Leadership and Coup Support:

Evidence from 1936 Spain

Vitor Calafate
FGV EPGE

Lucas Carvalho
FGV EPGE

Marcos Salgado*
FGV EPGE

September 3, 2024

Abstract

We study why subordinates followed their leaders in the Spanish Coup of 1936. We find that the 1936 chain of command was widely broken, but subordinates followed their former leaders. Officers who had served under rebel leaders before 1936 were thirteen percentage points more likely to join the rebellion. Our identification strategy exploits rotation among military leaders to compare officers exposed to rebel leaders to their peers who served in the same destination a few years before or after. We show that our control and treatment samples are balanced in many covariates and that our findings are not driven by selection. We also study the mechanisms behind our results, ruling out indoctrination and finding support for leaders as coordination devices and for expectations of promotions.

1 Introduction

On July 17, 1936, a military uprising intended to overthrow the Spanish Republic. The rebels failed to overthrow the government, but the government also failed to fully suppress the uprising. The army was split in two, with 35% of the officer corps in our sample supporting the government and 65% the rebels. Because of this split, we can study what

*marcos.salgado@fgv.br. We are grateful to Bruno Barsanetti, Valentin Figueroa, and seminar participants at FGV EPGE and the Workshop Carioca de Economia Politica for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge support from Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - Brasil (CAPES), Finance Code 001.

drove the decisions of five thousand military officers. Since 22% of the officers in our sample died during the conflict, we argue that we are studying the most crucial decision of their lives: whether to support the rebellion or stay loyal to the Republic. The coup led to a three-year civil war that foreshadowed the horrors of World War Two, with almost half a million casualties.

Our paper focuses on the role of military leadership in the Spanish coup of 1936. In particular, we study the influence of *former* leaders. The Republic was adept at placing reliable generals in crucial command positions. Still, the chain of command was broadly disrupted, and the loyalty of key generals failed to secure overwhelming support. Conversely, previous leaders continued to wield influence over their former subordinates. An officer who had served (before 1936) under a rebel leader was 13 percentage points more likely to join the rebellion than a comparable officer who served in the same destination under retired or neutral leaders. Our result is not symmetrical, as we observe no effect of past exposure to loyal generals.

Our identification strategy exploits (arguably exogenous) rotation among military leaders. We compare officers who were exposed to rebel leaders to their peers who served a few years earlier or later in the same post but were not exposed. We show that, after accounting for destination fixed effects, treated subordinates are very similar to control subordinates in a large number of observable characteristics. Moreover, we show that our findings are not driven by selection: subordinates who arrived at a destination with or after the rebel leader (and therefore may have been hired by him) are not more likely to rebel than those who were there before.

Surprisingly, the influence of former leaders surpasses the influence of 1936 leaders. After controlling for past exposure, those serving under a rebel leader in 1936 are only nine percentage points more likely to rebel. This finding shows the limits of a coup-proofing strategy that relies only on rotation, and it highlights the challenges new democracies face. Many of the rebel leaders in our sample advanced their careers (and therefore influenced a large number of subordinates) during the previous dictatorship, and they managed to gather support for the rebellion despite not occupying key positions in 1936.

We also develop a model that rationalizes our results and illustrates what mechanisms could be driving them. In doing so, we contribute to the literature on leadership, helping to answer the question: why do people follow leaders? We contemplate three potential

mechanisms: coordination, indoctrination, and career concerns (promotions).

In our model, subordinates need to decide which side to support with limited information. We make two key assumptions: that the coup's success depends on the number of rebel generals and that subordinates do not know the allegiance of every general, but they know who their former leaders support. In an attempt to join the winning side, they follow their sample of generals. Therefore, past leaders wield influence because they *coordinate* the actions of their subordinates. This first mechanism is rooted in the *present* (i.e., in July 1936).

Subordinates may also have an ideological preference for either side, and these beliefs may have been shaped by their former leaders, i.e., they may have been *indoctrinated*. This mechanism places the influence of leadership in the *past*.

Lastly, subordinates who had previous relationships with rebel leaders may have expected material benefits from supporting a coup. Superiors may prefer to *promote* their former subordinates (perhaps because they have a more precise signal of their ability), and those superiors will have vastly superior means to give promotions if they find themselves on the winning side of a coup. Therefore, subordinates with former rebel leaders have a vested interest in the success of the coup. This mechanism places the leaders' influence in the *future*.

We next proceed to test whether each of these mechanisms played a role. We find suggestive evidence for coordination and promotions but none for indoctrination. We first test coordination by assuming that some generals are more important than others for coup success. In particular, the support of those in command of troops in July 1936 was perceived as key.[1] We do, in fact, find that rebel generals with command of troops had more influence on their former subordinates.

To study whether the indoctrination mechanism played a role, we leverage a succesful coup from 1923 and a failed one from 1932. We classify those generals who supported these uprisings but were not around in 1936 (dead or retired) as "placebo authoritarians". If indoctrination was behind our results, subordinates who served under them should disproportionately support the 1936 coup. However, their effects are small and not statistically significant. This remains the case even when we focus on those who (from retirement)

[1]We do find that the chain of command was widely broken, i.e., that current generals did not have an overwhelming influence over their subordinates. However, this was not obvious ex-ante. In fact, the government's coup-proofing strategy consisted of placing reliable generals in charge of the military districts (Payne (2017), p. 316, see more in Section 2).

endorsed the 1936 coup. Therefore, we find no evidence for the *indoctrination* mechanism.

We also leverage the 1923 coup and the dictatorship it installed to find evidence for the *promotions* mechanism. This dictatorship lasted until 1931 when elections were called and the Second Spanish Republic was inaugurated. We show that subordinates who were exposed to the leaders of the 1923 coup were promoted more rapidly during the dictatorship but not during the Republic (i.e. their promotions slowed down after 1931). Therefore, we conclude that relationships with influential leaders were a determinant of promotions in Spain. It is reasonable to assume that forward-looking officers assumed that those relationships would also matter in the future[2].

Next, we include a series of robustness checks on our results. We only list the most important two here. First, we remove concerns about reverse causality by dropping the highest-raked subordinates from our dataset. Second, we use the methods developed by Oster (2019) and Diegert et al. (2022), among others, to show that selection on unobservables would have to be implausibly large to explain away our results.

In Appendix Section A.3, we show an example from our dataset that highlights both how we built our dataset and illustrates the mechanisms behind our results. There are two characters in this example: Major Cuesta Monereo (a subordinate) and General Miguel Cabanellas (a leader). Cuesta was Cabanellas' *aide-de-camp* in 1934, and since the latter was a leader of the rebellion, the former is classified as "treated" in our dataset. In 1936, Cuesta was serving under a loyalist general, but he rebelled anyway. Before 1936, Cabanellas was a committed republican, so it is unlikely that he indoctrinated Cuestas with anti-republican ideals. We cannot establish for certain why Cuesta supported the rebellion, but two things are clear: First, he had a deep knowledge of the conspiracy and had, therefore, a good idea about its probability of success. Importantly, he was aware of Cabanellas' involvement (unlike the government). Second, during and after the Civil War, Cuesta got promoted very rapidly, reaching the very top of the Army's hierarchy.

This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, to the understanding of military coups, which are responsible for 75% of democratic failures (Marinov and Goemans (2014)) and are, therefore, the most significant threat to democracy. After the usually small group of conspirators launch a coup attempt, its success or failure depends almost entirely

[2]We are unable to verify whether this was the case. Our data source (the military yearbooks) is only available until 1936.

on how the rest of the military reacts (Singh (2014), pg. 5). Despite their importance, the drivers of coup participation are poorly understood. La Parra-Pérez (2020) also studies the 1936 Spanish coup. He shows that professional and economic interests influenced officers' decisions: for example, those who got promoted under the Republic were more likely to stay loyal and those who got demoted were more likely to rebel. Naidu et al. (2021) shows that Haiti's most central families were more likely to support a coup and benefitted more afterward.

We also contribute to the literature on leadership. Previous theoretical work has emphasized the role of persuasion (Caillaud and Tirole (2007)), coordination (Akerlof and Holden (2016), Loeper et al. (2014)), visibility and modification of social norms (Acemoglu and Jackson (2015), example or sacrifice (Hermalin (1998)), and monitoring (Calvo and Wellisz (1978)). Empirically, Dippel and Heblich (2021) study the role of leaders in the movement against slavery. Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bandiera et al. (2020), and Jones and Olken (2005) study the effects of leaders on firm policies, firm performance, and macroeconomic outcomes respectively. Our paper complements work by Cagé et al. (2023), who show that the home municipalities of French regiments led by Petain at Verdun were more likely to support authoritarian views and to collaborate with the Nazis[3]. Our paper contributes to this literature by explicitly testing three different theoretical mechanisms, helping to answer the question: why do individuals follow leaders?

Further, we contribute to the literature on the Spanish Civil War. Though we do not summarize the historical literature here, some relevant works are Payne (2012), Payne (2017), and Thomas (2001). McLauchlin and Parra-Pérez (2019) studies executions of military officers. Balcells (2011) and Balcells (2012) study violence and victimization in Catalonia and Aragon. Tur-Prats and Valencia Caicedo (2020), Rodon (2024), and Oto-Peralías (2015) (among others) study the long-term effects of the war. More generally, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of democratic breakdown and the rise of fascism[4].

[3]The reflection problem (Manski (1993)) makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of leaders from the preferences of their followers (which may endogenously determine the leader's rise). Our identification strategy exploits turnover in leaders to identify effects on subordinates. Some papers that use a similar strategy are: Jia et al. (2015), Salgado (2023), Shih et al. (2012), Voth and Xu (2020), and Xu (2018). Relatedly, Jha and Wilkinson (2012) and Grosjean et al. (2023) also use variation in military assignments for identification.

[4]For example, Acemoglu et al. (2022), Adena et al. (2015), Galofré-Vilà et al. (2021), Koenig (2023), Satyanath et al. (2017), and Voth and Voigtlander (forthcoming).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides relevant historical background. Section 3 outlines the model and provides some empirical predictions for the three proposed mechanisms. 4 presents our data sources and estimation strategies. Section 5 presents our main results, and subsections 5.1 and 5.2 respectively test the three mechanisms and subject our main results to robustness checks. In the Appendix, Section A.1 outlines proofs for our model, and Section A.2 includes additional tables. Lastly, Section A.3 recounts the biography of Major Cuesta Monereo, highlighting both how we built our dataset and illustrating the mechanisms behind our results.

2 Historical Context

The setting for this paper is the Spanish Coup of 17-21 July 1936. Tensions between the left and the right (or monarchists vs. republicans, Catholic integrists vs. secularists, etc.) date back to the nineteenth century. The involvement of the military in civilian politics also had a long tradition. In this section, however, we provide only a very brief background to the coup.

A left-wing coalition won the elections of February 1936. The newly formed government proceeded to remove suspect generals from key posts, successfully guessing many of their allegiances[5]. The conspiracy was led by General Mola and intended to have then-exiled General Sanjurjo (then in exile) as its figurehead. Franco himself was hesitant, and the main plotters did not intend for him to play a major role in the government. On 13 July (five days before the coup), right-wing politician Calvo-Sotelo was murdered by a socialist officer. The assassination precipitated the coup, and it may have convinced Franco to join (Preston (2015), ch. 5).

The uprising started on July 17^{th} in Africa. Important provincial capitals like Burgos, Córdoba, and Sevilla had been taken by the 19^{th}, but others like Barcelona, Valencia, and more importantly, Madrid, stayed in the government's hands until much later. In summary,

[5]Franco was removed as chief of staff and sent to the Canary Islands, Mola was removed as general of the Army of Africa and given a smaller command in Pamplona, Goded was sent to the Balearic Islands. An important exception was Miguel Cabanellas, who had a reputation as a republican and was put in charge of the 5^{th} military district. Payne (2017) writes: "The government had in fact taken more than a few measures to keep the army under control. Nearly all the top command assignments had been changed, and most of the generals with active commands were, as events proved, loyal to the regime." (p. 316). Also, in Payne (2012): "The government had not erred in its calculation that most generals in active command were loyal; very few joined the rebellion, Franco and Miguel Cabanellas, who commanded a division in Zaragoza, being the only two active major generals to do so... in many garrisons the role of middle-rank and junior officers was decisive" (p. 76).

the government failed to suppress the rebellion but managed to keep control of about half of the country and half of the army (for example, 53% of the officers in our sample were located in Republican-controlled territory in July 1936). The territory of Spain was therefore divided in two (see map in Figure 1).

The coup's mixed success can be explained by a divided military. Fifty-one generals supported the coup, and thirty-four opposed it. Among those in charge of the eight military districts (arguably the most strategic posts), six remained loyal. On both sides, many generals failed to keep their troops in line[6]. The ground was set for the Spanish Civil War, which lasted until 1939 and involved half a million casualties. Early in 1939, the rebels occupied Madrid and declared victory. Francisco Franco became dictator and remained so until his death in 1975.

Figure 1: Map of Spain in July 1936



Source: Payne (2012). Darker areas were controlled by the rebels.

Our sample is divided between officers serving in the Republican and Rebel areas imme-

[6]For example, in Morocco, General Romerales remained loyal to the Republic, but was imprisoned and later executed by his subordinates. Payne (2017) writes: "Around 4:00 AM on the nineteenth [prime minister] Martinez Barrio began to contact district military commanders by telephone... he found that several of those loyal to the regime had been virtually deposed by younger officers." (p. 336).

diately after the coup. We observe almost no variation in our dependent variable within the Rebel Zone (93.8% of the officers supported the rebels). In contrast, the Republican Zone has significant variation (65.1% supported the rebels, 34.9% stayed loyal). La Parra-Pérez (2020) argues that the dissimilar strategies adopted by each side explain this difference. The rebels imposed discipline and repression to intimidate those loyal to the government. In contrast, the government issued a decree declaring that "all the troops in which officers have positioned themselves against republican legality are discharged" (La Parra-Pérez (2020), p. 18). Since most units had experienced some attempt at rebellion, this act gave freedom of action to the entire military. In short, the rebel strategy was to secure the support of the entire military, while the government deeply suspected it (and therefore proceeded to arm the people)[7].

In the next paragraphs, we give short accounts of two earlier coups, which are not part of our main analysis but which we use to test mechanisms in section 5.1.

Primo de Rivera's 1923 Coup. In 1923, a military coup overthrew a democratic government and installed a dictatorship with the support of the king. The coup was led in Barcelona by General Primo de Rivera and in Madrid by a group of four generals known as the *Cuadrilátero* (quadrilateral). The resulting government was a military dictatorship, with Primo de Rivera as president and a Military Directory consisting of eight generals and one admiral.

In 1930, Primo de Rivera resigned and appointed a transition government, led by General Dámaso Berenguer. Democracy returned in 1931 with elections, a new constitution, and the abolition of the monarchy. Among the first acts of the republican government was a military reform that reduced the number of officers and overhauled the divisional structure. Many monarchist officers (and most of the supporters of the 1923 coup) retired then.

1932 Coup Attempt *(Sanjurjada).* On August 10, 1932, military officers attempted a coup. Among the conspirators were monarchist generals who had participated in Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, such as José Cavalcanti and Emilio Barrera. The government had full knowledge of the conspiracy and successfully repressed the coup in Madrid, imprisoning the main plotters. General Sanjurjo led an uprising in Sevilla, successfully taking control

[7]This was confirmed by the President of the Republic, Manuel Azaña, who wrote in a post-war book: "Aiming at leaving the leaders of the coup without troops, the government freed all soldiers from obeisance to their superiors. Obviously, this decree was not followed in those cities already under rebel control, but it applied to important towns under republican command... Soldiers abandoned the garrisons and almost everyone went back home... The professional officers were suspect, and the troops, mostly workers, leaned towards obeying their parties or unions..." Azaña and Jackson (1986).

of the city. No other city was affected by the coup attempt. When news of the failure in Madrid was known in Seville, the troops returned to their barracks.

Sanjurjo was sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by President Manuel Azaña. When a coalition of right-wing parties won the 1934 elections, Sanjurjo was pardoned and left for Portugal. This government also reincorporated other conspirators into the military, such as Manuel Goded (who later on supported the 1936 coup).

3 Model

3.1 To rebel or not to rebel?

In this section, we present a model of leadership and coup participation that rationalizes our main result (subordinates followed their former leaders during the 1936 coup) and provides insights into the potential mechanisms (and how to test them).

There are a large number of leaders who can be of two types: rebels (denoted by $\theta = 1$) or loyalists ($\theta = 0$). A proportion p of them are rebels and $1-p$ are loyalists (this is unknown to agents). We assume that a coup is successful if, and only if, at least p^* of leaders are rebels. A subordinate officer, i, must decide whether to rebel ($d_i = 1$) or not ($d_i = 0$). His **conditional payoffs** will be denoted as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(d_i = 1 \mid p \geq p^*) &= u_i^{r|r}, \\ u_i(d_i = 1 \mid p < p^*) &= u_i^{r|\ell}, \\ u_i(d_i = 0 \mid p \geq p^*) &= u_i^{\ell|r}, \\ u_i(d_i = 0 \mid p < p^*) &= u_i^{\ell|\ell}. \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

The type of each leader is private information, but the subordinate learns the type of his (current and former) leaders and uses this information to estimate p. Let θ_j^i be the type of officer i's j^{th} leader. When the context is clear, we will suppress the i index.

More formally, an officer i observes a sample, n_i, of types

$$n_i = \{\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_{n_i}\}. \tag{2}$$

We denote both the sample and its size by n_i. The officer's problem is choosing whether or not to support a coup, given n_i. He acts as an econometrician with a random sample. Recall that a type $\theta = 1$ is a rebel and $\theta = 0$ is a loyalist. So the officer estimates the proportion of rebels by

$$\hat{p}_i = \frac{k_i}{n_i}, \tag{3}$$

where $k_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \theta_j$ is the number of rebel leaders the officer has had.

If the sample is random and the parameter true value is p, the estimator distribution can be derived from a binomial[8], because

$$k_i \sim B(n_i, p). \tag{4}$$

The officer's expected utility for each choice is given by

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(d_i = 1 \mid \hat{p}_i) &= u_i^{r|r} P(p \geq p^* \mid \hat{p}_i) + u_i^{r|\ell} P(p < p^* \mid \hat{p}_i), \\ u_i(d_i = 0 \mid \hat{p}_i) &= u_i^{\ell|r} P(p \geq p^* \mid \hat{p}_i) + u_i^{\ell|\ell} P(p < p^* \mid \hat{p}_i). \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

To simplify notation, denote the conditional probability of a successful coup by

$$\sigma_i := P(p \geq p^* \mid \hat{p}_i). \tag{6}$$

In Appendix A.1, we derive an expression for σ_i assuming a uniform prior distribution of p. To find i's best policy, it is enough to rewrite equations (5) as

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(d_i = 1 \mid \hat{p}_i) &= \sigma_i(u_i^{r|r} - u_i^{r|\ell}) + u_i^{r|\ell}, \\ u_i(d_i = 0 \mid \hat{p}_i) &= \sigma_i(u_i^{\ell|r} - u_i^{\ell|\ell}) + u_i^{\ell|\ell}. \end{aligned}$$

So we can finally answer the question: what is i's best policy? Well, i should decide for rebelling if, and only if, $u_i(d_i = 1 \mid \hat{p}_i) \geq u_i(d_i = 0 \mid \hat{p}_i)$[9]. This is equivalent to

$$\sigma_i(p^*, k_i, n_i) \geq \frac{u_i^{\ell|\ell} - u_i^{r|\ell}}{(u_i^{\ell|\ell} - u_i^{r|\ell}) + (u_i^{r|r} - u_i^{\ell|r})}. \tag{7}$$

[8] For a finite population, the exact distribution is hypergeometric, but for large n and p not too close to 0 or 1, the approximation is good.

[9] Note that we decided the indifference case in favor of rebelling. Since leaders are not strategic and n is big, indifference is unlikely.

The term $u_i^{\ell|\ell} - u_i^{r|\ell}$ represents the premium for making the "right" decision when the coup fails. Its mirror image is $u_i^{r|r} - u_i^{\ell|r}$, the premium for supporting a successful coup. Condition (7) says that officer i should support the rebels if, and only if, the probability of a successful coup is bigger than an i specific threshold.

3.2 Mechanisms: now, then and later

In the previous subsection, we established that subordinates follow their generals in an attempt to predict whether the coup will succeed (left side of 7), and their relative preferences for either side (right side of 7). We will refer to the left side as *coordination*. We will unbundle the right side (preferences) into ideology (or indoctrination) and self-interest (different promotion prospects under different regimes).

In this section, we will impose some assumptions over subordinates' payoffs which will allow us to make testable predictions in Proposition 1. First of all, a subordinate can be correct in two ways and wrong in two ways. He is correct if he chooses to rebel when a coup is successful (i.e. $p \geq p^*$) or if he stays loyal when a coup fails (i.e. $p < p^*$). He is wrong otherwise. It is reasonable to assume that, conditional on their choice, subordinates prefer their side to win.

Assumption 1. *Conditional payoffs satisfy:*

$$u_i^{r|r} > u_i^{r|\ell}$$
$$u_i^{\ell|\ell} > u_i^{\ell|r}.$$

With Assumption 1, the right-hand side of inequality 7 lies in the open interval $(0, 1)$.

We now argue that different *kinds* of former leaders will have different implications for the subordinate's decision. In particular, we make two distinctions. Leaders may be *active* or *retired*. Among those *active*, they may have *command* of troops or they may not.

In order to assess the probability of success of the coup, we assume that subordinates only counted the allegiances of generals in command of troops (or alternatively, they weighted them more heavily). Let's denote those by $n_i^{command}$ and let $k_i^{command}$ denote the rebel leaders in command of troops.

Assumption 2. *In equation 6, the relevant sample is* $n_i^{command}$*, i.e.,*

$$\sigma_i = P\left(p \geq p^* \mid k_i^{command}, n_i^{command}\right).$$

In words, only generals with command of troops change the coup's probability of success (and, hence, only those count for coordination based decisions).

Second, we assume that retired rebel generals (classified as rebels because they endorsed the coup or because they supported a different coup in the past) do not have an impact on the coup's success probability. However, retired generals may have influenced preferences (through ideology). Lastly, the more active rebel leaders a subordinate has, the more material gains he expects in the future if the coup is successful. We show in Section 5.1 that subordinates who were exposed to the leaders of the 1923 coup were promoted more rapidly during the dictatorship.

These two assumptions are stated formally in Assumptions 3 and 4. The notation follows that in Assumption 1: $n_i^{retired}$ counts the number of retired generals agent i has had, while $k_i^{retired}$ is the number of rebels among those retired generals. The notation n_i^{active}a dn k_i^{active} are similarly interpreted.

Assumption 3. *If* ***indoctrination*** *is a relevant important, then*

$$u_i^{r|r} - u_i^{r|\ell} \text{ increases with } k_i^{retired},$$

and

$$u_i^{r|r} - u_i^{r|\ell} \text{ decreases with } k_i^{retired}.$$

Assumption 4. *If* ***expected gains*** *are a relevant mechanism, then*

$$u_i^{r|r} - u_i^{r|\ell} \text{ increases with } k_i^{active},$$

and

$$u_i^{r|r} - u_i^{r|\ell} \text{ decreases with } k_i^{active}.$$

Proposition 1 states the intuitive result that the bigger the number of rebel generals (of any kind) the bigger the probability of rebelling.

Proposition 1. *Assumptions 1 through 4 imply that:*

$$\frac{\Delta d_i}{\Delta k_i^{\chi}} \geq 0$$

for $\chi \in \{active, command, retired\}$.

Proof. Check Appendix A.1. □

What is less obvious is that Assumptions 2, 3 and 4 allow us to distinguish between the three mechanisms: coordination, indoctrination and promotions. In subsection 4.3 we discuss the econometric strategy to estimate the effects stated in Proposition 1. In section 5, we show evidence that both coordination and expected gains are important factors for the subordinates' decision. We do not find similar evidence for indoctrination.

4 Data and Estimation

4.1 Military Yearbooks

Our first data source is the Spanish Military Yearbook[10] *(Anuario militar de España)*. See an example of a page of the 1930 Yearbook in Figure 2.


We use the yearbooks to track the career of every army officer during the ten years before the coup. In particular, chapter IX of each yearbook lists every officer, their date of birth, their date of entry into the Army, their seniority, and their *destination*. We use the destination to link officers to their leaders[11].

As we mentioned in Section 2, the government reformed the army in 1931, significantly changing its structure. Therefore, the set of destinations is different in 1927-1930 from 1931-1936.

[10] Available for download from the website of the Spanish National Library https://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/hd/es/results?parent=170edc64-562e-4aa6-baca-6dfa60260d5b&t=alt-asc. We digitized the yearbooks using *Textract*, a machine learning OCR service by AWS, together with extensive manual checking and cleaning.

[11] In Appendix Section A.3 we provide a specific example, showing how a subordinate and

Figure 2: Part of a page from the 1930 Military Yearbook



244 CAPÍTULO X.—ESCALAS GENERALES DEL EJÉRCITO ACTIVO

Número por clase	NOMBRES	FECHAS del nacimiento	FECHAS del ingreso en el servicio	FECHAS de efectividad en el cuerpo	DESTINOS
21	D. Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros y Bermejillo	28-10- 80	30- 8- 94	31- 1-928	Comisión internacional de límites de los Pirineos
22	» Emeterio Muga Díez	3- 3- 75	31- 8- 91	11- 6-928	Cap.ª gral. de la 6.ª región.
23	» Gregorio Sabater Aranda	12- 4- 73	20- 4- 91	30- 7-928	Jefe E. M. y Srio. gob. mil. de Cartagena.
24	» Toribio Martínez Cabrera	13- 4- 74	24- 8- 92	12-12-928	Jefe de E. M. y Srio. del Gob. militar de El Ferrol.
25	» Emilio Araujo y Vergara	28- 5- 74	29- 8- 91	1- 1-929	Cap.ª gral. de la 5.ª región.
26	» Cayetano Benítez Vilar	28- 1- 78	25- 8- 94	19- 2-929	Cap.ª gral. de la 2.ª región.
27	» Jesús Ferrer Jimeno	17-12- 72	15- 5- 93	26- 7-929	Disp. Canarias.
28	» Rafael Rodríguez y Ramírez	21- 9- 78	25- 8- 94	21- 8-929	Disp. 2.ª región.
	TENIENTES CORONELES				
1	D. Antonio Lago Espina	28-11- 71	1- 7- 88	20- 8-919	Dep.º Geog.º e Hist.º del Ej.º y 2.º Jefe B. O. y T. de E. M.
2	» José García de la Concha y Otermín	26- 7- 74	31-10- 90	29- 8-919	Disponible 1.ª región.
3	» Nemesio Toribio de Dios	30- 6- 72	12-12- 91	31- 8-919	Div. de Caballería (Madrid).
4	» Alfonso Velasco y Martín	10- 4- 76	1- 9- 93	15- 9-919	Exc. 1.º Región.
5	» Valentín Massanet y Beltrán	2- 7- 73	1-11- 90	20- 9-919	Cap.ª gral. de Baleares.
6	» Ricardo Guerrero y Uguet	5- 5- 79	28- 8- 94	27- 9-919	Escuela Estudios Superiores Militares.
7	» Daniel Dod y Martínez Fortún	14-12- 74	6- 1- 93	15-10-919	Reemplazo 8.ª región (El Ferrol).
8	» Félix Campos y Martínez	11-11- 78	1- 9- 94	17-10-919	Sup.º-Inst.º Geográfico.
9	» José Rodríguez Ramírez	23- 2- 75	25- 8- 94	17-10-919	4.ª div. y Srio. Gob.º militar de Granada.
10	» Rafael Alfonso de Villagómez y Núñez	5-12- 75	1-10- 90	24- 1-920	Depósito Geográfico e Histórico del Ejército.
11	» Mariano Rivera y Juer	1- 1- 78	29- 6- 94	24- 3-920	Sup.ª 4.ª Región.
12	» Francisco Carreras y Lafuente	8-10- 71	31- 8- 91	30- 4-920	Ministerio del Ejército.
13	» José García Puchol	25-12- 77	25- 8- 94	3- 5-920	Com.ª geográfica del N. E. de España (Barcelona).
14	» Ildefonso Martínez Pérez	17- 9- 73	26- 6- 94	31- 5-920	1.ª div. (Madrid).
15	» Juan Cantero y Ortega	30- 3- 77	29- 8- 94	5- 7-920	Gob.º mil. Campo Gibraltar.

Example from our data source. This is a page of the 1930 Military Yearbook. The columns include the officer's name (which we use to match across years and with the Engel dataset); dates of birth, of entry to the army, and seniority at their current rank; and destination.


4.2 Engel Dataset

The original data source for the classification of officers into rebels and loyalists is Carlos Engel's book *El Cuerpo de Oficiales de la Guerra de España* (Engel Masolvier (2008))[12]. The book classifies the entirety of the Spanish officer corps serving in July 1936 into rebels, loyalists, and neutrals.

Engel classifies officers using official documents and secondary sources, including promotions, rewards, punishments, and defections. For example, if an officer was promoted by the rebel side, Engel classified him as a rebel. If the government executed another officer, he

[12]This dataset was previously digitized by La Parra-Pérez (2020). We are very thankful to the author for making his replication dataset available. And, of course, we are very thankful to Carlos Engel for his work of decades.

Figure 3: Part of a page from Engel's book



EL CUERPO DE OFICIALES EN LA GUERRA DE ESPAÑA 663

Comandancia de la Circunscripción Oriental

La Comandancia fue, como es lógico, el primer objetivo de los alzados. Su jefe, el general Romerales, intentó, apoyado por algunos de sus oficiales, resistirse a entregar el mando al coronel Soláns, tal como pretendía su jefe de Estado Mayor, el coronel Peñuelas. La presencia del teniente coronel Seguí que venía de la Comisión de Límites con algunos regulares decidió.

La plantilla de la Comandancia era:

R	general de brigada de Infantería	Manuel Romerales Quintero
N	comandante de Infantería	José Márquez Bravo (ayudante)
R	comandante de Infantería	Alfredo Álvarez Buznego
R	capitán de Infantería	José Rotger Canáls
N	director de música 1º	Francisco Martínez Peiró
N	teniente de Infantería	Segundo Merino Martín (ayudante de la plaza de Melilla)

Los nacionales fusilaron en Melilla al general Romerales y al capitán Rotger.

El comandante Álvarez Buznego se hallaba de permiso en Madrid al ocurrir los sucesos en Melilla.

Estado Mayor

N	teniente coronel de Estado Mayor	Emilio Peñuelas Beamud
N	capitán de Estado Mayor	Emilio Bonaplata Caballero

Example from our data source. This is an example page from Engel Masolvier (2008) (p. 663). The officers marked with **R** remained loyal to the government (Republicans). The officers marked with **N** joined the rebellion (Nationalists).

classified him as a rebel[13]. Importantly, Engel's book also contains information on officers' postings in July 1936 (which may differ from their postings when the last yearbook was printed, in April 1936). See an example of a page in Figure 3.

We merged La Parra-Pérez (2020)'s version of the Engel dataset to our the yearbook data using names, and occasionally manually checking additional information such as posting and rank. We achieved a very high merge success rate: we found 96.3% of the Engel officers in the yearbooks (and we cannot rule out that some of the missing officers joined the army after the yearbook was printed). The merge across yearbooks was also successful. In the Appendix, Table A.1 lists the number of unique individuals per year and the number of "exits": officers who appear in a given year but not in the next. Since we only match the officers present in the Engel dataset, all exits are temporary, that is, they reappear later on. We cannot ascertain whether these missing observations are due to failed name matches or

[13]Engel also uses the post-war outcomes: if an officer served under the Republic but was afterward reincorporated to the Army by Franco, he is classified as "geographically loyal" to the Republic. In our dataset, he is considered a rebel. The opposite happens for officers who served under the rebel side but were dismissed after the war. In a robustness check, we show that our results are robust to excluding these "geographically loyal" officers (Table A.13).

due to periods of inactivity (i.e., being assigned to the reserve or temporarily incapacitated). In a typical year, between 3 and 4% of the sample exits. Reassuringly, the years with the highest number of exits (around 9%) correspond to the military reform, when many officers were transferred to the reserve.

Retired generals. We added to the dataset all generals that were not present in the Engel dataset (237 people). The objective is double. First, in a robustness check, we limit the sample to destinations with generals, and destinations with retired generals constitute our control sample. Second, 14 of those 237 supported an earlier coup (in 1923 or 1932), and we use them to test the indoctrination mechanism. The 1923 coup supporters were conspirators (members of the *Cuadrilatero*), members of the Military Directory, and the War Minister of Primo de Rivera's government. The 1932 coup supporters are classified according to Payne (2017). We further classify them into those who endorsed the 1936 coup or not, based on their biographical information[14].

4.3 Estimation

We classify every general in a given destination (including both major generals and brigadier generals) as a leader. We categorize them into rebels (51 generals), loyalists (34), and neutrals or retired (237). Everyone else serving in the destination is a subordinate.

Our dependent variable is the subordinate's decision to support the rebels or the government, and it varies at the individual level for 5330 subordinates. Our independent variable is the exposure (before 1936) to generals who rebelled in 1936. Our identification strategy exploits (arguably exogenous) rotation among military leaders. We compare officers who were exposed to rebel leaders to their peers who served in the same post but were not exposed. To execute this comparison, we rely on two estimation methods (with two different datasets).

First, we assemble an individual-level dataset, where the independent variables are the number of destinations where an individual was treated. We include two variables: the number of destinations under rebels and under loyalists (note that an individual may have zero in both variables since he may have been served in a destination with no general or under

[14]Jose Sanjurjo is a complicated case because he was retired in 1936 (so in our main regressions his subordinates are in our control sample), but he did more than endorse the 1936 coup, he was part of the conspiracy. Moreover, he died three days into the coup in a plane accident (on his way to join the rebellion). Our results do not change if we reclassify him.

a retired one). To control for different careers, we include one dummy per destination, which equals one if, at any point, the officer served there. The model includes 2200 destination dummies[15]. We also include a set of controls that may predict rebellion. Therefore, our estimation equation is:

$$y_i = \beta NDest_i^{reb} + \alpha NDest_i^{loy} + \sum_{j=1}^{2200} \delta_j D_{i,j} + \gamma X_i + \nu_i$$

Where $NDest_i^{reb}$ and $NDest_i^{loy}$ are our independent variables of interest, $D_{i,j}$ represents the destination dummies for each of the 2200 destinations, and X_i is a vector of controls[16]. We report results for this equation in Table 2, column 3. We also report a model without controls (column 2), and a model with no controls nor destination dummies (column 1).

Second, we assemble an individual-destination level dataset, where the independent variables are two dummies that equal one if the leader of that destination was a rebel/loyalist and zero otherwise. Note that both variables equal zero if the destination had no general or the general was retired by 1936. Therefore an individual may be treated in all, some, or no destinations. To control for different careers, we include destination fixed effects.[17] Therefore, our second estimation equation is:

$$y_{i,j} = \pi Dest_{i,j}^{reb} + \mu Dest_{i,j}^{loy} + Destination_j + \rho X_i + \upsilon_{i,j}$$

Where $Dest_{i,j}^{reb}$ and $Dest_{i,j}^{loy}$ are our independent variables of interest, $Destination_j$ represent the destination fixed effects, and X_i is a vector of controls (equivalent to the one in the first specification). We report results for this equation in Table 2, column 6. We also report a model without controls (column 5), and a model with no controls nor destination dummies (column 4).

The first specification has the advantage of the agreement between the dimension of variation of the dependent variable (the decision to rebel) and the unit of observation (the

[15] 1708 dummies correspond to destinations before 1935, and 492 dummies correspond to 1936 destinations.

[16] We always include a dummy that equals one if the officer was exposed to (any) generals. In some specifications, we include the controls listed in Table 1. Specifically, the number of destinations, tenure, officer rank, and years in Africa (all of which predict rebellion), the subordinate's variation in the hierarchy during the Republic, which is a potential confounder because it is related to discontent. We also include the leftist vote in the province in 1936, and the corps and division the subordinate belonged to.

[17] Note that, because destinations change with the military reform, each comparison group includes only individuals who served there from 1927 to 1930 or 1931 to 1935. Arguably, this makes our results stronger, because we only compare individuals who serve in the same destination at most four years apart.

individual). However, since each individual belongs to several destinations during their lifetime, we cannot clearly delineate control and treatment groups and must include the dummies in the regression. The advantage of the second specification is that the treatment and control groups are crystal clear. We compare, within each destination, those who served when a rebel/loyalist leader was in charge to those who served there at a different time. The disadvantage is that each individual appears many times in the dataset and may appear as both a treated and non-treated unit. Reassuringly, we find that the results are very similar under both specifications.

We show that our treatment and control samples are balanced in Table 1. We run regressions for two treatment variables (number of destinations under a rebel/loyalist leader) on potential confounders for both our datasets. We include the number of destinations, tenure, officer rank, and years in Africa, all of which are positively related to exposure to rebel leaders before including fixed effects, but they flip the sign and lose significance after including fixed effects (in the individual-level dataset). We also include the subordinate's variation in the hierarchy during the Republic, which is a potential confounder because it is related to discontent. Lastly, we include the leftist vote in the province in 1936.[18]. For more variables, see Table A.4).

As we explained in section 2, after the first days of the coup, Spain was divided into two zones, one controlled by the government and one by the rebels. We observe almost no variation in regions of Spain that were controlled by the rebels right after the coup (93.8% of the officers there rebelled). In contrast, the Republican area has significant variation (65.1% supported the rebels, 34.9% stayed loyal). Since we do not observe variation in the rebel area, our baseline regressions limit the sample to officers in the Republican area. Our results remain significant if include the full sample (our estimates become significantly smaller, as it should be expected from roughly doubling the sample and adding almost no extra variation in the dependent variable).

As we argued above, the differences between the zones may have been due to different strategies by the government and the rebel leaders (La Parra-Pérez (2020)). The rebel leaders managed to intimidate hesitant officers into complying by punishing those who did not. The government, on the other hand, rushed to dismiss those officers they considered unreliable. Table A.3 shows descriptive statistics for the full army and for the army in the

[18]We take these potential confounders from La Parra-Pérez (2020), who studies the role of professional and economic determinants of rebellion in 1936.

Table 1: Balance Table - Effect of Covariates on Treatment Status

Dataset:	Individual-level				Ind-Destination Level			
Treatment Variable:	N Rebel Destinations		N Loyalist Destinations		Rebel Destination		Loyalist Destination	
Destination FE?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Covariates:								
Number of Destinations	0.096	-0.885	0.064	0.315	0.008	0.000	0.003	-0.002
p-value	0.000	0.180	0.000	0.071	0.000	0.609	0.099	0.122
Tenure	0.013	-0.872	0.011	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.003	0.000
	0.000	0.374	0.000	0.152	0.000	0.467	0.000	0.595
Officer Rank in 1936	0.141	-0.887	0.107	0.013	0.032	0.000	0.024	0.000
	0.000	0.784	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.818	0.000	0.929
Years in Africa	0.101	-0.887	0.070	-0.003	0.014	-0.002	0.009	0.002
	0.000	0.151	0.000	0.642	0.048	0.281	0.005	0.369
Hierarquical Position Variation (1932-1936)	-0.045	-0.883	-0.037	-0.001	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	0.000	0.150	0.000	0.870	0.370	0.158	0.371	0.235
Leftist Vote in Province	-0.568	-0.916	-0.344	-0.031	-0.136	0.024	-0.081	-0.002
	0.000	0.224	0.000	0.581	0.177	0.112	0.002	0.936
Treatment Variable Mean	0.247		0.188		0.073		0.056	

Each cell in this table corresponds to a regression of one covariate against one of our main treatment variables. For each covariate, the first row reports the coefficient and the second the p-value. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 report the regressions without fixed effects, showing unbalanced samples (i.e. with p-values below standard significance levels). Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, show that, after including fixed effects, our treatment and control samples are mostly balanced in observables.

government-controlled zone (who are our sample in the main specification). The officers in the government zone are representative of the full army in a number of variables. For example, officer rank and tenure are higher by only 3 and 4% respectively (to be expected since it includes Madrid). Other variables are less balanced; for example, years in Africa are much higher outside (as expected since Africa was under Rebel control).

5 Results

In the individual level dataset, we find that individuals who served in one destination under a rebel leader are 12.7 pp more likely to rebel than those who served in none (column 3, 19% of the mean). The effect is very similar in the specification without controls (column 2, 13.9 pp), further confirming that our treatment is orthogonal once we control for destinations. The results are similar in the individual-destination dataset: A subordinate who served under a rebel leader is 10.8 pp more likely to rebel than a subordinate who served in the

same destination without a general or under a retired one[19]. Surprisingly, exposure to loyalist leaders has no effect, so our main result is asymmetric. This may be because the loyalist side's actual leaders were the lawfully elected civilian authorities, and therefore, military leadership may have been less salient.

Table 2: The Effect of Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Destinations under Rebel Leader	0.074***	0.139***	0.127***			
	(0.017)	(0.046)	(0.049)			
N Destinations under Loyalist Leader	−0.038*	0.019	−0.004			
	(0.020)	(0.047)	(0.046)			
Destination under Rebel Leader				0.078***	0.108***	0.108***
				(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Destination under Loyalist Leader				−0.035	0.029	0.022
				(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-destination (models 4-6). We report OLS regressions with no fixed effects (1 and 4), with destination fixed effects (2 and 5), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 6). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the destination level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and destination levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3 studies the effect of 1936 leaders on the decision to rebel, and compares it to the impact of former leaders. In addition to the variables already included in Table 2, we include a dummy that equals one if the subordinate was serving under a rebel leader in 1936. Note that the effect of *former* leaders remains significant and with similar (or slightly higher in some models) magnitude. As expected, we find that 1936 leaders (both rebels and republicans) had an impact in the expected direction. Compared to the impacts of former leaders, the effects range from around half (models 2, 3, and 4) to around the same (model 1)[20]. Since the effects of former leaders are far from one, these results highlight the

[19]The endogenous coefficient (without fixed effects) in columns 1 and 4 is significantly smaller. One explanation for this finding is that the government may have placed loyal generals in charge of the most rebellious units, biasing the coefficient downwards.

[20]Note that our identification strategy allows us to control for destinations in the past, but not necessarily in the present. For example, we assume that an officer who served in 1932 in the XV Brigada de Galicia (under Franco) is comparable to an officer who served in 1931. However, their destination (and therefore geographic location) in 1936 is more directly relevant to their coup participation. More specifically, we cannot include 1936 destination fixed effects in these regressions. Therefore, the controls are more important in these regressions, so we prefer specifications 2 and 4 of Table 3.

widespread breaking of the chain of command and the relative importance of *past hierarchies*.

Table 3: The Effect of Current and Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N Destinations under Rebel Leader	0.137***	0.147***		
	(0.038)	(0.041)		
	(0.040)	(0.040)		
Destination under Rebel Leader			0.150***	0.143***
			(0.025)	(0.026)
Destination under Loyalist Leader			0.013	0.010
			(0.021)	(0.019)
Destination under Rebel Leader in 1936	0.145**	0.112*	0.086***	0.079***
	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Destination under Loyalist Leader in 1936	−0.102	−0.125**	−0.058*	−0.069**
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of *former* and *current* rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-2) and the individual-destination (models 3-4). We report regressions with destination fixed effects (1 and 3), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (2 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the destination level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and destination levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Selection? The main threat to our identification strategy is selection. That is, would-be rebel generals may have hired like-minded subordinates. In Table 4, we show that selection does not drive our results. We classify treated subordinates as "potentially selected" if they joined a destination *after or at the same time* as the leader. Everyone else had been serving at the unit *before* the arrival of the leader. Individuals who arrived after may have been hired by the leader and therefore selected in unobservables (for example, proclivity to support a coup). In models 1 and 2, we drop potentially selected individual-destinations, and our coefficient of interest remains positive and significant (only slightly bigger). In models 3 and 4, we add a variable that equals one if the individual-destination was potentially selected. The associated coefficient is not statistically significant, indicating that officers who arrived at the destination with or after a leader were not more likely to follow than those who were there before. Therefore, we conclude that leaders were not hiring based on coup proclivity or that they could not observe it.

We also account for "inverse selection". Even if generals did not hire like-minded subor-

dinates, they may have fired opposite-minded subordinates. If they did so as soon as they arrived (before the next yearbook) republican-minded officers would be less likely to serve under rebel generals. We also show that this is not the case. In the Appendix Table A.10, we drop potentially fired subordinates (i.e. those that transferred away from a destination the year a rebel or loyalist general arrived), and our results do not change. In models 3 and 4, we add a variable that equals one if the individual-destination followed a potential transfer.

Table 4: Selection? Effect of Rebel Leaders by Date of Incorporation

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Destination under Rebel Leader	0.153***	0.169***	0.095***	0.108***
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Destination under Loyalist Leader	−0.011	−0.024	0.042	0.033
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.030)
Potentially Selected by Rebel Leader			0.015	−0.004
			(0.034)	(0.029)
Potentially Selected by Loyalist Leader			−0.019	−0.021
			(0.041)	(0.036)
Dataset	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Drop Potentially Selected	Yes	Yes	No	No
Destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.684	0.684	0.686	0.686
Observations	16,614	16,614	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual-destination. We classify a treated subordinate-destination as "potentially selected" if he arrived at the destination at the same time or after the leader. In models 1 and 2, we drop potentially selected observations. In models 3 and 4, we add two variables that equal one if the subordinate was potentially selected. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the destination level. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Extensive and Intensive Margins. Our baseline specifications in Table 2 capture the *extensive margin* of our treatment, that is, whether an individual-destination was exposed to a rebel leader or not (in the individual-level dataset, the number of destinations). In Table A.19, we test the *intensive margin*. Some individuals were exposed to rebel leaders for a larger number of years. Therefore, in addition to the variables already listed, we include the sum of years under rebel and loyalist leaders. We detect no effect on the intensive margin, and our extensive margin result remains unchanged after including the new variables. This result sheds light on a potential staffing mistake by the democratic government. In an

attempt to coup-proof the regime, the republic made frequent use of rotation to place likely loyal generals in strategic positions. In doing so, they "exposed" more officers to more generals (some of whom ended up on the rebel side). Since more years under a rebel do not increase the probability of rebellion, a better strategy may have consisted of having suspect generals as stationary as possible.

5.1 Mechanisms

In this section, we will test the potential mechanisms behind our results. In doing so, we contribute to a wider literature that asks why do individuals follow their leaders. In Section 3, we developed a model that highlighted three potential pathways. First, generals may be *coordinating* their subordinates. We assume that the coup's success depends on the number of rebel generals and that subordinates do not know the allegiance of every general, but they know who their former leaders support. In an attempt to join the winning side, they follow their sample of generals. Second, generals may be *indoctrinating* by transmitting authoritarian or anti-republican values. Third, subordinates may expect *promotions* from their former generals if the coup succeeds.

Coordination. First, we investigate whether leaders were focal points in a coordination game. Geddes (1999) describes coups as coordination games[21]. After extensive interviews with army officers, Singh (2014) concludes that the risk to life trumps ideological considerations[22]. Therefore, officers attempt to support the winning side. The Spanish Coup was atypical since, after the first few days, the army (if not the officer corps) and the country were split pretty evenly. Therefore, when trying to estimate the split of the Army (which is known to us after decades of historical research, but uncertain at the time), officers may have oversampled those they knew better (their former leaders).

In Table 5 we decompose our treatment into two categories of generals, those who were in command of troops and those who were not, under the assumption that the latter are

[21] "... the most important concern for many officers deciding whether to join a coup conspiracy is their assessment of how many others will join" (Geddes (1999), pg. 126)

[22] "In fact, they believed that it would have been selfish to let their personal political beliefs guide their response. As officers, their first responsibility was to their men, and they felt it was wrong to use their troops, possibly endangering their lives, to support the side they preferred if it was likely to lose." (Singh (2014), p. 6).

more instrumental for coup success[23]. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the results for the individual-level dataset. We find that generals who had commands in 1936 had a bigger impact on their former subordinates, and the impact for generals without command is positive but smaller by around half and not statistically significative[24].

As further evidence of the coordination mechanism, we report heterogeneous results by distance (in 1936) between officers and subordinates. Officers had an incentive to keep track of the situation on the ground (especially to save their own lives), and the decisions of generals posted far away were probably less relevant. Therefore, for each subordinate-destination, we calculate the distance (in 1936) between the subordinate and their (former) leader, and we split the sample in two (above and below the median). We report results in Table 6. Indeed, we find that the effect is larger below the median distance (columns 1 and 3, with and without controls). It is still positive and significant above, but half the size. The difference in coefficients is significant only for the specifications with controls (p-value of the difference without controls=0.117, with controls=0.052).

Indoctrination? Table 7 tests our second hypothesized mechanism for the effect of former leaders. We postulate that generals with a right-wing ideology may have indoctrinated their troops when they were in charge. These preferences may have been transferred to their subordinates through persuasion. For example, in 1928 (during the monarchy) as Director of the Zaragoza Military Academy, Franco gave "ten commandments" to the cadets, the first one being: "Love the Homeland deeply and be loyal to the King" (Preston (2015), ch. 2). Eight years later, during the Republic, that message may have inspired officers to rebel against the regime.

By revealed preference, the generals that supported the 1923 and 1932 coups[25] (the first one succeeded and the second one failed) also had authoritarian preferences. We show in Table 7 that officers who served under them were not more likely to rebel than soldiers who served in the same units under Republican or retired generals. Models 1 and 2 show the null in the individual dataset (without and with controls), and Models 3 and 4 do

[23]Importantly, there is no reason to think that these generals had more influential positions in the past (or that they would in the future). Although in this version of the paper we do not have data about command of troops in previous years, it appears that these assignments were constantly shuffled. In fact, almost all the generals with commands of troops in 1936 were not in that position in 1935. We therefore find it unlikely that these generals were in a privileged position to indoctrinate before 1936 or to give promotions after.

[24]However, the difference between coefficients is not statistically significant (in model 1: difference=0.108, p-value=0.203), and it is close to zero in the individual-destination level dataset. Therefore, we only take this table as suggestive evidence of a coordination mechanism.

[25]We list these fourteen generals in Appendix Table A.5. In Section 2, we explain how we classified them.

Table 5: Coordination? The Effect of Generals with Command of Troops in 1936

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N Destinations under Rebel Leader (in command in 1936)	0.175***	0.158**		
	(0.066)	(0.065)		
N Destinations under Rebel Leader (not in command in 1936)	0.067	0.066		
	(0.064)	(0.065)		
N Destinations under Loyalist Leader (in command in 1936)	−0.003	−0.022		
	(0.048)	(0.046)		
N Destinations under Loyalist Leader (not in command in 1936)	0.009	−0.015		
	(0.077)	(0.082)		
Destination under Rebel Leader (in command in 1936)			0.116***	0.112**
			(0.042)	(0.045)
Destination under Rebel Leader (not in command in 1936)			0.104***	0.107***
			(0.034)	(0.026)
Destination under Loyalist Leader (in command in 1936)			0.021	0.016
			(0.024)	(0.023)
Destination under Loyalist Leader (not in command in 1936)			0.065	0.053
			(0.057)	(0.055)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. We further classify generals into those with and without command of troops in 1936. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1 and 2) and the individual-destination (models 3 and 4). We report regressions with destination fixed effects (1 and 3), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (2 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the destination level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and destination levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

the same in the individual-destination dataset. In Appendix Table A.11, we disaggregate the right-wing generals into those who endorsed the 1936 coup and those who did not. It makes no difference whether or not they supported the coup[26]. Therefore, we conclude that indoctrination is unlikely to be the mechanism behind our results[27].

Promotions. The third mechanism we explore relates to potential material gains to be expected from following former leaders. Previous literature has established that subordi-

[26]With the exception of Sanjurjo, those who supported the coup were not expected to play a major role (maybe due to their age, or because if incorporated to the Army, they would have outranked the principal conspirators). Because he was retired and because he died two days into the coup, Sanjurjo is included in this group. The results are unchanged if we exclude him.

[27]A potential concern is that retired generals are less influential because their contact with subordinates was, on average, less recent than those of active generals. That is, their indoctrination may have faded out. However, in Table A.8, we disaggregate our main result into the dictatorship (1927-30) and the Republic (1931-36), and we find that the links made during the earlier period are, in fact *stronger* predictors of rebellion.

Table 6: Effect of Rebel Leaders by Distance to Subordinate

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Destination under a Rebel Leader	0.189***	0.098**	0.208***	0.075*
	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.058)	(0.038)
Difference between Coefficients	0.091		0.134*	
	(0.058)		(0.069)	
Median Condition	Below	Above	Below	Above
Dataset	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	17,077	17,102	17,077	17,102

In this table, we split the sample by geographic distance between leader and subordinate in 1936 (for treated units, the control sample is the same in all regressions). Treatment observations were divided into above and below the median distance. For observations with multiple leaders, the average distance concerning this specific set of leaders was calculated. For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with fixed effects and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors doubly clustered at the destination and individual levels are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

nates are more likely to receive promotions when their patrons or peers gain more influence (for example, see Jia et al. (2015), Salgado (2023), Shih et al. (2012), Voth and Xu (2020), and Xu (2018)). Leaders who had been in charge of subordinates in the past may promote them faster in the future, maybe because they have a more accurate signal of their ability, or because they expect reciprocity in the future.

Much like the papers cited above, we test whether previous connections led to promotions in Spain. If they did before the coup, we expect officers to anticipate rewards and, therefore, follow their former bosses. We check whether, during the regime installed in 1923, former subordinates of coup supporters got promoted more rapidly. In Table 8, column 1, we find that they did (before 1931). In column 2, we show that this pattern reversed during the Republic (after 1931). The effects are sizable, a promotion was 28 percentage points more likely for connected officers (the average probability was 42%). Moreover, there were only 10 ranks in the hierarchy (including three general-level ranks), so a promotion of this kind was a considerable step forward[28].

[28]The average pay increase between these ranks was 27%. Given that a connection to a general increases the probability of promotion by 28 pps., a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that for subordinates, having served under a successful coup supporter increases earnings by 7.56% (salaries from San Martin Losada (1929)).

Table 7: Indoctrination? The Effect of Right-Wing Retired Generals

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N Destinations under Right-Wing Retired	0.039	0.022		
	(0.045)	(0.043)		
N Destinations under a Rebel Leader	0.130***	0.122**		
	(0.047)	(0.050)		
N Destinations under a Loyalist Leader	0.012	−0.008		
	(0.047)	(0.048)		
Destination under Right-Wing Retired			0.059	0.044
			(0.053)	(0.044)
Destination under a Rebel Leader			0.101***	0.102***
			(0.025)	(0.027)
Destination under a Loyalist Leader			0.019	0.015
			(0.020)	(0.020)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126

Mechanisms Right-Wing Generals: This table shows the effect of Retired Right-Wing Generals on subordinates' decision (*Rebel* = 1). Two different datasets were used, individual and individual destinations (each observation is an individual in a given destination). These generals participated in either the 1923 or the 1932 coup attempt. We separate them into those who endorsed the 1936 (Active) and those who did not (Inactive). For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with fixed effects and fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Standard errors clustered at the destination level in parentheses.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

5.2 Additional Robustness Checks

Alternative sample definitions. In Table A.17, we show that our results are robust to different decisions in sample definition. First, in columns 1 and 2, we show that when we include the rebel-controlled area in our estimation, our estimates remain positive and significant but decrease by roughly half. This is to be expected since there is almost no variation in the dependent variable within the rebel-controlled area (as explained in section 2). In columns 3 and 4, we drop those serving under or exposed to Republican generals. In columns 5 and 6, we restrict our sample to destinations with generals (discussed immediately below). In columns 7 and 8, we drop the observations where a subordinate is treated by both a rebel and a Republican.

Destinations without generals. A large number of destinations in the control sample do not have a general in charge (by definition, those in the treatment sample are in a destination with at least one general, loyalist or rebel). Therefore, in Table A.17 (columns 5

Table 8: Promotions Mechanism? Effect of Connections on Promotions

	Promotion in Regime		Promotion in Destination	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4))
N Destinations under a 1923 Leader	0.280***	−0.250***		
	(0.074)	(0.066)		
N Destinations under a Rebel Leader	−0.046	−0.159***		
	(0.056)	(0.041)		
N Destinations under a Loyalist Leader	−0.086	−0.010		
	(0.078)	(0.042)		
Destination under a 1923 Leader			0.175**	−0.225***
			(0.071)	(0.006)
Destination under a Rebel Leader			−0.133**	−0.196***
			(0.056)	(0.071)
Destination under a Loyalist Leader			0.017	−0.035
			(0.048)	(0.087)
Regime	Dictatorship	Republic	Dictatorship	Republic
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Promotions	0.426	0.286	0.298	0.249
Observations	6,936	11,273	15,910	21,375

This table shows that subordinates of the 1923 coup organizers were promoted more rapidly during the dictatorship (1927-1931) and more slowly afterward (1932-1936). Two different datasets were used, individual and individual-destinations (each observation is an individual in a given destination). The variable Promotion is equal to 1 if we observe an increase in the officer's rank. For the individual dataset, we are looking into promotions within each regime. In the case of individual-destinations, we are evaluating promotion within this specific destination. The regressions include fixed effects plus additional controls. Appendix Table A.12 reports regressions without controls. Standard errors double clustered at the destination and individual level in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

and 6), we run robustness checks where we restrict the control sample to destinations with (retired or neutral) generals. Our results remain substantively unchanged (though we lose significance in one of the four specifications).

The samples are smaller. The individual sample has 1,663 observations (down from 5,330), and the individual-destination sample has 2,733 (down from 18,126). This is a product of how we define the destinations. In our baseline regressions, we take the destinations literally (as they appear in the yearbooks, see 2). Therefore, someone serving in the "First Division, Second Brigade, Third Regiment" will not be serving under a general since they were in charge of brigades and divisions, not battalions. Our main regressions, therefore, are informative of the relationship between high-ranking and middle-ranking officers, not necessarily reflecting effects on low-ranking officers.

Using the military hierarchy. In order to cover the vast majority of the sample, those not serving *directly* under a general, we use the Army's organizational structure to link, for

example, subordinates serving in regiments and battalions to the generals in charge of the divisions or brigades. We report the results in Table A.18. If we sum all the rebel leaders above an officer in the hierarchy, the main coefficient is positive but smaller in magnitude. This is to be expected since the relationships between high-ranking and low-ranking officers are necessarily more distant. For example, it is not even guaranteed that a given regiment is located in the same city as the divisional headquarters. More precisely, we define the independent variable (at the individual-destination level) as:

$$\text{Rebel in Hierarchy} = \sum_{d=0}^{n} \text{Rebel} \times \alpha^d$$

Where *Rebel* is a dummy variable that equals one if there is a general in the destination. n equals the number of levels in a destination. For example, someone posted in the First Division will only have one level. Someone posted in the First Division, Second Brigade, Third Regiment, will have three. d equals zero for the literal destination where the subordinate is posted, and it increases by one for each higher-level destination. α is a parameter that adjusts by how much we discount higher-up generals for lower-ranking officers. We also compute corresponding *Loyalist in Hierarchy* variables

For example, take an officer posted in the "First Division, Second Brigade, Third Regiment". There is one rebel general in the First Division. Therefore, we compute the independent variable as $0 \times \alpha^0 + 0 \times \alpha^1 + 1 \times \alpha^2$. With $\alpha = 1$, the independent variable equals 1. With $\alpha = 0.5$, it equals 0.25. With $\alpha = 0$, it equals 0. Therefore, $\alpha = 1$ weights all superiors equally, and $\alpha = 0$ approaches our baseline specification by only considering generals in the same destination as the subordinate.

Table A.18 reports the results. As expected, with $\alpha = 0$ the results approach the baseline (they are slightly different due to the exclusion of those outside the hierarchy, such as support or training units.). With $\alpha = 1$, we find that exposure to rebel generals (more precisely, the number of levels with rebel generals) causes a 1.8 pp. increase in the probability of rebellion (equivalent to 2.6% of the mean). Therefore, the effect is smaller but statistically significant and substantively important. We also run the regressions for $\alpha = \{0.25, 0.5, 0.75\}$, and we find that our effect is decreasing in α. In conclusion, the distance between the leader and the subordinate matters, and our effects are driven by close relationships.

Reverse causality. A potential concern is that subordinates may have influenced their

former leaders into joining the rebellion. Our identification strategy assumes that lower-ranking officers do not influence generals. Reassuringly, our results remain unchanged when we drop colonels and lieutenant colonels from our sample (Table A.15). These two ranks are the 6^{th} and 7^{th} steps in the ladder (generals are in the 8^{th} to 10^{th}). We also drop the highest-ranked (non-general) officer in each 1936 destination (Table A.16) and our results remain robust.

Weights. A potential problem with the individual-destination dataset is that individuals who served in many destinations are overrepresented in the dataset. Therefore, in Table A.14, we weight observations by $\frac{1}{\text{number of destinations}}$. Our results remain substantively unchanged.

Alternative definition of the dependent variable. If an officer served under the Republic but was afterward reincorporated to the Army by Franco, he is classified as "geographically loyal" to the Republic. In our dataset, he is considered a rebel. The opposite happens for officers who served under the rebel side but were dismissed after the war. In Table A.13, we show that our results are robust to reclassifying these "geographically loyal" officers.

Omitted Variable Bias. A remaining concern is that, despite our strategy to deal with the issues of selection described above, treated officers are different from control officers in unobservable determinants of rebellion. Above, we argued that this is unlikely to be the case because our coefficients (after including fixed effects) remained stable after including important determinants of rebellion as control variables. That is, observables do not drive selection into the treatment. We now proceed to formally test this argument, using the methods developed by Altonji et al. (2005), Oster (2019), Masten and Poirier (2022), and Diegert et al. (2022)[29].

In particular, we will compare the "short" regression in Table 2, column 5 to the "medium" regression in column 6. We will explore under what conditions our main causal finding goes away (the effect of being in a destination under a rebel general). The short regression includes our main variable of interest "Destination under Rebel Leader", plus "Destination under Loyalist Leader", "Destination under Any General" and destination fixed effects as always-included controls. The medium regression also contains as regressors the number of destinations, tenure, officer rank, and years in Africa, the subordinate's vari-

[29] All the results that follow were calculated using Diegert et al. (2022)'s `regsensitivity` Stata package.

ation in the hierarchy during the Republic, the leftist vote in the province in 1936, *corps* fixed effects (artillery, cavalry, infantry, engineers, carabineros, general staff), and division fixed effects.

We find that, for our results to be invalid, the selection into the treatment on unobservables has to be disproportionately big as a proportion of the selection on observables. First, we calculate what Masten and Poirier (2022) call the *explain away* breakdown point. That is, what value of the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables is consistent with a zero causal effect? This is Oster (2019)'s main sensitivity parameter. We find that, for the causal effect to be zero, the selection on unobservables has to be 7.55 times the magnitude of the selection on observables. We make the most conservative assumption for Oster (2019)'s second sensitivity parameter (that is, the R^2 of the "long" regression with the omitted variables is set to one).

Second, we calculate the *sign change* breakdown point. That is, what value of the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables is consistent with a causal effect that has a different sign from the causal effect in the baseline model? Masten and Poirier (2022) show that these points are not generally equivalent. We find a sign-change breakdown point equal to 1, the highest possible value for this parameter if we impose no limits on the size of the omitted variable bias (Theorem 4 of Masten and Poirier (2022)). A reasonable magnitude restriction on the true (unobserved) causal effect may be $\beta \geq -1$ (that is, an officer exposed to the rebels is 100pp. less likely to join the rebellion than a non-exposed officer). This is equivalent to limiting the omitted variable bias to 1.108. Imposing this restriction, we obtain a *sign change* breakdown ratio of 7.44, very similar to Oster (2019)'s *explain away* breakdown ratio.

Third, Diegert et al. (2022) argue that in the presence of endogenous controls (i.e., when the omitted variables are correlated with the included controls) the methods described above can yield incorrect results, even when they use a method called residualization to avoid the assumption. Under very conservative assumptions (in particular, unbounded effects of the omitted variables on the treatment), we find that the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on unobservables that breaks our results is equal to .402.

Principal Rebel Leaders. In Table A.7, we decompose the effect of rebel leaders into the impact of "principal" leaders and the rest. Principal leaders were the eight main conspirators (listed in Table A.6), including generals elsewhere mentioned in the paper, such

as Franco, Mola, Goded, and Cabanellas. We find that these leaders had a stronger pull over their former subordinates, but the differences between the coefficients are not statistically significant. Still, this is a reassuring sanity check, indicating that our results are not driven by strong effects of the most obscure rebel generals.

6 Conclusion

For Spanish Army officers, choosing what side to support in the coup may have been the most important decision of their lives. For Spain, the split of the Army led to a civil war with half a million casualties and a forty-year-long dictatorship. In this paper, we have shown that replacing key generals was not sufficient for the Republic to survive. The widespread breaking of the chain of command seems to suggest that the military hierarchy does not matter, but we, in fact, find the opposite: subordinates followed their *former* leaders. Therefore, this paper highlights the role of *past hieararchies*.

We contribute to a small but growing literature that posits the question: Why do individuals follow leaders? Since we focus on *past* leaderships, we rule out mechanical compliance with the chain of command.

The two sides in the Spanish Civil War were separated by wide ideological differences. The Republican government had support from a wide range of factions, including republicans, socialists, communists, and anarchists. The same goes for the rebel ideology, which consisted of a mix of monarchists, conservatives, and fascists. Internationally, the government had support from the Soviet Union, while the rebels had support from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. However, we do not find that indoctrination played a role. Officers exposed to retired or dead right-wing generals were not more likely to support the coup.

Our results point to mechanisms consistent with forward-looking agents, worried both about the immediate present (surviving the coup) and their future career prospects. First, we show that the effect of leadership is stronger for former subordinates of leaders who had command positions in 1936. This is consistent with a "coordination" theory of leadership, where officers try to predict the winner side by looking at what their former leaders are doing.

Another possibility is a "reciprocal" nature of leadership. Subordinates support their leaders because they expect material rewards from doing so. Agents can benefit if their

former leaders have more power and resources. First, their former leaders have a more accurate signal of their abilities and are, therefore, more likely to pick them for promotions. Second, leaders and subordinates (or, as it is more common in the literature, patrons and clients) may be engaged in a long-term repeated cooperation game, where they exchange support for material rewards. Spanish officers in 1936 had reason to believe this would be the case. Officers who had served under the leaders of the 1923 coup were promoted more rapidly than their peers during the dictatorship, and their promotions slowed down during the Republic.

Our results also have practical insights for democratic leaders trying to coup-proof their regimes. The role of past hierarchies suggests that the bond of loyalty between a subordinate and his former leader is not broken when the latter is transferred away. This is most relevant for young democracies, whose recent past hierarchies were shaped by former dictators. But even decisions made during democratic administrations can have unexpected consequences. The republic made frequent use of rotation to place likely loyal generals in strategic positions. In doing so, they "exposed" more officers to more generals (some of whom ended up in the rebel side). Since we do not find an effect on the intensive margin (i.e. more years under a rebel do not increase the probability of rebellion), keeping suspect generals as stationary as possible may have been the best move.

References

Acemoglu, Daron and Matthew O Jackson, "History, expectations, and leadership in the evolution of social norms," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 2015, *82* (2), 423–456.

_ , Giuseppe De Feo, Giacomo De Luca, and Gianluca Russo, "War, socialism, and the rise of fascism: An empirical exploration," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2022, *137* (2), 1233–1296.

Adena, Maja, Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, Veronica Santarosa, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, "Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2015, *130* (4), 1885–1939.

Akerlof, Robert and Richard Holden, "Movers and shakers," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2016, *131* (4), 1849–1874.

Altonji, Joseph G, Todd E Elder, and Christopher R Taber, "Selection on observed and unobserved variables: Assessing the effectiveness of Catholic schools," *Journal of political economy*, 2005, *113* (1), 151–184.

Azaña, Manuel and Gabriel Jackson, *Causas de la guerra de España*, Crítica Barcelona, 1986.

Balcells, Laia, "Continuation of politics by two means: Direct and indirect violence in civil war," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2011, *55* (3), 397–422.

_ , "The consequences of victimization on political identities: Evidence from Spain," *Politics & Society*, 2012, *40* (3), 311–347.

Bandiera, Oriana, Andrea Prat, Stephen Hansen, and Raffaella Sadun, "CEO behavior and firm performance," *Journal of Political Economy*, 2020, *128* (4), 1325–1369.

Bertrand, Marianne and Antoinette Schoar, "Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies," *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 2003, *118* (4), 1169–1208.

Cagé, Julia, Anna Dagorret, Pauline Grosjean, and Saumitra Jha, "Heroes and villains: The effects of heroism on autocratic values and Nazi collaboration in France," *American economic review*, 2023, *113* (7), 1888–1932.

Caillaud, Bernard and Jean Tirole, "Consensus building: How to persuade a group," *American Economic Review*, 2007, *97* (5), 1877–1900.

Calvo, Guillermo A and Stanislaw Wellisz, "Supervision, loss of control, and the optimum size of the firm," *Journal of political Economy*, 1978, *86* (5), 943–952.

Coque, Arturo Garcia Alvarez, "Los militares de Estado Mayor en la guerra civil espanola (1936-1939)." PhD dissertation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid 2017.

de Paz Sánchez, Manuel, *Militares masones de España. Diccionario biográfico del siglo XX*, Centro

Francisco Tomás y Valiente UNED Alcira-Valencia. Fundación Instituto de Historia Social, 2004.

Diegert, Paul, Matthew A Masten, and Alexandre Poirier, "Assessing omitted variable bias when the controls are endogenous," *arXiv preprint arXiv:2206.02303*, 2022.

Dippel, Christian and Stephan Heblich, "Leadership in social movements: Evidence from the "forty-eighters" in the civil war," *American Economic Review*, 2021, *111* (2), 472–505.

Egea Bruno, Pedro María, "Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer," in "Diccionario Biográfico electrónico," Real Academia de la Historia, 2024.

Galofré-Vilà, Gregori, Christopher M Meissner, Martin McKee, and David Stuckler, "Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi Party," *The Journal of Economic History*, 2021, *81* (1), 81–113.

Geddes, Barbara, "What do we know about democratization after twenty years?," *Annual review of political science*, 1999, *2* (1), 115–144.

Grosjean, Pauline A, Saumitra Jha, Michael Vlassopoulos, and Yves Zenou, "Political Trenches: War, Partisanship, and Polarization," 2023. Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper.

Guarner, Vicente, *Cataluña en la guerra de España, 1936-39*, Madrid, Gregorio del Toro, 1975.

Gómez y González de la Buelga, Juan, "José Cuesta Monereo," in "Diccionario Biográfico electrónico," Real Academia de la Historia, 2024.

Hermalin, Benjamin E, "Toward an economic theory of leadership: Leading by example," *American Economic Review*, 1998, pp. 1188–1206.

Jha, Saumitra and Steven Wilkinson, "Does combat experience foster organizational skill? Evidence from ethnic cleansing during the partition of South Asia," *American Political Science Review*, 2012, *106* (4), 883–907.

Jia, Ruixue, Masayuki Kudamatsu, and David Seim, "Political selection in China: The complementary roles of connections and performance," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2015, *13* (4), 631–668.

Jones, Benjamin F and Benjamin A Olken, "Do leaders matter? National leadership and growth since World War II," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2005, *120* (3), 835–864.

Koenig, Christoph, "Loose cannons: war veterans and the erosion of democracy in Weimar Germany," *The Journal of Economic History*, 2023, *83* (1), 167–202.

Loeper, Antoine, Jakub Steiner, and Colin Stewart, "Influential opinion leaders," *The Economic Journal*, 2014, *124* (581), 1147–1167.

Losada, Eduardo San Martin, *Sueldos, haberes y gratificaciones del personal del Ejercito*, Ediciones

SML Madrid, 1929.

__ , *Sueldos, haberes y gratificaciones del personal del Ejercito*, Ediciones SML Madrid, 1941.

Manski, Charles F, "Identification of endogenous social effects: The reflection problem," *The review of economic studies*, 1993, *60* (3), 531–542.

Marinov, Nikolay and Hein Goemans, "Coups and democracy," *British Journal of Political Science*, 2014, *44* (4), 799–825.

Masolvier, Carlos Engel, *El cuerpo de oficiales en la Guerra de España*, AF Editores, 2008.

Masten, Matthew A and Alexandre Poirier, "The effect of omitted variables on the sign of regression coefficients," *arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.00552*, 2022.

McLauchlin, Theodore and Álvaro La Parra-Pérez, "Disloyalty and logics of fratricide in civil war: Executions of officers in republican Spain, 1936-1939," *Comparative Political Studies*, 2019, *52* (7), 1028–1058.

Naidu, Suresh, James A Robinson, and Lauren E Young, "Social Origins of Dictatorships: Elite Networks and Political Transitions in Haiti," *American Political Science Review*, 2021, *115* (3), 900–916. *NIST Digital Library of Mathematical Functions*

NIST Digital Library of Mathematical Functions, `https://dlmf.nist.gov/`*, Release 1.2.1 of 2024-06-15. F. W. J. Olver, A. B. Olde Daalhuis, D. W. Lozier, B. I. Schneider, R. F. Boisvert, C. W. Clark, B. R. Miller, B. V. Saunders, H. S. Cohl, and M. A. McClain, eds.*

Oster, Emily, *"Unobservable selection and coefficient stability: Theory and evidence," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 2019, 37 (2), 187–204.*

Oto-Peralías, Daniel, *"The long-term effects of political violence on political attitudes: Evidence from the Spanish Civil War," Kyklos, 2015, 68 (3), 412–442.*

Parra-Pérez, Álvaro La, *"For a Fistful of Pesetas? The Political Economy of the Army in a Non-Consolidated Democracy: the Second Spanish Republic and Civil War (1931–9)," The Economic History Review, 2020, 73 (2), 565–594.*

Payne, Stanley G, *The Spanish civil war, Cambridge University Press, 2012.*

__ , *The collapse of the Spanish republic, 1933-1936: Origins of the civil war, Yale University Press, 2017.*

Preston, Paul, *Franco: Caudillo de Espana, Debate, 2015.*

Rodon, Toni, *"The scars of violence and repression on founding elections: Evidence from Spain," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2024, 41 (1), 47–71.*

Salgado, Marcos, *"Building Loyalty through Personal Connections: Evidence from the Spanish Empire,"*

2023. Working Paper.

Satyanath, Shanker, Nico Voigtländer, and Hans-Joachim Voth, *"Bowling for fascism: Social capital and the rise of the Nazi Party," Journal of Political Economy, 2017, 125 (2), 478–526.*

Serem, Ruben, *"Conspiracy, coup d'etat and civil war in Seville (1936-1939): History and myth in Francoist Spain." PhD dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science 2012.*

Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu, *"Getting ahead in the communist party: explaining the advancement of central committee members in China," American political science review, 2012, 106 (1), 166–187.*

Singh, Naunihal, *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups, JHU Press, 2014.*

Thomas, Hugh, *The Spanish Civil War: Revised Edition, Modern Library, 2001.*

Tur-Prats, Ana and Felipe Valencia Caicedo, *"The long shadow of the spanish civil war," 2020. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3659549.*

Voth, Hans-Joachim and Nico Voigtlander, *"Highway to Hitler," American Economic Journal: Applied, forthcoming.*

Voth, Joachim and Guo Xu, *"Discretion and destruction: promotions, performance, and patronage in the Royal Navy," CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13963, 2020.*

Xu, Guo, *"The costs of patronage: Evidence from the british empire," American Economic Review, 2018, 108 (11), 3170–3198.*

A Appendix

A.1 Proofs

In Lemma 1, we derive an expression for σ_i, the probability of a successful coup.

Lemma 1. *If p has uniform prior distribution, $p \sim U[0,1]$, then*

$$\sigma_i = 1 - \frac{B(p^*, k_i + 1, n_i - k_i + 1)}{B(k_i + 1, n_i - k_i + 1)}$$

where $B(p^*, x, y)$ is the incomplete beta function

$$B(p^*, x, y) = \int_0^{p^*} t^{x-1}(1-t)^{y-1} dt$$

and $B(x, y) = B(1, x, y)$ is the beta function.

Proof. Denote the prior distribution of p by $F(p)$, with support in $[0,1]$. We can apply Bayes' Rule to Equation (6):

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_i &= P(p \geq p^* \mid \hat{p}_i) \\ &= \frac{\int_{p^*}^1 P(\hat{p}_i \mid p) dF(p)}{\int_0^1 P(\hat{p}_i \mid p) dF(p)}. \end{aligned}$$

If we assume p has **uniform distribution**, we can simplify the formula above:

$$\sigma_i = \frac{\int_{p^*}^1 P(\hat{p}_i \mid p) dp}{\int_0^1 P(\hat{p}_i \mid p) dp}.$$

Moreover,

$$P(\hat{p}_i \mid p) = \binom{n_i}{k_i} p^{k_i} (1-p)^{n_i - k_i},$$

because $\hat{p}_i \coloneqq k_i / n_i$ and $k_i \sim B(n_i, p)$. In this case:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_i &= \frac{\binom{n_i}{k_i} \int_{p^*}^1 p^{k_i}(1-p)^{n_i - k_i} dp}{\binom{n_i}{k_i} \int_0^1 p^{k_i}(1-p)^{n_i - k_i} dp} \\ &= 1 - \frac{B(p^*, k_i + 1, n_i - k_i + 1)}{B(k_i + 1, n_i - k_i + 1)} \end{aligned}$$

as claimed in the text.

The reason of beta functions in (1) is also called regularized beta function and denoted

$$I_{p^*}(k_i+1, n_i-k_i+1) = \frac{B(p^*, k_i+1, n_i-k_i+1)}{B(k_i+1, n_i-k_i+1)}. \tag{8}$$

□

Proof of Proposition 1

Proof.

Recall decision rule (7):

$$d_i = 1 \text{ iff } P(p \geq p^* \mid \hat{p}_i^{command}) \geq \frac{u_i^{\ell|\ell} - u_i^{r|\ell}}{(u_i^{\ell|\ell} - u_i^{r|\ell}) + (u_i^{r|r} - u_i^{\ell|r})}.$$

The left-hand side is a function of $k_i^{command}$ and $n_i^{command}$, whereas the right-hand side is a function of all $k_i^{\{}active\}$ and $k_i^{\{}retired\}$,. Denote

$$\sigma_i = P(p \geq p^* \mid \hat{p}_i^{command})$$
$$\nu_i = \frac{u_i^{\ell|\ell} - u_i^{r|\ell}}{(u_i^{\ell|\ell} - u_i^{r|\ell}) + (u_i^{r|r} - u_i^{\ell|r})}.$$

Then we have

$$d_i = 1 \iff \sigma_i \geq \nu_i.$$

I claim that, ν_i decreases with $k_i^{\{}active\}$ and $k_i^{\{}retired\}$, while σ_i increases with k_i^{active}. To see that, write ν_i as

$$\nu_i = \frac{1}{1+\omega_i}$$

where

$$\omega_i = \frac{u_i^{r|r} - u_i^{\ell|r}}{u_i^{\ell|\ell} - u_i^{r|\ell}}.$$

Due to Assumptions 3 and 4, ω_i increases with both k_i^{active} and $k_i^{retired}$. So that ν_i *decreases* in those variables.

Now, by Lemma 1, σ_i is given by:

$$\sigma_i(k_i^{command}, n_i^{command}) = 1 - I_{p^*}(k_i^{command}, n_i^{command} - k_i^{command} + 1)$$

where

$$I_{p^*}(a,b) = \frac{B(p^*,a,b)}{B(a,b)}$$

is the regularized beta function.

We will temporarily drop subscripts and superscripts.

We want to show that σ increases in k. Denote $k' = k+1$. Applying integration by parts, one can check, after no little computations, the following relation[30]

$$I_{p^*}(k'+1, n-k'+1) - I_{p^*}(k+1, n-k+1) = -\frac{p^{*k+1}(1-p^*)^{n-k'+1}}{(k+1)B(k'+1, n-k'+1)} < 0.$$

So that

$$\begin{aligned}
\sigma(k+1,n) - \sigma(k,n) &= I_{p^*}(k+1, n-k+1) - I_{p^*}(k'+1, n-k'+1) \\
&= \frac{p^{*k+1}(1-p^*)^{n-k'+1}}{(k+1)B(k'+1, n-k'+1)} \\
&\geq 0.
\end{aligned}$$

By induction on the increment, one concludes that $\sigma(k+m,n) \geq \sigma(k,n)$ for any positive integer m, as we wanted.

The previous arguments showed that

$$\sigma_i \text{ increases in } k_i^{command}$$

and

$$\nu_i \text{ decreases in } k_i^{active} \text{ and } k_i^{retired}.$$

So, if $k_i^{\chi\prime} > k_i^{\chi}$, we have $\sigma_i \geq \nu_i \implies \sigma_i' \geq \nu_i'$, and hence

$$d_i = 1 \implies d_i' = 1.$$

This shows that d_i increases in k_i^{χ}. □

[30] Alternatively, just check (*NIST Digital Library of Mathematical Functions*, n.d., 8.17.18).

A.2 Tables

Table A.1: Number of Officers per Year

Year	Entries All	Entries New	Entries Returning	Exits	Unique Individuals	Exits as % of N
1927				273	5665	4.82%
1928	436	436		214	5828	3.67%
1929	890	704	186	307	6504	4.72%
1930	333	180	153	578	6530	8.85%
1931	439	206	233	588	6391	9.20%
1932	1270	727	543	336	7073	4.75%
1933	856	381	475	262	7593	3.45%
1934	673	343	330	305	8004	3.81%
1935	883	608	275	345	8582	4.02%
1936	2710	2380	330		10947	

This table illustrates the number of officers per year in our dataset. The entries are officers who appear in a given year but were not present the year before. Some of them appear for the first time (i.e., they are incorporated into the army), and some of them are returning after being missing from the dataset. Exits are the officers who appear in that year but not in the next. Since we only look for officers present in 1936, all exits later return. We cannot ascertain whether these missing observations are due to failed name matches or due to periods of inactivity. Reassuringly, the years with the highest number of exits correspond to the military reform, when many officers were transferred to the reserve.

Table A.2: Summary Statistics: Individual-Level Dataset

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Subordinate joins the Rebels	0.651	0.477	0	1	5330
N Destinations under Rebel Leader	0.247	0.581	0	5	5330
N Destinations under Loyalist Leader	0.188	0.472	0	3	5330
N Destinations	3.376	1.996	1	11	5330
Tenure	22.95	8.360	5	57	5330
Officer Rank in 1936	3.448	1.485	1	7	5330
Years in Africa (core)	0.208	0.756	0	12	5330
Cavalry Corps	0.072	0.258	0	1	5330
Estado Mayor Corps	0.023	0.148	0	1	5330
Infantry Corps	0.358	0.480	0	1	5330
Engineers Corps	0.105	0.306	0	1	5330
Aviation Corps	0.050	0.219	0	1	5330
Carabineros Corps	0.080	0.271	0	1	5330
Training Corps	0.012	0.108	0	1	5330
Guardia Civil Corps	0.141	0.348	0	1	5330
Hierarquical Position variation (32-36)	0.843	0.655	-1.698	2.948	5330
Leftist Vote in Province	0.483	0.183	0	0.82	5330
Division 1	0.433	0.496	0	1	5330
Division 2	0.059	0.236	0	1	5330
Division 3	0.174	0.379	0	1	5330
Division 4	0.195	0.397	0	1	5330
Division 5	0.006	0.077	0	1	5330
Division 6	0.066	0.249	0	1	5330
Division 7	0.005	0.067	0	1	5330
Division 8	0.024	0.153	0	1	5330
Division 9	0.032	0.175	0	1	5330
Division 10	0.001	0.036	0	1	5330
Division 11	0.003	0.053	0	1	5330
Division 12	0.001	0.031	0	1	5330

This table reports summary statistics for the individual-level dataset. The first row has our dependent variable, and the next two have our main treatment variables.

Table A.3: Comparison between the Full Army and the Army in the Republican Zone

	All of Spain Mean	Republican Area Mean	Difference
Rebel Subordinate	0.803	0.651	0.152
p-value			0.000
diff as % of mean			0.189
Number of Destinations	3.280	3.376	-0.096
			0.004
			-0.029
Tenure	22.088	22.959	-0.871
			0.000
			-0.039
Officer Rank in 1936	3.345	3.448	-0.103
			0.000
			-0.031
Years in Africa (Core)	0.232	0.208	0.024
			0.058
			0.105
Hierarquical Position Variation (1932-1936)	0.820	0.843	-0.024
			0.028
			-0.029
Leftist Vote in Province	0.406	0.483	-0.076
			0.000
			-0.188
Guardia de Assalto	0.031	0.046	-0.015
			0.000
			-0.493
Years in Africa (Not Only Core)	1.722	1.444	0.278
			0.000
			0.161
Posted in 1936	0.925	0.908	0.017
			0.000
			0.019
Demoted in 1931 Reform	0.057	0.056	0.001
			0.824
			0.015
Highest Ranking in Garrison (1936)	0.070	0.067	0.003
			0.502
			0.040

The purpose of this table is to compare the full Spanish Army with the Army in the Republican Area. Since most officers in the Rebel Area did not have the choice of whether or not to rebel, our baseline specifications only use the Republican Area sample.

Table A.4: Balance Table: Effect of More Covariates on Treatment Status

	N Rebel		N Loyalist		Rebel		Loyalist	
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Artilary Corps	-0.089	-0.880	-0.076	0.078	-0.023	0.005	-0.020	0.008
p-value	0.000	0.071	0.000	0.007	0.253	0.751	0.080	0.670
Cavalry Corps	0.247	-0.884	0.209	-0.040	0.073	-0.010	0.062	-0.006
	0.000	0.459	0.000	0.168	0.068	0.458	0.006	0.766
Estado Mayor Corps	1.222	-0.882	0.899	0.536	0.226	-0.033	0.163	0.023
	0.000	0.268	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.240	0.000	0.548
Infantary Corps	0.012	-0.913	0.054	0.005	0.001	0.006	0.014	-0.003
	0.468	0.111	0.000	0.793	0.932	0.532	0.178	0.802
Enginner Corps	0.002	-0.877	-0.044	-0.082	0.008	0.014	-0.009	0.003
	0.933	0.007	0.035	0.024	0.570	0.332	0.434	0.818
Aviation Corps	-0.059	-0.885	-0.076	-0.045	-0.011	-0.071	-0.019	-0.067
	0.103	0.656	0.010	0.714	0.626	0.403	0.234	0.460
Carabineros Corps	-0.122	-0.887	-0.130	-0.040	-0.042	0.051	-0.042	0.012
	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.585	0.038	0.028	0.000	0.740
Train Corps	0.425	-0.881	0.324	-0.108	0.333	-0.045	0.254	-0.032
	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.106	0.314	0.099	0.627
Guardia Civil Corps	-0.228	-0.886	-0.185	-0.038	-0.068	0.016	-0.054	-0.014
	0.000	0.419	0.000	0.586	0.020	0.213	0.000	0.383
Guardia de Asalto	-0.127	-0.885	-0.053	0.625	-0.043	-27.622	-0.021	8.657
	0.001	0.000	0.085	0.005	0.002	1.000	0.175	1.000
Years in Africa	0.044	-0.885	0.034	0.005	0.004	0.000	0.003	0.001
(Not only Core)	0.000	0.959	0.000	0.036	0.033	0.810	0.017	0.159
Posted in 1936	-0.504	-0.686	-0.369	-0.384	-0.109	-0.059	-0.080	-0.033
	0.000	0.377	0.000	0.120	0.133	0.124	0.001	0.388
Demoted in 1931 Reform	0.259	-0.885	0.201	0.029	0.045	0.000	0.034	0.007
	0.000	0.759	0.000	0.086	0.013	0.996	0.004	0.442
Highest Ranking	0.058	-0.883	0.084	0.005	-0.004	-0.007	0.006	-0.004
in Garrison 1936	0.070	0.485	0.001	0.806	0.770	0.241	0.500	0.515

Each cell in this table corresponds to a regression of one covariate against our main treatment variables. The first row shows the coefficient, the second the p-value, and the third the coefficient as a % of the treatment variable. Columns 1 and 3 report the regressions without fixed effects, showing unbalanced samples. Columns 2 and 4 include destination fixed effects, showing mostly balanced samples.

Table A.5: List of Retired Generals sho Supported Previous Coups

Name	Supported the 1923 Coup	Supported the 1932 Coup	Endorsed the 1936 Coup
Severiano Martinez Anido	Yes		Yes
José Cavalcanti de Alburquerque y Padierna	Yes	Yes	Yes
Emilio Barrera Luyando		Yes	
Dámaso Berenguer Fusté	Yes		
José Sanjurjo Sacanell	Yes	Yes	Yes*
Juan O'Donnell Vargas	Yes		
Francisco Gomez-Jordana Sousa	Yes		
Federico Berenguer Fusté	Yes		
Leopoldo de Saro Marin	Yes		
Francisco Ruiz del Portal y Martinez	Yes		
Luis Navarro y Alonso de Celada	Yes		
Dalmiro Rodriguez Pedré	Yes		
Mario Muslera Planes	Yes		Yes
Miguel Ponte y Manso de Zunfiga		Yes	Yes

This is a list of the retired generals we use to test the indoctrination mechanism (Table 7). The 1923 coup supporters were conspirators *(Cuadrilatero)*, members of the Military Directory, and the War Minister of Primo de Rivera's government. The 1932 coup supporters are classified according to Payne (2017). Their endorsement of the 1936 coup is based on their biographies in Wikipedia or in the *Diccionario Biografico Electronico* of the Royal Academy of History. José Sanjurjo is a complicated case because he did more than endorse the 1936 coup, he was part of the conspiracy (despite being retired). Our results do not change if we reclassify him.

Table A.6: List of Rebel and Loyalist Generals

Name	Allegiance	Rank in 1936	Principal Rebel Conspirator	Command of Troops in 1936
Emilio Mola Vidal	Rebel	Brigadier General	Yes	Yes
Francisco Franco Bahamonde	Rebel	Major General	Yes	Yes
Gonzalo Queipo Llano Sierra	Rebel	Major General	Yes	Yes
Manuel Goded Llopis	Rebel	Major General	Yes	Yes
Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer	Rebel	Major General	Yes	Yes
Andres Saliquet Zumeta	Rebel	Major General	Yes	
Eduardo Lopez Ochoa Portuondo	Rebel	Major General	Yes	
Joaquin Fanjul Goni	Rebel	Major General	Yes	
Agustin Gomez Morato	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Angel San Pedro Aymat	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Cristobal Pena Abuin	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Domingo Batet Mestres	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Eduardo Cavanna Val	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Enrique Salcedo Molinuevo	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Fernando Martinez Monje Restoy	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Francisco Llano Encomienda	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Jose Fernandez Villa Abrille Calivara	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Jose Iglesias Martinez	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Jose Miaja Menant	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Julian Lopez Viota	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Luis Castello Pantoja	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Manuel Cardenal Dominicis	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Manuel Romerales Quintero	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Mariano Gamir Ulibarri	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Miguel Nunez Prado Susbielas	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Nicolas Molero Lobo	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Rogelio Caridad Pita	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Sebastian Pozas Perea	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Toribio Martinez Cabrera	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Alvaro Fernandez Burriel	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Angel Garcia Benitez	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Carlos Bosch Bosch	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Eduardo Martin Gonzalez Fuente	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Eliseo Alvarez Arenas Romero	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Fernando Capaz Montes	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Francisco Patxot Madoz	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Gerardo Ravassa Cuevas	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Gonzalo Gonzalez Lara	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Gregorio Benito Terraza	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Jacinto Fernandez Ampon	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Jose Bosch Atienza	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Jose Garcia Aldave Mancebo	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Jose Sanchez Ocana Beltran	Rebel	Major General		Yes
Justo Legorburu Dominguez Matamoros	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Manuel Garcia Alvarez	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Marcial Barro Garcia	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Victor Carrasco Amilivia	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Virgilio Cabanellas Ferrer	Rebel	Major General		Yes
Alejandro Rodriguez Gonzalez	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Anselmo Otero Cossio Morales	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Carlos Bernal Garcia	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Carlos Masquelet Lacaci	Loyalist	Major General		
Celestino Garcia Antunez	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Jose Aranguren Roldan	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Jose Riquelme Lopez Bago	Loyalist	Major General		
Juan Garcia Gomez Caminero	Loyalist	Major General		
Juan Urbano Palma	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Manuel Alcazar Leal	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Manuel Cruz Boullosa	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Pedro Cerda Lopez Mollinedo	Loyalist	Major General		
Rafael Rodriguez Ramirez	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Abilio Barbero Saldana	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Alberto Castro Girona	Rebel	Lieutenant General		
Alfonso Moya Andino	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Angel Rodriguez Barrio	Rebel	Major General		
Antonio Losada Ortega	Rebel	Major General		
Aurelio Rodriguez Ocana	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Emilio Araujo Vergara	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Enrique Aviles Melgar	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Eugenio Espinosa Monteros Bermejillo	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Federico Cruz Boullosa	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Federico Miquel Lacour	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Jose Rodriguez Casademunt	Rebel	Lieutenant General		
Julio Bragulat Pascual	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Julio Mena Zueco	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Leopoldo Jimenez Garcia	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Luis Grijalvo Celaya	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Luis Orgaz Yoldi	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Manuel Gonzalez Carrasco	Rebel	Major General		
Manuel Llanos Medina	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Manuel Lon Laga	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Pio Lopez Pozas	Rebel	Lieutenant General		
Rafael Lopez Gomez	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Rafael Villegas Montesinos	Rebel	Major General		
Ricardo Morales Diaz	Rebel	Brigadier General		

Table A.7: The Effect of Principal Rebel Leaders

	Rebel Subordinate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Destinations under Rebel Leader (Principal)	0.136***	0.148***	0.128***			
	(0.026)	(0.049)	(0.048)			
N Destinations under Rebel Leader (Not Principal)	0.057***	0.112**	0.112**			
	(0.017)	(0.050)	(0.049)			
Destination under a Rebel Leader (Principal)				0.138***	0.148***	0.137***
				(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.039)
Destinations under a Rebel Leader (Not Principal)				0.056*	0.081**	0.088***
				(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126	18,126

Principal Rebel Results: This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders and Republican Leaders on their subordinates' decisions ($Rebel = 1$). Two different datasets were used, individual and individual destinations (each observation is an individual in a given destination). For each treatment variable, we report OLS regressions with no fixed effects, with destination fixed effects, and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Standard errors clustered at the destination level are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.8: Effect of Rebel Leaders by Time Period

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Destination under a Rebel Leader	0.130**	0.080***	0.134**	0.077***
	(0.054)	(0.029)	(0.061)	(0.027)
Diff Coefficients	0.050		0.057	
	(0.061)		(0.067)	
Regime	Dictatorship	Republic	Dictatorship	Republic
Dataset	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	7,763	10,363	7,763	10,363

In this table, we split the sample by period: Monarchy and Republic. We present OLS regressions with fixed effects and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Standard errors clustered at the destination level are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.9: The Effect of Current and Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel - Drop Connected in 1936

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N Destinations under Rebel Leader	0.143**	0.115*		
	(0.062)	(0.067)		
N Destinations under Loyalist Leader	0.006	0.008		
	(0.069)	(0.066)		
Destination under Rebel Leader			0.115***	0.111***
			(0.024)	(0.027)
Destination under Loyalist Leader			0.034	0.031
			(0.027)	(0.028)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Drop Connected in 1936	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.644	0.644	0.685	0.685
Observations	4,680	4,680	17,715	17,715

This table shows the effect of *former* and *current* rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-2) and the individual-destination (models 3-4). We report regressions with destination fixed effects (1 and 3), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (2 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the destination level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and destination levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.10: Negative Selection - Potentially Transferred Subordinate

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Destination under a Rebel Leader	0.108***	0.105***	0.107***	0.106***
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Destination under a Loyalist Leader	0.033	0.029	0.037	0.032
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Potentially Transferred away from Rebel Leader			−0.010	−0.018
			(0.037)	(0.033)
Potentially Transferred away from Loyalist Leader			0.032	0.040
			(0.037)	(0.037)
Dataset	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Drop Potentially Transferred	Yes	Yes	No	No
Destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.684	0.684	0.686	0.686
Observations	17,865	17,865	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders and Republican Leaders on their subordinates' decisions (*Rebel* = 1). Each observation is an individual in a given destination. The "Potentially Transferred" variables equal 1 if the subordinate leaves the destination the same year of the leader's arrival. If the transfer is to a new destination with the same leader type, we do not classify it as a transfer attempt. For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with destination fixed effects, and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Standard errors double clustered at the destination and individual level in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.11: Indoctrination - Active and Inactive Right-Wing Retired Generals

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N Destinations under Right-Wing Retired (Active in 1936)	0.062	0.034		
	(0.041)	(0.041)		
N Destinations under Right-Wing Retired (Inactive in 1936)	0.070	0.075		
	(0.104)	(0.103)		
N Destinations under Rebel Leader	0.118**	0.104*		
	(0.052)	(0.055)		
N Destinations under Loyalist Leader	0.001	−0.024		
	(0.053)	(0.054)		
Destination under Right-Wing Retired (Active in 1936)			0.060	0.050
			(0.045)	(0.035)
Destination under Right-Wing Retired (Inactive in 1936)			−0.029	−0.038
			(0.042)	(0.048)
Destination under Rebel Leader			0.121***	0.123***
			(0.028)	(0.032)
Destination under Loyalist Leader			0.038	0.033
			(0.024)	(0.023)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126

Mechanisms Right-Wing Generals: This table shows the effect of Retired Right-Wing Generals on subordinates' decision (*Rebel* = 1). Two different datasets were used, individual and individual destinations (each observation is an individual in a given destination). These generals participated in either the 1923 or the 1932 coup attempt. We separate them into those who endorsed the 1936 (Active) and those who did not (Inactive). For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with fixed effects and fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Standard errors clustered at the destination level in parentheses.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.12: Promotions Mechanism - Without Controls

	Promotion in Regime		Promotion in Destination	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4))
N Destinations under a 1923 Leader	0.270***	−0.203***		
	(0.074)	(0.059)		
N Destinations under a Rebel Leader	−0.061	−0.106***		
	(0.059)	(0.041)		
N Destinations under a Loyalist Leader	−0.067	0.027		
	(0.078)	(0.043)		
Destination under a 1923 Leader			0.196***	−0.202***
			(0.067)	(0.005)
Destination under a Rebel Leader			−0.164***	−0.153***
			(0.063)	(0.059)
Destination under a Loyalist Leader			0.021	−0.014
			(0.043)	(0.080)
Regime	Dictatorship	Republic	Dictatorship	Republic
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	No
Observations	6,936	11,273	15,910	21,375

This table shows that subordinates of the 1923 coup organizers were promoted more rapidly during the monarchy (1927-1931) and more slowly afterward (1932-1936). Two different datasets were used, individual and individual destinations (each observation is an individual in a given destination). The variable Promotion is equal to 1 if we observe an increase in the officer's rank. For the individual dataset, we are looking into promotions within the years of a certain regime. In the case of individual destinations, we are evaluating promotion within this specific destination. For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with fixed effects and with fixed effects plus additional controls. Standard errors clustered at the destination level in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.13: Baseline Results (Excluding Geographically Loyal Officers)

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Destinations under Rebel Leader	0.085***	0.182***	0.172***			
	(0.020)	(0.046)	(0.048)			
N Destinations under Loyalist Leader	−0.048**	0.022	−0.000			
	(0.023)	(0.048)	(0.048)			
Destination under a Rebel Leader				0.087***	0.118***	0.110***
				(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Destination under a Loyalist Leader				−0.044	0.021	0.013
				(0.037)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.621	0.621	0.621	0.66	0.66	0.66
Observations	4,885	4,885	4,885	16,629	16,629	16,629

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-destination (models 4-6). We report OLS regressions with no fixed effects (1 and 4), with destination fixed effects (2 and 5), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 6). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the destination level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and destination levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.14: Regressions Weighted by the Inverse of the Number of Destinations

	Rebel Subordinate	
	(1)	(2)
Destination under a Rebel Leader	0.117***	0.099***
	(0.033)	(0.033)
Destination under a Loyalist Leader	0.045	0.034
	(0.034)	(0.022)
Dataset	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.686	0.686
Observations	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders and Republican Leaders on their subordinates' decisions ($Rebel = 1$). Each observation is an individual in a given destination. We weight observations by the inverse of the number of destinations per individual. For each leader variable, we present OLS regressions with no fixed effects, with destination fixed effects, and with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Standard errors clustered at the destination level in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.15: Reverse Causality (Excluding Colonels)

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Destinations under Rebel Leader	0.086***	0.147**	0.131**			
	(0.019)	(0.059)	(0.061)			
N Destinations under Loyalist Leader	−0.059**	−0.004	−0.016			
	(0.024)	(0.055)	(0.054)			
Destination under a Rebel Leader				0.084**	0.118***	0.118***
				(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Destination under a Loyalist Leader				−0.054	0.018	0.014
				(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	4,893	4,893	4,893	15,942	15,942	15,942

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-destination (models 4-6). We report OLS regressions with no fixed effects (1 and 4), with destination fixed effects (2 and 5), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 6). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the destination level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and destination levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.16: Reverse Causality (Excluding Highest Rank in Destination 1936)

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Destinations under Rebel Leader	0.068***	0.136***	0.125**			
	(0.018)	(0.051)	(0.053)			
N Destinations under Loyalist Leader	−0.039*	0.031	−0.005			
	(0.021)	(0.054)	(0.055)			
Destination under a Rebel Leader				0.067**	0.109***	0.114***
				(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Destination under a Loyalist Leader				−0.037	0.026	0.021
				(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	4,974	4,974	4,974	16,482	16,482	16,482

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-destination (models 4-6). We report OLS regressions with no fixed effects (1 and 4), with destination fixed effects (2 and 5), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 6). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the destination level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and destination levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.17: The Effect of Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel: Alternative Sample Definitions

	Individual Dataset							
	Rebel Subordinate							
	Including Rebel Area		*Without Republicans*		*Only Generals*		*Droping Both Leaders*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
N Destinations under Rebel Leader	0.064***	0.062**	0.350***	0.322***	0.153*	0.117	0.269***	0.241**
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.103)	(0.105)
Destinations FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.803	0.803	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651
Observations	11,308	11,308	4,493	4,493	1,663	1,663	4,806	4,806
	Individual-Destinations Dataset							
	Rebel Subordinate							
	Both Sides		*Without Republicans*		*Only Generals*		*Droping Both Leaders*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Destination under a Rebel Leader	0.051***	0.054***	0.181***	0.209***	0.120***	0.120***	0.187***	0.209***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.042)
Destinations FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.813	0.813	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	37,285	37,285	17,118	17,118	2,733	2,733	17,593	17,593

This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders on their subordinates' decisions (*Rebel* = 1). Each observation is an individual in a given destination. The "Both Sides" columns include subordinates who were in the Republican and Rebel zones on the day of the coup. The "Without Republicans" columns exclude subordinates under Republicans Leaders from the Control Group. The "With 1936" columns include connections with generals in 1936. Finally, the "Not Dropping Both Leaders" columns include observations that have both Republican and Rebel leaders within the destination. For each pair of columns, we present an OLS regression with destination fixed effects and with fixed effects plus additional controls. Standard errors clustered at the destination level are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.18: Effect of Rebel Leaders using the Military Hierarchy

	Rebel Subordinate				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rebels in Hierarchy	0.100***	0.092***	0.066***	0.037***	0.018**
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.009)
Loyalists in Hierarchy	0.027	0.021	0.012	0.006	0.003
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.006)
α	0	0.25	0.5	0.75	1
Rank	All	All	All	All	All
Destinations FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	18,128	18,128	18,128	18,128	18,128

This table shows the effect of Rebel Leaders and Republican Leaders on their subordinates' decisions ($Rebel = 1$) using the Military Hierarchy. Each observation is an individual in a given destination. The distance variable calculates how many levels separate a subordinate from a specific general. We present OLS regressions with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the Republican Zone on the day of the coup. Standard errors are clustered at the destination and subordinate in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.19: Extensive and Intensive Margins

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Destinations under a Rebel Leader	0.063***	0.109**	0.125**			
	(0.024)	(0.049)	(0.053)			
N Destinations under a Loyalist Leader	−0.027	−0.014	−0.011			
	(0.041)	(0.068)	(0.072)			
Sum Years under a Rebel Leader	0.007	0.024	0.0002			
	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.023)			
Sum Years under a Loyalist Leader	−0.011	0.019	0.006			
	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.045)			
Destination under a Rebel Leader				0.062	0.094***	0.098***
				(0.057)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Destination under a Loyalist Leader				−0.022	0.023	0.018
				(0.055)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Years inside Destination under a Rebel Leader				0.012	0.014	0.010
				(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Years inside Destination under a Loyalist Leader				−0.012	−0.001	−0.001
				(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest	Ind-Dest
Destination FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-destination (models 4-6). We report OLS regressions with no fixed effects (1 and 4), with destination fixed effects (2 and 5), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 6). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the destination level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and destination levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.3 Example from our Dataset: José Cuesta Monereo

In this section, we show an example from our dataset that highlights both how we built our dataset and illustrates the mechanisms behind our results. There are two relevant people in his example: Major Cuesta Monereo (a subordinate) and General Miguel Cabanellas (a leader). Cuesta was Cabanellas' *aide-de-camp* in 1934, and since the latter was a leader of the rebellion, the former is classified as "treated" in our dataset. In 1936, Cuesta was serving under a loyalist general, but he rebelled anyway.

Before 1936, Cabanellas was a committed republican, so it is unlikely that he indoctrinated Cuestas with anti-republican ideals. We cannot establish for certain why Cuesta supported the rebellion, but two things are clear: First, he had a deep knowledge of the conspiracy and had, therefore, a good idea about its probability of success. Importantly, he was aware of Cabanellas' involvement (unlike the government). Second, during and after the Civil War, Cuesta got promoted very rapidly, reaching the very top of the Army's hierarchy.

Figures A.1 and A.2 illustrate our data collection process. The first reproduces a small extract of Engel Masolvier (2008) (pp. 390-391 and 450), which we use to classify the loyalties (support for either the rebels or the government) for both leaders and subordinates. The second reproduces part of the military yearbooks, which we use to link subordinates to their former leaders.

Cabanellas. Miguel Cabanellas[31] joined the army in 1889 and got "meteoric" promotions during the 1910s, thanks to his performance in battle in Africa. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1919. He did not support Primo de Rivera's coup in 1923, but he was still promoted to major general in 1924. He was put in reserve in 1926. He conspired against the government in 1929 and 1930, the last year of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Around this time, he joined an association of like-minded republican generals, the *Asociación de Ciudadanía Militar*, which also included General Queipo de Llano. He was also a mason (Paz Sánchez (2004)).

After the end of the dictatorship and the abolition of the monarchy, he was rehabilitated by the new republican government. He had important commands during the early 1930s, including Inspector General of the Army. At that time, Cuesta Moreneo was his *aide-de-*

[31] The biographical information in these paragraphs is mostly based on Cabanella's entry in the Biographical Dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy of History (Egea Bruno (2024)).

camp, and they traveled the country inspecting regiments. We have an account of one such visit to the VII Brigade. Cabanellas demanded the officers to say "long live the Republic" when they saluted with their sabers, and suggested they hang artwork with some sort of allegory of the Republic (summarized in Coque (2017), pp. 154-155, based on Guarner (1975))[32].

In January 1936 he got assigned command of the 5$^{\text{th}}$ Division, based in Zaragoza. When the left won the February elections, the government replaced many of the division commanders with more loyal generals (e.g., Franco was sent to Canarias, Goded to the Balearic Islands, etc.). Due to his reputation as a republican, Cabanellas was confirmed in his post. On June 5$^{\text{th}}$, Mola (the main plotter) got him to join the conspiracy (Coque (2017), p. 104). Of the eight major generals in charge of military districts (in Peninsular Spain), he was the only one who rebelled, which was a complete surprise for the government. It is not entirely clear why he joined the uprising, as he did not share the ideas of conservative and monarchist officers such as Franco and Mola. His participation was crucial: Zaragoza, strategically located between Madrid and Barcelona, fell to the rebels, with all the troops and resources of the 5$^{\text{th}}$ Division and with little opposition from loyalist forces.

Cuesta's pre-coup career. Cuesta Moreneo[33] graduated from the Toledo Infantry Academy in 1913 and participated in campaigns in Morocco in 1924 and 1925, where he was described as "affable, cultured, active and tireless in the fulfillment of his duties and, in short, a brilliant Chief of Staff".

From 1931 to 1934, he was *aide-de-camp* of General Miguel Cabanellas. In 1933, Cabanellas was named chief of the 2$^{\text{nd}}$ General Inspection of the Army, and Cuesta accompanied him in visits to garrisons all over Spain. Coque (2017) (p. 101) affirms that the pair had "strong personal ties" and that Cuesta may have been influenced by Cabanellas' republicanism "within an idea of social progress, but with order." On April 28$^{\text{th}}$, 1936, Cuesta wrote to Cabanellas, affirming that most officers would join an uprising because they saw Spain "threatened by theses masses without control", he also affirmed that many "who now call themselves leftists" would join, because "that does not exclude the idea of order, which

[32] As a further confirmation of Cabanella's republicanism, In 1933, he participated in politics as a candidate for the Radical Republican Party. In a manifesto, he proclaimed: *"I am not a Marxist nor an anti-Marxist, I recognize the proletarian desires as just..."* (Egea Bruno (2024)). Coque (2017) describes him as "one of the most republican bosses in the Army" (p. 154, our translation).

[33] The biographical information in these paragraphs is mostly based on Cuesta's entry in the Biographical Dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy of History (Gómez y González de la Buelga (2024))

is what we need, since no one is scared by social advances and everything that has to come, but with order".

In 1935 Cuesta was assigned to the 2nd division, headquartered in Sevilla. In February 1936, General Villa-Abrille was appointed to command the division by the new leftist government.

The coup in Seville. Mola made General Queipo de Llano the leader of the uprising in Andalucía, but the real architect of the coup was Cuesta Moreneo. Serem (2012) (p. 55) calls him "...the true brains behind the conspiracy, weaved a vast network encompassing not only Seville, but the entire II Division and stretching even outside the army."[34]

In mid-June, Villa-Abrille was approached by rebel general Queipo de Llano, but he refused to join the conspiracy (Serem (2012), p. 28). However, he failed to report the conspirators to the government. When assessing the coup's chances, Mola concluded that despite the lack of support by the top ranks, success in Seville (and all of Andalusia) was almost certain, thanks to the support and planning of the middle ranks (especially Cuesta) (cite Coque (2017) 101-102, 151-152)[35].

When the coup was launched, in July 18th, the rebels, led by General Queipo de Llano, took control of the city's largest regiment in just a few hours. General Villa-Abrile did not join them, though his opposition was not very energetic[36]. By the end of the day, the rebels had secured the main government buildings, and Queipo de Llano addressed the population through the radio. During the following three days, the rebels managed to defeat loyalist forces in the workers' neighborhoods, where militias had risen up to defend the Republic.

The rebels' success in the coup in Sevilla was key. First, it was the fourth largest city in Spain and the biggest to fall in July. Strategically, it was crucial for the arrival of rebel

[34]Also, Serem (2012) (p. 55) affirms: "The organizational skills of the introvert Cuesta matched, if not surpassed, those of Mola. Cuesta Monereo drew important conclusions from the Sanjurjada, including the modus operandi and how to incorporate a capricious leader [Queipo de Llano] in the entire project... The local Director [Cuesta] left no detail to chance, including the myth of Queipo de Llano and his soldaditos, of which he would become the second greatest promoter, after the rebel general himself."


[35]If the coup failed in Madrid (which it did), Mola's original plan only contemplated an advance from the north (where Cabanellas controlled the 5th Division). After this new assessment, the plan also contemplated success in Seville (Serem (2012), p. 52). Control of Andalusia was also important for the landing of the African troops.

[36]Villa-Abrile was discharged from the Army in December 1938. In February 1939, he was sentenced to six years in prison by a rebel court. He died in 1946 shortly after finishing his sentence. Because he was a recent arrival to Seville, and because his more competent subordinates succeeded so spectacularly in orchestrating the coup Serem (2012) (p. 58) argues that Villa-Abrille was the leader of the 2nd Division "in name only."

African troops to the Peninsula.

Cuesta's post-coup career. In the civil war that followed the coup, Cuesta Moreneo played an important command role under General Queipo, including in the battles of Málaga and Peñarroya. He also acted as a liaison between Queipo and Franco. When the war was over, he was destined to the Army's General Staff with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He eventually made it to the top of the military hierarchy: he was promoted to brigadier general in 1947, major general in 1951, and lieutenant general in 1957. For reference, without counting bonuses, a lieutenant general's salary was 2.72 times a major's (Cuesta's rank at the beginning of the war) (San Martin Losada (1941)).

Figure A.1: Example from our dataset: Engel's book




450 CARLOS ENGEL MASOLIVER

Jefatura de la 5ª División Orgánica

N	general de división	Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer
N	comandante de Estado Mayor	José Cebollero Garcés

El general Cabanellas falleció de enfermedad en Málaga en el año 1938.

(a) Cabanellas loyalty and destination in 1936, according to Engel Masolvier (2008) (p. 450)



Jefatura de la 2ª División Orgánica

R	general de división	José Fernández-Villabrille Calivara
N	teniente coronel de Artillería	Manuel Lizaúr de Paúl (ayudante)
N	comandante de Infantería	Mariano Allende Nuviola (ayudante)
N	profesor 1º de Equitación	Gabriel Fuentes Ferrer

El general Fernández-Villabrille, que se había resistido a la sublevación, fue dado de baja y permaneció en prisión durante toda la guerra.

Estado Mayor


R	coronel de Estado Mayor	Juan Cantero Ortega
N	comandante de Estado Mayor	José Cuesta Monereo
R	comandante de Estado Mayor	Francisco Hidalgo Sánchez
N	comandante de Estado Mayor	Enrique González Pons (Sección de Topografía)
N	comandante de Estado Mayor	Manuel Lombardero Vicente
N	capitán de Estado Mayor	Manuel Escribano Aguirre
N	capitán de Estado Mayor	Manuel Gutiérrez Flores
N	capitán de Estado Mayor	Fernando Fuster Vilaplana (Sección de Topografía)

El coronel Cantero y el comandante Hidalgo fueron retirados por indecisión.

(b) Cuesta Monereo's and Villa-Abrille's loyalty and destination in 1936, according to Engel Masolvier (2008) (pp. 390-391)


Example of our dataset construction. These are example pages from Engel Masolvier (2008). The **N**, next to Cabanellas and Cuesta indicates that they joined the rebels (Nationalists), and the **R** next to Villa-Abrille means that him remained loyal to the government (Republican).

Figure A.2: Example from our dataset: yearbooks




Número por clase	NOMBRES	FECHAS del nacimiento	FECHAS del ingreso en el servicio	FECHAS de antigüedad	Procedencia	DESTINO O SITUACIÓN
	TENIENTES GENERALES (A extinguir)					
	EXCMOS. SEÑORES:					
1	⊕ D. Pío López Pozas.....	7- 4-71	30- 8-88	22- 4-927	Inf.ª	Disponible 1.ª División.
2	★ M. M. D. Alberto Castro Girona....	7-10-75	14- 9-92	1-10-927	Inf.ª	Disponible 1.ª División.
3	⊕ D. José Rodríguez Casademunt...	8-12-70	31- 8-86	9-11-928	Inf.ª	Presidente del Consejo Director de las Asambleas de las Ordenes Militares de San Fernando y San Hermenegildo.
	GENERALES DE DIVISIÓN					
	EXCMOS. SEÑORES:					
1	D. Eduardo López de Ochoa y Portuondo.....	31- 1-77	27- 8-98	19- 1-924	Inf.ª	3.ª Inspección General.
2	» Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer.....	1- 1-72	22- 8-89	19- 5-924	Cab.ª	2.ª Inspección General.
3	★ D. Angel Rodríguez del Barrio....	28- 8-76	28- 8-93	19-10-925	Inf.ª	1.ª Inspección Gral.-Vicepresidente Consejo Superior de la Guerra.-Presidente Junta Clasificadora de Generales y Coroneles.

(a) Cabanellas in 1934




	GENERALES DE DIVISIÓN					
	EXCMOS. SEÑORES:					Hermenegildo.
1	D. Eduardo López de Ochoa y Portuondo.....	31- 1-77	27- 8-93	19- 1-924	Inf.ª	Disponible.
2	» Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer.....	1- 1-72	22- 8-89	19- 5-924	Cab.ª	5.ª División.
3	★ D. Angel Rodríguez del Barrio....	28- 8-76	28- 8-93	19-10-925	Inf.ª	1.ª Inspección Gral.-Vicepresidente Consejo Superior de la Guerra.-Presidente Junta Clasificadora de Generales y Coroneles.

(b) Cabanellas in 1936



46	0. P. A. D. Angel Negrón Cuevas.....	27- 4- 95	30- 8-909	2- 2-924	1.ª División orgánica.
47	D. Luis Serrano Gómez.....	17-12- 92	1- 3-909	6- 3-924	5.ª División orgánica.
48	» Francisco Mut Ramón.....	3- 2- 94	30- 8-910	13- 3-924	4.ª División orgánica.
49	» José Cuesta Monereo.....	5-12- 95	28- 8-910	13- 3-924	Ayudante de Campo del General Cabanellas (M) 2.ª Insp. General del Ejército.
50	» Enrique González Pons.....	22- 4- 89	29- 8-909	15- 3-924	Sec. Topográfica de la 2.ª División.
51	» Miguel Rodríguez Pavón.....	1-11- 92	30- 1-911	31- 7-924	Sección Cartográfica.

(c) Cuesta in 1934



26	0. P. A. D. Angel Negrón Cuevas.....	27- 4- 95	30- 8-909	2- 2-924	1.ª División orgánica.
27	D. Luis Serrano Gómez.....	17-12- 92	1- 3-909	6- 3-924	5.ª División orgánica.
28	» Francisco Mut Ramón.....	3- 2- 94	30- 8-910	13- 3-924	4.ª División orgánica.
29	» José Cuesta Monereo.....	5-12- 95	28- 8-910	13- 3-924	2.ª División orgánica.
30	» Enrique González Pons.....	22- 4- 89	29- 8-909	15- 3-924	Sec. Topográfica 2.ª División.
31	» Miguel Rodríguez Pavón.....	1-11- 92	30- 1-911	31- 7-924	E. M. C., Sec.ª Cartográfica.
32	» Felipe Amillo Miguel.....	2- 2- 92	31- 8-911	31- 7-924	Ayudante del Gral. Rodríguez Ramírez.

(d) Cuesta in 1936

Example of our dataset construction. In 1934, Miguel Cabanellas was 2nd Inspector General of the Army, and his *aide-de-camp* was Cuesta (note that the fact that Cabanellas is mentioned by name in Cuesta's destination is not necessary to link them, they are matched because Cuesta's destination includes *"2ª Inspección General"*). In 1936, they were both in different destinations: Cabanellas in charge of the 5th Division and Cuesta under Villa-Abrile in the 2nd Division. These images are extracted from the 1934 and 1936 Military Yearbooks, Chapter IX, section "Generales de Division" (major generals) for Cabanellas and section "Comandantes" (majors) for Cuesta.