Majority Perceptions of Minority Groups: Economic Inequalities, Causes and Policy Solutions*

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Abstract

How does the majority population view the economic opportunities available to ethnic minorities, causes of ethnic inequalities, and policy solutions to address them? We answer these questions in the UK context, a multi-ethnic society where some minorities outperform the majority population in economic outcomes, while others underperform. Using an online survey fielded to a representative sample of 3200 White British individuals, we document how perceptions of minorities, causes of ethnic inequalities and policies to address them, vary far more by political leaning of respondents than other characteristics. We then use a survey experiment to understand the malleability of attitudes. The experiment presents respondents with either positive or negative primes about the economic success or disadvantage of specific minority groups. The experiment was purposefully implemented in the run up to the 2024 UK General Election, where issues of immigration and the rise of populist parties were salient. We find that even in such charged times, light-touch primes can shift perceptions of minority groups, including those of right-leaning voters. In response to primes, right-leaning voters are more likely to think of ethnic diversity as having a generally positive impact on life in the UK, they become more aware of the lack of opportunities for specific minorities, and even more supportive of policies to teach children about British values as a way to reduce ethnic inequalities. Perceptions of the root causes of ethnic inequalities – such as lack of effort, bad luck and discrimination are harder to shift. Finally, using perceptions towards the ingroup, we document that primes about the success of some minorities can sometimes shift perceptions in ways consistent with zero sum thinking. We draw together our findings by exploiting information on past actual and future intended voting behavior of respondents to suggest implications for future debates around ethnic inequalities if the majority group becomes more politically polarized. *JEL: D8, H1, J15*.

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1 Introduction

Horizontal inequalities across racial and ethnic groups consistently rank among a leading concern among the public and policy makers in countries with long histories of diversity [Clark and D'Ambrosio 2015, Benson *et al.* 2024]. We present evidence from an online survey experiment to study the perceptions of the majority population towards minorities, the root causes of ethnic inequalities, and attitudes towards whether and how policies could be used to tackle these inequalities. We do so in the UK context, a multi-ethnic society with a long history of large-scale immigration from many origin countries. We examine how the White British majority views minorities as a whole, but dig deeper to study majority views towards specific minority groups. We layer the survey with an experiment that primes respondents with information about the economic success or failure of specific minorities. We use this to understand the malleability of perceptions of the majority towards multiple minority outgroups, as well as towards the White British ingroup.

Figure 1 details the ethnic make up of the UK. In the 2021 Census, 74% of the population identified as White British. We study the views of a representative sample of this ingroup towards the remaining 26% of the population, that identifies as part of some minority. The central panel in Figure 1 shows the breakdown of minorities, highlighting the highly multi-ethnic nature of UK society. Our study focuses on perceptions of the majority towards some of the largest minorities: Poles, Indians, Pakistanis, Black Caribbeans, and Black Africans. These cover both long settled groups well into a third-generation of UK-born individuals, such as Indians and Black Caribbeans, and more recent inflows of foreign-borns from Poland and Sub Saharan Africa. As the right hand panel shows, partly because of these differences in timing of inflows into the UK, groups differ in their share of UK-born individuals.[1]

While there is often an assumption of minorities being economically disadvantaged, the diversity and varying histories of groups means that there is actually substantial variation in economic outcomes across them [Allas *et al.* 2020, Mirza and Warwick 2024] as well as differing stereotypes toward them [Burgess and Greaves 2013, Creighton and Jamal 2022]. For example, it is widely documented that most minority children outperform the majority in educational attainment, with rates of entry into universities exceeding those of the majority White British population [Britton *et al.* 2021]. Some groups – such as Indians – have also seen marked improvements in labor market outcomes through occupational mobility across generations. Yet at the same time large and persistent gaps remain in other outcomes such as employment rates (especially for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women), and wealth accumulation across all minority groups.

We designed a survey to study the attitudes of the majority towards minorities along three dimensions: perceptions of actual economic outcomes across groups and wider perceptions of opportunities available to them in education and work; causes of gaps in economic opportunities and outcomes, such as a lack of effort, bad luck, or discrimination; appropriate policy responses in

[1] We report results based on terms for ethnic groups used by the Office for National Statistics.

terms of equal opportunities policies benefitting specific groups, immigration from particular countries of origin, and a wider set of non-targeted policies related to education/training, supporting families, teaching British values, and increasing penalties for discriminatory behavior.

The survey was administered online by *YouGov*, to their regular panel of registered members, yielding a representative sample of 3205 White British respondents. Our survey was purposefully fielded in the immediate run up to the UK General Election in July 2024. That high stakes electoral campaign saw the rise of populist parties, with immigration being a salient topic throughout. Political messaging during the election campaign provides a set of background primes that our survey respondents could have been exposed to. We thus understand whether in the charged atmosphere of a General Election campaign, there remains potential to shape attitudes towards minorities though the provision of light-touch information.[2]

We find attitudes of the average White British individual towards minorities as a whole, the causes of ethnic inequalities, and policy responses to all be quite progressive: horizontal inequalities along ethnic lines are considered a problem by 62% of respondents, 45% hold the view that ethnic diversity generally has a positive impact on life in the UK, and 63% believe that discrimination is a big/moderate problem. On the politically salient topic of immigration, 68% of respondents hold the view that immigration should be reduced. In line with existing evidence, attitudes are more progressive among the young, women, and the more educated.[3]

However, as with the recent literature studying attitudes towards racial gaps in the US [Haaland and Roth 2021, Alesina *et al.* 2024], we find the political leaning of respondents trumps all other observables in correlating with perceptions of minorities, causes of ethnic inequalities, and policy preferences over whether and how to address them. The extent of political polarization is first order: left, centre and right-leaning voters have significantly different perceptions from each other. As a result, on some outcomes there is almost zero support among right-leaning individuals (e.g. whether ethnic diversity has a generally positive impact on life) and on others there is almost universal support among right-leaning individuals (e.g. immigration should be reduced).[4]

We exploit a survey experiment to study the interplay between majority attitudes, political leaning, and primes about the success and failure of specific groups, to provide insights on the malleability of attitudes. The survey experiment randomly assigned respondents to one of three arms: (i) a control group; (ii) a first treatment arm in which they are positively primed about the

[2]Some of this salience stems from large changes over time. Minorities grew from 20% of the population in 2011, to 26% in 2021. The foreign-born population increased from 13% in 2011 to 17% in 2021, largely reflecting migration of 'other white' groups.

[3]The earlier literature is replete with examples validating self-reported attitudes and beliefs with real world behaviors. As an example, Alesina *et al.* [2021] document how views on race-targeted and redistribution policies correlate with real-world behaviors such as signing petitions donating to causes in line with reported policy attitudes.

[4]Of course the correlation with political leaning could arise because of differences in how questions are interpreted, how potential answers are understood, or differences in social desirability bias between groups. Whatever is the root cause, our focus lies in understanding how individuals respond differentially to primes in terms of their perceptions of multiple outgroups, their ingroup, and across a range of attitudes towards minorities, the causes of ethnic inequalities and policy solutions.

economic opportunities of minorities, by being told: *Ethnic minorities in the UK are performing well in education. In most cases, they are getting more/higher qualifications than White British people, even when they come from poor backgrounds. This is particularly true for Indians and also for Pakistanis*; (iii) a second treatment arm in which they are negatively primed about the economic opportunities of minorities, by being told: *Ethnic minorities in the UK face higher unemployment rates than the White British majority. Even among those with similar levels of education, the chances of being unemployed are still higher in most cases. This is particularly true for Black Caribbeans and also for Pakistanis.*

A central innovation of our survey experiment is to probe perceptions among the majority White British population along three interlinked dimensions, and towards *specific* minority groups: (i) Indians – who are referred to in the positive prime; (ii) Black Caribbeans – who are referred to in the negative prime; (iii) Pakistanis – who are referred to in both primes. In addition, for each survey question we also ask respondents their perceptions of the White British ingroup.

To gauge whether these light-touch primes have any bite, and whether they do so differentially by political leaning, we first document how they impact attitudes towards minorities as a collective whole. We find: (i) primes shift forward the perception that ethnic diversity has a positive impact on life in the UK, especially for right-leaning individuals; (ii) primes increase the view that discrimination is a big/moderate problem; (iii) primes increase support for policies aiming to reduce ethnic inequalities.

Our core results then examine how primes impact perceptions of specific minority groups. Our main results are as follows.

We begin by considering perceptions of economic outcomes in two dimensions linked to the primes: graduation rates, and employment rates. Our findings line up well the growing body of evidence misperceptions of others, overviewed in Bursztyn and Yang [2022], that show misperceptions are widespread, they are asymmetric, and they are typically smaller with regards to the ingroup. Our evidence suggests that one of the great economic success stories of minorities in the UK that is well established among social scientists – their advancement in education and transition into university education – appears little known among the majority White British population.

These misperceptions are corrected by primes. The positive prime shifts forward perceptions of graduate shares among Indians and Pakistanis – the groups named in the positive prime. The magnitude of impacts are not trivial: for example White British repondents assigned to the positive prime increase their perceived graduate share of Indian men by 3.4pp relative to 36% among controls. The negative prime significantly reduces perceived employment shares among Pakistani and Black Caribbean men – the groups named in the negative prime. Left-leaning respondents are more impacted by primes with regards to graduation rates, but the beliefs of centrist and right-leaning respondents are not differentially malleable. On employment shares, centrists respond most differentially to the primes. Left and right-leaning voters have relatively immutable beliefs on this dimension of economic outcome for any group.

The results show that even during a period of heightened political campaigning, light-touch primes can shift beliefs of the majority population about economic outcomes of minorities. These shifts however relate to the specific dimension of outcome that the prime relates to, and to the specific minority groups mentioned. The direction of shift in beliefs is in line with respondents Bayesian updating from information in primes, and causing the degree of misperception to fall so beliefs align more closely with reality [Haaland and Roth 2021].

Second, we consider perceived opportunities of minorities along dimensions linked to the wording of the primes: (i) obtaining a good education; (ii) finding work; (iii) earning a decent wage. Primes have little impact on the perceptions of the majority population over opportunities faced by minority groups. However, for each dimension we find significantly differential responses to primes on perceptions of the lack of opportunities the White British ingroup faces, in regards to a lack of opportunities in education ($p = .007$), finding work ($p = .001$) or earning a decent wage ($p = .004$). However, responses differ between the positive and negative prime. For White British individuals randomly assigned to the positive prime – that informs them of the relative educational success of Indian and Pakistani groups – they are significantly more likely to report that White British individuals have few or no opportunities of finding work or earning a decent wage. These magnitudes of response correspond to 36% and 27% increases over controls respectively. Such responses are consistent with zero sum thinking – that positive outcomes for outgroups might come at the expense of the White British ingroup.

For White British individuals randomly assigned to the negative prime – that informs them of the relative disadvantage in unemployment for Pakistani and Black Caribbean groups despite their educational success – they are significantly less likely to report that White British individuals have few or no opportunities in obtaining a good education, the magnitude of the effect corresponding to a 39% decrease from controls. The response to the negative prime is more aligned with the realization that the ingroup does not face disadvantage in the same underlying dimension as highlighted for minorities.

On perceived root causes of ethnic inequalities, we first asked respondents about the relative importance of luck and effort in driving success across groups. We find that: (i) a lack of success for White British individuals is far more attributed to a lack of effort rather than bad luck (34% versus 7%, $p = .000$); (ii) the opposite attribution is made for Indians (13% versus 24%, $p = .000$); (iii) for Pakistani and Black Caribbeans, respondents are equally likely to attribute a lack of success to luck and effort. Neither the positive nor the negative prime shift perceptions of these underlying causes, nor do they have impact by political leaning.

The final cause we consider is discrimination, so emphasizing systematic forces against a group rather than individual-based causes such as effort or luck. We focus on majority views of discrimination face in labor market recruitment. The ranking of discrimination matches with perceptions of opportunities for finding work or earning a decent wage: Black Caribbeans are perceived to face the most discrimination in recruitment, followed by Pakistanis and then Indians. Primes shift

these view for all minority groups with the exception of Black Caribbeans. However, the largest impact is found for how the positive prime – showing minorities are doing well in education – increases the perception that White British men face labor market discrimination. This is again in line with zero sum thinking: as the prime highlights some minority groups are doing well, respondents are triggered to think the ingroup is more disadvantaged.

We again find little evidence of primes having differential impacts by political leaning. This reinforces the notion that despite the importance of political leaning in shaping attitudes towards minorities and perceptions of the causes of a lack of success of minorities, these views are deep rooted and not malleable to light-touch primes.

The third major dimension of perceptions we examine relates to policies addressing ethnic inequalities. We start with views on equal opportunities policies in general, and whether White British respondents feel they have 'gone too far' or 'not far enough' in relation to specific groups. 24% of respondents view such policies have not gone far enough in relation to the White British ingroup, and only 4% report that they have gone too far. This is very different for views toward each minority group, where there is a far more even split of views: around 20% of White British respondents report that such policies have gone too far, and not far enough, with regards to Indians, Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans.

Views of equal opportunities policies can be shifted by light-touch primes: (i) the negative prime increases the view that such policies have not gone far enough for all minority groups; (ii) both primes increase views that policies have gone too far with regards to the White British population. Hence we do not see any evidence of zero sum thinking when it comes to support for or against equal opportunities policies, unlike other domains related to opportunities or labor market discrimination as a cause of ethnic inequalities.

While there are stark differences in levels of support for equal opportunities polices by the political leaning of White British respondents, we again find that primes do not differentially impact these policy views across political leaning.

We also asked repondents about immigration policy. The majority of White British respondents think immigration numbers should be reduced, irrespective of migrants' country of origin. For any given origin, support for immigration numbers being reduced is around ten times higher than for immigration flows to be increased. Primes nudge these views. Exposure to the positive prime – that minorities are performing well in education – increases the view that immigration numbers should be reduced; exposure to the negative prime nudge support the other way. We do not find evidence that primes differentially impact these views across political leaning.

Given most policies cannot be explicitly tagged to groups based on race or ethnicity, we asked respondents their views on the role of specific policies to help reduce ethnic inequalities. Investing in education/training receives the strongest support (70%). Support is lower for other policies such as teaching children about British values, supporting families with children financially, and increasing penalties for discriminating, and each also have a good share of respondents that think

such policies can do not much/nothing.

Primes shift support for these polices. The positive prime significantly increases support by 7.1pp for teaching children about British values, especially among right-leaning voters. The differential impacts of the positive and negative primes also decrease support for financially supporting families with children and penalizing discrimination ($p = .076$, .084 respectively).

We draw together our findings by exploiting information on past actual and future intended voting behavior of respondents to suggest implications for future debates around ethnic inequalities if the majority group becomes more politically polarized, or if views of the majority and minorities themselves diverge.

Our work contributes to a burgeoning literature in economics using survey experiments to understand perceptions [Stantcheva 2022, Fuster and Zafar 2023, Haaland *et al.* 2023]. We add to this by considering attitudes of the majority towards multiple minority groups, the root causes of ethnic inequalities, and policy solutions. We do so in the context of a multi-ethnic society, using our survey experiment to study the interplay between majority attitudes, political leaning and primes about the success and failure of specific groups.

We do so in a non-US context. In our UK setting, political polarization is less entrenched and histories of racial and ethnic relations differ markedly from the US experience. Moreover, we focus on establishing views towards multiple outgroups as well as the ingroup. A vast literature examines the evolutionary roots of ingroup bias. While the standard view is that such preferences are immutable, there has been increasing attention on alternative formulations. A nascent body of evidence – mostly from lab settings – shows agents can display contagious altruism: under this view, positive altruism towards an outgroup fosters altruism towards the ingroup. A second scenario is one of parochial altruism: under this view, greater rivalry between groups fosters more cooperation within the ingroup – akin to zero sum thinking, that is more in line with some of our results. While the study of ingroup-outgroup biases goes back decades, to the best of our knowledge, there has been little examination of spillover effects across outgroups [Tajfel *et al.* 1971, Bertrand and Duflo 2017, McConnell and Rasul 2021]. The notion is important because it implies a malleability of outgroup biases, and that information about one outgroup can have positive or negative externalities on others.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our survey data and provides preliminary descriptive evidence on majority perceptions. Section 3 describes the survey experiment and presents evidence on how primes impact attitudes of white British respondents towards minorities as a whole. Section 4 presents evidence on majority attitudes towards specific minority groups, examining whether primes shift attitudes towards groups, perceived causes of ethnic inequalities, and policy responses to address such inequalities. Section 5 concludes with some final remarks on directions for future work. Appendix A provides additional results. Appendix B shows our core findings allowing for heterogeneity by political leaning, gender and education of White British respondents. Appendix C presents other results from the survey experiment.

2 Data

2.1 Sample

The data for our analysis comes from a survey we designed and that was administered online by *YouGov*, to their regular panel of registered members. This panel is designed to be representative of the UK population. Panel members frequently interact with *YouGov* and are incentivized to complete their online surveys. 4229 individuals were surveyed (a response rate of XXX%). For our study of majority views towards minorities, we focus on a sample of 3205 White British respondents. The survey took place online between the 25th and 28th June 2024, in the immediate run up to the UK General Election on July 4th. That high stakes electoral campaign saw the rise of populist parties, with immigration being a salient topic throughout. Political messaging during the election campaign provides a natural set of background primes that respondents could have been exposed to, and any impacts of our survey primes should be interpreted as being on top of these. This is especially the case given all survey questions were framed as being related to the contemporary situation in the UK.[5]

Table A1 shows the sample characteristics, comparing them to 2021 UK census figures for the White British population. Respondents are on average age 50, split equally by gender, and 95% are UK born. The sample is slightly older, slightly less urban and slightly less educated than the White British population as whole. Throughout our analysis, we therefore use individual weights to adjust respondents to the national profile.

Table A2 details respondents' political orientation. Panel A shows a measure of political leaning, with 9% of respondents self-reporting being right-leaning, 48% report themselves as centrists, and 16% consider themselves to be left-leaning (the remainder being unsure/don't know). Panel B shows voting intentions in the 2024 General Election: our sample is politically engaged – 89% report intending to vote (while actual turnout was 60%). Respondents again reflect a full spectrum of political views, with 34% planning to vote Labour, and 19% reporting considering voting for the Reform Party. Given these sample features we expect: (i) respondents to be especially subject to any background priming from the election campaign; (ii) the view of the median voter to be represented in our sample, with respondents reflecting views that shape policy demands.

[5] After the election in late July and early August, anti-immigration demonstrations and riots took place across 27 towns and cities in the UK. Many involved participants attacking mosques and hotels housing asylum seekers. As of August 30th 2024, 1280 people had been arrested for their involvement, with 796 being charged, making this the most significant disorder in the UK for over a decade.

2.2 Preliminaries

2.2.1 Concerns over Inequalities

After consenting to take part in the survey, respondents were shown an opening message outlining the study purpose: *This is an academic study looking at public attitudes towards inequality and ethnic diversity. It forms part of a research programme on race and ethnicity in the UK.* This priming as well as the politically charged atmosphere in which the survey was fielded, means that our sample might be more focused on issues of inequality than might be the case at other times. To gauge this we asked respondents up front (before the primes were displayed) their views on: (i) vertical inequalities across domains; (ii) horizontal inequalities between groups. The results in Table A3 show that views among our respondents line up closely with other online surveys conducted either earlier in 2024 prior to the General Election being announced [Fairness Foundation 2024] or those conducted in other times of uncertainty such as the pandemic [Benson *et al.* 2024]. Specifically we find that: (i) the majority of respondents are concerned over vertical inequalities along any given dimension, with the top ranked dimension being inequalities in wealth and income (80%); (ii) horizontal inequalities along ethnic lines are considered a problem by the largest share of respondents – likely reflecting some of the survey priming, but again at least 40% of respondents report the same on any given dimension of horizontal inequality.[6]

2.2.2 Perceptions of Minorities as a Whole

To lay the foundations for our analysis, Table 1 describes perceptions among controls towards minorities as a whole, causes of ethnic inequalities, and policy responses, as well as the individual characteristics that correlate to each of these perceptions. At the foot of each Column we show the proportion of respondents that agree with the statement underlying each perception.

Ethnic Diversity We start by considering whether respondents think inequalities between ethnic groups are a big/moderate problem. Column 1 shows that 62% of respondents hold this view, where such perceptions are more common among female and more educated respondents. Column 2 additionally controls for political leaning. This slightly weakens the partial correlations of education with this perception, but most strikingly, political leaning is the most economically and statistically significantly correlate of perceptions. Compared to the omitted group of left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 24pp less likely to view ethnic inequalities as a big/moderate problem, and right-leaning respondents are 36pp less likely to view ethnic inequali-

[6] A *Fairness Foundation* survey conducted in January 2024 on a sample of 2050 adults in the UK found that: (i) the top ranked dimension of vertical inequality was also along dimensions of wealth and income, considered by 75% of respondents as being a big or moderate problem; (ii) 58% of respondents considered horizontal ethnic inequalities to be a big or moderate problem, being ranked above concerns over other dimensions of horizontal inequality such as gender, religion, age and sexual identity [Fairness Foundation 2024].

ties as a big/moderate problem.[7]

Columns 3 and 4 repeat the analysis for whether the respondent agrees that ethnic diversity generally has a positive impact on life in the UK. 45% of respondents hold this view, and the perception is more commonly held among educated and higher income individuals. However, we again see the strength of correlation with political leaning: compared to the omitted group of left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 36pp less likely to view ethnic diversity positively, and right-leaning respondents are 68pp less likely to do so.

Causes We next consider respondent perceptions of causes of ethnic inequalities, asking whether they believe that racial discrimination is a big/moderate problem. 63% of respondents think so, with this perception being more prevalent among women. However, political leanings again dominate conditional on other characteristics: compared to the omitted group of left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 33pp less likely to view discrimination as a big/moderate problem, and right-leaning respondents are 61pp less likely to do so.

Policy Responses The final batch of perceptions relate to policies related to ethnic inequalities. We start with the politically salient topic of immigration, and whether respondents agree that immigration should be reduced. 68% of respondents agree with this, a view that is more prevalent among older and male respondents. However as with other outcomes, partial correlations with political leaning swamp the effects of other covariates: compared to left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 32pp more likely to state wanting immigration to be reduced, and right-leaning respondents are 51pp more likely to do so.

Finally, we asked whether individuals agreed that government should aim to reduce economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families. Columns 9 and 10 show that 49% of respondents agree with this, with younger and more educated respondents being more likely to agree with this policy aim. Again partial correlations with political leanings are precisely estimated and of economic significance: compared to left-leaning respondents, centrist respondents are 26pp less likely to agree, and right-leaning respondents are 53pp less likely to agree.

Summary The perceptions of the average White British individual towards minorities as a whole, the causes of ethnic inequalities, and policy responses are all quite progressive. In line with existing evidence, views are generally more progressive among the young, women, and the more educated. However, what trumps all these dimensions in terms of economic significance are the partial correlations of perceptions with political leaning. Moreover, the majority population

[7] Those unsure of their political leaning (or don't knows) are included in the specification. At the foot of each even Column we report the p-value on a Wald test of the equivalence of the coefficients on the common covariates shown. The economic significance of political leaning is high: for example, the partial correlation with gender is 11pp, less than half the strength of the correlation with centrist leaning, or less than a third of the partial correlation with right-leaning views.

is politically polarized in regards to ethnic inequalities: on each dimension, left, centre and right-leaning voters have significantly different perceptions from each other, conditional on observables. As a result, on some outcomes there is almost zero support among right-leaning individuals (e.g. whether ethnic diversity has a generally positive impact on life) and on others there is almost universal support among right-leaning individuals (e.g. immigration should be reduced).

Our results echo the literature studying attitudes towards racial gaps in the US context [Alesina *et al.* 2024], in that the political leaning of respondents is a key force driving majority perceptions towards minorities. Throughout, we thus consider the role political views have on perceived inequalities in economic opportunities across minority groups, causes of those inequalities, and preferences over policies to address them.

Table A4 shows these conclusions are robust to alternative measures of political leaning such as: (i) the political party voted for in the 2019 General Election (ii) voting intention in the 2024 General Election. Interestingly, for the backward-looking measure based on voting in 2019, we generally find few statistically significant differences between those that voted for the right-leaning Conservative Party and the (further right-leaning) Brexit Party. However, this changes when we measure political views using forward-looking voting intentions in the upcoming 2024 General Election. On that measure, for three out of five perceptions we find statistically significant different views between those intending to vote for the Conservative and Reform Parties. This highlights that views towards minorities might be becoming more polarized over time in the UK, adding to the importance of understanding whether such views can be shifted in politically charged times. This is the issue we now turn to.

3 The Survey Experiment

Respondents are randomly assigned to three treatment arms. In a first treatment, respondents are positively primed about the economic opportunities of minorities, by being told:

Ethnic minorities in the UK are performing well in education. In most cases, they are getting more/higher qualifications than White British people, even when they come from poor backgrounds. This is particularly true for Indians and also for Pakistanis. We want to know what you think about ethnic diversity in the UK today;

In a second treatment, respondents are negatively primed about the economic opportunities of minorities, by being told:

Ethnic minorities in the UK face higher unemployment rates than the White British majority. Even among those with similar levels of education, the chances of being unemployed are still higher in most cases. This is particularly true for Black Caribbeans and also for Pakistanis. We want to know what you think about ethnic diversity in the UK today;

A third group are assigned as controls that receive no priming. All impacts of primes should be

interpreted as being relative to background primes from exposure to the general election campaign.

Figure 2 shows the structure of the survey experiment. In each treatment arm, we ask individuals a sequence of questions relating to: (i) their perceptions towards minorities and the opportunities available to them; (ii) perceptions of the causes of gaps in economic opportunity across groups – such as a lack of effort, bad luck, or discrimination; (iii) views of potential policy solutions related to ethnic inequalities, such as equal opportunities policies in general, immigration policy more specifically, or a wider range of untargeted policies including those related to education/training, welfare support to families, teaching British values in school, or increasing punishments for discriminatory behavior.

A central innovation of our survey experiment is to probe perceptions among the majority White British population along the three broad dimensions above, towards *specific* minority groups: (i) Indians – who are referred to in the positive prime; (ii) Black Caribbeans – who are referred to in the negative prime; (iii) Pakistanis – who are referred to in both positive and negative primes; (iv) Polish and Black Africans, who are not referred to in either prime, but as shown in Figure 1, constitute important minorities in the UK today. In addition, for each survey question we also ask respondents their perceptions of the White British ingroup.[8]

3.1 Interpreting the Primes

Both primes are factually correct [Mirza and Warwick 2024], and demonstrate a common base for positive and negative outcomes, namely they state some groups are doing well even if from poor backgrounds, and that others are doing poorly even if well qualified. The primes are not intended to suggest that either is necessarily a cause for celebration or concern. To reinforce this, both primes have the neutral final sentence intended to show a range of reactions could be possible.[9]

The primes in the survey experiment serve two purposes. First, they shed light on the malleability of attitudes of the majority population, in a time of heightened awareness of issues around vertical and horizontal inequalities. The primes describe no detail on magnitudes of differences in economic opportunities across groups. Exposure to them is therefore more likely to shift perceptions in a given direction, rather than towards some specific focal point. Second, they allow us to understand the malleability of perceptions towards specific groups – given that some groups, but not all, are named in the primes. Moreover, they allow us to understand whether primes shift perceptions narrowly only towards named groups, or whether there are spillover impacts onto non-

[8]It is because of this structure of asking respondents about multiple groups that we had to limit the cognitive load on respondents by restricting the number of groups asked about. Hence we do not ask about other important minorities such as Bangladeshis, Chinese or those of Mixed ethnicity (Figure 1). We are still able to examine if the primes have spillover attitudes onto groups that are not named, and to this extent can speculate how malleable attitudes towards other outgroups might be.

[9]Our information treatments are thus less targeted than examples from the related literature on racial/ethnic gaps, where primes are often designed to trigger respondents in a specific dimension on either the causes or consequences of gaps [Alesina *et al.* 2021].

named groups, or whether they indeed shift attitudes towards the White British ingroup, that in some cases can be consistent with zero sum thinking [Chinoy *et al.* 2023]. Namely, that if other groups are doing better than perceived, perceptions of the economic standing of the ingroup shift in the opposite direction.

As with any survey experiment, responses could be driven by social desirability bias or experimenter demand effects. The concern is partially ameliorated by the fact that respondents are well used to answering surveys from *YouGov*, are incentivized to complete them and aware there are no gains or losses to them from not answering truthfully. Even so, any demand effects would also suggest attitudes could be malleable through exposure to the kinds of far stronger priming from messages put forth in high stakes political campaigns. Moreover, we assess if primes shift attitudes towards non-named groups and the White British ingroup, this is more reflective of an updating of attitudes rather than the primes inducing experimenter demand effects towards specific minorities.[10]

3.2 Estimation and Balance

Following our pre-analysis plan, we estimate the impacts of primes using a standard specification for perception y of individual i:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_P T_{iP} + \beta_N T_{iN} + u_i, \tag{1}$$

where T_{iP} is a dummy equal to one if i is randomly assigned to the positive prime, and zero otherwise; T_{iN} is a dummy equal to one if i is assigned to the negative prime. u_i is an error term.

Given our primes are light touch they might not always shift attitudes relative to controls. Hence, we report the p-value on the null that $\beta_P = \beta_N$, to assess the symmetry of responses to primes, and to probe the more general hypothesis that attitudes can be shifted primes more generally, through differential exposure to positive and negative primes. Throughout our analysis we use individual weights to adjust respondents to match the national profile, and report robust standard errors. For any given perception, a range of answers can typically be expressed – e.g. an individual might agree or disagree with a statement, or express they don't know. For expositional ease, we focus on the most relevant response categories, that need not always sum to one due to other outcomes not being shown.

Panels A and B in Table A1 shows treatment arms are well balanced on socioeconomic characteristics (Columns 6 to 8). Panel C shows the modal survey response was received on 26th June 2024 – eight days before the General Election. The median survey response time was just under 20

[10]Earlier work has documented limited impacts of demand effects in survey experiments but this might vary across contexts [de Quidt *et al.* 2018, Mummolo and Peterson 2018]. The concern might be especially acute: (i) in the absence of truth-telling incentives, although some evidence cautions that incentives can be counterproductive for truth-telling [Halland *et al.* 2023]; (ii) if respondents engage in political 'cheerleading', although the UK is traditionally less polarized than the US.

minutes across treatment arms, with a slightly longer right tail of response times for those exposed to the negative prime. Table A2 shows the the treatment arms to be well balanced on political leaning – either in their self-reported leaning, voting intentions in the 2024 General Election, past voting behaviors in the 2019 General Election or the 2016 EU Referendum.

3.3 Primes and Perceptions Towards Minorities as a Whole

We first consider how perceptions of minorities as a collective whole are shifted by the primes. The results in Table 2 demonstrate that: (i) primes do not shift attitudes towards ethnic diversity being positive for life in the UK, but they do shift views on discrimination as a big/moderate problem, and support for policies to address ethnic inequalities; (ii) relative to controls, the negative prime is more impactful than the positive prime; (iii) differential responses to positive and negative primes are statistically significant for three out of four outcomes – exposure to the negative relative to the positive prime shifts forward the view that discrimination is a cause of ethnic inequalities ($p = .014$), that policy should aim to reduce differences between White British and minority households ($p = .095$), and weakens the view that immigration should be reduced ($p = .043$).

As pre-specified, Table B1 examines heterogeneous impacts by political leaning. For any given outcome, all coefficients are estimated from a single regression that extends the specification in (1). Column 1 reiterates that among controls, there are starkly different attitudes between left-leaning, centrist and right-leaning White British respondents. The remaining Columns show that perceptions of centre and right-leaning voters are shifted by primes. Centrist voters become more favorable towards ethnic diversity when presented with the positive prime, and right-leaning voters become more favorable when presented with either prime. The magnitudes of impact are relatively large showing the malleability of views among this group even to a light-touch intervention. For example, among right-leaning controls, 10% think ethnic diversity has a positive impact, but this rises by 12-14pp among those exposed to either prime. The impact occurs even during a period of heightened electioneering, when respondents will potentially have been exposed to and primed by political messaging around salient topics including immigration.

On other margins, right-leaning voters are more weakly impacted by priming in terms of thinking discrimination is a cause of ethnic inequalities, that policy should address economic differences across groups, or that immigration should be reduced.

4 Perceptions of Specific Groups

The remainder of our analysis focuses on the attitudes of the majority White British population towards specific minority groups, and whether and how these are shifted by light-touch primes.

4.1 Who is a Minority?

We first consider whether White British respondents consider specific groups as being minorities *per se*. The results are in Table 3, where we highlight the minority groups referred to in each prime (to make clear that Indians and Pakistanis are mentioned in the positive prime, and that Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans are mentioned in the negative prime). Minority groups referred to in the primes are significantly more likely to be recognized as minorities, irrespective of whether respondents are exposed to the positive or negative prime. The magnitudes of impacts are non-trivial, ranging from 12% to 16% increases over controls. The increased salience of minorities in response to primes potentially underlies the changes perceptions towards causes and solutions to ethnic inequalities that we come to later. Somewhat surprisingly, 23% of controls view the White British ingroup as a minority. Primes do not shift this attitude.

Table B2 shows how these treatment effects differ by political leaning. Among controls, there are striking differences by political leaning in whether groups are viewed as minorities. 12% of left-leaning voters view the White British as a minority, rising by 12pp for centrists, and by 19pp for right-leaning respondents. For any given minority, centrist and right-leaning respondents are significantly less likely to view that group as a minority, with the gap between centrist and right-leaning attitudes being small. However, we find no evidence that treatment effects of primes on groups being viewed as a minority differ by political leaning.

Finally, we find strong spillover effects in the recognition of other groups as minorities even if they are not referred to in the primes. This result is detailed in Table A5 where we show results for the complete set of groups respondents were asked about, collating groups by race. Within White groups, there is heterogeneity in the extent to which different groups are recognized as minorities by the White British majority: 14% of respondents view the Irish as a minority, but 32% do so for Poles. Both primes increase the recognition of Poles as a minority. Primes increase the recognition of all Asian and Black groups as minorities, even those not named in the primes. Within Asian and Black groups, a very similar share of respondents recognize each specific group as a minority, and treatment effects of primes are also broadly similar.

Hence except for White groups, there is little to suggest major divergences in how different ethnic groups within Asian and Black races are perceived, despite large differences within these groups in their economic standing.

4.2 (Mis)Perceptions of Economic Outcomes

Perceptions We now consider perceptions of White British respondents of the economic outcomes of minority groups. We do so along two dimensions closely linked to the wording of the primes: (i) the share of graduates, by gender, among each group; (ii) the employment rate, by gender, among each group. For expositional ease we consider perceptions of economic outcomes of men in each group, and focus on perceptions towards the three named outgroups and the ingroup.

We discuss below perceptions of the economic outcomes of other minority groups, and of women.[11]

To understand the level and accuracy of perceptions we first consider the control group. The results are in Figure 3. Panel A shows perceptions of graduate shares of different groups. White British respondents believe 36% of White British men are graduates, with this belief being almost identical towards Indian men. 26% and 21% of Pakistani and Black Caribbean men respectively, are thought to be graduates. We measure the accuracy of these beliefs using the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) from April 2023-March 2024 than enables us to derive actual graduate shares among men in each group. The difference between perceptions and reality is shown on the right hand side of Panel A. Perceptions and reality of the White British population of the graduate share among White British men line up well – there is only a 5pp overestimation of graduate shares. In sharp contrast, there are large misperceptions of graduate shares among Indian and Pakistani men – the underestimation of graduate shares for Indian men being 30pp (around half the actual share) and 18pp for Pakistani men (just under half the actual share).

Our findings line up well the growing body of evidence misperceptions of others, overviewed in Bursztyn and Yang [2022], that show misperceptions are widespread, they are asymmetric, and they are typically smaller with regards to the ingroup. They also demonstrate that one of the great economic success stories of Asians in the UK that is well established among social scientists – their advancement in education and transition into university education – appears little known among the majority White British population. This misperception does not however apply to all minorities: perceptions and reality line up closely for graduate shares among Black Caribbean men, with the degree of misperception being similar to that for White British men.[12]

Panel B of Figure 3 repeats the analysis for employment shares of men. Employment shares are perceived to be closer across groups, and between 70 and 80% for all minorities. Using the QLFS to benchmark these against reality, we again find evidence of significant misperceptions. The majority population underestimates employment shares for White British men and Indian men, and overestimate them for Pakistani and Black Caribbean men.

The results extend to perceptions of men in other minority groups that are not referred to in either prime (Polish, Black Africans). We also find a strong similarity of results in relation to perceptions of economic outcomes for women across groups.[13]

[11] On employment shares, the exact wording of the question was, *Out of 100 men of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are not working?* Respondents appear to have interpreted this not as the unemployment rate (that varies between 4% and 9% across groups), but as employment rates (among the economically active).

[12] Alesina *et al.* [2023] study misperceptions of the economic lives of immigrants in the US.

[13] The upper panel in Figure A1 shows the extent of (mis)perceptions of the economic outcomes for Polish and Black African men. For Poles, the extent of misperception on each outcome is very similar to that for the White British ingroup. For Black Africans, perceived graduation and employment rates are very similar to those towards Black Caribbeans, and the direction and extent of misperceived outcomes are also similar. The lower panel in Figure A1 shows the extent of (mis)perceptions of the economic outcomes for women across groups. There largely replicate findings for perceptions of outcomes for men, with White British graduation rates being slightly underestimated, the graduation rates of all other groups being vastly underestimated, and with results on employment rates being

Correlates of Perceptions Table 4 shows correlates of perceptions for each outcome, by group. We control for the same set of covariates as when we considered attitudes towards minorities as a whole. There are a few robust predictors of perceptions of economic outcomes: (i) older and less educated individuals perceive lower graduate shares and employment rates across groups; (ii) women perceive higher graduate shares and lower employment shares across groups. However, the political leaning of White British respondents again plays an economically significant role in shaping perceptions of economic outcomes of minorities, conditional on observables. Relative to left-leaning individuals: (i) centrist and right-leaning individuals underestimate graduate shares among Pakistani and Black Caribbean men; (ii) centrist and right-leaning individuals underestimate employment shares of all groups.[14]

Correlates of perceptions of economic outcomes for women across groups are again found to be very similarly correlated to observables as for men.[15]

Primes and Perceptions Table 5 documents how these perceptions are impacted by the primes. Panel A shows results for beliefs about graduate shares. The positive prime shifts forward perceptions of graduate shares among Indians and Pakistanis – the groups named in the positive prime. The magnitude of impacts are not trivial: for example White British repondents assigned to the positive prime increase their perceived graduate share of Indian men by 3.4pp relative to 36% among controls. There is no significant impact of the negative prime (that was worded in terms of employment outcomes). Panel B shows treatment effects for perceived employment shares. Here we find the negative prime significantly reduces perceived employment shares among Pakistani and Black Caribbean men – the groups named in the negative prime.

Taken together the results show that even during a period of heightened political campaigning, light-touch primes can shift beliefs of the majority population about economic outcomes of minorities. These shifts relate to the specific dimension of outcome that the prime relates to, and to the specific minority groups mentioned. The direction of shift in beliefs is in line with respondents Bayesian updating from information in primes, and causing the degree of misperception to fall so beliefs align more closely with reality [Haaland and Roth 2021].

These priming effects again extend to impacts of perceptions of men in other minority groups

more mixed across groups, but employment rates of Pakistani and Black Caribbean women being overestimated (as for men in those groups).

[14]However, while political leaning strongly partially correlate with the level of belief about groups, they do not fully explain the directions of misperceptions among groups. Comparing the results in Table 4 to the direction of misperceptions in Figure 3, the underestimation of graduate shares of Indian men is driven also by older respondents, and not so much by their political leaning; the overestimation of employment shares of Pakistani and Black Caribbean men is mostly driven by educated and left-leaning respondents.

[15]Table A6 shows partial correlations of observables on each outcome across groups to be similar to those for perceptions of male economic outcomes. Specifically: (i) older and less educated individuals perceive lower graduate shares and employment rates; (ii) women perceive higher graduate shares and lower employment shares. Political leaning again plays an economically significant role in shaping perceptions of economic outcomes of women in minorities, conditional on observables.

that are not referred to (Polish, Black Africans). We also find a strong similarity of priming effect results in relation to perceptions of economic outcomes for women across groups.[16]

Finally, given political leaning strongly correlates with perceptions, in Table B3 we consider whether and how the primes have differential impacts by political leaning. Left-leaning respondents are more impacted by primes. For each group, we find significantly differential responses among left-leaning respondents to the positive and negative prime, whether that is in regards to graduate shares among White British ($p = .041$), Indian ($p = .022$), Pakistani ($p = .004$) and Black Caribbean men ($p = .027$). The beliefs of centrist and right-leaning respondents are far less malleable. On employment shares, Table B4 shows centrists respond most differentially to the primes. Left and right-leaning voters are found to have relatively immutable beliefs on this dimension of economic opportunity in regards to any group.

4.3 Opportunities

To dig deeper into the beliefs underlying misperceptions, we next examine how the majority views economic opportunities available to minorities. To do so, we asked respondents about three dimensions again closely linked to the wording of the primes: (i) obtaining a good education; (ii) finding work; (iii) earning a decent wage. Each question was framed in the context of opportunities minorities might face in the local neighborhood of the respondent (rather than in relation to the UK as a whole). The results are in Table 6.

Focusing first on views among controls in Columns 1, 4 and 6, we see widespread recognition of minorities having few or no opportunities related to education, work and wages. The ranking of minorities also line up well with the earlier perceptions of economic outcomes: Black Caribbeans are seen to have the fewest opportunities relative to the majority population, followed by Pakistanis and then Indians.

The remaining Columns show generally weak impacts of each prime on the perceived lack of opportunities for minority groups across these dimensions. However, on perceptions of getting a good education, the positive prime nudges down the perceived lack of opportunities and the positive prime nudges up the perceived lack of opportunities, leading to there being a differential response to the positive and negative prime for perceived lack of opportunities for Indians ($p = .035$) and Pakistanis ($p = .009$).

[16]Tables A7 and A8 show how the results extend to other male groups. As for perceptions of White British graduate shares and employment rates, we find no significant impact of primes towards Poles. As for perceptions of Black Caribbean graduate shares, we find a significant differential impact of the positive and negative primes on Black Africans ($p = .027$), but this also extends to perceptions of employment rates among Black Africans ($p = .036$). Tables A7 and A8 also show how the results extent to perceived economic outcomes of women across groups. The results are very similar when comparing perceptions of graduate shares of women to those for men. On employment rates, we again see a differential impact of the primes for perceptions of Indian ($p = .091$) and Pakistani women ($p = .026$) with null impacts on perceptions of those for White British and Black Caribbean women (and also for Polish and Black African women).

However, the most striking pattern that emerges is in relation to views about whether the White British population face few or no opportunities. Along all three dimensions we find significantly differential responses to the positive and negative prime, whether that is in regards to a lack of opportunities in education ($p = .007$), finding work ($p = .001$) or earning a decent wage ($p = .004$). However, the nature of response differs between the positive and negative prime.

White British individuals randomly assigned to the positive prime – that informs them of the relative educational success of Indian and Pakistani groups – are significantly more likely to report that White British individuals have few or no opportunities in terms of finding work or earning a decent wage. These magnitudes of response are also large, corresponding to 36% and 27% increases over controls respectively. The response to the positive prime is consistent with zero sum thinking – that positive outcomes for outgroups might come at the expense of the White British ingroup [Chinoy *et al.* 2023].

White British individuals randomly assigned to the negative prime – that informs them of the relative disadvantage in unemployment for Pakistani and Black Caribbean groups despite their educational success – are significantly less likely to report that White British individuals have few or no opportunities in obtaining a good education, the magnitude of the effect corresponding to a 39% decreases from controls. The response to the negative prime is more aligned with the realization that the ingroup does not face disadvantage in the same underlying dimension as highlighted for minorities.

Both results have implications for messaging during political campaigns and how they can be used to engender feelings of ingroup opportunities. To explore this further, in Table B5 we examine how responses vary with political leaning. On opportunities related to finding work or earning a decent wage, responses to primes largely do not vary with political leaning. Primes and political leaning interact more when White British respondents consider educational opportunities. More precisely, right-leaning respondents respond significantly to the negative prime, reducing beliefs that Indians, Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans lack educational opportunities (where recall the negative prime informs them that Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans have poor labor market outcomes despite doing as well in education).

4.4 Causes

Given this background landscape of how economic opportunities across groups are viewed by the majority, our next batch of results consider perceived causes of these gaps.

4.4.1 Luck versus Effort

We first asked respondents about the relative importance of luck and effort in driving success: *does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?* The results are in Table 7, where it is again instructive to start

with responses among controls. We see that: (i) a lack of success for White British individuals is far more attributed to a lack of effort rather than bad luck (34% versus 7%, $p = .000$); (ii) the opposite attribution is made for Indians, bad luck rather than effort is far more likely to be viewed as a cause of success (13% versus 24%, $p = .000$); (iii) for Pakistani and Black Caribbeans, respondents are equally likely to attribute a lack of success to luck and effort (19% versus 19%, $p = .975$, and 20% versus 17%, $p = .216$ respectively). The remaining Columns show that neither the positive nor the negative prime shift perceptions of these underlying causes of a lack of success across groups.

Table B6 explores responses by political leaning. We see that: (i) among controls, relative to left-leaning respondents, centrist and right-leaning respondents are significantly less likely to attribute a lack of success to bad luck, and this true for both the ingroup and outgroups; (ii) neither the positive nor the negative prime shift the perceptions of these underling causes of a lack of success across groups by political leaning.

This reinforces the notion that despite the importance of political leaning in shaping attitudes towards minorities, perceptions of the root causes of a lack of success of the White British ingroup and minority outgroups are deep rooted and not malleable to light-touch primes.

4.4.2 Discrimination

Labor Markets The third cause of ethnic inequalities we consider is discrimination: so placing emphasis on systematic forces against a group rather than individual-based causes such as effort or luck. We start by focusing on majority views of labor market discrimination faced by minority groups, and then consider discrimination in other domains of life. On labor market discrimination, we framed questions to be group and gender specific, given large gender differentials in labor market participation. For discrimination faced by men we asked respondents, *Imagine that the following men applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.* Responses are coded so that a rank of 1 means the group is perceived to face the least discrimination at hiring processes in labor markets. The results are in Table 8, and we discuss the similarity of results for women below.

The ranking of discrimination faced by groups matches with the earlier described perceptions of opportunities for finding work or earning a decent wage: Black Caribbeans are perceived to face the most discrimination (rank 4), followed by Pakistanis and then Indians, with White British men perceived to face the lowest level of labor market discrimination. Primes shift these view for all groups with the exception of Black Caribbean men. For minorities, the positive prime tends to reduce perceptions of discrimination faced by that group, and the negative prime does the opposite. As a result the differential impacts of the primes is statistically significant for Indians ($p = .002$) and Pakistanis ($p = .014$).

However, the largest impact is found for how the positive prime – showing minorities are

doing well in education – increases the perception that White British men face labor market discrimination. This is again in line with zero sum thinking that if some minority groups are doing well, the ingroup might be becoming more disadvantaged.

A similar pattern of results extend to other minority groups not explicitly named in the primes, and also hold for perceptions of discrimination faced by women across groups including an element of zero sum thinking in response to the positive prime.[17]

Table B7 shows large differences by political leaning in perceptions of labor market discrimination that minority men face: centrist and right-leaning respondents perceive each minority group to be facing significantly less discrimination than left-leaning voters, and they perceive White British men to be facing significantly more labor market discrimination. Primes do little to shift these views. These results exactly match those from the US-based survey experiment of Haaland and Roth [2021], that highlights partisan differences in perceptions of discrimination against Black applicants in hiring processes, but that these perceptions are not mitigated by the provision of information detailing the extent of discrimination.

Other Domains We extend the analysis to perceptions of discrimination groups face across multiple domains: at work, in contact with the police, in obtaining housing, in obtaining medical care, at school, and in public spaces. Focusing on whether groups are perceived to face discrimination 'never' or 'often' in each domain, we find that: (i) perceptions of discrimination at work often being faced for all minorities significantly increase for respondents exposed to the negative prime – with the magnitudes of impact being of economic significance (Table A10a); (ii) neither prime impacts perceptions of discrimination faced in other domains (Tables A10a, A10b); (iii) despite the non-spillover to other domains, the impacts of primes on perceptions of discrimination at work do spillover to other minority groups that are not named as part of either prime (Table A11).

4.5 Policy

4.5.1 Equal Opportunities Policy

The third major dimension of perceptions we examine relate to policies addressing ethnic inequalities. We start with views on equal opportunities policies in general, and whether White British respondents feel they have 'gone too far' or 'not far enough' in relation to specific minority groups. The results are in Table 9 where it is useful to first consider views among controls in Columns 1

[17] The upper panel in Table A9 shows this pattern of findings holds for other minority groups: in response to the positive prime, we see an increase in perceived labor market discrimination that Polish men face (as for perceptions for White British men), and we see the primes do not shift perceptions of the labor market discrimination faced by Black African men (similar to the null impacts for perceptions of Black Caribbean men). The lower panel of Table A9 shows a similar pattern of results for perceptions of labor market discrimination faced by women across groups: the differential impacts of the primes are statistically significant for Indians ($p = .085$) and Pakistanis ($p = .005$), while primes have null impacts for Black Caribbeans. We again see evidence of zero sum thinking where those exposed to the positive prime increase their perception that White British women face labor market discrimination.

and 4. 24% of respondents view such policies have not gone far enough in relation to the White British ingroup, and only 4% report that they have gone too far. This is very different for views toward each minority group, where there is a far more even split of views: around 20% of White British respondents report that such policies have gone too far, and not far enough, with regards to Indians, Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans.

The remaining Columns show these views of equal opportunities policy can be shifted by light-touch primes. More precisely: (i) the negative prime increases support for the view that such policies have not gone far enough for all minority groups; (ii) the point estimates on the positive prime are mostly negative, so that there are differential impacts of primes for the view that policies have not gone far enough for Indians ($p = .017$) and Pakistanis ($p = .023$); (iii) both primes also increase views that policies have gone too far with regards to the White British population. Hence unlike other domains related to opportunities or labor market discrimination as a cause of ethnic inequalities, we do not see any evidence of zero sum thinking when it comes to support for or against equal opportunities policies.[18]

Table B8 shows that among controls, there are stark differences in levels of support for equal opportunities polices by the political leaning of White British respondents. Centrist and right-leaning respondents are significantly more likely than left-leaning respondents to view equal opportunities policies as having gone too far with regards to all minorities. However, when it comes to views on whether such policies have gone too far or not for White British individuals, a far greater share of repondents view these policies as not having gone far enough rather than having gone too far, irrespective of their political leaning. For example, 21% of left-leaning respondents report equal opportunities policies as having not gone far enough for the White British population, while only 6% view them as having gone too far. Right-leaning respondents are still significantly more likely than others to view such policies as not having gone far enough to support the White British population. The magnitude of the effect is large: while 21% of left-leaning respondents agree with this view, this rises by a further 25pp among right-leaning respondents. Primes do not differentially impact these policy views across political leaning.

4.5.2 Immigration

The second group specific policy we examine is with regards to immigration. In order to make the question relevant to contemporary migrant inflows into the UK, we make clear the countries of origin with the greatest current inflows: India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. Some overlap with groups named in the primes, and it is such recent inflows that help create some of the variation across minority groups in the shares of UK-born individuals by group shown in Figure

[18]Table A12 shows how these impacts extend to other groups not named in the primes. The results for Poles are similar to those for White British in that the negative prime increases the view that such policies have gone too far for this group. The results for Black Africans are more aligned with those for Black Caribbeans in that the negative prime increases the view that such policies have not gone too far for this group.

1. For these five origin countries, we asked respondents their view on what should happen to the levels of immigration. We focus on responses that numbers should be reduced, or numbers should be increased (rather than kept the same or don't know).

The results are in Table 10. The majority of White British respondents think immigration numbers should be reduced, irrespective of migrants' country of origin. For any given origin, support for immigration numbers being reduced is around ten times higher than for immigration flows to be increased. Primes nudge these views. Exposure to the positive prime – that minorities are performing well in education – increases the view that immigration numbers should be reduced; exposure to the negative prime nudge support the other way. As a result, there are differential effects of the positive and negative prime on the view that immigration numbers should be reduced from Pakistan ($p = .048$), Nigeria ($p = .054$), China ($p = .004$) and Zimbabwe ($p = .046$). The only exception is for immigration numbers from India, where Indians are a group explicitly named in the positive prime.

Table B9 shows results by political leaning and again we see substantively different views by political leaning in the expected direction (Columns 1 and 4), and not much evidence that primes differentially impact these views across political leaning.

4.5.3 Non-targeted Policies

Given domestic policies often cannot be explicitly targeted to groups based on their race or ethnicity, we asked respondents their views on the role of four broad policies to helping reduce ethnic inequalities: investing in education/training, teaching children about British values, financially supporting families with children, and increasing penalties for discriminating against groups. The results in Table 11 show broad support for this range of policies. Investing in education/training receives the strongest support – 70% of respondents think this can do a great deal or fair amount to reduce ethnic inequalities (while only 19% think it would do not much/nothing). Support for other policies such as teaching children about British value, financially supporting families with children, and increasing penalties for discriminating all receive between 48% and 52% of support, but they each also have a good share of respondents (between 35% and 40%) that think they can do not much/nothing.

Primes do shift support for these polices. For example, the positive prime significantly increases support by 7.1pp for teaching children about British values. The differential impacts of positive and negative primes decrease support for financially supporting families with children ($p = .076$), and decrease support for raising penalties for discrimination ($p = .084$).

Table B10 examines interactions with political leaning. Here we see centrist and right-leaning individuals are less supportive of all polices except teaching children about British values, for which they are far more supportive than centrist voters ($p = .XXX$). However we do not find precisely estimated effects of primes on policy support by political leaning with one exception: that the

differential effect of the primes is significant for supporting teaching children about British values among right-leaning voters ($p = .079$).

5 Final Remarks

We conclude by considering two dimensions in which divergences in policy preferences relating to ethnic inequality might be especially salient in future: (i) the White British population becoming more polarized; (ii) heterogeneity in views of the majority and minority populations.

5.1 Polarization Within the Majority

We can examine the implications of our results if the majority UK population continues to become politically polarized. We do so measuring the drift leftward or rightward or stability of political views of individuals by combining information on past voting behavior in the 2019 General Election and future voting intention in the 2024 General Election, that saw the emergence of new right-wing populist parties. We classify individuals into those whose political views have drifted leftward, drifted rightward, or remained stable. To illustrate the potential effects of polarization, we show how attitudes towards equal opportunities policies vary across individuals, with stable views being the omitted category.

The results are in Table 12. Focusing on controls, relative to those with stable political preferences: (i) those drifting rightward are significantly more likely to view equal opportunities policies as not having gone far enough for White British individuals, and to have gone too far for all minorities; (ii) those drifting leftward have very similar policy views as those with stable preferences. In terms of responsiveness to primes we find that: (i) across primes and groups, the view that equal opportunities policies have not gone far enough are more impacted than views they have gone too far; (ii) those drifting rightward significantly reduce their support (even further) for equal opportunities policies for all minority groups when exposed to the negative prime, that highlights how some minorities are faring poorly in labor markets despite high educational achievement; (iii) in contrast, those with stable preferences tend to significantly increase their view that equal opportunities policies have not gone far enough all minority groups when exposed to the negative prime; (iv) those with left-drifting preferences tend to be relatively unresponsive to primes.

5.2 Minority Attitudes

A final direction to examine is the perspective of minority groups themselves, and measuring the extent to which their views differ from the majority and other minorities [UKICE 2024]. Our survey sample was designed to focus on the majority population but we were able to gather sufficiently sized samples for the two largest other minority groups shown in Figure 1: Indians and

Other White. We now briefly discuss how their perceptions differ from the majority.

To begin with, we note, unsurprisingly, that minorities have more favorable attitudes towards ethnic diversity: as Table A13 shows, relative to the White British population, Indians and Other White groups are significantly more likely to view ethnic diversity as having a favorable impact on life in the UK, and to agree that government policy should aim to reduce ethnic inequalities. Indians also are significantly more likely to consider discrimination to be a big/moderate problem and be less supportive of reducing immigration numbers.

Table 13 then considers how White British and Indian groups view themselves and each other, in terms of opportunities available, causes of success, and extent of equal opportunities policies. Panel A shows that on opportunities, the two groups have relatively similar views of themselves and each other. The only striking difference being that Indians think that zero White British individuals have few opportunities to earn a decent wage, while 16% of White British think this is the case for their ingroup. Panel B shows that on causes, the two groups again have relatively similar views of themselves and each other. The only significant difference is that while 43% of Indians think their lack of success is down to bad luck, only 24% of White British think the lack of success of Indians is down to bad luck. However, Panel C shows that it is in terms of equal opportunities policies that the groups have the most divergent views, with each thinking such policies have not gone far enough for their own group, and gone too far for the other group.

We push on this in Table 14 to consider how views of non-targeted policies to address ethnic inequalities vary across the White British, Indian and Other White groups, and how each responds to primes. Among controls, we find divergences across groups in policy preferences, with Indians and Other White groups being substantially more supportive of investing in education/training or financially supporting families with children. These policy preferences also respond to primes. In particular, Indians exposed to the positive prime (that informs them Indians are performing well in education) become significantly less supportive of financially supporting families with children, entirely closing the gap with White British individuals.

All these findings suggest a multitude of directions for future work. This will help inform the future strength and direction of policy demands to address ethnic inequalities if the UK continues to become a more diverse society.

A Appendix

A.1 Other Dimensions of Heterogeneity

Given the correlates of attitudes towards ethnic inequalities in Table 1, we describe findings on the heterogeneous impacts of primes along other pre-specified dimensions: gender and education. As described below, we generally find muted differential responses to primes along either dimensions, but with two consistent exceptions: (i) perceptions of graduate shares; (ii) attitudes towards

non-targeted policies to address ethnic inequalities.

Gender For gender, we find little evidence of heterogeneous response to responses to primes on dimensions related to ethnic minorities as whole (the outcomes in Table 1). Examining perceptions of specific groups, we find little evidence of heterogeneous responses to primes by gender for: (i) whether groups are considered to be minorities; (ii) perceptions of whether bad luck or a lack of effort determine the economic success of groups; (iii) the extent of labor market discrimination faced by men across groups at the point of recruitment in labor markets; (iv) the extent to which equal opportunities policies have gone too far or not far enough across groups.

On other margins we find more substantive evidence of differential responses to primes by gender. Specifically, women respond significantly more to primes in relation to perceived graduate shares of men in Indian, Pakistani and Black Caribbean groups (Table B11), but the same does not apply to perceived employment shares.

We also find some differential responses to primes by gender on views over immigration – womens' views on immigration from different origin countries are for example generally more immutable than those of men (who become less supportive of immigration from Pakistan and China in response to the positive prime). The other margin along which gender plays an important role for responses to primes is in terms of non-targeted policies to reduce ethnic inequalities. As Table B13 shows, mean and women have relatively similar views over each policy in the control group (Columns 1 and 4), but women become significantly more in favor of investing in education/training in response to either prime, with the differential magnitudes of response by gender being economically important. We do not see robust differential priming responses to other policies by gender.

Education We consider heterogeneous responses to primes between those with and without a university degree. We find little evidence of heterogeneous response to responses to primes on dimensions related to ethnic minorities as whole (the outcomes in Table 1). Examining perceptions of specific groups, we find little evidence of heterogeneous responses to primes for: (i) whether groups are considered to be minorities; (ii) perceptions of whether bad luck or a lack of effort determine the economic success of groups; (iii) the extent of labor market discrimination faced by men across groups at the point of recruitment in labor markets; (iv) the extent to which equal opportunities policies have gone too far or not far enough across groups.

On other margins we find more substantive evidence of differential responses to primes by education. Specifically, in response to the positive prime, more educated respondents revise upward their belief on graduate shares of both the White British ingroup, and Pakistani and Black Caribbean outgroups (Table B14). There is no such differential response to perceptions on employment shares.

The other margin along which education plays an important role for responses to primes is

in terms of non-targeted policies to reduce ethnic inequalities. As Table B15 shows, more and less educated individuals differ over their support across the four policies (Columns 1 and 4): more educated individuals are significantly more in favor of investing in education/training and financially supporting families with children, and are less in favor of teaching children about British values (with the groups not differing in terms of increasing penalties for discriminatory behavior). The magnitudes of these difference are far smaller than by political leaning (Table B10). However, in response to the positive prime, educated individuals become significantly more in favor of increasing penalties for discriminating against groups. We do not see robust differential priming responses to other policies by education.

A.2 Additional Outcomes

For completeness, in Appendix C we collate results on the remaining survey questions. Table C1 shows that White British respondents slightly overestimate the share of the population that is a minority (34% versus 26% as calculated from the 2021 census), and that this believe nudges slightly forward in response to the negative prime. We also explored perceptions over a third dimension of economic standing of groups (by gender): their group ranking in terms of income. Figure C1 summarizes the evidence from controls, where we find the perceived income rank of White British (and Polish) men and women tend to be overestimated, while for some minorities they tend to be underestimated. Table C2 shows priming impacts on these outcomes. The upper panel shows the perceived ranking places Indian men above the majority population (while the reality is the reverse). Primes tend to shift up the perceived ranking of the majority population. The lower panel shows perceived income ranks of women across groups. We find a slight tendency to raise the income ranks of some minority groups in response to the negative prime.

Table C3 shows perceptions of how groups contribute to UK life – we used two variants of question wording, shown in the upper and lower panels. Primes do not shift the perceived contributions of groups. Table C4 details views of the aim of government policy more broadly, not related to ethnic inequalities specifically. These are not impacted by primes. Table C5 details views of policy priorities, again unrelated to ethnic inequalities. Some of these are impacted by primes – the positive prime increases support for spending on defence/national security, and transport infrastructure, while the negative prime reduces support for polices to provide decent housing for all.

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Table 1: Majority Attitudes Towards Minorities, Control Group

Regression estimates, robust standard errors, p-values in brackets

	Ethnic Diversity				Causes		Policies			
	Think inequalities between ethnic groups are a big or moderate problem?		Think ethnic diversity generally has a positive impact on life		Believe that racial discrimination is a big or moderate problem		Agree that the number of immigrants should be reduced		Agree that government should aim to reduce the economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Age	.000	.002	-.004***	-.001	-.000	.002*	.005***	.003***	-.004***	-.002*
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Female	.104***	.108***	.024	.024	.098***	.081**	-.039	-.038	.074**	.060*
	(.033)	(.034)	(.032)	(.030)	(.034)	(.034)	(.030)	(.030)	(.033)	(.034)
Undergraduate or higher	.119***	.072*	.223***	.148***	.098***	.047	-.260***	-.202***	.151***	.107***
	(.037)	(.037)	(.037)	(.035)	(.037)	(.036)	(.036)	(.036)	(.037)	(.037)
Gross HH Income £25K-£50K	-.048	-.055	.083*	.065	.019	.008	-.057	-.046	.034	.022
	(.050)	(.049)	(.049)	(.044)	(.052)	(.050)	(.042)	(.039)	(.051)	(.049)
Gross HH Income >£50K	-.022	-.036	.129**	.106**	-.013	-.023	-.101*	-.085*	.028	.018
	(.057)	(.055)	(.058)	(.051)	(.060)	(.054)	(.053)	(.048)	(.059)	(.056)
Political Leaning - Centre		-.244***		-.360***		-.325***		.316***		-.258***
		(.041)		(.037)		(.036)		(.045)		(.044)
Political Leaning - Right		-.364***		-.680***		-.611***		.512***		-.527***
		(.068)		(.045)		(.056)		(.051)		(.060)
Centre = Right		[.048]		[.000]		[.000]		[.000]		[.000]
Mean outcome	.618	.618	.447	.447	.632	.632	.682	.682	.487	.487
Other control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Test of covariates		.000		.000		.000		.000		.000
Observations	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The dependent variable in Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'a big problem' or 'a moderate problem'. In Columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'very positive' or 'fairly positive'. The dependent variable in Columns 7 and 8 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'reduced a lot' or 'reduced a little'. The dependent variable in Columns 9 and 10 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'strongly agree' or 'agree'. Other control variables include a dummy for being married/in a civil partnership, a dummy for residing in an urban area, and a dummy for home ownership. The omitted category for Political Leaning is respondents that report as left-leaning. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'. Centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'. Right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. At the foot of Columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10, the test of covariates reports the p-value on a Wald test of the equivalence of reported coefficients between the specifications with and without controlling for the political leaning of respondents.

Table 2: Attitudes Towards Minorities as a Whole

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
Do you think ethnic diversity generally has a positive or negative impact on life in the UK?				
Positive	.447	.006	.023	[.492]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Do you believe that racial discrimination in the UK is...				
Big or moderate problem	.632	-.006	.051**	[.014]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
In the UK, the government should aim to reduce the economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?				
Agree	.487	.011	.052**	[.095]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)	
Do you think the number of immigrants coming to the UK nowadays should be…				
Reduced	.682	.020	-.025	[.043]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.023)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. For the question, *do you think ethnic diversity generally has a positive or negative impact on life in the UK?*, the outcome includes those that report 'very positive' or 'fairly positive'. For the question, *in the UK, the government should aim to reduce the economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?*, the outcome includes those that report 'strongly agree' or 'agree'. For the question do you think the number of immigrants coming to the UK nowadays should be…, the outcome includes those that report 'reduced a lot' or 'reduced a little'.

Table 3: Who is a Minority?

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
White British	.228	-.027	-.027	[.974]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
Indian	.461	.073***	.056**	[.493]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Pakistani	.481	.076***	.065***	[.644]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Black Caribbean	.504	.029	.052**	[.350]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted.

Table 4: Correlates of Perceptions of Economic Outcomes of Minority Men

Regression estimates, robust standard errors, p-values in brackets

	Graduate Share				Employment Rate			
	(1) White British	(2) Indian	(3) Pakistani	(4) Black Carribean	(5) White British	(6) Indian	(7) Pakistani	(8) Black Carribean
Age	-.001***	-.001***	-.001***	-.001***	-.000	-.001***	-.001***	-.002***
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Female	.075***	.079***	.066***	.068***	-.064***	-.025***	-.019**	-.027***
	(.007)	(.009)	(.009)	(.007)	(.007)	(.008)	(.009)	(.009)
Undergraduate or higher	.008	.038***	.026***	.022***	.042***	.046***	.047***	.036***
	(.008)	(.010)	(.009)	(.007)	(.008)	(.009)	(.010)	(.009)
Gross HH Income £25K-£50K	-.016	-.015	-.017	-.034***	.056***	.028**	.019	.015
	(.011)	(.013)	(.012)	(.010)	(.011)	(.013)	(.014)	(.013)
Gross HH Income >£50K	-.019	-.011	.007	-.025**	.058***	.047***	.040***	.018
	(.013)	(.016)	(.015)	(.012)	(.012)	(.013)	(.014)	(.014)
Political Leaning - Centre	-.003	-.015	-.040***	-.031***	-.036***	-.044***	-.068***	-.073***
	(.010)	(.012)	(.011)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)	(.009)
Political Leaning - Right	-.010	-.015	-.073***	-.070***	-.058***	-.074***	-.122***	-.153***
	(.015)	(.018)	(.016)	(.012)	(.017)	(.018)	(.019)	(.020)
Centre = Right	[.560]	[.971]	[.016]	[.000]	[.168]	[.082]	[.003]	[.000]
Mean outcome	.357	.368	.269	.215	.725	.787	.756	.733
QLFS	.329	.645	.421	.231	.789	.830	.709	.645
Other control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Other control variables include a dummy for being married/in a civil partnership, a dummy for residing in an urban area, and a dummy for home ownership. The omitted category for Political Leaning is respondents that report as left-leaning. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'. Centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'. Right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. At the foot of each Column we report minority group estimates for men constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table 5: Primes and Perceived Economic Outcomes of Men

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

A. Graduate Shares

	(1) Quarterly Labor Force Survey	(2) Control Mean	[1 = 2]	(3) Δ Positive Frame	(4) Δ Negative Frame	[3 = 4]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?						
White British	.329	.360	[.000]	-.009	-.001	[.394]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	
Indian	.645	.355	[.000]	.034***	.006	[.016]
		(.008)		(.011)	(.011)	
Pakistani	.421	.260	[.000]	.038***	-.011	[.000]
		(.007)		(.010)	(.010)	
Black Caribbean	.231	.211	[.000]	.013	-.002	[.088]
		(.006)		(.008)	(.008)	

B. Employment Rates

	(1) 1 - Unem. rate	(1b) Share working	(2) Control Mean	[1 = 2]	(3) Δ Positive Prime	(4) Δ Negative Prime	[3 = 4]
Out of 100 men of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are not working?							
White British	.960	.789	.724	[.000]	.001	.000	[.938]
			(.006)		(.009)	(.010)	
Indian	.943	.830	.784	[.000]	.018*	-.010	[.007]
			(.007)		(.010)	(.011)	
Pakistani	.921	.709	.760	[.000]	.010	-.023**	[.003]
			(.008)		(.010)	(.012)	
Black Caribbean	.914	.645	.742	[.000]	-.008	-.019*	[.303]
			(.007)		(.010)	(.012)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Columns 1 and 1b report minority group estimates for men constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table 6: Educational and Labor Market Opportunities

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]	(7) Control Mean	(8) Δ Positive Prime	(9) Δ Negative Prime	[8 = 9]
Do the following groups have few or no opportunities to...where you live?												
		Get a good education				**Get a job**				**Earn a decent wage**		
White British	.066	.006	-.026**	[.007]	.097	.035**	-.018	[.001]	.156	.042**	-.013	[.004]
	(.009)	(.013)	(.011)		(.010)	(.016)	(.014)		(.013)	(.019)	(.018)	
Indian	.103	-.027*	.004	[.035]	.139	-.003	-.007	[.788]	.200	.010	.007	[.869]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.015)		(.012)	(.017)	(.017)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
Pakistani	.131	-.025	.019	[.009]	.175	-.015	.000	[.394]	.256	-.013	-.011	[.938]
	(.011)	(.015)	(.017)		(.013)	(.018)	(.019)		(.015)	(.021)	(.021)	
Black Caribbean	.153	-.012	.011	[.184]	.198	-.005	-.021	[.393]	.282	.015	-.014	[.185]
	(.012)	(.017)	(.018)		(.014)	(.019)	(.019)		(.015)	(.022)	(.022)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could answer each question with plenty, some, few or no opportunities, or don't know. We combine few and no opportunities for each outcome.

Table 7: Luck vs Effort

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	Luck vs Effort Control Means [1] = [5]	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(5) Control Mean	(6) Δ Positive Prime	(7) Δ Negative Prime	[6 = 7]
Does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?									
			Bad luck				**Lack of Effort**		
White British	[.000]	.074	.009	-.012	[.091]	.339	.026	-.000	[.259]
		(.009)	(.013)	(.013)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
Indian	[.000]	.240	-.009	.005	[.479]	.128	.005	-.015	[.229]
		(.015)	(.020)	(.021)		(.012)	(.017)	(.017)	
Pakistani	[.975]	.186	.011	.007	[.805]	.187	-.000	-.001	[.962]
		(.014)	(.019)	(.019)		(.014)	(.019)	(.019)	
Black Caribbean	[.216]	.174	-.019	.003	[.210]	.197	.010	-.005	[.448]
		(.013)	(.018)	(.019)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could answer the question with bad luck, a lack of effort, an equal mix of both or don't know.

Table 8: Labor Market Discrimination

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
Imagine that the following men applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.				
White British	1.96	.245***	.012	[.013]
	(.062)	(.089)	(.091)	
Indian	3.08	-.085	.129*	[.002]
	(.049)	(.068)	(.073)	
Pakistani	3.81	-.136*	.055	[.014]
	(.059)	(.080)	(.082)	
Black Caribbean	4.00	-.060	.043	[.239]
	(.062)	(.086)	(.089)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'not sure'. The share of respondents that answered 'not sure' is .16, .21, .22 and .23 for White British, Indian, Pakistani and Black Caribbean men, respectively.

Table 9: Equal Opportunities Policy

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				**Gone too far**		
White British	.238	.005	.002	[.897]	.037	.020*	.023**	[.795]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.021)		(.006)	(.010)	(.010)	
Indian	.179	-.007	.037*	[.017]	.176	.030	-.006	[.069]
	(.012)	(.017)	(.019)		(.013)	(.019)	(.019)	
Pakistani	.202	-.007	.036*	[.023]	.210	.027	-.009	[.075]
	(.013)	(.018)	(.020)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
Black Caribbean	.236	.022	.045**	[.267]	.200	.018	-.015	[.099]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.021)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'.

Table 10: Immigration

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
The top five countries of origin of recent UK immigrants are India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. For each of these countries, do you think the number coming to the UK should be…								
		Reduced				**Increased**		
India	.556	.014	-.021	[.136]	.056	-.016	.003	[.055]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.008)	(.010)	(.011)	
Pakistan	.601	.024	-.023	[.048]	.056	-.017*	-.002	[.125]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.024)		(.008)	(.010)	(.011)	
Nigeria	.612	.007	-.039	[.054]	.057	-.010	-.005	[.578]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.024)		(.008)	(.011)	(.011)	
China	.585	.035	-.033	[.004]	.063	-.020*	.006	[.016]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.024)		(.008)	(.011)	(.012)	
Zimbabwe	.576	.021	-.027	[.046]	.062	-.014	-.003	[.318]
	(.017)	(.023)	(.024)		(.008)	(.011)	(.011)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. In the reduced outcome we combine respondents that answered 'Reduced a lot' or 'reduced a little'. In the increased outcome we combine respondents that answered 'increased a lot' or 'increased a little'. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table 11: Effectiveness of Policies in Reducing Ethnic Inequalities

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
		Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**		
Investing more in education and training	.703	.021	.014	[.757]	.186	.010	-.002	[.544]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.023)		(.013)	(.020)	(.019)	
Teach children more about British values	.515	.071***	.022	[.042]	.362	-.027	-.030	[.903]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
Supported families with children more financially	.495	.011	.046*	[.155]	.360	.004	-.037	[.076]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups	.475	-.013	.014	[.260]	.386	.039	-.003	[.084]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table 12: Polarization and Equal Opportunities Policy

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Frame	(3) Δ Negative Frame	(4) p-value [2 = 3]	(5) Control Mean	(6) Δ Positive Frame	(7) Δ Negative Frame	(8) p-value [6 = 7]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				Gone too far		
White British								
Baseline	.218	-.043	-.046	[.915]	.034	.038**	.027	[.605]
	(.023)	(.030)	(.031)		(.010)	(.017)	(.017)	
x Moved to right	.136***	.120*	.099	[.748]	.015	.006	-.023	[.446]
	(.047)	(.065)	(.068)		(.020)	(.037)	(.029)	
x Moved to left	.013	.011	.036	[.689]	-.000	-.050*	-.013	[.243]
	(.051)	(.067)	(.067)		(.019)	(.027)	(.031)	
Indian								
Baseline	.204	.012	.085**	[.027]	.136	.010	-.010	[.466]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.033)		(.020)	(.028)	(.028)	
x Moved to right	-.097***	-.040	-.131***	[.034]	.166***	.141**	.066	[.257]
	(.033)	(.043)	(.046)		(.043)	(.063)	(.065)	
x Moved to left	.050	.049	.028	[.783]	.006	-.043	-.067	[.621]
	(.044)	(.067)	(.071)		(.048)	(.060)	(.057)	
Pakistani								
Baseline	.223	.021	.090***	[.042]	.150	.021	-.009	[.311]
	(.021)	(.030)	(.034)		(.021)	(.029)	(.029)	
x Moved to right	-.111***	-.039	-.104**	[.171]	.232***	.095	.065	[.663]
	(.033)	(.045)	(.049)		(.046)	(.065)	(.068)	
x Moved to left	.055	.059	.040	[.794]	.038	-.073	-.112*	[.437]
	(.046)	(.069)	(.072)		(.049)	(.062)	(.058)	
Black Caribbean								
Baseline	.261	.052	.098***	[.214]	.155	.011	-.025	[.202]
	(.022)	(.033)	(.035)		(.021)	(.029)	(.029)	
x Moved to right	-.082**	-.048	-.126**	[.176]	.203***	.071	.057	[.840]
	(.039)	(.056)	(.057)		(.046)	(.065)	(.067)	
x Moved to left	.079	.029	-.009	[.624]	.009	-.053	-.071	[.719]
	(.049)	(.073)	(.075)		(.048)	(.061)	(.058)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'. We measure the drift leftward or rightward or stability of political views of individuals by combining information on past voting behavior in the 2019 General Election and future voting intention in the 2024 General Election.

Table 13: Opportunities, Causes and Policies

Means, standard deviation in parentheses, p-values in brackets

		Respondent: (1) White British	(2) Indian	[1 = 2]
A. Opportunities				
Do the following groups have few or no opportunities to...where you live?				
Group asked about: White British	*Get a good education*	.066	.056	[.769]
	Get a job	.097	.101	[.938]
	Earn a decent wage	.156	.000	[.000]
Group asked about: Indian	*Get a good education*	.103	.076	[.485]
	Get a job	.139	.148	[.873]
	Earn a decent wage	.200	.128	[.172]
B. Causes				
Does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?				
Group asked about: White British	*Bad luck*	.074	.091	[.758]
	Lack of Effort	.339	.412	[.359]
Group asked about: Indian	*Bad luck*	.240	.432	[.022]
	Lack of Effort	.128	.117	[.815]
C. Policies				
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone…				
Group asked about: White British	*Not far enough*	.238	.069	[.000]
	Gone too far	.037	.247	[.002]
Group asked about: Indian	*Not far enough*	.179	.450	[.001]
	Gone too far	.176	.023	[.000]

Notes: The sample is restricted to White British and Indian respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. The p-values are calculated from an OLS regression for each outcome on a constant and a full set of treatment dummy interactions with ethnic group, where robust standard errors are calculated. In Panel A, respondents could answer each question with plenty, some, few or no opportunities, or don't know. We combine few and no opportunities for each outcome. In Panel B, respondents could answer the question with bad luck, a lack of effort, an equal mix of both or don't know. In Panel C, respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'.

Table 14: Effectiveness of Policies in Reducing Ethnic Inequalities

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
	Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**			
Investing more in education and training								
Baseline	.703	.021	.014	[.757]	.186	.010	-.002	[.545]
	(.016)	(.023)	(.023)		(.013)	(.020)	(.019)	
x Indian	.124*	-.175	.074	[.013]	-.088	.202*	-.036	[.014]
	(.067)	(.112)	(.079)		(.058)	(.107)	(.069)	
x Other White	.154***	-.093	-.040	[.586]	-.069	-.029	-.035	[.929]
	(.055)	(.092)	(.084)		(.049)	(.075)	(.063)	
Teach children more about British values								
Baseline	.515	.071***	.022	[.043]	.362	-.027	-.030	[.903]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
x Indian	-.045	-.061	.205*	[.018]	.071	.074	-.145	[.049]
	(.082)	(.123)	(.105)		(.084)	(.125)	(.105)	
x Other White	-.207***	.049	.135	[.437]	.272***	-.151	-.159	[.946]
	(.080)	(.115)	(.110)		(.083)	(.117)	(.112)	
Supported families with children more financially								
Baseline	.495	.011	.046*	[.155]	.360	.004	-.037	[.077]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
x Indian	.273***	-.313***	-.182*	[.263]	-.204***	.245**	.150	[.387]
	(.072)	(.117)	(.102)		(.065)	(.109)	(.093)	
x Other White	.230***	-.133	-.198*	[.567]	-.145**	.061	.130	[.505]
	(.075)	(.111)	(.107)		(.069)	(.103)	(.099)	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups								
Baseline	.475	-.013	.014	[.262]	.386	.039	-.003	[.084]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)		(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
x Indian	.130	.067	.146	[.470]	-.088	-.079	-.111	[.761]
	(.084)	(.122)	(.106)		(.083)	(.118)	(.103)	
x Other White	.032	-.089	.025	[.299]	.012	-.036	-.047	[.915]
	(.088)	(.119)	(.116)		(.089)	(.121)	(.113)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British, Indian and Other White respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for ethnic group. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority group in the positive (Indian) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Figure 1: Ethnic Diversity in the UK, 2021 Census




Figure 2: Structure of the Survey Experiment





Figure 3: Perceived Economic Outcomes of Men by Minority Group



A. Graduate Shares **B. Employment Shares**

Notes: The left hand side of each panel reports means for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. On the right hand side panel we calculate the degree of misperception by taking the control mean and subtracting the minority group estimates constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024. Hence positive misperceptions imply the control mean is higher than the group estimate, and we report whether these are statistically significant where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.

Table A1: Balance on Respondent Characteristics

Means, standard deviation in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) 2021 Census	(2) Control Mean	(3) Positive Prime	(4) Negative Prime	[1 = 2]	[2 = 3]	[2 = 4]	[3 = 4]
Observations		1078	1098	1029				
A. Demographics								
Age	43.0	50.3	51.7	50.6	[.000]	[.102]	[.747]	[.185]
		(17.7)	(17.2)	(17.4)				
Female	.509	.497	.507	.547	[.518]	[.694]	[.042]	[.097]
Married	.435	.571	.560	.573	[.000]	[.649]	[.950]	[.607]
Born in UK	.974	.951	.961	.964	[.004]	[.315]	[.208]	[.779]
Urban	.824	.739	.721	.733	[.000]	[.408]	[.785]	[.589]
Home owner	.684	.589	.575	.595	[.000]	[.562]	[.787]	[.396]
B. Education, Employment and Income								
Undergraduate or higher	.339	.287	.258	.289	[.000]	[.160]	[.893]	[.131]
Employed	.587	.393	.397	.405	[.000]	[.878]	[.626]	[.737]
Gross HH Income Below £25K	.340	.340	.330	.312	[.978]	[.697]	[.278]	[.474]
Gross HH Income Between £25K-£50K	.329	.341	.355	.359	[.509]	[.575]	[.485]	[.875]
Gross HH Income Above £50K	.331	.319	.315	.329	[.472]	[.861]	[.694]	[.574]
C. Survey Date and Response Time								
Modal Date of Survey Response		26th June 2024	26th June 2024	26th June 2024				
Survey Response Time (minutes) - p50		17.0	19.0	19.0				
Survey Response Time (minutes) - p90		48.0	45.0	52.0				

Notes: We report descriptive statistics for the sample of White British respondents, where observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. The p-values are calculated from an OLS regression for each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies, where robust standard errors are calculated. Undergraduate or higher includes respondents with at least a university or CNAA first degree (e.g. BA, BSc, BEd.). Column 1 reports outcomes for the White British population as estimated for the 2021 Census, unless otherwise stated. Gross Household income figures are calculated using 2022-23 Households Below Average Income (HBAI) dataset.

Table A2: Balance on Political Preferences of Respondents

Means, standard deviation in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Positive Prime	(3) Negative Prime	[1 = 2]	[1 = 3]	[2 = 3]
Observations	1078	1098	1029			
A. Political Leaning						
Right	.088	.119	.102	[.029]	[.314]	[.247]
Centre	.482	.441	.455	[.087]	[.276]	[.557]
Left	.163	.169	.168	[.697]	[.736]	[.964]
B. Voting Intentions for General Election 2024						
Planning to Vote	.891	.878	.877	[.461]	[.426]	[.948]
Planning to Vote Labour	.336	.333	.325	[.911]	[.659]	[.740]
Planning to Vote Conservative	.146	.155	.139	[.600]	[.727]	[.381]
Planning to Vote Reform	.188	.193	.173	[.785]	[.473]	[.316]
Planning to Vote Liberal Democrat	.087	.086	.091	[.962]	[.784]	[.748]
Planning to Vote Green	.062	.053	.070	[.434]	[.505]	[.155]
Planning to Vote Some Other Party	.182	.180	.201	[.898]	[.353]	[.288]
C. General Election 2019						
Voted	.795	.818	.788	[.264]	[.746]	[.152]
Voted Conservative	.462	.472	.462	[.692]	[.988]	[.708]
Voted Labour	.294	.297	.278	[.902]	[.508]	[.428]
Voted Liberal Democrat	.104	.100	.123	[.833]	[.263]	[.177]
Voted Green	.021	.023	.035	[.763]	[.102]	[.188]
Voted Brexit Party	.029	.026	.011	[.739]	[.016]	[.028]
Voted Some Other Party	.090	.081	.091	[.540]	[.965]	[.523]
D. EU Referendum 2016						
Voted	.783	.800	.784	[.446]	[.988]	[.460]
Voted Leave	.537	.559	.550	[.380]	[.614]	[.725]

Notes: We report descriptive statistics for the sample of White British respondents, where observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. The p-values are calculated from an OLS regression for each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies, where robust standard errors are calculated. In Panel A, left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'. Centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'. Right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. In Panel B, 'planning to vote for some other party' includes respondents that answered 'don't know'.

Table A3: Balance on Views on Inequality

Means, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Positive Prime	(3) Negative Prime	[1 = 2]	[1 = 3]	[2 = 3]
A. Vertical Inequalities						
To what extent, if at all, do you think inequalities in the following areas are a big/moderate problem in the UK today? Inequalities of..						
Wealth and income	.795	.796	.811	[.986]	[.442]	[.450]
Health and life expectancy	.680	.662	.700	[.422]	[.385]	[.096]
Educational attainment	.634	.673	.678	[.098]	[.067]	[.837]
Political influence	.617	.635	.604	[.445]	[.593]	[.196]
Status and respect	.596	.618	.619	[.361]	[.331]	[.943]
B. Horizontal Inequalities						
To what extent, if at all, do you think inequalities between the following groups in society are a big/moderate problem in the UK today?						
People from different ethnic groups	.618	.637	.664	[.432]	[.056]	[.254]
People from different social classes	.593	.599	.615	[.803]	[.356]	[.497]
Disabled and non-disabled people	.572	.581	.616	[.702]	[.071]	[.150]
People of different religions	.547	.564	.559	[.490]	[.628]	[.846]
People living in different regions	.483	.527	.528	[.069]	[.067]	[.960]
People of different ages	.465	.468	.472	[.899]	[.768]	[.864]
Men and women	.437	.439	.470	[.919]	[.173]	[.202]
Homosexual and heterosexual people	.405	.393	.436	[.608]	[.200]	[.072]

Notes: We report descriptive statistics for the sample of White British respondents, where observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. The p-values are calculated from an OLS regression for each outcome on a constant and treatment dummies, where robust standard errors are calculated. For the questions in both panels, respondents could also answer each issue was ‘a small problem’, ‘not a problem’ or ‘don’t know’.

Table A4: Robustness of Majority Attitudes Towards Minorities, Controls

Regression estimates, robust standard errors, p-values in brackets

	Ethnic Diversity				Causes		Policies			
	To what extent, if at all, do you think inequalities between ethnic groups are a problem?		Think ethnic diversity generally has a positive impact on life		Believe that racial discrimination is a big or moderate problem		Agree that the number of immigrants should be reduced		Agree that government should aim to reduce economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Age	.001	.001	-.003**	-.002**	.002	.001	.004***	.003***	-.003**	-.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Female	.097***	.091***	.010	.003	.083**	.067**	-.027	-.009	.061*	.054*
	(.033)	(.033)	(.031)	(.030)	(.032)	(.032)	(.030)	(.029)	(.032)	(.031)
UK born	.007	-.018	-.183**	-.228***	-.014	-.064	.039	.064	-.101	-.138
	(.085)	(.089)	(.071)	(.075)	(.074)	(.078)	(.082)	(.067)	(.081)	(.085)
Undergraduate or higher	.081**	.100***	.145***	.168***	.033	.057	-.200***	-.221***	.068*	.097***
	(.038)	(.037)	(.037)	(.035)	(.036)	(.035)	(.037)	(.035)	(.036)	(.035)
Gross HH Income £25K-£50K	-.055	-.051	.071	.058	.010	.013	-.048	-.039	.028	.024
	(.050)	(.050)	(.048)	(.046)	(.051)	(.049)	(.042)	(.040)	(.049)	(.046)
Gross HH Income >£50K	-.023	-.027	.129**	.104*	-.012	-.024	-.102**	-.083	.034	.014
	(.056)	(.056)	(.056)	(.054)	(.057)	(.056)	(.051)	(.052)	(.056)	(.054)
2019 General Election: Conservative	-.197***		-.345***		-.368***		.258***		-.364***	
	(.045)		(.044)		(.043)		(.043)		(.045)	
2019 General Election: Liberal Democrat	-.004		-.071		-.105*		.045		-.031	
	(.062)		(.066)		(.064)		(.062)		(.065)	
2019 General Election: Brexit Party	-.213*		-.383***		-.502***		.373***		-.211*	
	(.127)		(.112)		(.112)		(.054)		(.127)	
2024 General Election: Conservative		-.125**		-.245***		-.285***		.197***		-.492***
		(.058)		(.053)		(.058)		(.045)		(.046)
2024 General Election: Liberal Democrat		.032		.096*		.040		-.052		-.037
		(.059)		(.057)		(.053)		(.063)		(.064)
2024 General Election: Reform		-.166***		-.437***		-.381***		.366***		-.400***
		(.054)		(.044)		(.052)		(.033)		(.050)
Voted Brexit = Voted Conservative	[.903]		[.726]		[.229]		[.011]		[.220]	
Voted Reform = Voted Conservative		[.528]		[.000]		[.127]		[.000]		[.068]
Mean outcome	.618	.618	.447	.447	.632	.632	.682	.682	.487	.487
Other control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Test of covariates		.466		.391		.149		.287		.323
Observations	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The dependent variable in Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'a big problem' or 'a moderate problem'. In Columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'very positive' or 'fairly positive'. The dependent variable in Columns 7 and 8 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'reduced a lot' or 'reduced a little'. The dependent variable in Columns 9 and 10 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers either 'strongly agree' or 'agree'. Other control variables include a dummy for being married/in a civil partnership, a dummy for residing in an urban area, and a dummy for home ownership. The coefficients for categories that includes respondents with missing voting information and respondents that voted some other party are not displayed in the table but were included in the regression. At the foot of Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 we report the p-value on a test of the equality of having voted for the Brexit Party and voted for the Conservative Party in the 2019 General Election. At the foot of Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 we report the p-value on a test of the equality of intending to vote for the Reform Party and intending to vote for the Conservative Party in the 2024 General Election.

Table A5: Who is a Minority? All Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Positive Prime	(3) Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
Which of the following groups do you consider to be ethnic minorities?				
White:				
White British	.228	-.027	-.027	[.974]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
Irish	.141	.014	.038**	[.163]
	(.011)	(.016)	(.017)	
Polish	.318	.045**	.044*	[.959]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.023)	
Asian:				
Indian	.461	.073***	.056**	[.493]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Pakistani	.481	.076***	.065***	[.644]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Bangladeshi	.503	.069***	.054**	[.542]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Black:				
Black Caribbean	.504	.029	.052**	[.350]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)	
Black African	.493	.050**	.060**	[.675]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted.

Table A6: Correlates of Perceptions of Economic Outcomes of Minority Women

Regression estimates, robust standard errors, p-values in brackets

	Graduate Share				Employment Rate			
	(1) White British	(2) Indian	(3) Pakistani	(4) Black Carribean	(5) White British	(6) Indian	(7) Pakistani	(8) Black Carribean
Age	-.002***	-.002***	-.001***	-.001***	.000	-.001**	-.001***	-.001***
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Female	.086***	.071***	.058***	.061***	-.052***	-.035***	-.024**	-.020**
	(.008)	(.009)	(.008)	(.007)	(.007)	(.010)	(.011)	(.009)
Undergraduate or higher	.008	.009	.008	.006	.030***	.020*	.015	.038***
	(.009)	(.010)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.011)	(.012)	(.010)
Gross HH Income £25K-£50K	-.017	-.018	-.015	-.032***	.042***	.023	.014	.000
	(.012)	(.013)	(.011)	(.010)	(.011)	(.015)	(.016)	(.014)
Gross HH Income >£50K	-.027*	-.009	-.002	-.021*	.052***	.016	.007	.002
	(.014)	(.015)	(.013)	(.012)	(.013)	(.017)	(.018)	(.015)
Political Leaning - Centre	.002	-.029**	-.044***	-.037***	-.045***	-.077***	-.093***	-.076***
	(.010)	(.012)	(.011)	(.010)	(.009)	(.012)	(.013)	(.010)
Political Leaning - Right	.011	-.007	-.076***	-.075***	-.045***	-.134***	-.183***	-.135***
	(.017)	(.020)	(.015)	(.013)	(.014)	(.020)	(.023)	(.019)
Centre = Right	[.583]	[.207]	[.009]	[.000]	[.989]	[.003]	[.000]	[.001]
Mean outcome	.380	.294	.212	.201	.702	.660	.627	.691
QLFS	.349	.605	.403	.381	.734	.705	.509	.655
Other control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205	3205

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regression results for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Other control variables include a dummy for being married/in a civil partnership, a dummy for residing in an urban area, and a dummy for home ownership. The omitted category for Political Leaning is respondents that report as left-leaning. Left-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very left-wing' and 'fairly left-wing'. Centre-leaning respondents combine those that report being 'centre', 'slightly left-of-centre' and 'slightly right-of-centre'. Right-leaning respondents are those that report being 'very right-wing' and 'fairly right-wing'. At the foot of each Column we report minority group estimates for women constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table A7: Perceived Graduate Shares, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) QLFS	(2) Control Mean	(3) [1 = 2]	(4) Δ Positive Prime	(5) Δ Negative Prime	[4 = 5]
Out of 100 men/women above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?						
Men						
Polish	.263	.222	[.000]	.010	.016*	[.501]
		(.006)		(.008)	(.008)	
Black African	.467	.232	[.000]	.019**	-.001	[.027]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	
Women						
White British	.349	.380	[.000]	-.003	.003	[.532]
		(.007)		(.010)	(.010)	
Indian	.605	.281	[.000]	.037***	.003	[.002]
		(.007)		(.011)	(.011)	
Pakistani	.403	.200	[.000]	.038***	-.003	[.000]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	
Black Caribbean	.381	.199	[.000]	.014*	-.007	[.012]
		(.006)		(.008)	(.008)	
Polish	.437	.228	[.000]	.010	.003	[.398]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	
Black African	.483	.209	[.000]	.024***	-.002	[.004]
		(.006)		(.009)	(.009)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Column 1 report minority group estimates constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table A8: Perceived Employment Rates, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) 1 - Unem. rate	(1b) Share working	(2) Control Mean	[1b = 2]	(4) Δ Positive Prime	(5) Δ Negative Prime	[4 = 5]
Out of 100 men/women of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are not working?							
Men							
Polish	.979	.883	.797	[.000]	.002	.005	[.770]
			(.007)		(.009)	(.010)	
Black African	.908	.691	.734	[.000]	.004	-.019*	[.036]
			(.008)		(.010)	(.012)	
Women							
White British	.969	.734	.702	[.000]	-.006	.004	[.264]
			(.007)		(.009)	(.009)	
Indian	.941	.705	.663	[.000]	.006	-.015	[.091]
			(.009)		(.012)	(.013)	
Pakistani	.883	.509	.629	[.000]	.011	-.018	[.026]
			(.009)		(.013)	(.013)	
Black Caribbean	.953	.655	.695	[.000]	.003	-.013	[.150]
			(.008)		(.011)	(.012)	
Polish	.978	.827	.748	[.000]	-.001	-.008	[.553]
			(.007)		(.011)	(.011)	
Black African	.920	.686	.680	[.418]	.008	-.008	[.203]
			(.009)		(.012)	(.012)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Columns 1 and 1b report minority group estimates constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table A9: Labor Market Discrimination, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
Imagine that the following men applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.				
Polish	2.99	.172**	-.065	[.002]
	(.056)	(.077)	(.077)	
Black African	4.01	-.126	.045	[.050]
	(.060)	(.085)	(.088)	
Imagine that the following women applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.				
White British	1.88	.220***	.071	[.096]
	(.056)	(.083)	(.086)	
Indian	3.22	-.066	.061	[.085]
	(.055)	(.073)	(.078)	
Pakistani	3.96	-.184**	.047	[.005]
	(.062)	(.083)	(.087)	
Black Caribbean	3.97	-.027	-.002	[.781]
	(.063)	(.087)	(.091)	
Polish	3.00	-.043	-.117	[.335]
	(.059)	(.079)	(.081)	
Black African	3.91	-.052	.028	[.357]
	(.061)	(.084)	(.089)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'not sure'. The share of respondents that answered 'not sure' is .20 and .22 for Polish and Black African men, respectively, and .17, .21, .22, .23, .23 and .24 for White British, Polish, Indian, Black African, Pakistani and Black Caribbean women, respectively.

Table A12a: Discrimination Across Domains

How frequently do you think that people from the following groups experience discrimination or harassment in … because of their ethnicity?

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

		(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
			Never				Often		
At work	White British	.344	-.028	.018	[.157]	.068	-.007	.021	[.173]
		(.023)	(.032)	(.033)		(.012)	(.016)	(.020)	
	Indian	.056	.008	.010	[.924]	.219	.020	.086***	[.032]
		(.010)	(.016)	(.018)		(.021)	(.029)	(.031)	
	Pakistani	.054	.007	.004	[.899]	.270	.023	.075**	[.102]
		(.010)	(.016)	(.018)		(.022)	(.030)	(.032)	
	Black Caribbean	.050	.020	.014	[.757]	.258	.029	.078**	[.121]
		(.010)	(.017)	(.018)		(.021)	(.030)	(.032)	
By the police	White British	.344	-.031	-.030	[.975]	.068	.015	.022	[.716]
		(.023)	(.032)	(.032)		(.013)	(.019)	(.019)	
	Indian	.141	.003	-.013	[.501]	.125	-.000	.039	[.096]
		(.017)	(.025)	(.024)		(.016)	(.022)	(.024)	
	Pakistani	.114	.004	.013	[.681]	.190	.020	.036	[.568]
		(.016)	(.022)	(.023)		(.019)	(.027)	(.028)	
	Black Caribbean	.076	-.008	-.011	[.859]	.400	-.003	.007	[.778]
		(.013)	(.017)	(.018)		(.024)	(.034)	(.034)	
In getting housing	White British	.259	.026	.059*	[.292]	.173	.019	.008	[.693]
		(.021)	(.030)	(.031)		(.018)	(.027)	(.028)	
	Indian	.145	.025	-.010	[.178]	.200	-.017	-.020	[.929]
		(.017)	(.025)	(.025)		(.019)	(.026)	(.026)	
	Pakistani	.165	.018	-.022	[.132]	.217	-.018	.004	[.412]
		(.018)	(.026)	(.026)		(.020)	(.027)	(.028)	
	Black Caribbean	.152	.030	-.024	[.033]	.214	-.012	-.005	[.791]
		(.018)	(.026)	(.025)		(.019)	(.027)	(.027)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. In the often outcome we combine respondents that answered 'very often' and 'often'. Respondents could also answer 'sometimes' and 'don't know'.

Table A10b: Discrimination Across Domains Continued

How frequently do you think that people from the following groups experience discrimination or harassment in … because of their ethnicity?

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

		(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
			Never				Often		
In getting mdeical care	White British	.460	.005	-.082**	[.010]	.065	.003	.021	[.308]
		(.024)	(.034)	(.034)		(.012)	(.016)	(.018)	
	Indian	.255	.018	-.027	[.139]	.181	-.040	-.006	[.173]
		(.021)	(.031)	(.030)		(.020)	(.026)	(.027)	
	Pakistani	.244	.032	-.028	[.047]	.225	-.065**	-.024	[.115]
		(.021)	(.030)	(.029)		(.021)	(.028)	(.029)	
	Black Caribbean	.237	.023	-.026	[.103]	.235	-.049*	-.020	[.272]
		(.021)	(.030)	(.029)		(.021)	(.028)	(.029)	
At school	White British	.289	-.003	.040	[.178]	.112	-.023	-.013	[.621]
		(.022)	(.031)	(.032)		(.015)	(.020)	(.023)	
	Indian	.038	.002	-.003	[.715]	.375	-.016	.051	[.042]
		(.009)	(.013)	(.014)		(.023)	(.032)	(.034)	
	Pakistani	.045	-.005	-.010	[.749]	.420	-.030	.064*	[.005]
		(.010)	(.015)	(.015)		(.024)	(.033)	(.034)	
	Black Caribbean	.044	.007	-.010	[.305]	.392	-.044	.046	[.006]
		(.010)	(.016)	(.015)		(.023)	(.032)	(.034)	
On the street or in a public setting	White British	.302	.041	.007	[.290]	.061	.020	.027	[.728]
		(.021)	(.031)	(.031)		(.011)	(.018)	(.018)	
	Indian	.040	.017	-.011	[.028]	.298	-.019	-.027	[.773]
		(.011)	(.015)	(.013)		(.022)	(.031)	(.031)	
	Pakistani	.038	.020	-.008	[.029]	.373	-.053*	-.008	[.167]
		(.010)	(.015)	(.013)		(.023)	(.032)	(.033)	
	Black Caribbean	.030	.026*	.009	[.212]	.364	-.030	-.030	[.992]
		(.008)	(.013)	(.012)		(.023)	(.033)	(.033)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. In the often outcome we combine respondents that answered 'very often' and 'often'. Respondents could also answer 'sometimes' and 'don't know'.

Table A11: Discrimination Across Domains, Other Groups

How frequently do you think that people from the following groups experience discrimination or harassment in … because of their ethnicity?

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

		(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
		Never				Often			
At work	Polish	.085	.026	-.006	[.130]	.134	.005	.046*	[.105]
		(.014)	(.021)	(.020)		(.016)	(.023)	(.025)	
	Black African	.055	.008	.008	[.990]	.262	.033	.087***	[.088]
		(.011)	(.017)	(.019)		(.021)	(.030)	(.032)	
By the police	Polish	.187	-.012	-.019	[.785]	.082	-.004	.010	[.472]
		(.019)	(.026)	(.026)		(.014)	(.019)	(.020)	
	Black African	.071	.004	-.007	[.549]	.395	-.014	.005	[.569]
		(.012)	(.017)	(.018)		(.024)	(.034)	(.034)	
In getting housing	Polish	.142	.036	-.013	[.055]	.144	-.010	-.014	[.853]
		(.016)	(.025)	(.024)		(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
	Black African	.150	.032	-.022	[.032]	.213	-.006	.015	[.448]
		(.018)	(.026)	(.024)		(.019)	(.027)	(.028)	
In getting mdeical care	Polish	.280	.000	-.065**	[.030]	.107	-.018	-.004	[.489]
		(.022)	(.031)	(.030)		(.016)	(.021)	(.022)	
	Black African	.241	.015	-.034	[.098]	.239	-.040	-.010	[.285]
		(.021)	(.030)	(.029)		(.021)	(.028)	(.029)	
At school	Polish	.067	.031	-.010	[.024]	.190	-.019	.020	[.139]
		(.012)	(.020)	(.016)		(.019)	(.025)	(.027)	
	Black African	.052	-.003	-.020	[.287]	.395	-.038	.049	[.008]
		(.011)	(.016)	(.016)		(.023)	(.032)	(.034)	
On the street or in a public setting	Polish	.134	.005	-.023	[.206]	.125	-.010	-.032	[.291]
		(.017)	(.024)	(.022)		(.017)	(.023)	(.022)	
	Black African	.028	.034**	-.001	[.012]	.360	-.025	-.008	[.601]
		(.009)	(.015)	(.012)		(.023)	(.033)	(.033)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. In the often outcome we combine respondents that answered 'very often' and 'often'. Respondents could also answer 'sometimes' and 'don't know'.

Table A12: Equal Opportunities Policy, Other Groups

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				**Gone too far**		
Polish	.166	.004	.020	[.377]	.095	.031**	-.005	[.030]
	(.012)	(.017)	(.018)		(.010)	(.016)	(.015)	
Black African	.235	.013	.047**	[.106]	.215	.013	-.021	[.088]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.021)		(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with ‘about right’ or ‘don't know’.


Table A13: Group Attitudes Towards Minorities, Control Group

Means, standard deviation in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) White British	(2) Indian	(3) Other White	[1 = 2]	[1 = 3]	[2 = 3]
Observations	1078	44	42			
Ethnic diversity generally has a positive impact on life?	.447	.853	.675	[.000]	[.009]	[.077]
Racial discrimination in the UK is a big or moderate problem	.632	.681	.775	[.545]	[.052]	[.380]
Agree that government should aim to reduce the economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?	.487	.560	.769	[.380]	[.000]	[.050]
The number of immigrants coming to the UK nowadays should be reduced	.682	.563	.401	[.142]	[.001]	[.156]

Notes: The sample is restricted to White British, Indian and Other White respondents, with observations being reweighted to fit the national profile. The p-values are calculated from an OLS regression for each outcome on a constant and a full set of treatment dummy interactions with ethnic group, where robust standard errors are calculated. For the question, do you think ethnic diversity generally has a positive or negative impact on life in the UK?, the outcome includes those that report ‘very positive’ or ‘fairly positive’. For the question, in the UK, the government should aim to reduce the economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?, the outcome includes those that report ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’. For the question do you think the number of immigrants coming to the UK nowadays should be…, the outcome includes those that report ‘reduced a lot’ or ‘reduced a little’.

Figure A1: Perceived Economic Outcomes, Other Groups



Notes: The left hand side of each panel reports means for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. On the right hand side panel we calculate the degree of misperception by taking the control mean and subtracting the minority group estimates constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024. Hence positive misperceptions imply the control mean is higher than the group estimate, and we report whether these are statistically significant where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.

Table B1: Majority Attitudes and Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
Do you think ethnic diversity generally has a positive impact on life in the UK?				
Baseline	.878	-.078*	-.026	[.221]
	(.025)	(.040)	(.038)	
x Centre Leaning	-.438***	.123**	.062	[.268]
	(.034)	(.052)	(.051)	
x Right Leaning	-.774***	.136**	.119*	[.795]
	(.046)	(.064)	(.066)	
Do you believe that racial discrimination in the UK is a big or moderate problem				
Baseline	.923	-.045	-.036	[.802]
	(.020)	(.034)	(.032)	
x Centre Leaning	-.321***	.036	.112**	[.130]
	(.031)	(.047)	(.046)	
x Right Leaning	-.611***	.132*	.061	[.357]
	(.053)	(.076)	(.076)	
Agree that the government should aim to reduce the economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?				
Baseline	.791	.038	.032	[.893]
	(.032)	(.043)	(.045)	
x Centre Leaning	-.329***	-.028	.045	[.176]
	(.040)	(.055)	(.057)	
x Right Leaning	-.614***	.044	.052	[.907]
	(.056)	(.075)	(.077)	
Do you think the number of immigrants coming to the UK should be reduced				
Baseline	.296	.001	-.027	[.561]
	(.037)	(.051)	(.051)	
x Centre Leaning	.416***	.036	.012	[.680]
	(.043)	(.059)	(.060)	
x Right Leaning	.643***	.036	-.004	[.507]
	(.051)	(.063)	(.069)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The reference category is left-leaning respondents. For the question, *do you think ethnic diversity generally has a positive or negative impact on life in the UK?*, the outcome includes those that report 'very positive' or 'fairly positive'. For the question, *in the UK, the government should aim to reduce the economic differences between White British and ethnic minority families?*, the outcome includes those that report 'strongly agree' or 'agree'. For the question do you think the number of immigrants coming to the UK nowadays should be…, the outcome includes those that report 'reduced a lot' or 'reduced a little'.

Table B2: Who is a Minority and Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
Which of the following groups do you consider to be ethnic minorities?				
White British				
Baseline	.121	-.024	.000	[.478]
	(.026)	(.033)	(.037)	
x Centre Leaning	.117***	-.008	-.038	[.492]
	(.033)	(.044)	(.047)	
x Right Leaning	.187***	.005	-.025	[.698]
	(.057)	(.078)	(.079)	
Indian				
Baseline	.736	.033	.033	[.997]
	(.038)	(.048)	(.049)	
x Centre Leaning	-.305***	.056	.066	[.862]
	(.044)	(.059)	(.060)	
x Right Leaning	-.331***	.082	.025	[.504]
	(.067)	(.088)	(.092)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.747	.046	.048	[.954]
	(.037)	(.047)	(.048)	
x Centre Leaning	-.309***	.064	.072	[.887]
	(.044)	(.058)	(.059)	
x Right Leaning	-.259***	-.013	-.057	[.606]
	(.068)	(.089)	(.092)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.732	.037	.080*	[.312]
	(.038)	(.048)	(.048)	
x Centre Leaning	-.256***	.011	.006	[.934]
	(.045)	(.059)	(.059)	
x Right Leaning	-.259***	-.002	-.045	[.611]
	(.068)	(.089)	(.092)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The reference category is left-leaning respondents. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted.

Table B3: Graduate Shares and Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?				
White British				
Baseline	.364	-.005	.035*	[.041]
	(.013)	(.019)	(.019)	
x Centre Leaning	-.009	-.008	-.044*	[.134]
	(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
x Right Leaning	-.037	.006	-.022	[.434]
	(.025)	(.034)	(.038)	
Indian				
Baseline	.397	.049**	-.010	[.022]
	(.017)	(.025)	(.024)	
x Centre Leaning	-.049**	-.014	.030	[.146]
	(.020)	(.029)	(.029)	
x Right Leaning	-.062**	.001	-.000	[.973]
	(.030)	(.041)	(.044)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.316	.042*	-.026	[.004]
	(.015)	(.023)	(.021)	
x Centre Leaning	-.071***	.000	.022	[.417]
	(.018)	(.027)	(.026)	
x Right Leaning	-.142***	.042	.046	[.921]
	(.023)	(.037)	(.036)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.259	.019	-.022	[.027]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.018)	
x Centre Leaning	-.065***	.000	.035*	[.115]
	(.016)	(.023)	(.021)	
x Right Leaning	-.112***	.004	.018	[.624]
	(.020)	(.029)	(.027)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Columns 1 and 1b report minority group estimates for men constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table B4: Perceived Employment Rates and Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men of working age in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many would you say are not working?				
White British				
Baseline	.783	-.005	.004	[.573]
	(.012)	(.017)	(.017)	
x Centre Leaning	-.039***	.008	-.008	[.467]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.021)	
x Right Leaning	-.054**	.006	-.021	[.556]
	(.024)	(.032)	(.046)	
Indian				
Baseline	.861	.006	.006	[.988]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.014)	
x Centre Leaning	-.060***	.015	-.023	[.039]
	(.015)	(.019)	(.021)	
x Right Leaning	-.088***	.005	-.033	[.413]
	(.025)	(.034)	(.047)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.858	.001	-.010	[.437]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.015)	
x Centre Leaning	-.088***	.016	-.020	[.086]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.022)	
x Right Leaning	-.165***	.030	.017	[.772]
	(.031)	(.041)	(.051)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.844	-.018	-.008	[.491]
	(.010)	(.015)	(.014)	
x Centre Leaning	-.096***	.023	-.016	[.058]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.021)	
x Right Leaning	-.183***	.008	.018	[.831]
	(.035)	(.045)	(.052)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Columns 1 and 1b report minority group estimates for men constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table B5: Educational and Labor Market Opportunities and Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]	(7) Control Mean	(8) Δ Positive Prime	(9) Δ Negative Prime	[8 = 9]
Do the following groups have few or no opportunities to...where you live?												
		Get a good education				**Get a job**				**Earn a decent wage**		
White British												
Baseline	.035	.000	.023	[.326]	.079	.021	-.017	[.230]	.166	.060	-.028	[.042]
	(.018)	(.022)	(.026)		(.022)	(.033)	(.030)		(.030)	(.044)	(.041)	
x Centre Leaning	.031	.005	-.059**	[.020]	.016	-.002	-.013	[.770]	-.013	-.033	-.009	[.631]
	(.021)	(.028)	(.029)		(.026)	(.039)	(.035)		(.034)	(.051)	(.047)	
x Right Leaning	.029	-.005	-.018	[.824]	.000	.039	.061	[.749]	-.033	.024	.071	[.553]
	(.032)	(.041)	(.058)		(.036)	(.056)	(.063)		(.046)	(.070)	(.075)	
Indian												
Baseline	.100	-.031	.053	[.014]	.134	.046	.027	[.648]	.231	.049	.053	[.933]
	(.025)	(.030)	(.039)		(.027)	(.040)	(.040)		(.033)	(.048)	(.049)	
x Centre Leaning	.006	-.002	-.040	[.351]	-.007	-.047	-.027	[.679]	-.027	-.048	-.072	[.676]
	(.029)	(.036)	(.045)		(.031)	(.046)	(.047)		(.038)	(.055)	(.056)	
x Right Leaning	-.033	.048	-.084*	[.004]	-.067*	-.032	.010	[.456]	-.121***	-.015	-.040	[.707]
	(.035)	(.047)	(.049)		(.036)	(.052)	(.055)		(.045)	(.065)	(.067)	
Pakistani												
Baseline	.150	-.042	.053	[.016]	.162	.026	.038	[.798]	.277	.065	.046	[.703]
	(.029)	(.036)	(.044)		(.030)	(.042)	(.043)		(.035)	(.050)	(.051)	
x Centre Leaning	-.026	.018	-.027	[.326]	.008	-.035	-.025	[.855]	-.001	-.103*	-.085	[.753]
	(.032)	(.042)	(.050)		(.035)	(.049)	(.051)		(.041)	(.058)	(.059)	
x Right Leaning	-.029	.015	-.104*	[.024]	-.053	-.054	-.015	[.509]	-.127**	-.053	-.034	[.790]
	(.046)	(.057)	(.061)		(.045)	(.059)	(.064)		(.051)	(.070)	(.073)	
Black Caribbean												
Baseline	.167	-.026	.067	[.024]	.188	.029	.027	[.969]	.312	.087*	.076	[.841]
	(.029)	(.038)	(.044)		(.031)	(.044)	(.045)		(.036)	(.051)	(.053)	
x Centre Leaning	-.011	.025	-.056	[.099]	.009	-.031	-.051	[.716]	-.015	-.086	-.123**	[.544]
	(.034)	(.045)	(.051)		(.036)	(.052)	(.052)		(.042)	(.060)	(.061)	
x Right Leaning	-.032	.008	-.126**	[.017]	-.044	-.043	-.023	[.756]	-.095	-.061	-.109	[.534]
	(.047)	(.060)	(.062)		(.048)	(.064)	(.067)		(.059)	(.081)	(.080)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could answer each question with plenty, some, few or no opportunities, or don't know. We combine few and no opportunities for each outcome.

Table B6: Luck vs Effort and Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	Luck vs Effort Control Means [1] = [5]	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	Primes [2 = 3]	(5) Controls	(6) Δ Positive Prime	(7) Δ Negative Prime	Primes [6 = 7]
Does lack of effort or bad luck generally have more to do with whether a person from each of the following groups is unsuccessful?									
			Bad luck				**Lack of Effort**		
White British									
Baseline	[.026]	.128	-.005	.002	[.843]	.223	.075	.064	[.822]
		(.028)	(.037)	(.039)		(.031)	(.046)	(.046)	
x Centre Leaning	[.000]	-.069**	.023	-.013	[.363]	.153***	-.041	-.094*	[.369]
		(.031)	(.041)	(.042)		(.039)	(.057)	(.057)	
x Right Leaning	[.000]	-.035	.024	.010	[.830]	.236***	-.112	-.139	[.746]
		(.040)	(.057)	(.067)		(.065)	(.088)	(.089)	
Indian									
Baseline	[.000]	.381	-.041	.024	[.211]	.026	.030	.008	[.331]
		(.040)	(.053)	(.055)		(.012)	(.021)	(.018)	
x Centre Leaning	[.002]	-.158***	.097	-.011	[.071]	.118***	-.047	-.044	[.925]
		(.044)	(.060)	(.062)		(.022)	(.032)	(.031)	
x Right Leaning	[.934]	-.151**	-.006	-.059	[.470]	.199***	.003	.047	[.548]
		(.062)	(.079)	(.083)		(.047)	(.067)	(.073)	
Pakistani									
Baseline	[.000]	.338	-.021	.064	[.099]	.052	.011	.009	[.922]
		(.039)	(.052)	(.054)		(.016)	(.025)	(.023)	
x Centre Leaning	[.060]	-.169***	.070	-.049	[.042]	.167***	-.026	-.038	[.737]
		(.043)	(.058)	(.060)		(.026)	(.037)	(.037)	
x Right Leaning	[.000]	-.283***	.094	-.036	[.045]	.388***	-.089	.025	[.138]
		(.045)	(.064)	(.064)		(.059)	(.079)	(.082)	
Black Caribbean									
Baseline	[.000]	.364	-.078	.023	[.047]	.048	.035	.004	[.245]
		(.040)	(.052)	(.055)		(.017)	(.027)	(.023)	
x Centre Leaning	[.000]	-.224***	.092	-.002	[.097]	.188***	-.032	-.031	[.994]
		(.043)	(.057)	(.060)		(.027)	(.040)	(.037)	
x Right Leaning	[.000]	-.295***	.126*	-.021	[.031]	.405***	-.065	.024	[.244]
		(.048)	(.068)	(.067)		(.059)	(.079)	(.082)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could answer the question with bad luck, a lack of effort, an equal mix of both or don't know.

Table B7: Labor Market Discrimination

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
Imagine that the following men applied for a job, which they were qualified for. Please rank them based on how likely you think they would be to be turned down for the job.				
White British				
Baseline	1.47	.006	-.136	[.251]
	(.101)	(.139)	(.127)	
x Centre Leaning	.534***	.244	.098	[.405]
	(.132)	(.183)	(.178)	
x Right Leaning	1.22***	.391	.206	[.636]
	(.268)	(.364)	(.403)	
Indian				
Baseline	3.35	-.260*	-.035	[.118]
	(.102)	(.141)	(.147)	
x Centre Leaning	-.297**	.173	.155	[.916]
	(.124)	(.170)	(.180)	
x Right Leaning	-.661***	.155	.157	[.993]
	(.181)	(.247)	(.264)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	4.15	-.193	-.163	[.843]
	(.108)	(.149)	(.158)	
x Centre Leaning	-.347**	.128	.238	[.560]
	(.135)	(.186)	(.195)	
x Right Leaning	-.634**	-.287	.208	[.109]
	(.246)	(.309)	(.348)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	4.34	.173	.084	[.596]
	(.121)	(.168)	(.171)	
x Centre Leaning	-.284*	-.282	-.044	[.252]
	(.146)	(.205)	(.210)	
x Right Leaning	-.672**	-.302	-.323	[.949]
	(.278)	(.355)	(.375)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'not sure'. The share of respondents that answered 'not sure' is .16, .21, .22 and .23 for White British, Indian, Pakistani and Black Caribbean men, respectively.

Table B8: Equal Opportunities Policy and Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
Have attempts to give equal opportunities to the following groups gone too far or not gone far enough?								
		Not far enough				Gone too far		
White British								
Baseline	.208	-.014	-.044	[.458]	.063	-.011	.052	[.043]
	(.032)	(.044)	(.042)		(.019)	(.025)	(.032)	
x Centre Leaning	.032	-.004	.028	[.520]	-.043**	.036	-.025	[.075]
	(.038)	(.052)	(.051)		(.020)	(.028)	(.034)	
x Right Leaning	.249***	-.034	.002	[.664]	-.014	.071	-.029	[.062]
	(.065)	(.086)	(.089)		(.031)	(.049)	(.049)	
Indian								
Baseline	.440	-.050	.031	[.129]	.033	.030	.027	[.915]
	(.040)	(.054)	(.055)		(.013)	(.022)	(.024)	
x Centre Leaning	-.286***	.053	-.021	[.204]	.154***	-.029	-.059	[.429]
	(.043)	(.059)	(.061)		(.023)	(.035)	(.036)	
x Right Leaning	-.392***	.082	-.047	[.033]	.321***	.059	-.003	[.425]
	(.045)	(.063)	(.061)		(.055)	(.075)	(.080)	
Pakistani								
Baseline	.468	-.001	.055	[.292]	.042	.032	.020	[.686]
	(.040)	(.054)	(.056)		(.014)	(.025)	(.025)	
x Centre Leaning	-.288***	.000	-.030	[.611]	.180***	-.030	-.054	[.543]
	(.044)	(.060)	(.062)		(.025)	(.037)	(.037)	
x Right Leaning	-.428***	.042	-.058	[.102]	.455***	.005	-.039	[.576]
	(.044)	(.063)	(.061)		(.059)	(.079)	(.083)	
Black Caribbean								
Baseline	.533	.012	.044	[.558]	.030	.018	.025	[.787]
	(.041)	(.055)	(.056)		(.012)	(.022)	(.024)	
x Centre Leaning	-.302***	.008	-.025	[.591]	.183***	-.010	-.059	[.198]
	(.045)	(.062)	(.063)		(.024)	(.036)	(.036)	
x Right Leaning	-.481***	.080	-.038	[.081]	.455***	-.018	-.045	[.728]
	(.046)	(.070)	(.063)		(.058)	(.078)	(.082)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'.

Table B9: Immigration and Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
The top five countries of origin of recent UK immigrants are India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. For each of these countries, do you think the number coming to the UK should be…								
		Reduced				**Increased**		
India								
Baseline	.226	.033	-.008	[.373]	.151	-.052	.027	[.030]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.047)		(.028)	(.035)	(.040)	
x Centre Leaning	.380***	-.025	-.053	[.638]	-.113***	.057	-.020	[.051]
	(.041)	(.058)	(.059)		(.029)	(.038)	(.043)	
x Right Leaning	.482***	.003	.103	[.179]	-.092**	.007	-.074	[.038]
	(.068)	(.087)	(.085)		(.045)	(.051)	(.055)	
Pakistan								
Baseline	.235	.040	-.006	[.342]	.160	-.057	.011	[.064]
	(.035)	(.049)	(.048)		(.029)	(.036)	(.041)	
x Centre Leaning	.423***	-.023	-.031	[.891]	-.131***	.066*	-.008	[.057]
	(.041)	(.058)	(.059)		(.030)	(.039)	(.042)	
x Right Leaning	.629***	-.018	-.026	[.914]	-.102**	.011	-.058	[.076]
	(.054)	(.070)	(.074)		(.045)	(.051)	(.055)	
Nigeria								
Baseline	.240	.043	-.022	[.164]	.164	-.039	.014	[.171]
	(.035)	(.049)	(.048)		(.029)	(.038)	(.041)	
x Centre Leaning	.443***	-.049	-.039	[.862]	-.132***	.052	-.018	[.089]
	(.041)	(.058)	(.058)		(.030)	(.041)	(.043)	
x Right Leaning	.610***	-.028	.006	[.635]	-.111**	-.000	-.049	[.253]
	(.057)	(.075)	(.076)		(.044)	(.052)	(.055)	
China								
Baseline	.260	.034	-.003	[.436]	.160	-.056	.018	[.043]
	(.036)	(.049)	(.049)		(.029)	(.036)	(.041)	
x Centre Leaning	.378***	.029	-.065	[.109]	-.115***	.056	-.006	[.125]
	(.042)	(.058)	(.060)		(.030)	(.039)	(.044)	
x Right Leaning	.546***	-.043	-.013	[.699]	-.102**	.029	-.033	[.184]
	(.059)	(.081)	(.080)		(.045)	(.054)	(.058)	
Zimbabwe								
Baseline	.227	.040	-.037	[.091]	.170	-.039	.011	[.198]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.046)		(.029)	(.039)	(.041)	
x Centre Leaning	.403***	-.025	-.023	[.975]	-.130***	.042	-.008	[.224]
	(.041)	(.058)	(.057)		(.031)	(.041)	(.044)	
x Right Leaning	.584***	-.014	.041	[.438]	-.125***	.008	-.038	[.285]
	(.058)	(.075)	(.077)		(.044)	(.052)	(.054)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. In the reduced outcome we combine respondents that answered 'Reduced a lot' or 'reduced a little'. In the increased outcome we combine respondents that answered 'increased a lot' or 'increased a little'. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table B10: Effectiveness of Policies in Reducing Ethnic Inequalities and Political Leaning

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
	Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**			
Investing more in education and training								
Baseline	.915	.007	.020	[.636]	.036	.010	.013	[.919]
	(.022)	(.030)	(.030)		(.014)	(.022)	(.023)	
x Centre Leaning	-.180***	.007	-.038	[.297]	.149***	-.004	-.005	[.971]
	(.031)	(.043)	(.044)		(.024)	(.035)	(.036)	
x Right Leaning	-.407***	.104	-.013	[.136]	.330***	-.049	.021	[.361]
	(.061)	(.081)	(.084)		(.055)	(.075)	(.080)	
Teach children more about British values								
Baseline	.229	.036	.033	[.947]	.697	-.020	-.040	[.687]
	(.032)	(.046)	(.047)		(.036)	(.050)	(.051)	
x Centre Leaning	.339***	.030	-.018	[.413]	-.368***	.000	.019	[.754]
	(.040)	(.056)	(.058)		(.042)	(.059)	(.060)	
x Right Leaning	.483***	.105	-.025	[.079]	-.484***	-.078	.021	[.162]
	(.060)	(.076)	(.083)		(.058)	(.074)	(.079)	
Supported families with children more financially								
Baseline	.770	.008	.060	[.223]	.134	-.003	-.004	[.989]
	(.033)	(.046)	(.045)		(.027)	(.038)	(.038)	
x Centre Leaning	-.274***	-.030	-.020	[.866]	.262***	.035	-.044	[.115]
	(.041)	(.057)	(.057)		(.036)	(.050)	(.051)	
x Right Leaning	-.531***	.027	-.007	[.656]	.503***	.006	-.077	[.300]
	(.062)	(.081)	(.084)		(.063)	(.081)	(.087)	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups								
Baseline	.686	-.014	-.005	[.856]	.220	.038	.061	[.643]
	(.036)	(.051)	(.052)		(.031)	(.046)	(.047)	
x Centre Leaning	-.209***	-.025	.004	[.648]	.199***	.022	-.071	[.119]
	(.044)	(.061)	(.062)		(.039)	(.057)	(.058)	
x Right Leaning	-.504***	.130	.048	[.296]	.507***	-.143*	-.102	[.619]
	(.057)	(.080)	(.079)		(.059)	(.082)	(.083)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for political leaning. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table B11: Perceived Graduate Shares and Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?				
White British				
Baseline	.332	-.021*	-.023*	[.865]
	(.009)	(.012)	(.013)	
x Female	.058***	.022	.035*	[.485]
	(.013)	(.018)	(.018)	
Indian				
Baseline	.335	.005	-.019	[.152]
	(.011)	(.015)	(.017)	
x Female	.040***	.056***	.043*	[.542]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.023)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.241	.007	-.035**	[.004]
	(.010)	(.014)	(.015)	
x Female	.037***	.060***	.040**	[.315]
	(.014)	(.020)	(.020)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.184	-.004	-.018	[.232]
	(.007)	(.011)	(.011)	
x Female	.055***	.031**	.024	[.661]
	(.011)	(.016)	(.016)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Columns 1 and 1b report minority group estimates for men constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table B12: Immigration and Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
The top five countries of origin of recent UK immigrants are India, Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. For each of these countries, do you think the number coming to the UK should be…								
		Reduced				**Increased**		
India								
Baseline	.556	.048	.017	[.391]	.068	-.035**	-.014	[.175]
	(.025)	(.034)	(.037)		(.013)	(.016)	(.018)	
x Female	.001	-.066	-.070	[.932]	-.026	.038*	.035	[.881]
	(.034)	(.047)	(.049)		(.016)	(.020)	(.022)	
Pakistan								
Baseline	.609	.067**	.018	[.162]	.063	-.029*	-.003	[.103]
	(.024)	(.033)	(.036)		(.013)	(.016)	(.019)	
x Female	-.017	-.084*	-.073	[.808]	-.015	.024	.003	[.305]
	(.033)	(.046)	(.048)		(.016)	(.020)	(.022)	
Nigeria								
Baseline	.635	.037	-.021	[.102]	.070	-.030*	-.015	[.337]
	(.024)	(.033)	(.036)		(.014)	(.017)	(.018)	
x Female	-.045	-.058	-.028	[.528]	-.025	.039*	.021	[.379]
	(.033)	(.046)	(.048)		(.016)	(.022)	(.022)	
China								
Baseline	.584	.082**	-.006	[.015]	.078	-.035**	.003	[.040]
	(.025)	(.034)	(.037)		(.014)	(.018)	(.021)	
x Female	.002	-.092**	-.049	[.374]	-.031*	.030	.009	[.357]
	(.034)	(.047)	(.049)		(.017)	(.022)	(.025)	
Zimbabwe								
Baseline	.593	.056*	-.021	[.031]	.070	-.027	-.005	[.186]
	(.024)	(.034)	(.037)		(.013)	(.017)	(.019)	
x Female	-.036	-.068	-.006	[.201]	-.015	.026	.004	[.300]
	(.034)	(.047)	(.049)		(.017)	(.022)	(.023)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer the question with 'about right' or 'don't know'.

Table B13: Effectiveness of Policies in Reducing Ethnic Inequalities and Gender

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
	Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**			
Investing more in education and training								
Baseline	.720	-.033	-.062*	[.431]	.200	.033	.043	[.775]
	(.023)	(.033)	(.035)		(.020)	(.030)	(.031)	
x Female	-.034	.107**	.141***	[.462]	-.028	-.046	-.080**	[.401]
	(.032)	(.045)	(.046)		(.027)	(.039)	(.039)	
Teach children more about British values								
Baseline	.528	.079**	.015	[.077]	.376	-.034	-.026	[.815]
	(.025)	(.035)	(.037)		(.024)	(.034)	(.036)	
x Female	-.025	-.016	.016	[.515]	-.028	.015	-.004	[.677]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)		(.033)	(.045)	(.047)	
Supported families with children more financially								
Baseline	.489	-.035	.004	[.285]	.398	.029	-.021	[.161]
	(.025)	(.035)	(.037)		(.024)	(.035)	(.036)	
x Female	.013	.091*	.075	[.742]	-.074**	-.050	-.023	[.568]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)		(.033)	(.046)	(.046)	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups								
Baseline	.443	-.044	-.006	[.296]	.445	.069**	.010	[.110]
	(.025)	(.034)	(.037)		(.025)	(.035)	(.037)	
x Female	.065*	.059	.031	[.560]	-.118***	-.057	-.013	[.347]
	(.034)	(.048)	(.049)		(.033)	(.046)	(.047)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for gender. Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table B14: Perceived Graduate Shares and Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Controls	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
Out of 100 men above the age of 25 in the UK from each of the following groups, roughly how many do you think have a university degree?				
White British				
Baseline	.363	-.020*	-.009	[.338]
	(.008)	(.011)	(.012)	
x University Degree	-.010	.040**	.026	[.479]
	(.012)	(.018)	(.019)	
Indian				
Baseline	.345	.025*	-.002	[.050]
	(.009)	(.013)	(.014)	
x University Degree	.035**	.037	.027	[.680]
	(.016)	(.023)	(.023)	
Pakistani				
Baseline	.256	.025**	-.020*	[.000]
	(.009)	(.012)	(.012)	
x University Degree	.014	.051**	.031	[.382]
	(.014)	(.022)	(.021)	
Black Caribbean				
Baseline	.210	.002	-.012	[.159]
	(.007)	(.010)	(.010)	
x University Degree	.003	.042**	.035**	[.733]
	(.011)	(.017)	(.017)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Columns 1 and 1b report minority group estimates for men constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table B15: Effectiveness of Policies in Reducing Ethnic Inequalities and Education

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
How much difference do you think the government could make in reducing inequalities between ethnic groups from the following actions?								
	Great deal/fair amount				**Not much/none**			
Investing more in education and training								
Baseline	.658	.020	.008	[.663]	.207	.016	.012	[.870]
	(.020)	(.028)	(.029)		(.017)	(.024)	(.025)	
x University Degree	.155***	.018	.018	[.987]	-.073***	-.033	-.049	[.667]
	(.031)	(.043)	(.045)		(.027)	(.038)	(.037)	
Teach children more about British values								
Baseline	.564	.080***	.025	[.051]	.299	-.032	-.031	[.989]
	(.021)	(.028)	(.030)		(.019)	(.026)	(.027)	
x University Degree	-.170***	-.056	-.009	[.360]	.220***	.042	.003	[.436]
	(.035)	(.050)	(.051)		(.035)	(.050)	(.050)	
Supported families with children more financially								
Baseline	.460	.005	.035	[.296]	.380	.011	-.027	[.184]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.030)		(.020)	(.028)	(.028)	
x University Degree	.122***	.038	.035	[.954]	-.067*	-.035	-.036	[.982]
	(.036)	(.051)	(.052)		(.034)	(.048)	(.048)	
Increasing penalties for discriminating against groups								
Baseline	.469	-.053*	-.010	[.135]	.379	.080***	.014	[.024]
	(.021)	(.029)	(.030)		(.020)	(.028)	(.029)	
x University Degree	.020	.155***	.081	[.153]	.026	-.156***	-.059	[.052]
	(.036)	(.051)	(.052)		(.035)	(.050)	(.050)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. All estimates are derived from OLS regressions of the corresponding response variable on a treatment dummy variable fully interacted with a categorical variable for education (distinguishing between those with and without a university degree). Robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'.

Table C1: Minority Share

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
Out of every 100 people living in the UK, how many do you think belong to an ethnic minority?				
Ethnic Minority Population Share	.337	.015	.018*	[.793]
	(.007)	(.010)	(.011)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted.

Table C2: Actual and Perceived Income Ranks

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
p-values in brackets

	(1) QLFS	(2) Control Mean	[1 = 2]	(3) Δ Positive Prime	(4) Δ Negative Prime	[3 = 4]
In the UK today, which of the following groups of men/women do you think earns the most on average? Drag and drop items to rank from earns most to earns least.						
Men						
White British	2.00	1.64	[.000]	.121**	-.136***	[.000]
		(.039)		(.057)	(.050)	
Indian	1.00	2.52	[.000]	-.051	.082	[.032]
		(.045)		(.063)	(.062)	
Pakistani	3.00	3.73	[.000]	-.111	.107	[.002]
		(.049)		(.071)	(.069)	
Black Caribbean	6.00	4.61	[.000]	.003	.019	[.800]
		(.047)		(.063)	(.064)	
Polish	5.00	3.51	[.000]	.170**	-.039	[.003]
		(.051)		(.070)	(.072)	
Black African	4.00	4.45	[.000]	-.005	.056	[.353]
		(.047)		(.065)	(.067)	
Women						
White British	3.00	1.78	[.000]	.075	-.114*	[.002]
		(.044)		(.063)	(.059)	
Indian	1.00	3.00	[.000]	.059	.121*	[.408]
		(.048)		(.072)	(.072)	
Pakistani	6.00	4.24	[.000]	-.109	.195***	[.000]
		(.053)		(.074)	(.074)	
Black Caribbean	2.00	4.56	[.000]	-.033	-.007	[.669]
		(.046)		(.063)	(.064)	
Polish	4.00	3.50	[.000]	.082	-.070	[.034]
		(.053)		(.073)	(.073)	
Black African	5.00	4.38	[.000]	-.062	.043	[.104]
		(.048)		(.065)	(.067)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. A reported higher rank indicates a higher perceived level of income. Column 1 reports minority group estimates, by gender, constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024.

Table C3: Contribution to Society

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]
On a scale of 0 to 10, do you think the following groups generally make a positive or negative contribution to the UK? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.				
White British	7.33	-.119	-.186*	[.518]
	(.072)	(.100)	(.105)	
Indian	6.13	-.050	.018	[.606]
	(.089)	(.128)	(.130)	
Pakistani	5.13	.078	.123	[.750]
	(.100)	(.141)	(.143)	
Black Caribbean	5.59	.068	.095	[.840]
	(.095)	(.132)	(.138)	
Polish	6.37	-.023	.182	[.103]
	(.080)	(.121)	(.118)	
Black African	5.46	-.027	.107	[.315]
	(.094)	(.132)	(.134)	
How positively or negatively do you feel about each of the following groups? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 means 'very positive'.				
White British	7.39	-.008	-.042	[.741]
	(.073)	(.105)	(.103)	
Indian	6.13	.062	.132	[.597]
	(.090)	(.128)	(.131)	
Pakistani	5.24	.127	.162	[.813]
	(.102)	(.143)	(.146)	
Black Caribbean	5.83	.124	.177	[.696]
	(.095)	(.134)	(.137)	
Polish	6.55	.010	.110	[.436]
	(.080)	(.121)	(.121)	
Black African	5.73	.001	.105	[.445]
	(.093)	(.133)	(.135)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. The minority groups in the positive (Indian, Pakistani) and negative (Pakistani, Black Caribbean) prime are highlighted. Respondents could also answer 'not sure'. The share of respondents that answered 'not sure' in the top panel is .09, .11, .11, .13, .12 and .14 for White British, Polish, Indian, Black African, Pakistani and Black Caribbean, and for the lower panel it is .07, .08, .08, .09, .09 and .10 for White British, Polish, Indian, Black African, Pakistani and Black Caribbean, respectively.

Table C4: Role of Government

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
		Strongly Agree/Agree				Strongly Disagree/Disagree		
In the UK, the economic differences between the rich and poor are unfair	.734	-.001	.030	[.153]	.087	-.002	-.010	[.576]
	(.015)	(.022)	(.022)		(.010)	(.014)	(.013)	
The government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off.	.468	-.001	.028	[.238]	.285	-.007	-.048**	[.052]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.015)	(.022)	(.021)	
In the UK, the government should aim to reduce the economic differences...								
		Strongly Agree/Agree				Strongly Disagree/Disagree		
Between rich and poor families?	.685	.011	.036	[.272]	.097	.010	-.010	[.184]
	(.016)	(.023)	(.023)		(.010)	(.015)	(.014)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents could also answer ‘don’t know’.


Table C5: Policy Priorities

Regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets

	(1) Control Mean	(2) Δ Positive Prime	(3) Δ Negative Prime	[2 = 3]	(4) Control Mean	(5) Δ Positive Prime	(6) Δ Negative Prime	[5 = 6]
Here are several things that the government might spend more on. Please indicate if you would support or oppose increased spending in each of these areas. Please keep in mind that increasing spending in one area would decrease it in others or would mean raising taxes.								
		Support				**Oppose**		
Increasing income support programmes for the poor?	.594	-.025	-.014	[.646]	.162	.024	-.016	[.031]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.024)		(.013)	(.019)	(.018)	
Spending more money on schools in poor neighbourhoods?	.752	-.004	.016	[.367]	.053	-.011	-.006	[.644]
	(.015)	(.021)	(.022)		(.008)	(.011)	(.012)	
Providing decent housing for those who cannot afford it?	.725	.016	.027	[.617]	.094	-.012	-.042***	[.022]
	(.016)	(.022)	(.022)		(.011)	(.015)	(.014)	
Improving the conditions of the poorest neighbourhoods?	.776	.020	.028	[.696]	.052	-.009	-.019*	[.312]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.021)		(.008)	(.011)	(.011)	
Spending more on defence and national security?	.512	.077***	.024	[.029]	.189	-.022	.001	[.202]
	(.017)	(.024)	(.025)		(.014)	(.019)	(.020)	
Spending more on infrastructure such as roads and railways?	.744	.043**	.003	[.058]	.063	-.017	-.016	[.932]
	(.015)	(.020)	(.022)		(.010)	(.012)	(.013)	

Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. We report OLS regressions results of each outcome, a constant and treatment dummies. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile, and robust standard errors are reported. Respondents could also answer 'don't know'. The support outcome includes those that report 'strongly support' or 'tend to support'. The oppose outcome includes those that report 'strongly oppose' or 'tend to oppose'. Respondents could also answer 'neither support or oppose'.

Figure C1: Perceived Income Ranks



A. Men **B. Women**

Notes: The left hand side of each panel reports means for respondents in the Control arm. The sample is restricted to White British respondents, observations are reweighted to fit the national profile. On the right hand side panel we calculate the degree of misperception by taking the control mean and subtracting the minority group estimates constructed from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from April 2023-March 2024. Hence positive misperceptions imply the control mean is higher than the group estimate, and we report whether these are statistically significant where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.