Black Migration and the Rise of Jim Crow*

(PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE)

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December 20, 2024

Abstract

Following the abolition of slavery, and as states moved from slavery to wage labor, a new set of extractive institutions emerged in the US South, collectively known as Jim Crow. We show that Black migration within the South, by increasing the local Black workforce and lowering wages, benefited white elites but would have disadvantaged white wage-earners. In response, elites enacted segregationist laws to preserve white political loyalty and confer tangible benefits to white labor. Using data on migration, electoral outcomes, and Jim Crow legislation, we find that counties receiving more Black migrants saw larger increases in Democratic vote shares and the passage of Jim Crow laws, but not more racial violence. These counties also saw economic benefits for incumbent whites across the wealth distribution, while the economic outcomes of incumbent Black residents were hurt.

*Mardoché Ayitchehou and Raphaël Boulat provided excellent research assistance.

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1 Introduction

In the aftermath of the US civil war (1861-1865), a brief period of multi-racial democracy was followed by nearly a century of legal disenfranchisement that stripped Black residents of political, economic and legal rights. "Jim Crow" laws were enacted by state legislatures to regulate and circumscribe the lives of the region's newly freed citizens. Recent work has identified the effect of these institutions on the economic outcomes of descendants of freedmen and women (Althoff and Reichardt, 2024). In this study, we seek to understand the rise of these regimes across the South. In particular, while the difference between the institutional environments of the North and South is well recognized, less understood is the significant variation *within* the South in the number, timing, and type of Jim Crow laws adopted (see Table 1).

Labor relations in the post-bellum South underwent a dramatic change. Enslaved persons ceased to be chattel whose labor could be owned or rented, becoming workers whose labor demanded wages.[1] Yet the fundamental economic institutions remained essentially intact. Planters and industrialists continued employing the same production practices used under slavery, while substituting wage labor instead. As a consequence, securing a reliable labor force for factories, plantations, and farms emerged as a central concern among Southern elites. The predominance of labor-intensive agriculture heightened this anxiety, positioning the agricultural labor market as a key factor in shaping the region's evolving political economy (Higgs, 1977).

We argue that Black migration across states and counties within the South shaped the conditions that gave rise to the variety of Jim Crow regimes that emerged in the early twentieth century. States that were recipients of more Black migrants through 1900 saw larger increases in the Democratic vote share for presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional elections. These were also states where the economic outcomes of incumbent whites were relatively higher, while those of incumbent Black residents were lower. The mechanism we propose links population movements to local labor markets in receiving locations. Namely, wages would have declined in locations that received relatively more Black migrants. This benefited (white) elites engaged in plantation agriculture and other labor-intensive production activities. However, it would have had a negative effect on wage-earning white workers in these counties. The latter form a majority of the voting population and, as a result, needed to be placated.

Laws segregating educational institutions, transportation, and public facilities serve to channel benefits to those white workers who are hurt by competition in the labor market from incoming Black migrants. The use of policies to reify the racial hierarchy has been recognized as a way of paying white workers a "psychological wage" (Bois, 1935).

[1] Labor contract disputes were among the most common complaints that Freedmen's Bureau agents adjudicated (Foner, 1963; Li et al., 2024).

However, we also show that incumbent whites in places that received relatively more Black migrants had better economic outcomes across the wealth distribution (see Figure 6). One telling example is the set of demands composed by plotters of the coup and massacre of 1898 in Wilmington, NC. Although ostensibly about the affront white citizens felt in response to local Black newspaper editor Alex Manly's columns in the Daily Record, one demand explicitly proposes making work available for white men.

> "That we propose in the future to give the white men a large part of the employment heretofore given to negroes, because we realize that white families cannot thrive here unless there are more opportunities for the different members of said family." – *from The White Declaration of Independence [Printed in the Raleigh News and Observer, November 10, 1898]*

This illustrates one way in which coalitions between white elites and workers formed. Black labor (and hence, Black in-migration) was desirable for white elites, but not for the white workers who formed the political base of the Democratic party. Jim Crow laws were one method for elites to maintain the political allegiance of white workers while taking advantage of Black labor.

This particular example of extra-judicial violence in Wilmington, however, may be anomalous. Another set of findings we present relate to the effect of Black in-migration on anti-Black violence. Contrary to its effect on the adoption of Jim Crow laws and Democratic vote share, we show that lynchings and membership in the KKK was relatively lower in counties that received more Black migrants. One possible explanation to reconcile these findings is to recognize that formal laws segregating the races and restricting Black political and economic opportunities effectively met the demand from white laborers to be shielded from labor market competition, making violence unnecessary - a mechanism highlighted by Troesken and Walsh (2019) in the context of municipal racial zoning.[2] We interpret the higher vote share for Democratic candidates as a measure of demand for segregation, while the enacted Jim Crow laws as a response to that demand.

This study is broadly related to the literature on institutional development, as well as work that has examined the particular case of the US South (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011).[3] The focus on labor markets in the political economy of the post-bellum South echoes Naidu (2010), who finds that anti-enticement laws had the intended effect of reducing sharecropper mobility and wages. Unlike that paper's concern with the landlord-sharecropper relationship, however, we are interested in how restrictive laws uphold the coalition between white elites and labor.

[2] Testa and Williams (2023) find that lynchings are more likely to occur in response to perceived political mobilization by Black county residents.

[3] While Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) propose a theory in which elites may persist despite formal (dejure) restrictions on their influence, we argue that in the case of the US South, elites leveraged formal rules to maintain their influence.

This study's use of predicted Black migration within the South as a treatment is related to a recent and growing literature that leverages plausibly exogenous predicted population changes on the outcomes of destinations (Boustan, 2010; Derenoncourt, 2022; Bazzi et al., 2023). In studying the post-bellum US South, it also joins a new literature interrogating the political economy of post-slavery institutions (Ottinger and Posch, 2022; Logan, 2023; Testa and Williams, 2023; Chyn et al., 2024). Our finding that Black in-migration generated the largest economic gains for the wealthiest incumbent whites provides one potential pathway for the maintenance of elite status documented in Ager et al. (2021).

2 Historical Background

Well before the Great Migration, Black men and women in the South exercised their newly won freedoms by migrating in large numbers across counties and states in search of opportunity and safety.

2.1 Population Movements in the South (1865-1900)

The immediate aftermath of the Civil War saw significant mobility among the formerly enslaved Black population. Many sought to reunite with family members dispersed by slavery, while others moved to cities or counties with Union Army presence to seek employment and protection. Migration was largely intrastate, with some movement to neighboring states.

During Reconstruction, Black populations continued to move to urban centers where political and economic opportunities seemed promising. White Southern elites also engaged in limited migration, often to reclaim land or seek new business ventures. The migration remained primarily regional, with limited movement outside the South. As Reconstruction ended, Black migration patterns began shifting in response to increased racial violence and economic constraints. Some Black farmers migrated westward to states like Kansas and Oklahoma in the Exoduster movement of 1879. White Southerners also began migrating westward, seeking opportunities in less-developed areas.

In the 1880s, the beginnings of the Great Migration took root, although at a smaller scale than in the early 20th century. Southern white populations also migrated to urban centers and other states, seeking new economic opportunities as agriculture faced challenges.

The Great Migration officially began in the 1910s, but its precursors emerged in the 1890s. Black individuals and families sought to escape the tightening grip of Jim Crow laws and the economic constraints of sharecropping. Early migration destinations in-

cluded Northern industrial hubs and Western states with agricultural opportunities. This period set the stage for larger-scale migrations that would reshape American demographics in the 20th century.

2.2 Political Developments (1865-1900)

The Civil War ended in 1865 with the defeat of the Confederacy. The Reconstruction period (1865-1877) aimed to reintegrate Southern states into the Union and establish rights for newly freed Black citizens. Federal troops occupied the South to enforce new policies, and the Freedmen's Bureau was established to support formerly enslaved people.

The 13th Amendment (1865) abolished slavery, the 14th Amendment (1868) guaranteed citizenship and equal protection, and the 15th Amendment (1870) secured voting rights for Black men. President Andrew Johnson's lenient policies towards the South and his vetoes of civil rights legislation undermined Reconstruction efforts.

Under President Ulysses S. Grant, federal enforcement of civil rights laws intensified. The Enforcement Acts (1870-1871) targeted the Ku Klux Klan and protected Black voters. Despite these efforts, resistance from Southern elites persisted.

The disputed 1876 presidential election led to the Compromise of 1877, which resulted in the withdrawal of federal troops from the South. This marked the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of unchecked white Democratic control in Southern states. These states began enacting Jim Crow laws to enforce racial segregation. The laws targeted public facilities, education, transportation, employment, and voting rights, solidifying racial hierarchies. The Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) upheld the doctrine of "separate but equal," providing legal grounds for segregation.

Redeemers, a coalition of conservative Democrats, sought to restore pre-war social and economic order. They promoted the "New South" vision of industrial growth while maintaining white supremacy. The Populist movement emerged as a challenge to elite dominance, briefly uniting poor white and Black farmers. However, racial divisions and elite manipulation ultimately weakened this coalition, reinforcing Jim Crow policies.

2.3 Economic Developments (1865-1900)

In the post-Civil War South, the economy shifted from a plantation-based agricultural system to a more diversified economy. While agriculture remained dominant, industries like textiles, timber, and coal mining grew. The share of Black and white labor in agriculture decreased gradually, though most Black workers remained tied to sharecropping.

Railroads expanded significantly, connecting previously isolated regions. Measures of connectedness, such as miles of track laid and the number of connected towns, increased

throughout this period. Railroads facilitated the growth of commerce and industry but also reinforced elite control by enabling the movement of goods and resources controlled by white business interests.

Southern urbanization increased as cities like Atlanta, Birmingham, and New Orleans grew. Black and white populations moved to these cities seeking industrial jobs and better opportunities. Urban centers became focal points of both economic growth and racial tensions. Some cities experienced episodes of racial violence, such as Wilmington, NC in 1898, while others, such as Durham, NC, successfully managed to maintain relative peace between white and Black residents.

2.4 Jim Crow Laws

The earliest Jim Crow laws emerged in the late 1860s, primarily targeting public transportation and education (Murray, 1950). Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, states expanded these laws to cover voting restrictions, schools, workplaces, and public facilities. The number of laws increased steadily, with most Southern states adopting comprehensive segregation statutes by 1900.

The adoption of Jim Crow laws varied by state. States with larger Black populations or more significant Reconstruction-era challenges were quicker to implement these laws. For example, Mississippi and South Carolina led early efforts, while states like North Carolina and Tennessee followed later. The timing, location, and type of laws reflected local economic interests, demographic pressures, and elite strategies for maintaining control.

This variation challenges the notion of a "solid South." Instead, different states tailored Jim Crow policies to their specific needs, reflecting strategies adopted by Southern elites to preserve power and control.

Table 1 shows the extent of this variation. The total number of Jim Crow laws ranges from 9 (Delaware) to 116 (Louisiana). Virginia enacted the most laws regulating transportation (27), while North Carolina enacted the most regulating employment (24). Both of these states, in addition to Arkansas, Mississippi and Alabama passed more than 10 laws regulating the use of facilities. Laws regulating marriage were passed in all states, except DC, with Louisiana, Virginia, Florida and Georgia each passing more than 12. There were also six states that did not pass any Jim Crow laws regulating suffrage.

TABLE 1: Number of Jim Crow Laws by State and Type

	Type							
State	Education	Transportation	Employment	Facilities	Marriage	Suffrage	Other	Total
Louisiana	49	12	13	8	14	3	17	116
Virginia	34	27	6	11	14	5	11	108
North Carolina	18	11	24	11	4	3	3	74
Florida	20	17	11	5	12	1	2	68
Georgia	11	12	17	3	12	6	7	68
Arkansas	7	13	12	11	4	4	10	61
South Carolina	9	12	19	8	3	5	0	56
Alabama	10	7	19	10	2	4	3	55
Mississippi	19	6	8	11	3	2	2	51
Texas	24	8	3	5	3	1	4	48
Tennessee	17	10	6	5	3	1	2	44
Maryland	13	16	0	7	3	0	0	39
West Virginia	16	0	0	7	5	0	1	29
Kentucky	12	2	0	3	3	0	2	22
Missouri	9	0	0	3	2	0	0	14
District of Columbia	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Delaware	5	0	0	3	1	0	0	9
Total	283	153	138	110	88	32	68	872

Notes: This table shows the number of Jim Crow laws by state and type. Althoff and Reichardt (2024) collected this information from four sources (Murray, 1950; Roback, 1984; Cohen, 1991; Walton et al., 2012), covering around 800 laws passed across Southern states by 1950.

3 Empirical Strategy

To study the effect of Black migration on political and economic outcomes, we construct a shift-share instrumental variable to predict the number of arrivals. In doing so, we follow Derenoncourt (2022), adapting the framework such that destination locations are Southern counties receiving Black migrants rather than non-Southern commuting zones. We first define Black population change in county j as the 1870 to 1900 change in the Black population as a share of the initial 1870 population:

$$\Delta\text{Black pop}_j^{1870-1900} = \frac{b_j^{1900} - b_j^{1870}}{pop_j^{1870}} \tag{1}$$

Since our focus is within-south migration, we calculate these quantities only for individuals for whom the state of origin and destination is a Southern state.

The predicted black population change is given by:

$$\widehat{\Delta\text{Black pop}}_j^{1870-1900} = \frac{\widehat{\Delta b_j}}{pop_j^{1870}} \tag{2}$$

$$\widehat{\Delta b_j} = \sum_{j \in S} w_j^{1850-1860} \hat{m}_j^{1870-1900} \tag{3}$$

$w_j^{1850-1860}$ would ideally be the share of recently migrated pre-1860 Black southern migrants from county j, representing county j's exposure share to black migration. However, enslaved people only gained freedom (and hence freedom to move) in 1865, meaning that we have to proxy for these shares. To do so, we take the share of all people (Black or white) who moved from a Southern county j to another Southern county c between 1850 and 1860, computed from linked census data. $\hat{m}_j^{1870-1900}$ is the predicted Black migration from southern county j over the decades 1870-1900. Specifically,

$$\hat{m}_j^{1870-1900} = \sum_{t=1880}^{1900} \widehat{\text{mig rate}}_{jt} \times \text{Black pop}_{jt} \tag{4}$$

$\widehat{\text{mig rate}}_{jt}$ are the fitted values from the regression below, and Z_{jt-10} is a vector of covariates representing southern economic indicators.

$$\text{mig rate}_{jt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Z_{jt-10} + \varepsilon_{jt}$$

Note that to predict $\widehat{\text{mig rate}}_{jt}$, we use a leave-one-out prediction method. That is, for each Southern state j, we predict Black internal migration patterns based on the relationship between county characteristics and migration rates from all Southern states except j. This procedure is repeated for each Southern state and the predicted migration aggregated. Additionally, we use *LASSO* to select the predictors used for migration. More details are provided in Appendix A.2. After computing predicted changes in the Black population in other southern counties using this method, we use the percentile of predicted increase, $\widehat{M}_j$, to instrument for the percentile of observed change in the Black population, M_j. The 2SLS specification can we written as follows:

$$y_j = \alpha + \beta M_j + \mathbf{X}_j' \Gamma + \varepsilon_j \tag{5}$$

$$M_j = \gamma + \delta \widehat{M}_j + \mathbf{X}_j' \lambda + \mu_j \tag{6}$$

where y_j is an outcome under study, such as the county's democratic vote share. The identification assumption can be written as follows:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\widehat{M}_j \times \varepsilon_j | \mathbf{X}_j'\right] = 0 \tag{7}$$

In words, this means that the instrument for Black population change must be orthogo-

nal to omitted characteristics that are correlated with the outcome.

This research design helps us obtain quasi-exogenous changes in Black population by county to study how economic and political outcomes were affected in those counties.

4 Data


4.1 Data sources

Data is gathered from a variety of different sources. Election data come from ICPSR and contain information on presidential, gubernatorial and congressional votes at the county level. County level covariates come from IPUMS NHGIS. We use census data (and census linking) to construct measures of migration information.

4.2 Descriptive statistics

Figures 1, B.5 and B.6 examine the relationship between changes in Black population and Democratic Party vote share at the county level in 1900, showing this relationship for presidential, gubernatorial and congress elections, respectively. In all graphs, the x-axis represents the percentage change in Black population while the y-axis shows the Democratic vote share percentage. The red trend lines in both figures indicate a positive correlation - as Black population changes increased, Democratic vote share tended to increase as well.

FIGURE 1: Presidential Democratic Vote Share and Predicted Black Population Changes




Notes: The figure shows the relationship between Black population changes (in %) and Democratic vote shares in presidential elections in 1900 (in %) at the county level.

Figures B.7 and B.8 examine the relationship between changes in Black population and changes in Democratic presidential vote share at the county level over two different time periods. Figure B.7 shows this relationship for the long-difference 1856-1900, while Figure B.8 focuses on the shorter period 1876-1900. In both graphs, the x-axis represents the percentage change in Black population between 1870 and 1900, while the y-axis shows the change in Democratic vote share in percentage points. The red trend lines in both figures suggest a weak positive correlation.


Figure 2 presents the actual and predicted black population change at the county level between 1870 and 1900. As we can see below with the first stage, the predicted black population change is highly correlated with the actual population change. Figure 3 presents the geographical distribution of democratic and republican presidential vote share across Southern counties.

FIGURE 2: Actual and Predicted Black Population Changes in Southern Counties, 1870-1900

(A) Actual migration




(B) Predicted migration




Notes: The maps show the geographical distribution of actual (Panel A) and predicted (Panel B) Black population changes across Southern counties. We use the leave-one-out method and *LASSO* to predict net migration. The R^2 of the regression of actual migration on predicted migration is 0.18.

FIGURE 3: Presidential Democratic and Republican Vote Share in Southern Counties, 1900

(A) Democratic vote




(B) Republican vote



Notes: The maps show the geographical distribution of presidential vote share (in % of total votes) across Southern counties for Democrats (Panel A) and Republicans (Panel B). Data on vote shares comes from ICPSR.

Figure 4 shows the total predicted Black migration flows within the South for each decade from 1880 to 1900.

FIGURE 4: Total Predicted Black Migration Flows Within the South (1880-1900)




Notes: The figure shows the total predicted Black migration flows within the South for each decade from 1880 to 1900. Predictions are based on the leave-one-out method using LASSO to estimate migration networks from historical settlement patterns. Values represent the sum of all predicted county-to-county migration flows within Southern states.

5 Results

5.1 First stage

The shift-share instrumental variable strategy outlined in Section 3 succeeds in predicting actual Black migration into Southern counties. Figure 5 is a binned scatter plot that depicts the relationship between predicted Black population change and actual Black population change in percentiles.

FIGURE 5: First Stage: Predicted and Actual Black Population Changes



Notes: The figure shows the relationship between predicted and actual Black population changes across Southern counties. Both measures are expressed in percentiles. The slope and standard error are obtained from an OLS regression of actual on predicted changes, controlling for average value of farmland and buildings per acre in 1870 and with state fixed effects.

5.2 Democratic vote share

Table 2 and Table C.8 present instrumental variable estimates of the effect of Black population changes between 1870 and 1900 on electoral outcomes in 1900. Table 2 uses the predicted percentage increase in the Black population as the explanatory variable, instrumented using a leave-one-out method for predicting net migration. In contrast, Table C.8 uses the percentile rank of the Black population change, based on dividing counties into quantiles of the percentage change. Both tables measure electoral outcomes as the Democratic share of votes in presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional elections, with results reported across specifications that vary in the inclusion of controls and state fixed effects.

Across both specifications, the results are similar and show that Black in-migration had a positive effect on the Democratic vote share, except in the specification with state fixed effects.

TABLE 2: Effect of Black Population Change on Democratic Vote Share

	Democratic vote share in 1900 (%)									
	US President					State Governor				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.261***	0.258***	0.210***	0.172***	0.014	0.324***	0.321***	0.286***	0.188***	0.025
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.043)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
State-level total Black migration	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
State FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
First-stage F-stat	187.46	167.69	173.09	17.56	67.60	200.93	181.64	184.46	18.72	77.64
Observations	939	939	939	939	939	945	945	945	945	945
Sample mean			61.911					67.787		

Notes: This table shows the effect of percentage increase in Black population between 1870 and 1900 on electoral outcomes. Electoral outcomes are the Democratic share of votes (in % of total votes) in presidential and gubernatorial elections in 1900 at the county level. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. Political outcome data comes from ICPSR and county level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method and *LASSO* to predict net migration. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.2.1 Long difference

Both Tables 3 and C.9 examine the relationship between Black population changes and Democratic vote share changes at the county level, measuring these changes in two different ways. Table 3 uses the raw percentage change in black population between 1870 and 1900, while Table C.9 employs the percentile rank of these changes. Results are similar to those above using the Democratic vote share as the outcome, instead of the change in the vote share. Black migration has a positive effect on voting for the Democratic candidate and the estimated coefficient is significant, except when we include state fixed effects.

TABLE 3: Effect of Black Population Changes on Changes in Democratic Vote Share

	Change in Democratic vote share 1876-1900 (percentage points)									
	Presidential					Gubernatorial				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.207***	0.138***	0.109***	0.184***	0.058	0.402***	0.339***	0.299***	0.197**	-0.039
	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.088)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(.0089)	(0.105)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
State-level total Black migration	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
State FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
First-stage F-stat	187.98	166.77	173.24	127.939	65.88	203.93	178.02	183.03	136.478	77.54
Observations	936	936	936	939	936	925	925	925	945	925
Sample mean			-2.799					14.114		

Notes: This table shows the effect of black population changes between 1870-1900 on changes in Democratic vote share (in percentage points) for 1876-1900. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. Political outcome data comes from ICPSR and county level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method and *LASSO* to predict net migration. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.2.2 Decade-by-decade analysis

Tables 4 and 5 present the effects of Black population changes on local political outcomes for two different time periods: 1870-1880 and 1870-1890. Unlike the previous set of results, we find no consistent effect on the Democratic vote share by 1880, but a positive effect by 1890 across most specifications. Including state fixed effects reverses the sign of the coefficient.

Taken together, we interpret these results as showing demand for segregation among county residents in response to Black in-migration. That this effect only appears in the later period (1890 and beyond) may be the result of incomplete disenfranchisement of Black voters in the earlier period. State fixed effects appear to be important for these results. Including them renders the estimated coefficients insignificant. We interpret this as suggestive evidence that state-level policies, including Jim Crow laws, may shape the response of voters to Black in-migration.

TABLE 4: Effect of Black Population Change on Democratic Vote Share

	Democratic vote share in 1880 (%)									
	US President					State Governor				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Black pop. change 1870-1880 (%)	-0.016	0.142	-0.054	-0.094	-0.599***	0.330*	0.408*	0.178	0.149	-0.395**
	(0.157)	(0.190)	(0.185)	(0.172)	(0.196)	(0.180)	(0.216)	(0.203)	(0.200)	(0.190)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
State-level total Black migration	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
State FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
First-stage F-stat	134.47	105.23	89.78	89.32	66.45	136.04	105.21	87.93	86.72	64.11
Observations	945	945	945	945	945	941	941	941	941	941
Sample mean	60.03					58.57				

Notes: This table shows the effect of percentage increase in Black population between 1870 and 1880 on electoral outcomes. Electoral outcomes are the Democratic share of votes (in % of total votes) in presidential and gubernatorial elections in 1880 at the county level. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. Political outcome data comes from ICPSR and county level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method and *LASSO* to predict net migration. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE 5: Effect of Black Population Change on Democratic Vote Share

	Democratic vote share in 1890 (%)									
	US President					State Governor				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Black pop. change 1870-1890 (%)	0.303***	0.280***	0.267***	0.240***	-0.131*	0.233***	0.253***	0.211**	0.057	-0.161**
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
State-level total Black migration	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
State FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
First-stage F-stat	212.04	180.70	171.81	146.91	89.11	207.19	178.06	169.85	144.41	85.67
Observations	946	946	946	946	946	945	945	945	945	945
Sample mean	60.49					64.88				

Notes: This table shows the effect of percentage increase in Black population between 1870 and 1890 on electoral outcomes. Electoral outcomes are the Democratic share of votes (in % of total votes) in presidential and gubernatorial elections in 1890 at the county level. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. Political outcome data comes from ICPSR and county level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method and *LASSO* to predict net migration. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.3 Jim Crow laws

We find that increases in the local Black population due to in-migration had a positive effect on the number of Jim Crow laws enacted before 1900 but not on the total number ever passed (Table 6). The coefficient is significant in the most saturated model, which includes county controls and region fixed effects. This pattern is repeated when we use alternative specifications, including taking the log of the number of laws and using the percentile rank of Black population change (see Appendix Section C.1).

TABLE 6: Effect of Black Population Change on Jim Crow Laws

	Number of Jim Crow Laws		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Laws enacted before 1900			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.069	0.076	0.076***
	(0.081)	(0.070)	(0.029)
Panel B: Total laws enacted			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.243	0.263	0.077
	(0.232)	(0.190)	(0.085)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes
First-stage F-stat	13.13	14.56	10.62
Observations	950	950	950

Notes: This table shows the effect of black population changes between 1870-1900 on the number of Jim Crow laws enacted. Panel A shows effects on laws enacted before 1900, while Panel B shows effects on all Jim Crow laws enacted. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. County level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method to predict net migration. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.4 Economic outcomes

We find that migration-induced increases in the local Black population improved the outcomes of white residents and worsened those of incumbent Black residents (see Figure 6). Specifically, for white Americans, a growing Black population from 1870 to 1900 led to higher occupational incomes, homeownership rates, and literacy, and lower propensities to live on a farm. For Black Americans, the opposite is true across those outcomes.


The richest white families experienced the largest increases in occupational incomes and the propensity to live off farms. Gains in homeownership and literacy were more broadly shared. While estimates for Black Americans across the 1870 wealth distribution are more noisy, if anything, the negative impact on economic outcomes is largest at the top of the distribution.

In addition to economic outcomes, Black in-migration also affected incumbent residents' migration propensities (see Figure 7). For Black Americans, the main migration re-

sponse was migration across Southern states—a response especially pronounced among wealthier Black families. The implied migration elasticity is large, with one Black incumbent resident leaving for every two new Black arrivals. To a lesser extent, white Americans also were more likely to move to other Southern states. However, what stands out is that Black in-migration increased their propensity to stay in the South. This result is consistent with the benefits white families experience from Black in-migration.

We also analyze the effects of Black in-migration on outcomes of farmers and farm laborers separately, again pointing to gains that are concentrated among the white landowning elite (see Appendix Figure B.9). We find that the main beneficiaries of Black in-migration were wealthy white farmers. Poor white farm laborers experience far smaller gains or even reduced economic outcomes. Among Black Americans, the largest declines in economic status are concentrated among poor farm laborers, but even wealthy farm owners or tenants do not benefit from Black in-migration for some outcomes.


FIGURE 6: Black Migration's Effect on Incumbents' Economic Status (1870-1900)




Notes: This figure shows the causal effect of Black in-migration from our shift-share instrumental variable design. Estimates reflect the change in occupational income score (occscore), farm status (does or does not live on a farm), homeownership (for those who do not live on farms), and literacy in response to a one-percent increase in the local Black population across Southern states. Estimates are separate by a person's pre-treatment household-level wealth (the sum of real and personal property owned by the head and their potential spouse of the person's household in 1870). Quartiles are computed separately by race and county. Bars show robust 95-percent confidence intervals.

FIGURE 7: Black Migration's Effect on Incumbents' Migration (1870-1900)

(A) Migration to other Southern states



(B) Migration to non-Southern states



Notes: This figure shows the causal effect of Black in-migration from our shift-share instrumental variable design. Estimates reflect the increase in propensity to migrate either to other Southern states (Panel A) or to non-Southern to non-Southern states (Panel B) between 1870 and 1900. Migration is defined as living in a state in 1900 that is not a person's state of birth. Estimates are separate by a person's pre-treatment household-level wealth (the sum of real and personal property owned by the head and their potential spouse of the person's household in 1870). Quartiles are computed separately by race and county. Bars show robust 95-percent confidence intervals.

5.5 Extra-judicial violence

Tables 7 and C.10 examine the relationship between changes in the Black population between 1870 and 1900 and the subsequent incidence of lynchings during 1882-1930 across Southern counties. Results in Table C.10 report the effect on the total number of lynchings, though our preferred estimates are in Table 7 where the number of lynchings is normalized by the 1900 Black population. We find no effect of in-migration on this measure of extra-judicial violence.

TABLE 7: Effect of Black Population Changes on Historical Lynching Records

	Number of lynchings 1882-1930									
	EJI records					Historical records				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	-360.81	-475.71	-508.93	-595.09	-787.91	-2.65	-9.50*	-5.33	-4.90	-2.86
	(356.36)	(451.52)	(490.19)	(574.61)	(766.37)	(3.37)	(4.95)	(4.46)	(4.78)	(6.84)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
State-level total Black migration	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
State FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
First-stage F-stat	15.16	15.04	14.38	12.44	8.69	15.16	15.04	14.38	12.44	8.69
Observations	650	650	650	650	650	650	650	650	650	650
Sample mean	2658.950					788.098				

Notes: This table shows the effect of Black population changes between 1870 and 1900 on the number of recorded lynchings between 1882-1930, normalized by Black population in 1900. We use two different sources of lynching data: Equal Justice Initiative's county-level records (EJI) and historical records collected by multiple scholars (Historical). Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. County-level covariates come from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method and *LASSO* to predict net migration. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are multiplied by 1 million for readability. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Similarly, Table 8 reports the estimated effect of Black in-migration on membership in the KKK, normalized by total population. We find no effect on this alternative measure of extra-judicial violence either. Our interpretation is that demand for protection from labor market competition induced by greater Black migration was effectively met by state-level policies segregating the races and limiting economic and political opportunities. Although anti-Black violence continued apace, it was not more likely to occur in places with relatively more Black migrants.

TABLE 8: Effect of Black Population Change on Normalized Number of KKK Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	-2.684	-2.840	-2.521	-3.118	-3.289
	(2.221)	(2.337)	(2.406)	(2.571)	(3.730)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-level black pop. change	No	No	No	Yes	No
State FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	803	803	803	803	803
Cragg-Donald F-stat	115.45	115.42	142.42	128.93	68.04

Notes: This table shows the effect of black population changes between 1870-1900 on the normalized number of KKK groups (per total population). Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, and share of manufacturing employment in 1870. The state-level black population change control is included in column 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we examine the effects of Black migration within the South on economic and political outcomes with a view towards understanding the emergence of the region's Jim Crow regimes.

To obtain quasi-random variation, we employ a shift-share instrumental variables strategy following Derenoncourt (2022) adapted to the setting of the post-bellum South. Using this empirical strategy, we find that Black migration had a positive effect on the vote share of Democratic party candidates. We interpret this result as measuring voters' demand for segregationist policies in response to labor market competition from Black arrivals. Second, we find that Jim Crow laws are more likely to be passed in states that received relatively more Black migrants. Third, we document a divergent effect of migration on the economic outcomes of incumbent white and Black residents. Whereas outcomes of white residents tended to be relatively better (especially for the wealthiest) in counties with more migrant arrivals, those of Black residents tended to be worse. Fourth, we find no effect on extra-judicial violence in response to Black migration.

Putting these results together, we argue that while Black migration served the interests of elites, it was not welcomed by white laborers. The latter formed the political base of the Democratic Party, which dominated Southern politics. In order to take advantage of Black labor, while appeasing voters, elites sought to pass segregationist policies that limited competition faced by white workers and diverted public goods towards them and away from Black communities. These state-level policies effectively absorbed the animosity generated by competition between workers in the labor market such that places that received more Black migrants were no more likely to see instances of extra-judicial violence, as measured by lynchings and membership in the KKK.

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Appendix

A Data Appendix

A.1 Election data


This section presents details on how the election data was constructed in this context. Our election data collection encompasses presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional races across 15 Southern states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland, and Missouri). As our main outcome, we focus on counties' Democratic vote shares. For 1900, we obtained direct contemporary data for all three election types across all states, with two exceptions: Maryland gubernatorial data comes from 1899 (election happened in 1899 and not 1900), and Virginia's gubernatorial election data comes from 1901 (election happened in 1901 and not 1900). The 1870 period required more extensive use of proxy years due to data availability constraints.

For presidential elections, we use both 1856 and 1876 data to bracket the 1870 period, since no presidential election was held in 1870. To address missing values in the 1856 presidential data, we employed an imputation approach: we recover an estimate of Democratic vote shares for our full sample in 1856 by comparing the 1856 and 1868 vote shares of counties that have data available in both years and imputing the 1856 value for counties that have data available only for 1868 using linear regression. Based on these data, we also compute each county's change in Democratic vote shares (1856-1900 and 1876-1900). 1856 and 1868 data for Missouri counties contained numerous coding errors in the ICPSR dataset (values ending in multiple 9s) and implausible vote counts. Given these data quality concerns, we only use 1876 and 1900. Figures A.1 and A.2 present the changes in Democratic vote shares from 1856 to 1900 and 1876 to 1900, respectively.

For gubernatorial elections, while Alabama, Florida, Missouri, Tennessee, and West Virginia have direct 1870 data, we relied on 1868 data for Georgia, Louisiana, and North Carolina; 1869 data for Mississippi and Texas; 1871 data for Kentucky and Maryland; 1872 data for Arkansas; and 1873 data for Virginia. For Mississippi's 1869 gubernatorial election, the data shows zero Democratic votes because there was no official Democratic candidate. Instead, National Union candidate Lewis Dent ran with Democratic Party support through an alliance. Given that Dent represented Democratic interests and political positions during this period, we code these votes as Democratic. Similarly, for North Carolina's 1868 gubernatorial election, though the data shows votes for the Conservative


Party, we code these as Democratic votes since the Conservative Party was the official name of the state Democratic Party during this period. We therefore recode the Conservative Party votes as Democratic. Figure A.3 shows changes in gubernatorial democratic vote shares from 1870 to 1900. Congressional election data from 1870 is directly available for most states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia), while we use 1869 data for Mississippi and Texas, and 1874 data for Virginia. As displayed in Figure A.4, Georgia and Mississippi have a lot of missing values. Since presidential, gubernatorial and congress elections are highly correlated, and congress elections have more missing data, we decided to focus primarily on presidential and gubernatorial elections.

FIGURE A.1: Changes in Democratic Vote Share (1856-1900), Presidential Elections




Notes: The figure shows the change in Democratic vote share in presidential elections between 1856 and 1900 across Southern counties. The data is divided into quintiles, with darker blues indicating larger increases in Democratic vote share.

FIGURE A.2: Changes in Democratic Vote Share (1876-1900), Presidential Elections




Notes: The figure shows the change in Democratic vote share in presidential elections between 1876 and 1900 across Southern counties. The data is divided into quintiles, with darker blues indicating larger increases in Democratic vote share.

FIGURE A.3: Changes in Democratic Vote Share (1870-1900), Gubernatorial Elections



Notes: The figure shows the change in Democratic vote share in gubernatorial elections between 1870 and 1900 across Southern counties. Several states use proxy years for 1870 data as detailed in the text. The data is divided into quintiles, with darker blues indicating larger increases in Democratic vote share.

FIGURE A.4: Changes in Democratic Vote Share (1870-1900), Congressional Elections



Notes: The figure shows the change in Democratic vote share in congressional elections between 1870 and 1900 across Southern counties. Several states use proxy years for 1870 data as detailed in the text. The data is divided into quintiles, with darker blues indicating larger increases in Democratic vote share.

A.2 Predictors

Table A.1 presents the different categories of variables we consider as predictors. Note that the extensive manufacturing data is not integrated yet.

TABLE A.1: Categories of County-Level Variables

Category	Description
Agricultural Land Use	Farm acreage, improved/unimproved land, woodland, forest
Farm Structure	Number and size of farms by ownership status (owned, tenant, sharecropper)
Agricultural Production	Crops (cotton, corn, tobacco, etc.), livestock, dairy, orchard products
Manufacturing	Establishments, capital, labor force, wages, output
Demographics	Population by race, gender, age groups
Migration Background	Population by state of birth (US-born), country of birth (foreign-born)
Education	School attendance, literacy by race/gender/age
Religious Institutions	Organizations and membership by denomination
Economic Infrastructure	Transportation, irrigation, property values, taxes

Under the assumption that county-level variation in southern economic indicators from 1870-1890 is uncorrelated with southern destination county characteristics for migrants from those counties, we view estimating southern county net migration rates as a pure prediction problem. Following **?** and Derenoncourt (2022), we use a machine-learning-based estimation in a context where the number of potential predictors is large relative to the number of observations. We apply this approach to select predictors in the "zero" stage prediction of net migration from southern counties using southern push factors:

$$\text{mig rate}_{jt} = \beta_0 + \mathbf{Z}'_{jt-10}\beta + \varepsilon_{jt}, \tag{8}$$

for $t \in \{1880, 1890, 1900\}$ where mig_{jt} is net migration for southern county j from the decade of $t-10$ to t and $\mathbf{Z}_{jt-10}$ is the set of predictors measured in $t-10$. Using LASSO, we shrink the set of predictors to an optimal subset. Excluding a predictor from the subset corresponds to setting the respective element of β to zero. More explicitly, LASSO solves the following problem:

$$\min_{\beta_0,\beta} \left\{ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1,\ldots,N} (\text{mig rate}_{jt} - \beta_0 - \mathbf{Z}'_{jt-10}\beta + \varepsilon_{jt}) \right\} \text{ subject to } \sum_{k=1}^{K} |\beta_k| \leq \lambda, \tag{9}$$

where N is the number of southern counties and K is the total number of potential predictors, including agricultural, demographic, and manufacturing characteristics. λ is selected to minimize the Bayesian Inference Criterion (BIC).


We now list the predictors used to create the shift-share instrument after performing *LASSO* algorithm. Note that different years have a different number of variables because λ is chosen separately for each decade (we can probably change that).

- 1880:

  - Per capita Total number of farms
  - Per capita Annual agricultural wages paid w/ board
  - Per capita Value of orchard products
  - Per capita Pigs
  - Per capita Indian corn (bu.)
  - Per capita Cotton (bales)
  - Per capita Amount of non-national taxes
  - Per capita Amount of city, town, etc taxes
- 1890:
  - Per capita Number of improved tilled acres farmland
  - Per capita Indian corn (bu.) 1879
  - Per capita Wheat (bu.) 1879
  - Per capita Cotton (bales) 1879
  - Per capita Total annual wages manufacturing
  - Per capita Amount of county taxes
  - Per capita Amount of city, town, etc taxes
- 1900
  - Per capita Number of farms with 20-49 acres
  - Per capita Number of farms with 100-499 acres
  - Per capita Indian corn (bu.), 1889
  - Per capita Wheat (bu.), 1889
  - Per capita Cotton (bales) 1889
  - Per capita Manufacturing capital/buildings
  - Per capita Manufacturing capital/equipment


B Appendix Figures

FIGURE B.5: Gubernatorial Democratic Vote Share and Predicted Black Population Changes




Notes: The figure shows the relationship between Black population changes (in %) and Democratic vote shares in Gubernatorial elections in 1900 (in %) at the county level.

FIGURE B.6: Congress Democratic Vote Share and Predicted Black Population Changes




Notes: The figure shows the relationship between Black population changes (in %) and Democratic vote shares in Congress elections in 1900 (in %) at the county level.

FIGURE B.7: Change in Democratic Presidential Vote Share (1856-1900) and Black Population Changes




Notes: The figure shows the relationship between Black population changes (1870-1900, in %) and changes in Democratic presidential vote share between 1856 and 1900 (in percentage points) at the county level.

FIGURE B.8: Change in Democratic Presidential Vote Share (1876-1900) and Black Population Changes



Notes: The figure shows the relationship between Black population changes (1870-1900, in %) and changes in Democratic presidential vote share between 1876 and 1900 (in percentage points) at the county level.

FIGURE B.9: Effect on Incumbent Farmers' Economic Status (1870-1900)



Notes: This figure shows the causal effect of Black in-migration from our shift-share instrumental variable design. Estimates reflect the change in occupational income score (occscore), farm status (does or does not live on a farm), homeownership (for those who do not live on farms), and literacy in response to a one-percent increase in the local Black population across Southern states. Estimates are separate by a person's pre-treatment household-level farm status: farm laborers vs. farm owners or tenants; and wealthy (100 or more in the sum of real and personal property owned by the head and their potential spouse of the person's household in 1870) vs non-wealthy. Bars show robust 95-percent confidence intervals.

C Appendix Tables

C.1 Jim Crow Laws

TABLE C.2: Effect of Black Population Change on Log Jim Crow Laws (Log)

	Log Number of Jim Crow Laws		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Laws enacted before 1900			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.0026	0.0031	0.0054***
	(0.0054)	(0.0048)	(0.0018)
Panel B: Total laws enacted			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.0061	0.0063*	0.0032
	(0.0047)	(0.0037)	(0.0020)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes
Cragg-Donald F-stat	201.39	182.30	185.84
Observations	950	950	950

Notes: This table shows the effect of black population changes between 1870-1900 on the log of the number of Jim Crow laws enacted. Panel A shows effects on laws enacted before 1900, while Panel B shows effects on all Jim Crow laws enacted. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. County level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method to predict net migration. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE C.3: Effect of Percentile Rank of Black Population Changes on Jim Crow Laws

	Number of Jim Crow Laws		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Laws enacted before 1900			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (percentile rank)	0.125	0.116	0.119***
	(0.098)	(0.088)	(0.042)
Panel B: Total laws enacted			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (percentile rank)	0.401	0.382*	0.157
	(0.260)	(0.222)	(0.139)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes
First-stage F-stat	178.67	247.48	232.46
Observations	950	950	950

Notes: This table shows the effect of the percentile rank of Black population change between 1870-1900 on the number of Jim Crow laws enacted. Panel A shows effects on laws enacted before 1900, while Panel B shows effects on all Jim Crow laws enacted. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. County level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method to predict net migration. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE C.4: Effect of Black Population Change on Employment Jim Crow Laws

	Number of Employment Jim Crow Laws		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Laws enacted before 1900			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.0481	0.0532**	0.0537***
	(0.0316)	(0.0242)	(0.0178)
Panel B: Total laws enacted			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.0718	0.0852*	0.0826**
	(0.0601)	(0.0463)	(0.0354)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes
Cragg-Donald F-stat	201.39	182.30	185.84
Observations	950	950	950

Notes: This table shows the effect of black population changes between 1870-1900 on the number of employment Jim Crow laws enacted. Panel A shows effects on laws enacted before 1900, while Panel B shows effects on all employment Jim Crow laws enacted. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. County level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method to predict net migration. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE C.5: Effect of Black Population Change on Suffrage Jim Crow Laws

	Number of Suffrage Jim Crow Laws		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Laws enacted before 1900			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.0207**	0.0214**	0.0173***
	(0.0100)	(0.0087)	(0.0057)
Panel B: Total laws enacted			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.0199	0.0239*	0.0192*
	(0.0156)	(0.0132)	(0.0105)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes
Cragg-Donald F-stat	201.39	182.30	185.84
Observations	950	950	950

Notes: This table shows the effect of black population changes between 1870-1900 on the number of suffrage Jim Crow laws enacted. Panel A shows effects on laws enacted before 1900, while Panel B shows effects on all suffrage Jim Crow laws enacted. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. County level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method to predict net migration. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE C.6: Effect of Black Population Change on Non-Employment Jim Crow Laws

	Number of Non-Employment Jim Crow Laws		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Laws enacted before 1900			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.0205	0.0233	0.0225
	(0.0557)	(0.0512)	(0.0246)
Panel B: Total laws enacted			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.1713	0.1774	-0.0060
	(0.1915)	(0.1598)	(0.0853)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes
Cragg-Donald F-stat	201.39	182.30	185.84
Observations	950	950	950

Notes: This table shows the effect of black population changes between 1870-1900 on the number of non-employment Jim Crow laws enacted. Panel A shows effects on laws enacted before 1900, while Panel B shows effects on all non-employment Jim Crow laws enacted. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. County level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method to predict net migration. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE C.7: Effect of Black Population Change on Jim Crow Laws by Period

	Number of Jim Crow Laws		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Laws enacted in 1880s			
Black pop. change 1870-1880 (%)	0.1013*	0.1019*	0.0917*
	(0.0599)	(0.0545)	(0.0551)
Panel B: Laws enacted in 1890s			
Black pop. change 1870-1890 (%)	0.1018	0.1033	0.0892**
	(0.0701)	(0.0631)	(0.0450)
Panel C: Laws enacted 1900 and after			
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	0.1799	0.1912	0.0044
	(0.1701)	(0.1427)	(0.0877)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes
Cragg-Donald F-stat	139.35	109.48	93.53
Observations	950	950	950

Notes: This table shows the effect of black population changes on the number of Jim Crow laws enacted in different periods. Panel A uses population change from 1870-1880 to predict laws enacted in the 1880s. Panel B uses population change from 1870-1890 to predict laws enacted in the 1890s. Panel C uses population change from 1870-1900 to predict laws enacted from 1900 onwards. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. County level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method to predict net migration. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C.2 Democratic vote share

TABLE C.8: Effect of Percentile Rank of Black Population Change on Electoral Outcomes

	Democratic vote share in 1900 (%)									
	US President					State Governor				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Percentile Rank of Black Pop. Change	0.381***	0.373***	0.351***	0.317***	0.073	0.522***	0.509***	0.510***	0.375***	0.110**
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.048)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
State-level total Black migration	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
State FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
First-stage F-stat	612.51	541.66	510.92	304.97	192.09	607.63	540.68	502.768	304.01	185.55
Observations	939	939	939	939	939	945	945	945	945	945
Sample mean	61.911					67.787				

Notes: This table shows the effect of the percentile rank of Black population change (based on the quantile function of the percentage increase in Black population between 1870 and 1900) on electoral outcomes. The percentile rank is derived by dividing counties into 100 quantiles of the percentage change. Electoral outcomes are the Democratic share of votes (in % of total votes) in presidential and gubernatorial elections in 1900 at the county level. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. Political outcome data comes from ICPSR and county level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method and *LASSO* to predict net migration. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

TABLE C.9: Effect of Percentile Rank of Black Population Changes on Changes in Democratic Vote Share

	Change in Democratic vote share 1876-1900 (percentage points)									
	Presidential					Gubernatorial				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (percentile rank)	0.283***	0.181***	0.165***	0.337***	0.151*	0.710***	0.607***	0.619***	0.524***	0.203**
	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.076)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.079)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
State-level total Black migration	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
State FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
First-stage F-stat	609.38	536.99	506.23	297.76	186.67	597.05	521.68	488.99	294.72	179.07
Observations	936	936	936	936	936	925	925	925	925	925
Sample mean	-2.799					14.114				

Notes: This table shows the effect of the percentile rank of Black population change between 1870-1900 on changes in Democratic vote share (in percentage points) for 1876-1900. The percentile rank is derived by dividing counties into 100 quantiles of the percentage change. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. Political outcome data comes from ICPSR and county level covariates from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method and *LASSO* to predict net migration. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

C.3 Lynchings

TABLE C.10: Effect of Percentile Rank of Black Population Changes on Historical Lynching Records

	Number of lynchings 1882-1930									
	EJI records					Historical records				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (percentile rank)	0.081***	0.046**	0.059***	0.080*	-0.011	0.038***	0.020**	0.036***	0.029***	-0.017
	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
State-level total Black migration	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
State FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
First-stage F-stat	381.94	303.73	287.06	184.76	92.48	381.94	303.73	287.06	184.76	92.48
Observations	658	658	658	658	658	658	658	658	658	658
Sample mean	5.134					3.494				

Notes: This table shows the effect of the percentile rank of Black population changes between 1870 and 1900 on the number of recorded lynchings between 1882-1930. We use two different sources of lynching data: Equal Justice Initiative's county-level records (EJI) and historical records collected by multiple scholars (Historical). The percentile rank is derived by dividing counties into 100 quantiles of the percentage change. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, share of manufacturing employment in 1870, and census region FE. County-level covariates come from IPUMS NHGIS. We use the leave-one-out method and *LASSO* to predict net migration. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

C.4 KKK Membership

TABLE C.11: Effect of Black Population Change on Number of KKK Groups

	Number of KKK groups				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Black pop. change 1870-1900 (%)	-0.0215***	-0.0216***	-0.0146***	-0.0173***	-0.0128*
	(0.0049)	(0.0047)	(0.0046)	(0.0047)	(0.0073)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-level black pop. change	No	No	No	Yes	No
State FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	843	843	843	843	843
Cragg-Donald F-stat	125.55	126.86	151.09	137.29	65.57

Notes: This table shows the effect of black population changes between 1870-1900 on the number of KKK groups. Controls include average share of Black Americans living in a state not equal to their state of birth in 1870, average literacy rate in 1870, and share of manufacturing employment in 1870. The state-level black population change control is included in column 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$