns 7 and 8 explore respondents' perceptions of whether the renaming of Francoist streets was positive for the neighbors living in the affected areas. The findings are consistent with the earlier results. Very Francoist individuals perceive the renamings as somewhat negative for the neighbors, in contrast to the average respondent, who believes these changes had no significant effect on the local community. On the other hand, very anti-Francoist respondents strongly believe that the renamings were somewhat positive for the neighbors, further highlighting the ideological divide in the interpretation of these changes and their impact on the community.

5.4.3 Reported Feelings

Building on the findings from the previous section, it is evident that two distinct segments of the population hold strong opinions about Francoist street names. This raises an important question: did the renaming of these streets evoke emotions or feelings within these groups that might influence voting mobilization and behavior? To address this, this section delves into the reported emotions elicited by the renaming of Francoist streets, exploring whether these emotional responses could serve as a driving force behind potential shifts in voting patterns.

Figure 7 provides a visual summary of the findings detailed in Tables A9 and A10. The results reveal notable emotional divergences across segments of the population. Very Francoist respondents report significantly higher levels of anger, annoyance, and hate compared to the average participant, with effects that are substantial—approximately 50% greater than the average. This implies that very Francoist individuals experience these emotions at twice the intensity of the average respondent.

Figure 7: What feelings did the renaming of Francoist streets generate in you?



This figure shows self-reported emotional responses to the renaming of Francoist street names: "anger", "annoyance", and "hate" on the left and "indifference", "pride", and "satisfaction" on the right. Each variable ranges from 1 ("nothing") to 5 ("a lot"), indicating the intensity of the feeling. All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. The figure shows the coefficients reported in Table A10 and the 95% confidence intervals

Conversely, very anti-Francoist respondents exhibit 35% lower levels of anger, annoyance, and hate than the average participant. As anticipated, the very anti-Francoist group also reports significantly higher levels of satisfaction and pride in response to the street renamings, alongside lower levels of indifference. This contrasts with the very Francoist respondents, who tend to report being less proud, satisfied, or indifferent than the average

participant, although the coefficients are not statistically different from zero. These patterns underscore the polarized emotional reactions elicited by the renaming of Francoist streets.

5.4.4 Voting behaviour

In this section, I explore whether the sentiments surrounding the renaming of Francoist street names established above may translate into tangible shifts in electoral preferences, shedding light on the broader political implications of these actions.

Evidence presented in Table 5 supports this hypothesis. It shows that very Francoist respondents are particularly motivated to reconsider their vote, contemplate heading to the polls, engage in protests, or even change their vote. These behavioral shifts appear to be closely tied to the strong emotional responses documented earlier, underscoring the deep personal resonance of the renaming issue. As expected, these results are in line with the main results observed in the electoral voting data, implying that only the most Francoist people might have altered their voting behavior, leading to a greater turnout and extreme right voting.


Table 5: Voting behavior responses to the renaming of Francoist streets

	Dependent Variables							
	Reconsider vote change		Change vote		Go to vote		Protest	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Francoist indicator	0.3893***		0.3591***		0.5725***		0.4011***	
	(0.0632)		(0.0610)		(0.0659)		(0.0563)	
Francoist level 1		−0.3677**		−0.5094***		−0.3321		−0.5690***
		(0.1837)		(0.1760)		(0.2068)		(0.1734)
Francoist level 2		−0.2070		−0.4423**		−0.3115		−0.3775*
		(0.2002)		(0.1843)		(0.2094)		(0.1978)
Francoist level 3		−0.2037		−0.2998		−0.2489		−0.2335
		(0.1867)		(0.1920)		(0.2104)		(0.2004)
Francoist level 5		0.3508*		0.0340		0.2974		0.2048
		(0.2078)		(0.1962)		(0.2131)		(0.2130)
Francoist level 6		0.4954**		0.2453		0.4860**		0.4223**
		(0.2055)		(0.2073)		(0.2269)		(0.2099)
Francoist level 7		0.7747***		0.5709**		1.4931***		0.6502***
		(0.2320)		(0.2234)		(0.2399)		(0.2234)
Constant	2.1540***	2.0348***	2.0220***	2.0805***	2.3160***	2.1200***	2.0580***	2.0454***
	(0.0532)	(0.1391)	(0.0509)	(0.1373)	(0.0578)	(0.1483)	(0.0512)	(0.1458)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables measure respondents' behavioral intentions in response to Francoist street name changes: "reconsider vote", "change vote", "go to vote", and "protest". Each variable is measured on a scale from 1 ("nothing") to 5 ("a lot"), indicating the intensity of the behavioral response. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A closer look at Figure 8 and Table A15 reveals a clear pattern in how voting changes unfold. When asked about their hypothetical vote change, Figure 8 shows that shifts predominantly move toward the right, as indicated by the darker colors along the bottom diagonal of the matrix. Table A15 further investigates the origins of these hypothetical vote changes, demonstrating that the shift is largely driven by very Francoist individuals, who tend to move from the conservative party to the extreme right.

Figure 8: Vote change responses to the renaming of Francoist streets



This figure illustrates the share of hypothetical vote changes attributed to the renaming of Francoist street names. Parties are arranged from left to right (see Figure A22). The intensity of the color reflects the proportion of respondents that would change their vote. The upper diagonal represents shifts in vote toward the left, while the lower diagonal captures shifts in vote toward the right.


5.4.5 Channels

The findings so far underscore that the renaming of Francoist streets seem to hold significant importance for many individuals, particularly those with pronounced Francoist attitudes. These individuals not only exhibit a strong emotional attachment to these street names and their symbolism, but their reactions also appear to influence their voting behavior. However, the underlying mechanisms driving these responses remain unclear. Are these reactions rooted in ideological convictions, or do they stem from practical concerns, such as perceived mismanagement of public resources? In this section, I delve deeper into the potential channels that might explain how the renaming of Francoist streets translates into shifts in voting behavior.

The results summarized in Figure 9 and detailed in Tables A11 to A14 reveal that very Francoist individuals strongly associate Francoist street names with their sense of identity (Figure 9, top-left). The more Francoist a person is, the more they resonate with statements such as, "Francoist streets are a source of pride", "Francoist streets are part of the city's identity", or "I felt that the renaming of Francoist streets went against my values".

Interestingly, these patterns persist when examining both social and practical channels. Regarding social channels (Figure 9, top-right), Francoist individuals are more likely to agree with statements such as, "This type of policy [the renaming] polarizes society", "There are more urgent matters to address", or "When it comes to streets, everyone

Figure 9: Channels



This figure illustrates how Francoist attitudes shape the motivations behind reactions to the renaming of Francoist street names. The identity channel assesses: (1) whether Francoist streets are seen as a source of pride, (2) whether they are considered part of the city's identity, and (3) whether the renamings are perceived as going against the respondent's values. The social channel captures: (1) whether the renamings are viewed as polarizing society, (2) whether respondents agree there are more urgent matters to address, and (3) whether such policies are seen as futile because everyone will eventually be offended. The practical channel examines: (1) whether the renamings are perceived as creating confusion, and (2) whether they are regarded as an unnecessary expense. Finally, the comfort channel reflects how comfortable respondents feel discussing the renaming of Francoist street names, both (1) with family and friends and (2) with strangers. Each variable ranges from 1 ("completely against the statement") to 5 ("completely in favor of the statement"). All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4.

will end up being offended at some point; there's no point in trying to please everyone." Similarly, in practical terms (Figure 9, bottom-left), more Francoist individuals are inclined to agree with statements like, "Renaming the streets creates confusion", and "The money spent on the renaming was an unnecessary expense." I also examine how comfortable participants feel discussing their opinions on Francoist street renamings (Figure 9, bottom-right). The findings reveal that individuals at the extreme ends of the spectrum tend to feel more at ease discussing this topic, whether with strangers or family members, compared to the average respondent.

The responses to practical or social channels may also be influenced by ideology. For example, very Francoist individuals might express agreement with statements about the impracticality of renaming streets or the existence of more urgent priorities, not necessarily because of practical concerns, but due to their underlying beliefs about Francoist

street renamings. Their identity, strongly tied to Francoist symbols, could shape their perception of such policies, leading them to view these initiatives as unnecessary or divisive. To explore this possibility and determine whether practical or social channels drive the observed effects, I analyze how these channels impact voting behavior and feelings of annoyance, hate, and anger. If identity serves as the primary driver of these outcomes, the effect of the identity channel is expected to be positive and statistically significant. Similarly, if social and practical channels also reflect identity-related motives, their effects should align in the same direction.

The results presented in Table 6 reveal a strong correlation between the identity channel and both voting behavior and emotional responses, suggesting that identity motives are likely driving these effects. In contrast, practical and social concerns show little to no significant correlation with the dependent variables, or only partial correlations. This indicates that these channels are unlikely to reflect underlying ideological motives or drive the observed outcomes.

Table 6: Voting behavior and feelings: identity, social and practical concerns

	Dependent variables				
	Voting behaviour		Feelings		
	Change vote (1)	Go to vote (2)	Annoyance (3)	Hate (4)	Anger (5)
Francoist indicator	0.1637*	0.3705***	0.2823***	0.1611*	0.2193***
	(0.0890)	(0.0911)	(0.0836)	(0.0844)	(0.0801)
Identity channel	0.3107***	0.3927***	0.4722***	0.4840***	0.5178***
	(0.0897)	(0.0994)	(0.0915)	(0.0820)	(0.0772)
Social channel	−0.0625	−0.2480**	−0.0945	−0.2446***	−0.2210***
	(0.0934)	(0.1001)	(0.0858)	(0.0776)	(0.0792)
Practical channel	−0.0839	−0.0006	0.0573	−0.0100	0.0714
	(0.0944)	(0.0989)	(0.0923)	(0.0774)	(0.0810)
Constant	1.6974***	2.1443***	1.1434***	1.5268***	1.2403***
	(0.2705)	(0.2955)	(0.2822)	(0.2656)	(0.2610)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The voting behavior dependent variables measure respondents' behavioral intentions in response to Francoist street name changes: "change vote" and "go to vote". The dependent variables measuring emotional responses to the renaming of Francoist street names are: "annoyance", "hate", and "anger". Each variable ranges from 1 ("nothing") to 5 ("a lot"). I aggregate the different indicators for each of the channels. All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

In conclusion, the findings from this survey highlight four key insights. First, individuals at the extremes of the Francoist spectrum demonstrate the strongest reactions to Francoist street names, exhibiting sharply opposing preferences regarding their renaming. Second, higher levels of Francoism are strongly associated with heightened feelings of anger, hate, and annoyance, while lower levels correlate with greater satisfaction, pride, and reduced indifference. These emotional responses suggest that the renaming of Francoist streets could indeed act as a catalyst for political mobilization, as the results in the previous section indicated. Finally, the evidence points to identity concerns as the primary driver of these reactions, fueling increased voting engagement among the most Francoist individuals, particularly toward the extreme right.

6 Conclusion

Over recent decades, populist parties have gained significant traction, often leveraging narratives that portray national identity as being under threat. This rhetoric has been a key driver of their electoral campaigns in many Western countries, as seen with the National Rally in France and the Alternative for Germany. However, there is limited understanding of how the perception of identity being under attack has directly contributed to their growing support. This paper seeks to address this gap by empirically analyzing the causal relationship between perceived identity threats and voting for right-wing populist parties. To explore this, I focus on the case of Spain, where the removal of Francoist street names may have been perceived as a threat to identity by individuals who hold Francoist values, potentially influencing their political behavior and support for populist parties.

The findings of this paper are as follows. First, using a recent survey on memories of the Civil War and Francoism, I demonstrate a strong correlation between Francoist values and the presence of Francoist street names, establishing these street names as a reliable proxy for local values. Second, by examining the renaming of Francoist streets over recent decades, I show that left-wing mayors rename three to four times more Francoist streets than their right-wing counterparts, highlighting the political dimension of these changes. Third, I estimate the population's reaction to the symbolic removal of Francoist values through changes in voting behavior. The analysis reveals that renaming Francoist street names significantly increases the vote share for extreme right-wing parties in neighborhoods affected by these changes, particularly in cases of highly salient renamings. Finally, to empirically substantiate the role of identity in driving these effects, I conduct an online survey and find that the perception of identity is likely a fundamental driver of these results.

In conclusion, this paper provides critical insights into the role of identity in the rise of right-wing populism. The findings suggest that perceived threats to identity can lead individuals to support right-wing populist parties, which position themselves as defenders and protectors of these values and symbols.

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A Appendix




Figure A1: Evolution of the share of municipalities with at least one Francoist street name per Region.




Figure A2: Evolution of the share in Francoist street names per Region, base 2001.




Figure A3: Share of Francoist streets in 2001 and Francoist values.




Figure A4: Street names indicator of Francoism in 2007 and Francoist values.




Figure A5: Street names indicator of Francoism in 2014 and Francoist values.




Figure A6: Street names indicator of Francoism in 2021 and Francoist values.




Figure A7: First Stage: Votes share and mayor election.




Figure A8: Reduced Form: Votes share and Francoist street names changes




Figure A9: Reduced Form: Votes share and Francoist street names changes. Municipalities with at least one Francoist street name




Figure A10: Density of vote share by party bloc.




Figure A11: Demographics: census population by party bloc vote share.




Figure A12: Demographics: Number of municipal parliament seats by party bloc vote share




Figure A13: Demographics: Turnover rate by party bloc vote share.




Figure A14: City map of Madrid, neighbourhoods by treatment group.




Figure A15: City map of Madrid, neighbourhoods by treatment group and neighbouring units.




Figure A16: Evolution of the vote by left-right bloc, 1991-2019. Vote share scaled across the groups.




Figure A17: Evolution of the vote by left-right bloc, 1991-2019. Vote share not scaled across the groups.






Figure A18: Madrid: extreme right vote share. TWFE estimates

Figure A19: Perceptions about Francoist street names



All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4.

Figure A20: Did the Francoist street renamings affect your behaviour?



The dependent variables measure respondents' behavioral intentions in response to Francoist street name changes. Each variable is measured on a scale from 1 ("nothing") to 5 ("a lot"), indicating the intensity of the behavioral response. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4.

Figure A21: Correlation matrix: channels




Figure A22: Ideological position of political parties




Table A1: OLS: mayor party and Francoist street renamings by election type

	Dep var: # of Francoist streets renamed								
	Whole sample			Not swing elections			Swing elections		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Left wing Mayor	0.1344***			0.0845***			0.1681***		
	(0.0169)			(0.0214)			(0.0241)		
Right wing Mayor		–0.1513***			–0.0681***			–0.2050***	
		(0.0180)			(0.0226)			(0.0244)	
Independent Mayor			0.0115			–0.0361			0.0098
			(0.0216)			(0.0343)			(0.0305)
No. of observations	32,643	32,643	32,643	19,307	19,307	19,307	13,336	13,336	13,336
No. of municipalities	5,774	5,774	5,774	5,577	5,577	5,577	5,754	5,754	5,754
R-squared	0.014	0.015	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.030	0.032	0.022
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Municipality FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays OLS estimates of the effect of having a Left/Right/Ind mayor on the number of Francoist streets renamed. Francoist street names are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. I control for the total number of streets in the municipality. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A2: Fuzzy RDD - IV: mayor party and Francoist street renamings by election type

	Dep var: # of Francoist streets renamed						
	25%-75%	37.5%-62.5%	40%-60%	41.5%-58.5%	44%-56%	46%-54%	48%-52%
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Whole sample							
Left wing mayor	0.2772***	0.3731***	0.4203***	0.4259***	0.6257**	0.9345**	0.6184
	(0.0591)	(0.1036)	(0.1407)	(0.1626)	(0.2753)	(0.3713)	(0.4116)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat	2,228	783	522	392	174	70	24
No. of observations	23,081	13,515	10,772	9,071	5,937	3,405	1,103
No. of municipalities	4,868	3,699	3,226	2,888	2,134	1,361	497
Right wing mayor	–0.3147***	–0.4075***	–0.4131***	–0.3776**	–0.4245	–0.3928	–0.2883
	(0.0569)	(0.0978)	(0.1347)	(0.1573)	(0.2774)	(0.3567)	(0.3498)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat	2,324	828	512	366	157	78	21
No. of observations	24,170	14,403	11,553	9,751	6,366	3,723	1,266
No. of municipalities	4,971	3,875	3,407	3,054	2,255	1,471	567
Independent mayor	0.3325	0.4350	0.9041	1.1600	2.1094	–16.4477	0.5460
	(0.2117)	(0.2811)	(0.7135)	(1.2154)	(4.7179)	(219.8851)	(0.5436)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat	21	10	3	1	0	0	2
No. of observations	3,729	1,530	1,138	907	511	289	98
No. of municipalities	1,240	580	448	365	220	131	48
Not swing elections							
Left wing mayor	0.1809***	0.1981	0.0696	–0.0529	–0.0698	0.4470	1.3363
	(0.0605)	(0.1355)	(0.1782)	(0.2307)	(0.3899)	(0.4121)	(3.9388)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat	941	251	154	102	23	8	0
No. of observations	12,759	6,117	4,536	3,579	2,039	1,054	292
No. of municipalities	4,028	2,298	1,791	1,448	876	481	141
Right wing mayor	–0.2143***	–0.2953*	–0.1040	0.0076	0.1894	–0.2250	–0.6066
	(0.0727)	(0.1647)	(0.2223)	(0.2907)	(0.4449)	(0.3976)	(0.8944)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat	733	199	120	73	26	18	5
No. of observations	13,188	6,618	4,926	3,958	2,322	1,204	389
No. of municipalities	4,124	2,441	1,911	1,587	984	537	184
Independent mayor	0.0395	0.2487	0.1417	1.3343	–0.0537	0.2330	
	(0.1010)	(0.6660)	(0.6238)	(3.9974)	(0.2908)	(1.4224)	
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat	26	0	0	0	0	0	
No. of observations	1,239	421	278	188	98	55	19
No. of municipalities	503	184	123	83	44	25	9
Swing elections							
Left wing mayor	0.4237***	0.5536***	0.5917**	0.7064**	0.9465*	1.1019*	1.4241
	(0.1186)	(0.2149)	(0.2600)	(0.2930)	(0.4992)	(0.6253)	(1.2672)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat	772	314	244	204	85	39	13
No. of observations	8,163	5,060	4,018	3,365	2,133	1,185	327
No. of municipalities	2,956	1,978	1,621	1,386	913	533	155
Right wing mayor	–0.4418***	–0.5416***	–0.5652**	–0.6518**	–0.8033	–0.8243	–0.8756
	(0.1006)	(0.1982)	(0.2611)	(0.3044)	(0.5265)	(0.7452)	(1.0125)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat	1,141	374	256	209	79	40	8
No. of observations	8,832	5,378	4,283	3,566	2,153	1,189	311
No. of municipalities	3,184	2,110	1,738	1,479	932	542	148
Independent mayor	1.2644	0.7425	0.8902	0.9752	5.0505	12.7428	2.0485
	(1.5813)	(0.8230)	(1.1890)	(1.5186)	(23.7940)	(140.7603)	(1.9562)
No. of observations	1,504	574	415	340	186	109	26
No. of municipalities	634	251	184	152	86	52	13
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Municipality FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays Fuzzy RDD estimates of the effect of having a Left/Right/Ind wing mayor on the number of Francoist streets renamed. The Left/Right/Ind wing mayor indicator is instrumented with a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Left/Right/Ind parties obtain an absolute majority in votes. Francoist street names are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. I control for the total number of streets in the municipality. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3: Fuzzy RDD - First Stage: absolute majority in votes and mayor election

	Dep var: Left, Right, or Independent Wing Mayor						
	25%-75%	37.5%-62.5%	40%-60%	41.5%-58.5%	44%-56%	46%-54%	48%-52%
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Left wing majority	0.5165***	0.4378***	0.4138***	0.3985***	0.3442***	0.3036***	0.3178***
	(0.0109)	(0.0156)	(0.0181)	(0.0201)	(0.0261)	(0.0363)	(0.0647)
No. of observations	23,539	14,413	11,827	10,263	7,384	4,995	2,509
No. of municipalities	5,326	4,597	4,281	4,080	3,581	2,951	1,903
Right wing majority	0.4958***	0.4157***	0.3768***	0.3578***	0.2957***	0.2801***	0.2539***
	(0.0103)	(0.0144)	(0.0166)	(0.0187)	(0.0236)	(0.0317)	(0.0549)
No. of observations	24,560	15,179	12,520	10,863	7,798	5,298	2,681
No. of municipalities	5,361	4,651	4,374	4,166	3,687	3,046	1,982
Independent wing majority	0.1632***	0.1783***	0.1083*	0.0833	0.0450	−0.0103	0.3521
	(0.0354)	(0.0553)	(0.0642)	(0.0724)	(0.0960)	(0.1384)	(0.2627)
No. of observations	4,804	2,350	1,901	1,625	1,120	746	375
No. of municipalities	2,315	1,400	1,211	1,083	829	588	325
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Municipality FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays OLS estimates of the effect of having a Left/Right/Ind wing vote share majority on the election of a Left/Right/Ind wing mayor. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4: Fuzzy RDD - Reduced form effect: absolute majority in votes and Francoist street renamings by election type

	Dep var: # of Francoist streets renamed						
	25%-75%	37.5%-62.5%	40%-60%	41.5%-58.5%	44%-56%	46%-54%	48%-52%
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Whole sample							
Left wing majority	0.1431***	0.1633***	0.1739***	0.1697***	0.2154**	0.2837**	0.1965
	(0.0306)	(0.0455)	(0.0584)	(0.0651)	(0.0949)	(0.1109)	(0.1292)
No. of observations	23,539	14,413	11,827	10,263	7,384	4,995	2,509
No. of municipalities	5,326	4,597	4,281	4,080	3,581	2,951	1,903
Right wing majority	–0.1560***	–0.1694***	–0.1557***	–0.1351**	–0.1255	–0.1100	–0.0732
	(0.0283)	(0.0408)	(0.0509)	(0.0565)	(0.0823)	(0.1007)	(0.0881)
No. of observations	24,560	15,179	12,520	10,863	7,798	5,298	2,681
No. of municipalities	5,361	4,651	4,374	4,166	3,687	3,046	1,982
Independent majority	0.0543*	0.0776*	0.0979*	0.0966	0.0950	0.1701	0.1922
	(0.0324)	(0.0446)	(0.0547)	(0.0621)	(0.0841)	(0.1208)	(0.1966)
No. of observations	4,804	2,350	1,901	1,625	1,120	746	375
No. of municipalities	2,315	1,400	1,211	1,083	829	588	325
Not swing elections							
Left wing majority	0.0861***	0.0687	0.0214	–0.0148	–0.0123	0.0648	0.0474
	(0.0289)	(0.0471)	(0.0549)	(0.0644)	(0.0684)	(0.0562)	(0.0902)
No. of observations	13,652	7,654	6,126	5,222	3,620	2,393	1,194
No. of municipalities	4,921	3,835	3,381	3,091	2,457	1,820	1,043
Right wing majority	–0.0861***	–0.0804*	–0.0241	0.0015	0.0275	–0.0338	–0.0667
	(0.0293)	(0.0448)	(0.0515)	(0.0580)	(0.0641)	(0.0592)	(0.0937)
No. of observations	14,028	8,041	6,454	5,514	3,872	2,573	1,327
No. of municipalities	4,964	3,864	3,439	3,143	2,534	1,906	1,122
Independent majority	0.0097	0.0113	–0.0072	–0.0362	0.0024	–0.0056	0.2871
	(0.0248)	(0.0256)	(0.0283)	(0.0394)	(0.0107)	(0.0289)	(0.1949)
No. of observations	2,115	941	732	597	391	256	130
No. of municipalities	1,379	704	577	492	337	226	120
Swing elections							
Left wing majority	0.2331***	0.2843***	0.3084**	0.3787**	0.4213*	0.4903*	0.6533
	(0.0652)	(0.1100)	(0.1351)	(0.1560)	(0.2200)	(0.2721)	(0.5628)
No. of observations	9,887	6,759	5,701	5,041	3,764	2,602	1,315
No. of municipalities	4,680	3,677	3,304	3,062	2,544	1,950	1,143
Right wing majority	–0.2509***	–0.2744***	–0.2819**	–0.3335**	–0.3476	–0.3665	–0.3473
	(0.0572)	(0.1006)	(0.1305)	(0.1558)	(0.2275)	(0.3318)	(0.3942)
No. of observations	10,532	7,138	6,066	5,349	3,926	2,725	1,354
No. of municipalities	4,884	3,870	3,521	3,262	2,705	2,078	1,191
Independent majority	0.0825	0.1218	0.1260	0.1317	0.2034	0.3378	1.1472
	(0.0585)	(0.1073)	(0.1252)	(0.1496)	(0.2079)	(0.2821)	(0.9545)
No. of observations	2,689	1,409	1,169	1,028	729	490	245
No. of municipalities	1,819	1,086	938	840	629	433	232
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Municipality FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays OLS estimates of the effect of having a Left/Right/Ind wing vote share majority on the number of Francoist streets renamed. Francoist street names are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. I control for the total number of streets in the municipality. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Staggered DiD: TWFE

	Dep Var: Party bloc vote share				Dep Var: Turnout rate
	Ext right	Right	Left	Ext left	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
t-6	0.0006*	−0.0051	0.0038	−0.0009	0.0006
	(0.0003)	(0.0034)	(0.0036)	(0.0017)	(0.0035)
t-5	0.0002	−0.0062*	0.0050	0.0014	0.0004
	(0.0003)	(0.0032)	(0.0033)	(0.0017)	(0.0032)
t-4	−0.0002	−0.0032	0.0038	0.0017	−0.0013
	(0.0003)	(0.0033)	(0.0034)	(0.0016)	(0.0027)
t-3	−0.0003	−0.0013	−0.0010	0.0019	0.0007
	(0.0003)	(0.0024)	(0.0023)	(0.0012)	(0.0021)
t-2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
t-1	0.0002	0.0035	−0.0014	−0.0029	−0.0011
	(0.0005)	(0.0025)	(0.0026)	(0.0020)	(0.0024)
t	0.0025***	0.0081**	−0.0076**	−0.0055**	0.0030
	(0.0009)	(0.0036)	(0.0038)	(0.0022)	(0.0030)
t+1	0.0007	0.0074	−0.0074	−0.0055*	0.0050
	(0.0011)	(0.0050)	(0.0055)	(0.0028)	(0.0043)
t+2	0.0031**	0.0173***	−0.0110	−0.0077**	0.0086*
	(0.0015)	(0.0061)	(0.0069)	(0.0035)	(0.0048)
t+3	0.0018	0.0148*	−0.0111	−0.0119***	0.0113**
	(0.0026)	(0.0087)	(0.0091)	(0.0039)	(0.0057)
No. of observations	131,620	131,620	131,620	131,620	131,669
No. of neighbourhoods	17,007	17,007	17,007	17,007	17,007
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighbourhood FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighbourhood time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays TWFE estimates of the effect of renaming Francoist streets on voting behaviour. Francoist street names and party blocs are defined in the Appendix. Neighbourhoods affected by a Francoist street renaming are defined by a dummy variable that equals 1 if a neighbourhood n(i) had a Francoist street renamed. Standard errors are clustered at the neighbourhood level. I control for the turnout rate and population size of the neighbourhood. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A6: Robustness check: the rise of VOX and extreme right leaning neighbourhoods

	Dep var: Extreme Right Voting				
	Top 5%	Top 10%	Top 15%	Top 20%	Top 25%
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
t-6	−0.0226***	−0.0122***	−0.0090***	−0.0071***	−0.0057***
	(0.0069)	(0.0036)	(0.0026)	(0.0020)	(0.0015)
t-5	−0.0228***	−0.0123***	−0.0091***	−0.0072***	−0.0059***
	(0.0055)	(0.0030)	(0.0021)	(0.0016)	(0.0013)
t-4	−0.0191***	−0.0110***	−0.0081***	−0.0066***	−0.0056***
	(0.0055)	(0.0029)	(0.0020)	(0.0016)	(0.0012)
t-3	−0.0139**	−0.0064*	−0.0038*	−0.0027	−0.0020
	(0.0062)	(0.0033)	(0.0023)	(0.0017)	(0.0014)
t-2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
t-1	−0.0134	−0.0080*	−0.0065*	−0.0054**	−0.0050**
	(0.0092)	(0.0048)	(0.0033)	(0.0025)	(0.0020)
t	−0.0025	0.0035	0.0026	0.0029	0.0029
	(0.0115)	(0.0062)	(0.0043)	(0.0034)	(0.0028)
No. of observations	12,978	12,978	12,978	12,978	12,978
No. of neighbourhoods	1,644	1,644	1,644	1,644	1,644
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighbourhood FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighbourhood time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays TWFE estimates of the effect of the irruption of VOX in extreme right-leaning neighbourhoods on extreme right voting. Extreme right-leaning neighbourhoods are defined as the neighbourhoods in the top quantiles of extreme-right voting before the irruption of VOX in the 2019 elections. Period t-2 is defined as the baseline. Standard errors are clustered at the neighbourhood level. I control for the turnout rate and population size of the neighbourhood. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A7: Voting behaviour: Right, Left-wing bloc and Turnout.

	Voting behaviour		
	Rigth bloc	Left bloc	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)
t-6	–0.0114***	0.0110***	–0.0026
	(0.0029)	(0.0033)	(0.0033)
t-5	–0.0096***	0.0066*	0.0002
	(0.0034)	(0.0035)	(0.0034)
t-4	–0.0093	0.0053	–0.0026
	(0.0060)	(0.0058)	(0.0030)
t-3	–0.0057	–0.0014	0.0008
	(0.0045)	(0.0028)	(0.0025)
t-2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)	(.)
t-1	0.0148***	–0.0061	0.0004
	(0.0048)	(0.0038)	(0.0035)
t	0.0155***	–0.0076*	0.0085**
	(0.0055)	(0.0043)	(0.0043)
No. of observations	16,167	16,167	16,167
No. of neighbourhoods	2,046	2,046	2,046
Time FE	yes	yes	yes
Neighbourhood FE	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes
Neighbourhood time trend	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays TWFE estimates of the effect of renaming Francoist streets on voting behaviour. Francoist street names and party blocs are defined in the Appendix. Neighbourhoods affected by a Francoist street renaming are defined by a dummy variable that equals 1 if a neighbourhood n(i) had a Francoist street renamed. Period t-2 is defined as the baseline. Standard errors are clustered at the neighbourhood level. I control for the turnout rate and population size of the neighbourhood. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A8: Type of street renamed

	Dep var: Extreme Right Voting			
	Avenue	Street	Square	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
t-6	0.0003	0.0012**	0.0018	0.0002
	(0.0008)	(0.0006)	(0.0013)	(0.0007)
t-5	0.0005	0.0012**	0.0021*	0.0005
	(0.0009)	(0.0005)	(0.0012)	(0.0007)
t-4	–0.0001	0.0008	0.0035***	0.0008
	(0.0009)	(0.0005)	(0.0010)	(0.0008)
t-3	–0.0006	0.0000	0.0055***	0.0009
	(0.0012)	(0.0006)	(0.0016)	(0.0013)
t-2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
t-1	0.0002	0.0015*	0.0008	–0.0002
	(0.0020)	(0.0008)	(0.0022)	(0.0016)
t	0.0024	0.0092***	0.0082*	0.0029
	(0.0037)	(0.0025)	(0.0045)	(0.0029)
No. of observations	15,318	15,977	15,248	15,390
No. of neighbourhoods	1,939	2,022	1,930	1,948
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighbourhood FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighbourhood time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays TWFE estimates of the effect of renaming Francoist streets on extreme right voting by the type of street renamed. Francoist street names and extreme right parties are defined in the Appendix. Neighbourhoods affected by a Francoist street renaming are defined by a dummy variable that equals 1 if a neighbourhood n(i) had a Francoist street renamed. Period t-2 is defined as the baseline. Standard errors are clustered at the neighbourhood level. I control for the turnout rate and population size of the neighbourhood. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A9: What feelings did the renaming of Francoist streets generate in you? (negative feelings)

	Dependent Variables					
	Anger		Annoyance		Hate	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Francoist indicator	0.5567***		0.6087***		0.4130***	
	(0.0552)		(0.0571)		(0.0557)	
Francoist level 1		−0.7583***		−0.8107***		−0.6624***
		(0.1578)		(0.1709)		(0.1598)
Francoist level 2		−0.2828		−0.2886		−0.2359
		(0.1891)		(0.1896)		(0.1772)
Francoist level 3		−0.3224*		−0.1853		−0.2416
		(0.1747)		(0.1952)		(0.1762)
Francoist level 5		0.2062		0.1395		0.0684
		(0.1787)		(0.1914)		(0.1933)
Francoist level 6		0.2675		0.3390*		0.1765
		(0.1916)		(0.1933)		(0.2010)
Francoist level 7		1.0494***		1.2659***		0.7606***
		(0.2139)		(0.2264)		(0.2099)
Constant	2.0740***	2.0531***	2.2500***	2.1864***	1.9200***	1.9408***
	(0.0483)	(0.1249)	(0.0504)	(0.1354)	(0.0486)	(0.1305)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables measure emotional responses to the renaming of Francoist street names: “anger”, “annoyance”, and “hate”. Each variable ranges from 1 (“nothing”) to 5 (“a lot”), indicating the intensity of the feeling. All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A10: What feelings did the renaming of Francoist streets generate in you? (positive feelings)

	Dependent Variables					
	Indifference		Pride		Satisfaction	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Francoist indicator	0.1054		−0.3269***		−0.4903***	
	(0.0694)		(0.0659)		(0.0608)	
Francoist level 1		−0.8780***		1.0191***		1.4484***
		(0.2047)		(0.2247)		(0.2202)
Francoist level 2		−0.1396		0.3232		0.5663***
		(0.2012)		(0.2121)		(0.2090)
Francoist level 3		−0.4137**		0.1380		0.3119
		(0.1988)		(0.1981)		(0.2170)
Francoist level 5		−0.0526		0.0066		0.1532
		(0.1877)		(0.1909)		(0.1982)
Francoist level 6		0.0569		0.0716		0.1974
		(0.1955)		(0.2143)		(0.2065)
Francoist level 7		−0.4038*		−0.1557		−0.3243
		(0.2299)		(0.2120)		(0.2051)
Constant	2.8540***	3.1167***	2.3720***	2.1705***	2.5280***	2.1900***
	(0.0548)	(0.1385)	(0.0566)	(0.1397)	(0.0563)	(0.1404)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables measure emotional responses to the renaming of Francoist street names: “indifference”, “pride”, and “satisfaction”. Each variable ranges from 1 (“nothing”) to 5 (“a lot”), indicating the intensity of the feeling. All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A11: Identity channel

	Identity channel					
	Fracnoist streets motive of pride		Part of identity		Renamings against own values	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Francoist indicator	0.7298***		0.8125***		0.6264***	
	(0.0429)		(0.0456)		(0.0493)	
Francoist level 1		−1.1129***		−1.5840***		−1.0659***
		(0.1407)		(0.1709)		(0.1742)
Francoist level 2		−0.4903***		−0.7680***		−0.5798***
		(0.1741)		(0.1718)		(0.1702)
Francoist level 3		−0.3337**		−0.5836***		−0.1128
		(0.1631)		(0.1706)		(0.1733)
Francoist level 5		0.2318		0.1658		0.1225
		(0.1547)		(0.1522)		(0.1515)
Francoist level 6		0.5789***		0.3387**		0.3179*
		(0.1493)		(0.1658)		(0.1642)
Francoist level 7		1.1940***		1.1641***		1.0133***
		(0.1731)		(0.1633)		(0.1743)
Constant	2.3500***	2.3428***	2.9840***	3.1679***	2.5780***	2.6234***
	(0.0413)	(0.1056)	(0.0430)	(0.1161)	(0.0452)	(0.1116)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables capture identity components present in Francoist street names: (1) whether Francoist streets are a source of pride, (2) whether they are considered part of the city's identity, and (3) whether the renamings are perceived as going against the respondent's values. Each variable ranges from 1 ("completely against the statement") to 5 ("completely in favor of the statement"). All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A12: Social channel

	Social channel					
	Renamings polarize society		More urgent things to do		Everyone will get offended	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Francoist indicator	0.4787***		0.4538***		0.4475***	
	(0.0569)		(0.0519)		(0.0593)	
Francoist level 1		−1.0095***		−0.8193***		−0.9700***
		(0.1911)		(0.2040)		(0.1877)
Francoist level 2		−0.2366		−0.2701		−0.2621
		(0.1772)		(0.2026)		(0.1789)
Francoist level 3		−0.2169		−0.4020*		−0.4293**
		(0.1847)		(0.2142)		(0.1932)
Francoist level 5		0.2395		−0.0818		−0.0396
		(0.1725)		(0.1993)		(0.1842)
Francoist level 6		0.4376***		0.2729		0.2419
		(0.1684)		(0.1858)		(0.1720)
Francoist level 7		0.6130***		0.7676***		0.5505***
		(0.1906)		(0.1727)		(0.1997)
Constant	3.4260***	3.4525***	3.7460***	3.8243***	3.2580***	3.3899***
	(0.0476)	(0.1242)	(0.0515)	(0.1377)	(0.0493)	(0.1257)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables capture social perspectives regarding the renaming of Francoist street names: (1) whether the renamings are perceived as polarizing society, (2) whether respondents agree that there are more urgent matters to address, and (3) whether they believe such policies are futile because everyone will eventually be offended. Each variable ranges from 1 ("completely against the statement") to 5 ("completely in favor of the statement"). All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A13: Practical channel

	Practical channel			
	Renamings create confusion		Unnecessary expense	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Francoist indicator	0.5714***		0.6937***	
	(0.0523)		(0.0485)	
Francoist level 1		−1.0392***		−1.4657***
		(0.1872)		(0.1943)
Francoist level 2		−0.3964**		−0.5426***
		(0.1908)		(0.1911)
Francoist level 3		−0.3974**		−0.5500***
		(0.1997)		(0.1934)
Francoist level 5		0.1876		0.0692
		(0.1718)		(0.1695)
Francoist level 6		0.3116*		0.2118
		(0.1777)		(0.1869)
Francoist level 7		0.8961***		0.8989***
		(0.1879)		(0.1695)
Constant	3.2520***	3.3167***	3.3680***	3.5676***
	(0.0493)	(0.1272)	(0.0489)	(0.1258)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables capture practical concerns regarding the renaming of Francoist street names: (1) whether the renamings are perceived as creating confusion, and (2) whether they are viewed as an unnecessary expense. Each variable ranges from 1 ("completely against the statement") to 5 ("completely in favor of the statement"). All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A14: Comfort channel

	Comfort channel			
	Speaking with family or friends		Speaking with strangers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Francoist indicator	0.0395		0.1410**	
	(0.0601)		(0.0592)	
Francoist level 1		0.6385***		0.4854***
		(0.1954)		(0.1735)
Francoist level 2		0.0931		−0.0358
		(0.1805)		(0.1645)
Francoist level 3		−0.0799		0.0536
		(0.1870)		(0.1691)
Francoist level 5		0.0918		0.1316
		(0.1704)		(0.1675)
Francoist level 6		0.1766		0.2667
		(0.1808)		(0.1674)
Francoist level 7		0.6090***		0.8104***
		(0.1936)		(0.1787)
Constant	3.4180***	3.1996***	3.1440***	2.8996***
	(0.0496)	(0.1264)	(0.0475)	(0.1105)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500


Notes: The dependent variables capture how comfortable respondents feel when discussing the renaming of Francoist street names: (1) sharing their opinions with family and friends, and (2) sharing their opinions with strangers. Each variable ranges from 1 ("completely comfortable") to 5 ("completely uncomfortable"). All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A15: Vote change responses to the renaming of Francoist streets

	Change vote to the right	
	(1)	(2)
Francoist indicator	0.1448***	
	(0.0211)	
Francoist level 1		−0.1613*
		(0.0843)
Francoist level 2		−0.1624*
		(0.0867)
Francoist level 3		−0.0672
		(0.0880)
Francoist level 5		0.1070
		(0.0866)
Francoist level 6		0.1508*
		(0.0857)
Francoist level 7		0.2481***
		(0.0838)
Constant	0.4800***	0.4639***
	(0.0215)	(0.0631)
No. of observations	500	500

Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that equals 1 if a respondent changes their vote towards the right, and 0 otherwise. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A23: Identification of Francoist figures



This figure shows the familiarity of survey respondents in the City of Madrid with the different Francoist street names (left) and their replacements (right). On the left, respondents were asked to select the Francoist figures and slogans they recognized (they were not told that these were street names). I label the top 9 streets as salient and the rest as non salient. On the right, they identified street names they considered controversial. This comparison aims to determine whether voting behavior is influenced by reactions to the original Francoist names rather than the new ones. These list also falsely contain the name of Jordi Pujol (a leader of the Catalan independence movement) as a decoy.

Francoist Street Names

List of Francoist streets renamed by the municipality of Madrid in the year 2017, categorized into Salient and Non-Salient Francoist figures:

Salient Francoist Street Names:

- General Franco
- Caudillo
- Arriba Espana
- Caidos De La Division Azul
- General Mola
- General Moscardo
- General Yagüe
- General Millan Astray
- Capitan Haya

Non-Salient Francoist Street Names:

- General Varela
- Capitan Cortes
- General Aranda
- General Davila
- General Rodrigo
- Carlos Ruiz
- General Garcia De La Herranz
- Batalla De Belchite
- Crucero Baleares
- Veintiocho De Marzo
- Comandante Zorita
- General Romero Basart
- Cirilo Martin Martin
- General Sagardia Ramos
- General Saliquet
- Arco De La Victoria
- Alcalde Conde De Mayalde
- Puerto De Los Leones
- Munoz Grandes
- Juan Pujol
- El Algabeno
- General Orgaz
- Hermanos Garcia Noblejas
- Heroes Del Alcazar
- Hermanos Falco Y Alvarez De Toledo
- General Fanjul
- Angel Del Alcazar
- Manuel Sarrion
- Aunos
- Juan Vigon
- Eduardo Aunos
- Doctor Vallejo Nagera
- General Kirkpatrick
- Fernandez Ladreda
- Jose Luis De Arrese
- Emilio Jimenez Millas
- Primero De Octubre
- Gobernador Carlos Ruiz
- General Asensio Cabanilla
- Cerro De Garabitas
- Jose Luis De Arrese
- General Garcia Escamez
- Almirante Francisco Moreno

B Data Appendix

This appendix provides further description of data sources, variable definitions and the construction of the datasets.

B.1 Francoist street names

I obtain data on street names from the Cartography of the Censal Sections and Electoral Census Street Map of the National Institute of Statistics of Spain (INE). This database provides the geographical location of each censal section (namely, neighborhood) as well as the street map of Spain, containing all information that fully identifies the street branches that belong to each neighborhood. Importantly, this dataset also contains the denomination of the streets in the different vernacular languages. This data is available from 2001.

I use several sources to collect the list of Francoist words. The first one comes from the work by Oto-Peralias (2018), where he identifies 30 Francoist street names. Second, I collect additional Francoist names from lists provided by several city council in Spain as well as news articles documenting them. The final list of Francoist streets with their corresponding sources is show in B1:

Given the absence of a comprehensive database documenting all Francoist figures and events in the street gazetteer, the list may not capture every Francoist reference. However, it should offer a reasonable overview of the prevalence of Francoist names in Spain. One could also argue whether certain streets should be classified as Francoist. For my study, the perception of a street as Francoist is sufficient, as this ambiguity enhances my ability to examine how the prominence of Francoist figures may influence populist voting as explained in Section 4.3.1.

B.2 Sample construction

In my empirical strategy, I use the information of Francoist streets in two different ways. First, I assess how a mayor's political leaning influences the likelihood of renaming Francoist streets at the municipal level. Second, I estimate the impact of Francoist street renaming on voting behavior at the neighborhood level. To conduct these analyses, I merge the panel dataset on street names with electoral outcome data from the Ministry of the Interior. The first analysis does not require any sample restrictions. Here, the new dataset provides information on voting outcomes and the number of Francoist streets over the years at the municipal level. The second analysis, however, requires some sample restriction, as neighborhoods may not maintain constant geographical boundaries over time.

Neighborhoods in Spain are defined by population size, typically ranging from 500 to 2,000 inhabitants. Hence, as populations grow, new neighborhoods are created, leading to

a methodological challenge: ensuring consistent tracking of neighborhoods over time in a panel dataset. When a neighborhood's population increases and surpasses a threshold, it is subsequently divided into two. Thus, it is essential to account for these changes when creating the final sample. Hence, I restrict the sample to neighbourhoods that have not changed over the whole dataset.

Francoist street names, introduced during the dictatorship, were predominantly found in city centers. Over time, as the population grew, cities expanded and new neighborhoods emerged. However, the densely populated central neighborhoods remained largely unchanged. As a result, restricting the sample to these central neighborhoods does not pose a significant threat to the study's validity, since most Francoist streets remained in neighbourhoods that experienced little to no change.

Francoist street names	**Source**
6 de octubre	Toledo Diario (2023)
Agustín Flamarique	20minutos (2008)
Amadeo Marco	Nabarralde (2009)
Alcalde Conde de Mayalde	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Alferez Provisional	La Razón (2022)
Almirante Francisco Moreno	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Alfonso Churruca	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Almirante Vierna	El Diario (2022)
Alvarez Entrena	Ayuntamiento de Callosa de Segura (2018)
Alzamiento	Oto-Peralias (2018)
Ángel María Pascual	Naiz (2016)
Angel de Alcazar	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Arco de la Victoria	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Arriba España	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Arrese	Noticias de Navarra (2021*a*)
Aunós	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Barrie de la Maza	La Voz de Galicia (2021)
Batalla de Belchite	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Bellido Ahumanda	
Benjumea	Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (2017)
Bermudez de Castro	Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (2017)
Blanco Rajoy	El Español (2019)
Brunete	Lanza Digital (2023)
Canalejo	El Español (2019)
Canovas Lacruz	La Región (2016)
Capitán Cortés	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Capitán Garcia Galego	La Razón (2022)
Capitán Haya	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Carlos Pinilla	El Diario (2020)
Carmen Polo	Noticias de Navarra (2021*a*)
Carrero Blanco	El Diario Cantabria (2022)
Cecilio Lopez	Mi Ciudad Real (2016)
Cerro Garabitas	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Cirilo Martín	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Comandante Barja	El Español (2019)
Comandante Zorita	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Conde Rodezno	Noticias de Navarra (2021*b*)

Francoist street names	**Source**
Coronele Beorlegui	20minutos (2008)
Crucero Baleares	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Delicado Marañon	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Dieciocho de julio	Oto-Peralias (2018)
División Azul	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Doctor Vallejo-Nájera	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
El Algabeño	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Engelhardt	Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (2017)
Estanislao Gomez	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Falange	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Farina Ferreno	El Español (2019)
Faustino Garralda	Nabarralde (2009)
Federico Mayo	Naiz (2016)
Federico Servet	La Razón (2022)
Felipe Sánchez	VigoÉ (2018)
Fernández Ladreda	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Franco	Oto-Peralias (2018)
Garcia Herranz	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Garcia Morato	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
García Escámez	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
García Valiño	La Tinta de Almansa (2020)
General Aranda	Oto-Peralias (2018)
General Asensio	Toledo Diario (2023)
General Cabanillas	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Davila	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Fanjul	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Kirkpatrick	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Lafuente	El Diario (2020)
General Mola	Oto-Peralias (2018)
General Moral	Oto-Peralias (2018)
General Moscardo	Oto-Peralias (2018)
General Orgaz	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Queipo de Llano	Oto-Peralias (2018)
General Ramiro Ledesma	Oto-Peralias (2018)
General Rodrigo	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Romero Basart	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Sagardía Ramos	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)

Francoist street names	**Source**
General Sanjurjo	Oto-Peralias (2018)
General Saliquet	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Torres	La Razón (2022)
General Varela	Oto-Peralias (2018)
General Vigon	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Yague	Oto-Peralias (2018)
Generalisimo	Oto-Peralias (2018)
Gobernador Carlos Ruiz	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Gómez Zamalloa	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
González Galarza	
Héroes del Alcázar	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Hermanos García Noblejas	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Hermanos Imaz	Noticias de Navarra (2021*b*)
Jose Calvo Sotelo	Oto-Peralias (2018)
Jose Diaz de Mendivil	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Jose Luis Arrese	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
José Díaz de Mendívil	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
José Lejarreta	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
José Mina	Nabarralde (2009)
Juan Pujol	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Los Caidos	Oto-Peralias (2018)
Lucio Arrieta	20minutos (2008)
Luis María Uriarte	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Luis Valero	Government of Navarre (2019)
Manuel Fraga	
Manuel Sagastizábal	Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (2017)
Manuel Sarrión	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Mártires	
Mártires Tradición	
Mariano Mota	Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (2017)
Millan Astray	Oto-Peralias (2018)
Molina Brandao	La Voz de Galicia (2021)
Mora-Figueroa	La Razón (2022)
Morales León	Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (2017)
Onesimo Redondo	Oto-Peralias (2018)
Ozores Arraiz	El Español (2019)
Paso Duende	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)

Francoist street names	**Source**
Pedro Asua	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Pedro Orbea	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Pepín Rivero	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Plácido Careaga	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Planells Riera	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Plaza de Emilio Jiménez Millas	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Pío Loperena	Nabarralde (2009)
Ponte Anido	El Español (2019)
Primero de Octubre	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Primo de Ribera	Oto-Peralias (2018)
Puerto de los Leones	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Ramiro de Maeztu	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Rafael Sánchez Mazas	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Ruiz de Alda	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Salas Pombo	Salamanca RTV al Día (2019)
Salgado Torres	El Español (2019)
Salvador y Merino	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Santiago Gómez	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Solchaga	Government of Navarre (2019)
Teijeiro	El Español (2019)
Torpedero Tucumán	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Plus Ultra	Toledo Diario (2023)
Veintiocho de Marzo	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Victor Pradera	Naiz (2016)
Vicente Abreu	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Vicente Manterola	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Vilela Garate	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Zumalacarregui	González de Langarica Mendizábal & López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)

Table B1: Francoist street names and sources

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