TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF PERSISTENCE OF KINSHIP NORMS WITH DEEP HISTORICAL ORIGINS: EVIDENCE USING MULTIPLE REVEALED PREFERENCE EXPERIMENTS

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Abstract. We empirically test the role of elders, own-age, and younger peers in generating social pressure in historically tight-knit, kin-based communities whose social traits have persisted. We show via multiple revealed preference experiments, involving over 12,000 US-based participants, that own-age locals are the relevant social group generating social pressure for participants with high-intensity kin-based ancestry. Participants from historically high-intensity kinship ancestry are more likely to keep information on their social preferences hidden from their age peers in their locality. Revenge-taking punishment, communal values, and public shame likely underlie the social pressure emerging from own-age locals in high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups.

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Introduction

Kin-based institutions, considered as one of the oldest human institutions,[1] have evolved to address the fundamental economic problem of collective action[2] within society (Greif and Tabellini, 2017; Enke, 2019; Henrich, 2020). High-intensity kin-based communities typically achieve cooperation and social insurance through strong cohesion and financial ties within their extended family groups (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010; Kinnan and Townsend, 2012; Alesina and Giuliano, 2014; Moscona and Seck, 2021). Notably, research has shown that variations in kin-based systems with historical origins persist and can explain differences in contemporary traits relevant to economic outcomes (Enke, 2019; Schulz et al., 2019) and economic development (Bahrami-Rad et al., 2022). However, little is known about the underlying mechanisms that cause traditional patterns of allegiance to endure over time.

This paper examines the role of social image concern mechanisms in the perpetuation of kin-based norms in tight-knit kin-based or high-intensity kin-based communities.[3] High-intensity kin-based societies exhibit strong within-group cohesion, communal values, and social insurance (Enke, 2019; Schulz et al., 2019). Literature in anthropology and related sciences has highlighted the salient role of elders in enforcing social norms in close-knit community (Varcoe et al., 2010; Warburton and Chambers, 2007). Therefore, within-group conformity in high-intensity kin-based networks may be perpetuated through social pressure from elders. On the other hand, studies in psychology have emphasized the role of same-age peers in perpetuating culturally variable social conventions (Kanngiesser et al., 2022), which may lead them to regulate other's behavior in societies with strong within-group cohesion. Additionally, research in economics has highlighted the role of parents in the intergenerational transmission of traits (Bisin and Verdier, 2011; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017), which, in a high-intensity kinship society, could cause older cohorts to feel pressured to act as role models for younger cohorts to sustain community traits.

We follow the empirical framework developed in Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) to generate variations that identify the role of social pressure from a given age-group in high-intensity kinship societies. The assumption of the Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) identification framework is that an individual is free to make choices without social

[1] See Bahrami-Rad et al. (2022).
[2] See Olson Jr. (1971), Hardin (1971),Lichbach (1996), and Ostrom (2000)
[3] We use the terms tight-knit and high-intensity kinship communities interchangeably throughout the paper.

pressure if no one observes her behavior. Conversely, if her behavior is shared with peers, social pressure may affect her decisions. The most common application of Bursztyn and Jensen (2017)'s design has been to randomly vary the observability of one's actions in a decision choice as a test for social pressure.[4]

We use the framework of Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) as follows. First, we randomly vary whether information about the participant's behavior is shared with members of a *given reference group* within one's *locality*. Second, we use variations that will vary the impact of locals as a social pressure group by leveraging quasi-random variations in kinship intensities. In particular, we use kinship intensities of the participant's ancestral homeland, where kinship intensities are measured by the pre-industrial kinship index developed by Enke (2019). The kinship intensity index has been shown to have ecological origins (Cervellati, Chiovelli and Esposito, 2019; Enke, 2019)[5] and to explain contemporary differences in in-group favoritism, relative communal values, emotions of shame versus guilt, and willingness to take revenge. We measure a participant's ancestry in three ways: reported mother's country of birth, reported father's country of birth, and reported own country of birth.

A high-intensity kin-based community is characterized by extended family and clan members typically residing within the same neighborhood (Schulz, 2022; Enke, 2019). Therefore, participants with high-intensity kin-based ancestry are more likely to have social ties with individuals within their locality relative to participants with low-intensity kin-based ancestry. Consistent with the literature on kinship ties, using survey data, we find that participants with high-intensity kin-based ancestry—as measured using the pre-industrial kinship index of Enke (2019)—indeed have stronger reciprocal financial ties with individuals within their locality compared to those with low-intensity kin-based ancestry. Thus, for participants with high-intensity kin-based ancestry, experimental public exposure to any reference group in the locality implies exposure to individuals with whom the participants have strong social ties. Further, variations in kinship intensities also change what participants consider as desirable actions. While participants from high-intensity kinship groups care about social values and norms within their community, those from low-intensity kinship groups are more likely to have universal values and may care about

[4]The empirical research design has been used in seminal research studies in economics (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Funk, 2010; DellaVigna, List and Malmendier, 2012; Bursztyn et al., 2014; Bursztyn and Jensen, 2015; DellaVigna et al., 2016; Bursztyn, Fujiwara and Pallais, 2017; Bursztyn, Egorov and Jensen, 2019; Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin, 2020; Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2020; Bursztyn et al., 2023*b*). See Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) for a detailed review.

[5]Environmental conditions more conducive to diseases, which made traveling risky, resulted in high-intensity family ties through more localized interactions.

general perceptions of themselves. Thus, the nature of the social concern effect is likely to be different for the two groups.

We begin with three pre-registered revealed preference experiments on a sample of US-based respondents in partnership with CloudResearch, which is widely used in social science research (Bursztyn et al., 2023*b*). Following (Kuziemko et al., 2015), we took the following steps to generate a valid sample. We first used respondents with only US IP addresses. Second, we included a CAPTCHA and multiple open-ended questions to rule out potential robots (Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart, 2023). Third, we informed the participants that they would receive a prize contingent on the full completion of the survey. Fourth, we included several attention checks (Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart, 2023). Fifth, we included several obfuscation questions to mitigate social desirability bias. Sixth, we time-stamped each response. To mitigate concerns about experimenter-demand effects, our main outcome includes a task where real money is at stake (Stantcheva, 2023; Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart, 2023).

We deploy donation experiments where we offer every survey participant an option to win a $25 Amazon gift card that they can either take home or have us donate any amount of the $25 to a charity of their choice. In each experiment, before asking whether the participants would like to have us donate any amount of $25 to a charity of their choice should they win the $25 worth of Amazon gift card, we randomly assign one-half of the participants to the treatment group. In the treatment group, we randomly manipulated the participants' expectations of anonymity regarding their donation decision through a public condition that implies visibility by a relevant peer group in the same locality as the respondent. In the first experiment ("Experiment 1"), respondents in the treatment group were primed with information that their donation decision would be exposed to same-age individuals in their locality. In the second experiment ("Experiment 2"), respondents in the treatment group were primed with information that their donation decision would be exposed to individuals in their locality older than them. In the third experiment ("Experiment 3"), respondents in the treatment group were primed with information that their donation decision would be exposed to individuals in their locality who were younger than them. In all the three experiments, the participants in the control group were not primed and were simply asked whether they would like us to donate any amount of $25 to a charity of their choice, should they win the $25 Amazon gift card.

The treatment effect, which involves the effect of exposing decisions to a relevant reference group, reveals the significance of this group as a source of social pressure for participants. The differences in the average treatment effects of participants from high-intensity kin-based ancestries relative to participants from low-intensity kin-based ancestries provide insight into underlying channels driving social concern effects across kinship groups. Since significant variation in kinship intensity of Enke, 2019 has been argued to be driven by an exogenous ecological factor (Cervellati, Chiovelli and Esposito, 2019), we attribute a causal interpretation to the heterogeneity impact by kinship ties.

We find that participants from high-intensity kin-based ancestries are *less* likely to donate by 10-11 percentage points when their donation decisions are revealed to same-age peer groups within their locality relative to those from low-intensity kin-based ancestries. The differences in treatment effects are statistically significant at the 1% – 5% level of significance across different measures of historical ancestral kinship ties. Additionally, for participants from high-intensity kin-based ancestries, the exposure to own-age locals reduces the probability of donating by 8-9 percentage points compared to when they were not told that their donation decisions would be made public. This effect is statistically significant at 5%-10% level across measures of ancestry, while there is no statistically significant treatment effect of exposure of decisions to own-age locals on donations rates for participants with low-intensity kinship ancestry. Moreover, we find no statistically significant differences in responses to exposure to older or younger peer groups within one's locality for participants from high-intensity kinship ancestry and between participants from high-intensity and low-intensity kin-based ancestries. Taken together, the results across the three experiments suggest that the social pressure mechanism is operative for members of high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups from own-age locals.

Our main findings are robust to alternative measures of kinship intensities that have been argued to have pre-industrial origins (Schulz, 2022), alternative methods of inferences, omitted variable bias, and alternative specifications. We hypothesize that within-group cohesion, reciprocity norms, and relative importance to communal values drive the differences in social concern effects between high- and low-kin-based ancestry groups. However, one possible concern related to historical kinship indices is that they could be correlated with other contemporary political and cultural values (Schulz et al., 2019; Schulz, 2022), thereby confounding the interpretation of the social

concern effect identified in the experiments. To clarify the interpretation of the coefficients of the social pressure effect, we isolate the potential effects of democratic values, economic and other cultural preferences traits, effects of different colonial origins, European descent, religious differences, and genetic heterogeneity by residualizing Enke (2019) kinship intensity index. We regress the country-level kinship intensity index of Enke (2019) on Polity IV democracy index, the fraction of adherence to two major religions (Christians and Muslims), absolute latitude, measures of genetic distance (Galor and Klemp, 2017), measures of geographical characteristics that are correlated with other preference and cultural traits (Galor and Özak, 2016; Galor, Klemp and Wainstock, 2023; Mitterauer, 2010), distance to waterways, and irrigation potential (Buggle, 2020). We use the estimated residuals of the regression as a predictor for kinship intensity and report the effects of exposure of donation decision to own-age locals (i.e., Experiment 1). Correcting for estimation error in the residualized kinship score using bootstrapped standard errors, we find our results are robust, stable, and statistically significant at the 1 percent level for all measures of ancestry.

Next, we disentangle mechanisms behind the decline in donation rates among participants from high-intensity kin-based ancestry when donation decisions were primed to be revealed to local same-age cohort in Experiment 1. Motivated by the literature on kinship taxation,[6] one possible explanation could be that participants from high-intensity kinship ancestries possibly signaled to their own-age social network that they cannot afford financial support at the moment. Alternatively, findings from Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2020 would suggest that participants from high-intensity kin networks are possibly choosing an option that reveals minimal information to their same-age peers, for they may believe that their peers might not approve of their social choices

We implement an additional pre-registered experiment ("Experiment 4") to isolate the above two channels. In this experiment, in the treatment group, we prime participants that only their decision *not to donate* will be revealed to the same age cohort. In the control group, all decisions remain private. To rule out concerns that the treatment effect could be due to the act of posting and not to exposure to a relevant social group, we post donation decisions *anonymously* in the control group, following the strategy of Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin (2020). If kinship tax concern is driving the social concern mechanism, then participants with high-intensity kinship ancestry in the

[6]Platteau (2015), Di Falco and Bulte (2011), Kinnan and Townsend (2012), Boltz, Marazyan and Villar (2019), Grimm, Hartwig and Lay (2017), Carranza et al. (2022), and Squires (2024).

treated group would be more likely to choose *not to* donate compared to those with low-intensity kinship ancestry. On the other hand, if participants with high-intensity kinship ancestry prefer to keep their social preferences private from own-age locals, then we are more likely to observe a positive treatment effect on their donation rates, where the choice of donating is kept private while the choice of not donating is made public in the treatment group.

In Experiment 4 where the choice not to donate is made public, we find that donation rates increase in the treatment relative to control for high-intensity kinship ancestry, but the effect is imprecise. This rules out kinship-tax concerns as a potential channel. In Experiment 4, the decision not to donate is primed to be revealed to own-age locals in the treatment group, while decisions are kept private in the control group. In other words, in Experiment 4, the choice to donate does not reveal information about the social preferences of own-age locals in the treatment group. In contrast, in Experiment 1, all donation decisions are primed to be revealed to own-age locals in the treatment group. Thus, in Experiment 1, relative to the no-donation choice, the choice to donate revealed more information about the social preferences of own-age locals in the treatment group. The treatment effect on donation rates in Experiment 1 was the opposite of what we observed in Experiment 4 for high-intensity kinship ancestry groups. The donation rates declined statistically significantly for high-intensity kinship ancestry in the treatment group compared to the control in Experiment 1. Combining the experimental findings in Experiment 1 and Experiment 4, we conclude that participants from high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups choose decisions in the treatment group that reveal minimal information to their own-age peers.

We next examine the channels causing participants from high-intensity kin-based ancestries to prefer to keep charity information private. A high-intensity kinship society, measured using the kinship tightness index of Enke (2019), regulates communal values through negative reciprocity, mainly through revenge-taking punishment and public shame. We find that the social traits of revenge-taking relative to altruistic punishment, the relative importance of public shame versus guilt, and the importance of communal values explain the propensity of participants from high-intensity-kin ancestry groups to choose not to donate when donation decisions are made public to same-age peer groups.

The combined findings from Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 also show that the nature of social image concerns differs for participants with high- ancestry and low-intensity kin-based ancestry. While the revelation of donation decisions to own-age locals in Experiment 1 causally statistically significantly reduced the donation rates of the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, it marginally increases donation rates for the low-kin ancestry group, but the effect is not statistically significant. In Experiment 4, when the treatment includes only sharing the no-donation choice to own-age locals, the donation rates of the low-kin ancestry group increased statistically significantly. Combining the results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 4, we find that low-kin ancestry groups do not appear to be perceived as less charitable to their age locals. Additionally, the mechanism of hiding one's preferences or kinship taxation does not operate as the channel for low-kin ancestry groups, as expected.

In summary, the four experiments in our paper deliver three key findings. First, individuals from historically high-intensity kin-based ancestry face significant social image concerns from own-age locals. Second, participants from historically high-intensity kinship ancestries are more likely to keep information on their social preferences hidden from local same-age peers. Third, negative reciprocity, particularly revenge-taking punishment, and public shame, are social traits that likely underlie social pressure emerging from same-age peers in communities with high-intensity kin-based ancestry.

The key contribution of the paper is in the literature of deep roots. Empirical (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013; Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn, 2013; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016; Galor and Özak, 2016; Falk et al., 2018; Galor and Savitskiy, 2018; Becker, Enke and Falk, 2020; Michalopoulos and Xue, 2021; Michalopoulos and Rauh, 2024) and theoretical research (Galor and Moav, 2002; Galor and Michalopoulos, 2012) show that human traits and social norms that are deeply rooted in long-term history persist over time and are critical determinants of economic outcomes having implications for global policy (Roy, Gupta and Tourky, 2023). This paper examines kinship norms with historical origins that have persisted in regulating economic and social cooperation within a community. The concept of "collective conscience" that controls community members' social and economic behavior through rewards and negative reciprocity has been the subject of long-standing literature in anthropology, starting from the work of Durkheim, 2018. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that *experimentally* examines the social image concern mechanism that regulates behavior among kin networks

with pre-industrial origins that have persisted over generations, thereby providing insight into the role of social pressure in the perpetuation of norms.

Methodologically, our paper applies the identification framework of Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) to test for social image concerns among culturally embodied kinship communities. Studies have used the seminal empirical framework of Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) to identify social image concerns in various contexts, such as peer pressure in education (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2015), conspicuous consumption (Bursztyn et al., 2018), political identity (Bursztyn et al., 2020), inferring the presence of social image concerns from voting behavior (DellaVigna et al., 2016), labor market participation (Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2020), marriage market incentives (Bursztyn, Fujiwara and Pallais, 2017) and expression of xenophobic views (Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin, 2020).

The paper also relates to the literature that emphasizes the impact of ancestry, focusing on norms determined by the history of current populations (Putterman and Weil, 2010; Burchardi, Chaney and Hassan, 2019; Michalopoulos, Putterman and Weil, 2019; Dalgaard, Knudsen and Selaya, 2020; Bursztyn et al., 2024). For instance, Michalopoulos and Xue (2021) show collection of traditional beliefs passed through generations explain contemporary preferences. Michalopoulos and Rauh (2024) show that similarity of a film's plot to the local composition of ancestral narratives, measured using ancestral motifs, is associated with an increase in interest in movies. Chinoy et al. (2023) trace the contemporary variations in zero-sum thinking within the United States to individual's ancestries. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) show that descendants of those heavily raided during the slave trade tend to be less trusting, and Algan and Cahuc (2010) find that inherited trust boosts economic productivity. Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2011) confirm Boserup's hypothesis by linking historical plow use to gender inequality and reduced female labor force participation. Voigtländer and Voth (2012) attribute the persistence of anti-Semitic beliefs in Germany to low population mobility over 600 years, Ashraf and Galor (2013) demonstrate that the Out-of-Africa migration influenced comparative development through its impact on population diversity, and Becker, Enke and Falk (2020) link differences in economic preferences to ancient migration patterns and historical experiences. More recently, Galor, Klemp and Wainstock (2023) show that income differentials can be attributed to variations in productive traits that are determined by prehistoric Out-of-Africa Migration.

Last, the paper builds on the literature of kinship ties that are intergenerationally transmitted and are known to impact contemporary moral and social values (Enke, 2019). More broadly, we contribute to the literature on kinship ties that shows its impact on moral beliefs, norms, participatory institutions, and economic development (Platteau, 2015; Di Falco and Bulte, 2011; Kinnan and Townsend, 2012; Grimm, Hartwig and Lay, 2017; Boltz, Marazyan and Villar, 2019; Enke, 2019; Schulz et al., 2019; Henrich, 2020; Schulz, 2022; Lowes, 2022; Bahrami-Rad et al., 2022; Lowes, 2021; Carranza et al., 2022; Lowes and Nunn, 2024; Squires, 2024).

The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 1 discusses the adaptation of Bursztyn and Jensen (2017)'s empirical framework in our context. Section 2 describes the sample and design of each experiment. Section 3 presents the empirical specifications, followed by the main results of Experiment 1-3 in Section 4. Section 5, presents the robustness analysis of the main results. In Section 6 presents the design and results of Experiment 4 to tease out potential mechanisms. Section 7 discusses pre-registration, and Section 8 concludes.

1. Revisiting Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017's Empirical Framework of Social Concerns

The identification framework of social pressure of Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017 is based on the variation of the simple economic framework of Bénabou and Tirole (2006). Social image concern is defined in Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) as follows:

$$S_{ij} = \lambda_{ij} E_i(\omega_j) Pr_{-i}(\sigma_i = h|a_i) \tag{1}$$

where $Pr_{-i}(\sigma_i = h|a_i)$ is the probability that a given reference group thinks person i is of type h after observing i's action a_i. $E_i(\omega_j)$ represents what person i expects regarding the social desirability of i's type of being perceived as type h by reference group j. λ_{ij} is how much person i cares about being seen as type h by group j.

Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) embed the conceptual framework of social pressure in the random utility model as follows. Let $\tilde{a_i}$ be an unobserved variable measuring the desirability of action a_i. The underlying utility function is

$$\tilde{a_i} = B_i - C_i + \lambda_{ij} E_i(\omega_j) Pr_{-i}(\sigma_i = h|a_i) + \epsilon_i$$

where $B_i - C_i$ are the benefit and cost of action a_i that is unrelated to social pressure, and ϵ_i is a random shock. The researcher observes a_i, such that if $a_i = 1$, then $\tilde{a_i} \geq 0$ and 0 otherwise.

The most common approach to measuring the effects of social pressure in recent literature has been to vary $Pr_{-i}(\sigma_i = h|a_i)$ by randomly making behavior fully private or shared with others (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017). This approach assumes that an individual is free to choose without any social concern if no one observes their behavior. The social image concern term drops out when information about behavior is private, while social pressure becomes operative when behavior is public or shared with peers. Therefore, the difference between private and public design is considered a test of social pressure.

In our context, we randomly vary $Pr_{-i}(\sigma_i = h|a_i)$ by using public exposure of behavior and private information formats, where the context and environment of public and private settings are identical. The public condition pertains to priming respondents that their behavior will be revealed to a given reference group within the respondent's 'locality'. High-kinship communities are more likely to be affected by locality members. This is because communities with high-intensity kinship ties, which are characterized by co-residency of extended families (Enke, 2019; Schulz, 2022), are likely to have strong social ties with locals. In fact, our survey data support the literature and show that compared to individuals with low-intensity kin-based ancestry, those with high-intensity kinship ancestry, where kinship is measured using the kinship index of Enke (2019), are more likely to have stronger reciprocal financial ties with locals. Therefore, in our experimental context, the additional variation in kinship intensities generates differences in the impact of social pressure.

In terms of Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) model, the variations in kinship intensity, along with the experimental variation that introduce potential social pressure from local groups, correspond to variations in λ_{ij}, where λ_{ij} is expected to be positive for individuals with high-intensity kin-based ancestry and reflects variations in the expectations of social desirability when being perceived as a specific type by group j, i.e., $E_i(\omega_j)$. $E_i(\omega_j)$ differs for high-kin and low-kin ancestry groups. While the high-kin ancestry group is specifically concerned about social approval and social norms of their own locality, the low-kin ancestry group, characterized by universal values, is more concerned about the general perception about them and is not specific to locality. In what follows,

guided by the literature on anthropology, psychology and economics,[7] we implement a series of three social image experiments to first identify the age group within one's locality that causes social pressure for high-intensity kin-based groups. We then implement a pre-registered follow-up experiment motivated by the findings from the first three social image experiments to provide more information about the nature of social image concerns that affect high-intensity kin-based groups and insights about the different mechanisms underlying social pressure in high and low-kin ancestry groups.

2. Experiments 1–3: Sample, Design and Implementation

From March to April 2023, we implemented three pre-registered survey experiments[8] on a sample of US-based respondents in partnership with CloudResearch, which is widely used in social science research (Bursztyn et al., 2023*b*). Our participants are from Prime Panels, an aggregate of online panels with a diverse population pool that are less exposed to classic research protocols, mitigating confounding effects in survey data (Chandler et al., 2019). We followed Kuziemko et al. (2015), Stantcheva (2023), andHaaland, Roth and Wohlfart (2023) and took several steps to generate a valid sample. First, to mitigate experimenter demand effects, our main outcome variable is an incentivized outcome, where real money is at stake (Stantcheva, 2023). We also included several obfuscation questions to mitigate social desirability bias. Second, we use respondents with only US IP addresses. Third, we included a CAPTCHA and multiple open-ended questions to rule out potential robots (Stantcheva, 2023; Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart, 2023). Fourth, we informed the participants that they would receive the prize contingent on the full completion of the survey. Fifth, we included several attention checks (Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart, 2023). Last, we time-stamped each response.

To obtain the causal effect of social pressure from each local age group, the randomized treatment in each experiment involves public exposure of one's decisions to a given age group within one's locality. In contrast, decisions in the control group remain private. We focus on the causal estimate measuring whether social pressure from a given age group differentially impacts decisions by historical kin-based ancestry. Thus, our coefficient of interest involves the cross-randomization of experimental exposure variation with quasi-random variation in pre-industrial kinship intensity, using the kinship index of Enke, 2019.

[7] See Varcoe et al. (2010), Warburton and Chambers (2007),Kanngiesser et al. (2022),Bisin and Verdier (2011), andDoepke and Zilibotti (2017)
[8] The survey was preregistered on March 2, 2023, while the experiments were launched separately on and after March 27, 2023.

In each experiment, we targeted at least 18% non-US-born sample to ensure sufficient variation in ancestral kinship ties.[9] We targeted a sample size of N=3,000 in each of the three experiments. Next, we explain the sample and experimental designs of each experiment.

2.1. **Experiment-1.**

2.1.1. *Design.* After asking some demographic, obfuscation, and attention checks questions, we reminded the participants that 1 in 100 respondents who would submit a fully completed survey would receive a $25 Amazon gift card. However, they could choose to donate a part of their money to a charity of their choice should they receive it. We randomized participants into the treatment group, where they were informed that their donation decisions would be viewed by individuals in their locality who were in a similar age group. The link to the website was given to each participant so that it was clear that other participants would have access to the survey results. Following Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin, no identifying information was revealed in practice, and we displayed survey responses anonymously on the website.To avoid deception, we did not explicitly tell participants that their donation decisions, along with their identifying details, would be published on the website, instead providing hints that implied their names and email addresses might be published on the website along with their individual donation choices, following the strategy in Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin.

Specifically, we primed the participants using a variation of information provided in Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin as follows:

"The response from this survey, including your individual donation decision and the donation decisions of all of the **OTHER RESPONDENTS**, some of whom are close to **YOUR AGE** from **YOUR LOCALITY**, will be **POSTED** on our website in approximately one month. There is no need to provide your name, email, etc., here; the survey company we work with has this information already. We will notify you when the report becomes available on our website,[website link]."

In the control group, there was no priming, and the participants were simply asked whether they would like to donate to a charity of their choice any amount of the $25 Amazon gift card, should they receive it. The treatment effect is interpreted as an effect of explicit mention of revealing donation decisions to local own-age peers.

[9]We could have had higher variation in historical kinship ancestries if we only sampled first-generation migrants in the US. However, that sampling strategy would have implications for a limited population.

2.1.2. *Sample.* Appendix Table-A1 presents the summary statistics of participants randomly assigned to the treatment group (,1495 individuals)— where donation decisions were shown to own-age locals—or to the control group (1,510 individuals). We show that the randomization is valid as all observables are balanced between the exposure treatment and the control group. On average, about 17.2% of the experimental sample report being Black, and 63.7% report being White, and 64% of the sample are females. About 63.7% of the sample have a college education, 58.2% of the sample are currently employed, and 80% of the sample are US-born. When measuring high-intensity kin-based ancestry as the kinship score above the sample median, about 26%-27% of the sample are assigned as high-intensity kin-based ancestry, where ancestry is measured using parental country of birth. About 14% of the sample is designated as high-kin ancestry if ancestry is measured using own country of birth. If we use the father's or mother's country of birth to compute the respondent's ancestry, then about 48%–51% of the sample assigned to high-intensity kin-based ancestry have US-born respondents, while about 80%-90% of the sample are assigned to low-kinship ancestry are US-born respondents. Using parental country of birth as one's ancestry, we can account for US-born (second-generation migrants) respondents in the estimations. Figures-A1,A2 and A3 show the distribution of ancestries of our sample in Experiment-1.

2.2. **Experiment-2.**

2.2.1. *Design.* Similar to Experiment 1, after asking a set of demographic, obfuscation, and attention check questions in Experiment 2, we reminded the participants that 1 in 100 respondents who would submit a fully completed survey would receive a $25 Amazon gift card and have the option to donate any amount of $25 Amazon gift voucher to a charity of their choice. We randomized participants into the treatment group, where they were informed that their donation decisions would be viewed by locals older than them. Specifically, we primed the participants using a variation of information provided in Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin as follows:

"The response from this survey, including your individual donation decision and the donation decisions of all of the **OTHER RESPONDENTS**, some of whom are **OLDER THAN YOU** and are from **YOUR LOCALITY**, will be **POSTED** on our website in approximately one month. There is no need to provide your name, email, etc., here; the survey company we work with has this information already. We will notify you when the report becomes available on our website,[website link]. "

The survey in the control group in Experiment 2 is identical to that in Experiment 1. There is no priming in the control group. The participants are simply asked whether they would like to donate any amount of the $25 dollar Amazon Gift card to a charity of their choice, should they receive it.

2.2.2. *Sample.* Appendix Table-A2 presents the summary statistics of participants randomly assigned to the treatment group (1,644 individuals), where donation decisions were shown to individuals who are older than the respondents or the control group (1,639 individuals). The sample characteristics are similar to Experiment 1. About 67% of the sample is White, 16% is Black, and 64% of the sample is female. Around 66% have a college education, and about 61% were employed at the time of the survey. About 82% of the sample were US-born, with 23% designated as having high-kinship ancestry, where ancestry is measured using parental country of birth. About 12% of the sample is assigned to high-kinship ancestry when measured using own country of birth. Figures-A4,A5 and A6 show the distribution of ancestries of the experimental sample in Experiment 2.

2.3. **Experiment-3.**

2.3.1. *Design.* Similar to Experiment 1 and 2, after asking demographic, attention checks, and obfuscation questions in Experiment 3, we reminded participants that 1 in 100 respondents who would submit a fully completed survey will win a $25 Amazon gift card. They would have the option to donate any portion of this $25 gift card to a charity of their choice. We randomized half of the participants into a treatment group, informing them that their donation decisions would be viewed by individuals in their locality younger than them. Specifically, we primed the participants using a variation of information provided in Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin as follows:

"The response from this survey, including your individual donation decision and the donation decisions of all of the **OTHER RESPONDENTS**, some of whom are **YOUNGER THAN YOU** and are from **YOUR LOCALITY**, will be **POSTED** on our website in approximately one month. There is no need to provide your name, email, etc., here; our survey company already has this information. We will notify you when the report becomes available on our website, [website link]."

There was no priming in the control group, which is identical to Experiments 1 and 2. The participants are simply asked whether they would like to donate to a charity of their choice any amount of the $25 dollar Amazon Gift card, should they receive it.

2.3.2. *Sample.* Appendix Table-A3 presents balance along covariates between the treatment group, where donation decisions are revealed to individuals within the locality who are younger than the respondents, and the control group. The sample characteristics are similar to those of Experiment 1 and 2. About 18% of the sample report is Black, 67% of the sample report is White, 64% is employed, 62% of the sample is female, and 85% of the sample is US-born. Around 20% of the sample is high-kin ancestry, where ancestry is measured using parental country of birth, and 9% is high-kin ancestry, where ancestry is measured using own country of birth. Figures-A7,A8 and A9 show the distribution of ancestries of the experimental sample in Experiment 3.

2.3.3. *Attrition Rates.* Attrition, in our case, is defined as respondents who started the survey but dropped out before reaching or at reaching the survey's last question. In Experiments 1,2 and 3, 8.83%, 8.91%, and 9.40% did not complete the survey, respectively. Therefore, our attrition rates are substantially lower than those found in survey experiments, ranging from 15% – 30%, as noted in Stantcheva (2023). The control group and the treatment group survey had *identical* number of questions. They differed only in the randomized block, where the priming information treatment was implemented in the treatment group. The attrition rates at the experimental treatment and control stage are similar across all three experiments. We report details on the attrition rates at different stages of the survey in each of the three experiments, following guidelines by Stantcheva, 2023 in Appendix Section-C.

3. Empirical Specifications

We use two key sources of variation to estimate the impact of social image concerns on participants from ancestrally high-intensity kin-based societies relative to those from low-intensity ancestral kin-based societies. The first is the random variation of the public condition treatment where the respondents are primed into information that their donation decisions will be revealed to a local given reference group. The second is the variation in ancestral kinship ties. The kinship intensity is measured using the kinship tightness index developed by Enke (2019), which is based on local family structures and descent systems, following Henrich (2020). Enke created the country-level kinship tightness index by mapping the historical kinship tightness index at the ethnic-group level

to the contemporary country level, following the ancestry-adjusted procedure of Putterman and Weil (2010) that accounts for post-1500 migration and the matching procedures of Giuliano and Nunn (2018).

Following the literature on deep roots and the persistence of ancestral traits (Galor, Klemp and Wainstock, 2023; Michalopoulos and Rauh, 2024; Schulz et al., 2019; Galor and Özak, 2016), we measure ancestry using self-reported ancestry measure. We measure ancestry in three ways: 1) mother's country of origin, 2) father's country of origin, and 3) own country of origin. To each self-reported country determining ancestry, we associate the corresponding pre-industrial kinship index developed by Enke (2019).

We estimate the following baseline empirical specification via the following logit regression.

$$Pr(I_i = 1|T_i, HighKin_i) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\alpha+\beta_1 * T_i+\beta_2 * HighKin_i+\gamma * T_i * HighKin_i+X_i)}} \tag{2}$$

Where I_i is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent donates to charity and T_i is the dummy variable of randomized public condition treatment. X_i are the covariates of participant i, and $HighKin_i$ is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent's ancestral kinship index is above the sample median.

The coefficients in the logistic regression are log odds ratio. For easier interpretation, we also report the probability metric of our coefficient of interest, i.e., the interaction between the randomized exposure of donation decisions to a given group and the ancestral kinship intensity. The probability estimates of our coefficient of interest from specification without controls are simply the differences in the treatment effects of public exposure between participants with high-intensity kinship ancestry and those with low-intensity kinship ancestry on the probability of making a donation. The interaction term in the probability metric depends on all values of the covariates. When controls are added to the specification, the interaction term is the difference in the treatment effects when covariates are at their mean levels.

The above empirical strategy divides the sample into four comparison groups. Although the variation of the exposure of donation decisions is experimental randomization, the variation of ancestral kinship index is quasi-random and depends on variation in exogenous pre-industrial conditions and the sampling of respondents with

varying ancestries. We show in Appendix Tables-A4, A5, and A6 show balance along most observables across groups. There is, however, a higher proportion of white and married individuals among the low-intensity kinship in the sample. We show that our estimates remain stable after controlling for demographic covariates, and we report omitted variable bias-adjusted estimates using Oster (2019).

As a robustness check, we additionally estimate the following alternative specification via the logit regression model:

$$Pr(I_i = 1|T_i, Kin_i) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\alpha+\beta_1 * T_i+\beta_2 * Kin_i+\gamma * T_i * Kin_i+X_i)}} \tag{3}$$

Where I_i is the dummy variable that equals one if the respondent donates to charity. T_i is the dummy variable of the randomized public condition treatment, X_i are covariates of participant i, and Kin_i is a continuous variable measuring the participant's ancestral kinship intensity.

4. Main Results

4.1. **Experiment-1: Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Same Age Peers in Respondent's Locality.**

Table-1 presents the results of Experiment 1, where participants were primed that their donation decisions would be revealed to local same-age peers. Across all measures of ancestry, we find that public exposure reduces the probability of making any donation by participants from high-intensity kin-based societies by 10-11 percentage points compared to those from low-intensity kin-based societies. The coefficient estimates remain stable when controlling for attention checks and time taken to complete the survey. For samples where data on the demographic covariates are available from the survey, in Appendix Table-A7, we find that the treatment effects on donation rates among high-kin ancestry members are 7–13 percentage points lower than that of low-kin ancestry members depending on the measure of ancestry, after controlling for demographic covariates.[10] The difference in treatment effects is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance in the sample of Table-1 and between the 1%-5% level of significance in the sample of Appendix Table-A7, where ancestry is measured using the father's country of birth. The difference in treatment effects is statistically significant at the 5% level when ancestry is measured

[10]Demographic controls include the proportion of women, White individuals, those with education above the eighth grade, ever-married individuals, employed individuals, the survey duration, and those who passed the complex attention check.

using own country of birth in the total estimation sample of Table-1. Additionally, the treatment effects on donation probability for high-intensity kin-based ancestries are 8–10 percentage points lower than for low-intensity kin-based ancestries when measured by mother's country of birth, and the coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 5-10 percent level of significance, as shown in Appendix Table-A7.

Table-1 also shows that while exposure to own-age locals reduces donation rates of participants from high-intensity kin-based ancestries, the treatment effects on donation rates of low-kinship ancestry participants are positive but small in magnitude and not statistically significant. Appendix Figures-A13, A14 and A15 presents average donation rates of individuals from Experiment 1 in the four comparison groups where ancestry is measured using reported father's country of birth, mother's country of birth and own country of birth, respectively. Across all measures of ancestry, we find that at the private condition (i.e, no priming condition), there are no differences in donation rates between high- and low- kinship ancestry groups. Under public conditions, where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to own-age locals, the donation rates fall among those in high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups (39% in private conditions and 32% in public conditions with $p = 0.021$), while donation rates rise among those in low-kinship ancestry groups, with imprecise effects. We find that the statistically significant difference in differences in treatment effects between participants with high- and low-kinship are primarily due to the response of high kinship ancestry participants reducing donation in public conditions.

4.2. **Experiment-2: Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Older Peers in Respondent's Locality.** Table-2 presents the results from Experiment 2, where participants in the treatment group were primed that their donation decisions would be revealed individuals older than the respondents in their locality. We find no statistically significant treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions on donation rates for participants from high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups.[11] There is also no statistically significant difference in the treatment effects of public exposure on the probability of donating between participants with high- and low-intensity kin-based ancestry. Adding controls does not change the results across all measures of ancestry, as presented in Appendix Table A8.

[11]There is a statistically significant negative treatment effects for participants from low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups in Experiment 2. However, our intervention (or research question) is not designed to elicit mechanisms underlying social image concerns for low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. Therefore, our follow-up experiments will focus on disentangling mechanisms for high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups

Additionally, Appendix Figure-A16, A17 and A18 shows no statistically significant difference between participants with high- and low-intensity kin-based ancestry.

4.3. **Experiment-3: Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Younger Peers in Respondent's Locality.** Table 3 shows no statistically significant difference in the treatment effects on donation probabilities of exposure of donation decisions to locals younger than the participants from high- and low-intensity kin-based ancestries. The magnitude of the difference in the treatment effects on the probability of donation is close to 0. In Appendix Table A9, where we present results excluding and including a range of individual-level controls, we find no statistically significant difference in the treatment effects between high and low kinship intensity group members, and the magnitude of the difference is small and consistent with the coefficient estimates reported in Table 3.

Appendix Figure-A19, A20, and A21 shows that there is no statistically significant effect on donation rates due to public exposure to individuals younger than the respondents for both high and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups.

4.4. **Summary of Results.** In this section, we focused on the exposure of participants' donation decisions to local individuals. Since participants with high-intensity kinship ancestry have stronger reciprocal social ties with individuals within their locality relative to those with low-intensity kinship ancestry, our exposure treatment to locals is more likely to generate social image concerns driven by within-group norms for participants with high-intensity kinship ancestry. Furthermore, across our experiments, we varied the age of the locals to whom the decisions would be made public. This was motivated by the literature on cultural anthropology, psychology and economics (Varcoe et al., 2010; Warburton and Chambers, 2007; Kanngiesser et al., 2022; Bisin and Verdier, 2011; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2014) arguing for the role of elders, own-age peers, or younger groups in enforcing social norms and values.

Taken together, we find that the possibility of exposure of donation choices to own-age locals causally reduces the probability of donation for participants with high-intensity kinship ancestry those with low-intensity kinship ancestry. The difference in treatment effects in Experiment 1 between the high- and low-kinship groups is statistically significant at the 1%-5% significance level. There is also no statistically significant difference in treatment

effects on donation rates between both groups when the treatment includes the exposure of donation decisions to locals who are older (Experiment 2) or younger (Experiment 3) than the respondent. Further, there is a statistically significant treatment effect on high-intensity kinship ancestry only when the donation decisions were primed to be revealed to own age locals (Experiment 1).

The results from the three experiments suggest that high-intensity ancestry members likely face significant social image concerns from own age peer groups within their locality. Before analyzing the mechanisms underlying social image concerns from own-age locals, we first examine the robustness of our main findings.

5. Robustness of Results:

5.1. **Residualized Kinship Scores.** The social concern experiments involving public exposure of donation decisions use kinship score variation to estimate the differential effect of social pressure in communities that have strong within-group cohesion, communal values, and a relatively strong notion of shame compared to guilt and revenge-taking attitude. However, kinship intensity measures are correlated with other civic values, such as pro-democracy values (Schulz et al., 2019). To isolate other cultural traits, economic outcomes, and civic values that could be correlated with kinship tightness, we residualize the kinship index of Enke (2019). We regress kinship score on Polity IV democracy index, caloric suitability, ruggedness, distance to waterways, absolute latitude, tropical climate, mean temperature, mean elevation, mean precipitation, caloric suitability for oats and for rye, ancestor-adjusted timing of the Neolithic transformation, ancestor-adjusted genetic heterogeneity, irrigation potential, fraction of adherence to two major religions (Christians and Muslims) and on the fraction of people with European descent. While geographical variables, including caloric suitability, and absolute latitude, are associated with other cultural traits and social diversity (Galor and Özak, 2016; Galor, Klemp and Wainstock, 2023), caloric suitability for oats and rye are associated with a medieval European agricultural revolution (Mitterauer, 2010). (Galor and Klemp, 2017) show genetic heterogeneity is associated with autocratic rule and irrigation correlated with collectivism results in routine-intensive jobs (Buggle, 2020). We measure the estimated residuals from the above OLS regression. We use the estimated residuals as a regressor in place of the kinship index. We then regress the dummy variable measuring the decision to donate to any given charity on the randomized public exposure treatment indicator, interaction term including randomized treatment indicator, and estimated residuals

and respondent-level controls. We report bootstrapped standard errors since we have used estimated residuals as regressors. We present our results of Experiment 1, where donation decisions were primed to be revealed to own-age locals, using the residualized kinship index in Appendix Table-A10. Consistent with our main results, we find across all measures of ancestry, compared to individuals with low-intensity kinship ancestry, high-intensity kin-based members are 8-14 p.p less likely to make donations when their donation decisions are primed to be revealed to own-age locals, statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

5.2. **Permutation Tests.** We test for robustness of the social concerns effect from own-age peers established in Experiment 1 to alternative methods of inference using permutation tests.Experiment 1 randomized individual respondents to treatment, where they were primed that their donation decision was likely to be revealed to own-age locals. In Appendix Table-A11, we estimate OLS regression of a dummy variable for whether the respondent donates to a charity on independent variables that include the following: an indicator for the treatment where participants are told their donation decisions will be made public to own-age locals, an indicator for high-intensity kinship ancestry, an interaction term including the randomized treatment exposure and the high-intensity kinship ancestry, and control variables (dummy variable for passing complex attention checks, and duration of time taken to complete the survey). We report p-values using permutation tests in brackets. Consistent with our main findings, we find that in Experiment 1, the differences in the causal effect of exposure of donation decisions between high- and low-kinship ancestry groups are statistically significant at the 1% and 10% level when ancestry is measured using father's and own country of birth, respectively.

5.3. **Alternative Specification.** In Appendix Tables-A12,A13 and A14, we report results using Eq-3, where we code kinship intensity as a continuous variable. The coefficient on the interaction term between the randomized treatment, where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to a given reference group and the kinship tightness index measures the log-odds ratio. Consistent with results in Section-4, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term of the treatment of explicitly informing participants that their donation decision is likely to be revealed to similar age groups and kinship intensity is negative. In Experiment 2, where treatment included explicitly informing participants that their donation decision is expected to be revealed to locals older than the respondents, the coefficient on the interaction between treatment and kin-based ancestry is not statistically significant or consistent, as depicted in Appendix Table-A13. Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction between kinship intensity and

the treatment is not statistically significant in Experiment 3, where the randomized treatment involved revealing donation choices to locals younger than the respondents, as presented in Appendix Table-A14.

5.4. **Alternative measure of Pre-industrial Kinship tightness.** We test the robustness of our main findings in Experiment 1-3 using alternative *pre-industrial* kinship measures in the recent literature. We use two related measures to capture the intensities of kinship ties: cousin term differentiation and cousin marriage preference.

5.4.1. *Cousin-Term Differentiation.* We use an alternative kinship index developed by Schulz, 2022. The index uses kin terms to measure historically distant kin networks. The variable is based on an ethnographic atlas (EA)[12] that measures ethnic traits before the onset of the Industrial Revolution or European contact. A dummy variable was first coded at the ethnicity level to determine whether ethnicities differentiate cousin terms. The ethnic-level variable was then aggregated to the country level as the proportion of the population that speaks the language that differentiates cousin terms. This aggregation method of Schulz (2022) closely follows that of Giuliano and Nunn (2018), which was extended by Bahrami-Rad, Becker and Henrich (2021).

5.4.2. *Cousin Marriage Preference.* The cousin marriage preference measure of Schulz (2022) is an ethnicity-level ordinal variable, with the highest value taken when parallel cousin marriage—lineage endogamy—is preferred. We use the country-level aggregates of this cousin marriage preference measure.

Appendix Table-A15 presents the differences in the treatment effects of public exposure to same-age peer groups between the members of high- and low-intensity kinship society, where kinship intensity is measured by cousin marriage preference and cousin term differentiation, respectively. Consistent with our main results in Table-1, we find that the exposure of donation decisions to same-age peer groups causes members from high-intensity kin-based societies to be less likely to donate to any charity than those from low-kinship intensity societies. The difference in treatment effects ranges from 6% to 10% and is statistically significant and similar to our main findings in Table-1. Consistent with our main findings, Appendix Tables A16 and A17 find no statistically significant difference in treatment effects of exposure to donation decisions to older and younger peer groups between members from high- and low-intensity kin-based communities, where kinship intensity is measured using a preference for cousin marriage and cousin term differentiation.

[12] See Schulz (2022) for details

5.5. **Experimenter-demand Effect.** We included obfuscation questions and incentivized outcomes to mitigate experimenter-demand bias (Stantcheva, 2023). It is reassuring to note that we do not observe any pattern of being charitable or not charitable in our experiments. The treatment effects vary depending on the randomized exposure to a given reference group and the respondents' kinship ties ancestry, as is expected to occur under differential social pressure concerns.

5.6. **Omitted Variable Bias.** We use methods developed by Oster, 2019 to establish that omitted variable bias is unlikely to explain the differences in treatment effects of public exposure to own-age locals between high- and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups in Experiment 1.[13] The methods of Oster, 2019 assumes that the relationship between treatment and unobservables can be recovered from that of the treatment and observed covariates. In Appendix Table-A18, we run an OLS regression on a dummy variable measuring the decision to donate. The independent variables are a dummy variable for high-intensity kinship ancestry, a dummy variable for being assigned to the randomized treatment group where donation decisions are likely to be revealed to own-age locals, and the interaction between the two dummy variables measuring randomized treatment and high-intensity kin-based ancestry, respectively. Reassuringly, we find that the magnitude of the bias-adjusted estimate of the differences in treatment effects between high- and low-kin groups (difference-in-differences effect) is strictly negative, with the estimate larger than the OLS estimate.

5.7. **Raw data including attrition sample.** We reported our main results using the sample that completed the full survey. Following guidelines of Stantcheva (2023), in Appendix Table-A19 we report results of Experiment 1 using full sample without dropping respondents who have not completed the survey. We find that our results using the full sample is same as our estimation sample.

6. Disentangling Social Concern Mechanism Emerging From Similarly Aged Peers

The results from the three experiments show that members from high-intensity kin-based societies face social pressure from similarly aged kin groups. In particular, we find that the exposure of donation decisions to same-age locals reduces the likelihood of donating by members of a high-intensity kin-based group compared to those

[13]We implement the methods ofOster (2019) in Experiment 1 as it is the only experiment with statistically significant differences in treatment effects between high- and low-kin intensity ancestries, our coefficient of interest.

of a low-kinship group. There could be many mechanisms underlying the negative treatment effect on the donation rates of members of a high-intensity kin-based community. If we assume that members of high kin-based communities are closely connected with their family and their locality such that they rely on each other for financial support, one plausible mechanism following from the literature on kinship taxation[14] is that participants face pressure to provide financial assistance mostly from same-age kin groups. Therefore, they choose not to donate to signal to their same-age peers within their locality that they cannot afford donations. Alternatively, it is also likely that, on average, members of high-intensity kin-based communities individually hold social preferences that they believe differ from their community (Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2020). Thus, members from high-intensity kin-based ancestries choose not to donate to hide their social preferences from peers and avoid the cost of deviating from their expectations.

6.1. **Experiment-4.** To provide insight into the social pressure mechanism from same-age peers, we present results from a new experiment that was pre-registered in AsPredicted,[15] designed to isolate the mechanisms above. Similar to experiments 1–3, we first asked a set of demographic and obfuscation questions. We then reminded participants that 1 in 100 respondents who submitted a fully completed survey would receive a $25 Amazon gift card and could donate any amount of the voucher to any charity of their choice. We then randomized participants into the treatment group, where they were informed that if they chose not to donate, their decision would be revealed to local peers. More specifically, they were informed the following:

"If you decide **NOT TO DONATE**, then **YOUR DECISION NOT TO DONATE** will be **POSTED** on our website in approximately two months and viewed by your peers who are close to **YOUR AGE** from **YOUR LOCALITY**. There is no need to provide your name, email, etc., here; our survey company already has this information. We will notify you when the report becomes available on our website,[website link]."

In this experiment design, we closely follow Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin (2020) to also explicitly tackle a concern that the treatment effects of exposure to same-age peer groups could be an effect of only the act of posting and not due to exposure to the particular reference group. Therefore, we kept the act of posting both

[14]Platteau (2015),Di Falco and Bulte (2011), Kinnan and Townsend (2012),Boltz, Marazyan and Villar (2019), Grimm, Hartwig and Lay (2017),Carranza et al. (2022), and Squires (2024)

[15]We follow Bursztyn et al. (2023*a*) and register our experiment in AsPredicted. It was pre-registered on May 14, 2024 and launched online on May 20, 2024.

in the treatment and in the control group. In the control group, we posted the decisions in the aggregate form anonymously and assured participants that their responses would be kept private. We follow the control group (i.e., the private condition) in Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin (2020) and specifically tell participants the following:

"We will **ANONYMOUSLY** post respondents' donation decisions on our website in approximately two months. **RESULTS WILL BE REPORTED AS PERCENTAGES ONLY**, so your **INDIVIDUAL RESPONSE** to the survey will remain **ANONYMOUS**. We will notify you when the results become available on our website, [website link]."

Appendix Table-A20 presents the summary statistics and randomization of the experimental sample. Our sample is balanced between exposure treatment and control along all observables. Similar to our previous experimental sample, around 60% are female, about 50% are employed, more than 50% identify as White, and 24% identify as Black. About 75% of the sample is US-born, whereas in our previous experiment, about 80% of the sample was US-born. We targeted a higher share of non-US-born samples to have more ancestry variation in the sample. In this sample, 32% are members of high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups, where ancestry is measured by parental country of birth. If the participant's country of birth determines ancestry, the share of high-intensity kin-based ancestry is about 18%. Appendix Table-A21 shows demographic covariates are balanced across most observables across different kinship groups across treatment and control for all measures of ancestry. Similar to Experiments 1-3, we find that there is a higher proportion of the White population in low-kin ancestry groups than in high-kin groups. We show that our results are robust to controlling for demographic covariates, attention checks, and survey duration.

Next, we validate our assumption that members from high-intensity kin-based societies, where kinship is measured using parental and own country of birth, are more likely to receive and provide financial support to their family members and individuals in their locality. In experiment 4, we asked each participant four questions: i) how much they rely on people from their locality for financial support, ii) how much they rely on their own family for financial support, iii) how much people from their locality rely on them for financial support, and iv) how much their family members rely on them for financial support. In each of these questions, participants were given three responses to choose from: the relevant group is very likely to provide financial support, they may provide support if needed, or there is not much interaction between the participant and the group in question

and therefore financial support is not expected. The responses are grouped into categorical variables where a higher value indicates stronger support. Appendix Table-A22 shows that members from high-intensity kin-based ancestries, where ancestry is measured by parental or own country of birth, are more likely to report being very likely to receive and provide financial support to their family members and individuals from their locality. This aligns with the literature on kinship ties (Enke, 2019; Schulz, 2022) that shows high-intensity kin-based societies with deep origins have strong within-group cohesion.

6.1.1. *Ruling out Kinship Tax.* In Experiment 4, in the treatment group, if the participant chooses not to donate, their no-donation decision will be revealed to the local same-age peer group. Thus, if members from high-intensity kin-based societies in the treatment group use the no-donation choice to signal to their peers that they cannot afford to donate out of kinship tax concerns, we expect their donation rates to decline compared to participants with low-intensity kinship ancestry. However, Appendix Tables-A23, A24 and A25 show that for both groups, donation rates increase and there is no statistically significant difference in the treatment effects on donation rates between them. Thus, kinship tax is not the likely channel underlying the observed effects.

6.1.2. *Desire to Keep Information Private.* In Experiment 4, although participants in high- and low-intensity kinship ancestry groups make observationally equivalent choices, the mechanisms driving their decisions are different and are better understood by combining evidence from Experiment 1.

In Experiment 1, where all donation decisions are revealed to own-age locals in the treatment group, there is no statistically significant effect on donation rates for members of low-kin ancestry in the treatment group compared to the control group. Therefore, the treatment does not affect low-kin ancestry members. In Experiment 4, only the decision not to donate is made public to same-age peers, and donation rates statistically significantly increase in the treatment group compared to the control group for low-kin ancestry members. In other words, participants with low-intensity kin-based ancestry are less likely to signal to own-age locals that they are not charitable. In other words, low-intensity kin-based ancestry participants are less likely to signal to their age locals that they are not charitable in Experiment 4. Low kin ancestry groups are more likely to have universal values (Enke, 2019). Therefore, they may feel more social pressure to seem charitable in general. Virtue signaling is a

possible mechanism explaining donation responses for low-kin-based ancestry participants when their decisions are exposed to own-age peers.

The choice to donate in the treatment group of Experiment 1 would have revealed additional information on the participant's preferred charities. In Experiment 1, we find that the donation rates of members from high-intensity kin-based ancestries decline statistically significantly in the treatment group relative to the control group. However, in Experiment 4, it was the opposite; the choice not to donate would have revealed more information about the social preferences of the participants in the treatment group. In Experiment 4, we find that the donation rates marginally increase in the treatment group compared to the control group for members of high-intensity kin-based ancestry, but the effect is not statistically significant. Notably, the members of high-intensity kin-based ancestry are no longer choosing not to donate in Experiment-4. Therefore, we find that the members of high-intensity kin-based groups are more likely to prefer a decision that provides as minimal information about their social preferences to local same-age peers.

This finding can be explained by the mechanism in Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott (2020), where participants from high-intensity kinship ancestral communities may think that they prefer to support a charity that their own community might not approve, which has a social cost for members in high-intensity kinship communities. Enke (2019) shows that high-intensity kinship societies are linked with traits such as revenge-taking and negative reciprocity that regulate the behavior of its members and induce them to conform to communal values and norms. Below, we test different traits associated with high-intensity kin-based ancestry that can explain the social pressure driven by same-age locals.

6.2. **Social Pressure due to Negative Reciprocity, Revenge-Taking, Communal Values, Shame.** The pre-industrial kinship index developed by Enke, 2019 shows that historically high-intensity kin-based societies enforce norms through communal moral values, revenge-taking, emotions of external shame, negative reciprocal behavior as opposed to internalized guilt, and altruistic punishment. Using data from Enke, 2019, in Appendix Table-4, we estimate the following logit equation:

$$Pr(I_i = 1|T_i, HighTrait_i) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\alpha+\beta_1*T_i+\beta_2*HighTrait_i+\gamma*T_i*HighTrait_i)}} \tag{4}$$

where I_i is the dummy variable that equals one if the respondent donates to charity. T_i is the dummy variable of being assigned to the treatment group where donation decisions are likely to be exposed to same-age locals. $HighTrait_i$ is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent's ancestral trait is above the sample median.

The Appendix Table-4 only reports the probability estimates, that is, the marginal effects, for ease of interpretation. The estimates relate to the differences in the treatment effects between participants with above-sample median traits and those with below-sample median traits. We find that participants from ancestries that have a higher propensity for taking revenge, place more importance on communal values, encourage emotions of shame relative to guilt, and have a higher likelihood of negative reciprocity are less likely to donate when their donation decisions are revealed to local same-age peers. Therefore, revenge-taking, negative reciprocity, shame, and communal values explain why high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups prefer making decisions that keep their social preferences private from own-age locals. This result is consistent with long-standing literature in anthropology and psychology arguing that negative reciprocal behavior regulates social norms in cohesive groups (Horne, 2001).

7. Pre-registration

All our experiments were pre-registered *before* any data collection. Experiments 1–3 were pre-registered on March 13, 2023, with data collection occurring on March 27, 2023. We pre-registered Experiment 4 in AsPredicted on May 14, 2024 and launched it on May 20, 2024.

The main analysis, sample size, implementation methods in the paper are according to the pre-registration. However, we have a few deviations from the plan. We had registered an additional experiment on March 13, 2023 that we did not implement as we realized that an additional experiment could be embedded differently and usefully in a different design. We also erroneously added an incentivized belief question as an additional primary outcome in the pre-registration for Experiment 1–3. The measure has been excluded as it is inconsistent with the outcome variable (i.e., donation decisions) that we stated that we planned to study in the intervention section of the pre-registry. The incentivized beliefs in the control group provides us with some understanding about

perception regarding whether the social choices of participants with high-intensity kin-based ancestry align with those in their locality. We show that in all samples in the control group in Experiment 1–3, across all measures of ancestry, members from high-intensity kin-based communities believe that only approximately 6%-10% of own-age locals would support the charity they choose, as shown in Appendix Table-A26. The share of own-age locals perceived to have same charity preferences as the respondent is statistically significantly 2-3 percentage points lower for high-intensity kin-based groups compared to low-intensity kin-based groups. Please note that incentivized belief question measuring perception about others donation choices were asked *after* the randomized intervention (private or public) and asking the donation question. The belief questions were asked towards the very end of the survey. This was a deliberate choice to mitigate any concern related to experimenter demand effects. We only asked demographic questions and added several obfuscation and attention check questions before asking about their donation choices that measures our main outcome variable, following suggestions by Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart (2023); Stantcheva (2023) to mitigate social desirability bias.

We also mentioned that we will conduct follow-up experiments for robustness checks. However, after analyzing Experiment 1-3, we concluded that our limited research budget should be used to design follow-up experiments that help tease out mechanisms. Therefore, we designed Experiment 4 to focus on the mechanisms underlying social pressure. Our main analysis, survey experimental design, and sample size (on average) in Experiment 4 are as noted in the pre-registration.

The paper also has various robustness and heterogeneity analysis, which were outcomes of feedback received from seminar participants and various scholars. They lend credibility and clarify the results of the main analysis. In line with recent research on pre-analysis plans (Banerjee et al., 2020; Olken, 2015) that argues in favor of non-pre-specified analysis in experiments, we include these analyses in the paper.[16]

8. Conclusion

Using revealed preference survey experiments with US-based samples, we show that participants with high-intensity kin-based ancestry experience social pressure from same-age peers within their locality. In particular,

[16]Banerjee et al. (2020) note the value of ex-post reasoning in framing and interpreting experimental results.

these concerns cause participants to make decisions that reveal minimal information to same-age locals. Community traits characteristic of high-intensity kin-based social groups—including revenge-taking, the relative importance of communal values, and the importance of shame versus guilt—explain their desire to keep their decisions private.

Methodologically, the paper applies the empirical framework of Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) to design revealed preference experiments that identify social pressure mechanisms prevalent in close-knit communities. The most common application of Bursztyn and Jensen (2017)'s strategy to measure social concern effects is to make behavior fully private or randomly shared with others. We add two features to this design to capture the mechanisms of social image concerns by kinship ties. First, we focus on sharing information about respondents' behavior to reference groups within the their locality. Second, we introduce an exogenous variation in respondents' kinship ties using the kinship index of Enke (2019). Respondents from high-intensity kin-based communities are more likely to experience social pressure concerns from locals compared to those from low-intensity kin-based groups, as close-knit communities maintain tight social ties with locals.

We implement three donation experiments to identify which age group generates social pressure in tight-knit communities. The control group in all three experiments is identical, with respondents' donation decisions staying private. The experiments differed by their treatment component. In Experiment 1, we primed the respondents that their donation decision would be revealed to local same-age peers. In Experiment 2, respondents were primed that their donation decision would be revealed to locals who are older than them. In Experiment 3, we primed that donation decisions would be revealed to locals who are younger than them. We find that same-age locals exert social pressure on high-intensity kin-based communities, and our results are robust to omitted variable concerns, alternative specifications, methods of inference, and definitions of pre-industrial kinship norms.

We design an additional experiment, Experiment 4, to isolate the mechanisms underlying social pressure for high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. Experiment 4 keeps donation choices private in the control group, and the treatment primes respondents that only their decision not to donate will be revealed to own-age locals. Kinship tax concerns would predict a decrease in donation rates for high-kin ancestry participants because choosing not to donate would signal to their own-age peers that they cannot afford it. However, we do not find any statistically

significant treatment effect for these participants. Instead, donation rates marginally increase for high-kinship groups, but the effect is imprecise. Combining the results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 4, we conclude that participants from high-intensity kinship ancestry make decisions that keep their social preferences private. Additionally, we find that communal social norms, negative reciprocal attitudes, revenge-taking, and public shame drive the responses to public exposure of donation decisions for these participants.

The results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 also provide us insights into the different mechanisms driving social image concerns for participants from low-intensity kinship groups. Donation rates marginally increase when decisions are primed to be shared with own-age locals in Experiment 1, and economically and statistically significantly increase when only no-donation decisions are shared with own-age locals in Experiment 4. Thus, participants with low-intensity kinship ancestry do not like to be perceived as less charitable, in general, to same-age peers.

There is a long-standing literature in cultural anthropology (Varcoe et al., 2010; Warburton and Chambers, 2007) arguing for elders' role in enforcing community values through social pressure. Conversely, literature in psychology (Kanngiesser et al., 2022) and economics (Bisin and Verdier, 2011; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017) has emphasized the role of own-age peers or younger groups in perpetuating social values. We empirically test the salience of the role of age cohorts in social pressure effects among US-based samples with varying ancestral kinship norms. We find that own-age peers are a relevant social group that impacts the social decisions of participants from tight-knit communities.

TABLE 1. Experiment 1: Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Same Age Peers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treat	0.112	0.119	0.0642	0.0694	0.0583	0.0674
	(0.0872)	(0.0875)	(0.0875)	(0.0878)	(0.0809)	(0.0812)
High Kin Anc. (Pat.)	0.0193	0.0462				
	(0.122)	(0.122)				
Treat*High Kin Anc. (Pat.)	-0.459***	-0.460***				
	(0.174)	(0.174)				
High Kin Anc. (Mat.)			0.0227	0.0359		
			(0.120)	(0.120)		
Treat*High Kin Anc. (Mat.)			-0.271	-0.261		
			(0.171)	(0.172)		
C.O.B					0.0828	0.128
					(0.152)	(0.153)
Treat*C.O.B					-0.430**	-0.447**
					(0.218)	(0.220)
Observations	2,968	2,968	2,975	2,975	2,984	2,984
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ancestral homelands	132	132	134	134	112	112
Marginal Coeff. Estimates						
$(H^T - H^C) - (L^T - L^C)$	-0.106	-0.107	-0.0635	-0.0613	-0.0996	-0.104
p-val	0.008	0.008	0.113	0.129	0.048	0.041
$(H^T - H^C)$	-0.0790	-0.0781	-0.0482	-0.045	-0.086	-0.088
p-val	0.021	0.023	0.159	0.194	0.065	0.061
$(L^T - L^C)$	0.0270	0.0286	0.0154	0.0166	0.0139	0.0161
p-val	0.198	0.174	0.463	0.429	0.471	0.406

Notes: This table presents logit regressions of the probability of making any donation to any given charity on a dummy for the randomized exposure treatment, where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to own-age locals; a dummy variable for high-intensity kin-based ancestry; and a dummy variable for the interaction between randomized exposure treatment and high-intensity kin-based ancestry. Treat corresponds to the randomized exposure treatment where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to own-age locals. Columns 1, 3, and 5 have no controls. In columns 2, 4, and 6, we control for the time taken to complete the survey and a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed the complex attention check question. Columns 1 and 2 analyze a sample of survey respondents with ancestral kinship intensity measured by father's country of origin, columns 3 and 4 by mother's country of origin, and columns 5 and 6 by the respondents' own country of origin. Marginal coefficient estimates correspond to the difference in treatment effects (diff-in-diff estimate) on donation rates between high-intensity and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. $H^T - H^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for high-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. $L^T - L^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for low-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates.

TABLE 2. Experiment 2: Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Older Peers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Donate (Yes=1)						
Treat	-0.188**	-0.191**	-0.162**	-0.161*	-0.171**	-0.172**
	(0.0814)	(0.0815)	(0.0818)	(0.0820)	(0.0763)	(0.0764)
High Kin Anc. (Pat)	-0.195	-0.165				
	(0.123)	(0.124)				
T*High Kin Anc. (Pat)	0.0977	0.0943				
	(0.173)	(0.173)				
High Kin Anc. (Mat)			0.0328	0.0712		
			(0.119)	(0.120)		
T*High Kin Anc. (Mat)			-0.0244	-0.0446		
			(0.169)	(0.170)		
C.O.B High Kin					0.0238	0.0728
					(0.153)	(0.155)
T*C.O.B High Kin					-0.0209	-0.0382
					(0.218)	(0.219)
Obs	3,236	3,236	3,250	3,250	3,263	3,263
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Anc. Homelands	132	132	136	136	111	111
Marginal Coeff. Est.						
$(H^T - H^C) - (L^T - L^C)$	0.0243	0.0232	-0.0060	-0.0110	-0.00514	-0.0096
p-val	0.552	0.570	0.882	0.785	0.922	0.855
$(H^T - H^C)$	-0.0212	-0.023	-0.045	-0.0494	-0.0462	-0.051
p-val	0.553	0.526	0.208	0.166	0.347	0.304

Notes: This table presents logit regressions of the probability of making any donation to any given charity on a dummy for the randomized exposure treatment, where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to individuals older than the respondent in her locality; a dummy variable for high-intensity kin-based ancestry; and a dummy variable for the interaction between randomized exposure treatment and high-intensity kin-based ancestry. Columns 1, 3, and 5 have no controls. In columns 2, 4, and 6, we control for the time taken to complete the survey and a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed the complex attention check question. Columns 1 and 2 analyze a sample of survey respondents with ancestral kinship intensity measured by father's country of origin, columns 3 and 4 by mother's country of origin, and columns 5 and 6 by the respondents' own country of origin. Marginal coefficient estimates correspond to the difference in treatment effects (diff-in-diff estimate) on donation rates between high-intensity and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. $H^T - H^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for high-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. $L^T - L^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for low-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates.

TABLE 3. Experiment 3: Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Younger Peers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Donate (Yes=1)						
Treat (T)	-0.133	-0.139*	-0.115	-0.119	-0.108	-0.114
	(0.0828)	(0.0830)	(0.0831)	(0.0831)	(0.0781)	(0.0782)
High Kin Anc. (Pat)	-0.203	-0.186				
	(0.133)	(0.133)				
Treat*High Kin Anc. (Pat)	0.0703	0.0721				
	(0.191)	(0.191)				
High Kin Anc. (Mat)			-0.0868	-0.0586		
			(0.131)	(0.132)		
T*High Kin Anc. (Mat)			-0.0318	-0.0430		
			(0.188)	(0.189)		
C.O.B kin Tie					-0.104	-0.0766
					(0.179)	(0.180)
T*C.O.B High Tie					-0.0284	-0.0313
					(0.256)	(0.256)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Anc. Homelands	122	122	122	122	104	104
Obs	2,938	2,938	2,943	2,943	2,959	2,959
Marginal Coeff. Est.						
$(H^T - H^C) - (L^T - L^C)$	0.0177	0.018	-0.007	-0.010	-0.006	-0.007
p-val	0.699	0.694	0.874	0.826	0.918	0.908
$(H^T - H^C)$	-0.015	-0.016	-0.035	-0.039	-0.033	-0.035
p-val	0.715	0.695	0.384	0.339	0.576	0.551

Notes: This table presents logit regressions of the probability of making any donation to any given charity on a dummy for the randomized exposure treatment, where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to individuals younger than the respondent in her locality; a dummy variable for high-intensity kin-based ancestry; and a dummy variable for the interaction between randomized exposure treatment and high-intensity kin-based ancestry. Treat (T) corresponds to the randomized exposure of respondents' donation decisions to locals younger than the respondent. Columns 1, 3, and 5 have no controls. In columns 2, 4, and 6, we control for the time taken to complete the survey and a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed the complex attention check question. Columns 1 and 2 analyze a sample of survey respondents with ancestral kinship intensity measured by father's country of origin, columns 3 and 4 by mother's country of origin, and columns 5 and 6 by the respondents' own country of origin. Marginal coefficient estimates represent the difference in donation rates between high-intensity and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups, across both exposure treatment and control conditions. $H^T - H^C$ and $L^T - L^C$ represent the treatment effects on donation rates for high-intensity and low-intensity kinship ancestry groups, respectively, when donation decisions are exposed.

TABLE 4. Mechanisms of Social Concern in Experiment 1: Exposure of Decisions to Same Age Peers

Donate (Yes=1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A						
T*Pat. Anc. Localized Clans (=1)	-0.0031					
	(0.048)					
T*Pat. Anc. Revenge-Altruism (=1)		-0.0656				
		(0.0431)				
T*Pat. Anc. Rel. Imp Comm. Val (=1)			-0.1193			
			(0.0762)			
T*Pat. Anc. Shame–Guilt (=1)				-0.0509		
				(0.121)		
T*Pat. Anc. Punish Others (=1)					0.050	
					(0.155)	
T*Pat. Anc.Neg Reciprocity (=1)						-0.0748*
						(0.045)
Observations	2,964	2,642	2,656	2,347	2,968	2,642
Panel B						
T*Mat Anc. Localized Clans (=1)	0.0201					
	(0.0470)					
T*Mat Anc.Revenge-Altruism (=1)		-0.146***				
		(0.042)				
T*Mat Anc. Rel. Imp Comm. Val (=1)			-0.161**			
			(0.076)			
T*Mat Anc. Shame–Guilt(=1)				-0.292***		
				(0.107)		
T*Mat Anc. Punish Others (=1)					-0.205	
					(0.144)	
T*Mat Anc. Neg Reciprocity (=1)						-0.165***
						(0.045)
Observations	2,970	2,636	2,655	2,358	2,975	2,636
Panel C						
T*C.O.B Localized Clans (=1)	-0.053					
	(0.0603)					
T*C.O.B Revenge-Altruism (=1)		–0.1040**				
		(0.052)				
T*C.O.B Rel. Imp To Comm. Val (=1)			-0.093			
			(0.100)			
T*C.O.B Shame–Guilt(=1)				-0.357***		
				(0.138)		
T*C.O.B Punish Others (=1)					-0.1431	
					(0.2190)	
T*C.O.B Neg. Reciprocity (=1)						-0.149***
						(0.058)
Observations	2,970	2,636	2,655	2,358	2,975	2,636

Notes: This table reports the marginal coefficients (i.e., the probability estimates) of the interaction term in logit regressions of the probability of making any donation to any given charity on a dummy for the randomized exposure treatment, where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to own-age locals; a dummy variable for high-intensity ancestral traits; and a dummy variable for the interaction between randomized exposure treatment and high-intensity ancestral traits. The marginal coefficient reflects the differences in treatment effects on donation rates between the high-intensity and low-intensity ancestral trait groups in Experiment 1. Panels A, B, and C measure ancestry using the father's, mother's, and own country of birth, respectively. The table considers the following ancestral traits associated with kin-based systems: localized clans, revenge-taking versus altruism, communal values versus universal values, shame versus guilt, punishing others, and general negative reciprocity.

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
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
Appendix A. Online Appendix Figures

Figure A1. Distribution of Ancestral Kinship Ties in Experiment-1: Ancestry Measured by Father's Country of Birth




Notes: The two figures depict the distribution of the ancestral kinship index in the sample of Experiment 1. The top figure depicts the distribution of low ancestral kinship ties, while the bottom depicts the distribution of high ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by father's country of birth. The gray region represents no data.

FIGURE A2. Distribution of Ancestral Kinship Ties in Experiment-1: Ancestry Measured by Mother's Country of Birth




Notes: The two figures depict the distribution of the ancestral kinship index in the sample of Experiment 1. The top figure depicts the distribution of low ancestral kinship ties, while the bottom depicts the distribution of high ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by mother's country of birth. The gray region represents no data.


FIGURE A3. Distribution of Ancestral Kinship Ties in Experiment-1: Ancestry Measured by Own Country of Birth



Notes: The two figures depict the distribution of the ancestral kinship index in the sample of Experiment 1. The top figure depicts the distribution of low ancestral kinship ties, while the bottom depicts the distribution of high ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by own country of birth. The gray region represents no data.


FIGURE A4. Distribution of Ancestral Kinship Ties in Experiment-2: Ancestry Measured by Father's Country of Birth






Notes: The two figures depict the distribution of the ancestral kinship index in the sample of Experiment 2. The top figure depicts the distribution of low ancestral kinship ties, while the bottom depicts the distribution of high ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by father's country of birth. The gray region represents no data.


FIGURE A5. Distribution of Ancestral Kinship Ties in Experiment-2: Ancestry Measured by Mother's Country of Birth



Notes: The two figures depict the distribution of the ancestral kinship index in the sample of Experiment 2.The top figure depicts the distribution of low ancestral kinship ties, while the bottom depicts the distribution of high ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by mother's country of birth. The gray region represents no data.


FIGURE A6. Distribution of Ancestral Kinship Ties in Experiment-2: Ancestry Measured by Own Country of Birth






Notes: The two figures depict the distribution of the ancestral kinship index in the sample of Experiment 2. The top figure depicts the distribution of low ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by own country of birth. The bottom figure depicts the distribution of high ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by own country of birth. Gray region represents no data.

FIGURE A7. Distribution of Ancestral Kinship Ties in Experiment-3: Ancestry Measured by Father's Country of Birth




Notes: The two figures depict the distribution of the ancestral kinship index in the sample of Experiment 3. The top figure depicts the distribution of low ancestral kinship ties, while the bottom depicts the distribution of high ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by father's country of birth. The gray region represents no data.

FIGURE A8. Distribution of Ancestral Kinship Ties in Experiment-3: Ancestry Measured by Mother's Country of Birth




Notes: The two figures depict the distribution of the ancestral kinship index in the sample of Experiment 3. The top figure depicts the distribution of low ancestral kinship ties, while the bottom depicts the distribution of high ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by mother's country of birth. The gray region represents no data.

FIGURE A9. Distribution of Ancestral Kinship Ties in Experiment-3: Ancestry Measured by Own Country of Birth




Notes: The two figures depict the distribution of the ancestral kinship index in the sample of Experiment 3. The top figure depicts the distribution of low ancestral kinship ties, while the bottom depicts the distribution of high ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by own country of birth. The gray region represents no data.

FIGURE A10. Distribution of Ancestral Kinship Ties in Experiment-4: Ancestry Measured by Father's Country of Birth




Notes: The two figures depict the distribution of the ancestral kinship index in the sample of Experiment 4. The top figure depicts the distribution of low ancestral kinship ties, while the bottom depicts the distribution of high ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by father's country of birth. The gray region represents no data.

FIGURE A11. Distribution of Ancestral Kinship Ties in Experiment-4: Ancestry Measured by Mother's Country of Birth




Notes: The two figures depict the distribution of the ancestral kinship index in the sample of Experiment 4. The top figure depicts the distribution of low ancestral kinship ties, while the bottom depicts the distribution of high ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by mother's country of birth. The gray region represents no data.

FIGURE A12. Distribution of Ancestral Kinship Ties in Experiment-4: Ancestry Measured by Own Country of Birth




Notes: The two figures depict the distribution of the ancestral kinship index in the sample of Experiment 4. The top figure depicts the distribution of low ancestral kinship ties, while the bottom depicts the distribution of high ancestral kinship ties, where ancestry is measured by own country of birth. The gray region represents no data.

FIGURE A13. Donation Rates in Experiment 1: Ancestry Measured by Father's Country of Birth




Notes: The figure displays average donation rates by individuals from Experiment 1 in the four comparison groups. The two bars on the left display donations for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using father's country of birth (respectively, N = 357 and N = 375). The two bars on the right display those for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the low-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using own country of birth (respectively, N = 1,081 and N = 1,053). Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. The top horizontal bars show p-values for t-tests of equality of means between different comparison groups.

FIGURE A14. Donation Rates in Experiment 1: Ancestry Measured by Mother's Country of Birth




Notes: The figure displays average donation rates by individuals from Experiment 1 in the four comparison groups. The two bars on the left display donations for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using mother's country of birth (respectively N = 377 and N = 371), and the two bars on the right display those for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the low-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using mother's country of birth (respectively N = 1,065 and N = 1,061). Error bars reflect 95 percent confidence intervals. The top horizontal bars show p-values for t-tests of equality of means between different comparison groups.

FIGURE A15. Donation Rates in Experiment 1: Ancestry Measured by Own Country of Birth




Notes: The figure displays average donation rates by individuals from Experiment 1 in the four comparison groups. The two bars on the left display donations for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using own country of birth (respectively N = 193 and N = 193), and the two bars on the right display those for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the low-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using own country of birth (respectively N = 1,255 and N = 1,237). Error bars reflect 95 percent confidence intervals. The top horizontal bars show p-values for t-tests of equality of means between different comparison groups.

FIGURE A16. Donation Rates in Experiment 2: Ancestry Measured by Father's Country of Birth




Notes: The figure displays average donation rates by individuals from Experiment 2 in the four comparison groups. The two bars on the left display donations for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using father's country of birth (respectively N = 337 and N = 363), and the two bars on the right display those for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the low-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using father's country of birth (respectively N = 1,233 and N = 1,211). Error bars reflect 95 percent confidence intervals. The top horizontal bars show p-values for t-tests of equality of means between different comparison groups.

FIGURE A17. Donation Rates in Experiment 2: Ancestry Measured by Mother's Country of Birth




Notes: The figure displays average donation rates by individuals from Experiment 2 in the four comparison groups. The two bars on the left display donations for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using mother's country of birth (respectively, N = 357 and N = 364). The two bars on the right display those for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the low-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using mother's country of birth (respectively, N = 1,217 and N = 1,218). Error bars reflect 95 percent confidence intervals. The top horizontal bars show p-values for t-tests of equality of means between different comparison groups.

FIGURE A18. Donation Rates in Experiment 2: Ancestry Measured by Own Country of Birth




Notes: The figure displays average donation rates by individuals from Experiment 2 in the four comparison groups. The two bars on the left display donations for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using own country of birth (respectively, N = 183 and N = 191). The two bars on the right display those for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the low-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using own country of birth (respectively, N = 1,398 and N = 1,395). Error bars reflect 95 percent confidence intervals. The top horizontal bars show p-values for t-tests of equality of means between different comparison groups.

FIGURE A19. Donation Rates in Experiment 3: Ancestry Measured by Father's Country of Birth




Notes: The figure displays average donation rates by individuals from Experiment 3 in the four comparison groups. The two bars on the left display donations for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using father's country of birth (respectively, N = 280 and N = 266). The two bars on the right display those for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the low-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using father's country of birth (respectively, N =1168 and N = 1164). Error bars reflect 95 percent confidence intervals. The top horizontal bars show p-values for t-tests of equality of means between different comparison groups.

FIGURE A20. Donation Rates in Experiment 3 : Ancestry Measured by Mother's Country of Birth




Notes: The figure displays average donation rates by individuals from Experiment 3 in the four comparison groups. The two bars on the left display donations for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using mother's country of birth (respectively N = 283 and N = 277). The two bars on the right display those for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the low-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using mother's country of birth (respectively N = 1,164 and N = 1,157). Error bars reflect 95 percent confidence intervals. The top horizontal bars show p-values for t-tests of equality of means between different comparison groups.

FIGURE A21. Donation Rates in Experiment 3: Ancestry Measured by Own Country of Birth




Notes: The figure displays average donation rates by individuals from Experiment 3 in the four comparison groups. The two bars on the left display donations for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using own country of birth (respectively, N = 134 and N = 136). The two bars on the right display those for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the low-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using own country of birth (respectively, N = 1,323 and N = 1,302). Error bars reflect 95 percent confidence intervals. The top horizontal bars show p-values for t-tests of equality of means between different comparison groups.

FIGURE A22. Donation Rates in Experiment 4: Ancestry Measured by Father's Country of Birth




Notes: The figure displays average donation rates by individuals from Experiment 4 in the four comparison groups. The two bars on the left display donations for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using father's country of birth (respectively, N = 509 and N = 506). The two bars on the right display those for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the low-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using father's country of birth (respectively, N = 1,139 and N = 1,123). Error bars reflect 95 percent confidence intervals. The top horizontal bars show p-values for t-tests of equality of means between different comparison groups.

FIGURE A23. Donation Rates in Experiment 4: Ancestry Measured by Mother's Country of Birth



Notes: The figure displays average donation rates by individuals from Experiment 4 in the four comparison groups. The two bars on the left display donations for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using mother's country of birth (respectively N = 509 and N = 506). The two bars on the right display those for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the low-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using mother's country of birth (respectively N = 1,139 and N = 1,123). Error bars reflect 95 percent confidence intervals. The top horizontal bars show p-values for t-tests of equality of means between different comparison groups.

FIGURE A24. Donation Rates in Experiment 4: Ancestry Measured by Own Country of Birth



Notes: The figure displays average donation rates by individuals from Experiment 4 in the four comparison groups. The two bars on the left display donations for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the high-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using own country of birth (respectively N = 271 and N = 299). The two bars on the right display those for individuals in the private and public exposure conditions in the low-intensity kin-based ancestry group, where ancestry is measured using own country of birth (respectively N = 1,382 and N = 1,337). Error bars reflect 95 percent confidence intervals. The top horizontal bars show p-values for t-tests of equality of means between different comparison groups.

Appendix B. Online Appendix Tables

Table A1. EXPERIMENT 1: Summary Statistics of Pre-Treatment Covariates for Public Exposure to Same-Age Peers

EXPERIMENT 1: Social Pressure from Same Age Gr.

Panel A: Means Std. Dev. in Brackets	Public Treatment	Control	P-value of t-test
Black	0.167	0.177	0.4368
Std. dev.	(0.373)	(0.382)	
N	1447	1477	
White	0.647	0.628	0.2797
Std. dev.	(0.478)	(0.484)	
N	1477	1477	
Female	0.635	0.646	0.5275
Std. dev.	(0.482)	(0.478)	
N	1465	1497	
College	0.635	0.639	0.8223
Std. dev.	(0.480)	(0.482)	
N	1450	1467	
Ever Married	0.537	0.539	0.8972
Std. dev.	(0.499)	(0.499)	
N	1440	1454	
Empl.	0.581	0.584	0.8792
Std. dev.	(0.494)	(0.493)	
N	1427	1451	
US-born	0.789	0.807	0.2157
Std. dev.	(0.408)	(0.395)	
N	1492	1508	
High Kin (Pat.)	0.273	0.253	0.2235
Std. dev.	(0.446)	(0.435)	
N	1476	1492	
High Kin (Mat.)	0.267	0.267	0.9849
Std. dev.	(0.443)	(0.443)	
N	1479	1496	
High Kin (C.O.B)	0.145	0.139	0.6219
Std. dev.	(0.352)	(0.346)	
N	1480	1504	
Survey duration (in seconds)	514.820	503.016	0.7235
Std. dev.	(1101.899)	(679.439)	
N	1495	1510	

Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of Experiment 1's sample. The public treatment column corresponds to the sample assigned to treatment, where the respondent is primed to believe that her donation decisions will be revealed to own-age locals. The control group column corresponds to a sample where respondents were not primed, and their donation decisions were kept private. P-values represent the test for the difference in means between the public treatment and control groups. Female and employed are dummy variables for respondents reporting their gender as female and employed, respectively. The variable survey duration is the time taken to complete the study, measured in seconds. College is a dummy variable for respondents having a college education. Black and White correspond to the indicator variables for reporting Black and White as singular racial identities, respectively. Ever married is a dummy variable for being ever married at the time of the survey.

TABLE A2. EXPERIMENT 2: Summary Statistics of Pre-Treatment Covariates for Public Exposure to Older Peers

EXPERIMENT 2: Social Pressure from Older Age Gr.			
Means Std. Dev. in Brackets	Public Treatment	Control	P-value of t-test
Black Alone	0.161	0.151	0.4400
Std. Dev.	0.367	0.358	
N	1618	1598	
White Alone	0.671	0.673	0.8971
Std. Dev.	0.470	0.469	
N	1618	1598	
College	0.650	0.671	0.1921
Std. dev.	0.477	0.470	
N	1604	1592	
Female	0.637	0.637	0.9892
Std. Dev.	0.481	0.481	
N	1628	1618	
Ever Married	0.548	0.535	0.4605
Std. Dev.	0.498	0.499	
N	1594	1588	
Empl.	0.605	0.611	0.6969
Std. Dev.	0.489	0.488	
N	1583	1572	
US Born	0.818	0.824	0.6609
Std. Dev.	0.386	0.381	
N	1641	1639	
High Kin (Pat.)	0.235	0.219	0.2923
Std. Dev.	0.424	0.414	
N	1620	1616	
High Kin (Mat.)	0.235	0.232	0.8814
Std. Dev.	0.424	0.423	
N	1628	1622	
High Kin (C.O.B)	0.123	0.122	0.8985
Std. Dev.	0.329	0.327	
N	1634	1629	
Survey duration (in seconds)	531.122	542.261	0.8312
Std. Dev.	1566.921	1423.338	
N	1644	1639	

Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of Experiment 2's sample. The public treatment column corresponds to the sample assigned to treatment, where the respondent is primed to believe that her donation decisions will be revealed to individuals older than her. The control group column corresponds to a sample where respondents were not primed, and their donation decisions were kept private. P-values represent the test for the difference in means between the public treatment and control groups. Female and employed are dummy variables for respondents reporting their gender as female and employed, respectively. The duration taken in the survey is the duration taken to complete the study, measured in seconds. College is a dummy variable for respondents having a college education. Black Alone and White Alone correspond to the indicator variables for reporting Black and White as singular racial identities, respectively. Ever married is a dummy variable for being ever married at the time of the survey.

TABLE A3. EXPERIMENT 3: Summary Statistics of Pre-Treatment Covariates for Public Exposure to Younger Peers

EXPERIMENT 3: Social Pressure from Younger Age Gr.			
Means Std. Dev. in Brackets	Public Treatment	Control	P-value of t-test
Black Alone	0.169	0.184	0.2684
Std. dev.	0.374	0.388	
N	1454	1472	
White Alone	0.671	0.660	0.5312
Std. dev.	0.470	0.474	
N	1454	1472	
College	0.6470	0.655	0.6489
Std. dev.	0.478	0.475	
N	1,445	1,470	
Female	0.613	0.619	0.7581
Std. dev.	0.487	0.486	
N	1469	1485	
Ever Married	0.558	0.531	0.1418
Std. dev.	0.497	0.499	
N	1441	1462	
Empl.	0.599	0.609	0.5828
Std. dev.	0.490	0.488	
N	1434	1435	
US Born	0.855	0.860	0.6747
Std. dev.	0.353	0.347	
N	1472	1493	
High Kin (Pat.)	0.189	0.197	0.5512
Std. Dev.	0.391	0.398	
N	1458	1480	
High Kin (Mat.)	0.195	0.199	0.7798
Std. Dev.	0.397	0.400	
N	1464	1479	
High Kin (C.O.B)	0.095	0.095	0.9503
Std. Dev.	0.294	0.293	
N	1469	1490	
Survey duration (in seconds)	761.918	624.685	0.5473
Std. dev.	8502.238	2313.789	
N	1472	1495	

Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of Experiment 3's sample. The public treatment column corresponds to the sample assigned to treatment, where the respondent is primed to believe that her donation decisions will be revealed to individuals younger than her. The control group column corresponds to a sample where respondents were not primed, and their donation decisions were kept private. P-values represent the test for the difference in means between the public treatment and control groups. Female and employed are dummy variables for respondents reporting their gender as female and employed, respectively. The duration taken in the survey is the duration taken to complete the study, measured in seconds. College is a dummy variable for respondents having a college education. Black Alone and White Alone correspond to the indicator variables for reporting Black and White as singular racial identities, respectively. Ever married is a dummy variable for being ever married at the time of the survey.

TABLE A4. Experiment-1: Balance of Covariates

Panel A	Full Sample	High Kinship (Pat) Exposed	High Kinship (Pat) Not exposed	Low Kinship (Pat) Exposed	Low Kinship (Pat) Not exposed	p-*value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.640	0.670	0.668	0.621	0.640	0.215
	[0.480]	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.014)	
Employed	0.582	0.583	0.563	0.583	0.593	0.807
	[0.493]	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
College	0.637	0.683	0.629	0.624	0.638	0.217
	[0.481]	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
Some High School	0.071	0.079	0.064	0.063	0.078	0.479
	[0.257]	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	
White Alone	0.637	0.431	0.343	0.724	0.720	0.000
	[0.481]	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Black Alone	0.172	0.152	0.217	0.171	0.167	0.123
	[0.377]	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.011)	
Married	0.400	0.339	0.314	0.431	0.423	0.000
	[0.490]	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
Duration taken in Survey	508.889	538.285	482.447	507.970	507.434	0.894
	[914.214]	(66.276)	(38.992)	(30.924)	(19.170)	
N	2894	375	357	1053	1081	
Panel B	Full Sample	High Kinship (Mat) Exposed	High Kinship (Mat) Not exposed	Low Kinship (Mat) Exposed	Low Kinship (Mat) Not exposed	p-*value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.640	0.646	0.639	0.630	0.650	0.802
	[0.480]	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.014)	
Employed	0.582	0.598	0.552	0.580	0.598	0.444
	[0.493]	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
College	0.637	0.693	0.636	0.621	0.636	0.088
	[0.481]	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
Some High School	0.071	0.080	0.068	0.063	0.077	0.517
	[0.257]	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	
White Alone	0.637	0.419	0.364	0.727	0.719	0.000
	[0.481]	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Black Alone	0.172	0.151	0.191	0.172	0.175	0.515
	[0.377]	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.012)	
Married	0.400	0.353	0.321	0.426	0.421	0.000
	[0.490]	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
Duration taken in Survey	508.889	550.208	527.423	503.976	496.060	0.823
	[914.214]	(67.769)	(49.841)	(30.569)	(15.785)	
N	2894	371	377	1061	1065	
Panel C	Full Sample	High Kinship (C.O.B) Exposed	High Kinship (C.O.B) Not exposed	Low Kinship (C.O.B) Exposed	Low Kinship (C.O.B) Not exposed	p-*value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.640	0.675	0.621	0.628	0.651	0.398
	[0.480]	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.014)	(0.013)	
Married	0.400	0.368	0.383	0.414	0.396	0.540
	[0.490]	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Employed	0.582	0.585	0.544	0.584	0.591	0.678
	[0.493]	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
College	0.637	0.685	0.596	0.634	0.641	0.303
	[0.481]	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.014)	(0.013)	
Some High School	0.071	0.107	0.071	0.061	0.076	0.163
	[0.257]	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.007)	
White Alone	0.673	0.477	0.402	0.713	0.709	0.000
	[0.469]	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Black Alone	0.172	0.147	0.221	0.169	0.170	0.280
	[0.377]	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.011)	
Duration taken in Survey	508.889	651.307	478.325	493.691	506.822	0.556
	[914.214]	(124.972)	(32.874)	(26.088)	(19.651)	
N	2894	193	193	1239	1255	

Notes: This table presents summary statistics and covariate balance across four comparison groups in Experiment 1, based on the sample for which the reported variables are available. Exposed refers to the randomized assignment to treatment where respondents were primed that all their donation decisions would be revealed to own-age locals. High-Kin Anc. (Pat.) refers to the kinship index of the father's country of birth above the sample median. High-Kin. Anc. (Mat.) refers to the kinship index of the mother's country of birth above the sample median. High-Kin Anc. (C.O.B.) refers to the kinship index of the father's country of birth above the sample median. P-values represent the joint test for the difference in means across four comparison groups. Female and employed are dummy variables for respondents self-reporting as female and employed, respectively.The duration taken in the survey is the time taken to complete the survey, measured in seconds. College is a dummy variable for respondents having a college education. Black Alone and White Alone correspond to the indicator variables for reporting Black and White as singular racial identities, respectively. Ever married is a dummy variable for being ever married at the time of the survey.

TABLE A5. Experiment-2: Balance of Covariates

Panel A	Full Sample	High Kinship (Pat) Exposed	High Kinship (Mat) Not exposed	Low Kinship (Pat) Exposed	Low Kinship (Pat) Not exposed	p-*value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.637	0.632	0.621	0.640	0.637	0.933
	[0.481]	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Duration taken in Survey	536.683	549.134	602.446	527.393	524.989	0.926
	[1496.744]	(65.989)	(121.405)	(47.073)	(30.351)	
Employed	0.608	0.612	0.600	0.605	0.617	0.919
	[0.488]	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
College	0.661	0.683	0.666	0.642	0.677	0.243
	[0.474]	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.013)	
Some High School	0.063	0.080	0.080	0.061	0.054	0.216
	[0.243]	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.006)	
Black Alone	0.156	0.165	0.189	0.160	0.142	0.194
	[0.363]	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.010)	
White Alone	0.672	0.435	0.395	0.744	0.750	0.000
	[0.469]	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.012)	
Married	0.393	0.355	0.318	0.415	0.408	0.002
	[0.488]	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
N	3182	363	337	1211	1233	
Panel B	Full Sample	High Kinship (Mat) Exposed	High Kinship (Mat) Not exposed	Low Kinship (Mat) Exposed	Low Kinship (Mat) Not exposed	p-*value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.637	0.618	0.604	0.643	0.645	0.421
	[0.481]	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Duration taken in Survey	536.683	598.207	519.568	511.450	548.798	0.779
	[1496.744]	(76.494)	(80.198)	(45.260)	(39.373)	
Employed	0.608	0.623	0.589	0.601	0.619	0.634
	[0.488]	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
College	0.661	0.681	0.695	0.642	0.667	0.192
	[0.474]	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.013)	
Some High School	0.063	0.087	0.084	0.059	0.054	0.076
	[0.243]	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.006)	
Black Alone	0.156	0.172	0.191	0.156	0.139	0.104
	[0.363]	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.010)	
White Alone	0.672	0.450	0.407	0.739	0.754	0.000
	[0.469]	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.012)	
Married	0.393	0.352	0.347	0.415	0.400	0.035
	[0.488]	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
N	3182	364	357	1218	1219	
Panel C	Full Sample	High Kinship (C.O.B) Exposed	High Kinship (C.O.B) Not exposed	Low Kinship (C.O.B) Exposed	Low Kinship (C.O.B) Not exposed	p-*value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.637	0.635	0.617	0.636	0.637	0.957
	[0.481]	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Duration taken in Survey	536.683	590.363	579.601	523.086	535.443	0.909
	[1496.744]	(89.626)	(150.352)	(42.522)	(34.450)	
Employed	0.608	0.594	0.555	0.606	0.620	0.375
	[0.488]	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
College	0.661	0.679	0.634	0.646	0.678	0.244
	[0.474]	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Some High School	0.063	0.111	0.091	0.058	0.056	0.053
	[0.243]	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.006)	
Black Alone	0.156	0.221	0.176	0.152	0.148	0.107
	[0.363]	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.010)	(0.009)	
White Alone	0.672	0.385	0.351	0.712	0.718	0.000
	[0.469]	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.012)	(0.012)	
Married	0.393	0.429	0.372	0.395	0.390	0.690
	[0.488]	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
N	3182	191	183	1395	1398	

Notes: This table presents summary statistics and covariate balance across four comparison groups in Experiment 2, based on the sample for which the reported variables are available. Exposed refers to the randomized assignment to treatment where respondents were primed that all their donation decisions would be revealed to locals older than the respondent. High-Kin Anc. (Pat.) refers to the kinship index of the father's country of birth above the sample median. High-Kin. Anc. (Mat.) refers to the kinship index of the mother's country of birth above the sample median. High-Kin Anc. (C.O.B.) refers to the kinship index of the father's country of birth above the sample median. P-values represent the joint test for the difference in means across four comparison groups. Female and employed are dummy variables for respondents self-reporting as female and employed, respectively. The duration taken in the survey is the time taken to complete the survey, measured in seconds. College and Some High School are dummy variables for respondents having a college education and some high school, respectively. Black and White correspond to the indicator variables for reporting Black and White as singular racial identities, respectively. Married is a dummy variable for being married at the time of the survey.

TABLE A6. Experiment-3: Balance of Covariates

Panel A	Full Sample	High Kinship (Pat) Exposed	High Kinship (Pat) Not exposed	Low Kinship (Pat Exposed	Low Kinship (Pat) Not exposed	p-*value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.616	0.634	0.634	0.605	0.616	0.712
	[0.486]	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Duration taken in Survey	692.769	1618.655	890.866	567.747	562.301	0.469
	[6209.101]	(1167.123)	(246.037)	(47.931)	(44.707)	
Employed	0.604	0.582	0.648	0.605	0.601	0.410
	[0.489]	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
College	0.651	0.625	0.672	0.655	0.650	0.698
	[0.477]	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Some High School	0.071	0.091	0.084	0.062	0.070	0.361
	[0.257]	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.007)	
Black Alone	0.176	0.186	0.232	0.164	0.174	0.090
	[0.381]	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.011)	
White Alone	0.666	0.461	0.377	0.722	0.730	0.000
	[0.472]	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Married	0.410	0.368	0.339	0.439	0.409	0.007
	[0.492]	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.014)	
N	2903	266	280	1164	1168	
Panel B	Full Sample	High Kinship (Mat) Exposed	High Kinship (Mat) Not exposed	Low Kinship (Mat) Exposed	Low Kinship (Mat) Not exposed	p-*value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.616	0.623	0.628	0.608	0.615	0.920
	[0.486]	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Duration taken in Survey	692.769	1555.790	890.858	571.182	561.375	0.468
	[6209.101]	(1122.369)	(243.512)	(48.136)	(44.863)	
Employed	0.604	0.619	0.646	0.598	0.602	0.470
	[0.489]	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
College	0.651	0.672	0.697	0.645	0.646	0.314
	[0.477]	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Some High School	0.071	0.063	0.073	0.070	0.073	0.944
	[0.257]	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.008)	
Black Alone	0.176	0.180	0.224	0.165	0.174	0.190
	[0.381]	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.011)	
White Alone	0.666	0.450	0.388	0.724	0.731	0.000
	[0.472]	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Married	0.410	0.379	0.339	0.436	0.410	0.013
	[0.492]	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.014)	
N	2903	277	283	1157	1164	
Panel C	Full Sample	High Kinship (C.O.B) Exposed	High Kinship (C.O.B) Not exposed	Low Kinship (C.O.B) Exposed	Low Kinship (C.O.B) Not exposed	p-*value*
Female	0.616	0.616	0.662	0.613	0.614	0.713
	[0.486]	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Duration taken in Survey	692.769	2726.514	830.837	555.647	603.713	0.575
	[6209.101]	(2288.425)	(317.415)	(42.818)	(57.415)	
Employed	0.604	0.595	0.578	0.601	0.613	0.822
	[0.489]	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
College	0.651	0.615	0.655	0.651	0.654	0.859
	[0.477]	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Some High School	0.071	0.100	0.094	0.067	0.070	0.497
	[0.257]	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.007)	(0.007)	
Black Alone	0.176	0.163	0.268	0.169	0.176	0.086
	[0.381]	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.010)	(0.010)	
White Alone	0.666	0.474	0.333	0.691	0.695	0.000
	[0.472]	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Married	0.410	0.449	0.358	0.423	0.398	0.256
	[0.492]	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.014)	(0.013)	
N	2903	136	134	1302	1323	

Notes: This table presents summary statistics and covariate balance across four comparison groups in Experiment 3, based on the sample for which the reported variables are available. Exposed refers to the randomized assignment to treatment where respondents were primed that all their donation decisions would be revealed to locals who are younger than the respondents. High-Kin Anc. (Pat.) refers to the kinship index of the father's country of birth above the sample median. High-Kin. Anc. (Mat.) refers to the kinship index of the mother's country of birth above the sample median. High-Kin Anc. (C.O.B.) refers to the kinship index of the father's country of birth above the sample median. P-values represent the joint test for the difference in means across four comparison groups. Female and employed are dummy variables for respondents self-reporting as female and employed, respectively. The duration taken in the survey is the time taken to complete the survey, measured in seconds. College and Some High School are dummy variables for respondents having a college education and some high school, respectively. Black and White correspond to the indicator variables for reporting Black and White as singular racial identities, respectively. Married is a dummy variable for being married at the time of the survey.

TABLE A7. Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Same Age Peers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Donate (Yes=1)						
Treat (T)	0.104	0.119	0.0704	0.0855	0.0335	0.0340
	(0.0897)	(0.0923)	(0.0898)	(0.0925)	(0.0833)	(0.0857)
High Kin Anc. (Pat)	0.0772	0.271*				
	(0.129)	(0.144)				
Treat*High Kin Anc. (Pat)	-0.452**	-0.550***				
	(0.183)	(0.188)				
High Kin Anc. (Mat)			0.0780	0.261*		
			(0.126)	(0.134)		
T*High Kin Anc. (Mat)			-0.315*	-0.402**		
			(0.181)	(0.186)		
C.O.B High Kin Tie					0.0897	0.199
					(0.162)	(0.169)
T*C.O.B High Kin Tie					-0.302	-0.361
					(0.234)	(0.241)
Observations	2,732	2,732	2,740	2,740	2,746	2,746
Ancestral homelands	122	122	124	124	106	106
Prob. est. ($H^T - H^C$) − ($L^T - L^C$)	-0.107	-0.131	-0.075	-0.0967	-0.072	-0.086
p-val	0.013	0.003	0.081	0.030	0.196	0.133

Notes: This table presents logit regressions of the probability of making any donation to any given charity on a dummy for the randomized exposure treatment, where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to own-age locals; a dummy variable for high-intensity kin-based ancestry; and a dummy variable for the interaction between randomized exposure treatment and high-intensity kin-based ancestry. Treat (T) corresponds to the randomized exposure treatment where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to own-age locals. Columns 1, 3, and 5 have no controls. In columns 2, 4, and 6, we control for the total time spent to complete the survey, a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed the complex attention check question, indicator for being Black, White, female, married, employed, and having education above high school. Columns 1 and 2 analyze a sample of survey respondents with ancestral kinship intensity measured by father's country of origin, columns 3 and 4 by mother's country of origin, and columns 5 and 6 by the respondents' own country of origin. Marginal coefficient estimates correspond to the difference in treatment effects between high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. $H^T - H^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for high-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. $L^T - L^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for low-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates.

TABLE A8. Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Older Peers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Donate (Yes=1)						
Treat	-0.190**	-0.192**	-0.162*	-0.166*	-0.167**	-0.170**
	(0.0833)	(0.0856)	(0.0837)	(0.0861)	(0.0785)	(0.0807)
High Kin Anc. (Pat)	-0.221*	-0.168				
	(0.132)	(0.139)				
T*High Kin Anc. (Pat)	0.150	0.125				
	(0.183)	(0.188)				
High Kin Anc. (Mat)			0.0464	0.0951		
			(0.127)	(0.134)		
T*High Kin Anc. (Mat)			-0.00496	-0.0229		
			(0.179)	(0.184)		
C.O.B. High Kin Anc.					0.0974	0.146
					(0.167)	(0.175)
T*C.O.B. High Kin Anc.					0.0256	-0.0222
					(0.234)	(0.240)
Obs.	3,001	3,001	3,013	3,013	3,019	3,019
Anc. Homelands	126	126	132	132	107	107
Prob. est. ($H^T - H^C$) − ($L^T - L^C$)	0.0367	0.0290	-0.001	-0.006	0.0056	-0.006
p-val	0.401	0.499	0.973	0.892	0.922	0.916

Notes: This table presents logit regressions of the probability of making any donation to any given charity on a dummy for the randomized exposure treatment, where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to individuals older than the respondent within her locality; a dummy variable for high-intensity kin-based ancestry; and a dummy variable for the interaction between randomized exposure treatment and high-intensity kin-based ancestry. Columns 1, 3, and 5 have no controls. In columns 2, 4, and 6, we control for the total time spent to complete the survey, a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed the complex attention check question, indicator for being Black, White, female, married, employed, and having education above high school. Columns 1 and 2 analyze a sample of survey respondents with ancestral kinship intensity measured by father's country of origin, columns 3 and 4 by mother's country of origin, and columns 5 and 6 by the respondents' own country of origin. Marginal coefficient estimates correspond to the difference in treatment effects between high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. $H^T - H^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for high-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. $L^T - L^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for low-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates.

TABLE A9. Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Younger Peers

Donate (Yes=1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treat	-0.145*	-0.174**	-0.121	-0.144	-0.118	-0.131
	(0.0849)	(0.0880)	(0.0849)	(0.0880)	(0.0802)	(0.0830)
High Kin Anc. (Pat)	-0.236*	-0.167				
	(0.140)	(0.147)				
T*High Kin Anc. (Pat)	0.120	0.172				
	(0.200)	(0.206)				
High Kin Anc. (Mat)			-0.0828	-0.0167		
			(0.139)	(0.146)		
T*High Kin Anc. (Mat)			-0.00452	0.0185		
			(0.198)	(0.204)		
C.O.B High Kin					-0.0896	0.00810
					(0.188)	(0.198)
T*C.O.B High Kin					0.0505	-0.00566
					(0.270)	(0.279)
Obs	2,759	2,759	2,763	2,763	2,775	2,775
Anc. Homelands	115	115	118	118	98	98
Prob. est. ($H^T - H^C$) − ($L^T - L^C$)	0.02980	0.039683	-0.00076	0.00427	0.01258	-0.00131
p-val	0.537	0.399	0.987	0.927	0.849	0.984

Notes: This table presents logit regressions of the probability of making any donation to any given charity on a dummy for the randomized exposure treatment. where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to individuals younger than the respondent within her locality; a dummy variable for high-intensity kin-based ancestry; and a dummy variable for the interaction between randomized exposure treatment and high-intensity kin-based ancestry. Columns 1, 3, and 5 have no controls. In columns 2, 4, and 6, we control for the total time spent to complete the survey, a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed the complex attention check question, indicator for being Black, White, female, married, employed, and having education above high school. Columns 1 and 2 analyze a sample of survey respondents with ancestral kinship intensity measured by father's country of origin, columns 3 and 4 by mother's country of origin, and columns 5 and 6 by the respondents' own country of origin. Marginal coefficient estimates correspond to the difference in treatment effects between high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. $H^T - H^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for high-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. $L^T - L^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for low-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates.

TABLE A10. Robustness: Residualized Kinship Score

Expt.-1 Exposure Same Age Peers Donate Yes=1	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treat	0.0307	0.0324	0.0314
	(0.0202)	(0.0203)	(0.0222)
Res. High Kin-Score (Pat.)	0.0410*	0.0458*	0.0924**
	(0.0245)	(0.0244)	(0.0378)
Treat*Res. High Kin-Score (Pat.)	-0.121***	-0.121***	-0.136***
	(0.0395)	(0.0390)	(0.0462)
Observations	2,797	2,797	2,589
R-squared	0.003	0.010	0.060
Treat	0.0228	0.0240	0.0258
	(0.0199)	(0.0199)	(0.0207)
Res. High Kin-Score (Mat.)	0.0405	0.0426	0.0819**
	(0.0264)	(0.0266)	(0.0332)
Treat*Res. High Kin-Score (Mat.)	-0.0887**	-0.0867**	-0.115***
	(0.0409)	(0.0410)	(0.0424)
Observations	2,802	2,802	2,603
R-squared	0.002	0.007	0.057
Treat	0.0199	0.0215	0.0137
	(0.0201)	(0.0199)	(0.0207)
Res. High Kin-Score (Own C.O.B)	0.0506	0.0582	0.0560
	(0.0385)	(0.0386)	(0.0713)
Treat*Res. High Kin-Score (Own C.O.B)	-0.149***	-0.149***	-0.140***
	(0.0533)	(0.0542)	(0.0537)
Observations	2,846	2,846	2,636
R-squared	0.003	0.009	0.057

Notes: (Bootstrapped standard errors). We regress kinship score on Polity IV democracy index, caloric suitability, ruggedness, distance to waterways, absolute latitude, tropical climate, mean temperature, mean elevation, mean precipitation, caloric suitability for oats and for rye, ancestor-adjusted timing of the Neolithic transformation, ancestor-adjusted genetic heterogeneity, irrigation potential, fraction of adherence to two major religions (Christians and Muslims) and on the fraction of people with European descent. We measure the estimated residuals from the above OLS regression. We use the estimated residuals as regressor in place of kinship index. In column 1, we report coefficients of OLS regression of the dummy variable measuring the decision to donate to any given charity on the randomized public exposure treatment indicator, and an interaction term including randomized treatment indicator and estimated residuals. In Column 2, we replicate column 1 and add time taken to complete the survey and an indicator variable for passing complex attention check questions. In column 3, we add respondent-level controls including indicators for being black, white, female, ever married, employed, and having education above high-school.

TABLE A11. Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Same Age Peers

	(1)	(2)
Donate (Yes=1)		
	(1)	(2)
Treat	0.027	0.028
	(0.021)	(0.021)
	[0.270]	[0.250]
High Kin (Pat.)	0.005	0.011
	(0.029)	(0.029)
	[0.790]	[0.580]
Treat*High Kin (Pat.)	-0.106	-0.105
	(0.040)	(0.040)
	[0.010]	[0.010]
Donation Rate Control Group (Private)	0.390	
N	2968	2968
R^2	0.004	0.010
	(1)	(2)
Treat	0.015	0.016
	(0.021)	(0.021)
	[0.520]	[0.510]
High Kin (Mat.)	0.005	0.009
	(0.029)	(0.028)
	[0.730]	[0.660]
Treat*High Kin (Mat.)	-0.064	-0.061
	(0.040)	(0.040)
	[0.150]	[0.170]
Donation Rate Control Group (Private)	0.390	
N	2975	2975
R^2	0.001	0.008
	(1)	(2)
Treat	0.014	0.016
	(0.019)	(0.019)
	[0.530]	[0.480]
High Kin (C.O.B)	0.020	0.030
	(0.037)	(0.037)
	[0.570]	[0.320]
Treat*High Kin (C.O.B)	-0.100	-0.102
	(0.050)	(0.050)
	[0.090]	[0.080]
Donation Rate Control Group (Private)	0.387	
Controls	No	Yes
N	2984	2984
R^2	0.002	0.008
Controls	N	Y

Notes: Column 1 presents OLS regressions of a dummy variable for donating to a charity on a dummy for randomized assignment to treatment, where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to own-age locals; a dummy for high-intensity kinship ancestry; and a dummy for the interaction between randomized assignment to treatment and high-intensity kinship ancestry. Column 2 replicates column 1 and adds individual-level covariates (passing complex attention checks and survey duration). Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and p-values using permutation tests are in brackets.

TABLE A12. EXPERIMENT 1: Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Same Age Peers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Donate (Yes=1)						
Treat	0.153	0.170	0.0192	0.0183	0.0781	0.0135
	(0.115)	(0.123)	(0.113)	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.127)
Kinship high-intensity (Anc. Pat)	-0.269	0.213				
	(0.242)	(0.279)				
Treat*Kinship high-intensity (Anc. Pat)	-0.661*	-0.770**				
	(0.358)	(0.392)				
Kinship high-intensity (Anc. Mat)			-0.309	0.0647		
			(0.239)	(0.272)		
Treat*Kinship high-intensity (Anc. Mat)			-0.114	-0.136		
			(0.348)	(0.382)		
C.O.B Kinship high-intensity					0.0304	0.257
					(0.293)	(0.333)
Treat* C.O.B Kinship high-intensity					-0.390	-0.118
					(0.434)	(0.487)
Observations	2,968	2,732	2,975	2,740	2,984	2,746
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: This table estimates the logit regression specified in equation-3, where ancestral kinship intensity is a continuous variable. Columns 1, 3, and 5 do not include controls. Columns 2, 4, and 6 replicate columns 1, 3, and 5, respectively, by adding controls (race, gender, education, marital status, employment status, passing complex attention checks, and survey duration). Treat corresponds to the randomized assignment to treatment where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to own-age locals. Columns 1 and 2 use the ancestral kinship index measured by the father's country of birth, columns 3 and 4 by the mother's country of birth, and columns 5 and 6 by own country of birth.

TABLE A13. EXPERIMENT 2: Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Older Peers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Donate (Yes=1)						
Treat	-0.277**	-0.331***	-0.216**	-0.218*	-0.156	-0.169
	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.113)	(0.122)
Kinship high-intensity (Anc. Pat)	-0.553**	-0.563*				
	(0.264)	(0.301)				
Treat*Kinship high-intensity(Anc. Pat)	0.480	0.728*				
	(0.358)	(0.394)				
Kinship high-intensity(Anc. Mat)			-0.254	-0.143		
			(0.244)	(0.277)		
Treat*Kinship high-intensity(Anc. Mat)			0.203	0.205		
			(0.344)	(0.377)		
C.O.B high-intensity					-0.0924	0.197
					(0.302)	(0.346)
Treat*C.O.B high-intensity					-0.0887	-0.0154
					(0.433)	(0.479)
Observations	3,236	3,001	3,250	3,013	3,263	3,019

Notes: This table estimates the logit regression specified in equation-3, where ancestral kinship intensity is a continuous variable. Columns 1, 3 and 5 do not include controls. Columns 2, 4, and 6 replicate columns 1, 3, and 5, respectively, by adding controls (race, gender, education, marital status, employment status, passing complex attention checks, and survey duration). Treat corresponds to the randomized assignment to treatment where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to individuals older than the respondent within her locality. Columns 1 and 2 use the ancestral kinship index measured by the father's country of birth, columns 3 and 4 by the mother's country of birth, and columns 5 and 6 by own country of birth.

TABLE A14. EXPERIMENT 3: Randomized Exposure of Donation Decision to Younger Peers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Donate (Yes=1)						
Treat	-0.209*	-0.277**	-0.185	-0.228*	-0.0595	-0.107
	(0.116)	(0.125)	(0.115)	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.135)
Kinship high-intensity(Anc. Pat)	-0.465	-0.247				
	(0.292)	(0.334)				
Treat*Kinship high-intensity(Anc. Pat)	0.413	0.621				
	(0.405)	(0.447)				
Kinship high-intensity(Anc. Mat)			-0.348	-0.115		
			(0.284)	(0.320)		
Treat*Kinship high-intensity(Anc. Mat)			0.289	0.395		
			(0.393)	(0.431)		
C.O.B Kinship high-intensity					-0.0947	0.208
					(0.373)	(0.425)
Treat*C.O.B Kinship high-intensity					-0.267	-0.132
					(0.529)	(0.583)
Observations	2,938	2,759	2,943	2,763	2,959	2,775
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: This table estimates the logit regression specified in equation-3, where ancestral kinship intensity is a continuous variable. Columns 1, 3, and 5 do not include controls. Columns 2, 4, and 6 replicate columns 1, 3, and 5, respectively, by adding controls (race, gender, education, marital status, employment status, passing complex attention checks, and survey duration). Treat corresponds to the randomized assignment to treatment where donation decisions are primed to be revealed to individuals younger than the respondent within her locality. Columns 1 and 2 use the ancestral kinship index measured by the father's country of birth, columns 3 and 4 by the mother's country of birth, and columns 5 and 6 by own country of birth.

TABLE A15. Robustness: Alternative Kinship-Tie Proxies

Expt-1: Exp. Same Age Donate Yes=1	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Pat. Anc.	Mat. Anc.	Own C.O.B
Treat	0.0429	0.0266	-0.00305
	(0.0857)	(0.0856)	(0.0832)
High Cousin Marr.	0.247	0.247	0.214
	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.217)
Treat*High Cousin Marr.	-0.439*	-0.317	-0.142
	(0.240)	(0.240)	(0.303)
Obs	2,754	2,754	2,754
Marginal Effects			
$(H^T - H^C) - (L^T - L^C)$	-0.105	-0.0766	-0.034
p-val	0.065	0.185	0.638
Treat	0.0484	0.0627	0.0234
	(0.0883)	(0.0887)	(0.0839)
High Cousin Term Diff	0.187	0.309**	0.146
	(0.148)	(0.144)	(0.193)
Treat*High Cousin Term Diff.	-0.346*	-0.407**	-0.406
	(0.209)	(0.206)	(0.279)
Obs	2,754	2,754	2,754
Marginal Effects			
$(H^T - H^C) - (L^T - L^C)$	-0.083	-0.098	-0.096
p-val	0.097	0.048	0.144

Notes: This table estimates the logit regression specified in equation-2 in Experiment 1, where randomized treatment included priming respondents that their donation decisions will be revealed to own-age locals. In this regression, ancestral kinship intensity is measured using country-level measures of cousin marriage and the cousin term differentiation index developed in Schulz (2022). The cousin marriage preference is an ordinal variable at the ethnicity level, with the highest value taken when parallel cousin marriage—lineage endogamy—is preferred. We use the country-level aggregates of the cousin marriage preference measure developed in Schulz (2022). The cousin term differentiation index measures historically distant kin networks using kin terms. High cousin marriage refers to the above-median measure of cousin marriage preference, and high cousin term differentiation refers to the above-median index of cousin term differentiation. All columns have controls (race, gender, education, marital status, employment status, passing complex attention checks, and survey duration). Column 1 reports the main treatment effects and treatment effects by two measures of ancestral kinship intensities, with ancestry measured by father's country of birth. Column 2 uses mother's country of birth, and column 3 uses own country of birth. Marginal coefficient estimates correspond to the difference in treatment effects between high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. $H^T - H^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for high-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. $L^T - L^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for low-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates.

TABLE A16. Robustness: Alternative Kinship-Tie Proxies

Expt.-2 Older Grp. Donate Yes=1	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Pat. Anc.	Mat. Anc.	Own C.O.B
Treat	-0.197**	-0.197**	-0.164**
	(0.0802)	(0.0803)	(0.0784)
Cousin Marr. Pref.	-0.0401	-0.0389	0.285
	(0.182)	(0.173)	(0.225)
Treat*Cousin Marr. Pref.	0.221	0.230	-0.161
	(0.247)	(0.244)	(0.308)
Obs	3,031	3,031	3,031
Marginal Effects			
$(H^T - H^C) - (L^T - L^C)$	0.0534	0.0556	-0.041
p-val	0.375	0.351	0.590
Treat	-0.145*	-0.153*	-0.151*
	(0.0822)	(0.0823)	(0.0791)
Cousin Term Diff.	0.0664	0.145	0.411**
	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.208)
Treat*Cousin Term Diff.	-0.184	-0.140	-0.315
	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.280)
Obs	3,031	3,031	3,031
Marginal Effects			
$(H^T - H^C) - (L^T - L^C)$	-0.044	-0.0347	-0.0790
p-val	0.390	0.503	0.251

Notes: This table estimates the logit regression specified in equation-2 in Experiment 2, where randomized treatment included informing respondents that their donation decisions will be revealed to individuals older than the respondents. In this regression, ancestral kinship intensity is measured using country-level measures of cousin marriage and the cousin term differentiation index developed in Schulz (2022). The cousin marriage preference is an ordinal variable at the ethnicity level, with the highest value taken when parallel cousin marriage—lineage endogamy—is preferred. We use the country-level aggregates of the cousin marriage preference measure developed in Schulz (2022). The cousin term differentiation index measures historically distant kin networks using kin terms. High cousin marriage refers to the above-median measure of cousin marriage preference, and high cousin term differentiation refers to the above-sample median index of cousin term differentiation. All columns have controls (race, gender, education, marital status, employment status, passing complex attention checks, and survey duration). Column 1 reports the main treatment effects and treatment effects by two measures of ancestral kinship intensities, with ancestry measured by father's country of birth. Column 2 uses mother's country of birth, and column 3 uses own country of birth. Marginal coefficient estimates correspond to the difference in treatment effects between high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. $H^T - H^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for high-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. $L^T - L^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for low-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates.

TABLE A17. Robustness: Alternative Kinship-Tie Proxies

Exp-3 Younger Grp. Donate Yes=1	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Pat. Anc.	Mat. Anc.	Own C.O.B
Treat	-0.169**	-0.136	-0.130
	(0.0833)	(0.0830)	(0.0815)
High Cousin Pref.	0.0197	0.151	0.326
	(0.196)	(0.207)	(0.255)
Treat*High Cousin Pref.	0.405	0.0457	-0.0513
	(0.270)	(0.279)	(0.346)
Obs	2,780	2,780	2,780
Marginal Effects			
$(H^T - H^C) - (L^T - L^C)$	0.100	0.0108	-0.013
p-val	0.135	0.876	0.876
Treat	-0.138	-0.129	-0.136*
	(0.0850)	(0.0848)	(0.0820)
Cousin Term Diff.	0.0805	0.0787	0.124
	(0.170)	(0.173)	(0.229)
Treat*Cousin Term Diff.	0.0585	-0.0151	0.0870
	(0.234)	(0.237)	(0.316)
Obs	2,780	2,780	2,780
Marginal Effects			
$(H^T - H^C) - (L^T - L^C)$	0.01408	-0.0040	0.0211
p-val	0.808	0.946	0.788

Notes: This table estimates the logit regression specified in equation-2 in Experiment 3, where randomized treatment included informing respondents that their donation decisions would be revealed to individuals younger than them. In this regression, ancestral kinship intensity is measured using country-level measures of cousin marriage and the cousin term differentiation index developed in Schulz (2022). The cousin marriage preference is an ordinal variable at the ethnicity level, with the highest value taken when parallel cousin marriage—lineage endogamy—is preferred. We use the country-level aggregates of the cousin marriage preference measure developed in Schulz (2022). The cousin term differentiation index measures historically distant kin networks using kin terms. High cousin marriage refers to the above-median measure of cousin marriage preference, and high cousin term differentiation refers to the above-median index of cousin term differentiation. All columns have controls (race, gender, education, marital status, employment status, passing complex attention checks, and survey duration). Column 1 reports the main treatment effects and treatment effects by two measures of ancestral kinship intensities, with ancestry measured by father's country of birth. Column 2 uses mother's country of birth, and column 3 uses own country of birth. Marginal coefficient estimates correspond to the difference in treatment effects between high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. $H^T - H^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for high-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. $L^T - L^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for low-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates.

TABLE A18. Robustness of EXPERIMENT 1: Omitted Variable Bias

Donate Yes=1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treat	0.0282	0.0163	0.0158
	(0.0209)	(0.0209)	(0.0193)
High Kin (Pat.)	0.0108		
	(0.0291)		
Treat*High Kin (Pat.)	-0.105***		
	(0.0400)		
High Kin (Mat.)		0.00857	
		(0.0284)	
Treat*High Kin (Mat.)		-0.0606	
		(0.0400)	
High Kin (C.O.B)			0.0303
			(0.0365)
Treat*High Kin (C.O.B)			-0.102**
			(0.0504)
Observations	2,968	2,975	2,984
R-squared	0.010	0.008	0.008
Bias-adjusted (Diff-Diff) estimates Oster (2019)	-0.111	-0.062	-0.105

Notes: This table reports the estimates of OLS regressions of donation rates on a dummy variable for high-intensity kinship ancestry, a dummy variable for random assignment to treatment where donation decisions were primed to be shared with own-age locals, and a dummy variable measuring the interaction between high-intensity kinship ancestry and the randomized treatment. We use the methods developed in Oster (2019) to establish that omitted variable bias is unlikely to explain the differences in treatment effects of public exposure to own-age locals between high- and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups in experiment 1. Column 1 includes a sample where ancestry is measured using father's country of birth, column 2 using mother's country of birth, and column 3 using the own country of birth. All regressions include controls for the time taken to complete the survey (in seconds) and a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed complex attention checks).

TABLE A19. Robustness: Full Sample Incl. Attrition Sample

Exp-1 Same Age Donate Yes=1	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Pat. Anc.	Mat. Anc.	Own C.O.B
Treat	0.114	0.0668	0.0561
	(0.0878)	(0.0882)	(0.0815)
High Kinship Sc.	0.0224	0.0260	0.0859
	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.154)
Treat*High Kinship Sc.	-0.463***	-0.272	-0.409*
	(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.222)
Obs	2,917	2,924	2,932
Prob. est. ($H^T - H^C$) − ($L^T - L^C$)	-0.107	-0.0637	-0.095
p-val	0.008	0.116	0.064

Notes: This table estimates the logit regression specified in equation-2 in Experiment 1, where the randomized treatment included priming respondents that their donation decisions will be revealed to own-age locals. Column 1 reports the main treatment effects and treatment effects by two measures of ancestral kinship intensities, where ancestry is measured using the fathers' country of birth. Column 2 reports the main treatment effects and treatment effects by two measures of ancestral kinship intensities, where ancestry is measured using the mother country of birth. Column 3 reports the main treatment effects and treatment effects by two measures of ancestral kinship intensities, where ancestry is measured using one's own country of birth. Marginal coefficient estimates correspond to the difference in treatment effects between high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. $H^T - H^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for high-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. $L^T - L^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for low-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates.

TABLE A20. Summary Statistics of Pre-Treatment Covariates in EXPERIMENT 4

EXPERIMENT 4: Social Pressure from Same Age Peers			
Panel A: Means Std. Dev. in Brackets	Treatment	Control	P-value of t-test
Black	0.239	0.242	0.887
Std. dev.	0.427	0.428	
N	1675	1677	
White	0.572	0.583	0.5328
Std. dev.	0.495	0.493	
N	1675	1677	
Female	0.680	0.681	0.9955
Std. dev.	0.466	0.466	
N	1696	1709	
College	0.60	0.59	0.9157
	0.49	0.49	
N	1662	1672	
Married	0.323	0.334	0.5193
Std. dev.	0.468	0.472	
N	1646	1663	
Empl.	0.507	0.490	0.3094
Std. dev.	0.500	0.500	
N	1620	1630	
US Born	0.734	0.755	0.1534
Std. dev.	0.442	0.430	
N	1718	1724	
High Kin (Pat.)	0.3164	0.322	0.7268
Std. Dev.	0.4674	0.4652	
N	1,691	1,702	
High Kin (Mat.)	0.316	0.313	0.8280
Std. Dev.	0.465	0.464	
N	1,698	1,704	
High Kin (C.O.B)	0.189	0.171	0.1510
Std. Dev.	0.392	0.376	
N	1,706	1713	

Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of Experiment 4's sample. The treatment column corresponds to the sample assigned to treatment, where respondents were primed that only their no-donation decision would be revealed to own-age locals. The control group column corresponds to a sample where respondents were not primed, and their donation decisions were kept private. P-values correspond to the p-values of the test for the difference in means between the treatment and the control group. Female and employed are dummy variables for respondents self-reporting as female and employed, respectively. The duration taken in the survey is the time taken to complete the survey, measured in seconds. College and Some High School are dummy variables for respondents having a college education and some high school, respectively. Black and White correspond to the indicator variables for reporting Black and White as singular racial identities, respectively. Married is a dummy variable for being married at the time of the survey.

TABLE A21. Experiment-4: Balance of Covariates

	Full Sample	High Kinship (Pat) Exposed	High Kinship (Pat) Not exposed	Low Kinship (Pat Exposed	Low Kinship (Pat) Not exposed	p-*value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.680	0.659	0.633	0.690	0.700	0.033
	[0.467]	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.013)	
Duration taken in Survey	526.544	478.994	505.469	533.647	550.900	0.014
	[455.114]	(18.703)	(16.635)	(12.124)	(15.406)	
Employed	0.499	0.514	0.481	0.506	0.493	0.686
	[0.500]	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
College	0.601	0.637	0.635	0.589	0.582	0.052
	[0.490]	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
Some High School	0.091	0.101	0.089	0.091	0.088	0.876
	[0.288]	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	
Black Alone	0.240	0.242	0.256	0.235	0.236	0.799
	[0.427]	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
White Alone	0.579	0.363	0.389	0.669	0.669	0.000
	[0.494]	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Married	0.329	0.292	0.326	0.338	0.337	0.256
	[0.470]	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
N	3277	506	509	1123	1139	
	Full Sample	High Kinship (Mat) Exposed	High Kinship (Mat) Not exposed	Low Kinship (Mat) Exposed	Low Kinship (Mat) Not exposed	p-*value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.680	0.659	0.633	0.690	0.700	0.033
	[0.467]	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.013)	
Duration taken in Survey	526.544	478.994	505.469	533.647	550.900	0.014
	[455.114]	(18.703)	(16.635)	(12.124)	(15.406)	
Employed	0.499	0.514	0.481	0.506	0.493	0.686
	[0.500]	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
College	0.601	0.637	0.635	0.589	0.582	0.052
	[0.490]	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
Some High School	0.091	0.101	0.089	0.091	0.088	0.876
	[0.288]	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	
Black Alone	0.240	0.242	0.256	0.235	0.236	0.799
	[0.427]	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
White Alone	0.579	0.363	0.389	0.669	0.669	0.000
	[0.494]	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Married	0.329	0.292	0.326	0.338	0.337	0.256
	[0.470]	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
N	3277	506	509	1123	1139	
	Full Sample	High Kinship (C.O.B) Exposed	High Kinship (C.O.B) Not exposed	Low Kinship (C.O.B) Exposed	Low Kinship (C.O.B) Not exposed	p-*value*
Female	0.680	0.675	0.655	0.682	0.685	0.803
	[0.467]	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.012)	
Duration taken in Survey	526.838	506.028	545.000	520.820	533.694	0.705
	[458.265]	(28.034)	(37.912)	(10.990)	(11.833)	
Employed	0.499	0.479	0.464	0.515	0.495	0.371
	[0.500]	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
College	0.600	0.623	0.665	0.597	0.584	0.060
	[0.490]	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Some High School	0.091	0.107	0.087	0.092	0.088	0.801
	[0.288]	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.008)	
Black Alone	0.240	0.284	0.239	0.229	0.241	0.269
	[0.427]	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.011)	(0.011)	
White Alone	0.579	0.343	0.370	0.626	0.626	0.000
	[0.494]	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Married	0.329	0.344	0.399	0.321	0.321	0.085
	[0.470]	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
N	3289	299	271	1337	1382	

Notes: This table presents summary statistics and covariate balance across four comparison groups in Experiment 4, based on the sample for which the reported variables are available. Exposed refers to the randomized assignment to treatment where respondents were primed that only their no-donation decision would be revealed to own-age locals. High-Kin Anc. (Pat.) refers to the kinship index of the father's country of birth above the sample median. High-Kin. Anc. (Mat.) refers to the kinship index of the mother's country of birth above the sample median. High-Kin Anc. (C.O.B.) refers to the kinship index of the father's country of birth above the sample median. P-values represent the joint test for the difference in means across four comparison groups. Female and employed are dummy variables for respondents self-reporting as female and employed, respectively. Time spent on the survey is the total duration needed to complete the study, measured in seconds. College and Some High School are dummy variables for respondents having a college education and some high school, respectively. Black and White correspond to the indicator variables for reporting Black and White as singular racial identities, respectively. Married is a dummy variable for being married at the time of the survey.

TABLE A22. Validation of High-Intensity Kinship Measure

Financial Support	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A	Fam. Helps	I Help Family	Locality Help	I Help Loc.
High Kinship (Anc. Pat)	0.0752**	0.0718**	0.0843***	0.0849***
	(0.0296)	(0.0289)	(0.0291)	(0.0294)
Observations	3,361	3,336	3,350	3,371
R-squared	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002
Panel B	Fam. Helps	I Help Family	Locality Help	I Help Loc.
High Kinship (Anc. Mat)	0.0621**	0.0569*	0.0697**	0.0834***
	(0.0296)	(0.0290)	(0.0292)	(0.0294)
Observations	3,369	3,344	3,358	3,379
R-squared	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
Panel C	Fam. Helps	I Help Family	Locality Help	I Help Loc.
High Kinship (C.O.B)	0.0621*	0.0624*	0.0872**	0.102***
	(0.0359)	(0.0350)	(0.0354)	(0.0355)
Observations	3,385	3,360	3,374	3,395
R-squared	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002

Notes: This table presents the correlation between high-intensity kinship ties and financial relations with family and locality members. In column 1, the outcome variable is categorical: the highest value indicates that family members and extended kin networks are very likely to support the respondent financially in times of need, the middle value indicates possible financial support, and the lowest value indicates little interaction, making financial support unlikely. In column 2, the outcome variable is categorical: the highest value indicates that the respondent is very likely to support her family and extended kin networks financially in times of need, the middle value indicates possible support, and the lowest value indicates little interaction, making it unlikely that family or extended kin would seek financial support from her. In column 3, the outcome variable is categorical: the highest value indicates that locality members are very likely to support the respondent financially in times of need, the middle value indicates possible support, and the lowest value indicates little interaction, making it unlikely that the respondent would seek financial support from locality members. In column 4, the outcome variable is categorical: the highest value indicates that the respondent is very likely to support her locality members financially in times of need, the middle value indicates possible support, and the lowest value indicates little interaction, making it unlikely that locality members would seek financial support from her. Panel A shows the correlation between financial relationships and high-intensity kinship ancestry, with ancestry measured by father's country of birth. Panel B uses mother's country of birth, and Panel C uses own country of birth.

TABLE A23. Experiment: Decision Exposed Only If You Do Not Donate

Expt-4: Donate Yes=1	(1)	(2)	(3)
Exp. Treat	0.296***	0.303***	0.336***
	(0.0895)	(0.0906)	(0.0941)
High Kinship (Anc. Pat)	0.236**	0.286**	0.319***
	(0.111)	(0.113)	(0.122)
Exp. Treat*High Kinship (Anc. Pat)	-0.211	-0.195	-0.210
	(0.156)	(0.157)	(0.169)
Observations	3,393	3,393	3,038
Attention Check,Survey Duration	No	Yes	Yes
Demographic Cov	No	No	Yes
Anc. Homelands	147	147	140
Marginal Effects			
$(H^T - H^C) - (L^T - L^C)$	-0.045	-0.0397	-0.043
p-val	0.197	0.252	0.251
$(H^T - H^C)$	0.0194	0.0244	0.0285
p-val	0.502	0.398	0.369
$(L^T - L^C)$	0.0644	0.0641	0.0714
p-val	0.001	0.001	0.000

Notes: This table presents logit regressions of the probability of making any donation to any given charity on a dummy for the randomized exposure treatment, where no-donation decision are primed to be revealed to own-age locals; a dummy variable for high-intensity kin-based ancestry; and a dummy variable for the interaction between randomized exposure treatment and high-intensity kin-based ancestry. Column 1 has no controls, and in column 2, we replicate column 1 and add two controls (time taken to complete the survey, a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed the complex attention check question). In column 3, we control for the time taken to complete the survey, a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed the complex attention check question, indicator for being Black, White, female, married, employed, and having education above high school. Marginal coefficient estimates correspond to the difference in treatment effects between high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. $H^T - H^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for high-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. $L^T - L^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for low-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. In this sample, ancestry is measured using father's country of birth.

TABLE A24. Experiment: Decision Exposed Only If You Do Not Donate

Expt-4: Donate Yes=1	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treat	0.241***	0.252***	0.269***
	(0.0888)	(0.0898)	(0.0935)
High Kin (Anc. Mat.)	0.166	0.221*	0.224*
	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.123)
Treat*High Kin (Anc. Mat.)	-0.0717	-0.0624	-0.0161
	(0.156)	(0.158)	(0.168)
Observations	3,402	3,402	3,046
Attention Check,Survey Duration	No	Yes	Yes
Demographic Cov	No	No	Yes
Anc. Homelands	155	155	147
Marginal Effects			
$(H^T - H^C) - (L^T - L^C)$	-0.0140	-0.0107	-0.000
p-val	0.689	0.758	0.998
$(H^T - H^C)$	0.0385	0.0428	0.0574
p-val	0.187	0.143	0.071
$(L^T - L^C)$	0.0525	0.0535	0.0574
p-val	0.007	0.005	0.004

Notes: This table presents logit regressions of the probability of making any donation to any given charity on a dummy for the randomized exposure treatment, where no-donation decisions are primed to be revealed to own-age locals; a dummy variable for high-intensity kin-based ancestry; and a dummy variable for the interaction between randomized exposure treatment and high-intensity kin-based ancestry. Column 1 has no controls, and in column 2, we replicate column 1 and add two controls (time taken to complete the survey, a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed the complex attention check question). In column 3, we control for the time taken to complete the survey, a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed the complex attention check question, indicator for being Black, White, female, married, employed, and having education above high school. Marginal coefficient estimates correspond to the difference in treatment effects between high-intensity kin-based ancestry groups and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups. $H^T - H^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for high-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. $L^T - L^C$ corresponds to the treatment effect of exposure of donation decisions for low-intensity kinship ancestry on donation rates. In this sample, ancestry is measured using mother's country of birth.

TABLE A25. Experiment: Decision Exposed Only If You Do Not Donate

Expt-4: Donate Yes=1	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treat	0.236***	0.246***	0.277***
	(0.0809)	(0.0817)	(0.0852)
C.O.B	0.157	0.199	0.218
	(0.137)	(0.140)	(0.153)
Treat*C.O.B	-0.0632	-0.0556	-0.0565
	(0.188)	(0.190)	(0.209)
Observations	3,419	3,419	3,058
Attention Check,Survey Duration	No	Yes	Yes
Demographic Cov	No	No	Yes
Anc. Homelands	136	136	121
Marginal Effects			
$(H^T - H^C) - (L^T - L^C)$	-0.01225	-0.0096	-0.0096
p-val	0.772	0.820	0.837
$(H^T - H^C)$	0.03932	0.043	0.05010
p-val	0.307	0.265	0.246
$(L^T - L^C)$	0.0516	0.053	0.0597
p-val	0.003	0.003	0.001

Notes: This table presents logit regressions of the probability of making any donation to any given charity on a dummy for the randomized exposure treatment, where no-donation decisions are primed to be revealed to own-age locals; a dummy variable for high-intensity kin-based ancestry; and a dummy variable for the interaction between randomized exposure treatment and high-intensity kin-based ancestry. Column 1 has no controls, and in column 2, we replicate column 1 and add two controls (time taken to complete the survey, a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed the complex attention check question). In column 3, we control for the time taken to complete the survey, a dummy variable for whether the respondent passed the complex attention check question, indicator for being Black, White, female, married, employed, and having education above high school. Marginal coefficient estimates represent the difference in donation rates between high-intensity and low-intensity kin-based ancestry groups, across both exposure treatment and control conditions. $H^T - H^C$ and $L^T - L^C$ represent the treatment effects on donation rates for high-intensity and low-intensity kinship ancestry groups, respectively, when donation decisions are exposed. In this sample, ancestry is measured using own country of birth.

TABLE A26. Experiment 1-3 Control Sample: Beliefs about the share of locals choosing the same charity as the respondent by kinship intensity

	(1)	(2)	
Experiment-1 Control Sample	High-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Pat.)	Low-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Pat.)	p-value
Sh. Own-Age Locals	7.430	10.198	0.0018
Sh. Old Locals	7.197	10.727	0.0001
Sh. Young Locals	6.248	9.641	0.0001
	High-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Mat.)	Low-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Mat.)	
Sh. Own-Age Locals	7.825	10.096	0.0101
Sh. Old Locals	8.437	10.324	0.0410
Sh. Young Locals	6.523	9.6059	0.0004
	High-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Own.)	Low-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Own.)	
Sh. Own-Age Locals	7.814	9.754	0.0819
Sh. Old Locals	8.465	10.079	0.1680
Sh. Young Locals	6.792	9.108	0.0341
Experiment-2 Control Sample	High-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Pat.)	Low-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Pat.)	p-value
Sh. Own-Age Locals	6.899	10.314	0.0002
Sh. Old Locals	7.052	10.557	0.0002
Sh. Young Locals	6.601	9.614	0.0009
	High-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Mat.)	Low-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Mat.)	
Sh. Own-Age Locals	8.111	9.912	0.0454
Sh. Old Locals	8.150	10.218	0.0267
Sh. Young Locals	7.677	9.282	0.0741
	High-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Own.)	Low-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Own.)	
Sh. Own-Age Locals	6.1805	9.935	0.0012
Sh. Old Locals	5.989	10.223	0.0004
Sh. Young Locals	5.857	9.293	0.0029
Experiment-3 Control Sample	High-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Pat.)	Low-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Pat.)	p-value
Sh. Own-Age Locals	8.770	11.560	0.0098
Sh. Old Locals	9.698	11.557	0.0937
Sh. Young Locals	8.517	10.045	0.1337
	High-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Mat.)	Low-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Mat.)	
Sh. Own-Age Locals	9.138	11.506	0.0270
Sh. Old Locals	9.947	11.555	0.1442
Sh. Young Locals	8.460	10.072	0.1106
	High-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Own.)	Low-Int. Kin-Based Anc. (Own.)	
Sh. Own-Age Locals	7.814	9.754	0.0819
Sh. Old Locals	8.465	10.078	0.1680
Sh. Young Locals	6.792	9.108	0.0341

Notes: This table reports the beliefs of the respondents about the share of own-age locals, locals who are older or younger than the respondent who would donate to the same charity as the respondent. An example of the belief question designed to elicit the belief about locals who are older or younger or the same age (any given age group) than the respondent is as follows: "What is the share of people in your locality, who are "x" than you, who will donate to the same charity as you? You can win $1 if you are +(-)2 close to the actual number. You can select "Do not Know" if you do not know the answer." Column 1 reports the beliefs of the survey respondents with high-intensity kin-based ancestry, and column 2 reports the beliefs of the survey respondents with low-intensity kin-based ancestry. High-Intensity Kin-Based Anc. (Pat) are respondents whose ancestry is measured using the father's country of birth. High-Intensity Kin-Based Anc. (Mat) are respondents whose ancestry is measured using the mother's country of birth. High-Intensity Kin-Based Anc. (Own. are) respondents whose ancestry is measured using their own country of birth. Panel A consists of control sample in Experiment 1. Panel B consists of control sample in Experiment 2. Panel C consists of control sample in Experiment 3.

Appendix C. Attrition

The survey flow has four blocks of questions. The first block consists of demographic and obfuscation questions. The second block consists of two attention check questions. The third block is the randomized block, where priming information is randomly assigned to the treatment group and all participants are asked whether they want to donate any amount of $25 Amazon Gift card to any charity of their choice. The last block consists of a single open ended question asking for a feedback on the survey. The control group and the treatment group survey had *identical* number of questions. They differed only in the randomized block, where the priming information treatment is implemented in the treatment group.

Of the 8.83% (291) respondents who attrited in Experiment 1, 56.7% (165) responded to all the questions in the section with demographic questions. In the attrition sample, 120 participants continued till the end of demographic and obfuscation question block, and would be randomly assigned to treatment and control. In the randomization block, 101 participants responded to whether they would like to donate to a charity (our primary outcome variable), of which 48 participants are in the control group, and 53 participants are in the treatment group. Of the 8.91% (321) attrition sample in Experiment 2, 51% (164) responded to all the questions in the section with demographic questions. In the attrition sample, 114 participants continued till the end of demographic and obfuscation question block, and would be randomly assigned to treatment and control. In the randomization block, 97 participants chose to respond to the donation question, of which 51 are in control and 46 are in treatment. Of the 9.4% (308) attrition sample in Experiment 3, 51.6% (159) responded to all the questions in the section with demographic questions. 111 continued the end of demographic and obfuscation question block, and would be randomly assigned to treatment and control. In the randomization block, 96 participants chose to respond to the donation question, of which 44 are in control and 52 are in treatment. The Table below depicts the characteristics of the attrition sample in the treatment and in the control group who selected to respond to the donation choice question. We see that the respondents who chose to respond to the donation question in the attrition sample are similar along demographic covariates to the respondents who chose to complete the survey.

Experiment 1	Public Treatment	Control
Black	0.115	0.133
N	52	45
White	0.692	0.733
N	52	45
Female	0.769	0.765
N	52	47
College	0.66	0.590
N	51	44
US-Born	0.867	0.77
N	53	48
Working	0.52	0.432
N	50	44
Married	0.358	0.333
N	53	45
Time Spent (in seconds)	431.94	595.5
N	53	48
Experiment 2	Public Treatment	Control
Black	0.14	0.28
N	43	50
White	0.74	0.5
N	43	50
Female	0.67	0.8
N	43	50
College	0.65	0.56
N	43	48
US-Born	0.76	0.80
N	46	51
Working	0.60	0.49
N	42	47
Married	0.31	0.32
N	42	50
Time Spent (in seconds)	520.65	1172.706
N	46	51
Experiment 3	Public Treatment	Control
Black	0.18	0.22
N	51	41
White	0.66	0.54
N	51	41
Female	0.73	0.727
N	52	44
College	0.48	0.548
N	50	42
US-Born	0.88	0.772
N	52	44
Working	0.510	0.439
N	49	41
Married	0.28	0.357
N	50	42
Time Spent (in seconds)	1909.519	1116.614
N	52	44

This table reports the summary statistics of the demographic characteristics of the attrition sample selected to respond to the donation decision question in Experiment 1-3. Female and working are dummy variables for respondents reporting their gender as female and employed, respectively. The time spent in the survey is the duration taken to complete the study, measured in seconds. College is a dummy variable for respondents having a college education. Black and White correspond to the indicator variables for reporting Black and White as singular racial identities, respectively. Married is a dummy variable for being married at the time of the survey.

In Experiment 4 the attrition rates is higher (18.8%). About 20% (163) of the attrition sample reached the randomized question block. 25 out of 163 respondents dropped out at the randomization stage. 22% (18) dropped out from treatment survey and 8.64 % (7) dropped out from control survey. Below we report the summary statistics of the attrition sample in Experiment 4 who chose to respond to donation question.

Experiment 4	Public Treatment	Control
Black	.25	0.323
N	60	71
White	0.52	0.49
N	60	71
Female	0.75	0.79
N	60	72
College	0.49	0.39
N	51	69
US-Born	0.60	0.595
N	64	74
Working	0.35	0.43
N	52	69
Married	0.18	0.34
N	56	64
Time Spent (in seconds)	449.45	469.28
N	64	74

This table reports the summary statistics of the demographic characteristics of the attrition sample selected to respond to the donation decision question in Experiment 4. Female and working are dummy variables for respondents reporting their gender as female and employed, respectively. The time spent in the survey is the duration taken to complete the study, measured in seconds. College is a dummy variable for respondents having a college education. Black and White correspond to the indicator variables for reporting Black and White as singular racial identities, respectively. Married is a dummy variable for being married at the time of the survey.