Can Revolution Work? Evidence from the Birth of Nepal's Federal Democracy *

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Abstract

Can revolutions in ethnically segregated societies create inclusive democracies? Nepal, a multi-ethnic country that had been a monarchy for 240 years, became a federal democratic republic in 2015 after a ten-year People's War and a decade-long constitution design process. The new constitution delegated significant policy powers to elected local governments. Using merged census and electoral data, we show that Nepal's historically disempowered indigenous ethnic groups (Janajatis), who account for more than a third of the country's population, won proportional representation in local leadership positions in the 2017 democratic election. We provide evidence that Janajatis' representation on party selection committees was an important channel for achieving this representation. Moreover, caste-leadership Implicit Association Tests (IATs) reveal that party elites involved in candidate selection have an implicit bias against Janajatis, with Janajati party elites having a lesser bias. We trace the origins of Janajati representation in party leadership positions back to the governance structure of the Maoist group, which spearheaded the People's War and incorporated Janajatis in revolutionary governance institutions. The Maoists subsequently entered democratic Nepali politics, and Janajati representation was highest for the Maoist party. Moreover, political inclusion is persistent, with Janajatis expanding their electoral share in 2022. Finally, turning to the targeting of the largest locally delivered program (post-earthquake housing reconstruction transfers), we do not observe ethnic favoritism. Rather, consistent with electoral incentives, Janajati leaders favor the population majority group in their constituency.

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1 Introduction

According to leading political economy models, democratization occurs when economic elites gain from extending the franchise to poorer households with whom they share economic interests (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001) or when non-elites threaten to, or actually do, take power violently (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Aidt and Franck, 2015). Much of this literature is inspired by democratization in Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom, and sees class as the most salient societal division rather than ethnic identity. In terms of policy, this literature focuses on the impacts of income redistribution and public good spending that benefit the elite and non-elite differently, not the targeting of transfers based on ethnicity. This focus makes it difficult to apply the findings of this literature to lower-income countries, where redistribution along ethnic lines is widespread in both authoritarian and weakly democratized regimes (Alesina, 2003; Burgess et al., 2015). The demand for democracy is then often led by politically disempowered ethnic groups. But, it could well be that in these settings, democratization simply changes the nature of ethnic favoritism rather than overcoming the obstacles ethnic heterogeneity poses for inclusive and cohesive governance (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Wacziarg et al., 2003; Easterly and Levine, 1997).

This paper examines the impact of Nepal's democratic transition, which followed a decade-long People's War, on post-revolution governance. Historically, Nepal's caste system - promulgated by the National Code or *Muluki Ain* in 1854 – concentrated political and economic power in a few elite castes (Vollan, 2015). In pursuit of democracy and the abolition of this dominant caste system, the Maoist party initiated a People's War in 1996 that successfully overturned Nepal's 240-year-old monarchy. The historically disadvantaged Janajati caste – a collection of several Indigenous groups comprising roughly one-third of Nepal's population – formed the backbone of the Maoist insurgency (Lawoti, 2007) and were integrated into wartime governance institutions. Following the peace agreement, the Maoists emerged as the largest political party in the first Constituent Assembly in 2008. However, the government did not promulgate the current federal, multiparty, democratic constitution until after a significant earthquake in 2015. The Constitution enshrines protections for some historically disadvantaged groups, like women and Dalits, and devolves substantial authority to local governments (municipalities and wards) to address the diverse needs (and identities) of the country. The first democratic elections for the three spheres of government were held in 2017, with a second election in 2022.

We focus on elected leadership positions in Nepal's local government bodies, given their central importance in service delivery and governance under a Constitution that enshrines

decentralization and given their proximity to revolutionary experiences and institutions. Our primary focus is on municipality and ward leaders. We report three main results.

First, we combine census micro-data on 2,562,008 voting-age Nepalis (spanning 11 districts in Nepal and 15% of the population) with data on all 20,408 political aspirants (for the three major parties, herein nominees), 15,523 candidates, and 4,029 elected representatives in the 2017 local elections. We show that for municipal and ward leadership positions, Janajatis achieve significant representation (43% of seats), which is proportional to their population share in ward-level positions, and 31% in municipality-leadership positions.

Second, we examine the role of party institutions in shaping patterns of political selection by merging party selection committee rosters with electoral data. Party selection committees are critical in determining which nominees are given tickets to contest in local elections but, as our data show, are themselves elite institutions and severely underrepresent Janajatis. Representation in these key party institutions matters for the representativeness of nominees and candidates: when a party selection committee comprises a majority of Janajatis, the likelihood of selecting a Janajati as the ward chair and mayoral candidate increases by 20% and 25% respectively. To evaluate whether this reflects the demand for Janajatis, we sampled a representative set of 705 of these committee members and conducted an in-person survey (with a response rate of 80%). Using a single-attribute Implicit Association Test (IAT) to measure implicit associations between caste identity and leadership (Penke et al., 2006), we show that there is substantial bias against Janajatis, particularly among elite caste party members.

We further show that the inclusion of the Maoists as a political party and the composition of party selection committees shaped the demand for Janajati candidates among party elites in the first democratic local elections. Maoist elites early on articulated a commitment to inclusion and equality (Ismail and Shah, 2015). The Maoist party was significantly more likely to field and elect Janajati candidates than the two other leading political parties (even after accounting for gender, education, and income). In contrast to other parties, 60% of the Maoist politicians in local leadership positions are Janajati (as compared to 47% for non-Maoist parties). Going further back in the selection chain, 49% of Maoist nominees are Janjati, as compared to only 39% for the other major parties.

We argue that Nepal's revolution provided the Maoist party with an electoral base and party membership of Janajatis. We show that areas where Maoists created People's Govern-

ments during the revolution are associated with greater representation of Janajatis in key party institutions today. Based on qualitative interviews with high-ranking party officials, we suggest that the Maoists People's Governments intentionally mobilized the historically disadvantaged to the cause of the revolution and empowered them as political actors through governance processes. An explicit aim of these wartime institutions, as articulated in interviews, was the creation of a cadre of politically experienced Janajatis that the Maoist party could draw upon during subsequent democratic political selection. Our results imply that the revolution increased the supply of competitive Janajati candidates and inculcated a norm of Janajati representation.

Third, we examine if Janajatis' election affected longer-run political and policy outcomes. We show that Janajati incumbents were significantly more likely to recontest and be reelected than upper-caste incumbents in the 2022 election. More generally, localities where Janajatis were elected in 2017 saw a rise in Janajati non-incumbent candidacy and election in 2022, suggesting that descriptive representation begets further representation. Next, we match census data to beneficiary lists of 740,277 households that had received post-earthquake housing reconstruction grants to evaluate whether the election of Janajatis influenced household access to the earthquake housing reconstruction program. Grant eligibility was based on objective measures of household damage captured in the 2016 census. We leverage the fact that two of the three benefits tranches were delivered after the 2017 elections to use a difference-in-differences design and show that Janajati representatives delivered more benefits than upper-caste politicians. Unlike other studies of the policy impacts of descriptive representation, we find that Janajatis do not target more benefits to co-ethnics but instead increase benefits mostly to non-Janajatis, potentially explaining their greater electoral success in the subsequent election.

Overall, this paper contributes to three important literatures. First, a large literature explores the consequences of conflict for democracy and democratic consolidation (Matanock, 2017; Ashley, 2023). But, as (Blattman and Miguel, 2010, p. 42) note, "the social and institutional legacies of conflict are arguably the most important but least understood of all war impacts." We document the consequences of revolutionary conflict for political selection and show that political representation, in fact, increases in subsequent elections, suggesting that the representational gains from revolutionary processes are likely to persist. Second, this paper opens the black box of party political selection, building on work that documents the importance of party institutions for candidate selection (Casey et al., 2021; Karpowitz et al., 2017). We show that the political party formed by the rebel group played a critical

role in fielding Janajati candidates by enabling more inclusive party institutions, particularly in places with a deeper revolutionary history. Finally, we show that the historically disadvantaged social group of Janajatis gained representation in the first democratic election, a surprising feat given the depth of inequalities in Nepal. This expands the literature on political selection, which has been largely situated in high-income and consolidated democracies, to demonstrate that even in deeply unequal contexts, representation can be achieved (Dal Bó et al., 2017; Dal Bó and Finan, 2018; Gulzar, 2021).

2 Context and Data

2.1 Ethnic Groups in Nepal

In 1854, Nepal's monarch mandated a civil code, the Muluki Ain, which established Nepal as a Hindu state and codified ethnic inequality. Brahmins and Chhetris were elevated as elite castes and, to a lesser extent, indigenous Newaris. Lower-ranked Dalits and indigenous Janajatis were relegated to inferior positions. This caste system forcibly integrated Hindu caste groups with non-Hindu indigenous groups into a single ethnic hierarchy.

Janajatis, or the Indigenous Peoples of Nepal, are an agglomeration of 59 distinct recognized indigenous communities and comprise more than 35% of the population of Nepal. They, therefore, reflect a vast array of cultural and linguistic traditions.

Historically, the three elite castes Bahun (Brahmin), Chhetri, and Newar castes (BCN) - which comprise 35 percent of the population - have wielded significant administrative and political power while the indigenous ethnic (Janjatis) and out-caste (Dalits) groups remained marginalized. Prior to the unification of Nepal in the 18th century, Hindu upper castes and Janajati indigenous groups separately administered their own territorial land. With Nepal's unification, historically Janajati-occupied land started to become populated by upper castes, and during the Rana dynasty (1846-1951), land was allocated by the state largely based on caste, with upper caste groups receiving the largest land tracts and land tracts in the fertile and commercially important Kathmandu valley. With limited property rights and political representation, substantial economic and human capital inequalities between Janajatis and upper-caste Hindus emerged. These caste-based economic inequalities persisted into the late 20th century, where, as of 1995, poverty rates within elite castes (BCN) were half those of non-elite castes (Dalits and Janjatis) (20-30% v/s 50-55%) (BS 2005, based on NLSS-I).

2.2 The Maoist Revolution and the Ethnic Origins of Democracy in Nepal

For most of the 20th century, elite caste monarchs ruled Nepal with absolute authority.[1] The 1990 People's Movement, a series of protests led by the Nepali Congress and Communist United Left Front, forced the Monarchy to form a new Constitution allowing democratic elections alongside monarchical rule. The 1990 Constitution recognized Nepal as a multi-ethnic society while maintaining Nepal as a Hindu State (Onta, 2006; Gurung, 2009). The right to form ethnic organizations enabled indigenous organizations aimed at establishing language rights, affirmative action, decentralization, and self-rule. The majority of these represented Janajatis, the largest indigenous group.

Nepal held its first multi-party, semi-democratic local elections in 1992. These elections were dominated by upper-caste elites, and lower-caste and Janajati ethnic groups challenged the processes as being unfair. Again, an attempt towards democracy in Nepal was seen to have failed to address the demands of the historically marginalized. In response, in 1995, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), which had been banned from participation in the second phase of local elections in 1997, adopted the 'Plan for the Historic Initiation of a People's War' declaring that for "the true liberation of the people, all efforts must be concentrated for the development of a people's war that would usher in the new people's democratic form of government," and the Maoist People's War was launched in 1996.

In his 40 point demand, Baburam Bhattarai, a founder of the Maoist movement, declared their intent to use the People's War to pursue an inclusion-oriented agenda through the "establishment of a people's democratic system" and the elimination of ethnicity-based, caste-based, language-based, and gender-based inequalities. Maoist leaders, many of whom were upper caste, articulated this strong ideological commitment to ethnic inclusion from the initiation of the People's War and saw the insurgency as a necessary response to the failure of past attempts at democratic transition to overturn dominant hierarchies.

The Maoist commitment to ethnic inclusion, in part, reflected strategic incentives: From the 1950s, the Maoist movement was centered in the Midwestern region of Nepal where

[1] A first attempt at demanding democracy for Nepal in 1951, motivated by democratic transitions in South Asia, yielded a constitution that allowed semi-democratic elections and political organizations but vested ultimate power in the monarch. The monarch responded to the success of semi-democratic elections in 1959 by mandating a Panchayat system that marginalized and suppressed indigenous cultures. It banned political parties, declared Nepal a Hindu state, and recognized only one language, Nepali.

Janajatis formed the largest ethnic group (Acharya, 2009). The People's War grew by mobilizing support from Janajati organizations, and Janajatis and other lower caste groups were seen as the backbone of the insurgency. To credibly commit to Janajatis' demands, Maoists amplified the specific call of these organizations for self-rule and decentralization. In 2004, at the peak of their insurgency, the Maoists declared the formation of "autonomous regions," whereby the country would be divided into nine regions, out of which seven would be "ethnic in nature in that the names reflected the historical origins of some of the country's major Janajati and Madhesi groups" (Thapa and Ramsbotham, 2017). Advocacy for autonomous regions was seen as the impetus for today's federalism in Nepal.

As the Maoists successfully took control of territories, they established a parallel system of governance to the state. This included establishing military control, overseeing governance and service provision, developing fiscal capacities, and erecting judicial institutions. People's Governments were the governance arm of the Maoist political system and were charged with managing government operations and service delivery according to Maoist principles. As further evidence of the Maoist commitment to ethnic inclusion, Janajatis and other lower caste groups were elevated to positions of political authority in these wartime governance institutions.

Both ideology and strategic incentives meant that ethnic equality and inclusion became a critical component of the Maoist agenda. Maoists elevated Janajatis to positions of authority within the institutions established during the War and committed to the principal demand of these groups, namely the creation of a Federal Republic with autonomous regions. Nepal's People's War lasted a decade until 2006, culminating in a Peace Agreement between the Maoists and mainstream parties that laid the foundations for the modern Republic and eradicating the erstwhile Monarchy.

Following the subsequent Peace agreement, two constituent assemblies - elected in 2008 and 2013 - worked on drafting a new Constitution but failed to reach an agreement. Despite the Maoist party having the largest share of seats in the 2008 Constituent Assembly, their demands for federalism and ethnic inclusion were met with substantial resistance. Disagreement over how to ensure representation in Nepal was one of the core reasons for the failure to reach an agreement. However, in April 2015, a devastating earthquake affected one-third of Nepal's population, destroying over 800,000 homes. The earthquake heightened demands for a Constitution and, combined with substantial international political pressure, yielded the 2015 Constitution that established Nepal as a federal, democratic republic.

2.3 Political Selection in Democratic Nepal

The 2015 Constitution created a federal structure that included seven provinces, 753 municipalities, and 6,742 wards with elected governments at all levels. At the municipality level, a mayor and deputy mayor were to be elected, requiring each party to nominate at least one woman across the two positions.[2] At the ward level, each ward government comprised an elected ward chairperson and four ward members, with one ward member seat reserved for a woman and one reserved for a woman from the Dalit community. Election required a plurality, and those elected were to serve a five-year term. The Constitution did not include institutional protections for minorities in provincial or national legislative bodies, nor did it include institutional protections for Janajatis at any level.

Between May and September 2017, more than 28,000 new representatives (from nearly 150,000 candidates) were elected to local (municipal and ward) governments for the first time under fully democratic elections. These local officials hold substantial policy authority under the federal structure outlined in the 2015 Constitution. Municipal governments are principally responsible for preparing annual programs and budgets, collecting local taxes, overseeing local subcommittees, adjudicating local disputes, and delivering most local public services. Ward governments are primarily responsible for designing and implementing plans regarding ward-level public services. The Constitution enshrined a commitment to decentralization, and so vested substantial authority in local governments.

As in many countries, party elites select candidates without any form of primary. Candidate selection procedures are broadly similar across Nepal's three main parties. First, all parties had committee structures at two tiers: an upper-tier committee responsible for selecting municipal candidates and a lower-tier committee responsible for selecting ward candidates.[3] Second, selection committees were comprised of senior party officials and involved a governance structure. More senior party officials were granted positions of authority on selection committees, such as "in-charge" or secretary. The number of positions of authority on a selection committee was roughly the same across the three main parties, although they varied in the number of non-titled committee members. Third, selection followed two broad stages. Lower-level party nomination committees selected potential candidates (hereon, nominees) for consideration by the party selection committees. Party selection committees then delib-

[2]Referred to as a chairperson and vice chairperson in rural areas.

[3]For all three parties, the upper-tier committee was at the district level. For the UML and Maoists, the lower tier committee was at the municipality level, and for the Nepali Congress, the lower tier committee was at the regional level.

erated and selected a candidate for final approval. If a consensus could not be reached on who should be a candidate from among the nominees, the list of was passed on to higher selection committees. Final candidate lists were approved by higher party committees.

3 Data

In this paper, we: (i) measure political selection; (ii) report descriptive facts about and measure the biases of candidate selection committee members; (iii) look at relationships between the identity of candidates and selection committee members; (iv) assess whether experience in wartime institutions enabled subsequent peacetime political leadership; and (v) study whether politician identity affects political and policy outcomes. We describe our data following the order in which we use them for these five analyses.

3.1 Measuring political selection

We combine census data with data on electoral results and with internal party records on members considered for candidacy to study patterns of political selection.

3.1.1 Census Data:

In response to the 2015 earthquake, the Government of Nepal conducted a census in 11 earthquake-affected districts to identify housing reconstruction needs in early 2016. Through a partnership with Nepal's National Reconstruction Authority, we accessed individual-level census data, including information on caste, education, household income, household pre- and post-earthquake assets, and levels of housing damage. The data include 3,680,772 Nepalis, 2,562,008 of whom are voting-age. Our analysis focuses on these 11 districts, hereon census districts.[4]

3.1.2 Electoral Data:

We obtained Electoral Commission data, including candidate name, gender, party affiliation, and vote share, for all candidates (nearly 150,000) who stood for municipal and ward-level

[4]These districts are located in the north-central region of Nepal.

elections in 2017 and in 2022 for all of Nepal. We also collated Electoral Commission data on candidates in the 1992 and 1997 local elections.

3.1.3 Party Data on Members Considered for Candidacy:

Shortly after the 2017 local elections, we obtained lists of all citizens considered for candidate nomination by party selection committees from district party leaders for the three main parties, the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal- United Marxist-Leninist (UML), and Maoist Centre, in our 11 census districts. Party documentation of nominees for municipal-level positions was complete, but data on ward position nominees was less readily available and maintained.

Combining electoral and party nomination data yields 22,179 potential nominees, 18,626 candidates, and 4,920 representatives from all parties. We match these data using name and geographic identifiers to the census data, which provides demographic and socioeconomic data for political candidates. We successfully match 80% of candidates to the census data, yielding a sample of 16,614 nominees, 14,219 candidates, and 3,767 representatives across the three largest parties. The Appendix describes the matching process. We directly observe caste for candidates who are matched to the census data; to identify caste for unmatched candidates and candidates outside our 11 census districts and in other elections, we use a machine learning algorithm to predict caste from surname, which is trained on the matched data (see Appendix for details).

3.2 Data on Party Selection Committees

3.2.1 Administrative Records of Selection Committees:

We worked with the three main parties to obtain lists of the names of all party members who served on the candidate selection committees for the 2017 local election. We use these administrative records to provide a sample frame for a representative survey of selection committee members.

3.2.2 Survey of Selection Committee Members

We additionally surveyed a large sample of party selection committee members in 2019 to capture information on committee member characteristics and selection dynamics. We ran-

domly sampled 883 committee members from the party selection committee lists, stratifying on party, committee, and position on committee.[5] Surveys were conducted in person by trained enumerators whose party affiliation was not known by respondents. The survey had a response rate of 79.84% and a final sample size of 705. The Appendix demonstrates that respondents and non-respondents are statistically identical with respect to gender, party, and location. We learn committee member caste from these survey data and use the aforementioned machine learning algorithm to predict committee member caste for all non-surveyed committee members.

3.3 Wartime Governance Data:

Complete, local-level records on the presence of wartime governance institutions were not maintained by the Maoists during the People's War. To measure the presence of the Maoist-organized People's Governments, we leverage the Nepali Home Ministries' categorization of districts by their level of saturation of Maoist People's Governments. The People's War touched 68 of Nepal's 75 districts to varying degrees. The Nepali Home Ministry categorized affected districts into three classes based on the degree to which the Nepali Government retained control during the People's War.[6] We leverage this designation to differentiate our 11 census districts between those that had complete coverage of Maoist People's Governments with those that had only partial coverage. We validate these categorizations with data that we obtained from the Maoists for three districts that provide information on which local areas (defined as village development committees before and during the War) had institutionalized People's Governments.

[5]We took a stratified random sample of committee members, stratifying on party, committee type, committee, and position on committee. The probability of inclusion varied by committee type and party position. First, we sampled all titled committee members from the district and regional selection committees. Only the UML had non-titled committee members, but given that they had larger committees, we yielded a similar sample size. We were further informed that non-titled committee members had very little influence on these committees. Second, for the municipal committees, we took a random sample of two titled committee members and one non-titled committee member from each committee.

[6]Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, Salyan, Pyuthan and Kalikot districts were categorized as "sensitive class A", Dolakha, Ramechhap, Sindhuli, Kavrepalanchowk, Sindhupalchowk, Gorkha, Dang, Surkhet and Achham districts were classified as "Sensitive Class B", and Khotang, Okhaldhunga, Udaypur, Makwanpur, Lalitpur, Nuwakot, Dhading, Tanahu, Lamjung, Parbat, Baglung, Gulmi, Arghakhachi, Bardiya, Dailekh, Jumla and Dolpa districts were classified as "sensitive class C."

3.4 Earthquake Reconstruction Data

The National Reconstruction Authority provided household-level data on the receipt of three tranches of reconstruction grants (up to March 2022). Data include tranche and timing of grant receipt along with the amount received. Across these 11 districts, we observe 740,277 beneficiary households. We match these beneficiary data to the census data, which also includes indicators of housing damage and corresponding assigned damage grades. We are able to match 95% of the beneficiaries to the census data.

4 Results

4.1 Who Became a Politician in Nepal?

To evaluate political selection in Nepal, we compare the caste distributions of nominees, candidates, and elected representatives with that of the adult population in the first fully democratic elections in Nepal. Figure 1 reports the caste distribution in Nepal in the 2017 local elections across different (unreserved) positions. When looking at open ward member seats (the lowest level local position), the political class is almost representative of the population with respect to caste. In these positions, Janajatis are marginally over-represented, while Dalits remain underrepresented. As noted previously, ward chairpersons are largely representative of Janajatis but underrepresented Dalits. Mayors, however, the most powerful leadership position in local governments, still substantially under-represent both Janajatis and Dalits.

Importantly, particularly for mayors, parties appear to play an important role in shaping the caste distribution of politicians. While still severely underrepresented relative to the population, Janajati mayoral candidates comprise a larger share of the candidate pool than Janajati aspirants comprise of the aspirant pool. Party selection of candidates yields relatively more positive selection of historically excluded castes. Voters, then, do not shift the caste distribution of elected representatives vis a vis the candidate pool. Similar dynamics, though to a lesser degree, attain when looking at ward chairpersons.

Were the Maoists responsible for the more proportionate representation of Janajatis in post-war elections? We now turn to a regression framework to explicitly test Janajati representation among the political class across parties:

$$Y_{imp} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Ethnicity_{imp} + \beta_2 JanajatiPopulationShare_m + \beta_3 X_{imp} + \gamma_d + \varepsilon_{imp} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{imp} is a dummy variable equal to 100 for individual i in constituency m who is, separately, an aspirant, candidate, or representative by party p. We consider selection into the position of mayor and ward chairperson, where constituency m is defined as the municipality for mayoral races and the ward for ward chairperson races. $Ethnicity_{imp}$ is a vector of different broad ethnic groups (BCN, Janajati, and Dalit) though we report the coefficient only on Janajati. $JanajatiPopulationShare_m$ is the share of the population in constituency m that is Janajati, which serves as a proxy for supply and demand for Janajati candidates. X_{imp} is a vector of covariates, including gender, education, income (z-score), and pre-earthquake assets (z-score), to account for the valence attributes of candidates. γ_d are district fixed effects.

Table 1 reports estimates of specification 1 for each stage in the political selection process for ward chairpersons in Panel A and mayors in Panel B. Estimates are presented for all three main parties and then separately for the Maoist and Non-Maoist parties. First, as expected, only a select few from the population enter the political pipeline. Only 23 in every 10,000 BCNs were considered by selection committees as potential candidates for ward chairperson, and only 15 in 10,000 were chosen as candidates, and 3 in 10,000 were elected as ward chairpersons. These ratios are even smaller for mayoral races.

Second, overall we see that Janajatis are less likely to be nominees and candidates for both ward chairperson and mayoral positions (columns 1 and 4): only 12 out of every 10,000 Janajatis were chosen as candidates for ward chair. Importantly, this negative selection of Janajatis holds even after accounting for valence attributes of education, income, and assets. Janajatis, however, are not underrepresented among the final pool of elected ward chairpersons and mayors, suggesting some positive selection by voters of Janajatis (see column 7).

Third, there are substantial party-wise differences in caste-based political selection. Decomposing the relationship between caste and political selection by party demonstrates at all levels, and in both positions, that the underrepresentation of Janajatis is driven by non-Maoist parties. The Maoist party was as likely to consider and nominate a Janajati as someone from an elite caste. This is reflected in the composition of Maoist candidates: 60% of Maoist nominees were Janajati, compared to only 40% for the other major parties, and the majority of Maoist politicians were Janajati.

In combination with the fact that the Maoist party has long touted an ideology of caste-based advancement and representation, these contrasting patterns of behavior across parties are suggestive of the important role of the Maoist party in generating a representative political class post-democratization. Using novel data from party selection committees themselves, we now turn to a deeper exploration of the partisan dynamics of political selection.

4.2 Who Selects Politicians?

Does political inclusion in party institutions shape selection decisions? In this section, we make use of unique data on the universe of party selection committee members in eleven districts, along with a survey of a sample of these committee members to examine how selection committee dynamics - especially for the Maoist party - impacted candidate selection. We start by describing the composition of selection committees and then examine the role of diversity and ethnic attitudes in candidate selection.

First, we evaluate the composition of selection committees to understand the characteristics of the gatekeepers of political selection. Table 2 reports estimates from specification 1 except where the outcome is now an indicator for a person being a member of a selection committee as opposed to a politician. Strikingly, membership in a selection committee is even more uncommon than electoral representation: only 4.6 out of every 10,000 upper-caste adults serve on party selection committees. Column 1 shows that Janajatis and Dalits are significantly under-represented, with only 2.1 out of 10,000 Janajati adults and 0.9 out of 10,000 Dalit adults serving on party selection committees. However, this underrepresentation of Janajatis and Dalits disappears after accounting for education and income inequalities. In fact, selection committee members have substantially higher incomes and significantly more education than the population. Adults with bachelor's degrees are seven times more likely to be selection committee members than those without. Additionally, women are substantially under-represented even after accounting for valence attributes. Finally, while all parties exhibit patterns of unequal representation of historically disadvantaged groups, the Maoist selection committees are somewhat more representative of Janajatis than non-Maoist committees.

Second, we more explicitly consider differences in the composition of selection committees across parties in Table 3. Table 3 correlates selection committee member characteristics with an indicator for whether they are a member of the Maoist party. Janajatis are marginally more represented (though not significantly so) on Maoist section committees. Dalit rep-

resentation is strikingly skewed across parties: 70% of Dalit selection committee members serve on Maoist committees. Additionally, Maoist selection committee members are significantly less likely to have completed a bachelor's degree and to be considered higher income. In combination, this affirms the Maoist ideological commitment to incorporate nonelites in party institutions.

Does the caste composition of party selection committee members correlate with the caste composition of the political class? We evaluate the relationship between the caste composition of selection committees and the nominees considered and candidates selected, using the following specification[7]:

$$I(Nom./Cand.\ is\ Jan.)_{pcm} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 I(Comm.\ Maj,\ Jan.)_{pc} + \alpha_2 Jan.\ Pop.\ Share_m + \gamma_d + \nu_{pc} \tag{2}$$

where $I(Nom./Cand.\ is\ Jan.)_{pcm}$ is an indicator for an aspirant or candidate for a ticket in constituency m, where constituency m is defined as the municipality for mayoral races and the ward for ward chairperson races, from party p evaluated/selected by committee c, $I(Comm.\ Maj.\ Jan.)_{pc}$ is an indicator for whether the selection committee c in party p is comprised of a majority of Janajatis, $Jan.\ Pop.\ Share_m$ is the share of the population in constituency m that are Janajati, a proxy for supply and demand for Janajati candidates. γ_d indicates district fixed effects. Given the salience of caste for political behavior in Nepal, we expect that most variation in committee and candidate caste distributions within a district will be driven by the demographic caste distributions in that constituency. Controlling for the population share of Janajatis at the same level as the ticket competition, thus, accounts for this observable confounding. As a result, observed correlations between committee composition and nominee/candidate pools will not merely reflect geographic concentrations of ethnic groups or regional party strategies.

Table 4 reports estimates from this specification and demonstrates that there is a large and robust relationship between the composition of selection committees and the composition of the nominee and candidate pools. Columns 1 and 5 demonstrate that committees comprised of a majority of Janajatis, even after accounting for the underlying distribution of Janajatis

[7]We evaluate the composition of nominees in addition to candidates because, while we do see all of the nominees passed from the general committees to the selection committees, there is no way to track all of the names considered by the general committees. Therefore, there is a stage of candidate selection that our data do not fully capture. This stage is valuable for us, as it could signal which types of nominees were expected to be favorably considered by candidate selection committees.

in the population, are substantially and significantly more likely to see Janajati nominees for both the position of mayor and ward chairperson, the two most important local offices. There are at least two reasons for this correlation. Janajati selection committee members might actively recruit co-caste members into the nominee pools. Alternatively, citizens may seek nomination for an office if they believe they will be evaluated by a committee of co-caste members. Columns 3 and 7 of Table 4 demonstrate that this positive relationship persists when looking at the selected candidates though only significantly so for Ward Chairpersons (plausibly because of power constraints in the Mayoral contests). The size of these correlations indicates that the composition of selection committees could materially impact the caste composition of newly elected politicians.

Maoist committees, even after controlling for the caste composition the the committee, are more likely to see Janajati nominees for both mayor and ward chairperson and are more likely to nominate Janajatis as candidates for ward chairperson. Columns 2 and 4 further show that having a majority Janajati committee is more predictive of observing a Janajati mayoral nominee or selecting a Janajati mayoral candidate for Maoist committee members than for non-Maoist committee members. Party is less of a moderator of the relationship between committee composition and ward chair nominee/candidate composition. Altogether, this provides suggestive evidence that greater diversity in party committees, specifically Maoist committees, may foster greater diversity in nominee pools.

Why might selection committees with more Janajatis favor Janajati nominees and candidates more? One possibility is that Janajati committee members hold different attitudes than their elite counterparts, particularly with respect to ethnic representation. We included implicit association tests in our survey of party selection committee members to evaluate differential attitudes across committee members. Specifically, we implemented a single-attribute implicit association test (IAT)[8] aimed at measuring the strength of the association between ethnicity and leadership (Penke et al., 2006). Each respondent was presented with two sets of stimuli. The first set included elite caste Brahmin surnames (e.g., Sharma) and non-elite Janajati caste Tamang surnames (e.g., Norgay), and the second set included words related to leadership. Respondents were asked to categorize words as fast as possible according to different labels displayed on the top of the screen (for instance, on the right, the label "Brahmin" and on the left, the label "Tamang"). The strength of the association of elite caste and leadership

[8]The IAT uses the categorization of words to the left or to the right of a computer or tablet screen to provide a measurement of the strength of the association between two concepts – in this case, caste, and leadership.

is measured based on differential performance in two tasks: speed and success in categorizing Brahmin surnames and leadership categories together relative to speed and success in categorizing Tamang surnames and leadership categories together.[9]. The respondent-level IAT D-score is the standardized difference in time to complete the two aforementioned tasks[10] and assumes that if committee members are biased against non-elite castes (Tamangs) being leaders, they will take longer to associate Tamang names with leadership words. More positive IAT D-scores imply a longer differential in categorizing Brahmins relative to Tamangs and, therefore, greater implicit bias.

Table 5 correlates committee member caste with the IAT D-Score and an index of explicit attitudes against non-elites in leadership roles.[11] Shown in column 1, Janajati committee members have a significantly lower IAT D-score than BCN committee members, suggesting that Janajati committee members exhibit less implicit bias than BCN committee members by about 0.08σ ($p < 0.05$). Janajati committee members also report less explicit bias toward lower caste groups in leadership positions (column 2). This negative relationship with both implicit and explicit bias is larger for Maoist committee members. However, the average level of implicit bias for upper-caste Maoist committee members is higher than for upper-caste non-Maoist committee members. However, Maoists of all castes report lower explicit bias. In total, these findings are consistent with left-wing parties being more explicitly progressive with respect to attitudes around ethnic diversity but with no difference in implicit attitudes for those from elite castes.

[9]Respondents were asked to complete a total of five rounds as follows:
Randomization of Brahmin/Tamang to right or left
Round 1: Brahmin/Tamang, 10 trials
Randomization of Leadership to right or left
Round 2: Brahmin/Tamang; Leader, 20 trials
Round 3: Brahmin/Tamang; Leader, 20 trials (identical to round 2)
Round 4: Tamang/Brahmin; Leader, 20 trials (reverse to round 2)
Round 5: Tamang/Brahmin; Leader, 20 trials (identical to round 4)

[10]This difference is calculated by taking the difference in average time to correctly categorize responses in round 3 and round 5. Following common practices, we eliminate trials with latencies $>$ 3,000ms and $<$ 300ms. We further drop respondents if more than 10% of trials have latency $<$ 300 ms or more than 10% of trials have $>$ 3000 ms.

[11]“““To minimize social desirability bias, respondents were given a self-administered questionnaire with questions on attitudes towards representation and leadership. After completing the form, they were asked to place it in a sealed envelope and return that envelope to the survey team.

4.3 Do Revolutions Build Inclusive Party Institutions?

Why might the Maoists have better represented Janajatis in Nepal's recent local elections? Qualitative interviews with dozens of high-ranking Maoist party members, including members who served in positions of authority in People's Governments, affirmed the party's commitment to building inclusive politics throughout the People's War. These officials outlined intentional procedures to ensure that lower caste groups and Janajatis would be elevated to positions of authority in Maoist governance institutions. One official explicitly described the pattern of political selection during the People's War: He described how there were several important positions that the Maoists had to fill after they gained control of a territory, including the army, the court system, and the People's Government. While Janajatis and other lower caste groups were prevalent in each of these institutions, he shared that caste was a core selection criterion for which institution an individual would be placed. Janajatis, he said, were more likely to be placed in the People's Government because this aligned with the movement's commitment to political diversification and was thought to best prepare the Maoist cause for inclusive politics in a democratic future. A core aim of elevating Janajatis to positions of authority in People's Governments was to build the capacities and experience of the historically excluded Janajatis. Instead, upper castes were more likely to be placed in positions of authority in the court or the army.

We confirm the prevalence of Janajatis in People's Governments with the limited available data from the war. Maoist officials were able to share the names of all district-level People's Government members in six of our eleven census districts.[12] These data reveal that Janajati officials comprised nearly 50% of Maoist-organized wartime People's Governments.

Did this wartime political inclusion by the Maoists persist in their party institutions today? We examine the relationship between the presence of Maoist People's Governments and party selection committee composition in the 2017 elections. Table 6 reports the correlation between our district-level measure of the complete control of wartime governance by the Maoists and the caste composition of party selection committees for the three main parties in 2017. The analysis is at the municipality-party level, and we control for the municipal population share of Janajatis as the clearest predictor of both Maoist revolutionary success and present-day committee composition. Since we can only measure the saturation of People's Governments at the district level and with only eleven districts, we estimate

[12]Names of district-level People's Government representatives were collected directly from Maoist party leaders in these six districts. Records were maintained only for these six districts and not the remaining five study districts. The caste prediction algorithm was deployed to infer caste from name.

p-values using randomization inference with all possible permutations of assignment of People's Governments (with seven districts fully saturated and six only partially covered by People's Governments). Table 6 shows that Maoist party committees were more inclusive of Janajatis in districts where they had full control of wartime governance and had covered the entire district with People's Governments during the War. The same is not observed when looking at the non-Maoist parties: Nepali Congress and UML party committees were only marginally more inclusive of Janajatis (and not significantly so) in districts that had been fully saturated with Maoist People's Governments during the War. This aligns with the qualitative suggestion that the Maoist wartime governance institutions provided a pathway to political inclusion for Janajatis.

Finally, in our survey of 2017 party selection committee members, we asked Maoist committee members about their exposure to and participation in the People's War. 10% reported having been officials in the Maoists' People's Governments, 17% fought in the People's Liberation Army, and 79% participated in the People's War in some way. Participation rates in the People's War were similar for upper caste and Janajati committee members, which is consistent with the idea of such participation shaping subsequent access to positions of political authority within the Maoist party, including critical selection committees. Thus, inclusive practices during the War may have facilitated Janajatis' rise within the Maoist party.

4.4 The Impacts of Electing Lower Caste Politicians

4.4.1 Is inclusion self-sustaining?

The second fully democratic local elections in Nepal provide an opportunity to evaluate whether the initial political inclusion of Janajatis persisted. We find instead that Janajati inclusion was strikingly rewarded, demonstrating the persistence of political inclusion. We match the 2017 candidate pool with the 2022 candidate pool to create panel data on political selection from Nepal's first two fully democratic local elections. Using these data, we first consider whether incumbents were more likely to recontest and be reelected if they were Janajati. Second, we consider whether there new entrants in 2022 were more likely to be Janajati in locations that observed a Janajati representative in 2017. Specifically, we estimate the following specifications:

$$I(Recontest/Reelect)_{im} = \eta_0 + \eta_1 I(Janajati)_{im} + \eta_2 Jan.\ Pop.\ Share_m + \eta_3 X_{im} + \gamma_d + \nu_m \quad (3)$$

$$Janajati\ Cand.\ Share_m = \eta_0 + \eta_1 Ethnicity_{im} + \eta_2 Jan.\ Pop.\ Share_m + \eta_3 X_{im} + \gamma_d + \nu_m \quad (4)$$

$$I(Janajati\ Rep.)_{nm} = \eta_0 + \eta_1 Ethnicity_{im} + \eta_2 Jan.\ Pop.\ Share_m + \eta_3 X_{im} + \gamma_d + \nu_m \quad (5)$$

where $I(Recontest/Reelect)_{im}$ is an indicator for whether a 2017 incumbent i recontested and was reelected in 2022 in constituency m, where constituency m is defined as the municipality for mayoral races and the ward for ward chairperson races. $Janajati\ Cand.\ Share_m$ is the share of 2022 non-incumbent candidates (new entrants) in constituency m that are Janajatis. $I(Janajati\ Rep.)_m$ is an indicator for whether non-incumbent elected representative n in 2022 is Janajati. $I(Janajati)_{im}$ is an indicator for whether the 2017 incumbent i in municipality m is Janajati. $Jan.\ Pop.\ Share_m$ is the share of the population in constituency m that are Janajati, a proxy for supply and demand for Janajati candidates. X_{im} is a vector of covariates, including gender, education, income (z-score), and pre-earthquake assets (z-score), to account for the valence attributes of candidates. γ_d indicates district fixed effects.

First, Table 7 documents the relationship between the caste of the 2017 incumbent and that same incumbent's outcomes in 2022. Columns 1 and 5 show that Janajati mayoral and ward chair incumbents were significantly more likely than upper caste incumbents to recontest for any locally elected office in 2022, and further, columns 2 and 6 show that they were also more likely to be reelected. These relationships are substantively large: Janajati mayors are three times as likely to be reelected as incumbent upper caste mayors, and Janajati ward chairs are 50% more likely to be reelected. This provides strong evidence that Janajati elected representatives did not perform worse than upper caste representatives in their initial tenure and, instead, suggests that they were rewarded by voters in the second elections.

Second, Table 7 documents positive spillovers of Janajati representation. In constituencies where the incumbent did not recontest the election, Janajatis comprise a greater share of the ward chair candidate pool when the 2017 elected representative was Janajati as compared to places where the 2017 elected representative was upper caste (column 7). Further, places that had a Janajati ward chair in 2017 were substantially and significantly more likely to have a Janajati ward chair in 2022, even when the incumbent does not re-contest. In combination, Table 7 suggests that inclusion is self-sustaining and begets more inclusion.

4.4.2 Does inclusion affect access to earthquake reconstruction benefits?

In addition to descriptive representational impacts, Janajati political representation may have impacts on policy access. This section examines how the electoral representation of

Janajatis impacts the delivery of earthquake reconstruction benefits. We estimate equations of the following form:

$$Relief\ Tranche\ Count_{imt} = \beta MayorJanajati_m \times Post_t + \eta_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{imt} \quad (6)$$

where $Relief\ Tranche\ Count_{imt}$ is the number of relief transfer tranches that household i in municipality m has received until month-year t. We also explore the effect on the total value of transfers received. $MayorJanajati_m$ is an indicator of whether the municipality elected a janajati mayor, and $Post_t$ indicates the month-years after the election. We compare the change in benefit transfers before and after the first local elections across municipalities with and without a Janajati mayor as of 2017. The coefficient of interest is β which captures the differential impact on transfers in municipalities that elected a Janajati mayor. As we can track transfers with precision, we can include household fixed effects η_i as well as month-year fixed effects γ_t in the estimation.

Table 8 reports the results from specification 6. Column 1 shows that in all municipalities in our data and across all households, there is a positive but insignificant effect on the number of tranches of electing a Janajati mayor. Columns 2 and 3 decompose this effect between Janajati and non-Janajati recipients, and while both are positive, we see a statistically significant effect in the case of the latter. Non-Janajati households receive 0.21 (s.e. = 0.10) more tranches on average in municipalities that elected a Janajati mayor. This suggests that Janajati mayors may concentrate their efforts towards allocating resources to swing voters in their areas. We further split the results between municipalities where the majority of the households are Janajati (columns 4-6) and municipalities where the majority is not Janajati (columns 7-9). The results show that the targeting of relief to non-Janajatis occurs primarily in the latter set of municipalities where the majority is non-Janajati (comparing columns 6 and 9).[13]

To further bolster the causal interpretation of this decomposition, we take an event study approach in Figure 2, where Columns A, B, and C correspond to Columns 1, 4, and 7 in Table 8. The top row presents the treatment effect in relative time with household and month-year fixed effects, while the bottom panel shows the raw means of treatment and control municipalities for each month-year in our data. This figure shows that the two groups followed parallel paths in the months before the election. However, after the election, municipalities that elected a Janajati mayor saw more tranches delivered to households, particularly if the

[13]In Appendix Table 9, we show the robustness of these results when considering the total value of the tranches.

municipality is itself majority non-Janajati.


Taken together, these results highlight that the inclusion of Janajati mayors had material impacts on the delivery of welfare after the earthquake in Nepal. Patterns in the data are consistent with the interpretation that mayors prioritized the delivery of benefits in swing areas.

5 Conclusion

TBC

6 Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Evidence of Increased Representativeness of Politicians by Caste



Notes: The figure shows the distribution of education for the adult population in 11 districts in Nepal as well as for nominees, candidates, and elected representatives. The sample consists of 2,528,653 individuals from the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) census who were 18 as of the last election, as well as 22,133 nominees, 18,582 candidates, and 4,910 representatives from the Nepali Electoral Commission. For Mayoral nominees, caste is inferred using the prediction algorithm outlined in the Appendix. For Ward Chairs, caste is pulled from the PDNA for matched nominees and predicted for all others.

Table 1: Caste-based Political Selection in Nepal in 2017

	Nominees			Candidates			Representatives		
	All	Maoist	Non-Maoist	All	Maoist	Non-Maoist	All	Maoist	Non-Maoist
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Ward Chair (× 10,000)									
Janajati Caste (=1)	-3.026***	0.415	-3.440***	-2.363***	-0.199	-2.165***	-0.390	0.094	-0.484**
	(1.020)	(0.576)	(0.838)	(0.574)	(0.262)	(0.508)	(0.263)	(0.116)	(0.237)
Ward Janajati Population Share	10.569***	4.038***	6.531***	8.567***	1.555***	7.012***	2.993***	0.849***	2.144***
	(1.855)	(1.014)	(1.456)	(1.169)	(0.404)	(0.990)	(0.430)	(0.237)	(0.402)
BCN Mean	22.683	5.710	16.973	14.829	3.144	11.685	3.382	0.541	2.841
# Observations	2528653	2528653	2528653	2528653	2528653	2528653	2528653	2528653	2528653
Panel B: Mayor / Chairperson (× 10,000)									
Janajati Caste (=1)	-0.408	1.799	-2.207**	-0.539**	-0.006	-0.533**	-0.065	0.009	-0.074
	(1.483)	(1.258)	(0.885)	(0.237)	(0.080)	(0.231)	(0.090)	(0.036)	(0.081)
Municipality Janajati Population Share	11.596***	4.760*	6.837***	4.033***	0.616***	3.418***	0.893***	0.096	0.797***
	(3.918)	(2.478)	(2.092)	(0.599)	(0.170)	(0.529)	(0.213)	(0.089)	(0.212)
BCN Mean	9.266	2.685	6.580	2.447	0.275	2.172	0.412	0.046	0.367
# Observations	2528653	2528653	2528653	2528653	2528653	2528653	2528653	2528653	2528653

The sample consists of 2,528,653 individuals from the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) census who were 18 years old as of the 2017 election. The outcome is an indicator that equals 10,000 if the individual is a nominee (columns 1, 2 and 3), a candidate (columns 4, 5 and 6), or a representative (columns 7, 8 and 9), and is 0 otherwise. Panel A reports patterns of political selection for the ward chair position and Panel B reports the same for the mayor position. *Ward/Municipal Janajati Population Share* indicates the population share that is Janajati in the respective ward/municipality. All models include district fixed effects and control for being a woman, having a bachelor's degree, having an income of 25k Rs. or higher, and a standardized index of household assets.
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
Levels of significance: $^{*}p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 2: Characteristics of Party Political Selection Committees in Nepal in 2017

	All Committees		**Maoist Committees**		**Non-Maoist Committees**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Committee Member (× 10,000)						
Janajati Caste	-2.506***	0.004	-0.835***	-0.062	-1.671***	0.067
	(0.231)	(0.235)	(0.147)	(0.149)	(0.179)	(0.181)
Dalit Caste	-3.660***	-0.601	-1.065***	-0.105	-2.595***	-0.496
	(0.426)	(0.429)	(0.271)	(0.273)	(0.329)	(0.331)
Female		-4.595***		-1.802***		-2.793***
		(0.221)		(0.140)		(0.170)
Bachelor's Degree or Higher		28.125***		7.479***		20.646***
		(0.614)		(0.390)		(0.474)
Household Income of 25,000 NPR or Higher		12.000***		4.391***		7.609***
		(0.297)		(0.189)		(0.230)
BCN Mean	4.648	4.653	1.757	1.759	2.891	2.894
# Observations	2555259	2552292	2555259	2552292	2555259	2552292

The sample consists of 2,528,653 individuals from the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) census who were 18 years old as of the 2017 election and 793 selection committee member surveyed. The outcome is an indicator that equals 100 if the individual is a party selection committee member. *Levels of significance*: $^{*}p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 3: Characteristics of Party Political Selection Committees in Nepal in 2017

	Dependent Variable: *Maoist Committee Member (= 1)*	
	(1)	(2)
Janajati Caste	0.052	0.022
	(0.037)	(0.037)
Dalit Caste	0.322***	0.285***
	(0.111)	(0.109)
Female		0.071
		(0.058)
Bachelor's Degree or Higher		-0.157***
		(0.036)
Household Income of 25,000 NPR or Higher		-0.157***
		(0.043)
BCN Mean	0.378	0.378
# Observations	793	793

The sample consists of 793 selection committee members surveyed. The outcome is an indicator that equals 1 if the committee member is from the Maoist party. *Levels of significance*: *$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$

Table 4: The Caste Composition of Selection Committees and Nominee/Candidate Pools in 2017

	Mayor				**Ward Chairperson**			
	Nominee is Janajati		Candidate is Janajati		Nominee is Janajati		Candidate is Janajati	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Majority of Committee Janajati	0.151***	0.008	0.152***	0.029	0.072***	0.084***	0.072***	0.069***
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Maoist		0.098**		-0.047		0.054***		0.038**
		(0.039)		(0.066)		(0.018)		(0.019)
Majority of Committee Janajati X Maoist		0.072		0.185*		-0.033		0.006
		(0.085)		(0.105)		(0.029)		(0.032)
Municipality Janajati Population Share	1.286***	1.274***	1.552***	1.555***				
	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.120)	(0.121)				
Ward Janajati Population Share					1.123***	1.122***	1.150***	1.150***
					(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
E(Y)	.332	.332	.429	.429	.47	.47	.5	.5
R-squared	.268	.276	.366	.368	.386	.388	.41	.411
# Committees	33	33	33	33	250	250	250	250
# Ticket Competitions	934	934	312	312	3,960	3,960	2,512	2,512

The unit of analysis is a ticket [position-party pair]. The analysis is restricted to the three main parties: Nepali Congress, CPN-UMl and CPN-Maoist. *Share of Committee Janajati* indicates the share of selection committee members who are Janajati. *Commitee Majority Janajati* (main X) is an indicator that equals one if share of the selection committee members who are Janajati is more than 50%, 0 otherwise. *1997 VDC Chair Janajati* controls for having Janajati as a VDC chairperson in 1997 to the corresponding Ward. *Ward Level Controls* include the population share that is Janajati, highly educated (Grade 10+) and has a high annual income (NPR 25,000+) in the ward where the ticket competition takes place. *Municipality Level Controls* include the population share that is Janajati, highly educated (Grade 10+) and has a high annual income (NPR 25,000+) in the municipality where the ticket competition takes place.
Standard errors clustered at the level of the selection committee are reported in parentheses.
Levels of significance: $^{*}p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$ All models include district fixed effects.

Table 5: Leadership Bias of Party Selection Committee Members

	All		**Maoist**		**Non-Maoist**	
	IAT Score	Explicit Bias	IAT Score	Explicit Bias	IAT Score	Explicit Bias
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Janajati Committee Member	-0.080***	-0.062*	-0.118***	-0.113**	-0.056*	-0.021
	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.056)	(0.034)	(0.051)
Outcome Mean for Non-Janajati	.16	.384	.197	.366	.137	.396
# Observations	709	702	282	278	427	424

This table includes data from 709 respondents in our survey that completed the IAT and 702 that completed the self-administered questionnaire that measured explicit leadership bias towards non-elite castes. Caste is measured directly in the survey. IAT scores are the D-score from a single attribute IAT categorizing Janajati and BCN names with words associated with leadership. Explicit bias is measured using a self-administered questionnaire with questions on attitudes towards representation and leadership. To minimize social desirability bias, after completing the form, respondents were asked to place it in a sealed envelope and return that envelope to the survey team.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Levels of significance: $^{*}p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 6: Maoist People's Government and the Caste Composition of 2017 Party Selection Committees

	Share of Committee Janajati		
	All	Maoist	Non-Maoist
	(1)	(2)	(3)
District Saturated with People's Governments	0.045	0.089	0.023
	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.065)
	{p: 0.357 }	{p: 0.035 }	{p: 0.736 }
Municipality Janajati Population Share	0.936	1.144	0.832
	(0.082)	(0.068)	(0.113)
	{p: 0.108 }	{p: 0.009 }	{p: 0.294 }
Partial MPG. (mean)	.436	.436	.436
R-squared	.369	.528	.301
# Districts	11	11	11
# Observations	330	110	220
# RI Sample	462	462	462

The unit of analysis is party-municipality. The analysis is restricted to the three main parties: Nepali Congress, CPN-UMl and CPN-Maoist. *District Saturated with People's Governments* is an indicator that equals 1 for districts where Maoist ran people's government during the conflict era. Standard errors clustered at district level are reported in parentheses; Randomization inference p-values clustered at district in brackets.

Table 7: The Persistence of Janajati Political Representation in 2022

	Mayor				**Ward Chair**			
	Recontest	Reelect	Janajati Cand. Share	Janajati Rep.	Recontest	Reelect	Janajati Cand. Share	Janajati Rep.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Janajati Caste	0.300**	0.351***	0.013	0.142	0.172***	0.115***	0.089***	0.112*
	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.069)	(0.259)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.066)
BCN Mean	.39	.153	.319	.2	.429	.225	.272	.257
# Observations	102	102	70	28	706	706	686	344
Sample	Incumbents	Incumbents	New Entrants	New Entrants	Incumbents	Incumbents	New Entrants	New Entrants
SE Cluster Level	Municipality	Municipality	Municipality	Municipality	Ward	Ward	Ward	Ward


The sample for each model is denoted in the table. In the incumbent samples, we restrict the sample to representatives who we can map to the census data (roughly 75%).
All models include individual-level controls for caste, education, income, assets in addition to municipality/ward caste population shares. All models also include district fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered and the level of clustering is reported below each specification.
Levels of significance: $^{*}p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 8: The Effect of Electing a Janajati Mayor on the Number of Earthquake Transfers

	All Municipalities			**Maj. Janajati Munic.**			**Maj. Non-Janajati Munic.**		
	All HH	Janajati HH	Non-Janajati HH	All HH	Janajati HH	Non-Janajati HH	All HH	Janajati HH	Non-Janajati HH
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Mayor Janajati	0.119	0.073	0.206**	0.015	0.040	-0.017	0.259**	0.209	0.294**
	(0.099)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.156)	(0.157)	(0.172)	(0.120)	(0.132)	(0.116)
Mean Y_0 - Before	0.288	0.284	0.291	0.290	0.292	0.287	0.288	0.280	0.292
Mean Y_0 - After	1.521	1.495	1.540	1.489	1.459	1.539	1.531	1.515	1.540
N. Muni. Treated	44	44	44	28	28	28	16	16	16
N. Muni. not Treated	66	66	66	20	20	20	46	46	46
Observations	54780498	26518566	28261932	17960540	12790382	5170158	36819958	13728184	23091774

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of electing a janajati mayor on the number of tranches received by a household. Each observation is a household month-year. All models include month and household fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses.

Figure 2: Event Study - The Effect of Electing a Janajati Mayor on the Number of Earthquake Transfers



Notes: This figure presents event study plots examining the impacts of electing a Janajati mayor on the number of earthquake transfers received. Relative time on the x-axis reflects months since the election. The top row plots event studies that correspond to columns 1, 4, and 7 in Table 8. These include household and month-year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 95% confidence intervals are displayed. The bottom row shows the raw means for treatment and control municipalities.

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Table 9: The Effect of Electing a Janajati Mayor on the Total Amount of Earthquake Transfers

	Full Sample			Mun. is Majority Janajati			Mun. is not Majority Janajati		
	(1) *Full Sample*	(2) *Janajati HH*	(3) *NonJanajati HH*	(4) *Full Sample*	(5) *Janajati HH*	(6) *NonJanajati HH*	(7) *Full Sample*	(8) *Janajati HH*	(9) *NonJanajati HH*
Mayor Janajati	14512.4	8912.6	24951.1**	294.3	3006.7	-2671.9	32028.2**	27080.0*	35624.3***
	(10953.4)	(11444.3)	(11296.3)	(17460.5)	(17482.4)	(19342.7)	(13078.9)	(14307.0)	(12653.0)
Mean Y_0 - Before	14416.7	14204.4	14573.4	14497.5	14579.6	14355.2	14392.3	14005.3	14611.1
Mean Y_0 - After	146305.0	143679.1	148243.0	143787.1	140212.6	149993.2	147065.6	145518.5	147940.6
N. Muni. Treated	44	44	44	28	28	28	16	16	16
N. Muni. not Treated	66	66	66	20	20	20	46	46	46
Observations	54780498	26518566	28261932	17960540	12790382	5170158	36819958	13728184	23091774
Month FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
HH FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at municipality level and reported in parentheses.