Is Basic Democracy Enough?

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Motivation: Tell Me What Democracy Looks Like

- Democracy/elections are a central focus for political economy
- Transitions → democracy promote public goods, growth
  - e.g., (Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, Robinson 2019)
- But many countries' institutions are democratic-*ish*
  - "hybrid regimes" / "flawed democracies"
  - Partial role for elections, but significant unelected authorities
  - e.g., Pakistan
  - Unelected military with major influence
- Economic research has mostly studied *complete* democratic transitions
- ...or improvements in democratic systems (e.g., suffrage, voter info)
- Question: do partial expansions of democracy matter?
  - Today: partial increases in elections/electoral representation

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Is Change on the Margin Important?

- Different potential views on "small" democratizations
- Positive
  - Same benefits as complete transitions
  - Better politicians, electoral incentives
- Pointless
  - Electoral capture
  - "The military calls the shots"
  - Only large reforms shift politicians, incentives
- Negative
  - Elected politicians "worse," more "captured"
  - Misalignment with higher levels of government
  - Lack of coordination within mixed system

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
This Paper: Evidence From Local Government in Pakistan

- Challenges
  - How to define "marginal" changes?
  - Most are non-random
    - Theory: "Elections in Non-Democracies" (Egorov and Sonin 2021)
  - ...and packaged with other events
- Today: effects of quasi-random, marginal changes in electoral representation
  - Setting: Pakistan's local governments, 1960s
  - Councils with elected and unelected members
  - Alternating, even/odd variation → more elections (formula)
  - Effects on public goods, long-run development

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Many Contexts Use Mixed Elected/Appointed Systems



Al Jazeera/AFP, May 2023

- Partially electoral systems pretty common
- Left: Hong Kong's legislature since 1990s
  - 94% $\rightarrow$ 43% $\rightarrow$ 20% elected
- Historically: parliaments in UK; Iceland
- Various examples in Indonesia; Thailand; Libya; Guinea-Bissau; Chicago school boards...
- Colonial India legislative councils
  - $\rightarrow$ Pakistan's version in 1960
- Understudied in economics

Contributions to Previous Literature

- Democracy and public services, economic growth
  - (Martinez-Bravo 2014; Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria, Miguel 2015; Martinez-Bravo, Miquel, Qian, Yao 2022; Dal Bò, Finan, Folke, Persson, Rickne 2017; Barro 1996; Arora, George, Rao, Sharan 2023)
- Quality of democracy
  - Electoral capture: (Martinez-Bravo, Mukherjee, Stegmann 2017; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; George 2023; Cheema, Javid, Naseer 2013; Trebbi and Xiao 2023)
  - Suffrage, information, competitive elections in democracies: (Miller 2008; Campante and Do 2014; Hinnerich, Pettersson-Lidbom 2014; Bazzi and Gudgeon 2021; Gulzar and Khan 2024)
- Measuring democracy
  - (Bollen, Paxton 2000; Lueders, Lust 2018; Gerring et al. 2015)
- Contributions
  - Natural experiment, large N (local governments)
  - A lot of democratization happens on the margin
  - Specific system relevant to ≈5% of world population

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  - Specific system relevant to $\approx$5% of world population

- Background
  - Institutional context, data
  - Natural experiment
- Empirical Strategy
  - Specification, balance
- Main: marginal election → lowers public goods, growth by ≈0.03-0.05σ
  - 5.8% net construction for primary schools; 15% clinics
  - Persistence for most of Pakistan's independent history
- Mechanisms: less active councils
  - Less revenue/spending/activity
  - Null effects on central govt. activity (alignment)
  - (more in paper)
  - Speculative: preferences or ability?

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Historical Background & Data

Background: "Basic Democracies"




- 1958: General Ayub Khan takes power in coup
- 1959: "Basic Democracies"
  - ≈4000 local councils
  - Political role: electoral college
- Administrative role: tax/spend
  - Directed ≈70% of rural public works
  - Schools, clinics, roads, agriculture
  - Local + (typically fixed) central funding
- Overall: major push for rural public goods
  - Decentralized control ("CDD")
- Today: first-round councils, "West Pakistan"
  - 5-year term (with reelection)
  - System did not last

- 10-25 councilors; 1 chairman
  - Elected & "appointed" (by central govt.)
  - Chair: agenda-setter; limited formal powers
    - ≈prime minister
- Elected/appointed ratio = metric for "electoral representation"
- Population → # elected (1 per 800)
- # appointed = $\lfloor$(# elected)/2$\rfloor$
  - 4 elected, 2 appointed
  - 5 elected, 2 appointed
  - 6 elected, 3 appointed...
- "Odd" councils are more democratic
  - Change on the margin


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
Figure 1: Elected/Appointed Ratio and Council Size



- 2:1 elected/appointed (even)
- 2.23:1 (odd)
- ≈11% gap
- "Odd" → more elections
  - (on the margin)



...versus Discrete Unelected/Elected Transition (diagram)







Figure 2: Number of Villages by Council Size




Elections and Appointments Selected Different Politicians

- Historical sources: the elections offered real choice ▸ Quotes
  - Universal adult franchise, 75% turnout
  - Largely non-partisan (≈10% candidate affiliated)
- Similar pool of politicians
  - Locally notable landowners
  - ≈70% literate, (16% nationally)
- Appointed: usually higher status
  - ...but not outsiders, soldiers
- Effort/organization was key
  - Majority vote rules, devised projects, (local) revenue raising
  - "Project committees" to oversee execution
  - Unspent, misspent funds were a big issue (Inayatullah and Burki 1966)

Both Electeds & Appointeds Have Influence


Figure 3: Probability Elected Chairman



- Electeds ≈79% chairs (vs. 68% councilors)
- *Note*: in progress, 4% sub-sample here
- No bloc voting: appointeds still lead
- vs. e.g., US Congress
- ...but they do not dominate


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Data: Village Public Goods, 1951 – 2020



Schools in 1961 Census

- "West" Pakistan census data 1951–2020
- 1951, 1961 = "pre"
- 1972 = medium-run
- 2020 = long-run
- Local: schools, clinics, electricity (of ag)
  - ≈75% of spending
- Central: post office, railway...
- Main results: z-scores/aggregate indexes
- Fuzzy matching to other data

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$$y_{v,c} = \alpha [\text{Odd}]_c + f(N_c) + X_{v,c}\beta + \varepsilon_{v,c} \quad (1)$$

- Village v in council c
- Odd = odd-elected members (0/1)
  - 1 = more democratic
- $f(N_c)$
  - Linear / spline for # elected members
- $X_{v,c}$ controls
  - Often: district (administrative) fixed effects
  - Post-treatment: 1951, 1961 baseline characteristics
- $\varepsilon_{v,c}$ clustered at council-level

Table 1: Public Goods Provision (1951) [Placebo]

	Individual Public Goods				Index (z-scores)	
	(1) School (primary)	(2) School (all)	(3) Dispensary	(4) Electricity	(5) Index	(6) Index
Odd	-0.00035	0.0013	0.000064	0	0.00049	0.0027
	(0.0069)	(0.0077)	(0.00079)	(.)	(0.018)	(0.015)
N	26,622	26,622	26,622	26,622	26,622	26,622
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	2952	2952	2952	2952	2952	2952
51 District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	.22	.26	.0039	0	0	0

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Table 2: Public Goods Provision (1972) ▸ PCA version ▸ IV version ▸ Effects by size

	Individual Public Goods				Index (z-scores)			
	(1) School (primary)	(2) School (all)	(3) Dispensary	(4) Electricity	(5) Index	(6) Index	(7) Index	(8) Index
Odd	-0.017***	-0.016*	-0.0052**	-0.015***	-0.038*	-0.043***	-0.045***	-0.046***
	(0.0060)	(0.0080)	(0.0024)	(0.0056)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.012)
N	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975
61 District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y				Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	.59	.72	.053	.11	0	0	0	0

Figure 4: Local Public Goods (1972) and Council Size





Table 3: Economic Indexes (2020)

	(1) Ag.	(2) Finance	(3) Markets	(4) Industry	(5) Jobs	(6) Media	(7) Housing	(8) Combined
Odd	-0.040**	-0.057**	-0.013	-0.032*	-0.0100	-0.024	0.0067	-0.050**
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)
N	25,830	25,830	25,830	25,830	25,830	25,830	25,830	25,830
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	2939	2939	2939	2939	2939	2939	2939	2939
61 District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Notes: (1) cropland extent (2) banks (3) markets/related infrastructure (4) manufacturing presence (5) jobs in trade/business (6) TV/radio presence (7) housing materials/home toilet

Figure 5: Economic Indicators (2020) and Council Size



- Marginal effect of elections: fewer public goods, less growth
  - Benchmark: 5.8% net construction for primary schools; 15% clinics
- Affected villages missed out rapid rural development in the 1960s
  - ...with long-term effects
  - No persistence through councils directly (dissolved)
- Contrasts with literature on discrete transitions
  - ...even in largely non-democratic contexts
  - e.g., China (Martinez-Bravo, Miquel, Qian, Yao 2022)
- What can we say about why?

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Results Already Rule Out a Lot of Mechanisms

- Many (ex-ante) plausible stories ruled out so far
- Predict 0 effects
  - "The military/appointeds decide everything"
  - "The same people would be chosen in either system"
  - "All that matters is which group has a majority"
- Predict temporary or mixed effects
  - "The public goods are unimportant/fake"
  - "Electeds like to do A, unelecteds like to do B"
- Predict positive effects
  - "More elections universally result in better politicians/incentives to do more"
- Preferred mechanism: less active council

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
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"Dhori Gondal Union Council Tax on Hearths"



SCHEDULE B

1. *Short title and commencement*—(1) This schedule may be called the Dhori Gondal Union Council (Tax on hearths) schedule.

(2) It shall come into force from the date of its notification.

2. *Tax*—(1) A tax at the following rates shall be levied on the senior member of every hearth in the union :—

Description of hearth	*Rate of Tax*
(i) Hearths in a kacha building	.. One rupee per hearth per year.
(ii) Hearths in a pucca building	.. Two rupees per hearth per year.
(iii) Hearths in a Bungalow	.. Five rupees per hearth per year.

- Councils usually needed to raise own revenue for projects
- Data on individual taxes passed by councils
- Aggregate into a z-score
- Predicted Δ in public goods

Table 4: Union Council Taxes/Fees

	(1) Hearth	(2) Parties	(3) Vendors	(4) Home Construction	(5) Misc. (total)	(6) Tax Index (z-score)	(7) Public Goods 72 (predicted z-score)
Odd	-0.0067	-0.0059**	-0.0094***	-0.0080	-0.044***	-0.063***	-0.0035***
	(0.0078)	(0.0026)	(0.0026)	(0.0071)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.0013)
N	3,846	3,846	3,846	3,846	3,846	3,846	28,158
SEs / Clusters	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Council
61 District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	.1	.0085	.011	.078	.13	0	-.02

Table 5: Centrally Provided Public Goods (1972)


	(1) Post Office	(2) Telegraph	(3) Police Station	(4) Railway	(5) Hospital	(6) Index (z-score)
Odd	-0.00080	0.00063	0.00055	-0.0011	0.0022	0.0050
	(0.0035)	(0.0011)	(0.0016)	(0.0014)	(0.0019)	(0.010)
N	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975
61 District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	.15	.0084	.021	.021	.026	0

Conclusion

- When do more elections/democracy deliver more for citizens?
  - Surprising (to me): not always
- Natural experiment in 1960s Pakistan local governments
  - Odd/even variation $\rightarrow$ marginal increase in elections
  - More elections $\rightarrow$ long-term 0.03-0.05σ reduction in public goods, growth
- Consistent with theories of non-monotonic effects from institutional change (Acemoglu and Robinson 2023)
- "Basic" democracy may not be enough
  - Suggests the need for complementary institutions for elections
  - ...and for complete democratization
- Plug for paper
  - More heterogeneity
  - Individually rule out more explanations

More on Mechanisms

Balance: 1961 "baseline" data



- 16 outcomes (population, public goods)
- District FEs / none
- 1951 controls / none
- Linked through 61 / 72
- 1-5 knots
- = 640 regressions ($16 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 5$)

Table 6: Balance on Sample Linkage

	(1) Link 51	(2) Link 61	(3) Link 72	(4) Main 1972	(5) Main 1972	(6) Main 1972	(7) Link 20	(8) Main 2020
Odd	-0.0011	-0.011	-0.017	-0.016	-0.0056	0.0022	-0.018	-0.015
	(0.0080)	(0.0100)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.0099)	(0.0062)	(0.014)	(0.014)
N	39,128	39,128	39,128	39,128	39,128	34,532	39,128	39,128
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	3846	3846	3846	3846	3846	3744	3846	3846
61 District FEs					Y	Y		
51 Controls						Y		
61 Controls						Y		
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	.91	.89	.78	.73	.73	.82	.73	.67

Table 7: Public Goods Index (1972) and Size

	(1) Baseline	(2) Total Size	(3) Total Size (even/odd)
Odd	-0.046***	-0.046***	-0.046***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Size (total)		-0.0010	
		(0.0015)	
Odd (total)			-0.0093
			(0.012)
N	28,158	28,158	28,158
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	2975	2975	2975
61 District FEs	Y	Y	Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	0	0	0

- Odd/even could affect tied votes
- ...but elected size $\neq$ total size
- e.g.:
  - 5 elected, 2 appted = 7 total
  - 7 elected, 3 appted = 10 total

Table 8: Public Goods Index (1972) and Elected Member Controls

	(1) 1 knot	(2) 2 knots	(3) 3 knots	(4) 4 knots	(5) 5 knots	(6) Pair FEs
Odd	-0.046***	-0.046***	-0.044***	-0.046***	-0.053***	-0.046***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
N	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975
61 District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N_c Pair FEs						Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	0	0	0	0	0	0

Qualitative Reports of Conflict, Gridlock

There were "numerous conflicts between the elected and appointed members... [electeds] act[ed] like 'dummies' in the presence of the [appointed] members."
— *Development and Local Reform*, Ashford 1967

"The chairmen of union councils... may not want to do the [project committee] work. This is particularly true where there are inter-group or inter-union council conflicts"
— *Report of the Training Programme for Circle Officers (Development) In Rural Public Works Programme*, 1962

- Tension between high-status minority (appointed) and numerous elected members
- Inaction/dysfunction/unspent funds major issue for councils (Inayatullah and Burki 1966)

Table 9: RWP Council-Directed Spending Breakdown

	(1) log(Spending) [central]	(2) log(Spending) [local]	(3) Any Spending? [local]	(4) % Spending [center]
Odd	-0.31*	-0.37***	-0.11***	0.029
	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.037)	(0.023)
N	1,314	1,314	1,314	624
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	217	217	217	213
61 District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	6.2	5.4	.4	.75

- 1 district: 63-64 project spending data
- Revenue: local + population-based central
- Spending ↓ (both sources)
- ⇒ unspent central funds
- Gridlock vs. preferences

Table 9: RWP Council-Directed Spending Breakdown

	(1) log(Spending) [central]	(2) log(Spending) [local]	(3) Any Spending? [local]	(4) % Spending [center]
Odd	-0.31*	-0.37***	-0.11***	0.029
	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.037)	(0.023)
N	1,314	1,314	1,314	624
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	217	217	217	213
61 District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	6.2	5.4	.4	.75


- 1 district: 63-64 project spending data
- Revenue: local + population-based central
- Spending ↓ (both sources)
- ⇒ unspent central funds
- Gridlock vs. preferences

Table 10: Public Goods (1972) and Literacy Rates

	(1) Village	(2) Ward	(3) Council
Odd, [90th pctile literacy]	-0.077***	-0.082***	-0.056**
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Odd × Literacy	-0.34**	-0.42**	-0.12
	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.29)
N	28,158	28,099	28,157
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	2975	2974	2974
61 District FEs	Y	Y	Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	0	.00048	0

- Lower human capital for electeds?
  - e.g., not literate
- But: effects are worse for highly-educated areas


Figure 6: RD for Increased Ward Representation



RD Estimate: +0.41 (z = 6.25)*** , bw = 107.8

- "Ward" = elected constituency within council
- Can have multiple representatives
- By default: one per 800 people
- $\rightarrow$ RD at cutoffs (1200, 2000, 2800)


Figure 7: Increasing Representation for Educated Areas



RD Estimate: +0.21pp (z = 4.88)*** , bw = 158.1

- Above average education: RD for gaining a seat
- Below average: RD for *not* gaining one
- → more councilors from educated areas

Figure 8: High-Education Reps and Public Goods



RD Estimate: -0.02 (z = -0.59) , bw = 128.4

- Marginal elected from high-educated area
- ...decreases public goods (not significant)

Quotes & Context

Were These "Real" Elections? (mostly yes)

"There were few reports of injustices in the elections, and available reports indicate that the elections transpired in an orderly fashion."

Appointed members "were to be selected by the district officer, often with the recommendation of police, education, and other officials."
— *Development and Local Reform*, Ashford 1967

The elections were "a start toward diffusing political power throughout the country."
— "Pakistan's Experiment in Basic Democracies", Friedman 1960

Back

- Universal adult franchise
- Turnout ≈75%
- Similar pool of politicians
  - Locally notable landowners
  - ≈70% literate
  - (vs. 16% nationally)
- Very few outsiders, soldiers
- Appointed: usually higher status

Robustness & More

Other Administrative Controls? (no)

Table 11: Public Goods (1972) and Administrative Fixed Effects

	General		1961 Definitions			1951 Definitions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	None	Province	District	Tehsil (grouped)	Tehsil	District	Tehsil (grouped)	Tehsil
Odd	-0.040***	-0.041***	-0.046***	-0.042***	-0.039***	-0.045***	-0.040***	-0.039***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
N	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975
Province		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tehsil (grouped)				Y	Y		Y	Y
Tehsil					Y			Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 12: Heterogeneity: Major Provinces

	(1) Punjab	(2) Sindh	(3) Sindh (only)	(4) Balochistan	(5) NWFP/KPK
Odd	-0.033	-0.056***	0.026	-0.042***	-0.044***
	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Odd × province	-0.018	0.074**		-0.10*	-0.021
	(0.028)	(0.030)		(0.053)	(0.057)
N	28,158	28,158	4,047	28,158	28,158
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	2975	2975	500	2975	2975
61 District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	0	0	.11	0	0

Table 13: Public Goods Provision, PCA Index (1972) Back

	Individual Public Goods				Index (z-scores)			
	(1) School (primary)	(2) School (all)	(3) Dispensary	(4) Electricity	(5) Index	(6) Index	(7) Index	(8) Index
Odd	-0.017***	-0.016*	-0.0052**	-0.015***	-0.037*	-0.042**	-0.043***	-0.044***
	(0.0060)	(0.0080)	(0.0024)	(0.0056)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.012)
N	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975
61 District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y				Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	.59	.72	.053	.11	0	0	0	0

Table 14: Public Goods Provision, IV (1972) Back

	Individual Public Goods				Index (z-scores)			
	(1) School (primary)	(2) School (all)	(3) Dispensary	(4) Electricity	(5) Index	(6) Index	(7) Index	(8) Index
Elected/Appted	-0.077***	-0.071*	-0.024**	-0.069***	-0.17*	-0.20***	-0.20***	-0.21***
	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.091)	(0.075)	(0.063)	(0.055)
N	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158	28,158
SEs / Clusters	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council
N (clusters)	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975	2975
F stat	10,260	10,260	10,260	10,260	7,395	10,098	10,227	10,260
61 District FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
51 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
61 Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y				Y
$\mathbb{E}[y\|T=0]$	.59	.72	.053	.11	0	0	0	0

Figure 9: Local Public Goods (1972) and Village Size Back (main public goods)

