Misperceptions of Social Norms in Corruption*

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Abstract

This paper investigates the role of misperceptions in social norms surrounding corruption in shaping political beliefs and voting behavior. Using a survey experiment, we examine how voters' beliefs about others' attitudes toward corruption influence their support for incumbents. We find that many voters misperceive these norms, despite the incentivized question. When provided with accurate information about social norms, we observe that voters update their posterior beliefs and voting behavior. Specifically, we observe a backfiring effect among those who initially held more optimistic views about others' intolerance toward corruption. In contrast, no effects were observed for those with more severe initial views. We also found an interplay between social norms and party identity. This study offers new insights into how misperceptions of social norms regarding corruption can influence political beliefs and voting behavior, with significant implications for electoral accountability in democracies.

1 Introduction

Democracy constitutes a crucial driver of modern economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2019). However, democratic values can be undermined by corruption, which erodes trust in institutions and distorts the political process. Corruption manifests through various channels,

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including the misuse of public resources for personal or political gain, and is more prominent in developing countries (Svensson, 2006; Olken and Pande, 2012). Understanding the dynamics of corruption is, therefore, essential for ensuring that democratic systems function effectively and promote economic development.

The standard political agency model predicts that providing voters with information about incumbents' past performance disciplines politicians by increasing electoral accountability (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Besley, 2006). This theoretical prediction has received empirical support. For instance, Ferraz and Finan (2008) showed that disseminating audit results before elections reduced incumbents' re-election probabilities in Brazilian municipalities with high corruption violations. Although audits only had a short-term reduction in corruption in Puerto Rico (Bobonis et al., 2016), the corruption levels of municipalities audited in the past tend to be lower in Brazil (Avis et al., 2018). However, recent experimental studies show a more nuanced picture (Chong et al., 2015; Boas et al., 2019; Adida et al., 2020; Arias et al., 2022; Figueiredo et al., 2023). For example, Chong et al. (2015) found that informing voters about corruption not only reduced support for the incumbent party but also led to declines in voter turnout and opposition party support. In addition, Arias et al. (2022) found that informing voters of incumbent malfeasance *increased* the incumbent's vote share, especially among those with unfavorable prior beliefs.

This paper argues that understanding the social norms of corruption is vital to explaining these mixed results. Using an overlapping-generations model with interactions, Acemoglu and Jackson (2015) show that social norms of low cooperation can become self-perpetuating when prominent agents are rare. As an application of their model considering corruption in the police force, corruption among police officers may persist if they expect others to be corrupt. Corbacho et al. (2016) also regard corruption as a self-fulfilling prophecy. To test this idea, they conducted an experiment in Costa Rica in which they randomly distributed a flyer showing that an increasing number of Costa Ricans had directly observed an act of corruption. They found that the treatment increased the proportion of respondents willing to bribe by 28%, compared to the control group

In this paper, we study the social norms about corruption in the political context. Between 2023 and 2024, Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) faced a major scandal

as prominent factions, including ex-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's, failed to report about 6.5 million U.S. dollars (USD) in political funds. Some factions allegedly assigned ticket-selling quotas for fundraising events, refunding excess revenue as kickbacks. These refunds were not recorded in individual funding reports, raising suspicions that they had become personal slush funds. In the October 2024 general election, the LDP and its coalition partner Komeito lost their majority in the House of Representatives, marking their first failure to secure a Lower House majority since 2009.

During the election, we conducted an online survey experiment among Japanese voters to study the interplay between social norms about corruption and voters' beliefs and voting behavior. In the baseline survey, we elicited voters' prior beliefs about others' attitudes toward corruption. Specifically, using an incentivized question, we asked respondents about the fraction of individuals who are intolerant of the slush fund issue. This question was designed to help us understand how much people are willing to punish the corrupt incumbent, as predicted by the standard political agency model.[1] Analyzing their responses revealed significant misperceptions in these beliefs.

Next, we randomly provided the treatment group with accurate information about social norms regarding attitudes toward corruption. This led to significant shifts in these beliefs, particularly among those with initially optimistic views. However, instead of reducing support for the corrupt incumbent, the information treatment produced a backfiring effect: their support for the incumbent increased. In contrast, the treatment had minimal impact on those who initially held more severe views.

To further understand the mechanism behind the backfire effect, we examined the interplay between social norms and political identity. First, we found that those who held optimistic views tended to be supporters of the LDP, although our results still hold *within* this group. Second, the treatment effect was larger for these individuals. These results suggest that learning that others are more intolerant of corruption than previously believed leads them to anticipate that their preferred incumbent faces a higher risk of electoral defeat. This perceived threat motivates them to increase their support for the incumbent as a form of defensive behavior (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Jost, 2004). We found supporting evidence

[1] We also asked about the prevalence of corruption and conducted an analysis 'a la Corbacho et al. (2016) and Arias et al. (2022).

for this mechanism.

Related literature: Misperceptions of social norms are documented in various settings, and correcting them has been shown to affect behavioral outcomes, such as protest participation (Cantoni et al., 2019), female labor participation (Bursztyn et al., 2020), canvassing behavior (Hager et al., 2023), and willingness to act against climate change (Andre et al., 2024).[2] In political contexts, previous research has shown misperceptions between peers, such as partisan differences in political opinions (Chambers et al., 2005; Ahler, 2014; Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016), the share of party-stereotypical groups in parties (Ahler and Sood, 2018), closeness of the election (Gerber et al., 2020), and others' voting behavior (Carlson and Hill, 2022). To these strands of literature, this study provides new evidence that beliefs about corruption-related social norms are misperceived, especially among supporters of the political party implicated in corruption. In addition, we show that correcting such beliefs changes their posterior beliefs and voting behavior.

This study is also related to the literature on electoral accountability, especially that evaluates the impact of randomly disseminating politicians' past performance to voters using field or survey experiments (Banerjee et al., 2011; Chong et al., 2015; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2017; Buntaine et al., 2018; Adida et al., 2020; Cruz et al., 2020; Arias et al., 2022; Figueiredo et al., 2023). In contrast to these studies, this study does not directly provide the past performance of incumbent politicians; instead, we offer the correct information on social norms regarding attitudes toward incumbents' malfeasance. The most related study, Corbacho et al. (2016), found that providing information about the prevalence of corruption in society increased the proportion of those willing to bribe. In contrast to their study, our study focuses on the political context. Guided by the standard political agency model, we analyze second-order beliefs about others' willingness to punish the malfeasant incumbent. Our primary outcomes are posterior political beliefs and voting behavior, rather than the willingness to bribe.

[2] Bursztyn and Yang (2022) provides a nice review of recent literature.

2 Background

Between 2023 and 2024, Japan faced a significant political scandal involving the LDP. The scandal was initially uncovered by the communist newspaper *Akahata Shimbun*, which reported financial irregularities within LDP factions, including ex-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's faction (Akahata Shimbun, 2022). A year later, major media outlets, including *NHK*, revealed that the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office was conducting voluntary interviews with individuals responsible for the issue (NHK, 2023).

The investigation revealed that the Abe, Nikai, and Kishida factions failed to report over 970 million Japanese yen (JPY) (approximately 6.5 million USD, at an exchange rate of 1 USD = 150 JPY) in their political funding reports over five years, up to 2022 (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2024). It is alleged that in the Abe and Nikai factions, participating politicians were assigned quotas to sell tickets for political fundraising events. Any revenue exceeding these quotas was allegedly refunded as kickbacks to those who collected the funds. These refunded amounts were not recorded in the politicians' political funding reports, leaving their use unclear and drawing criticism that they may have been turned into personal slush funds.

The public reacted with widespread disapproval, as evidenced by the LDP's approval ratings plummeting to 21% by February 2024—the lowest for the party since its return to power in 2012 (Asahi Shimbun, 2024). The scandal had profound electoral consequences. In the October 2024 general election, the LDP, along with its coalition partner Komeito, lost its majority in the House of Representatives. The LDP's seat count dropped from 237 to 191, marking its first failure to secure a Lower House majority since 2009. Of those involved in the fraud issue who ran for office in this election, 28 out of 46 lost. This outcome was a severe blow to Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, who had assumed office on October 1, 2024.

3 Experimental Design

3.1 Sample

The pre-registered experiment (AEARCTR-0014635) took place between October 18th and 28th, 2024, while the election occurred on October 27th. We conducted the experiment in collaboration with *Myvoice Inc.*. The target population consisted of 2,800 registered individ-

uals aged between their 20s and 60s in target constituencies in Japan. These constituencies were divided into two types, both of which had incumbent candidates from the LDP: *Fraud Districts*, where the incumbent politicians were involved in the slush fund issue, and *Clean Districts*, where the incumbent politicians were not involved. We determined this target sample size through a power calculation described in the Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP). The final sample includes 10 Fraud Districts and 15 Clean Districts. The details of the selection process for the target constituencies are provided in Section A.1 of the Online Appendix. As shown in Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix, these constituencies are not concentrated on a particular region.

Due to limitations in the demographic characteristics of the survey company's registered sample pool, we conducted stratified sampling based on constituency types rather than individual characteristics.

3.2 Survey procedures

This study involved three surveys: the baseline, post-treatment, and endline surveys. We conducted the baseline survey between the 18th and 23rd, the information intervention and post-treatment survey between the 25th and 26th, and the endline survey between the 28th and 31st. The election took place on the 27th (Sunday). Participants were informed at the outset that the surveys were related to the upcoming election, conducted for academic research by university researchers, and that no moral judgment would be made based on their responses. To avoid the experimenter demand effect, the general but specific purpose of the surveys was disclosed. Participant anonymity was guaranteed, and they were free to withdraw from the experiment at any time.

To incentivize completion, we limited the number of survey questions as much as possible and kept the questions clear and straightforward to avoid complications or confusion.[3] Furthermore, in addition to a baseline participation reward, payments increased toward the end of the experiment. By completing all surveys, participants could earn up to 65 points (one point is equivalent to one JPY).

We also incentivized certain questions, including primary outcomes, to encourage truth-

[3] The baseline survey, which includes the most questions, contains only 11 questions and is designed to be completed within 5 minutes.

telling and minimize the experimenter demand effect. Questions were incentivized by informing participants in advance that questions with a special icon were bonus questions, and 100 participants who answered them correctly would receive an additional 100 points.

Screening & Baseline survey (October 18th): Before conducting the baseline survey, screening questions were administered. The screening questions included postal code, whether the respondent had already voted in early voting, and an attention-check question. Those who did not live in the target constituencies, had already voted, or did not pass the attention-check question did not continue to the baseline survey. For those who proceeded to the baseline survey, we asked about their demographics and questions related to politics and policy. Importantly, one question asked about respondents' beliefs regarding the fraction of other voters who consider the fraud issue unacceptable. This question was incentivized, and its responses were used in the information treatment. The baseline survey included a total of 11 questions.

Intervention & Post-treatment survey (October 25th): We first provided the treatment group with information about other voters' attitudes toward corruption (the details are explained in Section 4.1). In contrast, the control group proceeded without receiving any additional information. The post-treatment survey was administered immediately afterward and included three primary outcomes of interest. The first two questions assessed the respondent's posterior beliefs about others' voting behavior in the same constituency: the respondent's belief about the fraction of voters who *will* vote for the incumbent candidate, and her belief about the fraction of voters who *should* vote for the incumbent candidate. We refer to the first outcome as *behavior norms* and the second as *normative norms* in the following analysis. The third question asked about the respondent's own voting behavior, particularly the likelihood of her voting for the incumbent candidate.

We also asked questions related to the valence (competence) and trustworthiness of the incumbent candidate, the extent to which the respondent believes she is pivotal, and her support for policies or NGOs that aim to increase transparency in political funding.

There were a total of eight questions, of which those about beliefs regarding others' voting behavior and the valence and trustworthiness of the incumbent candidate were incentivized.

The same set of questions was asked of both treatment and control groups.

Endline survey (October 28th): The endline survey asked two questions: whether the respondent voted, and if so, which political party candidate she voted for.

All survey questions (originally in Japanese) and their English translations are provided in the Online Appendix.

3.3 Balance and attrition

We conducted a statistical test (t-test) to check the balance between the treatment and control groups. The variables used to check the balance were pre-specified in the PAP. Table A.1 in the Online Appendix shows that all variables, except for education attainment, are balanced at a false discovery rate of 0.05. Following the PAP, we included this variable as a baseline control in the subsequent regression analyses.

We also checked the balance between attritors and non-attritors using the same set of variables. Table A.2 in the Online Appendix shows the result. First, the number of attritors after the treatment is minimal (95/2280 or 4%). Second, the table shows that all variables, except gender and marital status, are balanced at a false discovery rate of 0.05. As pre-specified in the PAP, we computed bounds using the method proposed by Lee (2009).

The summary statistics of the final sample is provided in Table A.3 in the Online Appendix.

4 Empirical Strategy

In the regression analysis, we estimate the following regression:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta T_i + \mathbf{X}_i \gamma + \varepsilon_i, \tag{1}$$

for individual i, where y_i is the outcome, T_i is the treatment indicator, $\mathbf{X}_i$ is a vector of control variables, and ε_i is the error term. The control variables include the baseline control variable and prefecture fixed effects. We use a randomized experiment to estimate the causal effect

β.

4.1 The information treatment

To measure respondents' prior beliefs regarding others' attitudes toward corruption, we asked about the fraction of other voters who are intolerant of the slush fund issue in the baseline survey. The answers to this question were used to create the intervention screen.

Figure 1 shows the intervention screen, which indicates that 67% of participants answered that the slush fund issue is unacceptable. We provided this information to the treatment group at the intervention stage, while the control group proceeded without receiving any additional information.

5 Results

5.1 Misperception in curruption-related norms

Each voter holds prior beliefs about other voters' attitudes toward corruption, but these beliefs may not always be accurate. For example, voters may incorrectly perceive that other voters are *more* tolerant of corruption than they actually are. Conversely, they might perceive that other voters are *less* tolerant of corruption than they actually are.

Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows respondents' prior beliefs about other voters' corruption intolerance, with the vertical line indicating the mean (correct) value. First, the distribution is skewed, suggesting that a high fraction of respondents believe that many other voters are *not* tolerant of corruption. However, the distribution is widely spread, with some voters holding more optimistic views than others.

5.2 Effects of the information treatment

As seen, intolerance norms tend to be misperceived by many voters. This suggests that accurate knowledge of others' intolerance levels could influence respondents' posterior beliefs about others' voting behavior as well as their own voting decisions. The following analysis examines how our information treatment affected these beliefs and behavior.

5.2.1 Posterior beliefs about others' voting behavior

Main effects: Table 1 shows the main effects of the information treatment. It indicates that providing accurate information about intolerance norms, on average, *increases* respondents' posterior beliefs about others' voting behavior in the treatment group. The estimated coefficients suggest that knowing the correct social norms regarding intolerance levels leads individuals to believe that 6% more people will vote for the incumbent candidate (behavior norm) and 7% more people should vote for the incumbent candidate (normative norm). In the following, we will conduct further analyses, pre-registered in the PAP, to understand these findings.

Heterogeneity: As discussed in Section 5.1, intolerance norms are widely misperceived. We examine whether the effect of our treatment varies by how social norms about intolerance levels are (mis)perceived.

Figure 3 shows the conditional marginal effects of the treatment variable. Panels (a) and (b) use behavior and normative norms as the dependent variables, respectively. The figure illustrates that the positive main effects observed earlier are primarily driven by individuals with optimistic prior beliefs—those who tend to believe others are more tolerant of corruption than they actually are. In contrast, no visible effect is found for individuals with severe prior beliefs.

This result is also confirmed in the regression analysis. Table 2 presents the sub-sample analysis, where the sample is divided into two groups based on respondents' prior beliefs. Columns (1) and (5) show that the treatment effect is absent for those who believe others are less tolerant of corruption, i.e., those above 67 in Figure 2. In contrast, the results in Columns (2) and (6) indicate that the positive main effects are observed only among those who believe others are more tolerant of corruption. The treatment increases beliefs about others' voting behavior by 13 to 14 percent.

5.2.2 Voting behavior

Voting for the incumbent candidate: Correcting beliefs about other voters' intolerance levels may affect not only respondents' posterior beliefs about others' voting behavior but also

their own voting behavior. To examine the effect on voting behavior, we asked participants about their decision to vote for the incumbent candidate both just before and after the election.

In contrast to posterior beliefs about others' voting behavior, the nature of this question makes it difficult to incentivize the responses.[4] At a minimum, we conducted surveys just before and after the election, allowing participants to give as realistic answers as possible to minimize self-reporting bias. Although we consider their post-election survey responses (asked the day after the election) to be closer to their actual voting behavior, we also report the results based on their declared choice before the election.

Investigating the relationship between respondents' posterior belief measures about others' voting behavior and their decision to vote for the incumbent candidate in Table 3 reveals that the voting variables are highly correlated with the belief measures. Moreover, our preferred measure of voting behavior in Columns (3) and (4) shows stronger predictive power, which is reassuring.

We conducted a similar regression analysis using these voting variables. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 4. Columns (2) and (6) do not show clear evidence that the information treatment affects voting outcomes for this sample. However, as we will discuss later, using the full sample masks important heterogeneity.

Turnout: Next, we analyzed the effect of the information treatment on respondents' turnout decisions in Panel B of Table 4. The table shows that the information treatment increased turnout for individuals with high prior beliefs (Columns (1) and (5)). Since the treatment did not affect posterior beliefs for individuals with high prior beliefs, as shown in Table 2, we do not provide a detailed analysis of turnout results for this group. Although we found that the treatment increased turnout for individuals with lower prior beliefs in Column (2) when voting decisions were asked before the election, this effect is absent when the questions were asked after the election (Column (6)).

[4] We considered using methods like the Bayesian Trust Serum (Prelec, 2004) to incentivize participants to report their beliefs when the truth is not verifiable. However, we decided against using it in our survey due to concerns that the complexity of the method could lead to attrition. Charness et al. (2021) discusses various strategies to elicit beliefs from this perspective.

5.3 Mechanism

To understand these main findings, we conducted additional analyses on the interplay between social norms and party identity. The analyses based on party identity are pre-registered in the PAP.

In Section 5.1, we found that some voters tend to make lenient judgments about the corrupt behavior of the LDP incumbent. Further analysis reveals that the distribution of these beliefs systematically varies by respondents' supporting party. Panel (b) of Figure 2 illustrates that ruling-party supporters are more likely to believe others are *more tolerant* of corruption compared to opposition-party supporters (mean for ruling-party supporters: 62; mean for opposition-party supporters: 70; the difference in means: p-value < 0.001).[5] Moreover, Figure A.2 in the Online Appendix shows that this specific distribution for ruling-party supporters is primarily driven by LDP supporters. In other words, the results clearly indicate that party supporters responsible for corruption tend to make lenient judgments about it.

These results may raise concerns that the heterogeneous effects of misperception on posterior beliefs are merely a reflection of party identity. To address this, we restricted the sample to ruling-party or LDP supporters and repeated the same analyses as before.

The first column of Table 5 reproduces the estimated coefficients from Columns (3) and (4) in Table 1, while the subsequent columns use restricted samples. Starting with the second column, which restricts the sample to ruling-party supporters, we find results similar to those from the full sample. Restricting the sample to LDP supporters in the third column also yields similar results. However, the effect size becomes larger for these sub-samples (19 to 22 percent) compared to the full sample (13 to 14 percent). Moreover, Figure A.3 in the Online Appendix shows that restricting the sample to LDP supporters results in similar marginal effects of the treatment variable as before. Finally, the regression analysis reveals comparable results, as shown in Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) of Table 2.

These results indicate that ruling-party supporters, particularly LDP supporters, are the key drivers of the main effects, and that heterogeneous effects of misperception also exist within such voters. Among them, those with lower prior beliefs tend to support the

[5] The mean value for those who do not support any particular party tends to be similar to that of opposition-party supporters (mean: 69; the difference in means: p-value $= 0.63$).

incumbent candidate more than their peers with higher prior beliefs.

By contrast, other groups—opposition-party supporters and those who do not support any particular party—do not show strong main effects (Table 5). We found a significant, albeit weak, effect only when the normative norm is used as the dependent variable (Columns (4) and (5) in Panel B of Table 5). However, this effect disappears when the sample is restricted to those in fraud districts, although effects for ruling-party or LDP supporters in such districts remain (Table A.4 in the Online Appendix).

Next, we examined the effect on voting behavior. Regarding the likelihood of voting for the incumbent, we initially found that the full sample does not show evidence that the information treatment affects voting outcomes (Columns (2) and (6) of Panel A in Table 4). However, restricting the sample to ruling-party supporters (Columns (3) and (7) of Panel A) and LDP supporters (Columns (4) and (8) of Panel A) reveals that the treatment increases the likelihood of voting for the incumbent by 17 to 25 percent.[6] In contrast, the treatment did not affect turnout decisions for these sub-samples (Panel B in Table 4).

In summary, voters' prior beliefs about others' intolerance of corruption are closely tied to party identity. Correcting these beliefs by informing them that others are *less* tolerant of corruption triggers a backfire effect, likely driven by those who support incumbents implicated in a political scandal. However, this correction does not impact these voters' turnout decisions.

5.3.1 Other outcomes

Although our primary outcomes are respondents' posterior beliefs about others' voting behavior and their own voting behavior, we also examined the effect on other outcomes as specified in the PAP.

Policy Support and Donations: First, we analyzed the effect on respondents' support for a policy promoting more transparent political funding and their donations to an NGO working to enhance transparency, as shown in Table 6. For these outcomes, we did not observe a treatment effect for those who changed their posterior beliefs and voting behavior,

[6] Although not shown in the table, these supporters do not change their voting behavior if their prior beliefs are *above* the actual value.

according to Tables 4 and 5.

Political Attitudes: Second, we used three outcome variables to understand the psychology behind the backfire effect. The first outcome asks respondents about their belief regarding the fraction of voters in the same constituency who think the incumbent candidate is competent (Kendall et al., 2015). The second outcome asks about respondents' posterior belief regarding the fraction of voters in the same constituency who think the incumbent candidate is trustworthy (Chong et al., 2015). In addition, the third outcome asks about respondents' posterior belief that their vote influences the electoral result, measuring their perception of pivotality (Kawai and Watanabe, 2013).

The results in Columns (5) to (8) of Table 6 indicate that the treatment increases respondents' perceptions that more voters in the same constituency view the incumbent candidate as competent and trustworthy. These findings suggest that, in aligning their beliefs to support the incumbent, respondents tend to perceive the incumbent as more competent and trustworthy. Furthermore, Columns (9) and (10) show that the treatment strengthens respondents' belief in the influence of their vote, potentially increasing support for the incumbent.

6 Conclusion

Our findings highlight the importance of social norms in shaping political beliefs and voter behavior, particularly regarding corruption. While the standard political agency model suggests that information about corruption should reduce support for corrupt incumbents, we argue that this effect may depend on the prevailing social norms in society. Our study demonstrates that many voters misperceive these social norms. It also shows that correcting these misperceptions can influence voters' beliefs and voting behavior. The backfiring effect observed among those with optimistic views about corruption underscores the complexities of electoral accountability, as social norms and party identity seem to interact. Future research should explore how these dynamics unfold in different political contexts and how interventions can effectively promote electoral accountability without reinforcing undesirable behaviors.

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7 Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Information Treatment

This survey project brings together a diverse group of participants, whose responses can be said to represent the views and attitudes of the average voter in Japan. In the previous survey, participants were asked how many among them believe that "omissions in political fund reports and kickbacks from political funds" are "completely unacceptable" or "somewhat unacceptable."

As a result, it was found that out of 100 participants, 67 considered "omissions in political fund reports and kickbacks from political funds" to be either "completely unacceptable" or "somewhat unacceptable."






Figure 2: Distribution of Intolerance Norms




(a) Full sample




(b) By supporting party

Note: The figures show the distributions of intolerance norms. Panel (a) uses the distribution of intolerance norms using the full sample. Panel (b) shows the distribution of intolerance norms by supporting party. The group omitted in the second panel consists of those not supporting any particular party and those unwilling to report a supporting party.

Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Information Treatment on Beliefs about Others' Voting Behavior



(a) Behavior norm



(b) Normative norm

Note: The figures show the conditional marginal effects of the treatment variable with the 95% confidence intervals using the *interflex* package (Hainmueller et al., 2019). Panel (a) uses the behavior norm as the dependent variable. Panel (b) uses the normative norm as the dependent variable. The distributions at the bottom of each panel show the distributions of intolerance norm. Baseline controls and prefecture fixed effects are included.

Table 1: Effects of Information Treatment on Beliefs about Others' Voting Behavior

	Dependent variable:			
	Behavior norm			Normative norm
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	3.103	3.047	2.933	3.150
	(0.954)***	(0.954)***	(0.957)***	(1.060)***
Baseline controls	no	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	no	no	yes	yes
Control mean	46.679	46.679	46.679	43.746
Control std.	(24.225)	(24.225)	(24.225)	(26.399)
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
N	2280	2280	2280	2280

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1)–(3) is the respondent's belief about the fraction of voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *will* vote for the incumbent candidate. In contrast, the dependent variable for Column (4) is the respondent's belief about the fraction of voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *should* vote for the incumbent candidate. Baseline controls include education attainment. *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$, respectively.

Table 2: Heterogeneous Effects of Information Treatment on Beliefs about Others' Voting Behavior: Prior Beliefs on Intolerance Norms

Dependent variable:	Behavior norm				Normative norm			
Sample:	Prior > Actual	Prior ≤ Actual			Prior > Actual	Prior ≤ Actual		
	Full	Full	LDP+Komei	LDP	Full	Full	LDP+Komei	LDP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.886	5.921	10.237	9.827	1.835	5.539	9.331	9.308
	(1.127)	(1.787)***	(3.277)***	(3.458)***	(1.270)	(1.921)***	(3.749)**	(3.961)**
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	49.323	42.170	47.236	47.692	44.669	42.172	48.250	47.658
Control std.	(23.340)	(25.050)	(24.494)	(23.235)	(25.692)	(27.517)	(28.189)	(26.768)
R^2	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.06
N	1508	772	206	177	1508	772	206	177

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1) to (4) is the respondent's belief about the fraction of voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *will* vote for the incumbent candidate. The dependent variable for Columns (5) to (8) is the respondent's belief about the fraction of voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *should* vote for the incumbent candidate. Baseline controls include education attainment. Columns (1) and (5) include individuals whose prior beliefs on intolerance norms are above the actual value. The remainder uses individuals whose prior beliefs on intolerance norms are below or equal to the actual value. Columns (3) and (7) restrict the sample to ruling-party supporters, and Columns (4) and (8) limit the sample to LDP supporters. *, **, and *** indicate $p<0.10$, $p<0.05$, and $p<0.01$, respectively.

Table 3: Correlation between Beliefs and Voting Behavior

	Dependent variable: Vote incumbent			
	Before election		After election	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Behavior norm	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
	(0.001)**	(0.001)*	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
Normative norm	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
Female		−0.061		−0.076
		(0.018)***		(0.021)***
Age		0.017		0.008
		(0.008)**		(0.010)
Education		−0.002		−0.001
		(0.005)		(0.005)
Log income		0.022		0.014
		(0.012)*		(0.014)
Married		0.071		0.089
		(0.017)***		(0.021)***
Control mean	0.226	0.226	0.307	0.307
Control std.	(0.419)	(0.419)	(0.461)	(0.461)
R^2	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05
N	2280	2280	2047	2047

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1) and (2) is the respondent's declaration to vote for the incumbent candidate, according to the baseline (pre-election) survey. The dependent variable for Columns (3) to (4) is the respondent's vote for the incumbent candidate, according to the post-election survey. Baseline controls include education attainment. *, **, and *** indicate p <0.10, p <0.05, and p <0.01, respectively.

Table 4: Heterogeneous Effects of Information Treatment on Voting Behavior: Prior Beliefs on Intolerance Norms

Sample:	Prior > Actual	Prior ≤ Actual			Prior > Actual	Prior ≤ Actual		
	Full	Full	LDP+Komei	LDP	Full	Full	LDP+Komei	LDP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A	Dep. var.: Vote incumbent (before election)				Vote incumbent (after election)			
Treatment	0.014	0.048	0.162	0.164	0.005	−0.005	0.172	0.123
	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.066)**	(0.069)**	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.065)***	(0.068)*
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	0.187	0.273	0.643	0.675	0.268	0.381	0.687	0.737
Control std.	(0.390)	(0.446)	(0.481)	(0.470)	(0.443)	(0.486)	(0.466)	(0.442)
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.01	0.09	0.09
N	1508	772	206	177	1361	686	197	171
Panel B	Dep. var.: Turnout (before election)				Turnout (after election)			
Treatment	0.093	0.122	0.013	0.035	0.080	0.032	0.028	0.023
	(0.025)***	(0.036)***	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.023)***	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.052)
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	0.551	0.554	0.850	0.838	0.701	0.721	0.896	0.886
Control std.	(0.498)	(0.498)	(0.358)	(0.370)	(0.458)	(0.449)	(0.307)	(0.319)
R^2	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.05
N	1508	772	206	177	1361	686	197	171

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In Panel A, the dependent variable for Columns (1) to (4) is the respondent's declaration to vote for the incumbent candidate, according to the baseline (pre-election) survey. The dependent variable for Columns (5) to (8) is the respondent's vote for the incumbent candidate, according to the post-election survey. In Panel B, the dependent variable for Columns (1) to (4) is the respondent's declaration to turn out, according to the baseline (pre-election) survey. The dependent variable for Columns (5) to (8) is the respondent's turnout decision, according to the post-election survey. Baseline controls include education attainment. Columns (1) and (5) include individuals whose prior beliefs on intolerance norms are above the actual value. The remainder uses individuals whose prior beliefs on intolerance norms are below or equal to the actual value. Columns (3) and (7) restrict the sample to ruling-party supporters, and Columns (4) and (8) limit the sample to LDP supporters. *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$, respectively.

Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects of Information Treatment on Beliefs about Others' Voting Behavior: Party Orientation

Sample:		Ruling			
	Full	LDP+Komei	LDP	Opposition	Swing
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A	Dependent variable: Behavior norm				
Treatment	2.933	6.681	6.248	3.829	1.473
	(0.957)***	(2.128)***	(2.339)***	(2.620)	(1.189)
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	46.679	49.826	50.833	46.897	46.430
Control std.	(24.225)	(24.445)	(23.454)	(23.816)	(23.717)
R^2	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01
N	2280	463	364	320	1392
Panel B	Dependent variable: Normative norm				
Treatment	3.150	5.858	5.857	4.930	2.270
	(1.060)***	(2.408)**	(2.687)**	(2.938)*	(1.312)*
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	43.746	48.613	49.131	42.697	43.038
Control std.	(26.399)	(27.544)	(26.443)	(26.785)	(25.542)
R^2	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.01
N	2280	463	364	320	1392

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Panel A is the respondent's belief about the fraction of voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *will* vote for the incumbent candidate. The dependent variable for Panel B is the respondent's belief about the fraction of voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *should* vote for the incumbent candidate. Baseline controls include education attainment. Column (1) uses the full sample. Column (2) includes individuals who support either the LDP or the Komei Party. Column (3) consists of individuals who support LDP. The sample for Column (4) is opposition-party supporters, while that for Column (5) is those who do not support any particular party. *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$, respectively.

Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects of Information Treatment on Other Outcomes

Dependent variable:	Policy support		Donation		Competent		Trustworthy		Pivotal	
Sample:	LDP+Komei	LDP	LDP+Komei	LDP	LDP+Komei	LDP	LDP+Komei	LDP	LDP+Komei	LDP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treatment	−0.016	−0.077	158.386	333.010	12.141	10.456	10.805	9.576	0.204	0.236
	(0.105)	(0.109)	(1135.945)	(1126.759)	(3.533)***	(3.849)***	(3.384)***	(3.654)***	(0.109)*	(0.118)**
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	2.757	2.803	3659.050	3241.598	31.529	32.479	33.221	33.821	2.636	2.624
Control std.	(0.748)	(0.710)	(8188.917)	(6506.688)	(24.801)	(25.273)	(24.750)	(25.158)	(0.779)	(0.763)
R^2	0.07	0.12	0.05	0.09	0.12	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.09
N	206	177	206	177	206	177	206	177	206	177

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1) and (2) is the respondent's support for a policy that makes political funding more transparent. The dependent variable for Columns (3) to (4) is the amount of donation (measured in JPY) to an NGO working to increase transparency in political funding. The dependent variable for Columns (5) and (6) are the respondent's belief about the fraction of voters in the same constituency who she thinks that the incumbent candidate is competent. The dependent variable for Columns (7) and (8) are the respondent's belief about the fraction of voters in the same constituency who she thinks that the incumbent candidate is trustworthy. The dependent variable for Columns (9) and (10) are the respondent's belief that her vote has an influence on the electoral result. Baseline controls include education attainment. In all regressions, the sample uses individuals whose prior beliefs on intolerance norms are below or equal to the actual value. Columns with *LDP+Komei* restrict the sample to ruling-party supporters, and Columns with *LDP* limit the sample to LDP supporters. *, **, and *** indicate p <0.10, p <0.05, and p <0.01, respectively.

Online Appendix for *Misperceptions of Social Norms in Corruption*

Shuhei Kitamura* Ryo Takahashi† Katsunori Yamada‡

Abstract: This supplementary material includes additional text, tables, figures, and the survey questionnaire. For references to the tables and figures, please refer to the main text.

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A.1 Sampling

The target constituencies consist of two types, both of whose incumbent candidates are from the LDP: Fraud Districts, where the incumbent politicians were found to have failed to report information in their political fund balance reports correctly, and Clean Districts, where the incumbent politicians were not involved.

We selected target constituencies to make clean comparisons by removing the influence of other factors. The starting number of incumbent candidates in the House of Representatives is 43, excluding eight individuals who did not run for office due to reasons such as suspension of civil rights, retirement, or health issues.[1] First, we excluded candidates who won through the proportional representation (PR) system (8) and focused on candidates who won in the single-member district (SD) system in the previous election.[2] Second, we excluded candidates related to another scandal involving the former Unification Church (16).[3] Third, we excluded those who would not be officially endorsed by the party in the election due to the fraud scandal (4) to avoid capturing this additional shock in our estimates. The number of candidates becomes 15.

Each of these 15 LDP candidates represents a single constituency in the SD system, who re-runs for office.[4] We further restricted constituencies based on the following criteria: (a) The constituency does not include any municipality split between multiple constituencies (3) and (b) The constituency is not significantly affected by the 2022 amendment to the Public Offices Election Law (1).

In prefectures where a Fraud District exists, we selected Clean Districts where the incumbent LDP candidates are not involved in the slush fund scandal and satisfy the above criteria. Finally, we excluded a Fraud District where Clean Districts do not exist within the same prefecture.

[1] This also excludes three individuals who ran for office but are not incumbent candidates in the House of Representatives: Younosuke Kano, Tamayo Marukawa, and Yasuhide Nakayama.

[2] Some PR election winners actually *lost* in the SD election, making comparisons difficult. PR candidates represent larger, multi-prefecture constituencies, which are very different from the local constituencies we consider. Furthermore, electoral outcomes in the PR system depend on the party's list, not necessarily representing local constituents' preferences.

[3] A scandal surrounding the Unification Church attracted significant attention in the 2020s, especially after the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in July 2022. The LDP has been accused of close ties with the Unification Church.

[4] Japan does not impose term limits for political office.

The final sample includes 10 Fraud Districts and 15 Clean Districts. As shown in Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix, these constituencies are not concentrated on a particular region: Iwate (Fraud District: 1; Clean District: 1), Tochigi (1,1), Saitama (1,4), Chiba (1,2), Tokyo (1,3), Ishikawa (1,1), Nagano (1,1), Aichi (2,2), and Mie Prefectures (1,1), where the first and second numbers in parentheses represent the number of Fraud and Clean Districts within each prefecture, respectively. In addition, the figure also shows that Fraud Districts are adjacent to Clean Districts in most prefectures.

The target population for the study consists of 2,800 registered individuals aged between 20s and 60s in these target constituencies. We derived this target number through the power calculation described in the Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP).

A.2 Figures and Tables

Figure A.1: Target Constituencies






Figure A.2: Distribution of intolerance norms




(a) LDP versus Opposition




(b) Komei versus Opposition

Note: The figures show the distributions of intolerance norms by supporting party. In Panel (a), LDP supporters are contrasted with opposition-party supporters. In Panel (b), Komei Party supporters are contrasted with the opposition-party supporters.

Figure A.3: Marginal Effects of Information Treatment on Beliefs about Others' Voting Behavior (LDP Supporters Only)



(a) Behavior norm



(b) Normative norm

Note: The figures show the conditional marginal effects of the treatment variable with the 95% confidence intervals using the *interflex* package (Hainmueller et al., 2019). Panel (a) uses the behavior norm as the dependent variable. Panel (b) uses the normative norm as the dependent variable. The distributions at the bottom of each panel show the distributions of intolerance norm. Baseline controls and prefecture fixed effects are included. The sample only includes LDP supporters.

Table A.1: Balance Check

	(1) Control	(2) Treatment	(1) vs. (2)	N
Female	0.397	0.374	0.278	2280
	(0.013)	(0.016)		
20s	0.026	0.021	0.457	2280
	(0.004)	(0.005)		
30s	0.081	0.060	0.058	2280
	(0.007)	(0.008)		
40s	0.212	0.204	0.613	2280
	(0.011)	(0.013)		
50s	0.337	0.358	0.301	2280
	(0.013)	(0.016)		
60s	0.344	0.358	0.502	2280
	(0.013)	(0.016)		
Education	14.044	14.318	0.001	2280
	(0.053)	(0.062)		
Married	0.576	0.595	0.366	2280
	(0.013)	(0.016)		
Log income	14.549	14.588	0.206	2280
	(0.019)	(0.023)		
N	1366	914		

Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. The third column shows p-values.

Table A.2: Attrition Check

	(1) Not attrited	(2) Attrited	(1) vs. (2)	N
Female	0.388	0.558	0.001	2375
	(0.010)	(0.051)		
20s	0.024	0.021	0.869	2375
	(0.003)	(0.015)		
30s	0.073	0.063	0.722	2375
	(0.005)	(0.025)		
40s	0.209	0.200	0.837	2375
	(0.009)	(0.041)		
50s	0.345	0.274	0.150	2375
	(0.010)	(0.046)		
60s	0.350	0.442	0.065	2375
	(0.010)	(0.051)		
Education	14.154	14.242	0.662	2375
	(0.041)	(0.181)		
Married	0.584	0.695	0.031	2375
	(0.010)	(0.047)		
Log income	14.565	14.459	0.153	2375
	(0.015)	(0.067)		
N	2280	95		

Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. The third column shows p-values.

Table A.3: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std	Min	p10	p50	p90	Max	N
A. Outcomes								
Behavior belief	47.92	23.01	0.00	5.00	50.00	75.00	100.00	2280
Norms belief	45.07	25.33	0.00	2.50	50.00	80.00	100.00	2280
Vote incumbent (before election)	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2280
Vote incumbent (after election)	0.31	0.46	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2047
Turnout (before election)	0.60	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2280
Turnout (after election)	0.74	0.44	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2047
Policy support	2.84	0.97	1.00	1.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	2280
Donation	2790.38	7928.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	10000.00	50000.00	2280
Competent	32.15	21.75	0.00	3.00	30.00	60.00	100.00	2280
Trustworthy	31.32	21.52	0.00	3.00	30.00	60.00	100.00	2280
Pivotal	2.37	0.81	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	2280
B. Treatment dummy								
Treatment	0.40	0.49	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2280
C. Covariates								
Female	0.39	0.49	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2280
20s	0.02	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	2280
30s	0.07	0.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	2280
40s	0.21	0.41	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2280
50s	0.35	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2280
60s	0.35	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2280
Education	14.15	1.93	9.00	12.00	14.00	16.00	16.00	2280
Married	0.58	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2280
Log income	14.56	0.71	12.61	13.53	14.63	15.42	17.91	2280

Table A.4: Heterogeneous Effects of Information Treatment on Beliefs about Others' Voting Behavior: Party Orientation (Fraud Districts Only)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		Ruling			
Sample:	Full (fraud only)	LDP+Komei	LDP	Opposition	Swing
Panel A	Dependent variable: Behavior norm				
Treatment	3.719	9.415	8.843	4.559	1.294
	(1.355)***	(3.064)***	(3.480)**	(3.637)	(1.680)
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	45.520	49.196	50.194	44.989	45.227
Control std.	(23.931)	(24.952)	(23.413)	(22.678)	(23.308)
R^2	0.01	0.07	0.04	0.09	0.00
N	1094	224	168	151	670
Panel B	Dependent variable: Normative norm				
Treatment	3.941	8.457	8.222	4.888	3.019
	(1.518)***	(3.329)**	(3.741)**	(4.064)	(1.877)
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	42.425	47.615	47.861	41.568	41.394
Control std.	(26.300)	(27.914)	(26.251)	(26.874)	(25.215)
R^2	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.22	0.02
N	1094	224	168	151	670

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Panel A is the respondent's belief about the fraction of voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *will* vote for the incumbent candidate. The dependent variable for Panel B is the respondent's belief about the fraction of voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *should* vote for the incumbent candidate. Baseline controls include education attainment. Column (1) uses the full sample of those who are in fraud districts. Column (2) includes individuals who support either LDP or Komei Party. Column (3) consists of individuals who support LDP. The sample for Column (4) is opposition-party supporters, while that for Column (5) is those who do not support any particular party. *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$, respectively.

A.3 Survey Questionnaire

A.3.1 English-translated Version

Screening & Baseline Survey - October 18th

As of July 14, 2024, please provide the postal code of your address listed on your certificate of residence.

※Please respond with a 7-digit number without a hyphen.

(　　)

Next　Back

In this House of Representatives election (national election), have you already voted during early voting?

○ Voted during early voting

○ Did not vote during early voting

In social surveys, it is important for respondents to fully understand the questions and provide their answers accordingly.

From the following options, please select "None of the above."

○ Employment

○ AI

○ 42

○ Globalization

○ None of the above

Thank you for accessing this survey page. This survey is being conducted by the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Osaka University, the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University, and the Faculty of Economics at Kinki University to understand public perceptions regarding elections.

This survey aims to academically investigate your thoughts and opinions leading up to the House of Representatives election.

The information you provide will be used only for academic research and not for any other purposes. The survey is anonymous, and your privacy will be fully protected. It is designed to understand your honest perspectives, without any judgment of right or wrong. We request your understanding in this regard and hope you are comfortable while answering the following questions.

In addition to this survey, some participants will be invited to complete additional surveys at approximately 6:00 PM on Friday, October 25, and Monday, October 28. This survey consists of 11 questions, while the survey on Friday, October 25, includes 8 questions, each expected to take about 5 minutes to complete. The survey on Monday, October 28, is a simple one with only 2 questions, which are expected to take no more than 2 minutes to complete.

Please note that if you leave the survey, any answers provided before your leave will still be submitted to the research team.

Furthermore, questions marked with the following icon are bonus questions. For these questions, after collecting responses from all participants in this survey for each question, 100 participants who answered correctly will be randomly selected to receive an additional 100 yen worth of points. Across the three surveys, there are a total of 5 bonus questions, allowing participants to earn up to 500 yen in bonus points.



If you are able to participate, we would greatly appreciate your cooperation in completing all the surveys.

Next Back

Q1. We would like to ask about your political values. Do you support any political party?

○ I support the Liberal Democratic Party.
○ I support another ruling party.
○ I support an opposition party.
○ I do not support any political party.
○ I prefer not to answer.

Q2. Regarding the upcoming House of Representatives election (national election), please select up to three issues that you personally consider important, in order of priority.

	Most important	Second most important	Third most important
	↓	↓	↓
Inflation	○	○	○
Declining birthrate	○	○	○
Aging population	○	○	○
Climate change and the environment	○	○	○
Fiscal policy	○	○	○
Foreign policy	○	○	○
Pension	○	○	○
Nuclear power and energy	○	○	○
	Most important	Second most important	Third most important
Constitutional amendment	○	○	○
Issues related to the former Unification Church	○	○	○
Politics and money/slush funds	○	○	○
Regional revitalization	○	○	○
Disaster relief	○	○	○
Others	○	○	○
There is no second/third important issues		○	○

Q3. Among the candidates in this House of Representatives election, which political party does the incumbent member of the House of Representatives in your constituency belong to?

○ Liberal Democratic Party
○ Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan
○ Japan Innovation Party
○ Komeito
○ Democratic Party for the People
○ Japanese Communist Party
○ Reiwa Shinsengumi
○ Social Democratic Party
○ Other parties/Independent
○ I don't know

Q4. In the previous House of Representatives election (2021), which party or independent candidate did you vote for?

○ Did not vote
○ Liberal Democratic Party
○ Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan
○ Japan Innovation Party
○ Komeito
○ Democratic Party for the People
○ Japanese Communist Party
○ Reiwa Shinsengumi
○ Social Democratic Party
○ Other parties/Independent
○ Other/Prefer not to answer

Q5. How frequently have you been exposed to election-related news since October of this year?
○ Almost every day
○ Several times a week
○ Rarely
○ Hardly at all

Q6. What percentage of Japanese politicians do you believe are involved in issues such as omissions in political fund balance reports or kickbacks from political funds?
(　　)%

Next　Back



Q7. This survey project brings together a diverse group of participants, whose responses can be said to represent the views and attitudes of the average voter in Japan.

Regarding the following question, how many out of 100 participants do you think answered "Completely unacceptable" or "Somewhat unacceptable"?

<Question>
To what extent can you tolerate issues such as omissions in political fund balance reports or kickbacks from political funds?

<Responses>
1. Completely unacceptable 2. Somewhat unacceptable 3. Somewhat acceptable 4. Completely acceptable

To the above question, I believe that (　　) out of 100 people answered "1. Completely unacceptable" or "2. Somewhat unacceptable."

Next　Back

Q8. What is your highest educational level?
○ Junior high school graduate
○ High school graduate
○ Junior college, technical college, or vocational school graduate
○ University or graduate school graduate

Next Back

Q9. What is your marital status?

○ Married

○ Single

○ Divorced/Widowed

Next Back

Q10. How many people live in your household?

○ 1 person (living alone)

○ 2 people

○ 3 people

○ 4 people

○ 5 people

○ 6 people

○ 7 or more people

Next Back

Q11. What was your household's annual income before taxes in 2023?

○ Less than 2 million yen

○ 2 million to less than 4 million yen

○ 4 million to less than 6 million yen

○ 6 million to less than 8 million yen

○ 8 million to less than 10 million yen

○ 10 million to less than 12 million yen

○ 12 million to less than 15 million yen

○ 15 million to less than 20 million yen

○ 20 million to less than 30 million yen

○ 30 million to less than 50 million yen

○ 50 million yen or more

Intervention & Post-treatment survey - October 25th

Thank you for accessing this survey page. This survey is being conducted by the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Osaka University, the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University, and the Faculty of Economics at Kinki University to understand public perceptions regarding elections.

This survey aims to academically investigate your thoughts and opinions leading up to the House of Representatives election.

The information you provide will be used only for academic research and not for any other purposes. The survey is anonymous, and your privacy will be fully protected. It is designed to understand your honest perspectives, without any judgment of right or wrong. We request your understanding in this regard and hope you are comfortable while answering the following questions.

Please note that if you leave the survey, any answers provided before your leave will still be submitted to the research team.

Furthermore, questions marked with the following icon are bonus questions. For these questions, after collecting responses from all participants in this survey for each question, 100 participants who answered correctly will be randomly selected to receive an additional 100 yen worth of points. Across the three surveys, there are a total of 5 bonus questions, allowing participants to earn up to 500 yen in bonus points.




If you are able to participate, we would greatly appreciate your cooperation in completing all the surveys.

Next Back

This survey project brings together a diverse group of participants, whose responses can be said to represent the views and attitudes of the average voter in Japan. In the previous survey, participants were asked how many among them believe that "omissions in political fund reports and kickbacks from political funds" are "completely unacceptable" or "somewhat unacceptable."

As a result, it was found that out of 100 participants, 67 considered "omissions in political fund reports and kickbacks from political funds" to be either "completely unacceptable" or "somewhat unacceptable."



Next Back



This survey project brings together a diverse group of participants, whose responses can be said to represent the views and attitudes of the average voter in Japan.

Q1. We would like to ask your opinion.
Regarding the following question, how many people out of 100 in your constituency, whom we surveyed, do you think answered that they "will vote" for the incumbent candidate in your constituency?

<Question>
Will you vote for the incumbent candidate in your constituency in this election?

<Responses>
1. Will vote 2. Will not vote

To the above question, I believe that (　　) out of 100 people answered "1. Will vote".



Q2. Similarly, we would like to ask your opinion.
Regarding the following question, how many people out of 100 in your constituency, whom we surveyed, do you think answered that they "should vote" for the incumbent candidate in your constituency?

<Question>
Do you think you “should vote” for the incumbent candidate in your constituency in this election?

<Answers>
1. Should vote 2. Should not vote

To the above question, I believe that (　　) out of 100 people answered "1. Should vote."



Q3. Similarly, we would like to ask your opinion.
Regarding the following question, how many people out of 100 in your constituency, whom we surveyed, do you think answered that the incumbent House of Representatives member (elected in the previous 2021 election) in their constituency is "very competent" or "competent"?

<Question>
How competent do you think the incumbent House of Representatives member (elected in the previous 2021 election) in your constituency is?

<Answers>
1. Not competent at all 2. Not competent 3. Competent 4. Very competent

To the above question, I believe that ( ) out of 100 people answered “4. Very competent” or “3. Competent”.



Q4. Similarly, we would like to ask your opinion.
Regarding the following question, how many people out of 100 in your constituency, whom we surveyed, do you think answered that the incumbent House of Representatives member (elected in the previous 2021 election) in their constituency is "very trustworthy" or "trustworthy"?

<Question>
How trustworthy do you think the incumbent House of Representatives member (elected in the previous 2021 election) in your constituency is?

<Answers>
1. Not trustworthy at all 2. Not trustworthy 3. Trustworthy 4. Very trustworthy

To the above question, I believe that ( ) out of 100 people answered “4. Very trustworthy” or “3. Trustworthy”.

Next Back

Q5. How much influence do you think your vote has on the election outcome?
○ Not at all
○ Not much
○ Some
○ A great deal

Next Back

Q6. In this House of Representatives election, will you vote in the single-member district for the incumbent candidate (elected in the previous 2021 election) in your constituency?

○ Vote for the incumbent
○ Vote for another candidate from the same party as the incumbent
○ Vote for a candidate from a different party or an independent candidate
○ Do not plan to vote
○ Not sure

Next Back

Q7. To what extent do you support policies that aim to make the flow of political funds more transparent, including legal reforms?

○ Do not support at all
○ Do not support much
○ Somewhat support
○ Strongly support

Next Back

Q8. Suppose you have 50,000 yen at your disposal. How much of it would you donate to an NGO working to increase the transparency of political funding?

I would like to donate (　　) yen out of 50,000 yen.

Endline Survey - October 28th

Thank you for accessing this survey page. This survey is being conducted by the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Osaka University, the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University, and the Faculty of Economics at Kinki University to understand public perceptions regarding elections.

This survey aims to academically investigate your thoughts and opinions leading up to the House of Representatives election.

The information you provide will be used only for academic research and not for any other purposes. The survey is anonymous, and your privacy will be fully protected. It is designed to understand your honest perspectives, without any judgment of right or wrong. We request your understanding in this regard and hope you are comfortable while answering the following questions.

Please note that if you leave the survey, any answers provided before your leave will still be submitted to the research team.

If you are able to participate, we would greatly appreciate your cooperation in completing all the surveys.

Next Back

Q1. Did you vote in the current House of Representatives general election (national election)?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Prefer not to answer

Next Back

Q2. In the single-member district of the current House of Representatives general election,

did you vote for the incumbent candidate (elected in the previous 2021 election)?

○ Did not vote

○ Voted for the incumbent candidate

○ Voted for another candidate from the same party as the incumbent candidate

○ Voted for a candidate from a different party or an independent candidate

○ Prefer not to answer

Next Back

A.3.2 Original Version

Baseline Survey - October 18th

本アンケートページにアクセスしていただきましてありがとうございます。本アンケート調査は、みなさまの「選挙に関する意識」を理解する目的のために、大阪大学社会経済研究所、早稲田大学政治経済学術院、近畿大学経済学部が共同で実施するものです。

この調査は、みなさまが今回の衆議院議員総選挙に先立ち、どのような考えを持っていらっしゃるのかを学術的に調査することを目的としています。

ご回答いただいた内容は学術調査にのみ使用され、その他の目的では一切使用されません。また、アンケートは匿名調査で、みなさまのプライバシーは完全に保護されます。アンケートはみなさまのありのままの姿を理解することを目的としており、それに関する善悪の判断をすることは一切ありません。その点をご理解いただき、気楽にお答え頂けますと幸いです。

今回の調査に加えて、一部の方には、10月25日(金)と28日（月）の午後18時ごろにアンケートのご案内を行います。今回の質問数は11問、10/25(金)の質問数は8問となっており、それぞれ5分程度の完了時間を想定しています。10/28（月）の質問数は2問の簡単な調査になっており、所要時間が2分を越えることはないと想定しています。

本調査では、回答を中断した場合も、中断までに回答されたデータは調査委託者に納品されます。

また、以下のマークがついている質問は、ボーナス質問です。これらの質問は、質問ごとにこの調査に参加されている皆さんの回答を集計した後、正解した方の中から100名様に追加で100円相当のポイント差し上げます。ボーナス質問は3回のアンケート合計で5問あり、最大で500円相当のポイントが獲得可能です。



ご参加頂ける方は、是非全てのアンケートにご協力くださいますよう、お願い申し上げます。

Q1 あなたの政治的価値観についてお尋ねします。あなたには支持している政党はありますか。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ○ 自民党を支持している
- ○ その他与党を支持している
- ○ 野党を支持している

○ 支持している政党は無い

○ 答えたくない

Q2 今回の衆議院議員総選挙(国政選挙)に関して、以下の点について、あなたが個人的に重視する順に1つから最大３つまで選んで下さい。

ひとつだけ　必須

	最も重視する	2番目に重視する	3番目に重視する
	↓	↓	↓
物価高	○	○	○
少子化	○	○	○
高齢化	○	○	○
気候変動・環境	○	○	○
財政	○	○	○
外交	○	○	○
年金	○	○	○
原発・エネルギー	○	○	○
	最も重視する	2番目に重視する	3番目に重視する
憲法改正	○	○	○
旧統一教会問題	○	○	○
政治とカネ・裏金	○	○	○
地方創生	○	○	○
被災地援助	○	○	○
その他	○	○	○
2番目／3番目に重視するものはない		○	○

Q3 今回の衆議院議員選挙の候補者のうち、あなたの選挙区の現在の衆議院議員(現職)の政党はどれですか。

ひとつだけ　必須

- ○ 自民党
- ○ 立憲民主党
- ○ 日本維新の会
- ○ 公明党
- ○ 国民民主党
- ○ 日本共産党
- ○ れいわ新選組
- ○ 社会民主党
- ○ その他の政党・無所属
- ○ わからない

Q4 前回(2021年)の衆議院議員選挙では、どの政党・無所属の議員に投票しましたか。

ひとつだけ　必須

- ○ 選挙に行っていない
- ○ 自民党
- ○ 立憲民主党
- ○ 日本維新の会
- ○ 公明党
- ○ 国民民主党
- ○ 日本共産党
- ○ れいわ新選組
- ○ 社会民主党
- ○ その他の政党・無所属
- ○ その他・答えたくない

Q5　今年の10月以降、どの程度の頻度で選挙関連のニュースに触れましたか。

ひとつだけ　必須

- ○ ほぼ毎日
- ○ 1週間に数回程度
- ○ あまり触れていない
- ○ ほとんど触れていない

Q6 あなたは、日本の政治家の何%ぐらいが「政治資金収支報告書への記載漏れや政治資金のキックバック」問題に関係していると思いますか。

必須

[ ] %



Q7 この調査プロジェクトには、様々な方々が集まっており、調査参加者の回答は、日本の平均的な有権者の見解と態度を表しているといえます。

以下の質問について、私たちが尋ねた中の100人のうち、何人が
「全く許容できない」または
「それほど許容できない」と答えたと思いますか。

＜質問＞
あなたは、「政治資金収支報告書への記載漏れや政治資金のキックバック」問題についてどれぐらい許容できますか。

＜回答＞
1.全く許容できない、2.それほど許容できない、3.まあ許容できる、4.全く許容できる

必須

上記の質問で、100人中 [ ]
人が、「1.全く許容できない」または「2.それほど許容できない」と答えたと思う

Q8 あなたの最終学歴をお答えください。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ○ 中学卒
- ○ 高校卒
- ○ 短大・高専・専門学校卒
- ○ 大学・大学院卒

Q9 あなたの婚姻状況をお答えください。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ○ 既婚
- ○ 未婚
- ○ 離死別

Q10 あなたのご家庭の同居人数をお答えください。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ○ 1人（1人暮らし）
- ○ 2人
- ○ 3人
- ○ 4人
- ○ 5人
- ○ 6人
- ○ 7人以上

Q11 2023年のあなたのご家庭の世帯年収（税引き前）をお答えください。

ひとつだけ　必須

- ○ 200万円未満
- ○ 200万円～400万円未満
- ○ 400万円～600万円未満
- ○ 600万円～800万円未満
- ○ 800万円～1000万円未満
- ○ 1000万円～1200万円未満
- ○ 1200万円～1500万円未満
- ○ 1500万円～2000万円未満
- ○ 2000万円～3000万円未満
- ○ 3000万円～5000万円未満
- ○ 5000万円以上

Intervention & Post-treatment survey - October 25th

本アンケートページにアクセスしていただきましてありがとうございます。本アンケート調査は、みなさまの「選挙に関する意識」を理解する目的のために、大阪大学社会経済研究所、早稲田大学政治経済学術院、近畿大学経済学部が共同で実施するものです。

この調査は、みなさまが今回の衆議院議員総選挙に先立ち、どのような考えを持っていらっしゃるのかを学術的に調査することを目的としています。

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本調査では、回答を中断した場合も、中断までに回答されたデータは調査委託者に納品されます。

また、以下のマークがついている質問は、ボーナス質問です。これらの質問は、質問ごとにこの調査に参加されている皆さんの回答を集計した後、正解した方の中から100名様に追加で100円相当のポイント差し上げます。ボーナス質問は3回のアンケート合計で5問あり、最大で500円相当のポイントが獲得可能です。



ご参加頂ける方は、是非全てのアンケートにご協力くださいますよう、お願い申し上げます。



この調査プロジェクトには、様々な方々が集まっており、調査参加者の回答は、日本の平均的な有権者の見解と態度を表しているといえます。

Q1 あなたのお考えについてお聞きします。
以下の質問に関して、 私たちが尋ねた中の 、あなたの選挙区の人たち100人のうち、何人が自分たちの選挙区の現職候補に「投票する」と答えたと思いますか。

＜質問＞
あなたは今回の選挙で、自分の選挙区の現職候補に投票しますか。

＜回答＞
1．投票する　2．投票しない

必須

上記の質問で、100人中 [ ] 人が、「1．投票する」と答えたと思う



Q2 同様に、あなたのお考えについてお聞きします。
以下の質問に関して、 私たちが尋ねた中の 、 あなたの選挙区の人たち100人のうち、何人が自分たちの選挙区の現職候補に「投票すべき」と答えたと思いますか。

＜質問＞
あなたは今回の選挙で、自分の選挙区の現職候補に投票すべきだと思いますか。

＜回答＞
1．投票すべき　2．投票すべきではない

必須

上記の質問で、100人中 [ ] 人が、「1．投票すべき」と答えたと思う



Q3 同様に、あなたのお考えについてお聞きします。
以下の質問に関して、私たちが尋ねた中の、あなたの選挙区の人たち100人のうち、何人が自分たちの選挙区の現職の衆議院議員（前回の選挙（2021年）で当選した人）は「とても能力がある」または「能力がある」と答えたと思いますか。

＜質問＞
あなたは、自分の選挙区の現職の衆議院議員（前回の選挙（2021年）で当選した人）にはどれぐらい能力があると思いますか。

＜回答＞
1．全く能力がない　2．能力がない　3．能力がある　4．とても能力がある

必須

上記の質問で、100人中 [　　] 人が、「4．とても能力がある」または「3．能力がある」と答えたと思う



Q4 同様に、あなたのお考えについてお聞きします。
以下の質問に関して、私たちが尋ねた中の、あなたの選挙区の人たち100人のうち、何人が自分たちの選挙区の現職の衆議院議員（前回の選挙（2021年）で当選した人）は「とても信頼できる」または「信頼できる」と答えたと思いますか。

＜質問＞
あなたは、自分の選挙区の現職の衆議院議員（前回の選挙（2021年）で当選した人）はどれぐらい信頼できますか。

＜回答＞
1．全く信頼できない　2．信頼できない　3．信頼できる　4．とても信頼できる

必須

上記の質問で、100人中 [　　] 人が、「4．とても信頼できる」または「3．信頼できる」と答えたと思う

Q5 あなたの票は、選挙結果に対してどれぐらい影響力があると思いますか。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ◯ 全くない
- ◯ あまりない
- ◯ 少しある
- ◯ とてもある

Q6 あなたは今回の衆議院議員選挙の小選挙区で、自分の選挙区の現職候補(前回の選挙(2021年)で当選した人)に投票しますか。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ◯ 現職に投票する
- ◯ 現職と同じ政党だが別の候補者に投票する
- ◯ 現職とは別の政党・無所属の候補者に投票する
- ◯ 選挙に行く予定はない
- ◯ わからない

Q7 あなたは、法改正などを含め、政治資金の流れをより透明にする政策をどれぐらい支持しますか。

ひとつだけ　必須

- ◯ 全く支持しない
- ◯ それほど支持しない
- ◯ まあ支持する
- ◯ 強く支持する

Q8 仮に自由に使える5万円が手元にあるとします。そのうちの一部を、政治資金の透明性を高める活動をしているNGOに寄付できるとします。あなたは、5万円のうちいくらを寄付しますか。

必須

5万円のうち、 [　　] 円、寄付する

Endline Survey - October 28th

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Q1 あなたは今回の衆議院議員総選挙(国政選挙)で投票しましたか。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ○ はい
- ○ いいえ
- ○ 答えたくない

Q2 あなたは今回の衆議院議員選挙の小選挙区で、現職候補(前回の選挙(2021年)で当選した人)に投票しましたか。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ○ 選挙に行ってない
- ○ 現職に投票した
- ○ 現職と同じ政党だが別の候補者に投票した
- ○ 現職とは別の政党・無所属の候補者に投票した
- ○ 答えたくない