# Interviews*

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**Abstract**

Job interviews serve a clear function for employers to learn about workers, but do they also allow workers to learn about firms? Studying 1.5 million interview reports from Glassdoor, we present clear evidence they do. In particular, candidates for high-paying jobs increasingly turn down offers when they perceived the interviews were easy. Easy interviews appear to convey poor fit, as those who ultimately accept offers after easy interviews tend to be less satisfied with their jobs and separate from the firm sooner. Content analysis of interview narratives using a large language model suggests difficult interviews convey the ability of future colleagues, a productive amenity for accumulating human capital. In turn, interviewees who are likely to sort into high-skill professions respond more to easy interviews. Our results highlight, in the face of recent developments toward algorithmic recruiting, a job interview is an informative signal for all workers.

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# 1 Introduction

Moving outside models and into real-world interactions, it is hard to imagine a more ubiquitous feature of the labor market than the job interview. Almost every worker, regardless of age or experience, has had many interviews, including for many roles they did not take on. Notwithstanding their prevalence and relevance, the *worker's* perspective on interviews is largely unexplored, especially in economics. Can job interviews affect workers' perceptions of the hiring employers? Will workers make high stakes decisions, such as which job offer to accept, based on such information? These are basic questions that remain understudied.

In personnel economics (e.g. Oyer and Schaefer, 2011), interviews are a part of a firm's response to the problem of distinguishing between workers during the recruitment process. Workers may appear similar on paper but differ in unobservables, which may be measured during interviews. Less attention has been given, however, to the worker's information problem: choosing amongst firms that appear similar but differ in hard-to-observe ways. Such differences could reflect, for instance, corporate culture, interpersonal relations, or high-performance work systems, such as on-the-job training.[1] If workers care about these externally opaque non-wage aspects of jobs (Wiswall and Zafar, 2017; Sockin, 2022; Maestas *et al.*, 2023), then processes that provide prospective jobseekers with information on these aspects should affect labor supply decisions. Indeed, previous work has shown that reputation systems that provide additional information on experience-based aspects of jobs can influence labor market sorting (e.g., Benson *et al.*, 2019; Ward, 2022; Sockin and Sojourner, 2023).

Does the interview experience give workers an informative glimpse into the workplaces they might join? To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence to say one way or another. Using new data on 1.5 million interview reports from Glassdoor, we fill this gap in the literature and advance our understanding on the link between workers' interview experiences and their labor market outcomes. Each interview report is connected to detailed metadata about the prospective firm and the candidate worker, including sector and experience. For each interview report, we observe whether the worker received a job offer and if they ultimately chose to accept the

[1] Since such attributes typically cannot be assessed before joining the firm, a job is intrinsically more akin to an experience good than an inspection good (Nelson, 1970). Menzio and Shi (2011) show that modeling jobs as experience goods as opposed to inspection goods can better explain cyclical labor market dynamics.

position or turn it down. We also observe the level of difficulty each worker assessed their interview as being, which we show serves an important information function for learning about prospective employers. Further, workers include a free-text response characterizing the interview experience, allowing us to explore mechanisms by using a large language model (LLM) to conduct text analysis.

Our descriptive evidence shows that a worker's own perception of interview difficulty is related to both short- and long-term labor market outcomes. We first focus on short-term outcomes, such as job offer acceptance or rejection. There is a remarkable asymmetry in the response to perceived interview difficulty: high-paying jobs are likely to be rejected after easy interviews while low-paying jobs are more likely to be rejected after difficult interviews. These patterns arise both within and between industries and occupations, and are robust to a variety of specifications, such as fixing the worker's choice set or the job vacancy's hiring set. The increase in the likelihood of rejecting a high-paying job after an easy interview is especially pronounced among workers with high marks in university or when the interview process included a coding exercise — both scenarios in which human capital development or career concerns may be especially relevant. We also document a particularly large effect when the interview involved remote interviewing via Zoom — a scenario in which the interview process may play an especially pronounced role in gauging workplace amenities.

We next focus on long-term outcomes, in particular the length of workers' employment spells, to test whether the interview process — a potential ex ante signal of match quality — is predictive of ex post labor market outcomes. Looking at workers' job histories as recorded on their resumes, we are able to link interview experiences to the jobs workers took on if they accepted the offer. More difficult interviews appear to convey better "fit" for job seekers, as those who ultimately accepted offers following easy interviews separated from their firms sooner. Workers who accept offers after easy interviews exhibit 7-14% shorter tenure, even when looking within the same job title for the same firm. Put differently, workers who accept easy interviews are 2–5 percentage points less likely to be still employed in the same job.

Why are easy interviews associated with lower firm tenure? On one hand, it could be that such workers are less productive so they are laid off earlier. On the other hand, workers might voluntarily exit sooner to pursue other opportunities. Studying 6.5 million Glassdoor reviews, we find evidence consistent with the latter; in that workers appear comparatively less satisfied with their jobs after easy interviews. Workers

who accept offers after easy interviews exhibit 0.4–0.6 stars lower satisfaction with their jobs. At 30–40 percent of a standard deviation, this discount in reported job satisfaction is remarkable. For context, it is larger than the effect of learning your employer engaged in corporate misconduct (Gadgil and Sockin, 2020) or received an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Zhou and Makridis, 2021).

An economically relevant component of job satisfaction is how much one learns on the job. The human capital that one accrues in learning from peers, i.e., peer effects (Herbst and Mas, 2015), is helpful both now and in the future. We formally test whether perceptions of human capital development are a driving mechanism behind our results by turning to the interview descriptions job seekers provide with their interview reports. In particular, we use a LLM to conduct content analysis to determine whether workers have the perception of the employees at the hiring firm being of high ability. For high-wage workers, more difficult interviews tend to inform workers that their prospective colleagues are more able and more intelligent. Interviews thus enable learning about this critical, yet hard-to-observe ex ante, component of jobs with long-term career consequences.

This work contributes to three strands of the literature in economics. The first is the empirical literature on the implications of real-world interviews for workers and firms. Interviews have been predominantly studied in fields such as organizational decision-making, sociology, and psychology, with methods ranging from lab experiments to qualitative surveys (Highhouse, 2008; Dana *et al.*, 2013; Rivera, 2012, 2015).[2] Studies in such fields have highlighted the potential for interviews to result in hiring disparities along socioeconomic status or their tendency to detract from the hiring process by adding extraneous, non-diagnostic information on candidates that do not predict ultimate performance. In economics, a recent study of entry-level recruitment at top multinational firms shows subjective, open-ended interviews affords employers the opportunity to discriminate against minorities (Shukla, 2024). To the best of our knowledge, no study prior has considered the worker's perception of the interview experience, in particular its difficulty level. This paper is the first to show workers' labor supply decisions, with regards to both initial sorting and job tenure thereafter, are affected by the interview experience itself.

[2]While there is indirect evidence in economics related to job acceptance or rejection, e.g., by gender for recent college graduates (Cortes *et al.*, 2024), there is little direct evidence.

The second is a literature on the importance of non-wage job attributes for workers' labor supply decisions, especially among those who are high-skilled. A recent body of work has highlighted that workers would be willing to take a pay cut to enjoy a variety of workplace amenities, including for instance, having workplace flexibility (Chen *et al.*, 2019), pursuing an individual research agenda (Stern, 2004), working in a startup environment (Roach and Sauermann, Forthcoming), and avoiding sexual harassment (Folke and Rickne, 2022), frequent deadlines (Nagler *et al.*, 2023), and unanticipated work schedules (Mas and Pallais, 2017). Maestas *et al.* (2023) estimate that workers would value a shift from the worst-amenity to the best-amenity job as much as a 55 percent wage increase. Workers, particularly high-wage ones, will sort into workplaces that align with their preferences over job attributes, including corporate social responsibility (Hedblom *et al.*, 2019), the frequency of social interactions (Krueger and Schkade, 2008), and political alignment (Adrjan *et al.*, 2023). Our paper shows that an important channel through which workers can learn about such non-wage amenities (e.g., the ability of potential peers) is the job interview.

The third strand of literature is how workers respond to the revelation of information relevant to their current or future job search. Benson *et al.* (2019), for instance, show that highly-rated employers receive increased labor supply after a reputation system was introduced on an online labor market platform (MTurk), while Sockin and Sojourner (2023) show that improved Glassdoor ratings increase applications to small firms. Further, Ward (2022) finds that presenting jobseekers with workplace happiness scores induces workers to sort away from companies with below-average levels of happiness, while Turban and Cable (2003) show that firms included on "best places to work" lists attract more applicants. This paper adds interviews to the list of modalities through which such information can be revealed to workers.

## 2 Data

Our data on job interviews come from the website Glassdoor, which is an online labor market platform where workers can go to learn about the pay, job satisfaction, or interview experiences that other visitors to the website have disclosed. Workers can learn about these labor market dimensions for jobs at their own firm or at other firms. Visitors to the website are incentivized to contribute through a give-to-get mechanism (which expires and needs to be readdressed annually) whereby they gain access to the

information others have provided once they themselves contribute.[3] Workers can satisfy the give-to-get requirement by submitting one of four surveys: a pay report, an employer review, a fringe benefits rating, or an interview experience. Although we will incorporate data from the pay reports and employer reviews, our primary focus is on interview experiences. Workers and firms in the Glassdoor database are assigned unique identifiers, allowing for the linking together of these different surveys if workers have provided more than one.

When providing an interview experience, workers are first asked for their employer and job title. They can also provide the location in which the interview took place but this is not required. Since this survey is a summary of their interview experience, workers are asked: whether they had a positive, neutral, or negative experience overall, to provide a free-response description of the interview process, and to recall any particular interview questions they were asked. Workers are also asked the difficulty level of the interview, to which they can respond very easy, easy, average, difficult, or very difficult. We translate this measure of difficulty into a 1-5 integer scale, which is increasing in difficulty. Critically for our purposes, respondents state whether they received an offer for the job in question, and if they did, whether they chose to accept or reject it. Respondents also have the option to describe a number of additional aspects of the interview process, including how they received the interview (e.g., an employee referral[4]), how long the interview process took, when the interview occurred, the form the interview took (e.g., a phone discussion), and any testing that occurred (e.g., personality test, drug test). Appendix Figures A1 and A2 provide snapshots from a sample submission form for submitting an interview experience on Glassdoor.

For each job interview, we unfortunately do not observe the posted wage of the vacancy for which the interview is being conducted. However, to obtain an approximate wage for the job corresponding to each interview, we turn to Glassdoor pay reports. For each job title at each firm, we calculate the mean base pay among workers in the pay data; then, since we observe the firm and job title for each interview, we merge in these firm-job title specific averages. We believe these averages from Glassdoor pay data are reasonable proxies for the posted wages for two reasons.

[3]This give-to-get mechanism has been found to reduce selection bias in accumulating extreme responses when it comes to job satisfaction (Marinescu *et al.*, 2021).

[4]Workers who are referred to a vacancy may enter with different expectations about the firm and its amenities. For instance, Hampole *et al.* (2023) find that female MBA students are more likely to learn about female-friendly firms when their social network is comprised of more females.

First, Marinescu and Wolthoff (2020) show that job titles explain more than 90% of the variance in the midpoints of the wage ranges firms advertise in their vacancies. Second, Glassdoor data have been found to be representative when disaggregated between industries (Karabarbounis and Pinto, 2018), occupations (Gibson, 2021), and industry-occupation pairs (Sockin, 2022). Through this process, we are able to impute a wage estimate for 865,000 interviews. The distribution of interviews by imputed base pay is depicted in Appendix Figure B3. Evidently, both low- and high-paying jobs are represented in Glassdoor interviews.

To avoid concerns regarding negative selection into the sample of interviews we observe, we exclude about one-third of interviews for which the worker did not ultimately receive a job offer. Therefore, every interview we study is for a worker who received an offer from the firm. Limiting our sample to interviews that were conducted between 2008 and 2023 (necessarily excluding any interviews for which the date of the interview was not provided), we arrive at 1.5 million interview experiences, all of which resulted in job offers. Summary statistics regarding characteristics of the interviews are available in panel A of Table A1. In our sample, about 15 percent of offers are rejected and 85 percent are accepted. The distribution of interviews by two-digit NAICS industry is provided in Appendix Figure B2. The most represented industry is professional, scientific, and technical services (24%), followed by retail (15%), and finance and insurance (11%).

Still, one may be concerned that the interview experiences we do observe are selected in a particular way. This could include along dimensions such as the productivity of the job seeker or the sentiment the job seeker felt after the interview. Leaning on Glassdoor pay reports and employer reviews, we find little evidence for selection along at least these two dimensions. With regards to job seeker productivity, when we compare the distribution of worker fixed effects — obtained from an AKM specification on log wages — in the matched interviews sample to those in the full collection of Glassdoor pay reports, we find remarkable similarity between the two (Appendix Figure C1). With regards to job seeker sentiment, when we compare the distribution of job satisfaction ratings in the matched interviews sample to those in the full sample of employer reviews, we find they exhibit highly similar distributions. Thus, our interviews sample does not appear selected negatively or positively along the wage or sentiment distributions.

We also observe a number of demographic variables for subsets of interviewees.

For those who provided their demographic information when creating a profile on Glassdoor, we observe their gender and/or age. We observe gender for 650,000 and age for 340,000 interviewees. For workers who also provide a resume to Glassdoor, we additionally observe their educational background. This includes their major of study, for which we assign a STEM or non-STEM degree code.[5] Educational background also includes their university of study, from which we can ascertain whether the worker attended university outside the United States, and college graduate quality, as measured by Martellini *et al.* (2024), for their undergraduate alma mater. We also observe whether workers received a post-Bachelor's degree, and for some, their undergraduate grade point average (GPA). In summary, we observe educational resumes for 500,000 interviews, of which we observe college graduate quality for 415,000, the major of study for 360,000, and GPA for 64,000. Summary statistics for these demographics are available in panel B of Table A1.

## 3 Variation in Interview Experience and its Predictors

When it comes to the interview experience itself, the clearest barometer we have is the interview difficulty workers assigned their interviews. Among our sample of 1.5 million offers, the average difficulty level was 2.44; put differently, about 46 percent of respondents assessed their interviews as being easy or very easy (Appendix Table A1). In fact, looking at the distribution of responses across the five difficulty levels reveals that less than 10 percent considered their interviews to be difficulty or very difficult (Appendix Figure A3). Of course, workers who did not receive offers likely perceived their interviews to be more difficult; indeed, while this is true, even when we incorporate interviews that did not result in offers, still only about 15 percent of interviews were considered difficult or very difficult.

Does "interview difficulty" differ in meaning though between workers? While we find evidence that it does, we also find it does seem to capture some notion of difficulty. For instance, we can perform an internal validation exercise by comparing our subjective interview difficulty measure to the free-text response workers provide describing their interview experience. Very simply, we identify whether the job seeker mentions the word "easy" in their description. When we plot the fraction of interviews

[5]STEM majors include biological sciences, engineering, physical sciences, and technology, whereas non-STEM majors include arts and humanities, business, communication, education, health service, social sciences, and social service.

that mention "easy" by the numeric difficulty score, we do find that job seekers who rate the interview experience numerically as being very easy or easy (i.e., a rating of one or two), more often mention "easy" in their free-response text (Appendix Figure E1). In fact, one-quarter of interviews rated as being very easy mention "easy" in their summaries.


At the same time though, there are observable differences that suggest interview difficulty does not necessarily capture "difficulty", at least for low-wage workers. Here, we consider the *polarity*[6] of the Glassdoor text reviews to see if there are differences in the sentiment of the language workers use to write their interview summaries by the difficulty rating they supply. When we look between low- and high-wage workers, we find that low-wage workers use more (negatively) charged speech when they describing a difficult or very difficult interview compared with high-wage workers when they describe difficult or very difficult interviews (Appendix Figure E4). In this sense, what constitutes difficult or very difficult may indeed differ between low- and high-wage workers, which aids to motivate our sample partition in to low- and high-wage jobs in Section 4. Perhaps a difficult interview is more about how uncomfortable the experience was for low-wage worker, whereas for high-wage workers it might correspond to how intellectually challenging the experience was. We later explore this dichotomy further by analyzing the themes embedded in the free-response text.

Having seen that there is variation in self-reported interview experience and possibly also in what a given experience might mean for a worker, we explore which characteristics predict variation in interview experience. Since interviews impose an opportunity cost on recruiters and workers, a natural starting point is the time it takes to conduct an interview. The mean interview process takes about three weeks (20 days), whereas the median interview lasts about two weeks (14 days). Figure 1 shows two clear patterns. First, at any point of the wage distribution, interview difficulty and duration are positively correlated. Second, for any given level of interview difficulty, interview duration is increasing in the wage of the job posting. Among the highest paying jobs, very easy interviews take about 25 days to complete compared to very difficult interviews that take about 50 days. Among the lowest paying jobs, very easy interviews take about 5 days to complete compared to very difficult interviews that take about 30 days.

Clearly, interview duration is an important determinant of interview difficulty but

[6]This measure is obtained using the *Textblob* module in Python.

**Figure 1:** Interview Difficulty and Duration of Interview Process




Notes: Figure 1 reflects a binscatter for the number of days the interview process takes the worker's perception of how difficult was the interview process.

how much of the variation in interview difficulty does it explain? Table 1 shows that including the length of the interview duration explains only about 11% of the variation in interview difficulty. Adding firm and job title fixed effects explains about 45% of this variation. Therefore, almost 55% of the variation in interview difficulty is not explained by what is being hired for. The last two columns show that about 65% of the variation in interview difficulty is worker-specific and 75% of the variation is worker- and firm-specific. Therefore, about 25% of the variation in interview difficulty remains unexplained even after controlling worker and firm fixed effects.

**Table 1:** Variation in Interview Difficulty Between Jobs, Firms, and Job Seekers

| | Interview difficulty on 1-to-5 scale | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Log length of interview duration | 0.243*** | 0.146*** | 0.133*** | 0.106*** | | |
| | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.002) | | |
| $R^2$ | 0.117 | 0.279 | 0.303 | 0.369 | 0.647 | 0.764 |
| Job title FE | | ✓ | | ✓ | | |
| Firm FE | | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Job seeker FE | | | | | ✓ | ✓ |

Notes: Table 1 records the share of the variation ($R^2$) in interview difficulty (on a 1-to-5 scale) under varying fixed effects models. Each regression also includes year-quarter fixed effects. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

As with interview duration, worker characteristics and cumulative interviewing experience are natural candidates for potentially salient predictors of interview difficulty.

In contrast with interview duration, however, these other characteristics, conditional on the firm and job title, despite being correlated with interview difficulty, explain little of the remaining variation (Appendix Table E1). For example, a one standard deviation increase in college graduate quality increases the probability of rating the interview as easy by only 1 percentage point. Similarly, knowing whether the job seeker is male or a female provides little-to-no additional predictive power for interview difficulty. Additionally, one might think that interview difficulty is related to a worker's own cumulative experience with interviewing. While interviews do get more difficult over the life cycle — since workers eventually interview for increasingly higer-wage jobs — we find no evidence for this conditional on the job, suggesting little "learning by doing" with regards to interview difficulty (Appendix Table E2).


## 4 Who Rejects Job Offers?

While we observe an overall offer rejection rate of 15 percent, there may be significant heterogeneity between different cross-sections of workers. One particularly salient aspect along which we would expect workers to vary in their rates of offer rejections is the wage that would be received from accepting the offer. But, the predictions here are not obvious. Since job seekers increasingly apply to job vacancies that advertise greater posted wages (Marinescu and Wolthoff, 2020), one might expect workers to accept high-wage offers at greater rates. On the other hand, firms may invest more resources screening out workers for high-wage jobs (since their marginal revenue products of labor will be greater), such that low-wage workers receive more offers and subsequently have to make more rejections. Moreover, for high-wage roles, there may be more diffuse expectations ex ante over the wage, i.e., options for bargaining, such that high-wage workers can be more surprised on the downside and subsequently reject offers more frequently.

To this end, we plot in panel (a) of Figure 2 the fraction of job offers that are rejected by the estimated wage offer for the vacancy. Recall that since we do not observe the advertised or promised wage for each individual offer, our measure of the wage for each vacancy is the mean wage observed among Glassdoor pay reports for the offer's same industry and job title. Evidently, among our sample of job offers, high-wage offers are rejected increasingly often compared with low-wage offers. While the lowest-paying jobs witness offer rejection rates of around 8 percent, the highest-

**Figure 2:** Probability of Rejecting an Offer by Wage of Vacancy and Demographics

**(a)** Full sample **(b)** By gender **(c)** By age





Notes: Figure 2 reflects a binscatter for the fraction of offers that are rejected by the logarithm of the imputed wage of the vacancy. Imputed wage reflects the average pay among Glassdoor pay reports for the given firm and job title.

paying jobs experience offer rejection rates of around 20 percent. Clearly, the decision to accept or reject an offer is not the same between low- and high-wage jobs.

A natural question is whether there are differences in offer acceptance rates across the wage distribution by observable characteristics of the interviewees. Although we do not observe demographics for all job seekers, we do observe age and/or gender for some. In panel (b), we again consider the offer rejection rate across the wage distribution but separately for male and female job seekers. We observe the same upward sloping relation for both men and women though, across the wage distribution, women are on average about 3 percentage points less likely to reject an offer; this is true both for the lowest- and highest-paying jobs. In panel (c), we consider differences in rejection rates across the wage distribution by whether job seekers are younger or older than 30 years of age. Both younger and older workers are more likely to reject higher-paying offers than lower-paying ones. Interestingly, the difference between the two is not constant over the wage distribution. While older workers are more likely to reject offers for low-wage jobs, younger workers are more likely to reject those for medium- and high-wage jobs.

While the wage is an important feature of workers' labor supply decisions, it is pinned down in our analysis by the industry and job title of the vacancy — both features workers will know before undergoing the interview (Marinescu and Wolthoff, 2020). To determine whether the interview process itself has any implications for workers' offer acceptance decisions, we next consider whether the degree of difficulty workers perceived the interview to be is associated with differential offer acceptance rates. Although we partition interviews according to the vacancy's imputed wage,

**Figure 3:** Probability of Rejecting a Job Offer by Wage and Interview Difficulty




Notes: Figure 3 reflects a binscatter for the fraction of offers that are rejected by the logarithm of the imputed wage of the vacancy and the worker's perception of how difficult was the interview process. Imputed wage reflects the average pay among Glassdoor pay reports for the given firm and job title.

the results are similar if we were to consider other ordinal rankings of vacancies and interviews according to other proxies of match productivity, e.g., the worker's wage-specific differential, the firm's wage-specific premium, or the college graduate quality of the job seeker's alma mater (Appendix Figure E7). In Figure 2, we plot the offers rejection rate for different wage levels separately for each of the five perceived levels of interview difficulty: very easy, easy, average, difficult, and very difficult. As is evident, we observe that offer rejection rates do differ depending on the perceived difficulty level of the interview. Three takeaway patterns emerge.

First, offers for high-wage jobs are more likely to be rejected if the interview was considered to be relatively easy. For jobs at the upper end of the wage distribution, interviews that are considered (very) easy witness rejection rates upwards of 20 percent, whereas those that are considered (very) difficulty see rejection rates closer to 12–15 percent. Interviews that are considered of average difficulty experience rejection rates somewhere in between. Second, on the opposite and lower end of the wage spectrum, job offers for low-wage jobs are more likely to be rejected when interviews are perceived to be (very) difficult. After very difficult interviews especially, low-wage offers witness rejection rates upwards of 30 percent. Third, difficult interviews appear to be the "sweet" spot. Through the middle and upper thirds of the wage distribution, job offers are rejected with the lowest frequency when the job seeker perceives

the interview to have been difficult. Indeed, job seekers report the lowest incidence of dissatisfaction (i.e., a "thumbs-down" for rating the overall experience) with interviews for high-wage jobs when those interviews were perceived as being average or difficult (Appendix Figure E2).

While we observe these three patterns in the aggregate, they may not necessarily reflect differences across the wage distribution but rather differences between segments of the labor market; for instance, by industry or occupation, as it is well documented that there is wage dispersion between the former (e.g., Krueger and Summers, 1988) and latter (e.g., Autor and Handel, 2013). To understand whether this relation — of higher-paying jobs being increasingly rejected after easy interviews — is observed across industries and occupations, we take the following three steps. We create an indicator variable for the worker perceiving the interview as (very) easy, estimate the difference in the probability an offer is rejected when this indicator is active (through regression analysis) separately for each industry and each occupation, and then plot the resulting coefficients against the average wage in that industry or occupation. The two scatter plots, presented in Appendix Figure E3, show that higher-paying jobs have higher rejection rates following easy interviews across industries and occupations. Workers in higher-paying occupations, such as managers and finance professionals, are more likely to reject perceived-to-be-easy interviews than lower-paying occupations, such as food preparation and sales; the same is true between higher-paying industries, such as professional, scientific, and technical services, and lower-paying ones, such as retail.

To formalize the relations shown in Figure 3, and to determine whether these patterns are also observed within industries and occupations, we turn to a fixed effects analysis. Formally, we estimate

$$\begin{aligned} 1(\text{Accepts})_{i,k,t} = \beta 1(\text{Easy interview})_{i,k,t} + \gamma 1(\text{Easy interview})_{i,k,t} 1(w_{j(i,k,t),k} \geq \bar{W}) \\ + \psi 1(w_{j(i,k,t),k} \geq \bar{W}) + \lambda_{s(k)} + \lambda_{o(i,k,t)} + \lambda_{t,\tau(i,k,t)} + \varepsilon_{i,k,t} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $1(\text{Accepts})_{i,k,t}$ is an indicator worker $i$ accepted the offer from firm $k$ after being interviewed in calendar month $t$, $1(w_{j(i,k,t),k} \geq \bar{W})$ is an indicator for whether the imputed wage of the vacancy (based on pay reports for firm $k$ and job title $j(i,k,t)$) is above the sample average $\bar{W}$, and $\lambda_s(k)$ and $\lambda_{o(i,k,t)}$ are fixed effects for firm $k$'s industry and the job's occupation, respectively. To account for possible bias

in the recollection of the interview experience over time (since interviews are reported retroactively), $\lambda_{t,\tau(i,k,t)}$ are fixed effects for the calendar month of the interview $t$ cross the calendar month the interview was submitted on Glassdoor $\tau(i,k,t)$.[7] (About one-half of interviews are submitted to Glassdoor in the same calendar quarter that the interview process began). The results for the full sample, presented in row 1 of Table 2, affirm the patterns documented in Figure 3 materialize within industry and occupation. While low-wage offers are accepted 0.5 percentage point more often following an easy interview, high-wage offers are 5.1 percentage points more likely to be rejected if the interview was easy. Given a mean offer rejection rate of about 13%, a 5.1-percentage-points wedge constitutes a non-trivial increase in the rate at which offers are rejected.

We recognize though that the Glassdoor sample is not representative in that it skews toward young workers (Appendix Figure B1) in higher-paying industries (Appendix Figure B2). To show the composition of our sample is not driving this result, we take representative weights from the American Community Survey (ACS) such that re-weighing our sample would reflect U.S. employment by industry, occupation, sex, and metropolitan area. If we were to consider the sample for whom we have those characteristics (row 2). and apply these representative weights (row 3), we still conclude high-wage offers are more likely to be rejected following an easy interview.

### 4.1 Robustness Across Types of Job Seekers

Why do workers reject offers from high-wage jobs after an easy interview? One way we can get at the answer to this question is by investigating whether this phenomenon is driven by or has a sharper bite among some subsets of the population. In the remainder of Table A1, we re-estimate this regression for different classifications of workers based on their demographics, work history, or interview experience.

We begin with demographics. Both women (row 4) and men (row 5) increasingly reject high-wage offers following easy interviews. Workers throughout the lifecycle — ages 18–24 (row 6), 25–39 (row 7), and 40–65 (row 8) — are more likely to do so as

[7] Individuals may potentially have rosier or murkier memories of an interview if it happened in the past, especially if they did not accept the offer. Moreover, if a worker accepted the offer, their interview experience summary may be clouded by experiences on the job since then. Indeed, there are perceptible differences for those who submit reviews after more time has past since the interview (Appendix Figure E6). Those who accepted an offer are significantly more likely to write the interview was easy, those who rejected it that it was difficult.

**Table 2:** Interview Difficulty and Offer Acceptance for Different Subsets of Workers

| | | | 1(Easy interview) | | 1(Easy interview) x 1(High wage job) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interview sample | N | Acceptance rate | Coefficient | Standard error | Coefficient | Standard error |
| 1. Full sample | 779264 | 0.866 | 0.005*** | (0.002) | -0.051*** | (0.003) |
| 2. Sample with representative weights | 182284 | 0.910 | -0.001 | (0.002) | -0.036*** | (0.004) |
| 3. Applying representative weights | 182284 | 0.910 | 0.001 | (0.003) | -0.021*** | (0.005) |
| 4. Women | 185920 | 0.908 | 0.005** | (0.002) | -0.041*** | (0.004) |
| 5. Men | 170291 | 0.889 | -0.006*** | (0.002) | -0.042*** | (0.004) |
| 6. Age 18–24 | 70185 | 0.897 | 0.000 | (0.003) | -0.063*** | (0.006) |
| 7. Age 25–39 | 90067 | 0.888 | -0.006* | (0.003) | -0.040*** | (0.005) |
| 8. Age 40–65 | 25765 | 0.898 | 0.001 | (0.006) | -0.027*** | (0.008) |
| 9. Degree in a STEM field | 60496 | 0.854 | -0.001 | (0.005) | -0.055*** | (0.007) |
| 10. Degree in a non-STEM field | 128097 | 0.880 | -0.004 | (0.003) | -0.047*** | (0.004) |
| 11. University with above-average CGQ | 105227 | 0.849 | 0.001 | (0.004) | -0.064*** | (0.006) |
| 12. University with below-average CGQ | 112696 | 0.891 | -0.005* | (0.003) | -0.040*** | (0.004) |
| 13. Above average university GPA | 15530 | 0.840 | 0.017* | (0.009) | -0.090*** | (0.013) |
| 14. Below average university GPA | 14022 | 0.858 | -0.010 | (0.008) | -0.038*** | (0.014) |
| 15. Attended a foreign university | 17116 | 0.838 | -0.013 | (0.011) | -0.069*** | (0.014) |
| 16. Obtained a post-Bachelor's degree | 34912 | 0.858 | -0.014** | (0.007) | -0.032*** | (0.008) |
| 17. Received interview through university | 42594 | 0.822 | -0.019** | (0.010) | -0.038*** | (0.011) |
| 18. Has resume experience in occupation | 83377 | 0.875 | 0.004 | (0.004) | -0.051*** | (0.005) |
| 19. Interview during on-the-job search | 53997 | 0.911 | 0.005 | (0.003) | -0.033*** | (0.005) |
| 20. Would likely constitute a pay raise | 29993 | 0.908 | 0.002 | (0.004) | -0.054*** | (0.007) |
| 21. Would likely constitute a pay cut | 18669 | 0.898 | -0.001 | (0.006) | -0.062*** | (0.011) |
| 22. Competitive job for receiving an offer | 161808 | 0.800 | -0.026*** | (0.006) | -0.049*** | (0.008) |
| 23. Used Glassdoor to prepare | 220183 | 0.865 | 0.002 | (0.003) | -0.056*** | (0.004) |
| 24. Did not use Glassdoor to prepare | 200177 | 0.923 | 0.005*** | (0.002) | -0.031*** | (0.003) |
| 25. Interview process included HR | 82604 | 0.864 | -0.016*** | (0.004) | -0.033*** | (0.005) |
| 26. Interview process included manager | 184006 | 0.893 | 0.001 | (0.002) | -0.049*** | (0.004) |
| 27. Interview process included Zoom | 11580 | 0.795 | -0.002 | (0.012) | -0.081*** | (0.018) |
| 28. Interview process included coding | 15309 | 0.782 | 0.014 | (0.019) | -0.091*** | (0.022) |

Notes: Table 2 summarizes the relation between interview difficulty and whether an offer is accepted for low- and high-wage jobs. Each row represents a separate regression in which the sample is restricted to that described in the first column. A high wage job is a vacancy with an imputed wage above the mean for the full sample of interviews. Each specification includes industry, occupation, and year-quarter of interview x year-quarter submitted to Glassdoor fixed effects. Each specification includes an indicator variable for a high wage job, the estimates for which are available upon request. Representative weights match the annual distribution in the American Community Survey by two-digit NAICS industry, two-digit SOC occupation, sex, and metropolitan region. College graduate quality (CGQ) reflects the average human capital among a university's graduates from Martellini *et al.* (2024). Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

well, with the coefficient for the former more than twice as large as that for the latter. For workers who provide a resume to Glassdoor (which they would do when creating a profile, presumably for fostering job search), we observe their educational background. Workers who received a STEM degree (row 9), as well as those that received a non-STEM degree (row 10), are more likely to reject offers for high-wage jobs following easy interviews. Next, we partition workers according to whether the college graduate quality of their undergraduate alma mater (Martellini *et al.*, 2024) is above (row 11) or below (row 12) the sample average. Again, we observe this phenomenon for both

groups. For those workers who include the GPA they achieved at their alma mater, we can partition the sample into those with GPAs above (row 13) or below (row 14) the sample average. Though we observe this pattern for both groups, the reduction in acceptance probability is more than twice as large for high-achieving graduates. We also consider whether the worker attended university in another country (row 15), recognizing that college graduates who migrate to the United States are highly positively selected on unobserved ability (Martellini *et al.*, 2024). Migrants evidently are also more likely to reject a high-wage offer if the interview was perceived to be easy. Last, we identify workers who received a post-Bachelor's degree (row 16), for whom we also observe this pattern.

We next consider the context in which these interviews occurred. In the interview report, workers disclose how they received the interview. Recent college graduates — who received the interview through their universities — likely have little experience with hiring and thus on what to expect from the interview process. For such workers (row 17), we find higher rates of rejection for high-wage offers following easy interviews. Conversely, workers who have had past experience in the occupation for which they are interviewing — which we observe from their resumes — while exhibiting relatively low rates of rejection overall, also exhibit this pattern (row 18). Continuing with the use of worker's resumes, since we observe the start and end dates for each job listed, we can also determine whether the job seeker underwent the interview while still employed with a different firm, i.e., during on-the-job search. For these workers as well (row 19), despite the quite low rates at which offers are rejected, we document the same relation with easy interviews. Narrowing in on the jobs that workers had on their resumes just before these interviews, we can approximate their current wage at the time of the interview by imputing the wage for that firm and job title. Comparing these imputed wages with those for the interviewed jobs offers samples of workers for whom we can reasonably infer these job offers would have constituted pay raises or pay cuts. For both the former (row 20) and the latter (row 21), high-wage offers are more likely to be rejected after an easy interview.

Whether a worker chooses to accept or reject a job offer may also reflect how competitive it is to receive such an offer, especially if the workers experiences a warm glow from accomplishing a difficult task. From a scarcity perspective, competitive offers are harder to obtain and so it would be reasonable to assume they are more valuable. To proxy for the competitiveness of receiving an offer, we revisit interview reports

where the job seekers stated they did not receive an offer and calculate the fraction of interviews that resulted in an offer for each firm-job title pair (Appendix Figure A4). Perhaps not surprisingly, conditional on being interviewed, high-wage offers are more competitive to receive. Labeling vacancies as more competitive if the probability of receiving an offer is below the sample median, we find in row 22 that high-wage offers are still more often rejected after easy interviews even whey they are more difficult to obtain. We also recognize that workers may use others' Glassdoor interview reports to prepare or calibrate expectations for their own interviews. Regardless, those who studied others' reports (row 23) and those who did not (row 24) were more likely to reject a high-wage offer after an easy interview.

Last, we consider aspects of the interview process itself. Who the job seeker interviews with may influence their perceptions of the workplace and the decision to accept or reject. Whereas interviews with an HR representative may offer little insight into the workplace, interviews with a manager might provide deeper insight into the day-to-day operations, or illuminate the interpersonal relations within the office.[8] Whether it is an HR representative (row 25) or a manager (row 26), job seekers are again more likely to reject high-wage offers following easy interviews. Given the rise of remote work during the Covid-19 pandemic, we also consider whether the interview involved online video interaction (over Zoom). Online interviews seemingly make it difficult for candidates to acutely gauge workplace amenities and allow less scope to interact with the workplace, e.g., colleagues in the office. Consequently, one might lean on the interview process even more to gauge such aspects. Among those whose interviews involved Zoom (row 27), interviews for high-paying jobs that were perceived to be easy witnessed 8-percentage-points higher rejection rates. Finally, we identify whether the job seeker mentioned having had a coding exercise in their interview process. Coding interviews likely provide a barometer for the tasks and skills that would be required on the job. Among interviews for high-paying jobs that involved coding, easy interviews are rejected 9-percentage-points more often (row 28).

In sum, regardless of the sub-sample, a high-paying job is more likely to be rejected by a job seeker if they experienced an easy interview.

[8]We observe whether or not a job seeker interviewed with human resources or with a manager by identifying whether the worker mentioned the phrases "HR" or "manager" in their free-response description of the interview process.

### 4.2 Same Worker's Choice Set

Our analysis thus far has focused on the cross-section of workers in our sample, effectively comparing the decision to accept or reject a low- or high-wage offer after an easy- or not-so-easy interview between workers. The cross-sectional nature though invites the possibilities that our results reflect the selection of job seekers who accepted an offer and disclosed the decision on Glassdoor, considered their interviews to be easy, or both. One way to address this concern would be to observe whether the perceived difficulty of the interview affects the decision to accept or reject an offer for the *same* worker. Even still, looking at offer decisions for the same worker over time may conflate changes in labor market conditions, preferences, or experience with perceived interview difficulty. Thankfully, in our data, we observe a subset of workers who report having received multiple offers from different employers during the same calendar quarter. It is this group of workers that we turn our attention to next.

We observe about 18,600 interview reports for workers who received more than offer in the same calendar quarter. For this sample, we examine the interplay between an easy interview and the probability of rejecting an offer by re-estimating equation (1) but with the inclusion of worker by calendar quarter fixed effects, $\lambda_{i,t}$. Under this specification, our coefficients of interest are identified off of the same worker's decision between offers of which to reject. Identification is only feasible for workers who experienced both an easy interview and a not-so-easy interview; in other words, what is required is within-worker variation in perceived difficulty — which would assuage concerns that what we have been identifying in the cross-section is possibly differences in reporting functions (of perceived difficulty) rather than realized interview experiences (Bond and Lang, 2019). The results are displayed in Table 3.

Column (1) of Table 3, which excludes the two terms related to whether the job is high-paying, $1(w_{j(i,k,t),k} \geq \bar{W})$, reveals that the same worker is about 13 percentage points more likely to reject an offer if they considered the interview to be easy. Given an average acceptance rate of 63%, such an effect translates into a roughly one-fifth decline in the probability the worker accepts the offer. In column (2), we allow for differential effects by whether job offers a low or high wage, and find that the negative effect of an easy interview is almost entirely concentrated among high-wage jobs. For high-wage openings, the same worker is 20 percentage points more likely to reject an offer following an easy interview. It is worth noting that while higher-paying jobs were increasingly rejected in the cross-section, the coefficient on the standalone

**Table 3:** Probability of Accepting a Job Offer within Worker's Choice Set

| | 1(Accepts job offer) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| 1(Easy interview) | -0.128*** | -0.023 | -0.017 |
| | (0.013) | (0.026) | (0.027) |
| 1(Easy interview) x 1(High wage job) | | -0.203*** | -0.216*** |
| | | (0.038) | (0.040) |
| 1(High wage job) | | 0.156*** | 0.144*** |
| | | (0.034) | (0.036) |
| 1(High FE firm) | | | 0.047** |
| | | | (0.023) |
| Mean DV | 0.633 | 0.668 | 0.667 |
| Observations | 18,574 | 8,099 | 7,714 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.22 | 0.16 | 0.16 |
| Worker-Year-Quarter FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Notes: Table 3 summarizes the relation between the probability an offer is accepted and the workers' perceived difficulty level of the interview process within a worker's choice set. A high FE firm reflects a firm whose AKM fixed effect on the logarithm of pay is above the sample mean. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

indicator for a high wage job here is large and positive — so the same worker is more likely to accept an offer if it promises a higher wage. Last, in column (3), we consider the possibility that workers associate an easy interview with a firm offering being relatively low-paying, despite the advertised job likely being high-paying. To this end, we incorporate an indicator for whether the firm is high-paying based on its fixed effect from an AKM estimation process. While workers are more likely to accept an offer from a high-paying firm, this cannot rationalize the increased rejection rate following easy interviews.

### 4.3 Same Vacancy's Hiring Set

In addition to narrowing in on workers who make choices over multiple offers, we can similarly narrow in on firms' vacancies where multiple offers were extended to different job seekers. Since receiving an offer is a necessary condition for being included in our sample, any of these workers could have on-boarded with the firm; the question we are interested in here is whether the interview experience itself affects which job seekers choose to do so. We observe about 55,000 interview reports from workers who received an offer for the same job title with the same firm located in the same metropolitan

area during the same calendar quarter as another job seeker in the sample.[9]

By fixing the job title, the firm, the location, and the time period, we hold constant attributes that may induce sorting between different employment opportunities — such as wages, tasks, and skill requirements — that are pinned down by these observables. What aspects remain however are related to the job seekers' experiences with the interview process. We examine whether the interview experience relates to decision to reject an offer in this context by re-estimating a version of equation (1) with firm-job title-metropolitan area-calendar quarter fixed effects, $\lambda_{k,j(i,k,t),m(i,k,t),t}$.[10] The results are presented in Table 4.

As in Table 3, we first consider the overall relation between the probability of accepting the offer and whether the interview was easy. We find in column (1) that, even within the same vacancy, job seekers who perceived the interview to be easy are 2.4 percentage points more likely to reject the offer. When we allow for an interaction with whether the job is one that offers a high wage, it becomes clear this decline in offer acceptance rates is concentrated entirely among higher-paying jobs. Following an easy interview, job seekers are 5.1 percentage points more likely to reject an offer. Given a rate of rejection of only 13 percent, this increase in rejection probability is sizable. Evidently, who the firm ends up hiring is more likely to be the job seekers who found the interview to be not so easy.

### 4.4 Subjective or Objective Difficulty of the Interview?

Although we have shown that job seekers increasingly reject high-wage offers after experiencing easy interviews, it remains unclear whether it is an objectively easy interview process itself that discourages a worker from accepting such offers or if it is the worker's perception that the interview process was easy, or both. Whether it is the former or the latter can help disentangle if it is the unappealing aspects of the job itself that everyone observes, or rather its the unappealing aspects of the match between the worker in particular and the job, which not everyone observes — that results in elevated rates of offer rejection.

Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing whether the interviews in our sample

[9] Although we cannot pinpoint whether a set of job seekers applied for the same exact job posting, as the firm may have multiple establishments within the same metropolitan area, given that we condition on the job title, the offered roles should be highly comparable regardless.

[10] With the inclusion of these fixed effects, we can drop the indicator for a high wage job and the fixed effects for occupation, industry, and time, as they would all be redundant.

**Table 4:** Probability of Accepting a Job Offer Across Interviews within a Given Job

| | 1(Accepts job offer) | |
|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) |
| 1(Easy interview) | -0.024*** | -0.000 |
| | (0.006) | (0.007) |
| 1(Easy interview) x 1(High wage job) | | -0.051*** |
| | | (0.012) |
| Mean DV | 0.866 | 0.871 |
| Observations | 54,558 | 48,991 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.19 | 0.17 |
| Firm-Job title-Metro-Quarter FE | ✓ | ✓ |

Notes: Table 4 summarizes the relation between the probability an offer is accepted and the workers' perceived difficulty level of the interview process among interviews conducted for the same job title at the same firm in the same metro within the same year-quarter. A high wage job is defined as a vacancy with an imputed wage above the mean for the full sample of interviews. A long distance hire is a worker currently in a metro different than where the vacancy is located. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.


that were perceived to be easy were in fact easy, or if those deemed to be difficult were in fact difficult. In other words, objective difficulty is unobserved. That said, we can cleverly proxy for objective difficulty by considering the responses of others. Almost tautologically, objectively easy interview processes will generally be perceived as being easy by job seekers. With this in mind, we proxy for an interview's objective difficulty by taking the average reported difficulty level among all workers for each firm-job title pair. Objectively easy interviews should witness lower averages, difficult interviews greater ones.

With this measure of objective difficulty, we can still test whether the worker's own perception of the interview process affects the decision to accept the offer by calculating the relative difficulty level of their interview, i.e., the difference between their own reported difficulty level and the average of others. We then relate both of these measures, objective difficulty level and relative difficulty level, to the probability of rejecting the offer separately for low- and high-wage jobs in Figure 4.[11]

Looking first at objective interview difficulty level in panel (a), we find no clear relation with the decision to reject for high-wage jobs. Whether it is a firm-job title that has a low- or high-average difficulty level, the probability of rejecting a high-wage

[11]We observe similar, and perhaps even starker results, if we were to consider, instead of the distinction between a low- and high-wage job, we split the sample by low- and high-ability workers using each worker's AKM fixed effect (Appendix Figure 4).

**Figure 4:** Probability of Rejecting a Job Offer by Own Perception of Difficulty Compared with Other Job Seekers




**(a)** Difficulty of others **(b)** Relative difficulty to others

Notes: Figure 4 reflects a binscatter for the fraction of offers that are rejected, separately for low-paying and high-paying jobs, by the average interview difficulty reported by others for the same firm-job title pair (panel a) and the difference between one's own interview difficulty and the aforementioned average (panel b). Low- and high-paying jobs reflects that the average pay among Glassdoor pay reports for the given firm and job title is below or above the sample mean, respectively.

offer is similar. For low-wage jobs, however, there does appear to be a positive relation with objective difficulty — suggesting low-wage workers broadly dislike increasingly objectively difficult interview processes. When we consider instead relative difficulty in panel (b), there we observe a negative relation for high-wage jobs. Since relatively easy interviews are on the left-side of x-axis and relatively difficulty ones are on the right-side, we can conclude that relatively easy interviews are rejected between 5 and 10 percentage points more often than relatively difficult interviews. In other words, it is the workers' *own* perceptions themselves that drives the increased rejection rate for high-wage jobs, not the objective interview process itself.

Although we posit that relative interview difficulty level captures an intangible experience specific to each worker, it could be that relative difficulty simply proxies for relative human capital. If workers with high human capital have more experience interviewing or are more skilled, then they may find the same interview process easier than workers with less human capital. We can, however, reasonably rule out this possibility. In Figure E5, we show that relative age of the job seeker and relative work experience based on one's resume have little predictive power for a high-wage worker rejecting the job offer. Thus, relative interview difficulty does not seem to simply proxy for being (observably) over- or under-qualified for the role.

# 5 Potential Mechanisms

## 5.1 Learning About Peers

One interpretation for our results is that interviews are a mechanism for workers to learn about the employer, and in particular to learn about the peers that they will eventually work with. We find that perceived interview difficulty is associated with higher acceptance of the job for high-wage workers, and also more positive sentiment about the interview experience. One reason for this could be is that in difficult interviews, candidates update positively on the ability of their colleagues. That would be valuable to candidates because there could be skill complementarities with high-skill colleagues that make a candidate more productive. It could also be valuable because candidates could learn from high-skill colleagues, gain human capital, and earn a higher wage in better jobs later.

To start to substantiate this idea, we first investigate whether and how prospective colleagues are perceived. Looking to the interview descriptions, we use AI to annotate key dimensions. In particular, we seek a measure of how often candidates highlight the ability of colleagues. For each description, we produce an AI annotation using the following system prompt:

> I will provide you with a text snippet that describes a job interview.
>
> Does the description say that prospective colleagues are highly able, intelligent, or competent? Determine whether the interview description explicitly mentions or strongly implies that colleagues at the employer are of high ability, intelligence, or competence.
>
> Read the description and provide a label "Definitely Yes", "Probably Yes", "Probably Not", "Definitely Not", or "N/A", followed by a semicolon (;) and then a short one-sentence explanation.

We apply the prompt to annotate a sample of 10,000 descriptions using gpt-4o-mini. The sample is constructed with 1000 descriptions per difficulty level (very easy, easy, average, difficult, very difficult) for a high-wage broad sector (professional and technical services) and a low-wage broad sector (retail trade).

We use alternative prompts on the same sample to annotate a number of other dimensions of the interview descriptions. These are listed in Appendix D.1. First,

we include an AI annotation of the sentiment or polarity of the interview description, which turns out to match the previously described measure of polarity and generates similar descriptive results. Further, we tag narratives that highlight colleague pleasantness, processes that were perceived as more or less probing of candidate qualifications, and mentions of wages, hours, and/or workplace amenities. These dimensions are tagged separately and not mutually exclusive.

We have done significant human inspection and qualitative evaluation of the outputs of this system. The annotations and explanations are of very high quality and compare well in the performance to human judgment.

To analyze these dimensions, we construct a binary variable for posts that highlight colleague ability, measured as posts where the response to the above prompt is "Definitely Yes" or "Probably Yes". Based on this definition, 14.4% of posts do so.

We then run regressions where this binary variable is the outcome. The main explanatory variables are "High Wage", corresponding to the job being in professional and technical services, rather than retail trade, "Difficult Interview", corresponding to "Difficult" or "Very Difficult", and the interaction between the two.

The results of this regression are reported in Table 5. The interaction effect between High Wage and Difficult Interview is positive and statistically significant. That is consistent with interview difficulty being a mechanism for candidates to learn about the ability of their colleagues, in particular for high-wage jobs. The significant effect is robust to adding time fixed effects, controls for interview process metadata, and controls for other AI-annotated dimensions of the interview descriptions.

### 5.2 Career Concerns

High-wage workers may especially care, not only about their current opportunity, but also those that are in the future. If workers do have such career concerns in mind, they may place heightened value on skill development and learning on the job. Indeed, in the information technology sector, workers, especially younger ones, value firms that invest in emerging technologies since they can acquire valuable skills and may in turn accept lower wages to have the opportunity to learn (Tambe *et al.*, 2020). In a similar vein, Roach and Sauermann (Forthcoming) show workers employed in startups accept 17 percent lower pay to obtain the non-pecuniary benefits of startup employment, such as being involved in "cutting edge" and "intellectually challenging" work. If a relatively easy interview signals a working environment not conducive to

**Table 5:** Perceived Interview Difficulty Indicates Colleague Skill

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Effect on Perception of High Colleague Ability | | | |
| High Wage | 0.0403*** | 0.0450*** | 0.0596*** | 0.0581*** |
| | (0.00798) | (0.00808) | (0.00817) | (0.00816) |
| Difficult Interview | 0.111*** | 0.111*** | 0.134*** | 0.133*** |
| | (0.00892) | (0.00897) | (0.00923) | (0.00923) |
| High Wage × Difficult | 0.0957*** | 0.0941*** | 0.0819*** | 0.0817*** |
| | (0.0126) | (0.0126) | (0.0126) | (0.0126) |
| Duration | | | 0.000371** | 0.000374** |
| | | | (0.000131) | (0.000131) |
| Rejected | | | -0.0625*** | -0.0617*** |
| | | | (0.0117) | (0.0117) |
| Offer | | | 0.0826*** | 0.0822*** |
| | | | (0.00697) | (0.00696) |
| Colleague Pleasantness | | | | 0.0520 |
| | | | | (0.0378) |
| Directly Assessed | | | | 0.144*** |
| | | | | (0.0344) |
| Mentions Wages | | | | 0.00960 |
| | | | | (0.0565) |
| Mentions Hours | | | | -0.000298 |
| | | | | (0.0539) |
| Good Amenities | | | | 0.237** |
| | | | | (0.0793) |
| Date FE | | X | X | X |
| $N$ | 10000 | 10000 | 10000 | 10000 |
| $R^2$ | 0.079 | 0.090 | 0.104 | 0.106 |

Notes: Regression estimates for high colleague ability (measured from interview descriptions) on indicators for High Wage (meaning from professional and technical services, rather than retail), Difficult Interview (meaning "Difficult" or "Very Difficult"), and their interaction. Date FE includes year and month of interview and year that data was submitted. Controls include Duration, the interview process duration, indicators for whether the candidate received an Offer or Rejected the position, and text-based indicators from the text for the presence of Pleasant Colleagues, the occurrence of a Direct Assessment for the job, Mentions of Wages, Mentions of Hours, and highlighting of good Workplace Amenities (besides colleagues). Missing values imputed with indicators for missingness absorbed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%.

skill development, workers with career concerns might increasingly reject offers in high-wage occupations and industries after an easy interview.

To proxy for job seekers' potential career concerns, we turn to workers' resumes to identify likely future jobs that follow the job in question. More specifically, for each interview, we isolate workers who have been employed with that job opening's firm and job title. Then, we calculate the average wage among all jobs that have come next on workers' resumes. We repeat the same exercise for the second job that comes next, as well as the third. We then create an indicator variable for whether, on average, either of the next three jobs would be considered high-wage. If this indicator — which is not based on whether the current job is high wage but rather whether possible upcoming jobs are — has predictive power for the worker's decision to reject a high-wage offer, this would suggest career concerns and scaling the job ladder can help rationalize our findings. Indeed, in Appendix Table E3, we find this to be the case. Job seekers are 2 percentage points more likely to reject a high-wage offer following an easy interview if any of the next three likely *future* jobs are high-wage, a relation the can explain about one-fifth of the increased rejection rate for easy-interview, high-wage jobs.

## 6 Interview Difficulty as a Precursor for Match Quality

If job seekers considering high-paying jobs are willing to reject an offer because they experienced an easy interview, it must be because the interview itself has predictive power — at least, in the eyes of the job seeker — for the quality of that potential employee-employer match. If the interviews did not, workers would simply ignore any signals being cast by the interview experience and only focus on objective measures distinguishing vacancies, e.g., wages, hours, etc. Especially if workers learn about match quality over the duration of the match (Nagypál, 2007), then having an informative ex ante signal can help workers sort away from obviously poor matches. One clear measure for the quality of a match is the length of tenure a worker spends in their job, as workers with poor match quality will voluntarily quit sooner (Akerlof *et al.*, 1988) and workers will pursue their outside options if they believe them to be more appealing than their current match (Jäger *et al.*, 2024).

To test whether interview difficulty can serve as a precursor for eventual match quality, we study turnover behavior matching workers' interview experiences to their accepted offers using their resumes. In particular, we ask whether workers who ac-

cepted offers after interviews they perceived to be easy ultimately exit their jobs earlier than their counterparts who perceived their interviews to be not-so-easy. To construct this dataset of interview-tenure pairs, we consider all of the jobs listed on a worker's resume and identify for which (if any) the worker disclosed their interview experience on Glassdoor. We match an interview to a job on a resume if the worker reported an interview for that firm within a year of the job beginning. For jobs with end dates listed on the resume, we can calculate tenure with the firm. Of course not all jobs have ended, so as to not overlook still ongoing employment spells, we create an indicator for the job has not yet ended. We relate the difficulty of the interview difficulty to both of these measures related to firm attachment in Table 6.[12]

Every specification paints the same narrative: workers separate earlier if they thought the interview they had *before* starting the job was easy. Even within the same industries and occupations, workers separate 15 percent faster after an easy interview (column 1) — a relation that cannot be fully rationalized by the wage of the role (column 2). Even when looking within the same firm and job title, workers separate 9 percent earlier if they experienced an easy interview (column 3). If we were to incorporate employment spells that have not ended, we find workers are less likely to still be with their firms after easy interviews. This decline equates to 4.5 percentage points when looking within industries and occupations (column 4), and moderates but remains significant at 2.4 percentage points within the same firm and job title. Given a sample average of around 40 percent, a 2.4–4.5 percentage points decline constitutes a roughly 5–10 percent reduction.

Of course, both of these outcomes are equilibrium objects. Faster rates of turnover may reflect an increased propensity of voluntary quits just as easily as it could reflect a heightened probability of layoffs. Depending upon which one dominates, the implications are drastically different. Under the former, the utility of the match is insufficient to dissuade the worker from pursuing outside opportunities. Indeed, others have shown that improved amenities, such as hybrid work arrangements (Bloom *et al.*, 2022), can induce workers to remain longer with their firms. If, instead, faster turnover rates primarily reflect heightened probability of layoffs, an easy interview might be an accurate proxy for a less-productive worker who ultimately is let go because they under-perform. To disentangle these two channels, i.e., worker-initiated

[12]Although we do not control for differences in workers' ages at the time of the interview in our preferred specification, since we do not observe age for most respondents, the takeaways are unchanged with about 10 percent shorter firm tenure after an easy interview (Appendix Table E4).

**Table 6:** Tenure from Workers' Resumes After Offer Acceptance

| | Logarithm of firm tenure | | | 1(Still employed at firm) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| 1(Easy interview) | -0.162*** | -0.129*** | -0.093*** | -0.045*** | -0.034*** | -0.024*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.018) | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.008) |
| Estimated log wage of vacancy | | 0.165*** | 0.095* | | 0.073*** | 0.067*** |
| | | (0.017) | (0.052) | | (0.007) | (0.019) |
| Observations | 31,875 | 21,609 | 13,924 | 55,880 | 38,493 | 28,275 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.34 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.07 |
| Industry and occupation FE | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | |
| Firm and job title FE | | | ✓ | | | ✓ |

Notes: Table 6 relates the length of firm tenure for a job using workers' resumes to their interview experiences for that same employer. Each column additionally includes fixed effects for the calendar year-month the job began cross the calendar year-month the interview was submitted to Glassdoor. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

separations from employer-initiated ones, we test whether the workers exhibit signs of poor match quality after an easy interview. In particular, we turn to their job satisfaction, which we capture through Glassdoor employer reviews.

The reviews dataset is comprised of 6.5 million job satisfaction ratings where we observe the worker, their firm, and their job title. Glassdoor ratings are on an integral scale from 1–5 stars, and workers are incentivized to contribute through the give-to-get-mechanism introduced in Section 2.[13] Sockin (2022) shows Glassdoor satisfaction ratings across industries and occupations are strongly correlated with satisfaction reported in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997. With regards to our sample specifically, one may be concerned the reviews to which we can link interview reports are selected to some extent. Given that the worker would have had to contribute at least two separate survey responses (an employer review and an interview report) to Glassdoor for the same firm to be in this sample, such a pattern of selection is plausible. However, when we look at the distribution of satisfaction responses for this interview-paired sample compared with the sample of employer reviews overall (Appendix Figure C2), we find little difference between them.

To see if easier interviews are associated with worse satisfaction on the job, we match workers' accepted job offers to their later-written Glassdoor review. We attach a worker's employer review to their interview report if the two share the same firm in the same metropolitan area, and the review is provided after the interview

[13]For additional details about Glassdoor reviews, see Marinescu *et al.* (2021).

**Table 7:** Indicator of Match Quality from Glassdoor Reviews After Offer Acceptance

| | Overall rating | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| 1(Easy interview) | -0.622*** | -0.426*** | -0.502*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.058) |
| N | 241,606 | 166,912 | 6,116 |
| $R^2$ | 0.080 | 0.371 | 0.776 |
| Job title FE | | ✓ | |
| Firm FE | | ✓ | |
| Job seeker FE | | | ✓ |

Notes: Table relates job satisfaction from workers' Glassdoor reviews to their interview experiences for the same position. Glassdoor reviews are matched to interviews if they are submitted by the same worker for the same firm in the same metro, and the interview was conducted before the review was submitted. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

occurred. (We do not match on job title because workers may have been promoted or demoted in the in-between). The results are recorded in Table 7. Evidently, easy interviews precede *much worse* job satisfaction. Workers who accept offers after easy interviews are about 0.62 stars less satisfied with their jobs (column 1), a disparity that attenuates but remains large at 0.43 stars when looking within the same firm and job title (column 2). For context, these magnitudes are seismic. For one, they are equivalent to 30–40 percent of a standard deviation (which is 1.4 stars) of job satisfaction. Moreover, they are larger in magnitude than the effects from learning your employer engaged in corporate misconduct (Gadgil and Sockin, 2020) or received an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Zhou and Makridis, 2021). Even looking at the same worker who reported their satisfaction and described their interview experience for multiple jobs, that same worker reports 0.50 stars lower satisfaction for the job following the easy interview they had compared with the job that had the not-so-easy interview. Since easy interviews appear to convey poor "fit" for the worker, such evidence strongly supports the narrative of earlier voluntary quits over that of earlier layoffs.

## 7 Conclusion

Interviews are a two-way street, featuring interactions between hiring managers and workers. Yet, the personnel literature has almost exclusively adopted the perspective

of *hiring managers*, exploring how interviews allow employers to learn about workers (Hoffman and Stanton, 2024). In this paper, we take the opposite, more novel, perspective. We ask whether *workers*, instead of hiring managers, form perceptions of the employer through job interviews. We find that just as interviews allow firms to learn about workers, they also allow workers to learn about firms.

This paper takes the first step in empirically linking workers' perceptions of the interview experience to labor market outcomes. Many steps remain. For one, qualitative methods could be applied to measure workers' ex-ante beliefs about employers before, during, and after the interview process. Of particular interest would be how their perspectives shift depending upon the perceived difficulty of the interview. Given our own text analysis, we suspect their views on prospective coworkers would shift, but those for other aspects of the workplace might as well. Such qualitative methods could help shed light on whether there is mismatch between the perceptions of workers and those of hiring managers regarding interviews. Other work could also study how employee screening could be structured and to what extent different screening devices, e.g., IQ exams, coding assignments, or personality tests, alter workers' perceptions of the employer and the job itself. While hiring managers have a battery of screening tools at their disposal, it is unclear how such evaluation methods causally shift the likelihood a worker would accept an offer, or even simply choose to continue with the interview process further. Further, to what extent the difficulty of the interview, and by extension such screening devices, alter the pool of job seekers interested in the job along observable (e.g., demographics) and unobservable (e.g., ability) would be of heightened interest as well.

That workers' interview experience predicts job acceptances, tenure, and satisfaction raises a natural question: what are the implications of our results for firms? If firms know how interviews were perceived by workers, they can potentially make offers to workers who thought interviews were more difficult because such workers are less likely to leave separate due to better match quality. Doing so will reduce frictions in hiring and mitigate the deadweight loss from high worker turnover. On the other hand, firms might use interviews to engage in cheap talk because they know that such conversations are important avenues for workers to learn about the non-wage aspects of the job. For example, if what workers enjoy about difficult interviews is correlated with learning about whether they would be working in a high growth environment, employers might have the incentive to untruthfully advertise productive amenities at

their workplace. Thus, there is a tension in firms having more information about how job seekers perceived their interview experience: more efficiency versus the cost of incentivizing moral hazard through cheap talk.

While this study considers interviews over the last fifteen years, it seems plausible the nature of hiring will change. The advent of new technologies and the decentralization of hiring have intensified the use of automation in recruitment decisions. In particular, artificial intelligence has already begun to alter the recruitment process through algorithmic recommendations (Zhang and Kuhn, 2024), while new technologies such as Zoom have made remote interviews commonplace. Whether such technologies will disrupt, ease, or distort employer recruitment is not yet known. But we can begin to speculate what might happen if the interview process were to shift to being less interpersonal and more algorithmic. To the extent that the interview process is a helpful learning channel for workers, replacing interviews with automated candidate evaluations may harm job seekers. It is precisely the interpersonal aspect — learning about peers and workplace amenities — that workers gain through the interview experience. So, while such technologies may reduce the costs of recruiting new talent, they likely come at the expense of lower retention. Workers who might have rejected an offer after a traditional interview process — either because they thought the interview was too easy or too difficult — may have sorted elsewhere, rather than joining and separating sooner commpared to a candidate who was a better fit.

At the same time though, the subjective nature of the traditional interview process affords employers the opportunity engage in discrimination, for instance, by sex (Neumark *et al.*, 1996), caste (Shukla, 2024), race (Kline *et al.*, 2022), and preferred pronouns (Eames, 2024). While such bias may be detectable ex post through collecting data on new hires or through audit studies, it may be hard to detect in the absence of such interventions. Determining the welfare effects of new technological advancements entering the interview process will ultimately require balancing the potential loss in screening — for both workers and firms — with the potential gains from reducing bias and vacancy-filling costs. While personnel economics has long been blind to the worker's information problem, our results highlight that workers cling to what signals they can get about the quality of the match with potential employers. Perhaps the old adage is true, knowledge is power; in this case, for workers, knowledge about amenities through interviewing is bargaining power.

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
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# Appendix


## A Additional Summary Information

**Figure A1:** Screenshot of Interview Submission Process





Notes: Figure A1 provides a screenshot of the Glassdoor interview submission form, taken on March 12, 2024.

**Figure A2:** Screenshot of Additional, Optional Aspects of Interview Submission Process





Notes: Figure A2 provides a screenshot of the optional aspects of a Glassdoor interview submission form that a respondent can provide, taken on March 12, 2024.

**Figure A3:** Sample Distribution of Interview Difficulty, Including and Excluding Interviews That Did Not Result in Offers




Notes: Figure A3 plots the fraction of interviews in the sample reporting each level of interview difficulty, split by interviews that received an offer and those that did not.

**Figure A4:** Offer Rate by Imputed Wage of the Vacancy




Notes: Figure A4 is a binscatter of the fraction of Glassdoor interviews that led to an offer by the imputed wage of the vacancy. Imputed wage reflects the average pay among Glassdoor pay reports for the given firm and job title. Wages are inflation-adjusted to 2021 dollars. Sample is restricted to firm-job title pairs with at least five interviews.


**Table A1:** Summary Statistics for Interviews Dataset

| Measure | Observations | Mean | Median | Standard deviation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Panel A. Interview characteristics* | | | | |
| Interview year | 1482230 | 2,017.086 | 2,017.000 | 3.683 |
| Interview month | 1482230 | 6.121 | 6.000 | 3.461 |
| Months after interview responded to Glassdoor | 1482230 | 10.693 | 2.000 | 15.725 |
| 1(Rejected offer) | 1482230 | 0.147 | 0.000 | 0.354 |
| Interview difficulty level | 1482230 | 2.439 | 3.000 | 0.925 |
| 1(Easy or very easy difficult level) | 1482230 | 0.457 | 0.000 | 0.498 |
| 1(Employee referral) | 1268640 | 0.122 | 0.000 | 0.327 |
| 1(University recruitment) | 1268640 | 0.071 | 0.000 | 0.257 |
| Interview duration in days | 970363 | 19.976 | 14.000 | 29.179 |
| Imputed wage of the vacancy | 917532 | 26.864 | 21.346 | 16.884 |
| *Panel B. Job seeker demographics* | | | | |
| 1(Female) | 648512 | 0.517 | 1.000 | 0.500 |
| Age in years | 340473 | 29.534 | 27.000 | 9.232 |
| 1(Post-Bachelor's degree) | 500398 | 0.138 | 0.000 | 0.345 |
| 1(Attended university outside US) | 500398 | 0.071 | 0.000 | 0.257 |
| College graduate quality of alma mater | 414176 | -0.059 | -0.063 | 0.150 |
| Grade point average | 58496 | 3.564 | 3.600 | 0.292 |

Notes: Table A1 offers the mean, median, and standard deviation for each measure studied in our sample. Panel A pertains to aspects of the interview, Panel B to the demographics of the job seeker.


# B Sample Comparison with the American Community Survey

**Figure B1:** Distribution of Interviews by Worker's Age





Notes: Figure B1 plots the fraction of interviews in the sample by the age of the interviewee.

**Figure B2:** Distribution of Interviews by Two-Digit NAICS Industry




Notes: Figure B2 plots the fraction of interviews in the sample by each two-digit NAICS industry. Industries are assigned to each employer and come from a Glassdoor lookup table.


**Figure B3:** Sample Distribution by Imputed Wage of the Vacancy




Notes: Figure B3 plots the fraction of interviews in the sample by the imputed wage of the vacancy within $5 bins. Imputed wage reflects the average pay among Glassdoor pay reports for the given firm and job title. Wages are inflation-adjusted to 2021 dollars.


# C Selection of Workers and Satisfaction Reviews Observed in Interviews Sample

**Figure C1:** Distribution of Worker AKM Fixed Effects in Interviews Sample Compared with the Full Sample of Glassdoor Pay Reports




Notes: Figure C1 plots the distribution of the worker AKM fixed effects for the full sample of Glassdoor pay reports and the distribution of those that could be matched to an interview report.

**Figure C2:** Distribution of Job Satisfaction Ratings in Interviews Sample vs. the Rest of Glassdoor Reviews




Notes: Figure C2 plots the distribution of the overall job satisfaction rating for the full sample of Glassdoor employer reviews and the distribution of those that could be matched to an interview report for analyzing match quality in Section 6.

# D Additional Material on Text Analysis

## D.1 LLM Annotation Prompts

The following prompts were used to analyze the content of the interview descriptions.

**Valence/sentiment.** I will provide you with a text snippet that describes a job interview.

Based on the description, how would you describe the applicant's satisfaction or subjective experience with the interview process?

Read the description and provide a label "Strongly Positive", "Somewhat Positive", "Mixed", "Neutral", "Somewhat Negative", "Strongly Negative", or "N/A", followed by a semicolon (;) and then a short one-sentence explanation.

**Colleague ability.** I will provide you with a text snippet that describes a job interview.

Does the description say that prospective colleagues are highly able, intelligent, or competent? Determine whether the interview description explicitly mentions or strongly implies that colleagues at the employer are of high ability, intelligence, or competence.

Read the description and provide a label "Definitely Yes", "Probably Yes", "Probably Not", "Definitely Not", or "N/A", followed by a semicolon (;) and then a short one-sentence explanation.

**Colleague pleasantness.** I will provide you with a text snippet that describes a job interview.

Does the description say that prospective colleagues are friendly, pleasant, or interesting to spend time with for non-professional reasons? Determine whether the interview description explicitly mentions or strongly implies that colleagues at the employer are friendly, interesting, amiable, sociable, engaging, or have intriguing personalities. This does not include professional qualities like competence or skill, but rather focuses on personal interactions and social dynamics.

Read the description and provide a label "Definitely Yes", "Probably Yes", "Probably Not", "Definitely Not", or "N/A", followed by a semicolon (;) and then a short one-sentence explanation.

**"They'd accept anybody".** I will provide you with a text snippet that describes a job interview.

Does the description suggest, through explicit mention or clear implication, that the employer would hire anyone? That is, implying that the employer is desperate for employees and would accept any applicant regardless of qualifications or fit.

Read the description and provide a label "Definitely Yes", "Probably Yes", "Probably Not", "Definitely Not", or "N/A", followed by a semicolon (;) and then a short one-sentence explanation.

**Direct assessment.** I will provide you with a text snippet that describes a job interview.

Was the interviewee directly assessed on their skills or qualifications? Determine whether the interview description indicates that the process involved a technical component, such as a coding exercise, qualification exam, technical test, or similar assessment.

Read the description and provide a label "Definitely Yes", "Probably Yes", "Probably Not", "Definitely Not", or "N/A", followed by a semicolon (;) and then a short one-sentence explanation.

**Compensation.** I will provide you with a text snippet that describes a job interview.

Does the description mention wages, salary, or compensation? For example, did the author learn during the interview process that compensation would be higher, lower, or similar to what was expected?

Read the description and provide a label "Definitely Yes", "Probably Yes", "Probably Not", "Definitely Not", or "N/A", followed by a semicolon (;) and then a short one-sentence explanation.

**Scheduling.** I will provide you with a text snippet that describes a job interview.

Does the description mention hours or scheduling? For example, did the author learn during the interview process that the hours worked or flexibility would be higher, lower, or similar to what was expected?

Read the description and provide a label "Definitely Yes", "Probably Yes", "Probably Not", "Definitely Not", or "N/A", followed by a semicolon (;) and then a short one-sentence explanation.

**Workplace amenities.** I will provide you with a text snippet that describes a job interview.

Your task is to determine whether the interview description suggests that the workplace will be a desirable environment with good amenities. For example: - Office facilities (e.g., modern workspace, ergonomic desks, well-equipped meeting rooms). - Leisure and recreational facilities (e.g., gym, game room, relaxation areas). - On-site services (e.g., cafeteria, childcare, fitness centers). - Flexible working arrangements (e.g., remote work options, flexible hours).


Workplace amenities do not include qualities or attributes of colleagues, such as friendliness or professionalism. They do not include job features that are mainly intended to help you be more productive, such as better computer hardware or software.

Does the text explicitly mention or clearly imply that the company has a desirable environment with good workplace amenities?

Read the description and provide a label "Definitely Yes", "Probably Yes", "Probably Not", "Definitely Not", or "N/A", followed by a semicolon (;) and then a short one-sentence explanation.


# E Additional Results

**Figure E1:** Fraction of Interview Descriptions Mentioning "Easy" by Reported Interview Difficulty





Notes: Figure E1 plots the share of interviews for each reported difficulty level that mentioned the word "easy" in the free-response description workers provide about the interview. Interview difficulty is on a 1-5 integral scale (1-very easy, 2-easy, 3-average, 4-difficult, and 5-very difficult).

**Figure E2:** Probability of Reporting the Interview was a Negative Experience by Wage and Interview Difficulty




Notes: Figure E2 plots the share of interviews for each reported difficulty level that characterize the interview experience as a negative experience, separately for low- and high-wage jobs. Low- and high-paying jobs reflects that the imputed pay is below or above the mean, respectively. Interview difficulty is on a 1-5 integral scale (1-very easy, 2-easy, 3-average, 4-difficult, and 5-very difficult).


**Figure E3:** Difference in the Probability of Accepting an Easy Offer, Looking Across Industries and Occupations




**(a)** By occupation **(b)** By industry


Notes: Figure E3 reflects the coefficients on an indicator for the interview was considered easy for predicting acceptance rates separately for each two-digit SOC occupation (panel a) and two-digit NAICS industry (panel b). Each dot reflects a different occupation (panel a) and industry (panel b). Red vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around each point estimate. Standard errors are clustered by firm.

**Figure E4:** Interview Difficulty and Polarity of Interview Descriptions





Notes: Figure E4 reflects a binscatter for the polarity of the worker's description of the interview process using *TextBlob* Python package, separately based on the worker's perception of how difficult was the interview process. Polarity ranges from –1 to 1, with more positive numbers indicating a more positive charge.

**Figure E5:** Proxies for Under- or Over-Qualified and Offer Rejection Rate





**(a)** Relative age





**(b)** Relative resume experience

Notes: Figure E5 reflects a binscatter for the fraction of offers that are rejected, separately for low- and high-paying jobs, by the relative age of the worker (panel a) and the relative years of prior experience on the worker's resume (panel b) to all others who received offers for the same firm and job title. Low- and high-paying jobs reflects that the average pay among Glassdoor pay reports for the given firm and job title is below or above the sample mean, respectively.

**Figure E6:** Difference in Perceptions of Whether the Interview Was Difficult by Time Since Interview Occurred




**(a)** Accepted offers




**(b)** Rejected offers

Notes: Figure E6 reflects the difference in the probability of reporting an interview was very or easy by the amount of time that has elapsed between when the interview began and when the interview was reported to Glassdoor, separately for workers who accepted (panel a) and rejected (panel b) the job offer. Low- and high-paying jobs reflects that the average pay among Glassdoor pay reports for the given firm and job title is below or above the sample mean, respectively.

**Table E1:** Worker Demographics and Interview Difficulty within a Firm-Job Title

| | 1(Easy interview) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| 1(Female) | -0.014*** | | -0.011 |
| | (0.003) | | (0.007) |
| 1(Employee referral) | -0.018*** | | -0.029*** |
| | (0.005) | | (0.010) |
| 1(Age 18-30) | 0.032*** | | 0.040*** |
| | (0.004) | | (0.009) |
| 1(STEM degree) | | 0.023*** | 0.017** |
| | | (0.004) | (0.009) |
| College graduate quality | | 0.017*** | 0.012*** |
| | | (0.002) | (0.004) |
| N | 121,809 | 103,616 | 25,677 |
| $R^2$ | 0.419 | 0.442 | 0.474 |
| Firm-job title FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |


Notes: Table E1 summarizes how workers of different demographic groups perceive whether the interview was easy for the same firm and job title. College graduate quality reflects the measure of average human capital among a university's graduates from Martellini *et al.* (2024), standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

**Table E2:** Interview Difficulty for the Same Worker Over Time


| | 1(Easy interview) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Second interview observed | -0.044*** | -0.012** | -0.008 |
| | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.007) |
| Third interview observed | -0.056*** | -0.024** | -0.004 |
| | (0.009) | (0.011) | (0.016) |
| Fourth interview observed | -0.048*** | -0.020 | 0.025 |
| | (0.016) | (0.020) | (0.029) |
| N | 120,824 | 78,940 | 47,829 |
| Job title FE | | | ✓ |
| Firm FE | | ✓ | ✓ |
| Worker FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Notes: Table E2 summarizes the relation between whether an interview is considered easy and the order over time of the interviews the same worker experiences. Sample is restricted to workers for whom we observe more than one interview. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.


**Figure E7:** Probability of Rejecting a Job Offer, Worker Skill, and Interview Difficulty, Alternative Measures of Worker Skill




**(a)** Worker AKM FE





**(b)** College graduate quality




**(c)** Firm AKM FE

Notes: Figure E7 reflects a binscatter for the fraction of offers that are rejected by the worker's perception of how difficult was the interview process and (a) the worker's AKM fixed effect on the logarithm of pay, (b) the college graduate quality of the worker's university, and (c) the firm's AKM fixed effect on the logarithm of pay.

**Figure E8:** Probability of Rejecting a Job Offer by Own Perception of Difficulty Compared with Other Interviewees, By Estimated Worker AKM Fixed Effect




**(a)** Difficulty for others **(b)** Relative difficulty

Notes: Figure E8 reflects a binscatter for the fraction of offers that are rejected, separately for workers with low and high AKM fixed effects, by the average interview difficulty reported by others for the same firm-job title pair (panel a) and the difference between one's own interview difficulty and the aforementioned average (panel b). Low and high AKM fixed effects reflects that the worker fixed effect from a regression of worker and firm fixed effects on the logarithm of pay is below or above the sample mean, respectively.

**Table E3:** Probability of Accepting a Job Offer and Likely Wage of Future Jobs

| | 1(Accepts job offer) | |
|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) |
| 1(Easy interview) | 0.005*** | 0.014*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| 1(Easy interview) x 1(High wage job) | -0.051*** | -0.041*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| 1(Easy interview) x 1(Any of next three likely jobs high wage) | | -0.020*** |
| | | (0.003) |
| 1(High wage job) | -0.014*** | -0.017*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| 1(Any of next three likely jobs high wage) | | 0.004 |
| | | (0.003) |
| Observations | 779,264 | 779,264 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| Industry and occupation FE | ✓ | ✓ |

Notes: Table **??** summarizes the relation between the probability an offer is accepted and the workers' perceived difficulty level of the interview process by whether the current job and any of the typical next three jobs are high wage. A high wage job is defined as a firm-job title pair with an imputed wage above the mean. The typical 1st, 2nd, and 3rd next jobs are based on workers' resumes and wages for next jobs are based on imputations by firm-job title pair. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

**Table E4:** Tenure from Workers' Resumes After Offer Acceptance, Controlling for Worker's Age

| | Logarithm of firm tenure | | | 1(Still employed at firm) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| 1(Easy interview) | -0.114*** | -0.112*** | -0.097** | -0.051*** | -0.038*** | -0.028* |
| | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.043) | (0.007) | (0.009) | (0.017) |
| Estimated log wage of vacancy | | 0.047* | 0.042 | | 0.050*** | 0.011 |
| | | (0.028) | (0.139) | | (0.012) | (0.044) |
| Observations | 11,341 | 7,795 | 3,608 | 19,219 | 13,520 | 7,633 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.33 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.07 |
| Industry and occupation FE | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | |
| Firm and job title FE | | | ✓ | | | ✓ |

Notes: Table 6 relates the length of firm tenure for a job using workers' resumes to their interview experiences for that same employer. Sample is restricted to workers for whom we observe their age in the Glassdoor database. Each column additionally includes fixed effects for the worker's age and the calendar year-month the job began cross the calendar year-month the interview was submitted to Glassdoor. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

## Supplementary References

Martellini, P., Schoellman, T. and Sockin, J. (2024). The global distribution of college graduate quality. *Journal of Political Economy*, **132** (2), 434–483.