Network Effects in Democratic Reform: Evidence from Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan

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Abstract

This paper provides evidence of how a social movement through professional networks can transform a country's political and institutional landscape. Using novel data from a social movement led by lawyers in Pakistan, we assess the influence of this civil-society-led movement on support for the autocrat, democratic institutions, and electoral outcomes. Capitalizing on the visits of Chief Justice Chaudhry, along with his lawyers—the movement's central figures—as they canvassed for support across the country, and considering their incidental visits to districts en route to their planned destinations as an exogenous source of variation, we show that the movement shaped political attitudes, voting choices, and even participation in democratic institutions. The movement ultimately paved the way for a democratic transition. Over the long term, the districts more exposed to the movement display a greater trust in formal state institutions such as courts and decreased the use of informal non-state actors in providing justice. The analysis of mechanisms reveals an important role of lawyers' professional bar associations in explaining the movement's success. Our findings suggest that an organized civil society supported by a local network of supporters can bring down autocratic rule.

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"*The restoration of judges is not an administrative or a political issue rather it is a matter of the country's survival.*"

Opposition Leader and PML-N Chief Nawaz Sharif

1.1 Introduction

On the 9th of March 2007, a seemingly routine meeting between the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the military chief sparked a resistance movement against the autocratic government that would dramatically alter the course of Pakistan's history. In an unprecedented act of defiance, Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, refused to succumb to General Musharraf's and his generals' demand to resign. Despite Chief Justice Chaudhry's swift dismissal and arrest by the incumbent military ruler, far from quelling dissent, this event unleashed a social movement, led by lawyers in Pakistan across the country, setting the stage for General Musharraf's steep fall in popularity, decisive electoral defeat, subsequent exile and even a death sentence for his egregious assault on the democratic order. The collapse of General Musharraf's government and the move towards democratic reform in Pakistan raises a broader inquiry: What are the conditions that enable democratization in some contexts and not others?

In this paper, we provide causal evidence demonstrating how a social movement led by lawyers in Pakistan –the Lawyers' Movement– precipitated the collapse of a dictator and paved the way for a democratic transition. The Movement's success provides us a rare opportunity to analyze the dynamics of a successful social movement navigating the path to democratic reform.

As the movement spread across the country, General Musharraf's approval rating sharply declined, support for democratic institutions increased, and even voting choices aligned more closely with the movement's cause. Central to this narrative is Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and other leaders—lawyers of the movement—whose resistance to General Pervez Musharraf's authoritarian regime became a symbol of defiance, energizing a nationwide campaign for democratic reform. What started as a movement to limit government overreach to reinstate the dismissed Chief Justice soon morphed into a full-blown campaign of "Leave Musharraf, Leave." Public support for General Musharraf, previously as high as 63% in September 2006, sharply

declined to 21% by September 2007 (International Republican Institute, 2007). The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), a leading opposition party that notably aligned itself with the Lawyers' Movement, gained significant political ground.[2] In the wake of the February 2008 elections, a democratic transition unfolded as opposition parties formed a united front against General Musharaf. Just as the new government initiated impeachment proceedings against General Musharaf, he resigned.

The 2007 Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan offers an ideal context to study the effects of social movements on democratization in general. First, the Lawyers' Movement's ultimate triumph in meeting its primary objectives offer a setting to understand an episode of an effective social movement driving democratic reform. Such a context allows us to shed light on the power of organized civil society to trigger democratic reform, offering empirical support for recent theoretical models that emphasize the critical role of civic mobilization (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2019; Dixit, 2021; Bisin and Verdier, 2024). Second, and more significantly, the Movement's leadership by the dismissed Chief Justice of Pakistan and movement leaders, who embarked on extensive road trips to various parts of the country, offers a unique opportunity to assess the effect of the social movement at the local level. This contrasts with other movements advocating for democratic reforms, which tend to be centralized in specific political hotspots and broadly fall short of their objectives, such as the case of Arab Spring (Hodler, 2018) or Hong Kong's Anti-Authoritarian Movement (Cantoni et al., 2019; Bursztyn et al., 2021). The setting of the Lawyers' Movement presents subnational variation that captures the influence of the social movement on support for the autocrat, democratic institutions, and even non-democratic institutions such as the military and non-State providers of justice such as Jirgas or Panchayats (informal courts). Third, access to granular outcome data, such as high-frequency polls and election outcomes, permits a quantitative assessment of the Movement's support, evidenced by changes in General Musharraf's approval ratings and the electoral performance of pro-lawyers' groups before and after the movement.

[2] The PML-N's leader, Nawaz Sharif, was the arch-nemesis of General Musharraf, as it was Sharif's government that Musharraf had overthrown in the 1999 military coup, leading to Sharif's subsequent exile. Sharif viewed the lawyers' movement as a significant chance to undermine Musharraf's authority, pave the way for a return to democratic elections in Pakistan, and facilitate his own comeback to power. He famously stated before his party core committee, "The restoration of judges is not merely an administrative or political issue; it is crucial for the nation's survival." PML-N Chief Nawaz Sharif (Business Recorder, 2008).

A significant obstacle in determining the causal impact of social movements, particularly those advocating for democratic reforms, is that such movements are often concentrated in select political epicenters, with the exposure of social movements located non-randomly across space. Similarly, the Lawyers' Movement, marked by the Chief Justice and his lawyers' road trips across Pakistan to garner support, is subject to these same endogeneity concerns. Consequently, a straightforward comparison of opposition to General Musharraf, electoral backing for the pro-lawyers' party, or trust in democratic institutions between districts visited by the Chief Justice and those he did not visit may be confounded by underlying political, social, or economic factors. The Chief Justice may choose to go only to those districts where he expects to have extensive support. Indeed, the endogeneity of the entire mobilization process is of significant import in the literature and presents a fundamental challenge (as discussed recently in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2019; Cantoni and Yuchtman, 2021).

To address these identification challenges, we adopt three approaches. First, we compare support for General Musharraf and electoral support for the Movement within districts over time, contrasting changes in visited versus unvisited districts before and after the Lawyers' Movement. By adopting this difference-in-differences framework, we can potentially isolate the *change* in support for the social movement in places the Chief Justice visits relative to changes in unvisited districts. Second, we exploit an additional layer of identifying variation derived from the itinerary of the Chief Justice's visits, capitalizing on the incidental stops made by the Chief Justice en route to his planned destinations. Leveraging the quasi-random nature of the Chief Justice's incidental en route visits, we assess whether districts visited incidentally show a greater increase in support for the movement than those not visited. Our balance check suggests that incidentally visited and unvisited districts are comparable across key pre-movement characteristics, including socioeconomic, cultural, political, and demographic factors. While our identification strategy allows for potential level differences, it hinges on the similarity of trends between these districts—a position reinforced by balance checks, pre-trend analyses, and the stability of coefficients despite the addition of numerous variables that may be thought of as potential confounders. Third, we deploy the new synthetic Difference-in-Differences approach (Arkhangelsky et al., 2021), which is more robust to potential violations of parallel trends and is able to flexibly account for differential trends in high and low treatment exposure districts by re-weighting and matching it with pre-exposure trends.

Our main findings, across a suite of empirical strategies, indicate that greater exposure to the Lawyers' Movement is associated with (1) decreased support for both the dictator and the military, (2) an increase in electoral support for the Pro-Lawyers' Movement party, and (3) a reduced reliance on informal justice mechanisms such as *Jirgas* or *Panchayats*. This reduced reliance on informal dispute resolution mechanisms is accompanied by (4) an increased trust in, and actual recourse to, formal judicial institutions. Taken together, our results underscore the transformative impact of the Lawyers' Movement on the attitudinal, political, and institutional landscape of Pakistan, highlighting a pivotal shift in citizen engagement with the mechanisms of justice and democratic governance. Specifically, the estimates suggest that a district's exposure to Chief Justice Chaudhry and his lawyers' visit corresponds to a substantial 40% reduction in General Musharraf's approval ratings and a 10% diminution in trust in the military. These shifts in public sentiment are not merely superficial; they manifest in tangible electoral outcomes, as evidenced by a 25% increase in the vote share for the pro-Lawyers' Movement party relative to the sample mean.[3] These results hold when explicitly controlling for pre-treatment vote shares, turnout, and measures of electoral fraud and when using a large number of flexible time-varying controls that address potential observable disparities at baseline between districts that were visited and those that were not. In the 2008 elections, the pro-lawyers' movement party secured 23% of the parliamentary seats, compared to the pro-Musharraf party's 19.95%. To contextualize the impact of the Lawyers' Movement's visits on voting alone, the absence of the visits by the movement's leadership could have resulted in the opposition to General Musharraf conceding 39 parliamentary seats or losing 20% of its seats in the legislature. This would mean that the opposition to General Musharraf would not have the requisite majority in Parliament to impeach him, putting the entire democratic transition in peril.[4]

These results withstand a series of identification checks. First, employing former Prime

[3] Ahead of the elections, the pro-movement PML-N required electoral candidates to publicly endorse the Lawyers' Movement. After the elections, the party pulled out of the coalition government and resigned from cabinet roles to protest the government's inaction on the Lawyers' Movement demands and led a 'long march' to Islamabad to overthrow the government with lawyers, successfully campaigning for the reinstatement of the dismissed Chief Justice.

[4] One concern is that our measures of vote counts during the time of dictatorship may be flawed; however, we obtain essentially identical results when we use electoral fraud-adjusted measures. Specifically, a large NGO of independent observers, the Free and Fair, consisting of 20,000 independent observers, randomly deployed its members to 25 polling stations in nearly every electoral district, sampling 1,000 registered voters regarding their intention to vote and providing an estimate for a vote count adjusted for electoral fraud, which we utilize as an electoral-fraud-adjusted vote count.

Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto's concurrent campaign visits as a placebo, we find they do not significantly influence General Musharraf's support or the vote share for the pro-Lawyers' Movement party, underscoring the distinct impact of the movements' leadership's visits. Second, a balance test further corroborates that districts incidentally visited, as opposed to those not visited at all, are similar across a range of baseline characteristics, suggesting the districts incidentally visited by the Chief Justice offer an appropriate counterfactual to the unvisited districts. Third, our coefficient estimates are essentially identical when we incorporate a comprehensive set of interactions of baseline social, economic, and political characteristics with a post-Lawyers' Movement indicator, suggesting that potential confounding factors related to these characteristics do not drive the observed post-movement changes. Last, an analysis of planned and incidental visits by the Chief Justice reveals no differential pre-trends between visited and non-visited districts. This is substantiated by the similarity of the coefficient estimates from the more recent synthetic difference-in-differences method (Arkhangelsky et al., 2021), which attempts to relax the parallel trends assumption using matching and weighting with pre-treatment data, thereby reinforcing the causal interpretation of the relationship between the Chief Justice's visits and the observed outcomes.

In the ensuing discussion, we explore the mechanisms explaining our results. Specifically, we draw upon qualitative accounts surrounding the movement, suggesting potential explanations for the success of the Lawyers' Movement. In his memoir, Advocate Munir Malik, a central figure in the Lawyers' Movement who represented Chief Justice Chaudhry in the pivotal case that General Musharraf filed to remove him, highlights the crucial influence of lawyers' networks, particularly the local bar associations, in galvanizing support for the movement (Malik, 2008). He posits that court boycotts by lawyers, which coincided with the visits of the Chief Justice, were particularly easy to organize in regions where lawyers were well-organized within district bar associations.

Similarly, in an editorial note, the Harvard Law Review (2010) conjectured about the role of private media in amplifying the movement's message. The issue of electoral fraud has also been raised, which is thought to attenuate the actual electoral impact of the movement (FAFEN, 2008). All, any, or none of these channels may explain how the lawyers' movement impacted support for the autocrat, democratic institutions, and actual voting choices. Our analysis strongly suggests that the networks of lawyers' bar associations is a key mechanism underlying the movement's influence.

By examining the pre-treatment presence of lawyers' bar associations in the district, we find that the impact of the Chief Justice's visits is augmented with the presence of these professional associations in the district. Employing causal mediation analysis further substantiates the pivotal role of lawyers' bar associations in mediating the Movement's effects (Heckman and Pinto, 2024). These findings align with narratives and qualitative research, underscoring bar associations' role in coordinating court boycotts, mobilizing the legal community and broader civil society (Munir, 2012; Khan, 2019).

We explore alternative mechanisms, for instance, how the expansion of private media in Pakistan during the early 2000s may have mediated the Lawyers' Movement's influence Concurrently, we examine how electoral fraud may have mediated the effect of the Lawyers' Movement on voting patterns (EU Observers Report, 2008). By using a novel proxy for electoral fraud—votes rejected by the Election Commission in previous elections—and applying a fraud-adjusted measure of vote counts calculated by a network of independent observers (FAFEN, 2008), we determine that the impact of the movement is accurately assessed. Finally, by leveraging the visits of other leaders in the movement, we show that the effects are not confined to visits by the Chief Justice, indicating a broader influence of the Lawyers' Movement on democratic reform.

The Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan rapidly expanded beyond its original goal of contesting the Chief Justice's ousting, morphing into a broader crusade against dictatorship and a call for the strengthening of democratic institutions.[5] To understand the Movement's impact on support for democratic institutions, we leverage a novel administrative dataset on case filings in local courts from the statistical reports presented to the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan (LJCP). The Chief Justice's and movement leaders' visits are associated with an increase in case filings, which persisted for over a decade following the movement. In districts where the Chief Justice visited, compared to pre-movement case filings, there appears to be an annual increase of about 9,500 additional cases filed in local courts, or a 15% rise in new cases filed each year. For comparison, the visits by the movement leaders are associated with an increase of about five new cases per thousand residents. This increase is over double the increase reported in Acemoglu et al.

[5] Although the Chief Justice spoke sparingly, when he did, he touched on the themes of "rule of law" and "constitutionalism." For instance, on one such rare occasion, when he spoke, he stated, "Nations and states that are based on dictatorship instead of the supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law, and the protection of basic rights get destroyed." (Reuters, 2007a). A close confidant and lawyer leader of the Movement echoed a similar sentiment: "The Constitution gives the people of Pakistan the right to rule the country. We will no longer allow any army general to rule the country," (CNN, 2007).

(2020) analysis of the survey data on support for formal courts in Pakistan. The survey evidence, similar to that presented in Acemoglu et al. (2020), also supports evidence from adminstrative data: an increase in public trust in formal judicial bodies and a simultaneous decrease in the employment of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. The visits of the Chief Justice are linked with bolstering trust in formal courts while diminishing the use of informal dispute resolution mechanisms such as Panchayats or Jirgas. This suggests the Lawyers' Movement's consequential influence on strengthening democratic institutions within Pakistan. In districts with heightened exposure to the movement, citizens reveal a notable increase in trust and a greater inclination to engage with formal judicial mechanisms—ranging from lower courts to higher courts and the Supreme Court—for dispute resolution. This occurs in a setting where the state competes intensively with non-state actors who offer their own often brutal brand of justice.

1.2 Related Literature

Our findings contribute to three broad literatures. First, we engage with the literature on democratization. Economists and political scientists have long sought to understand the process of democratization. One school of thought posits that democratization is a "compromise" between the elite and the masses (Rustow, 1970), brought about by the 'power of the street' to preempt mass protests (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000), to avert a revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), and control escalating violence (Aidt and Franck, 2015). Another school of thought suggests that democratization occurs due to economic considerations, for instance, to reduce patronage (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004), to increase the size of the future economic pie (Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin, 2015), and to diversify against dwindling resource rents (Hodler, 2018). It has even been suggested that democratization is solely a function of the autocrat's actions: the autocrat democratizes to counter internal coups (De Mesquita and Smith, 2010) or makes a strategic mistake that inadvertently leads to democratization (Treisman, 2020). Yet, despite significant theoretical progress in this literature and some cross-country analyses (see Egorov and Sonin, 2024 for a comprehensive review), there remains a need for well-identified empirical studies on what can trigger democratic reform (a point also noted in Cantoni and Yuchtman, 2021). Our study distinguishes itself from previous scholarship by providing systematic empirical evidence to show how an organized civil society can facilitate democratization. Our contribution lies in causally identifying the role of civil society, which challenged an entrenched dictatorship and laid the

groundwork for democratic resurgence. Our findings thus corroborate a novel hypothesis advanced by Acemoglu and Robinson (2019) in "The Narrow Corridor," and further elaborated in Dixit (2021), positing that a sufficiently organized civil society—lawyers, in our context—is crucial to the democratization process, a channel that was once argued to be important in Taiwan's democratic reform efforts in earlier qualitative research (Winn and Yeh, 1995).[6] We also augment the recent cross-country analyses of democratic reforms, which associate greater exposure to democratic reforms with more substantial public support for democratic institutions, as seen in surveys (Aksoy et al., 2024) and dictator games (Acemoglu et al., 2020). By leveraging polling data on support for the autocrat and military, as well as administrative data on court usage, we provide causal evidence that the influence of organized civil society can extend beyond the fall of a dictatorship. It can foster support for democratic institutions by increasing trust in formal state institutions and concretely boosts the actual usage of formal democratic institutions, such as formal courts.

Second, it adds to the long-standing discussion on law and economic development. While a substantial body of theoretical work and cross-country literature has long emphasized the relationship between judicial independence and economic prosperity (Smith, 1937; Hamilton, 1788; Hayek, 1960; Buchanan, 1974; North, 1986; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; La Porta et al., 2004, 2008; Besley and Persson, 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), there remains a surprising paucity of rigorous empirical evidence on the impact of alleviating court capture by the State.[7] Notable exceptions include recent work by Liu et al. (2024a), who exploit exogenous variation in judges' incentives to demonstrate that alleviating the scope of local court capture in China's civil law setting and the role of lawyers in impacting court outcomes (Liu et al. 2024b). Our contribution is to demonstrate that civil society-led movements can increase judicial legitimacy and actual usage of formal courts, bridging a significant gap in the literature. Survey-based research underscores the critical importance of judicial legitimacy in upholding the rule of law (Gibson et al., 2003; Tyler 2006; Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2015), yet the empirical examination of its influence on broader democratic and socioeconomic outcomes has been limited. By focusing on this

[6] Relatedly, Satyanath et al., (2017) and Becker et al. (2024) further contribute to this understanding by demonstrating how networks, for instance, social networks, can function as critical nodes in times of significant political upheaval.

[7] In contrast, a burgeoning empirical literature examines the economic effects of judicial efficiency, particularly the speed of case processing (Chemin, 2009; Visaria, 2009; Ponticelli and Alencar, 2016; Boehm and Oberfield, 2020; Rao, 2021; Li and Ponticelli, 2022).

dimension, we add to the understanding of how the integrity of judicial institutions can drive meaningful progress towards democratic reform. The Pakistan Lawyers' Movement of 2007 serves as a study of judicial legitimacy, illustrating how an independent judiciary can catalyze democratic reform and build public trust in the judiciary. By defying General Musharraf's demands, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and Lawyers of the Movement –became symbols of resistance, rallying public support and highlighting the judiciary's role as a check on authoritarian power. The movement showed that when the judiciary is perceived as legitimate, it can influence public opinion, electoral and court outcomes, and contribute to broader political change.[8]

Third, we speak to the literature on social movements. Cascio and Washington (2014) study the Civil Rights movement in the United States, showing that enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was associated with heightened public expenditure in counties with larger African American communities. Aneja and Avenancio-Leon (2019) extend this line of inquiry by demonstrating that the Voting Rights Act not only augmented the representation of African Americans in the public sector but also significantly narrowed the black-white wage gaps. The post-war era also witnessed women at the forefront of social movements, with seminal work by Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2010) highlighting the popularization of "the pill," which led to delayed entry into motherhood, enhanced educational attainment, and increased participation in skilled professions by women. More recently, García-Jimeno et al. (2022) studied a 19th-century social movement, focusing on the women-led anti-liquor protests in the United States, while Assouad (2024) demonstrated how a social movement in Turkey contributed to nation-building by increasing the incidence of babies born with more Turkish-sounding names. While our identification strategy shares similarities with Assouad (2024), our empirical methodology diverges in a key respect. Unlike Assouad (2024)'s design, which assumes that incidentally visited regions by Kamal Attaturk, Turkey's founding father, are comparable to unvisited ones, our approach accounts for level differences between these groups by including district and year fixed effects. This adjustment allows our methodology to more closely align with a difference-in-differences framework. In our analysis, only the changes observed in incidentally visited districts are expected to mirror those in

[8] Earlier, survey-based studies, as well as experimental research, provide data on public attitudes toward the judiciary and how these attitudes change (Tyler 2006; Gibson et al., 2003). However, none of these examine the importance of judicial legitimacy in the field.

unvisited districts.[9] Further building on this prior work, our study contributes to the discourse on social movements by underscoring the significance of professional networks, such as lawyers' bar associations, in enhancing the capacity of social movements to achieve their objectives. Our findings suggest that the efficacy of social movements is not only tied to the strength of local efforts but also heavily relies on the presence of a well-coordinated, nationwide network infrastructure that enhances their ability to mobilize, sustain, and effectuate change.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the political and institutional context of the Lawyers' Movement; Section 3 describes the data and provides some descriptive evidence; Section 4 delineates the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the main results and explores the underlying mechanisms. Section 6 discusses and rules out alternative explanations and conducts additional robustness checks. A final section concludes. Supplementary variable and data descriptions, sources, and details are available in Online Appendix A, with additional figures in Online Appendix B.

2. Context and Institutional Background

Political Background. Pakistan gained independence from British colonial rule in 1947 when British India was partitioned into two separate nations, India and Pakistan. This event marked the beginning of a tumultuous political journey for Pakistan. The nascent state oscillated between periods of civilian rule and military dictatorships. Pakistan's political landscape has been shaped by several military dictatorships, the most recent being that of General Pervez Musharraf, who ruled the country from 1999 to 2008. General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff, executed a coup d'état in October 1999, effectively deposing the incumbent government led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, chief of Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). The military takeover led to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's arrest and subsequent exile to Saudi Arabia. A splinter group from Nawaz's PML-N, supportive of General Musharraf, was formed and rebranded as Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q). This newly established party, often referred to as the "King's Party" due to its close ties with the military regime, became instrumental in providing unwavering political

[9] Relatedly, González (2020) provides an analysis of a social movement by students in Chile, focusing on the influential role of high school classmate networks in driving collective action for educational reform, while Reny and Newman (2021) show that the Black Lives Matter protests likely impacted public opinion. Unlike our study, the focus of these movements was on educational reform and civil rights for African Americans in the US, not on bringing down a dictatorship. For a more complete review of recent literature on social movements, see Gethin and Pons (2024).

support to General Musharraf, thereby cementing the military's hold on power and offering a veneer of democratic legitimacy to his rule. General Musharraf was forced out when his Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) faced a resounding defeat in the February 2008 elections, with opposition parties, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), gaining a significant majority. This electoral defeat, coupled with a substantial decline in public approval for General Musharraf—from over 50% to less than 20% in less than a year—likely explains his exit and subsequent exile. However, the military continued to wield political power, particularly in foreign policy issues. Set against Pakistan's tumultuous political history, our study examines the influence of the Lawyers' Movement on the nation's ongoing journey from authoritarian rule towards a nascent democracy. While democratic institutions, like the judiciary, are operational, they continue to face challenges faced by many developing nations.

Major Political Players. The military has long played a dominant role in Pakistan's political landscape, often holding power for extended periods. During one such period of direct military rule, the Lawyers' Movement arose as a formidable challenge to autocratic rule. This movement took place in a relatively stable period of Pakistan's history, characterized by General Pervez Musharraf's rule following his 1999 coup, significant U.S. aid, and record economic growth (World Bank, 2006). The International Republican Institute (IRI) survey from June 2006 showed General Musharraf with an approval rating of over 60%, leading many commentators to view him as favorably positioned for electoral victory in the upcoming elections scheduled for next year. His primary rival, the center-right Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), led by Nawaz Sharif, whom he had ousted from power, was in exile in Saudi Arabia. One analyst succinctly observed that the opposition to General Musharaf was in "political cold storage" (Almeida, 2008).

Lawyers' Movement. Under this backdrop, the Lawyers' Movement emerged as a potential catalyst for democratic transition, galvanizing lawyers into a series of court boycotts. The movement was sparked by the suspension of Chief Justice Chaudhry by General Musharraf, an act that became a rallying point for the legal community. The public's perception of the movement was further shaped by the utilization of local networks of lawyers' "bar associations" where lawyers' strikes could be most effectively organized, which likely amplified the Chief Justice's and the movement leaders role as an emblem of defiance against autocratic governance (Kausar, 2012). A notable aspect of the movement was the dismissed Chief Justice's visits across Pakistan. A New York Times report at the time recounts: "Pakistan's suspended chief justice led a cavalcade of

about 100 cars jammed with lawyers and political supporters on a 75-mile trip from Islamabad. Along the route, hundreds of people stood waiting at every junction and small town. When the long motorcade passed, they tossed rose petals at Mr. Chaudhry's car." (NYT, 2007). Khan (2019) succinctly attributes the Lawyers' Movement to leading to "the downfall of the Musharraf regime and a transition to electoral democracy" (p. 2). This movement offers a compelling context for examining the efficacy of social movements and determining when they are likely to matter for democratic change.

Democratic Transition. The February 2008 general elections marked a decisive shift in Pakistan's political landscape, signaling a move towards greater civilian space for governance. The opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) emerged as the largest parties, collectively rebuking General Musharraf's policies and endorsing demands of the Lawyers Movement (Dawn, 2008). The ascendancy of these parties, both of which had faced the brunt of Musharraf's authoritarian regime, repression, and mass arrests, was helpful to the Lawyers' Movement's agenda, particularly the reinstatement of judges ousted by Musharraf. The 2008 electoral transition played a key role in shaping the Lawyers' Movement's trajectory by bringing to power political forces more sympathetic to its cause. This shift, coupled with escalating political pressure from the newly elected opposition and the imminent threat of impeachment by the new government, precipitated General Pervez Musharraf's dual resignations—first as Chief of Army Staff and subsequently as President in August 2008. The New York Times encapsulated these events succinctly when it reported: "In March 2007, Chaudhry refused the urging of five generals to resign and was removed by Musharraf. Two years later, with Musharraf in exile and a civilian government in power, nationwide protests returned Chaudhry to his position atop the nation's highest court." (New York Times, 2009).

Lawyers' Bar Associations. The institutional framework of the Pakistani bar, a vestige of the colonial era (Schmitthener, 1968), comprises a hierarchical structure that extends from the national level down to the grassroots at the district level. Its five provincial counterparts accompany the Pakistan Bar Council (PBC), the regulatory body governing the legal profession. Parallel to this regulatory framework, lawyers voluntarily associate within a tiered network of bar associations, ranging from district bar associations to the national Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA). With approximately 200 bar associations nationwide, these entities serve as a professional and political support network, with members elected in annual elections. The SCBA, an assembly of

Supreme Court advocates, anchors the collective action of the bar at the national level, while the bar associations' decentralized and locally integrated nature amplifies the capacity for lawyer mobilization. On the eve of the dismissal of the Chief Justice, the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association was quick to condemn it, calling it "a callous conspiracy of the highest order against the superior judiciary." (Dawn, 2007c). Similarly, the Lahore High Court Bar Association leadership adopted a unanimous resolution: "Relieving the chief justice of his responsibilities or rendering him non-functional is totally illegal and unconstitutional and condemnable in the strongest possible words". The Lawyers' Movement represented an unprecedented event in which bar associations, from the district to the national level, coalesced to support the dismissed Chief Justice. This solidarity was marked by a series of strikes organized by lawyers.

Role of Media. During the Lawyers' Movement, the role of private media in shaping public discourse may also have been important. The liberalization of private media, by General Musharraf in 2002, may have aided in dismantling the state's monopoly on information (Blumenstock et al., 2022). This transformation of the media landscape in Pakistan, marked by the rapid growth from a single state-owned radio station to approximately 100 private news channels by 2006, provides another lens to evaluate the influence of private, relatively independent media on mediating the effect of the Lawyers' Movement as the movement spread across Pakistan (Gallup, 2014). Specifically, it allows for an investigation into whether districts with prior exposure to private media experienced a more pronounced impact from the Lawyers' Movement.[10]

The Restoration of the Judiciary. Beyond the resignation and subsequent exile of General Musharraf, the Lawyers' Movement's crowning success was the March 2009 restoration of the judiciary, marking a watershed moment in Pakistan's history. The Bhurban Accord 2008, brokered between the opposition to General Musharaf parties, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in March 2008, laid the groundwork for this development by promising the judges' return within 30 days of government formation. Yet, a March towards Islamabad by lawyers eventually was needed for the government's compliance with the accord, reinstating Chief Justice Chaudhry and fellow judges whom General Musharaf also dismissed. A

[10] Notably, private radio emerged as an important source of information, especially in rural areas where television penetration remained sparse as of 2006. Radio ownership and engagement were notably higher in rural areas, with marked provincial disparities. For instance, over half of the rural households in the provinces of Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa own radios, compared to only 20% in Punjab's rural areas (Gallup, 2014).

remarkable reversal of fortunes had occurred: Musharraf was forced into exile, a democratic transition ensued, and the deposed Chief Justice was reinstated, resuming his position as the Chief Justice of Pakistan.

3. Data and Descriptive Evidence

The dataset for our analysis is a composite of various data streams, including official electoral records, bar association directories, annual reports from the media regulatory authority, journalistic coverage of the Lawyers' Movement, electoral audit reports, public opinion surveys conducted by international organizations, and judicial administrative records. Below, we detail our main data sources and the key variables, including their descriptive statistics. Thereafter, we offer descriptive evidence that sheds light on the nature and potential ramifications of the Lawyers' Movement. More detailed descriptions and sources for the variables are available in Appendix A1.

3.1 Data and Summary Statistics

Voting Data. Our study utilizes electoral data from the official records of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), focusing on the pro-lawyers' movement Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), led by Nawaz Sharif, and the anti-lawyers' movement Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), led by General Musharraf. The latter's allegiance to General Musharraf garnered the PML-Q the label of the "King's Party", while the PML-N's pre-election vow to reverse the Chief Justice's dismissal and support the lawyers' movement—"if elected, we will reinstate the Chief Justice and fully support the demands of the lawyers' movement" (Business Recorder, 2008)—was emblematic of the party's alignment with the Lawyers' Movement. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) in fact stood out as the primary political supporter of the Lawyers' Movement, with its leader Nawaz Sharif framing the restoration of judges as a critical national issue: "The restoration of judges is not an administrative or a political issue rather it is a matter of the country's survival" (Business Recorder, 2008). This alignment was further evidenced by the party's insistence that candidates publicly commit to the movement's cause, with a requirement for all party hopefuls to take a public pledge in front of the media to "restore the judiciary." Conversely, the PML-Q's position, as reported by Dawn (2007b), endorsed General Musharraf's dismissal and arrest of Chief Justice Chaudhry, calling it General Musharraf's "constitutional duty" (Arab News, 2007). It is, therefore, unsurprising that a machine learning model

(CatBoostClassifier) was trained using the Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) method for creating embeddings from a corpus of all available news reports in the local Pakistani press with mention of Lawyers' Movement. The result indicates a statistical difference between the scores of PML-N and PML-Q, which suggests that the two parties have distinct positions regarding the Lawyers' Movement (see Appendix A2). The availability of official voting records from before and after the Lawyers' Movement for both of these parties provides a setting to assess the impact of the movement on the votes garnered by political entities that were either aligned with (PML-N) or against the Lawyers' Movement (PML-Q) during periods of the movement's activity and inactivity. To mitigate the risk of manipulated official voting data under autocracy, we employ fraud-adjusted vote shares from the Free and Fair Election Network, which leveraged 20,000 observers and a random voter audit of 1,000 voters in each electoral district, further confirming the robustness of our findings.

Polling Data. Comprehensive opinion polling data on General Musharraf's domestic support, in light of his alliance with the United States in its "War on Terror," have been meticulously gathered by international organizations. The most comprehensive surveys, to best of our knowledge, whose data were available both before and after the Lawyers' Movement and could provide district-level variation, were conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI), which measured General Musharraf's approval ratings and trust in key state entities, including the army, the police, and the judiciary. The periodic surveys, capturing the views of 4,000 Pakistani citizens from both urban and rural areas across all provinces, were designed to paint a comprehensive picture of national sentiment. Conducted at key intervals— before and after the Lawyers' Movement—between September 2006 and January 2008. The large-scale surveys suggest a transformation in public opinion and the political atmosphere during the mid-2000s, capturing General Musharraf's precipitous fall in approval from highs of 60% before the Lawyers' Movement to lows nearing 30% in November 2007, as illustrated in Figure B1 in Appendix B.

Courts Data. The voting and polling data facilitate an exploration of the Lawyers' Movement's impact on political attitudes and voting choices, respectively, as well as public trust in state organs such as the judiciary, military, and police, which were also collected by the International Republican Institute (IRI) survey. This data can aid in understanding the dynamics behind the diminishing support for General Musharraf and the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan, potentially associating the legal community's activism with a decline in the military's support

among citizens while simultaneously investigating a potential increase in trust in democratic institutions like the courts of law. To augment these polling data, we, therefore, utilize an administrative dataset on the local district courts. We digitized a list of all available Statistical Reports submitted to the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan (LJCP) from 2006 to 2022. This enables us to construct a panel dataset of local court records, allowing us to observe new case filings and disposal rates in the district courts. This curated dataset serves as a key resource in our analysis of the Lawyers' Movement's impact on citizen interactions with the courts of first instance, traditionally perceived as the least susceptible to change (Siddique, 2013). We augment this administrative data with a detailed survey on the use of informal judicial mechanisms in Pakistan, specifically use of *Jirgas* and *Panchayats*, as obtained from a 2016 FAFEN Report. This report provides district-level data on the reported use of both formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms in Pakistan, allowing us to understand the extent of reliance on these non-state entities and to measure the trust in formal courts.

Chief Justice Visits. The key explanatory variable in our analysis is a dichotomous measure that turns one for districts where Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry made visits. It is important to note that the Chief Justice while serving as the figurehead of the movement, was largely a symbolic leader who seldom spoke publicly and consistently traveled in the company of the movement's leaders, who orchestrated the social gatherings. For example, the highly esteemed constitutional lawyer Aitzaz Ahsan, a central figure in the movement, often assumed the role of the Chief Justice's "chauffeur" during his nationwide tours, underscoring the collaborative and coordinated nature of the movement's leadership.[11] These visits predominantly consisted of road trips, with the Chief Justice traveling from his home in Islamabad to various locations. We construct our explanatory variable using the media reports and construct two distinct subsamples of Chief Justice visits: one encompassing the entire sample of visits, including his planned visits, and another comprising only incidental or "happenstance" visits that the Chief Justice visited en route to his planned destination. While our identification strategy resonates with that suggested by Assouad (2024), which contrasts incidentally visited districts by Attaturk against unvisited ones in Turkey, it diverges by integrating a temporal dimension. This is achieved through the interaction of the

[11] We subsequently demonstrate that the impact of the movement extends beyond visits by the Chief Justice, showing similar effects when any of the key leaders are involved. For instance, visits by prominent lawyers like Aitzaz Ahsan and Ali Ahmad Kurd yield comparable results.

visited dummy with a Post-Movement time dummy. The Chief Justice's visit coincided with synchronized boycotts and strikes by lawyers, organized across Pakistan through a comprehensive network of local and national bar associations. As the Chief Justice proceeded to his scheduled destination, a wave of lawyers' strikes swept through Pakistan, aligning closely with the activities of the Lawyers' Movement. Capturing the essence of the Chief Justice visits, The New York Times described the scene as follows, “Pakistan’s suspended chief justice led a cavalcade of about 100 cars jammed with lawyers and political supporters on a 75-mile trip from Islamabad. Along the route, hundreds of people stood waiting at every junction and small town. When the long motorcade passed, they tossed rose petals at Mr. Chaudhry’s car.” (New York Times, 2007). Appendix A provides variable definitions and data sources used in this study, while Table B1 in Appendix B reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the paper.

3.2 Descriptive Evidence

Patterns of the CJ Visits. Figure 1 displays the districts visited by the Chief Justice alongside those he did not visit, distinguishing between scheduled and unscheduled stops, as well as outlining the travel routes taken during his road trips. The map indicates that the Chief Justice's scheduled visits targeted major cities, while unscheduled stops included a variety of rural and urban areas. In the course of these visits, the Chief Justice rarely spoke but the lawyers’ and their bar associations were vocal on issuing calls for nationwide strikes and a boycott of the courts' proceedings in days leading up to the the Chief Justice visits. This is suggestive in Figure 2, which indicates a pronounced uptick in the frequency of lawyers' strikes subsequent to the Chief Justice's dismissal in March 2007. The strike activities of other groups, such as farmers and business associations also depicted in Figure 2, did not exhibit a similar pattern apost-March 2007. However, at times, they too joined the Lawyers' strikes, as suggestive of a correlation between the strikes during the Lawyers’ Movement. A prominent newspaper headline, “No court work as lawyers protest CJ's suspension,” encapsulates the atmosphere of the Chief Justice's visits and the Lawyers' Movement, with Dawn (2007a) reporting: “The court work came to almost standstill in all major cities as no lawyer appeared in the courts.”

Qualitative Accounts. The Lawyers’ Movement, organzed by a network of bar associations, originated with strikes and court boycotts in major urban centers. However, the strikes proliferated rapidly, leading to widespread court shutdowns across Pakistan. The movement's escalation into a

national event drew significant attention from media outlets across Pakistan and around the globe. A local news report from a city in Punjab highlighted the movement's reach: "A complete strike was also observed by lawyers in Chakwal to show solidarity with the Chief Justice." The Movement rapidly spread across Pakistan, resonating even in military strongholds like Taxila and Wah. Coverage from these regions reported, "The lawyers in Taxila and Wah Cantonment also boycotted the courts. A black flag was hoisted at the district bar office." These developments suggest the pivotal role of lawyers and the effectiveness of local bar associations in organizing the strikes.[12] This message of the Lawyers' Movement also began to resonate beyond the legal community, inspiring broader societal engagement. Amir Shehzad, a young chemical engineering student, echoed this spirit, stating, "There is a revolution happening. We are facing for many years a military dictatorship, and people want democracy" (Gall, 2007). The narrative of discontent and the desire to constrain the power of the military dictator was further echoed by Abdullah, a 70-year-old farmer who, had initially supported General Musharraf's rise to power. "I was among the many people who welcomed General Musharraf when he took over, but he wants no checks. He wants a free hand for everything but that's not fair," Abdullah stated, reflecting a shift in public opinion as he waited in the village of Kharian to greet Chief Justice Chaudhry's caravan of cars (Arab News, 2007). This growing demand was also reflected in the words of Chief Justice Chaudhry himself. Although the Chief Justice himself spoke sparingly, but when he did, he spoke about the importance of ending autocratic rule in Pakistan: "Nations and states which are based on dictatorship instead of the supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law and protection of basic rights get destroyed," Chaudhry declared. Echoing this sentiment at a later event, he succinctly declared, "The concept of an autocratic system of government is over." (NYT, 2007).

4. Empirical Strategy

Estimating Equation. We utilize information from official and unofficial election data, opinion polls, judicial administrative records, and employ three identification strategies, to delineate the impact of the Lawyers Movement. Specifically, we estimate the following panel specification by

[12] Tasked with oversight and censorship of a fast-growing private media industry in the mid-2000s, the nascent Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) struggled to keep up with the media's explosive growth, marked by the emergence of a multitude of new television and radio news channels. This proliferation of media ensured that the lawyers' movement received some coverage, even as PEMRA's regulatory authority in this new era of rapid media evolution in the mid-2000s continued to censor the movement for instance, prohibiting live coverage of the Chief Justice visits.

standard and synthetic difference-in-differences:

$$Y_{it} = \beta\ Chief\ Justice\ Visits_i\ X\ Post\ Movement_t + \gamma_i\ + \theta_t\ + X_{it}\ \mu\ + \epsilon_{it} \qquad (1)$$

i and t index districts and time. Time periods are defined as quarters, years, or election years, depending on data availability for the specific outcome being considered. *Chief Justice Visits* is a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 if Chief Justice Chaudhary visited the district and 0 otherwise. *Post Movement* is an indicator variable that switches to 1 for the period following the Lawyers' Movement, specifically from March 2007 onward. The interaction term between *Chief Justice Visits* and *Post Movement* serves as our primary variable of interest. The coefficient on this interaction term (β) serves as the difference-in-differences estimator, quantifying the impact of the Lawyers' Movement on the outcome under consideration. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. **X** is a matrix of time-varying controls.[13]

Identification. Assessing the difference in support for the Lawyers' Movement by comparing districts visited by the Chief Justice with those he did not visit is fraught with several identification concerns. For instance, the pattern of the Chief Justice's visits presumably reflects a non-random selection process, likely correlated with factors such as the pre-existing political dissent or the tactical importance of the districts. Our empirical approach speaks to these potential endogeneity concerns in three ways: First, our dataset includes outcome data for both pre- and post-movement periods, enabling before-and-after district comparisons. This standard difference-in-differences approach allows us to account for at least time-invariant sources of endogeneity. Our second empirical approach is to use incidental visits by the Chief Justice, where we estimate Equation (1) on a subsample of districts from which we exclude planned visits by the Chief Justice. By doing so, we harness the data from districts the Chief Justice visited incidentally while en route to his planned destinations. These impromptu, or "incidental visits," are likely to provide a better counterfactual to unvisited districts. These incidental visits offer a more robust counterfactual to districts that were not visited. Nevertheless, our empirical design does not strictly require the visited and unvisited districts to be balanced across observables and unobservables. This is

[13]The choice of controls depends on the type of outcome being considered. For polling data related to Musharraf's and the army's approval, the time-varying controls include support for the police and courts. In the case of voting data, we control for the share of rejected votes, total polled votes, and total registered voters.

because we utilize variation across both districts and time to compare potential outcome changes in districts incidentally visited by the Chief Justices with those that were not visited, both before and after the Lawyers' Movement. Despite potential level differences between districts incidentally visited and those unvisited, the results in Table B2 are encouraging, suggesting that both groups of districts are likely to be comparable in trends. This is further reinforced by systematic tests for pre-trends and the stability of the difference-in-differences coefficient of interest when a large list of potential confounding interactions is added.

Our third empirical approach utilizes the new synthetic difference-in-differences (SDID) method developed by Arkhangelsky et al. (2021), wherein the synthetic DID approach reweights and matches pre-Lawyers' Movement trends across districts with high and low Lawyers' Movement exposure to "weaken the reliance on parallel trend type assumptions." (Arkhangelsky et al., 2021, p. 4089). Specifically, the Arkhangelsky et al. (2021) synthesizes the difference-in-differences (DID) with the synthetic control (SC) methods. This approach does not strictly require parallel trends across treated and control units, thereby offering an advantage over standard difference-in-differences. Simultaneously, it circumvents the Synthetic Control method's constraint of the treated unit's outcomes needing to lie within the convex hull of the control units' outcomes, i.e., it does not require the treated group be similar to a combination of outcomes for untreated groups, which it does by optimally reweighting pre-treatment periods and matching trends rather than levels (Arkhangelsky et al. 2021). Our results are essentially identical across the three approaches, suggesting that the assumptions behind them, such as time-variant endogeneity or failure of parallel trends assumption, are unlikely to explain our findings.

5. Main Results and Mechanisms

5.1 Impact on Attitudes and Voting Choices

Attitudes. Our analysis commences with an assessment of the Lawyers' Movement's influence on attitudes, specifically regarding support for General Musharraf and the military as an institution. Using both standard and synthetic difference-in-differences, we assess the effect of Chief Justice visits on citizen attitudes, estimating Equation (1) using quarterly polling data. The findings are detailed in Table 1. Specifically, Panel A of Table 1 (Columns 1 and 2) illustrates the influence of Chief Justice visits on General Musharraf's approval ratings using the standard difference-in-

differences approach. Conversely, Panel B of Table 1 (Columns 1 and 2) presents the corresponding the estimates derived from the synthetic difference-in-differences method. Across both estimators, the Chief Justice visits appear to have reduced General Musharraf's approval rating by about 20 percentage points. This is both statistically and qualitatively significant and represents a 45% reduction in General Musharraf's approval rating relative to the sample mean. In Panel C and Panel D of Table 1 (Columns 1 and 2), we present the estimated standard and synthetic differences-in-differences for the incidentally visited samples, excluding planned CJ visits. The point estimates in this scenario are slightly larger but remain very similar to those obtained from the full sample for both estimators. Notably, there is a pronounced decline in approval ratings for General Musharraf, with his approval rating falling to about half in comparison to the mean of the dependent variable.

The second analysis of attitudes examines public attitudes toward the military as an institution—a significant entity in Pakistan's political history, having directly ruled the nation for approximately half of its existence. Historically, the military has maintained robust public support. During our sample period, the average public approval rating for the military stands impressively above 70%. In contrast, other law enforcement bodies, such as the police, garner 25% support, while the judiciary receives a higher yet modest 58%. This prompts an inquiry into the dynamics of public support: How did the Lawyers' Movement impact support for the military, particularly under General Musharraf's leadership, in comparison to other law enforcement agencies like the police and democratic institutions such as the judiciary? Our findings indicate that the Chief Justice's visits correlate with a reduction in approval for the army as an institution, evidenced by a sharp and statistically significant decrease. However, the magnitude of this decline is relatively smaller than fall in General Musharaf's approval, as detailed in Table 1, Columns 3 and 4. Across all estimators and both the full and incidental CJ visited samples, military approval decreases by 10 percentage points, or approximately 15% relative to the sample mean. This finding becomes particularly salient when juxtaposed with the approval ratings of other law enforcement agencies, such as the police, which is depicted in Table B3 (Column 1) which appear unaffected by the Chief Justice's visits.[14] Collectively, the results so far depict a consistent narrative: the Chief Justice's visited districts correlate with a significant decrease in support for General Musharraf and a

[14] The null effect of the police will be further discussed later when we examine this in conjunction with an increase in support for formal courts.

diminished backing for the military.

Voting Choices. To what extent do shifts in citizen attitudes manifest in consequent changes in official voting patterns? What effect do the Chief Justice's visits have on the support levels for the primary political opposition to General Musharraf? To explore these questions we estimate Equation (1) for the entire sample of districts and for those incidentally visited by the Chief Justice, utilizing standard and synthetic difference-in-differences approaches. Table 2 displays these findings. Examination of Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 reveals that the Chief Justice's visits correlate with a 4.5 percentage point boost in votes for the pro-Lawyers' Movement party, signifying a significant uptick of approximately 20% over the mean observed in the sample. To grasp the full extent of the impact, these estimates can be viewed in the context of the 2008 elections following the Lawyers' Movement. During these elections, PML-N, the party in support of the Lawyers' Movement, won 23% of the seats in Parliament.[15] According to our estimates, had the Chief Justice not made his visits, the opposition could have seen a loss of 39 electoral districts, equating to a 20% decrease in their legislative representation. This reduction could have left the opposition without the necessary majority to impeach General Musharraf, casting the entire democratic transition into jeopardy.

Our identification strategy, which involves comparing official election records from both pre- and post-movement periods, helps to mitigate concerns about the accuracy of vote counts during autocratic rule. Both the 2002 and 2008 elections took place under the autocratic rule of General Musharraf. To further validate our findings on voting data, we use fraud-adjusted vote counts computed by a large NGO called the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), which deployed one of the largest contingents in the world of 20,000 independent observers to survey 1,000 voters in each electoral district. The results using fraud-adjusted data from FAFEN, as presented in Table B4, closely align with the official election outcomes. This similarity indicates that our results are unlikely to be affected by misreported vote counts or electoral fraud. Finally, it is also worth noting that the Chief Justice's visits do not appear to significantly reduce anti-

[15] In the run-up to the elections, the pro-movement PML-N mandated that all its electoral candidates publicly pledge allegiance to the Lawyers' Movement. The party's leadership abandoned their government cabinet positions and pullted out of the coalition as a rebuke to the government's neglect of the Movement's appeals and initiated a 'long march' to Islamabad in solidarity with the lawyers to advocate for the return of the deposed Chief Justice, an effort that was eventually successful in achieving his reinstatement.

Lawyers' Movement vote shares. The point estimates for anti-Lawyers' Movement vote share in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 are negative, although they are statistically insignificant. We will discuss these results further in our analysis of mechanisms. We proceed to conduct a series of identification checks, the results of which underscore the robustness of our findings and are in line with their causal interpretation.

Identification Checks. The first identification check we do is a pre-trends analysis by applying a flexible variant of Equation (1). This entails incorporating time dummies in the specifiation, with the period immediately preceding the Lawyers' Movement in March 2007 serving as the baseline. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{it} = \Sigma\, \beta_k \; Chief\; Justice\; Visits_i \; X \; D_k + \gamma_i + \theta_t + X_{it}\; \mu + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where *Y* represents the respective outcome, either Musharraf's approval rating or vote shares and *D* is a set of time fixed effects that take the value of one for each period before and after the Lawyers Movement in March 2007. γ_i and θ_t are district and year fixed effects respectively. Figure 3 presents the estimation of Equation (2) utilizing polling data, whereas Figure B2 and Figure B3 in the Appendix provides the dynamic estimation for voting data. In both cases, we find no statistical evidence of pre-trends; prior to the Lawyers' Movement, districts visited by the Chief Justice were not on different trajectories compared to those that were not visited. This observation is consistent across the full sample and the incidentally visited sample. Crucially, there is a distinct break between the pre- and post-March 2007 periods, coinciding with the time of the Lawyers' Movement. This sharp discontinuity can also be visually observed in Figures 4 and Figure 5, which illustrate the synthetic difference-in-differences estimation the dynamic version of Equation (1). Solid lines trace the evolution of districts that the Chief Justice visited, while dotted lines track those he did not visit for polling data in Figure 4 and voting data on Figure 5. The trend breaks observed following the Lawyers' Movement represent a critical juncture where the diverging trends underscore our estimated treatment effect. This dynamic synthetic difference-in-differences approach mitigates the reliance on parallel trends by using a synthetic control method that leverages all pre-treatment data to balance the treated and control groups. A pronounced change in the trend is evident in both standard and synthetic difference-in-differences methodologies, suggesting the robustness of our main findings.

Our second key robustness check involves a placebo test. Fortunately, concurrent with the

time of Lawyers' Movement, a prominent political figure, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, also made visits across Pakistan canvassing support for her Centre-Left party.[16] This presents us with an opportunity to conduct a placebo test, examining whether political visits by an opposition figure could be accounting for the results, thereby rendering the specific visits by the Chief Justice irrelevant. To conduct this placebo, we estimate the baseline Equation (1) by substituting the districts visited by the Chief Justice with those visited by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Table B5 presents these findings, which are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Notably, even after adjusting the baseline results to account for the interaction between Benazir Bhutto's visits and the post-movement period, as detailed in Table B6 of Appendix B, our primary findings regarding the impact of CJ Visits remain virtually unchanged.

Our third main identification check applies a "control function approach" (Aneja and Xu, 2023), which involves interacting baseline (pre-Lawyers Movement) outcomes and time-invariant district characteristics with time dummies, sequentially incorporating these potential confounders into the baseline Equation (1). Table B7 in Appendix B presents these results, which gradually incorporate a series of time-interacted control variables. Our main coefficient of interest, the coefficient on CJ Visits X Post-Movement, remains essentially identical and statistically significant. The inclusion of these interactions as controls allows for more precise treatment-control comparisons; with the incorporation of time-interacted covariates and district and time fixed effects, we are better able to isolate the influence of CJ visits. The three identification checks yield a coherent narrative, with our findings remaining both qualitatively and statistically robust.[17]

Mechanisms. Our subsequent analysis investigates the mechanisms through which the Lawyers' Movement precipitated a decline in support for General Musharraf and the military, while concurrently amplifying electoral support for the movement advocates. Our inquiry

[16] Although Benazir Bhutto's party, like the PML-N, was technically in opposition to Musharraf, she did not explicitly support the Lawyers' Movement. Many political analysts contend that her return was the result of a U.S.-brokered agreement with General Musharraf, wherein General Musharraf would remain President and she would assume the Prime Ministership. This arrangement is suggested by various media reports from that time and later referenced in U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's autobiography (see, for example, Cooper and Mazzetti, 2007).

[17] In the robustness section, we further validate our findings by conducting a series of additional checks. These include demonstrating the stability of our results when applying Conley spatially correlated standard errors across various cutoffs and computing standard errors using Wild Bootstrap. We also account for alternative measures of electoral fraud to ensure that our conclusions are not contingent upon the official election results. Moreover, we provide evidence that political parties outside the pro- and anti-lawyers movements remain unaffected by the Chief Justice's visits.

commences with an evaluation of three principal hypotheses advanced by legal scholars and qualitative researchers concerning the movement's effectiveness. We begin by examining the mechanism for which we find robust evidence: the role of the local network of lawyers' bar associations in accounting for the movement's success. The efficacy of bar associations in advancing the Lawyers' Movement is underscored by the qualitative descriptions provided by several scholars (see e.g. Munir, 2012). Khan (2019) captures this dynamic, succinctly, "lawyers mobilized to reinstate the Chief Justice. They used a combination of street mobilization – involving weekly strikes and protests, and countrywide circuits of bar associations." These bar associations were hailed as "loci of associational politics as well as social capital for lawyers, enabling them to engage in annual elections, coordinate activity across and within regions. The decentralized and locally embedded network of bar associations across the country heightens the mobilizing potential of lawyers" (Munir 2012). To test this hypothesis, we investigate whether the Chief Justice's visits exert a greater influence on districts with a lawyers' bar association. Our quantitative exercise, utilizing data on the network of bar associations' across district courts supports these qualitative observations. Table 3 presents these results and provides empirical backing for the notion that districts with pre-existing bar associations experienced a more pronounced impact of Chief Justice Visits on both citizen attitudes and votes. CJ visits to districts with preexisting district bar associations are associated with a tripling of the decline in support for General Musharraf (Column 1), a twofold reduction in support for the military (Column 2), and, exclusively, an increase in votes for the pro-Lawyers' Movement party (Column 3). The results in Table 3, therefore, offer empirical support for the argument that bar associations helped drive the movement's success.

We next turn to alternative mechanisms that may explain our findings, first evaluating the impact of private media and then scrutinizing the role of electoral fraud in explaining our results. The importance of private media is underscored by an editorial note in the Harvard Law Review (2010), which asserted, "The media emerged as a pivotal educational and mobilizational force during the lawyers' movement." In view of this observation, evaluating the emergence of private media just before the Movement and its role in moderating the Movement's impact becomes important. Accordingly, we investigate whether the impact of the Chief Justice's visits was more pronounced in districts with prior private media exposure. These results are detailed in Table B8

of Appendix B.[18] There is no clear indication that the pro-Lawyers' Movement party secured the most gains in districts with the highest pre-Movement private radio exposure (Table B8, Column 2).[19] Finally, our investigation of mechanisms explores the possibility that electoral fraud might skew the estimated effects of the Chief Justice's visits that we have documented. Such electoral fraud could either overestimate the effects if electoral fraud occurs less in areas visited by the Chief Justice post-Movement or if electoral fraud occurs more in districts visited by the Chief Justice, underestimate our estimates. In our previous analysis, we suggested that the use of fraud-adjusted vote counts does not alter our main findings, as evidenced in Table B4. We now extend this analysis by employing a proxy for electoral fraud, to assess if electoral fraud is mediating the impact of the CJ Visits. These results reported in Table B9 of the Appendix B, utilizes the proportion of officially rejected ballots in the district as a proxy for electoral fraud. Consistent with prior results that incorporated fraud-adjusted vote counts from the Free and Fair Election Network, our findings do not substantiate electoral fraud as a significant intermediary in explaining our results.

We summarize our analysis of mechanisms into a more structured framework of "causal mediation analysis", as recently suggested by Pinto and Heckman (2024). Detailed in Appendix Table B10, our mediation analysis examines the three principal mechanisms discussed earlier. Notably, the existence of local network of bar associations, role of private media and electoral fraud in mediating the effect of Chief Justice visits. The qualitative and statistical significance of Natural Indirect Effects (NIE) underscores the importance of the network of district bar associations as a significant mediating factor in explaining our results, while prior exposure to private media and electoral fraud are statistically insignificant: bar associations' network appears as the primary mediating influence. This leads us to conclude that our evidence aligns most closely with qualitative accounts that a widespread network of local bar associations was instrumental in mobilizing support for the Lawyers' Movement.

[18] The liberalization of private Pakistani media in 2002, included the advent of private radio (see e.g. Blumenstock et al., 2022) and television. The availability of data for local radio allows us the possibility to analyze how private radio's prior presence in the district mediated the impact of Lawyers' Movement.

[19] There is some evidence of a decrease in support for the Anti-Lawyers' Movement party, specifically General Musharraf's Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q), in districts with prior private media presence (Table B8, Column 4). This suggests that the null effect of the Lawyers' Movement on anti-Lawyers' movement votes, may be obscured by many places in Pakistan that did not have private and relatively independent media in these districts.

5.2. Impact on Formal and Informal Institutions

Formal Courts. The Lawyers' Movement represented a collective demand for more than the simple reinstatement of the Chief Justice; it was also a call for constitutionalism and a respect for the legal order. Justice Athar Minallah, then a practicing lawyer, challenged the legality of the Chief Justice's dismissal by the military chief in the Supreme Court, terming it as a blatant and unconstitutional" (Minallah, 2024) attack on the constituional order. Chief Justice Chaudhry, th central figure in the Movement, also echoed as similar sentiment: "Nations and states which are based on dictatorship instead of the supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law and protection of basic rights get destroyed."

We proceed to examine how the Chief Justice's visits might influence satisfaction with institutions providing justice. Fortuitously, the International Republican Institute not only carried out comprehensive surveys across Pakistan both pre- and post-movement for approval of General Musharraf and the army but also posed the question, "How satisfied are you with the transparency and accountability of the judicial process on a scale of 1 to 100?" This circumstance permits an evaluation of whether the Lawyers' Movement influenced citizens' contentment with the courts, allowing us us to document the interplay between social mobilization and institutional trust. Table B3 indicates a statistically significant increase in satisfaction with the judiciary post-Chief Justice visits, with no corresponding effect on trust in police, which we include for completness. Recent survey data from FAFEN 2016 nationwide report align with the notion that the Lawyers' Movement may have had a lasting associatoin on trust in courts. By comparing districts that the Chief Justice visited, whether planned or incidentally, with those he did not, a clear correlation emerges: districts visited by the Chief Justice exhibit higher trust levels in the judicial system across all tiers, including lower courts, high courts, and the Supreme Court. As depicted in Figure B4, the visited districts are associated with an average increase in trust of 0.25 points on a 5-point scale compared to those he did not visit. This represents a significant 10% rise above the average.

While the survey data provide preliminary insights, we proceed to utilize judicial administrative data to determine whether the observed rise in satisfaction and trust in the judiciary associates with an actual increase in the use of formal courts. For this purpose, we digitized all judicial statistical reports issued by the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan (LJCP) at the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which began tracking new case filings across all Pakistani district courts annually starting from 2006. Although we cannot test for pre-trends in this instance, we do

have data for one year prior to the beginning of the Lawyers' Movement. Consequently, this administrative data allows us to investigate the long-term effects of the movement up to 2022. We apply our baseline equation (1) using both standard and synthetic difference-in-differences approaches, as well as our event study specification (2). The outcomes of this analysis are reported in Table 4 and illustrated in Figure 6. The findings presented suggest that subsequent to the Lawyers' Movement, Chief Justice visits are associated with an annual increase of approximately 16,000 in the actual number of new cases filed in Pakistani local courts, accompanied by a commensurate number of cases resolved. This surge is substantial and persistent, effectively doubling the influx of new cases in districts visited by the Chief Justice, relative to the sample mean.

Informal Courts. Beyond the formal judiciary, it is worth exploring whether the Chief Justice's visits had a ripple effect on informal dispute resolution forums, such as Panchayats and Jirgas. These traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, consisting of village elders and community leaders, likely substitute for formal courts, as suggested in recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2020). Despite the paucity of data on informal institutions, we leverage a nationwide survey from 2016, which offers district-level data on the usage of informal courts. We juxtapose the usage of these informal dispute-resolution mechanisms in districts visited by a Chief Justice against those that were not. The results of this comparison are reported in Figure B5 in Appendix B. While the results are indicative rather than definitive, they offer interesting insights. We observe a reduced engagement with informal dispute resolution forums in districts that received visits from the Chief Justice, whether planned (Panel A, Figure B5) or by happenstance (Panel B, Figure B5), relative to districts that did not receive such visits. This pattern suggests that the Chief Justice's visits may have diminished the dependence on these informal systems. It is plausible that the movement, which advocated for formal court system's commitment to dispensing justice to the masses across Pakistan, contributed to this shift away from traditional institutions like Jirgas and Panchayats, historically integral to local dispute resolution.

6. Alternative Explanations and Robustness

This section examines alternative explanations for our findings and presents additional sensitivity tests, which collectively reinforce the plausibility of our proposed interpretation.

Alternative Explanations. There may be at least five alternative interpretations that could also account for the influence of Chief Justice visits. First, one might consider that these visits simply stimulated political participation for all parties, rather than truly amplifying support for the party associated with the Lawyers' Movement. Second, there may be a post-movement Pro-Lawyers party effect, independent of the Lawyers Movement, with the pro-lawyers party performing well in these districts regardless of the visits. Third, Chief Justice visits may have impacted other say smaller political parties that we do not consider; even though they were not central to the movement, they might have had platforms that are correlated with CJ visits and post-movement dynamics. Fourth, we examine whether the effects are solely due to the Chief Justice's charisma by analyzing the impact of visits by other movement leaders. Lastly, we show that other potentially strong networks, such as those associated with bar associations or religious schools in Pakistan, do not explain the results. We systematically assess these possibilities in turn and uncover evidence that counters each of them. Firstly, we show that Chief Justice visits had little effect on political participation. The findings, detailed in Table B11 of Appendix B, emerge from substituting our main dependent variable in equation (1) with voter turnout in the district. The results indicate that Chief Justice visits did not significantly influence turnout, with districts visited and unvisited by the Chief Justice exhibiting similar rates of political participation, before and after the movement. This pattern holds true irrespective of the nature of the visit (planned or incidental) and the methodological approach employed (standard or synthetic difference-in-differences).

Secondly, we investigate the potential for a distinct Pro-Lawyers party effect, one that transcends the Lawyers Movement's influence, with the party consistently faring well across districts regardless of the visit by the Chief Justice. The absence of pre-trends in our analysis of the dynamic effects of Chief Justice visits, evident in both polling and voting data, reinforces this perspective. In the period leading up to the CJ's visits, the pro-Lawyers Movement party's performance in the districts showed no significant change when compared to one quarter earlier in polling data or to elections held before the Lawyers' Movement (Figure 3 and Figure B2).

Thirdly, the ramifications of Chief Justice visits may permeate smaller political parties not

encompassed by our study; although these groups may not be at the forefront of the political landscape as the pro- and anti-lawyers movement political parties, their platforms could be inadvertently influenced by the timing and aftermath of such visits. To provide a more comprehensive analysis, we examine the effect of Chief Justice visits on the vote shares of all parties, excluding those with explicit pro- or anti-Lawyers Movement stances (see Appendix A for discussion and evidence for their disparate party platforms). Table B12 in Appendix B presents these findings. The estimates suggest that Chief Justice visits have no aggregate impact on the vote shares of other parties, a conclusion that remains consistent across the full sample and incidental visits, as well as when employing both standard and synthetic difference-in-differences methodologies.

Fourthly, to address the potential alternative explanation that the observed effects might be attributed more to the personal charisma of the Chief Justice rather than to the broader Lawyers' Movement, we include additional analyses to clarify this point. Lastly, to address the potential alternative explanation that the observed effects might be more attributable to the personal charisma of the Chief Justice rather than to the broader Lawyers' Movement, we conduct additional analyses. Specifically, we examine the visits of other prominent lawyers within the movement, both alongside the CJ and individually, and find that these visits produced similar effects as shown in Appendix Table B13, the effect of visits by other movement leaders is comparable, reinforcing the idea that the outcomes reflect the broader movement rather than any single individual's charisma. Additionally, anecdotal evidence highlights the varying levels of charisma among different leaders, suggesting that the movement's effectiveness was a collective effort rather than the result of a singularly charismatic leader.

Lastly, we investigate whether the lawyers' network, which mediates the impact of CJ visits, might be confounded by other networks, such as the Pakistan religious schools or madrassa network, which qualitative accounts suggest could also play a role in organizing collective action. In Table B14 of Appendix B, we control for both networks simultaneously, finding that the lawyers' network remains significant for main outcomes, while the madrassa network shows no statistically significant effect. These results suggest that the lawyers' network remains a key factor in explaining the observed impacts, with no apparent influence from the madrassa network.

Additional Sensitivity Checks. We demonstrate that accounting for spatial heterogeneity by employing Conley's spatial correlation to compute standard errors and incorporating alternative

fixed effects (Table B15), calculating p-values using Wild Bootstrapping (Figure B6 and Figure B7), which does not rely on asymptotic theory and estimates the entire distribution (Cameron et al., 2008; Roodman et al., 2019), excluding regions such as Balochistan where the CJ never made any road trips (Table B16), and applying multiple hypothesis corrections to minimize the detection of false positives (Table B17 and Table B18), does not alter our results. These results are presented in the final tables and figures of Appendix B. Collectively, these sensitivity analyses underscore the robustness of our conclusions.

7. Conclusion

Civil society mobilization in recent years underscores the varying efficacy of such movements in challenging autocratic rule and promoting democratic reforms. In Israel, nonviolent protests spearheaded by civil society successfully galvanized public debate, leading the government to withdraw judicial reforms that threatened to undermine judicial independence. Similarly, in Bangladesh, a student-led movement achieved a remarkable victory by toppling the autocratic regime of Hasina Zia. However, the contrasting outcomes in Russia, Belarus, and Myanmar, where large-scale protests and movements for democratic reform were met with severe state repression, underscore the formidable challenges faced by civil society under entrenched autocratic regimes. In each of these cases, despite widespread mobilization and significant popular support, the movements were unable to achieve their democratic objectives. These varied outcomes underscore that while some movements succeed in achieving their objectives, others confront formidable challenges and even defeat. The question remains: what explains these differences?

In this paper, we take a step toward answering this question by showing how a social movement led by professional networks can substantially influence a country's political and institutional landscape. Focusing on the Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan, and using the visits of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry as an exogenous source of variation, we provide causal evidence that the movement significantly reduced public support for General Musharraf's autocratic regime, enhanced trust in democratic institutions, and strongly influenced electoral outcomes in favor of the pro- movement political party. Over the long term, the movement appears to have had a lasting impact, with districts more exposed to the Chief Justice's visits exhibiting signs of increased trust in formal state institutions and a potential decline in reliance on informal justice mechanisms. The

key role of lawyers' professional bar associations in organizing and sustaining the movement highlights the critical importance of an organized civil society in driving democratic reform.

This study contributes to a broader understanding of the mechanisms through which civil society can influence political transitions. While the Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan is a unique case, the findings highlight the potential for similar movements, supported by local network of support, to foster democratic change. Future research could explore how different types of professional or civil society networks contribute to democratization efforts in other countries, as well as examine the long-term sustainability of such movements in consolidating democratic gains.

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
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
Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Justice Visits across Pakistan



Note: The figure displays the visits of the Chief Justice across Pakistan from March 2007 to January 2008, leading up to the February 2008 elections. The districts included in his scheduled itinerary are represented by darker shades, while the lighter shaded regions indicate districts that were not included in his planned itinerary, covering only incidental visits. The arrows show the direction of the Chief Justice's movement.


Figure 2: Lawyers Strikes and Other strikes




Note: The figure shows the number of Lawyers' Boycotts of Courts before, during, and after the Lawyers' Movement, as well as Other strikes (of traders and farmers) combined. The data is taken from the Dawn Newspaper archives, which is one of the most prestigious and oldest newspapers in Pakistan. The first vertical line on the left marks the onset of the Lawyers' Movement, triggered by General Musharraf's dismissal of the Chief Justice in March 2007. The second vertical line indicates Elections of February 2008, and the third vertical line indicates the timing of General Musharraf's resignation in August 2008.

Figure 3: Lawyers Movement and Musharraf's Approval Ratings

Panel A: Lawyers Movement and Musharraf's approval. All CJ Visits




Panel B: Lawyers Movement and Musharraf's approval. Incidental Visits




Note: The figure presents an event study analysis of how Chief Justice visits influenced public support for General Musharraf, using survey responses on Musharraf's job approval from the International Republican Institute. The onset of the Lawyers' Movement is denoted by a red vertical line, and the 95% confidence intervals are also shown.

Figure 4: Impact of CJ Visits on Musharraf Approval Rating & Trust in Army - Synthetic Difference-in-Differences



Note: This figure presents synthetic difference-in-differences (SDID) estimates of the effect of Chief Justice visits on Musharraf's approval rating and trust in the army. The panels report synthetic differences in differences using the cluster bootstrap method described in Algorithm 2 of Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). We apply the Synthetic DID estimator to the residuals from Equation (1). The dependent variable in Panel A is the answer to the question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Pervez Musharraf is handling his job?" The dependent variable in Panel B represents the answer to the following question: "How confident are you in the Army's ability to maintain national security without compromising human rights on a scale of 1 to 100?". The data are sourced from the International Republican Institute. District and Quarter-by-Year Fixed Effects are included. The light blue shaded region shows time-weights. The red vertical line indicates the timing of the Lawyers' Movement.


Figure 5: Impact of CJ Visits on Party Vote Share - Synthetic Difference in Differences




Note: This figure presents synthetic difference-in-differences (SDID) estimates of the effect of Chief Justice visits on votes for the anti-Musharraf and pro-Lawyers' Movement (PML-N) party (Panel A) and the pro-Musharraf and anti-Lawyers' Movement (PML) party (Panel B). The panels report synthetic differences in differences using the cluster bootstrap method described in Algorithm 2 of Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). The Synthetic DID estimator is applied to the residuals from Equation (1). Data from the 1993, 1997, 2002, and 2008 elections were utilized for this analysis, aggregated at the district level. The panel was balanced on the year-district level. District and Election Year Fixed Effects are included. The light blue graph shows time-weights. The red vertical line indicates the timing of the Lawyers' Movement.

Figure 6: Impact on Case Filings and Resolved Over Time

Panel A: Event-study of CJ Visits on New Cases Filed



Panel B: Event-study of CJ Visits on the Number of Cases Closed



Note: This figure displays the over-time impact of CJ visits on the number of cases filled in Panel A and the number of cases closed in Panel B with 2006 as the reference year. This judicial administrative data is sourced from the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan (LJCP). The red vertical line indicates last pre-Lawyers Movement period.

Table 1: Impact of Chief Justice Visits on Attitudes

	Musharraf Approval %		Trust in Army %	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-18.199***	-17.446***	-9.516***	-9.996***
	(2.116)	(2.209)	(1.129)	(1.412)
Panel B: All CJ Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-18.326***	-17.687***	-9.514***	-9.612***
	(1.995)	(1.841)	(1.145)	(1.216)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	43.573	43.573	71.426	71.426
Observations	666	666	666	666
Panel C: Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	-19.870***	-19.125***	-11.322***	-12.566***
	(2.702)	(2.797)	(1.454)	(2.119)
Panel D: Incidental Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	-20.008***	-19.410***	-11.320***	-11.619***
	(3.479)	(3.172)	(1.884)	(1.511)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	44.928	44.928	71.710	71.710
Observations	612	612	612	612

Note: This table presents the effect of CJ visits on General Musharraf's approval rating and trust in the army. Unit of observation is district-quarter. Columns (1)-(2) report results on approval of General Pervez Musharraf. Specifically, the dependent variable in these Columns is the response to the question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Pervez Musharraf is handling his job?" The dependent variable in Columns 3-4 represents the response to the question: "How confident are you in the Army's ability to maintain national security without compromising human rights on a scale of 1 to 100?" The data are sourced from the International Republican Institute. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level in Panels A and C. Panels B and D report standard errors using the cluster bootstrap described in Algorithm 2 of Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). All standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. District and Quarter-by-Year Fixed Effects are always included. Trust in the police and trust in the judiciary are added as control variables in Columns (2) and (4). $*$ $p < 0.10$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: Impact of Chief Justice Visits on Voting Choices

	Vote Share %			
	Pro-Lawyers Movement		Anti-Lawyers Movement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	4.615**	4.793**	-0.948	-1.590
	(2.007)	(1.905)	(1.595)	(1.641)
Panel B: All CJ Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	4.595***	4.650***	-0.861	-1.019
	(0.831)	(0.847)	(0.854)	(0.860)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	21.468	21.468	29.456	29.456
Observations	1638	1638	1638	1638
Panel C: Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	4.819**	5.096**	-1.050	-1.173
	(2.191)	(2.150)	(1.610)	(1.835)
Panel D: Incidental Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	4.798***	4.965***	-0.962	-0.695
	(1.146)	(1.195)	(1.180)	(1.023)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	20.967	20.967	31.947	31.947
Observations	1312	1312	1312	1312

Note: This table presents the effect of CJ visits on vote shares. The Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Musharraf Vote Share are represented by the share of total votes for Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N). The Anti-Lawyers Movement and Pro-Musharraf Vote Share are represented by the share of total votes for Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q). "CJ Visits" is a dummy treatment variable that switches to 1 if the dismissed Chief Justice of Pakistan visited the district during the pre-election period in 2008. “CJ Incidental Visits” switches to 1 for incidental or enroute visits (the visit was not planned; he stopped there en route to his planned destination). Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level in Panels A and C. Panels B and D report standard errors using the cluster bootstrap described in Algorithm 2 of Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). All standard errors are reported in parentheses. The share of rejected votes, total polled votes, and total registered voters and Benazir Visits X Post-Movement are added as control variables in columns (2) and (4). $*$ $p < 0.10$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Mechanism - Network Effects of Bar Associations

	Approval and Trust in Army %		Vote Share %	
	Musharraf Approval	Trust in Army	Pro-Lawyers Movement	Anti-Lawyers Movemen
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-9.100**	-8.332***	4.377	1.671
X Bar Association in 2006	(3.667)	(2.423)	(3.110)	(2.592)
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-12.215***	-5.662***	2.343	-2.587
	(2.645)	(0.918)	(2.572)	(2.362)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	43.573	71.426	21.468	29.456
Observations	666	666	1638	1638
Panel B: Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-14.683***	-8.948***	6.641***	-1.056
X Bar Association in 2006	(4.037)	(3.192)	(2.189)	(2.007)
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-6.738**	-5.591***	-0.958	-0.249
	(2.969)	(2.059)	(1.244)	(1.574)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	44.928	71.710	20.967	31.947
Observations	612	612	1312	1312

Note: This table investigates the role of bar associations as a mediator in the relationship between Chief Justice (CJ) visits and public attitudes towards President Pervez Musharraf and the Army, as well as their impact on voting patterns in Pakistan. Specifically, Column 1 reports the impact of CJ visits on the approval ratings of President Musharraf, querying respondents about their satisfaction. Column 2 measures the public's confidence in the Army's ability to maintain national security without compromising human rights, rated on a 100-point scale. The survey data is sourced from the International Republican Institute. Regarding electoral impact, the vote shares for the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N) reflect pro-Lawyers Movement and anti-Musharraf sentiments, while the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q) vote shares indicate support for the opposite stance. The primary variable of interest in Columns 3 and 4 is the vote share for each party. The "CJ Visits" variable is a binary indicator that denotes whether the dismissed Chief Justice visited the district during the pre-election period of 2008, and "CJ Incidental Visits" identifies unplanned or incidental visits. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Control variables include the share of rejected votes, total polled votes, and total registered voters for election data, as well as public trust in the police and judiciary for the polling data analysis. The data on bar associations reflects their status as of 2006. $*$ $p < 0.10$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Impact of Chief Justice Visits on New Case Filings and Cases Closed

	Cases in 100,000s			
	Case Filings		Cases Closed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	0.165***	0.166***	0.162**	0.164***
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Panel B: All CJ Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	0.165***	0.170***	0.162***	0.166***
	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.048)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	.202	.202	.196	.196
Observations	2363	2363	2363	2363
Panel C: Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits Incidental X Post-Movement	0.154**	0.150**	0.156**	0.153**
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.064)
Panel D: Incidental Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits Incidental X Post-Movement	0.154**	0.136*	0.156***	0.143**
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.063)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	.175	.175	.169	.169
Observations	2176	2176	2176	2176

Note: This table reports the results of the impact of CJ visits on case filings and case closures in courts. The observations correspond to district courts and years, with the dependent variables being the number of new case filings and cases closed in each district, in Columns 1-2 and 3-4, respectively. The analysis utilizes all available data from judicial administrative records from the years 2006 to 2022. "CJ Visits" is a binary treatment variable that switches to 1 if the CJ visited the district. Year and District Fixed Effects are included in all columns. The number of pending cases in that court is used as a control variable in columns (2) and (4). For Panels A and C, robust standard errors are clustered at the district level within the standard difference-in-differences framework. In Panels B and D, synthetic differences-in-differences are reported, utilizing the cluster bootstrap method as detailed in Algorithm 2 by Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). $*$ $p < 0.10$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$.

For Online Publication

Network Effects in Democratic Reform: Evidence from Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan

By Sultan Mehmood and Daniel Li Chen

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A. Variable Definitions, data information and sources

Appendix A1. *Variable Definitions and Sources*

A. Elections Dataset

Districts = Administrative subdivisions within a province where electoral data is collected and reported.

Electoral Districts = Geographical regions defined for the purpose of conducting elections, each represented by a seat in the legislative body.

Pro-Lawyers Movement Party = The share of votes received by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) in a given election, at the electoral district level.

Anti-Lawyers Movement Party = The share of votes received by the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) in a given election, at the electoral district level.

Mixed-Lawyers Movement Party = The share of votes received by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in a given election, at the electoral district level.

Share of Rejected Votes = The percentage of votes that were deemed invalid or were rejected during the electoral process, at the electoral district level.

Total Polled Votes = The total number of votes cast in elections, at the electoral district level.

Registered Voters = The total number of individuals registered to vote in each electoral district.

Turnout = The percentage of registered voters who actually voted in the elections, calculated at the electoral district level.

CJ Visit = Dummy treatment variable indicating 1 if Chief Justice of Pakistan (Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry) visited the district during the pre-election period in 2008.

CJ Incidental Visit = Dummy treatment variable indicating 1 if Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry incidentally visited the district during the pre-election period in 2008 (the visit was not planned, he stopped there on the way to his planned destination).

B. Courts Dataset

Pendency = The number of legal cases that remain unresolved or pending in the courts, at the district level.

New Cases Filed = The number of new legal cases that were filed within a specific time period, at the district level.

Cases Closed = The number of legal cases that were resolved or closed within a specific time period, at the district level.

C. IRI Dataset

Musharraf Approval = The percentage of respondents who answered "yes" to the question “Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Pervez Musharraf is handling his job?”. Data provided by the International Republican Institute using polling data from June 2006 to November 2007, at the district level.

Trust in Army = The mean value of scores given by respondents in answer to the question "How confident are you in the Army's ability to maintain national security without compromising human rights on a scale of 1 to 100?". Data provided by the International Republican Institute using polling data from September 2006 to January 2008, at the district level.
Trust in Police = The mean value of scores given by respondents in answer to the question "How confident are you in the Police's ability to maintain national security without compromising human rights on a scale of 1 to 100?". Data provided by the International Republican Institute using polling data from June 2006 to January 2008, at the district level.
Trust in Courts = The mean value of scores given by respondents in answer to the question "How satisfied are you with the transparency and accountability of the judicial process on a scale of 1 to 100?". Data provided by the International Republican Institute using polling data from June 2006 to January 2008, at the district level.

D. FAFEN Socioeconomic Survey 2016
Lower Court = The courts that operate at the district or municipal level in Pakistan, dealing with minor criminal and civil cases.
High Court = The courts that are one level below the Supreme Court in Pakistan, with jurisdiction over a province or a group of provinces, dealing with appeals from lower courts and significant cases directly pertaining to their jurisdiction.
Supreme Court = The highest judicial body in Pakistan, which has the ultimate appellate jurisdiction over all civil and criminal cases in the country, and also deals with matters of national or constitutional importance.
Jirga = An informal tribal court system among the Pashtun communities, primarily in regions like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, where tribal elders make decisions by consensus based on Pashtunwali.
Panchayat = A village council system primarily in regions like Punjab and Sindh, dealing with civil matters and minor crimes through a consensus of five village elders.

E. Additional Data Used.

Right Party Lawyers Group = Dummy variable indicating 1 if there was a Bar Association predominantly consisting of lawyers who supported the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in the given district in 2006.
Left Party Lawyers Group = Dummy variable indicating 1 if there was a Bar Association predominantly consisting of lawyers who supported the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) in the given district in 2006.
Bar Associations = Dummy variable indicating 1 if there was a Bar Association (comprising the supreme court lawyers) in the given district in 2006.
Private Media = Dummy variable indicating 1 if there was a private media radio or TV station in the given district in 2006. Source for data is the 2006 PEMRA (Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority) Report.

Appendix A2. Evidence for Anti and Pro-Lawyers-Lawyers Messaging

Table A1: Partys' Alignment with the Lawyers' Movement

Position	Message/Quote/Signal	Source	Link	Party
pro-movement messages	"The Pakistan Muslim League-N candidates took oath that, if elected as parliament members, they would play their role and devote energies to restore the judiciary. The candidates have also vowed to play their role in ending the army's political role and restoring the 1973 Constitution."	Business Recorder "PML-N candidates take oath for restoration of judiciary", February 7, 2008	https://www.brecorder.com/news/3479882	Pro-Lawyers Movement Party (PML-N)
	"And the PML-N leader brought light to every issue that the PPP leader clouded: Musharraf would have to go, the army would have get out of politics and the judges, especially, Chaudhry, would have to be reinstated."	Middle East Research and Information Project "The Struggle for Pakistan Continues" by Graham Usher, Spring 2008	https://merip.org/2008/03/the-struggle-for-pakistan-continues/	
anti-movement messages	"Elahi has said President Pervez Musharraf has fulfilled his legal and constitutional responsibility by sending reference to the Supreme Judicial Council against restrained Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry."	DAWN "Pervaiz defends president's action" March 12, 2007	https://www.dawn.com/news/237015/pervaiz-defends-president-s-action	Anti-Lawyers Movement Party (PML-Q)
	"Punjab Chief Minister Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi said the judge's campaign seemed to have turned political with his speech in Lahore. "This is clear that this campaign has become political," Elahi told a local channel. The ruling party would respond with a "much bigger rally" on May 12, he said."	Arab News "Dictatorship A Thing Of The Past: Chaudhry" by Azhar Masood & Agencies, May 7, 2007	https://www.arabnews.com/node/298076	

Note: The table above presents two pro- and anti-Lawyers' Movement messages respectively as understood in investigative reporting at the time. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) strongly aligned itself with the Lawyers' Movement, advocating for reinstatement of Chief Justice Chaudhry and resignation of General Musharraf. This contrasts sharply with the stance of the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) under General Musharraf, which opposed the movement in support of the regime's judicial interventions. PML-N Chief Nawaz Sharif encapsulates his party stance as follows: "The restoration of judges is not an administrative or a political issue rather it is a matter of the country's survival."


Table A2: NLP scores of parties' messages

Party	Mean scores	p-value	Significant
PML-N	0.801382	0.0162**	True
PML-Q	0.472325		

Note: The table statistically distinguishes between the parties' messaging using NLP. Panel B also presents the classification model's scores for support of the Lawyers' Movement (LM), trained on a dataset of 210 messages categorized as anti-LM, mixed, and pro-LM. The model's predictions are based on 19 available messages from political parties. The scoring process involved: (1) collecting LM-related messages from diverse sources; (2) generating clear pro- and anti-LM messages via GPT with oversampling; (3) manually annotating messages with pro-, anti-, or neutral stances on LM and selecting valid generated messages; (4) preprocessing data, including anonymization and conversion to lowercase; (5) training a CatBoostClassifier on 191 non-PML-N/PML messages using TF-IDF for text embeddings and model tuning; (6) inputting 19 party messages into the model to obtain LM support scores; and (7) calculating average scores for PML-N and PML, with the significance of differences in support levels assessed at $\alpha = 0.05$. **The observed difference in LM support scores between PML-N and PML is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.


B. Additional Figures and Tables

Figure B1: General Musharraf Approval Rating Over Time




Note: The figure presents the proportion of individuals expressing approval for President Musharraf's job as a the president. Specifically, it is the response to the question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Pervez Musharraf is handling his job?" This information is sourced from the International Republican Institute's Survey of Pakistan Public Opinion. The red vertical line marks the onset of the Lawyers Movement in March 2007.

Figure B2: Impact of CJ Visits on Vote Shares for Pro- and Anti-Lawyers Party Over Time - Standard Difference-in-Differences



Note: The figure displays pre-treatment impact of CJ Visits on Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Lawyers Movement parties. The reference year is 2002. Panel (a) represents the Pro-Lawyers Movement Vote Share, indicated by the vote share for the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N). Panel (b) represents the Anti-Lawyers Movement Vote Share, indicated by the vote share for the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). The red line indicates the timing of the Lawyers' Movement.


Figure B3: Impact of CJ Visits on Vote Shares Over Time - Synthetic Difference-in-Differences




Note: This figure presents synthetic difference-in-differences (SDID) event study estimates of the effects of the Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Lawyers Movement parties' vote shares. The panels report synthetic difference-in-differences using the cluster bootstrap method described in Section 4.4 of Clarke et al. (2023), following the procedure outlined in Algorithm 4 of Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). The dependent variable for Panel A is the Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Musharraf Vote Share, represented by the share of votes for the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N). The dependent variable for Panel B is the Anti-Lawyers Movement Vote Share or Pro-Musharraf Vote Shares, represented by the share of votes for the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Data from the 1993, 1997, 2002, and 2008 elections were utilized for this analysis, aggregated at the district level. District and Election Year Fixed Effects are included and 95% Confidence Intervals are also shown.

Figure B4: CJ Visits and Trust in Courts

Panel A: Trust in Courts - full sample with All CJ Visits




Panel B: Trust in courts - restricted sample with incidental visits




Note: The figure displays the mean trust in Courts using the FAFEN census report that was made for the year of 2016. The sample is divided by districts visited amd unvisited by the Chief Justice. The data is aggregated at the district level and is based on the ratings from 1 to 5, with 1 being the response "Not at all" and 5 being "Very much," in answer to the question "How much do you trust the district/high/Supreme Court". The 95% Confidence Intervals are also reported.

Figure B5: Usage of informal courts




Note: The figure displays the average usage of informal dispute resolution mechanisms in districts visited and unvisited by the Chief Justice. These informal mechanisms include Jirgas and Panchayats, which are local, community-based systems of justice. The sample is divided by districts visited and not visited by the Chief Justice of Pakistan during the Lawyers' Movement. The question asked in the survey was, "Are community disputes taken to a Jirga/collective Panchayat/community Panchayat for resolution?" Possible answers were "Yes" and "No," which were coded as 1 and 0 points, respectively. The figure shows the share of people using at least one informal court institution. The data is taken from the FAFEN report of 2016. The 95% confidence intervals are also reported.

Figure B6: Confidence Interval by Wild Bootstrap



Note: The figure displays estimated distributions around our coefficients of interest using wild bootstrap clustering, as per Cameron et al. (2008), which imposes a small cluster correction. Roodman et al.'s (2019) bootest in Stata 17 is used to construct this confidence interval with 999 repetitions. Cameron et al.'s (2008) wild bootstrapping procedure utilizes the Rademacher distribution with the null hypothesis imposed. It involves converting the t-statistic from the Wald test and inverting the test to compute the bounds of the confidence set under the imposed number of clusters (in our case, 64 judicial benches). The resulting "confidence curve" is plotted, providing the bootstrapped p-values that represent the limits of the confidence set. The estimated distributions for first- and second-generation judges do not appear to intersect, suggesting a reform multiplier effect, even without strict reliance on asymptotic theory. All visits sample is considered in these computations.

Figure B7: Confidence Interval by Wild Bootstrap



Note: The figure displays estimated distributions around our coefficients of interest using wild bootstrap clustering, as per Cameron et al. (2008), which imposes a small cluster correction. Roodman et al.'s (2019) bootest in Stata 17 is used to construct this confidence interval with 999 repetitions. Cameron et al.'s (2008) wild bootstrapping procedure utilizes the Rademacher distribution with the null hypothesis imposed. It involves converting the t-statistic from the Wald test and inverting the test to compute the bounds of the confidence set under the imposed number of clusters (in our case, 64 judicial benches). The resulting "confidence curve" is plotted, providing the bootstrapped p-values that represent the limits of the confidence set. The estimated distributions for first- and second-generation judges do not appear to intersect, suggesting a reform multiplier effect, even without strict reliance on asymptotic theory. Incidental visits sample is considered in these computations.

Table B1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
Panel (a): IRI Polling Dataset:					
Musharraf Approval	666	43.57289	21.68536	0	96.66666
Trust in Army	666	71.42643	12.10718	16.66667	90
Trust in Police	666	24.84095	6.508405	3.333333	40
Trust in Courts	666	59.48449	11.62996	43.33333	100
Panel (b): Election Dataset:					
Total polled votes	1,629	41587.28	32099.54	6964	247146
Share of rejected votes	1,629	0.0282243	0.0125935	0	0.1738589
PMLN	1,629	11.93999	17.06117		71.34138
PML	1,629	18.54059	18.75537	0	85.7028
Panel (c): Court Dataset:					
Pendency	1,606	12480.58	24654.51	0	436276
New Cases Filed	1,606	23035.16	37635.95	37	604970
Cases closed	1,606	22260.31	36973.57	36	611992

Note: This table provides the summary statistics for the data utilized in the study. Panel A contains polling data sourced from the International Republican Institute, aggregated by district and quarter for the period between January 2006 and January 2008. Panel B includes election data by electoral district and election years. Panel C presents court statistics from the Pakistan Judicial Statistics Reports sourced from Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, covering the years 2006 to 2022, with information on the annual number of cases filed, resolved, and pending cases at the beginning of the year. Standard deviations are calculated based on the sample distribution for each panel.

Table B2: Balance over District Characteristics

	(1) CJ Visited	(2) Mean
Panel A: All CJ Visits		
Agriculture output in 1,000,000 tonnes per 100,000 people in 2007-2008	-0.073*	0.146
	(0.041)	
Share of people satisfied by facilities in 2006-2007	-0.042	0.401
	(0.042)	
Share of people owning housing in 2006-2007	-0.058***	0.886
	(0.020)	
Share of people attended hospitals in 2006-2007	0.005	0.073
	(0.005)	
Police stations per 100,000 people in 2006	-6.372*	6.03
	(4.182)	
Cinemas per 100,000 people in 2005-2006	-0.221	0.454
	(0.162)	
Number of Protests in 2005-2006	-0.979	5.082
	(2.081)	
District Size [1,000 km^2]	-1.681	6.443
	(1.38)	
Panel B: Incidental Visits		
Agriculture output in 1,000,000 tonnes per 100,000 people in 2007-2008	-0.037	0.157
	(0.044)	
Share of people satisfied by facilities in 2006-2007	-0.055	0.402
	(0.050)	
Share of people owning housing in 2006-2007	-0.011	0.897
	(0.011)	
Share of people attended hospitals in 2006-2007	0.002	0.726
	(0.007)	
Police stations per 100,000 people in 2006	-6.618	6.491
	(4.185)	
Cinemas per 100,000 people in 2005-2006	-0.239	0.469
	(0.166)	
Number of Protests in 2005-2006	-2.751	4.864
	(1.678)	
District Size [1,000 km^2]	-0.148	6.811
	(1.831)	

Note: This table conducts a balance test comparing district characteristics across two sets of districts: those visited by the Chief Justice and those not visited (Panel A), as well as districts with incidental visits by the Chief Justice and those without any visits (Panel B). The assessment includes pre-treatment variables such as agricultural output, satisfaction with government-provided facilities or public goods, housing ownership rates, hospital attendance figures, police station density, cinema availability, the number protests, and the geographical size of the district. The data for these variables are obtained from the Pakistani Bureau of Statistics, except for Protests data that are sourced from BFRS database. Standard errors, clustered by district-level, are provided in parentheses next to the estimates. Statistical significance is denoted by asterisks: * for $p < 0.10$, ** for $p < 0.05$, and *** for $p < 0.01$.

Table B3: Impact of CJ Visits on Trust in the Police and in Formal Courts

	(1) Trust in Police %	(2) Trust in Courts %
Panel A: All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences		
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	0.377	3.903**
	(0.493)	(1.955)
Panel B: All CJ Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences		
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	0.082	2.731*
	(0.412)	(1.402)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	25.151	58.791
Observations	888	888
Panel C: Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences		
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	0.356	6.320***
	(0.567)	(2.317)
Panel D: Incidental Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences		
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	0.120	4.396**
	(0.434)	(2.006)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	25.164	58.811
Observations	816	816

Note: The table reports the results of the CJ visits on public trust in the Police and the Judiciary. Column 1 reflects responses to the question, "How would you rate your level of trust in the Police to uphold law and order fairly and justly on a scale of 1 to 100?" Column 2 corresponds to the question, "How satisfied are you with the transparency and accountability of the judicial process on a scale of 1 to 100?" The data is sourced from the International Republican Institute. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level in Panels A and C. Panels B and D report standard errors using the cluster bootstrap described in Algorithm 2 of Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). All standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. District and Quarter-by-Year Fixed Effects are always included. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B4: Impact of Chief Justice Visits on Vote Shares - Adjusted for Electoral Fraud

	Vote Share %			
	Pro-Lawyers Movement		Anti-Lawyers Movement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	4.601**	4.759**	-1.163	-1.792
	(2.008)	(1.914)	(1.545)	(1.596)
Panel B: All CJ Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	4.593***	4.623***	-1.018	-1.132
	(0.897)	(0.786)	(0.765)	(0.899)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	21.983	21.983	29.597	29.597
Observations	1638	1638	1638	1638
Panel C: Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	4.855**	5.122**	-1.356	-1.444
	(2.202)	(2.165)	(1.573)	(1.819)
Panel D: Incidental Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	4.848***	5.007***	-1.211	-0.939
	(1.145)	(1.103)	(1.027)	(1.056)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	21.437	21.437	31.96	31.96
Observations	1312	1312	1312	1312

Note: This table illustrates the impact of CJ visits on vote shares. The data pertain to electoral districts and election years. Vote shares were adjusted for election fraud based on the Free Fair Election Network's 2008 eleciton report. The Free and Fair Election Network comprised of 20,000 independent observers, deployed personnel to 25 polling stations in every electoral district. This deployment involved collecting a random sample of 1,000 registered voters to gauge their voting intentions and provide an estimate of the vote count adjusted for electoral fraud. This adjusted figure is then used as the electoral-fraud-adjusted vote count. Out of 273 electoral district observations, 206 (75.46%) were corrected for the 2008 National Assembly elections results. The Pro-Lawyers Movement Vote Share is indicated by the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N) Vote Share, while the Anti-Lawyers Movement Vote Share is indicated by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) Vote Share. Electoral District and Election Year Fixed Effects are incorporated. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level in Panels A and C. Panels B and D report standard errors using the cluster bootstrap described in Algorithm 2 of Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). All standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B5: Impact of Benazir Visits on Attitudes and Voting Choices

	Musharraf Approval and Trust in Army (%)		Vote Share %			
	Musharraf Approval	Trust in Army	Pro-Lawyers Movement		Anti-Lawyers Movemer	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: All Benazir Visits. Difference-in-Differences						
Benazir Visits X Post-Movement	-1.557	-0.971	2.505	2.226	-0.715	-1.413
	(5.264)	(2.972)	(3.201)	(2.877)	(2.354)	(2.243)
Panel B: All Benazir Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences						
Benazir Visits X Post-Movement	-1.548	0.774	2.573*	2.070*	-0.901	-1.428
	(4.055)	(1.791)	(1.354)	(1.167)	(0.704)	(0.814)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	37.574	71.472	21.468	21.468	29.456	29.456
Observations	444	444	1634	1634	1634	1634

Note: This table depicts the influence of Benazir Bhutto's visits on support for Musharraf and army in Column 1 and 2 and vote shares in Columns 3-6. “Benazir Visits” is a dummy variable that switches to 1 if former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited the district during the pre-election period in 2008. Column 1 measures approval of General Pervez Musharraf's job performance, based on responses to "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Pervez Musharraf is handling his job?" Column 2 gauges confidence in the Army's ability to ensure national security without violating human rights, rated on a 1-100 scale. Data are from the International Republican Institute. Columns (3)-(4) focus on the dependent variable of party vote share within electoral districts over time from the Election Commission of Pakistan. The share of rejected votes, total polled votes, and total registered voters are incorporated as control variables in columns (4) and (6). Trust in courts and trust in the police are included as control variables in columns (1) and (2). Panel B presents a synthetic difference-in-differences analysis using the cluster bootstrap method described in Algorithm 2 by Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are reported in parentheses for standard difference-in-differences. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B6: Impact of Chief Justice Votes on Voting Choices with Benazir Visits X Post-Movement in Controls

	Vote Share %			
	Pro-Lawyers Movement		Anti-Lawyers Movement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel (a). All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences			
CJ Visits X Post-Treatment	4.619**	4.919***	-0.948	-1.349
	(2.008)	(1.854)	(1.594)	(1.606)
	Panel (b). All CJ Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences			
CJ Visits X Post-Treatment	4.595***	5.114***	-0.861	-1.087
	(0.805)	(0.724)	(0.840)	(0.861)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	21.468	21.468	29.456	29.456
Observations	1638	1638	1638	1638
	Panel (c). Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences			
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Treatment	4.822**	4.971**	-1.049	-1.043
	(2.191)	(2.161)	(1.608)	(1.853)
	Panel (d). Incidental Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences			
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Treatment	4.798***	4.943***	-0.962	-0.747
	(1.165)	(1.183)	(1.033)	(1.100)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	20.967	20.967	31.947	31.947
Observations	1312	1312	1312	1312

Note: This table presents the effect of Chief Justice (CJ) visits on vote shares, controlling for former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's visits X Post-Movement. The Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Musharraf Vote Share are represented by the total vote share for the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N). Conversely, the Anti-Lawyers Movement and Pro-Musharraf Vote Share are indicated by the total vote share for the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q). "CJ Visits" is a dummy treatment variable that switches to 1 if the dismissed Chief Justice of Pakistan visited the district. "CJ Incidental Visits" switches to 1 for incidental or en route visits. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level in Panels A and C. Panels B and D report standard errors using the cluster bootstrap method described in Algorithm 2 by Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). All standard errors are shown in parentheses. The share of rejected votes, total polled votes, total registered voters, and Benazir Visits X Post-Movement are included as control variables in columns (2) and (4). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B7: Impact of Chief Justice Votes on Voting Choices with Baseline Interactive Effects - Control Function Approach

	Vote Share %					
	Pro-Lawyers Movement			Anti-Lawyers Movement		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel (a). All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences					
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	4.350**	4.701***	4.377**	-2.088	-0.794	-0.574
	(1.786)	(1.748)	(1.726)	(1.524)	(1.588)	(1.582)
	Panel (b). All CJ Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences					
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	4.189***	3.322***	3.315***	-1.645**	-0.528	-0.631
	(0.838)	(0.999)	(1.008)	(0.825)	(1.118)	(1.058)
Year, District FEs and Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-Economic Factors X Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Public Goods X Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Political Violence X Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	21.468	21.468	21.468	29.456	29.456	29.456
Observations	1638	1638	1638	1638	1638	1638
	Panel (c). Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences					
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	4.803**	4.580***	4.536***	-1.350	-0.502	-0.400
	(1.894)	(1.713)	(1.718)	(1.750)	(1.709)	(1.708)
	Panel (d). Incidental Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences					
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	4.850***	4.280***	4.302***	-0.838	-0.149	-0.239
	(1.009)	(1.201)	(1.064)	(1.162)	(1.160)	(0.821)
Year, District FEs and Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-Economic Factors X Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Public Goods X Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Political Violence X Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	20.967	20.967	20.967	31.947	31.947	31.947
Observations	1312	1312	1312	1312	1312	1312

Note: This table illustrates the impact of CJ visits on vote shares in districts with pre-treatment outcomes interacted with year FE. These include: Socio-Economic variables, which encompass the proportion of people owning their homes and the average monthly income in the district in 2006. Public Goods are the variables: police stations and cinemas in districts in 2006. Political violence is measured by the tally of politically-related protests in each district for 2006. All these variables are interacted with election year dummies. The dependent variable is the vote share of the party in the electoral district. The Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Musharraf Vote Share are represented by the total vote share for PML-N. Conversely, the Anti-Lawyers Movement and Pro-Musharraf Vote Share are indicated by the total vote share for the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q). "CJ Visits" is a dummy treatment variable that switches to 1 if the dismissed Chief Justice of Pakistan visited the district. "CJ Incidental Visits" switches to 1 for incidental or en route visits. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level in Panels A and C. Panels B and D report standard errors using the cluster bootstrap method described in Algorithm 2 by Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). All standard errors are shown in parentheses. The share of rejected votes, total polled votes, total registered voters, and Benazir Visits X Post-Movement are included as control variables in columns (2) and (4). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B8: Impact of Chief Justice Visits on Vote Shares by Prior Penetration of Private Media

	Vote Share %			
	Pro-Lawyers Movement		Anti-Lawyers Movement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: All visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-3.077	-1.582	-1.310	-3.553
X Private Media 2006	(4.615)	(4.695)	(3.607)	(3.873)
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	5.813**	5.565**	0.086	0.362
	(2.513)	(2.449)	(1.579)	(1.477)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	21.468	21.468	29.456	29.456
Observations	1638	1638	1638	1638
Panel B: Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	0.809	3.132	-3.383	-6.772**
X Private Media 2006	(3.840)	(3.974)	(2.852)	(3.235)
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	4.711*	4.305*	-0.581	-0.089
	(2.530)	(2.395)	(1.647)	(1.557)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	20.967	20.967	31.947	31.947
Observations	1312	1312	1312	1312

Note: This table presents the effect of Chief Justice (CJ) visits on vote shares. The Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Musharraf Vote Share are represented by the total vote shares for the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N). Conversely, the Anti-Lawyers Movement and Pro-Musharraf Vote Share are indicated by the total vote share for the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q). "CJ Visits" is a dummy treatment variable that switches to 1 if the dismissed Chief Justice of Pakistan visited the district. "CJ Incidental Visits" switches to 1 for incidental or en route visits. CJ Visits X Private Media 2006 is the CJ Visits interacted with the dummy for presence of a private media radio station in the district in the pre-treatment year of 2006. Private Media 2006 is a dummy that switches to 1 if there was a private radio station in the district by 2006, and to 0 otherwise. District and Election Year Fixed Effects are included. The share of rejected votes, total polled votes, and total registered voters are added as control variables in columns (2) and (4). Standard errors are clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B9: Impact of Chief Justice Visits on Vote Shares by Electoral Fraud Measure

	Vote Share %			
	Pro-Lawyers Movement		Anti-Lawyers Movement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel (a). All CJ Visits				
CJ Visits X Post Movement	-8.583	-11.890	8.943	14.330*
X Election Fraud 2002	(10.928)	(9.242)	(9.825)	(8.466)
CJ Visits X Post Movement	6.934	8.300**	-3.451	-5.661*
	(4.539)	(4.081)	(3.706)	(3.342)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	21.468	21.468	29.456	29.456
Observations	1634	1634	1634	1634
Panel (b). Incidental Visits				
CJ Visits Incidental X Post Movement	-13.384	-13.776	13.768	15.636
X Election Fraud 2002	(13.890)	(14.104)	(13.573)	(12.736)
CJ Visits Incidental X Post Movement	8.972	9.105	-5.446	-6.160
	(5.465)	(5.701)	(5.088)	(5.036)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	20.996	20.996	31.947	31.947
Observations	1306	1306	1306	1306

Note: This table presents the effect of Chief Justice (CJ) visits on vote shares. The Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Musharraf Vote Share are represented by the total vote shares for the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N). Conversely, the Anti-Lawyers Movement and Pro-Musharraf Vote Share are indicated by the total vote share for the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q). "CJ Visits" is a dummy treatment variable that switches to 1 if the dismissed Chief Justice of Pakistan visited the district. "CJ Incidental Visits" switches to 1 for incidental or en route visits. CJ Visits X Election Fraud 2002 is a dummy treatment variable interacted with the share of rejected votes in 2002 for the electoral district. District and time-varying fixed effects are included in all columns. Total polled votes and total registered voters are added as control variables in columns (2) and (4). Standard errors are clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B10: Causal Mediation Analysis of Mechanisms

	Vote Share %		
	Bar Associations 2006	Private Media exposure 2006	Electoral Fraud 2002
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel (a). Impact on Pro-Lawyers Movement Party			
Natural Indirect Effect via Mediator	6.296***	0.341	2.752
(NIE)	(2.056)	(0.495)	(4.847)
Natural Direct Effect not via Mediator	-1.467	4.527*	1.982
(NDE)	(1.162)	(2.394)	(5.094)
Total Effect	4.829**	4.868**	4.734**
(TE)	(2.094)	(2.110)	(2.161)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	20.996	20.996	20.996
Observations	1306	1306	1306
Panel (b). Impact on Anti-Lawyers Movement Party			
Natural Indirect Effect via Mediator	-1.391	-0.813	-1.511
(NIE)	(1.999)	(0.765)	(2.966)
Natural Direct Effect not via Mediator	0.809	0.253	0.763
(NDE)	(2.066)	(1.644)	(4.006)
Total Effect	-0.582	-0.560	-0.748
(TE)	(1.611)	(1.613)	(1.636)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	31.947	31.947	31.947
Observations	1306	1306	1306

Note: This table presents the direct and indirect effects of Chief Justice (CJ) visits on vote shares. The Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Musharraf Vote Share are represented by the total vote shares for the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N). Conversely, the Anti-Lawyers Movement and Pro-Musharraf Vote Shares are indicated by the total vote share for the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q). The Total Effect (TE) encapsulates the impact on vote shares, encompassing both mediated and unmediated pathways. The Natural Direct Effect (NDE) isolates the portion of the TE that bypasses the mediator, directly linking CJ Visits to vote shares, while the Natural Indirect Effect (NIE) captures the influence exerted through the mediator and is our object of interest. Controls for the total polled votes and total registered voters are added in columns (1)-(3) as in baseline regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B11: Impact of CJ Visits on Political Participation

	Turnout	
	(1)	(2)
Panel (A). All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences		
CJ Visits	0.014	-0.001
	(0.024)	(0.007)
Panel (b). All CJ Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences		
CJ Visits	0.014**	0.015***
	(0.006)	(0.005)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Electoral District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	0.427	0.427
Observations	1638	1638
Panel (c). Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences		
CJ Visits	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.029)	(0.006)
Panel (d). Incidental Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences		
CJ Visits	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Electoral District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	0.436	0.436
Observations	1312	1312

Note: Observations correspond to districts and election years. The dependent variable is the voter turnout in the electoral district (constituency). "CJ Visits" is a dummy treatment variable that switches to 1 if the Chief Justice Chaudhry visited the district during the pre-election period in 2008. "CJ Incidental Visits" switches to 1 if Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry incidentally visited the district during the pre-election period in 2008 (the visit was not planned; he stopped there en route to his planned destination). The share of rejected votes, total polled votes, and total registered voters are added as control variables in column (2). Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level in Panels A and C. Panels B and D report standard errors using the cluster bootstrap method described in Algorithm 2 by Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). All standard errors are shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B12: Impact of CJ Visits on Other Political Parties

	Vote Share %	
	Other Parties	
	(1)	(2)
Panel (a). All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences		
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-2.339	-1.736
	(2.189)	(2.333)
Panel (b). All CJ Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences		
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-2.676**	-1.749
	(1.365)	(1.431)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	45.584	45.584
Observations	1638	1638
Panel (c). Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences		
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	-0.133	-0.357
	(2.500)	(2.325)
Panel (d). Incidental Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences		
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	-0.470	-0.605
	(1.634)	(1.534)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	44.007	44.007
Observations	1312	1312

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the electoral district level and are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is the mean vote share in the electoral district for all parties except the pro- and anti-Lawyers Party. CJ Visits is a dummy treatment variable that switches to 1 if Chief Justice Chaudhry visited the district during the pre-election period in 2008; CJ Incidental Visits switches to 1 if Chief Justice Chaudhry incidentally visited the district during the pre-election period in 2008 (the visit was not planned, and he stopped there on the way to his planned destination). Panels B and D report synthetic difference-in-differences using the cluster bootstrap described in Algorithm 2 of Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). The share of rejected votes, total polled votes, and total registered voters are included as control variables in column (2). $*$ $p < 0.10$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$.

Table B13: Impact of Visits by Other of Leaders of the Movement

	Musharraf Approval and Trust in Army %		Vote Share %	
	Musharraf Approval	Trust in Army	Pro-Lawyers Movement	Anti-Lawyers Movement
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel (a). Ali Ahmad Kurd Visits. Difference-in-Differences			
Leader 1 Visits X Post-Movement	-16.469***	-9.835***	5.655***	-1.269
	(2.365)	(1.701)	(2.076)	(1.878)
	Panel (b). Ali Ahmad Kurd Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences			
Leader 1 Visits X Post-Movement	-15.881***	-8.808***	5.953***	-1.628**
	(2.534)	(1.351)	(0.901)	(0.771)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	45.343	71.426	21.468	29.456
Observations	666	666	1638	1638
	Panel (c). Aitazaz Ahsan Visits. Difference-in-Differences			
Leader 2 Visits X Post-Movement	-11.544***	-10.104***	8.801***	-3.102
	(2.323)	(2.073)	(1.948)	(2.134)
	Panel (d). Aitazaz Ahsan Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences			
Leader 2 Visits X Post-Movement	-11.382***	-8.513***	9.070***	-3.423***
	(3.013)	(1.364)	(1.280)	(0.939)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	45.343	71.426	21.468	29.456
Observations	666	666	1638	1638

Note: This table illustrates the impact of visits by two prominent leaders of the Lawyers' Movement on approval ratings for General Musharraf, the military, and vote share distributions. Column 1 measures approval of General Pervez Musharraf's job performance, based on responses to "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Pervez Musharraf is handling his job?" Column 2 gauges confidence in the Army's ability to ensure national security without violating human rights, rated on a 1-100 scale. Data are from the International Republican Institute. Columns (3)-(4) focus on the dependent variable of party vote share within electoral districts from the Election Commission of Pakistan. The Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Musharraf sentiment are captured by the vote share for the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N), while the Anti-Lawyers Movement and Pro-Musharraf sentiment are reflected in the vote share for the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q). Panels A and B present the effects of visits by Ali Ahmad Kurd, while Panels C and D detail the visits by Aitzaz Ahsan. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level in Panels A and C. Panels B and D report standard errors using the cluster bootstrap method described in Algorithm 2 by Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). All standard errors are shown in parentheses. The share of rejected votes, total polled votes, total registered voters are included as control variables in columns (2) and (4). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B14: Alternative Mechanism to Lawyers Network

	Musharraf Approval and Trust in Army %		Vote Share %	
	Musharraf Approval	Trust in Army	Pro-Lawyers Movement	Anti-Lawyers Movement
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	1.817	-0.049	1.007	-5.683
X Madrassa Network	(4.642)	(1.750)	(4.191)	(3.728)
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-10.759**	-8.884***	3.728	2.886
X Bar Association in 2006	(4.466)	(2.523)	(4.075)	(3.222)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	43.573	71.426	21.468	29.456
Observations	666	666	1638	1638
Panel B: Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	2.215	-3.041	-3.274	-2.720
X Madrassa Network	(4.977)	(3.087)	(2.405)	(3.082)
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-16.626***	-8.527**	7.107***	-1.041
X Bar Association in 2006	(5.258)	(3.660)	(2.223)	(2.203)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	44.928	71.710	20.967	31.947
Observations	612	612	1312	1312

Note: This table illustrates the mediating impact of religious schools and lawyers bar association networks on approval ratings for General Musharraf, the military, and vote share distributions. Column 1 measures approval of General Pervez Musharraf's job performance, based on responses to "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Pervez Musharraf is handling his job?" Column 2 gauges confidence in the Army's ability to ensure national security without violating human rights, rated on a 1-100 scale. Data are from the International Republican Institute. Columns (3)-(4) focus on the dependent variable of party vote share within electoral districts from the Election Commission of Pakistan. The Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Musharraf sentiment are captured by the vote share for the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N), while the Anti-Lawyers Movement and Pro-Musharraf sentiment are reflected in the vote share for the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q). The share of rejected votes, total polled votes, total registered voters are included as control variables in columns (3) and (4). The data on bar associations reflects their status as of 2006 and network on religious schools is obtain from the 1998 census. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B15: Impact of Chief Justice Visits - Robustness to Alternative Fixed Effects and Conley Spatial Correlation Corrections

	Vote Share %			
	Pro-Lawyers Movement		Anti-Lawyers Movement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel (a). All CJ Visits				
P-value Baseline	0.024	0.014	0.574	0.343
P-value with electoral district fixed effects	0.114	0.060	0.709	0.655
P-value with electoral district clustering	<0.01	<0.01	0.302	0.231
P-Value Randomization Inference	0.029	0.019	0.687	0.376
P-Value Spatial Correlation	0.002	0.001	0.454	0.204
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	21.468	21.468	29.456	29.456
Observations	1638	1638	1638	1638
Panel (b). Incidental Visits				
P-value Baseline	0.031	0.020	0.512	0.523
P-value with electoral district fixed effects	0.129	0.107	0.676	0.797
P-value with electoral district clustering	<0.01	<0.01	0.353	0.578
P-Value (randomization inference)	0.051	0.035	0.625	0.634
P-Value Spatial Correlation	0.002	0.001	0.389	0.405
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	20.996	20.996	31.984	31.984
Observations	1310	1310	1310	1310

Note: This table represents the effect of CJ visits on election outcomes with different spatial correlation corrections. Observations correspond to electoral districts and election years. Spatial Correlation refers to the Conley Spatial Correlation method and cutoff refers to the radius where spatial dependence is assumed to be zero.

Table B16: Impact of Chief Justice Visits on Vote Shares. Balochistan excluded

	Vote Share %			
	Pro-Lawyers Movement		nti-Lawyers Movement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel (a). All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences			
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	4.514**	4.582**	-0.758	-1.331
	(2.026)	(1.921)	(1.592)	(1.637)
	Panel (b). All CJ Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences			
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	4.511***	4.560***	-0.600	-1.055
	(0.748)	(1.064)	(0.877)	(0.838)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	21.818	21.818	29.736	29.736
Observations	1600	1600	1600	1600
	Panel (c). Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences			
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	4.718**	4.866**	-0.859	-0.841
	(2.208)	(2.161)	(1.607)	(1.886)
	Panel (d). Incidental Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences			
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	4.715***	4.893***	-0.701	-0.604
	(1.001)	(1.374)	(1.061)	(1.007)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	21.411	21.411	32.372	32.372
Observations	1274	1274	1274	1274

Note: This table presents the effect of CJ visits on vote shares when all districts of Balochistan province is excluded. The Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Musharraf Vote Share are represented by the share of total votes for PML-N. The Anti-Lawyers Movement and Pro-Musharraf Vote Share are represented by the share of total votes for PML-Q. "CJ Visits" is a dummy treatment variable that switches to 1 if the dismissed Chief Justice of Pakistan visited the district during the pre-election period in 2008. “CJ Incidental Visits” switches to 1 for incidental or enroute visits (the visit was not planned; he stopped there en route to his planned destination). Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level in Panels A and C. Panels B and D report standard errors using the cluster bootstrap described in Algorithm 2 of Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). All standard errors are reported in parentheses. The share of rejected votes, total polled votes, and total registered voters and Benazir Visits X Post-Movement are added as control variables in columns (2) and (4). $*$ $p < 0.10$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$.

Table B17: Impact of Chief Justice Visits on Attitudes - Adjusting for Multiple Hypothesis Testing

	Musharraf Approval %		Trust in Army %	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-18.199***	-17.446***	-9.516***	-9.996***
	(2.116)	(2.209)	(1.129)	(1.412)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]***	[0.001]***	[0.001]***	[0.001]***
Romano-Wolf corrected p-value	{0.001}***	{0.001}***	{0.001}***	{0.001}***
Panel B: All CJ Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	-18.326***	-17.687***	-9.514***	-9.612***
	(1.995)	(1.841)	(1.145)	(1.216)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	43.573	43.573	71.426	71.426
Observations	666	666	666	666
Panel C: Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	-19.870***	-19.125***	-11.322***	-12.566***
	(2.702)	(2.797)	(1.454)	(2.119)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]***	[0.001]***	[0.001]***	[0.001]***
Romano-Wolf corrected p-value	{0.001}***	{0.002}***	{0.001}***	{0.002}***
Panel D: Incidental Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	-20.008***	-19.410***	-11.320***	-11.619***
	(3.479)	(3.172)	(1.884)	(1.511)
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	44.928	44.928	71.710	71.710
Observations	612	612	612	612

Note: This table presents the effect of CJ visits on General Musharraf's approval rating and trust in the army. Unit of observation is district-quarter. Columns (1)-(2) report results on approval of General Pervez Musharraf. Specifically, the dependent variable in these Columns is the response to the question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Pervez Musharraf is handling his job?" The dependent variable in Columns 3-4 represents the response to the question: "How confident are you in the Army's ability to maintain national security without compromising human rights on a scale of 1 to 100?" The data are sourced from the International Republican Institute. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level in Panels A and C and reported in parenthesis. Multiple hypothesis-adjusted FDR q-values in square brackets and FWER-adjusted p-values in curly braces are also reported in Panel A and C. Panels B and D report standard errors using the cluster bootstrap described in Algorithm 2 of Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). $*$ p < 0.10, $**$ p < 0.05, $***$ p < 0.01.

Table B18: Impact of Chief Justice Visits on Voting Choices - Adjusting for Multiple Hypothesis Testing

	Vote Share %			
	Pro-Lawyers Movement		Anti-Lawyers Movement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: All CJ Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	4.615**	4.793**	-0.948	-1.590
	(2.007)	(1.905)	(1.595)	(1.641)
Sharpened q-value	[0.049]**	[0.049]**	[0.384]	[0.285]
Romano-Wolf corrected p-value	{0.003}***	{0.003}***	{0.349}	{0.137}
Panel B: All CJ Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Visits X Post-Movement	4.595***	4.650***	-0.861	-1.019
	(0.831)	(0.847)	(0.854)	(0.860)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	21.468	21.468	29.456	29.456
Observations	1638	1638	1638	1638
Panel C: Incidental Visits. Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	4.819**	5.096**	-1.050	-1.173
	(2.191)	(2.150)	(1.610)	(1.835)
Sharpened q-value	[0.066]*	[0.066]*	[0.318]	[0.318]
Romano-Wolf corrected p-value	{0.011}**	{0.007}***	{0.423}	{0.423}
Panel D: Incidental Visits. Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				
CJ Incidental Visits X Post-Movement	4.798***	4.965***	-0.962	-0.695
	(1.146)	(1.195)	(1.180)	(1.023)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	20.967	20.967	31.947	31.947
Observations	1312	1312	1312	1312

Note: This table presents the effect of CJ visits on vote shares. The Pro-Lawyers Movement and Anti-Musharraf Vote Share are represented by the share of total votes for Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N). The Anti-Lawyers Movement and Pro-Musharraf Vote Share are represented by the share of total votes for Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q). "CJ Visits" is a dummy treatment variable that switches to 1 if the dismissed Chief Justice of Pakistan visited the district during the pre-election period in 2008. “CJ Incidental Visits” switches to 1 for incidental or enroute visits (the visit was not planned. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level in Panels A and C. Multiple hypothesis-adjusted FDR q-values in square brackets and FWER-adjusted p-values in curly braces are also reported in Panel A and C. Panels B and D report standard errors using the cluster bootstrap described in Algorithm 2 of Arkhangelsky et al. (2021). All standard errors are reported in parentheses. The share of rejected votes, total polled votes, and total registered voters and Benazir Visits X Post-Movement are added as control variables in columns (2) and (4). $*$ $p < 0.10$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$.