Gender Roulette? Causal Evidence on the Impact of Judge Gender in Labor Court Appeals*

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Abstract

I study the causal effect of the gender of the judge of the outcome of a trial in the context of the appeal of labor courts. Using scrapped French labor courts decisions from 2006 to 2016, I leverage as-good-as-random allocation of cases to judges in the same appeal court the same year to isolate such gender biases in France. I find female presidents (judges) to be substantially more pro-worker than male presidents. On average, a worker being judged by a female rather than a male president can expect up to two supplementary months of salary of compensation for a wrongful dismissal. This discrepancy is mainly explained by female presidents higher propensity to compensate the workers.

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1 Introduction

Minnesota Supreme Court Justice M. Jeanne Coyne famously stated that "a wise old man and a wise old woman reach the same conclusion" (Margolick, 1991). However, whether the gender of a judge influences judicial outcomes remains an open empirical question. Although previous research from sociology, political science, and social psychology has examined this issue, the findings are mixed and correlational (Allen and Wall, 1993; Ashenfelter et al., 1995; Segal, 2000; Davis, 1986; Gryski et al., 1986; Peresie, 2005). Studies using robust identification strategies to isolate judge gender effects remain very scarce (Lim et al., 2016; Bourreau-Dubois et al., 2020) and their results are contradictory. There is only one study providing causal evidence of judge gender effects in a civil law context (Bourreau-Dubois et al., 2020) and no causal work on judge gender effects in firing litigation. [1] Still, such firing litigation decisions are of economic importance because of their macroeconomic effects [2], and have been an area of focus in the law of economics literature since the seminal work of Ichino et al. (2003). This paper contributes to filling this gap. It provides causal evidence on the impact of judge gender on compensation decisions for unfair dismissal cases in appeals from French labor courts decisions.

Using a scrapped dataset containing the universe of decisions from French labor court appeals between 2006 and 2016, I employ a quasi-experimental approach that leverages the as-good-as random assignment of cases to judges within the same Appeal court the same year. I show that the hypothesis of as-good-as-random case allocation to judges is plausible in this setting by explaining key features of the institutional context and providing evidence that case characteristics are balanced across judge gender.

My results suggest that the gender of the presiding judge matters. Workers judged by female presidents receive, on average, up to two additional months of salary in compensation

[1] Online Appendix [TBA] provides the reader with a more thorough literature review on the topic.

[2] For example, Cahuc et al. (2021) show that pro-worker judicial bias in labor court decisions significantly impacts small, low-performing firms, affecting their survival and performance, especially in terms of employment and sales in France.

for wrongful dismissal compared to those judged by male presidents. This difference in compensation mainly occurs at the extensive margin: female presidents are significantly more likely to compensate employees. This pro-plaintiff stance is consistent with the result of Bourreau-Dubois et al. (2020), who found that female judges in France award higher child support. Interestingly and unlike in Bourreau-Dubois et al. (2020), this impact is entirely driven by the gender of the presiding judge. While every trial involves a total of three judges, the effect is fully robust for controlling by the gender of the two other non-presiding judges.

To explore possible mechanisms behind these gender differences, I consider three channels. First, female judges in the dataset have overseen more cases between 2006 and 2016. This could make them more resistant to employer arguments. However, the gender gap remains even after accounting for experience. Second, I test whether female judges show preferential treatment towards female plaintiffs. Such "sorority" effect is not found in the data. This finding contrasts with that of Bourreau-Dubois et al. (2020), who found that female judges in France award higher child support, particularly when the creditor is male. Third, I test whether female judges respond differently to local labor market conditions in the Employment Zone (EZ) where the employee was dismissed. The results show that this is not the case in this setting: a one-point increase in the unemployment rate in the employee's EZ does not significantly affect compensation, regardless of the president's gender.

These findings contribute to the ongoing policy debate on judicial diversity in top-level positions across OECD countries. The European Council, for instance, has introduced guidelines to promote gender parity in high-level judicial roles, as 72 percent of countries still have fewer than 40 percent women judges in such positions (Council of Europe, 2016). The result that male and female judges may reach different rulings in civil law contexts, and that the gender of the presiding judge significantly influences decisions even in collegial settings, can be argued to strengthen the case for increasing gender diversity in the judiciary. Enhancing gender parity at the top levels of the judiciary could help ensure that judicial decisions more accurately reflect the diversity of society.

2 Institutional setting

2.1 Labor courts in France, Appeal court and wrongful dismissals under French law

This paper analyzes judicial decisions from French appeal courts, specifically related to wrongful dismissals. Two key questions arise: Why focus solely on appeal decisions, and how is wrongful dismissal defined under French law?

First, the dataset includes only second-instance (appeal court) decisions, not those from first-instance labor courts (Prud'hommes councils). This choice is driven by two factors. Most importantly, data from Prud'hommes councils is unavailable. Additionally, the high rate of appeals (over 60%, (Guillonneau and Serverin, 2015)) makes appeal decisions a more reliable indicator of final compensation. Only 45% of Prud'hommes rulings on wrongful dismissal compensations are confirmed by appeal courts in this dataset, indicating that appeal rulings better reflect the final compensation paid by firms.

Second, in French law, a dismissal is deemed wrongful if it lacks a "real and serious cause." Open-ended contracts, which constitute 85% of employment contracts in France, can be terminated for economic reasons or personal misconduct. Economic dismissals are permissible only if they address legitimate economic difficulties faced by the firm, not merely to improve profitability. For personal reasons, misconduct or lack of adaptation to the job are valid grounds for dismissal. Additionally, in cases of economic dismissal or lack of job adaptation, employers must demonstrate that no alternative position is available for the employee, even globally, during the period in question. In all cases, the burden of proof rests with the employer. It is important to note that the sample period ends before 2017, prior to the implementation of Macron's labor reform, which introduced standardized guidelines for determining compensation in wrongful dismissal cases. As a result, during the period studied, judges had greater discretion in setting compensation amounts than today.

2.2 Random allocation of cases to judges

To identify gender bias in judicial decisions, it is essential to ensure that male and female judges are not systematically assigned different types of cases. My identification strategy draws on that of Cahuc et al. (2021). It relies on the random allocation of cases to judges within French appeal courts.

This analysis focuses on presidents of social chambers within the 36 French appeal courts. Each court is divided into several chambers, and there is at least one social chamber dedicated to handling cases from Prud'hommes councils (first instance labor courts), with a president of the chamber who oversees all trials in the chamber. Presidents are assisted by two councillor-judges in each case. The judicial decision is collegial: it is made on behalf of the three judges. In case of disagreement, the decision is made by a majority of the judges and no discrepancy is mentioned in the final judgment.

Notably, judicial mobility is high, with 20% of judicial positions re-assigned annually, as mandated by French law (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, 2017). Judges' movements are governed by the Ordonnance Organique of December 22, 1958, which stipulates that their placement is determined by the First President of the Court of Cassation and the First President of the Appeal Court. Promotion decisions are merit-based and made by the National Commission of Advancement. Additional mobility requirements, such as limiting tenure in a specific position to five years, further reduce the likelihood of case selection by judges.

There are three key institutional arguments supporting the existence of random components in case allocation to judges.

First, newly appointed judges inherit a significant backlog of cases, meaning it takes up to two years to clear the chamber's pending cases. Since the average tenure of a judge in a social chamber is around 2.5 years, in most cases, the presiding judge is not known when a case is initially assigned to the chamber. Moreover, plaintiffs are not allowed to influence the selection of judges, and judges cannot self-select their cases, except in instances of conflict of

interest.

Second, the identity of the presiding judge is typically unknown to employers, workers, and their lawyers until the day of the trial. This is due to several factors: a new judge may be appointed, the sitting judge may be absent (e.g., for holidays).

Third, according to court surveys (Bourreau-Dubois et al., 2020), cases are allocated between judges according to procedural criteria such as the order of arrival of the case, the alphabetical order of the geographical origin of the case or the names of the parties. In large Appeal Courts with several social chambers, survey and qualitative evidence suggest that the clerk simply assigns cases sequentially to one chamber and then to the other without any additional filter, so that they have the same number of cases (Jeuland, 2008). [3]. Those large Appeal courts are those of Aix-en-Provence, Paris and Versailles. They have from 4 to 14 social chambers.

The identification strategy presented in next section 3 aims at leveraging these random components in the allocation of cases to judges.

3 Methodology

3.1 Main model and identification strategy

I aim to isolate the effect of judge gender on the amount of compensation awarded for wrongful dismissals, measured in months of salary. The allocation of cases between male and female judges might not be random for several reasons. For example, geographic factors could play a role: certain regions or courts might have different gender distributions among judges, and judges in larger or more urban courts might handle different types of cases than those in smaller or rural courts. Additionally, more experienced or senior judges, who are disproportionately male or female in some courts, could be systematically assigned more complex or high-profile cases. These factors could create systematic differences in the types

[3] "Lorsque plusieurs chambres ont des compétences identiques, le greffier a simplement pris l'habitude d'attribuer une affaire à l'une puis à l'autre, de telle sorte qu'elles en aient le même nombre" (Jeuland, 2008)

of cases handled by male and female judges, leading to non-random allocation of cases.

However, as discussed in Section 2, there are strong institutional mechanisms in French Appeal Courts that ensure the quasi-random allocation of cases at the court-year of appeal level. Judges are assigned cases within the same social chamber based on procedural rules in a context of high judge mobility. This institutional framework supports the assumption of random allocation within the court-year, making it a credible basis for identifying the effect of judge gender on compensation outcomes.

The main specification is as follows:

$$Y_{ijt} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 presidentfemale_{jt} + \mathbf{X}_{ijt}\beta + CY_{it} + u_{ijt}$$

Where Y_{ijt} is the compensation awarded in months of salary, $presidentfemale_{jt}$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the president of the social chamber is female, $\mathbf{X}_{ijt}$ is a vector of observable case-level controls, including plaintiff gender (*salariefemale*), seniority, delay between judgments, and the compensation amount requested by plaintiffs (*amountdemand*), CY_{it} represents court-year of the appeal fixed effects, u_{ijt} is the error term.

Under the assumption of random case assignment at the cour-year level, the coefficient α_1 captures the effect of judge gender on compensation outcomes. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level, for it is level at which the treatment is allocated.

3.2 Balancing tests and robustness checks

To provide evidence supporting the assumption of random assignment at the court-year of appeal level, I conduct three sets of balancing tests on the observable characteristics included in $\mathbf{X}_{ijt}$.

First, I assess whether case characteristics—such as plaintiff gender, seniority, the delay between judgments, and the requested compensation amount—differ systematically between cases handled by male and female judges. For each observable, I use it as the dependent variable in the main specification and run a separate regression. This allows me to check

whether these characteristics are evenly distributed across male and female judges, confirming the plausibility of random assignment at the court-year level.

Second, I re-estimate the model with and without the vector of observable controls ($\mathbf{X}_{ijt}$) to ensure that the key coefficient of interest, α_1, remains stable before and after the inclusion of these controls.

Third, I re-estimate the main model for large Appeal Courts with multiple social chambers, where qualitative evidence suggest cases are randomly allocated between the different social chambers - see section 2.

These checks help confirm that any observed differences in judicial outcomes are attributable to judge gender, and not to systematic differences in the types of cases handled by male and female judges.

4 Data

4.1 Final sample

The dataset used in this analysis was originally constructed by Cahuc et al. (2021) from 145,638 Appeal court rulings in France between 2006 and 2016. These rulings, provided by the Ministry of Justice, were processed using natural language processing techniques to extract relevant case details, including compensation amounts for wrongful dismissal, firm names, and addresses. Firm identifiers (SIREN) were retrieved from the text or through online company registries, allowing the linkage of the rulings to administrative employer-employee data and firm financial information. Further details on the dataset construction can be found in Cahuc et al. (2021).

The dataset in Cahuc et al. (2021) focuses on cases where the firm was not in liquidation, excludes public sector employers, and limits the sample to cases judged by judges who handled at least 50 cases. I make slightly different sample restriction choices. First, I do not exclude cases in which firms are in liquidation (in bankruptcy), for in my study the main outcome is

not firm profitability or survival unlike in the original analysis. Second, to insure my main effect is not explained by outliers in terms of wage, I drop cases in which the monthly salary of the employee is above 38,000 euros which is the last decile of my distribution. In both cases however, none of my results are sensitive to these initial restriction choices: Appendix [TBA] and [TBA] reproduce the main analysis while making similar sample restrictions than in the original study.

Finally, I only keep observations for which all control variables are non-missing.[4]. My final sample contains 8,2111 observations. One might be worried that selecting on the availability of controls generate selection-out-of-the-sample patterns. Hence, in Appendix [TBA], I reproduce the main results in a sample in which I impute the average of variables for missing values and control for dummies for missing variables. Results hold.

4.2 Summary statistics

Table 1 provides an overview of the final sample after multiple merging steps, showing the means and standard deviations for the key variables of the study.

On average, 62 percent of the jury members in each trial are female. Online Appendix [TBA] shows a slight upward trend in the average share of female judges in juries during the sample period, from 2006 to 2016, reaching 66 percent by 2016. This finding aligns with previous research, which reported that in 2017, 66 percent of judges ("magistrats") across all jurisdictions in France were women (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, 2020). The share of female presidents is lower: 54 percent. As noted in prior research, "the positions of heads of jurisdiction show a strong and quite atypical masculinization, given the overall feminization of the judiciary: men become heads of jurisdiction both at a younger age and much more frequently than women" (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, 2020).

On average, female presidents award plaintiffs an additional month of salary in compensation compared to their male counterparts. This figure is unconditional on compensation

[4]In the mediation analysis, in case of missing employment data, I impute the average unemployment and enrich the set of control with a dummy for missing employment

being granted, suggesting that the difference may be driven by a higher tendency of female presidents to award compensation. Indeed, female presidents are more likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs. As shown in Online Appendix [TBA], this trend holds across all deciles of the employee wage distribution, although the difference in compensation across genders is less pronounced in the middle deciles.

However, these differences in compensation between female and male presidents are likely cofounded. The table reveals differences in terms of cases characteristics between female and male presidents. For instance, workers in cases judged by female presidents require a higher amount of compensation and have an higher salary. They also have higher wages than in cases ruled by female presidents. This imbalance in case characteristics between those ruled by male and female presidents stresses the need for a robust identification strategy

Table 1 Descriptives

	Full sample	Male President	Female President
Employer sentenced	0.69	0.64	0.73
	(0.462)	(0.479)	(0.444)
Compensation (in months of salary)	6.09	5.54	6.56
	(7.634)	(7.041)	(8.075)
Number of cases judged by president (2006-2016)	1156.06	941.38	1338.59
	(866.4)	(622.3)	(993.5)
Female President (judge)	0.54	0.00	1.00
	(0.498)	(0)	(0)
Total females jury (out of 3, incl. president)	1.86	1.21	2.42
	(0.921)	(0.719)	(0.670)
Whether worker is a female	0.37	0.37	0.37
	(0.483)	(0.483)	(0.483)
Seniority	7.86	7.84	7.88
	(8.548)	(8.525)	(8.570)
Economic dismissal	0.26	0.24	0.28
	(0.441)	(0.430)	(0.450)
Delay Appeal first judgment (days)	648.73	619.61	673.49
	(362.3)	(366.1)	(357.3)
Amount requested by worker in Appeal	56597.04	53192.92	59491.38
	(77106.4)	(69604.2)	(82851.1)
Worker salary (months)	3249.37	3123.20	3356.64
	(3437.7)	(3278.1)	(3564.6)
'Protected' worker	0.04	0.03	0.05
	(0.201)	(0.173)	(0.221)
Sick leave mentioned in decision	0.14	0.14	0.13
	(0.346)	(0.351)	(0.341)
Appelant is an individual	0.58	0.54	0.61
	(0.494)	(0.498)	(0.487)
Appelant is a firm	0.28	0.30	0.26
	(0.449)	(0.460)	(0.438)
Observations	8241	3787	4454

mean coefficients; se in parentheses

Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of 8,211 French labor court cases (2006-2016), and separately for cases presided over by male and female judges.

4.3 Balance of observables

Table 2 reports the balance of observable characteristics between cases handled by male and female presidents, conditional on the court and year of judgement. The characteristics tested include worker's gender, seniority, compensation demanded, and the time between judgments. These tests are important to check whether cases assigned to male and female judges differ systematically at the cour-year leaved. The results suggest that, for most characteristics, there are no significant differences, supporting the assumption that cases are likely assigned in an as-good-as-random fashion. Only two variables show a statistically significant difference ($p = 0.038$ for both the share of cases in which the appelant is a company, and the share of economic dismissals). Those differences however are not robust to Bonferroni correction, given the number of comparisons made.

Additionally, I conduct an auxiliary regression test. I regress the amount of compensation on all covariates to create a predicted compensation variable. I then regress this predicted compensation (labeled "Predicted difference in compensation" in the table) on the gender of the president. In essence, this test functions as a balance of observables check, but instead of examining each variable separately, it weights each observable by its OLS relevance in predicting compensation. Reassuringly, the predicted difference in compensation by the president's gender is much smaller than the main estimated effect: 0.12 months compared to the observed average difference of two months of compensation between female and male presidents.

Table 2 Balance of observables across president's gender

	Difference between Male and Female President
Female Employee	0.01
	(0.02)
Seniority	0.33
	(0.61)
Worker age	-0.55
	(0.41)
Delay Appeal first judgment (days)	9.36
	(23.93)
Amount requested by worker in Appeal	1059.83
	(3419.61)
Appelant is a company	-0.03*
	(0.02)
Worker salary (months)	36.45
	(101.68)
Sick leave mentioned in decision	0.01
	(0.02)
Protected worker	0.02
	(0.04)
Economic dismissal	0.06*
	(0.03)
Appelant is an individual	0.02
	(0.01)
Predicted difference in compensation	0.12
	(0.54)
N	8211

Notes: Each row displays the coefficient of a bivariate regression of the outcome on the female president dummy. SEs in parenthesis are clustered at the judge level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

5 Results

5.1 Effect of gender on compensation

Table 3 reports the estimated effect of having a female versus male president (judge) on the compensation awarded in wrongful dismissal cases, expressed in months of salary. The results in Column 1 are presented without any controls, while Columns 2 to 4 introduce case-level controls, such as worker gender, seniority, and the delay between judgments. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level to account for potential correlation within the same judge's cases.

The results consistently show a significant and substantial effect: female presidents award between 1.6 to 2.2 additional months of salary in compensation, depending on the specification. The average compensation awarded by male presidents being around 5.5 months, the effect of a female president represents an increase of approximately a third in the amount of compensation for wrongful dismissal. The findings are stable when including controls. If anything, the gender gap in compensation is bigger when restricting the sample to larger courts with multiple social chambers, in which qualitative evidence suggest that cases are randomly allocated between various social chambers. They are also robust to controlling for the gender composition of the jury - see Appendix [TBA].

Table 3 Effect of gender on employee compensation (in months of salary)

	Compensation	Compensation	Compensation	Compensation
Female President	1.7***	1.6***	2.3***	2.2***
	(0.55)	(0.51)	(0.76)	(0.71)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Large Courts	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	8211	8211	3918	3918

Notes: This table presents the estimated effect of judge gender on compensation awarded in wrongful dismissal cases, measured in months of employee salary. Standard errors (SEs) are clustered at the judge level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Column 1-2 show estimates for the main sample, whereas in column 2-4 the sample is restricted to decisions made in Appeal courts with several social chambers (Paris, Aix-Marseilles and Versailles). Column 2 and 4 include case-level controls from table 1.

Thus, there is convincing evidence that female presidents tend to award higher compensation than their male counterparts. However, it is still unclear whether this effect is primarily due to female judges being more likely to award compensation at all (extensive margin) or awarding higher amounts when they do (intensive margin). The next table attempts to breaks down this effect into both margins.

Table 4 presents the estimated effect of judge gender on compensation outcomes in wrongful dismissal cases, focusing on both the extensive margin (whether or not compensation is awarded) and the actual amount of compensation (intensive margin). At the extensive margin, columns 1 and 2 show that female presidents are 15 percent more likely to compensate workers. At the intensive margin, Columns 3 and 4 show that, conditional on the worker being compensated, the discrepancy in compensation between female and male presidents is small (around half a month of salary) and non-significant with all case controls. These results suggest that the overall compensation difference between male and female judges is largely driven by female judges' higher proclivity to award compensation at the extensive margin.

Table 4 Effect on compensation: intensive or extensive margin?

	Compensated	Compensated	Compensation (months)	Compensation (months)
President Female	0.1***	0.1***	0.8**	0.5
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.38)	(0.31)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Compensation >0	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	8211	8211	5659	5659

Notes: This table presents the estimated effect of having a female president (judge) on the likelihood of worker compensation and the amount of compensation in months of salary. The first two columns display the probability of the worker being compensated (using a Linear Probability Model), while the last two columns show the magnitude of compensation conditional on a compensation being awarded. The model includes results with and without controls for case-level observables. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to cases where compensation is awarded. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

5.2 Mechanisms

To investigate the gender differences in compensation outcomes, I explore two potential mechanisms. First,there could be an experience channel. Female judges in the dataset have overseen more cases between 2006 and 2016. This could make them more resistant to employer arguments. To account for this, I control for the number of cases each judge has handled, allowing us to isolate whether experience, rather than gender, is driving the more worker-friendly decisions. Second, I test for a "sorority hypothesis," which suggests that female judges may show bias in favor of female plaintiffs. This mechanism would imply that female judges are more likely to award higher compensation to female workers. However, previous literature on judicial decision-making indicates the possibility of negative in-group bias, where individuals might be harsher toward those within their own group, in the spirit of the findings of (Depew et al., 2017) regarding racial in-group bias or the "queen-bee" syndrome (Staines et al., 1974; Oswald, 1991) regarding gender in-group bias. Third, female judges could react differently to the local labor market conditions in the employment zone where the employee was dismissed. In their seminal paper, Ichino et al. (2003) find that higher unemployment in the employment zone increases the amount of compensation employees receive. If such effect

exists in my setting, it could differ by judge gender.

To try and disentangle these three mechanisms, I enrich my main specification. I add one interaction term between the gender of the judge with that of the plaintiff. I also add another interaction term between the gender of the judge and the unemployment in the employment zone (EZ) of the plaintiff at the time of dissmissal. I also control for the number of cases handled and the unemployment in the EZ at time of dismissal. In Table 5, the probability to be sentenced is used as the outcome, and these additional terms are included gradually. Aside from the main effect of gender of the compensation which is always significant and at least bigger than in the main result, none of the additional controls and interaction terms are significant and above 0.0. Hence, I do not find evidence for any of the three channels highlighted.

Table 5 Mediation analysis: effect of judge gender on probability of compensation (LPM)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female President	0.1***	0.1***	0.1***	0.1***	0.2*	0.2**
	(2.76)	(2.70)	(2.67)	(2.61)	(1.95)	(2.07)
Female Employee	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.94)	(1.14)	(0.94)	(1.14)	(0.94)	(1.15)
President female * Employee female	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(-0.31)	(-0.43)	(-0.32)	(-0.43)	(-0.30)	(-0.42)
Number of cases judged (2006-2016)			0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
			(0.64)	(0.61)	(0.62)	(0.59)
Unemployment EZ employee (percent)					-0.0	0.0
					(-0.02)	(0.11)
President female * Unemployment EZ employee					-0.0	-0.0
					(-1.08)	(-1.27)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	8211	8211	8211	8211	8211	8211

Notes: Case-level controls are those displayed in Table 1 in addition to a dummy for missing employment in columns 5-6 - average employment variables were imputed in case of missing employment data. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

6 Conclusion

In conclusion, this study provides novel causal evidence that the gender of the presiding judge has a significant effect on compensation awards in unfair dismissal cases in French labor courts. Female presiding judges are more likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs, awarding higher compensation compared to their male counterparts. These results can contribute to the broader debate on gender parity in the legal profession. They suggest enhancing gender parity at the top levels of the judiciary could help ensure that judicial decisions more accurately reflect the diversity of society.

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