Segregation and the March Right: Extreme Politics in England and Wales*

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Abstract

We investigate the connection between the rise of one of Britain's most successful extreme right parties, the British National Party (BNP), and the settlement patterns of the minority group it targets. We build on advances in the literature on shift-share instruments for immigration to generate a novel set of instruments for a minority's segregation as well as its size. We show that increased segregation between the South Asian minority and White British majority increases the BNP vote share, controlling for correlated variation in the minority's population share. We then demonstrate that segregation drives a majority-minority divergence in political views, increasing the expression of extreme right views among the majority while increasing the expression of liberal views among the minority. Exploring mechanisms, we find that this widening majority-minority gap is mirrored in individual views on social identity and reduced intergroup contact.

JEL Classification: P00, J15, D91, D72

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1 Introduction

Residential segregation can lead two groups to live 'parallel lives,' side-by-side but in near complete isolation from one another. This creates an environment in which "the ignorance about each others' communities can easily grow into fear" in a process amplified by extremist rhetoric (Cantle et al., 2001). A significant body of research has tied the growing wave of support for the extreme right in Western democracies to exposure to immigration (Alesina & Tabellini, in press; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2022). An open question, however, is whether the minority group's spatial segregation, as opposed to only its size, plays a role. Does exposure to a minority group influence views in the same way regardless of whether the group is integrated within the local community or segregated into ethnic enclaves?

The key obstacle in assessing the potential influence of segregation is the need to identify exogenous variation in two correlated dimensions of a minority group's settlement patterns: the group's relative size in an area (minority share) and how evenly it is spread across neighborhoods within that area relative to the majority (spatial distribution). In this paper, we build on the immigration shift-share IV literature to provide a method for generating instruments for both segregation and the minority share. Using this novel IV approach, we show that extreme right views take root in areas where the targeted ethnic-based majority-minority division of society is realized in segregated settlement patterns, holding constant the minority's relative size.

We make three main contributions. First, we develop an IV strategy that allows us to causally identify the effect of residential segregation of a targeted minority from the majority on support for the extreme right. We link the electoral success of the extreme right British National Party (BNP) to the settlement patterns of the minority group that it targets: increased South Asian-White British segregation increases the BNP vote share, controlling for variation in the minority share.[1] Second, we use individual-level survey data for both groups to demonstrate that focusing only on aggregate voting behavior conveys an incomplete view. Segregation induces a majority-minority divergence in political views, causing a rise in the expression of political views associated with the extreme right among the White British (consistent with aggregate voting results) while increasing the reporting of views associated with the left among South Asians. Third, we provide evidence for a mechanism consistent with identity-based models of behavior: segregation shifts each group's sense of the national 'British identity' in the direction that would serve to deepen the targeted majority-minority societal division.

[1] In this paper, the terms 'White British' and 'South Asian' refer to self-identified ethnicity – not citizenship, place of birth, or nationality.

Ethnic-based social factors (e.g., homophily or majority antipathy) may explain voting behavior and drive minority settlement decisions both across and within constituencies, simultaneously leading to endogeneity in the minority's size and segregation. At the same time, a minority's settlement decisions may be driven by economic factors common to all groups and unrelated to social or political views (e.g., jobs or affordable housing). Therefore, we develop a two-step approach that isolates variation in the targeted minority's *current* settlement patterns that can be explained by *historical* variation in this 'economic pull' across neighborhoods at times when many foreign-born minority individuals were choosing where to settle.

For each historical wave of immigration, we measure a neighborhood's relative pull within the constituency using the share of all migrants from *other* regions of the world that settle in the neighborhood among those arriving to the constituency – a revealed preference measure that abstracts from factors that specifically attracted or deterred the targeted minority. We then aggregate over historical waves, weighting each by the share of all migrants from the targeted minority's origin that arrive to England and Wales in that period (push factor), to predict the current share of ethnic minority individuals in the neighborhood among those living in the constituency (a component of segregation). Our first step for the minority share predicts the number of minority individuals in a neighborhood; we measure the neighborhood's pull relative to the rest of England and Wales as the share of migrants from other regions that settle in the neighborhood among those arriving to England and Wales and aggregate over waves weighting by the total number of migrants arriving from the targeted minority's origin in each period. Our second step aggregates the predicted neighborhood-level minority population measures and adds total/White British population counts to generate the constituency-level instruments for the minority share and segregation (dissimilarity index) – this paper then advances the approach developed by Burchardi et al. (2019) to generate a novel set of instruments for ethnic segregation and the minority share.

We find that a one standard deviation rise in South Asian-White British segregation increases the BNP's vote share by 0.9 percentage points in the 2010 UK General Election – the BNP's average vote share was 2.2 percent.[2] Critically, we control for the constituency's South Asian minority share, which negatively influences the BNP's vote share; this likely reflects that South Asians are unlikely to vote for the BNP as opposed to an influence on White British voters. Considering heterogeneity in these effects, we fail to find a difference in the influence of segregation on BNP support across constituencies based on socioeconomic variation. How-

[2]We include indicator variables to account for regional and socioeconomic variation across constituencies.

ever, we show that the estimated baseline effect of segregation on BNP support is driven by constituencies with a relatively large South Asian community – i.e., where the minority group is large enough to be 'visible' and so variation in segregation is likely to be salient.

The identification strategy relies on the assumption that the historical settlement decisions of *other* migrant groups were not influenced by the same unobserved factors that drive South Asian settlement patterns and support for the BNP; importantly, limiting the set of other migrants considered in our instrument construction to only those unlikely to face similar racial or religious animosity (i.e., Europeans) does not influence results. The findings are also not affected by replacing current White British settlement patterns with historical patterns to account for potential endogenous sorting (i.e., 'white flight') in instrument construction or controlling for possible correlates of ethnic settlement patterns associated with extreme right support (immigration, economic vulnerability, inequality, and industrial makeup). Further, a placebo instrument for segregation, identical to our baseline instrument except that it weights historical 'pull factors' with aggregate European migration flows instead of South Asian flows (placebo push factor), does not similarly predict support for the BNP.

We also explore the dynamics of segregation's influence on voting behavior. We combine data for six elections from 1983 to 2015 in a fixed-effects event study design that compares constituencies based on their 1971 settlement patterns. Constituencies with higher 1971 South Asian-White British segregation do not exhibit increased BNP support until 2001 – coinciding with the BNP's shift in rhetoric to targeting Asian Muslims; this pattern is robust to additionally controlling for non-linear time trends in historical socioeconomic factors and region-specific non-linear time trends. The rise of the BNP appears to be at the expense of the UK's other extreme right party, UK Independence Party (UKIP), which suddenly benefits from increased support in these areas when the BNP stops widely contesting seats in 2015.

To further understand the link between ethnic settlement patterns and voting, we use individual-level survey data on political views. We show that increased South Asian-White British segregation increases the probability of White British respondents expressing distrust in institutions, a hallmark of the populist right; for South Asian respondents, we instead find reduced satisfaction with democracy, shown to be a liberal response to the success of right-wing populism (Fahey et al., 2022). Segregation also generates opposing views regarding government's ethnic-based favoritism, increasing the probability that a White British respondent feels that the government treats ethnic minorities better and that a South Asian respondent reports that the government treats people of their ethnicity unfairly. Again, beliefs that the government

has not gone far enough to provide equal opportunities for ethnic minorities is associated with liberal views while beliefs it has gone too far are common among far right supporters (Butt et al., 2022; Sobolewska & Ford, 2019).

To identify the channels through which settlement patterns influence political views and voting behavior, we consider two theories of prejudice: contact theory and concentration theory. Contact theory states that increased (positive) intergroup interaction will reduce prejudiced beliefs (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998) while concentration theory posits that segregation reinforces prejudice by highlighting within-group homogeneity and cross-group cultural distance (Hawley, 1944). We look for evidence of each by studying the impacts of settlement patterns on a lack of intergroup contact and perceptions of cultural-based social identity, respectively.

In our sample, 89% of White British respondents say that all or most of their coworkers are of the same ethnicity while 25%, 55%, and 32% of South Asian respondents say that all or most of their coworkers, friends, or neighbors, respectively, belong to the same ethnic group.[3] OLS specifications would suggest that increased segregation is associated with increased isolation across each of these measures. IV results that account for endogenous location decisions are consistent for South Asian isolation, though less precisely estimated, but suggest no effect of segregation on White British workplace isolation.

We present evidence that segregation generates a gap in majority-minority views on British identity that is likely to be self-reinforcing and might be exploited by groups like the BNP. We show that segregation increases the probability that a South Asian respondent self-identifies as 'Asian not British' (significant at 10%) and reports no commonality with other British people. We then demonstrate that segregation increases the probability that White British respondents define British identity in a manner more likely to exclude the targeted minority (being born in Britain, having British ancestry, practicing British traditions, and speaking English).

Related Literature. This paper relates to several literatures. First, this work adds to the literature studying the importance of minority group settlement patterns in shaping political views and behavior. Most existing work finds that a rise in the (relative) number of immigrants or refugees generates increased support for right-wing politics in Europe (Barone et al., 2016; Brunner & Kuhn, 2018; Dal Bó et al., 2021; Dustmann et al., 2018; Halla et al., 2017; Harmon, 2018; Steinmayr, 2021) and the US (Tiburcio & Camarena, 2023; Tabellini, 2020). However, other work identifies important heterogeneity based on, for example, the length of exposure to

[3]Based on relative population shares, the average probability that any *two* randomly selected individuals in a constituency are both White British or both South Asian is 75% and 9%, respectively.

minority groups (Bursztyn et al., 2024; Steinmayr, 2021) or a rural-urban divide (Dustmann et al., 2018). Further, increased exposure to one minority group might induce support for policies benefiting another (Fouka & Tabellini, 2022). In seeking to identify the *causal* effect of increased minority exposure on right-wing political support, existing work, however, has focused largely on a single dimension: the group's size. Our methodology instead allows us to isolate plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to a targeted minority group based separately on its relative size and its spatial distribution. Importantly, we find strong evidence for the effects of South Asian-White British segregation on political views and behavior while the results for the South Asian minority share are less consistent.[4]

Within this literature, there has been a nearly exclusive focus on the effect of majority-minority exposure on the political views and behavior of the majority – a key exception, Ananat and Washington (2009) consider changes in the political attitudes and behavior of both Blacks and non-Blacks in explaining the effect of segregation on Black political efficacy. We consider political beliefs associated with support for right-wing populism and with backlash to right-wing support (Dal Bó et al., 2021; Fahey et al., 2022; Norris & Ingelhart, 2019; Wodak, 2015) as well as beliefs regarding government's relative treatment of ethnic minorities. We demonstrate that segregation shifts each group in different dimensions but towards beliefs that suggest increased dissatisfaction and ethnic-based resentment with government. Our work therefore highlights that majority-minority segregation has a significant influence on the political views of both groups, a point that is largely missed when only considering aggregate patterns.

By investigating the underlying social beliefs and behavior affected by settlement patterns, this paper speaks to work incorporating social identity (Tajfel, 1974; Turner, 1975) into models of economic and political decision-making (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Shayo (2009)). We provide evidence consistent with identity conflict as a mechanism linking ethnic segregation to political behavior: segregation induces the majority to impose a stricter definition of the national identity that excludes the minority group while the minority views itself as more distant from the national identity.[5] Recent work by Bonomi et al. (2021) further connects temporal changes in political conflict to changes in the salience of alternative dimensions of

[4]Prior studies in sociology demonstrate the correlation between segregation and extreme right support (e.g., Biggs and Knauss (2011), Bowyer (2008), and van der Waal et al. (2013)); Dustmann et al. (2018) explore whether interaction (an index combining variation in a minority's size and spatial distribution) can explain rural-urban heterogeneity in the influence of immigration on extreme right support. Relatedly, Ananat and Washington (2009) establish the effect of Black-White segregation on Black political efficacy controlling for the Black population share.

[5]Prior work also suggests that segregation leads to increased hostility and prejudiced views among the majority towards the minority group (e.g., Dustmann et al. (2018), Dustmann et al. (2011), and Bowyer (2009)).

social identity. Consistent with this model, our event study demonstrates the South Asian-White British division in social identity, measured by segregation, only begins driving BNP support after the party's shift to targeting Asian Muslims (also coinciding with several domestic and international events highlighting Islamic extremism). This paper also complements work by Bazzi et al. (2019) which finds that in the more diverse context of Indonesia, ethnic segregation mutes the effect of diversity (intergroup contact) on the formation of a national identity and work by Giuliano and Tabellini (2020) which shows that integration can promote cultural transmission from immigrants in forming a national political ideology.

Finally, we relate to a broader literature testing for evidence of intergroup contact theory (e.g., Bursztyn et al. (2024), Corno et al. (2022), Mousa (2020) and papers discussed by Paluck et al. (2019)). Again, this literature tends to focus on the impacts of contact on prejudiced beliefs of the majority, with the exception of some recent experimental studies (see Lowe (2021) and Ghosh (2022)). We provide evidence that the influence of settlement patterns on contact with other groups may not be symmetric: while increased South Asian-White British segregation is associated with workplace ethnic isolation for both groups, accounting for endogenous settlement patterns reveals an effect on South Asian but not White British individuals.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our data and introduces the context. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy we employ to estimate the effect of South Asian settlement patterns on BNP support and reports the empirical results and robustness checks. Sections 4 and 5 study the effects of South Asian settlement patterns on political and social beliefs, respectively. Section 6 concludes.

2 Data and Background

We begin this section with a discussion of the data used in our analyses (see Appendix A for further details). We then provide a brief background of the BNP and the party's targeting of South Asians. Finally, we introduce our measures of South Asian settlement patterns.

2.1 Data

Ethnicity. We obtain population data for England and Wales by detailed ethnicity from the 2011 UK Census. We construct population counts for the White British majority group based on individuals that identify their race as white and ethnicity as English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British (80 percent of the total population). For the South Asian minority group, we

include all individuals that identify as non-white with a detailed ethnic category that lists a country, region, or group associated with South Asia (India, Tamil, etc.) – in 2011, South Asians constitute the largest minority group at 5.9 percent of the population. We categorize all remaining individuals into broad ethnic categories as shown in Appendix Table A.1. We also use the 1971 UK Census to construct historical population counts of White British and South Asian individuals defined as those born in the UK and those born in India, Pakistan/Bangladesh, or Sri Lanka, respectively (data on ethnicity is not available).

Immigration. We identify immigration waves from each region of the world to each neighborhood in England and Wales using population counts by country/region of birth and the year of last arrival to the UK from the 2011 UK Census. We define waves of migration based on the periods for which year of arrival to the UK is reported: before 1961, 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2003, 2004-2006, 2007-2009, and 2010-2011. In each period t, we measure the number of migrants from each region of the world r to a neighborhood i, $I^t_{r,i}$.

Demographics. To measure the socioeconomic characteristics of a constituency, we collect data from the 2011 UK census. We use data on the share of the population assigned to each "approximate social grade," an estimate of a person's socioeconomic class on a 4-point scale based on occupation, employment status (employee, self-employed, etc.), highest level of education, housing tenure, and working status (full-time, etc.). We divide constituencies into quintiles based on the share of the constituency's population classified as belonging to the lowest social grade as our primary measure of relative inequality across constituencies. We also construct the share of households living in social housing, the share of the population that is considered deprived in at least one of four dimensions (employment, education, health/disability, and housing), and the share of economically active individuals working in each of eight industry categories.

Voting. General elections for members to the British Parliament are based on first-past-the-post elections across Westminster parliamentary constituencies. We construct the vote share for the BNP in each constituency for the 2010 General Election as a measure of local support for the party – the BNP ran in about 57% of constituencies (Rallings & Thrasher, 2010). Additionally, we use voting data from the 1983, 1997, 2001, 2005, and 2015 General Elections (Fox & Crewe, 1984; Johnston et al., 1999; Norris, 2005; Rallings & Thrasher, 2019).

Identity, Contact, and Political Beliefs. We use data from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) to construct a sample of individuals that identify as South Asian (i.e,

list ethnicity as Indian, Bangladeshi, or Pakistani) (Fisher et al., 2012) and from the 2010 British Election Study (BES) to create a sample of individuals who identify as White British (Whiteley & Sanders, August 2014); these post-election surveys involve face-to-face interviews and/or mailed/online surveys that elicit information on political attitudes and behavior. We obtain responses to questions on intergroup contact, self-determined identity, feelings of commonality with others, trust in institutions, and satisfaction with democracy and government. We collect data for White British respondents from the 2017 and 2019 BES post-election surveys for questions regarding the characteristics that define British identity (Fieldhouse et al., 2017; Fieldhouse et al., 2022).

The BES and EMBES samples are designed to be representative of the population of eligible voters and the minority population of eligible voters, respectively. Appendix Table A.2 provides summary statistics for all constituencies and the constituencies of respondents for each sample. The average constituency of 2010 BES and 2017/2019 BES White British respondents does not differ from the average constituency in England and Wales in terms of segregation but has a slightly smaller South Asian minority share and share of the population designated as the lowest social grade; the 2010 BES sample average constituency also differs from the average constituency in England and Wales in having a smaller vote share for the BNP (significant at 10%). The 2010 EMBES South Asian respondents tend to be drawn from constituencies with a higher South Asian minority share on average as well as higher South Asian-White British segregation and share of the population assigned the lowest social grade.

2.2 The British National Party (BNP)

The BNP was formed in 1982, after splitting from the National Front, with the stated goal of safeguarding the future of Britain's native peoples (British National Party (2005) as cited in Wood and Finlay (2008)). While the party falls definitively outside the boundaries of mainstream British politics, electoral success in the early 2000s saw the BNP make further inroads into political representation than any other extreme right party in the history of Great Britain. This success culminated in the BNP winning two seats in the 2009 European Parliament Election and fielding 338 candidates in the 2010 General Election to become the fifth largest party in British politics in terms of total votes (Goodwin, 2011; Wodak, 2015). The party has since fallen out of electoral politics, contesting only one seat in the 2019 General Election.

The BNP sets itself apart even among parties of the extreme right: Copsey (2007) argues against designating the party as national-populist due to its neo-fascist and nationalist ideology.

Norris and Ingelhart (2019) label the BNP as a White Supremacist party at the "extreme fringe" of authoritarian-populist parties; the median BNP supporter exhibits political values that place them at the far right of British politics in terms of authoritarianism and second only to UKIP in terms of populism.

A primary focus of the BNP's 2010 political manifesto is anti-immigration policies. However, the central theme of the manifesto – entitled "Democracy, Freedom, Culture and Identity" – is not the threat of immigration to the general economic prosperity of natives, but the threat to the very existence of the British people and their identity. The party places a specific target on Asian Muslims, pointing to the birth rates of ethnically South Asian women and the use of South Asian languages in London schools as evidence of the threat to indigenous British majority status. The manifesto devotes a section to claiming that Islam is incompatible with British ideals and calls for a complete ban on migration from Muslim countries (BNP, 2010).

This particular focus on Asian Muslims began in the early 2000s, coinciding with Nick Griffin becoming leader in 1999. Griffin himself was convicted (and jailed) for inciting racial hatred related to anti-Semitism as editor of a BNP magazine in the mid-1990s but by the mid-2000s was charged (and acquitted) for inciting racial hatred related to anti-Islam/anti-Muslim speech (Valley, 2009). In 2001, Griffin stood for election in Oldham West and Royton, an area known to be suffering from increasing South Asian-White British ethnic tension (Watt & Etim, 2001) – soon after, Oldham was the site of a series of events involving South Asian-White British ethnic-based rioting and violence. In 2010, Griffin first contested a seat in Barking but then also contested the neighboring Oldham East and Saddleworth seat in a by-election – a by-election called after judges determined the Labour candidate lied to win the seat, handing out leaflets accusing the Liberal Democrats candidate of catering to Islamist extremists (Mulholland, 2010). In 2018, when the last standing BNP local councillor retired, he pointed to the London bombings in aiding the growth of the party (Pidd, 2018). This anecdotal evidence linking BNP's political success to the targeting of South Asians is supported by existing work tying the settlement patterns of South Asian communities to support for the BNP in the local elections of the early 2000s (Bowyer, 2008) and BNP membership (Biggs & Knauss, 2011).

2.3 South Asian Settlement Patterns

While the literature on residential segregation proposes several measures that each capture different dimensions of segregation, we use the traditional measures of this field: the dissimilarity

index and minority share (Massey & Denton, 1988). The dissimilarity index is given by

$$\text{Dissimilarity}_L = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in L} \left| \frac{x_i}{x_L} - \frac{w_i}{w_L} \right| \tag{1}$$

where x_i is the population of the minority group and w_i is the population of the majority group in neighborhood i of constituency L while x_L and w_L are the comparable measures at the constituency level. The dissimilarity index aggregates the difference in the proportion of the constituency's targeted minority population living in each neighborhood relative to the proportion of the constituency's majority population located in that neighborhood. The index takes its minimum value of 0 when the two ethnic groups are spread across a constituency's neighborhoods in equal proportion. The index takes its maximum value of 1 when the constituency consists of perfectly monoethnic neighborhoods. The dissimilarity index, therefore, seeks to capture the relative spatial evenness of the minority group's settlement patterns. We use the constituency-level minority share $\frac{x_L}{t_L}$, where t_L is the constituency's total population, to measure the minority group's relative size. We can see in Figure 1 that the two measures, while positively correlated, capture separate variation in South Asian settlement patterns. To further demonstrate this difference, Panel A of Figure 2 maps the South Asian population relative to the South Asian-White British population in each neighborhood for Oldham East and Saddleworth and Uxbridge and South Ruislip, constituencies with a similar minority share but very different dissimilarity; Panel B provides comparable maps for Leicester East and Wrexham, which have nearly identical dissimilarity but minority shares of 54% and 2%, respectively.

Growth in Segregation. From 1971 to 2011, South Asian-White British segregation increased in just over 60% of constituencies (see Panel A of Figure 3). To understand what drove this rise, we reconstruct the growth in segregation under two counterfactual settings: (1) South Asian settlement patterns are held constant as in 1971 and only changes in White British settlement patterns are considered (Panel B) and (2) White British settlement patterns are held constant and only changes in South Asian settlement pattern are considered (Panel C). Under the first counterfactual experiment, segregation would have increased in more constituencies (about 80%) – possibly indicative of 'white flight' – but changes in White British settlement patterns do not appear to be the driving force for the observed changes in segregation (correlation of 0.2). Instead, the second counterfactual suggests that changes in South Asian settlement patterns largely explain the observed changes in segregation (correlation of 0.9).

3 Political Behavior

To determine how South Asian settlement patterns affect political behavior, we consider specifications of the form

$$V_L = \beta Dissimilarity_L + \zeta Minority\ Share_L + C_L + \delta_G + e_L \tag{2}$$

where V_L is the vote share in constituency L, $Dissimilarity_L$ is the dissimilarity index, $Minority\ Share_L$ is the South Asian population share, and δ_G represents Government Office Region (GOR) indicator variables.[6] The size and spatial distribution of a constituency's ethnic minority community may correlate with the socioeconomic makeup of the constituency, which in turn may influence voting behavior; therefore, we divide constituencies into quintiles based on the share of the population classified as belonging to the lowest social grade and include these indicators as controls (C_L). Importantly, V_L measures the vote share of a constituency for all valid votes and therefore aggregates voting by all ethnic groups.

A clear threat to identification for β and ζ is unobserved ethnic-based sentiments: the antipathy for South Asians that drives BNP voting may also influence the settlement patterns of South Asians. Consider constituencies with a high level of anti-South Asian sentiment, which may be readily observable through everyday interactions or demonstrations by groups like the National Front, BNP, or English Defense League (depending upon the time period). In these constituencies, measures may be put in place to limit the settlement of South Asians in 'white neighborhoods' or South Asians might respond by self-isolating into specific neighborhoods or by moving out of the constituency entirely. These effects will be compounded over time if new South Asian migrants are more likely to settle in neighborhoods with an established South Asian community. To overcome this issue, as well as concerns regarding other omitted contemporaneous factors that influence both settlement patterns and voting, we construct instruments for the settlement patterns of the South Asian community using historical immigration patterns.

3.1 Instrument Construction

To construct instruments for the minority share and dissimilarity index, our baseline instrumentation strategy focuses on identifying exogenous variation in South Asian settlement patterns. Though we find that changes in segregation have largely been driven by changes in South Asian

[6] Constituencies are wholly located within GORs, with 9 English regions and Wales as a single region.

settlement patterns, we will later address the potential influence of endogenous White British settlement decisions in alternative instruments as a robustness check of our baseline IV results.

Minority Share. We estimate the population of ethnically South Asian individuals in a given neighborhood i in 2011, x_i, as

$$x_i = \alpha_L + \sum_{t=1961}^{2009} \sigma^t I^t_{r,-L} \frac{I^t_{-r,i}}{I^t_{-r}} + \nu_i \tag{3}$$

where α_L are indicators for the constituency L in which neighborhood i is located.[7] The push factor, $I^t_{r,-L}$, is the total number of immigrants from the minority group's region of origin r into England and Wales in period t, leaving out those that moved into the constituency L. The pull factor, $\frac{I^t_{-r,i}}{I^t_{-r}}$, is the fraction of all immigrants to England and Wales in period t that choose to locate in neighborhood i, leaving out those from origin region r. In other words, we interact the number of immigrants from South Asia to *all other constituencies* in England and Wales in each immigration wave with the share of immigrants from *all regions other than South Asia* that move to neighborhood i in that wave. We remove South Asian migrants to constituency L of neighborhood i from the push factor to ensure that this select group of South Asian is not driving variation in aggregate migration flows from South Asia. Likewise, by excluding South Asian immigrants from the pull factor, we estimate the size of the South Asian community in a neighborhood that can be explained by the relative location choices of all other immigrants to England and Wales in that period. The sum of these push-pull interactions for a given neighborhood then aggregates the location's relative attractiveness to the 'average' migrant over time, weighting by each period's aggregate flow of immigrants from South Asia to other regions of England and Wales. The instrument is meant to abstract from attributes of the neighborhood that specifically attract or deter South Asians, such as anti-South Asian sentiment or ethnic enclave effects. Instead the instrument measures the part of location choice that is dependent on factors affecting all immigrant communities, such as the availability of jobs or housing. We then aggregate the predicted neighborhood-level South Asian populations to generate the predicted constituency-level share of South Asians in the population as

$$\widehat{\textit{Minority Share}}_L = \frac{\sum_{i \in L} \hat{x}_i}{t_L}, \text{ where } \hat{x}_i = \max\left\{0, \sum_{t=1961}^{2009} \hat{\sigma}^t I^t_{r,-L} \frac{I^t_{-r,i}}{I^t_{-r}}\right\}.^{8} \tag{4}$$

[7] We consider electoral outcomes in 2010 and so we exclude from the sum over push-pull interactions all migration that occurs between 2009 and 2011.

Dissimilarity Index. We estimate the share of constituency L's South Asian population living in neighborhood i as

$$\frac{x_i}{x_L} = \alpha_L + \sum_{t=1961}^{2009} \gamma^t \frac{I^t_{r,-L}}{I_{r,-L}} \frac{I^t_{-r,i}}{I^t_{-r,L}} + \epsilon_i \tag{5}$$

where α_L are constituency-level indicator variables as before. The pull factor in this case, $\frac{I^t_{-r,i}}{I^t_{-r,L}}$ is the fraction of all immigrants to constituency L in period t from regions other than r that choose to locate in neighborhood i . The push factor, $\frac{I^t_{r,-L}}{I_{r,-L}}$, is now the share of all immigrants (as opposed to the count) from the minority group's region of origin r into England and Wales in period t, less those that moved into the constituency L. The aggregation of the push-pull interactions measures the relative pull of a neighborhood i within the constituency L for the average migrant over time, weighting by the relative size of the aggregate flow of migrants from South Asia to other regions of England and Wales. We then construct the constituency-level segregation instrument as

$$\widehat{Dissimilarity}_L = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in L} \left| \frac{\widehat{x_i}}{x_L} - \frac{w_i}{w_L} \right|, \text{ where } \frac{\widehat{x_i}}{x_L} = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ 0, \sum_{t=1961}^{2009} \widehat{\gamma}^t \frac{I^t_{r,-L}}{I_{r,-L}} \frac{I^t_{-r,i}}{I^t_{-r,L}} \right\}, 1 \right\}, \tag{6}$$

and again predict the ratio using only the estimated coefficients for the push-pull interactions.[9]

Identifying Assumption. The identifying assumption is that, conditional on controlling for regional and relative socioeconomic variation, any omitted factor that determines voting for the BNP in a given constituency does not also influence variation in settlement patterns explained by: (1) the historical location decisions of non-South Asian immigrants or (2) the contemporaneous location of the White British population. There are three primary avenues by which the identifying assumption might be violated. First, a concern is that the relative 'pull' of a neighborhood during historical migration waves, as measured by the location decisions of non-South Asian immigrants, was influenced by the beliefs underlying current support for the BNP (e.g., a generalized antipathy for ethnic minorities). Second, the contemporaneous

[8] We restrict the predicted population counts to be positive and so set the predicted count to 0 if the sum over the predicted push-pull effects is negative (this occurs for less than 2% of neighborhoods in our baseline specification). Panel A of Appendix Figure A.1 depicts the relationship between the predicted neighborhood-level South Asian population ($\hat{x}_i$) and the observed population (x_i).

[9] In the construction of the instrument we set the predicted ratio to 0 or 1 in cases where the predicted ratio falls below or above the interval $[0, 1]$, respectively (this occurs in less than 1% of neighborhoods in our baseline specification). Panel B of Appendix Figure A.1 plots the relationship between the predicted and observed neighborhood-level South Asian population ratio ($\frac{\widehat{x_i}}{x_L}$ and $\frac{x_i}{x_L}$, respectively).

settlement patterns of the White British majority may reflect beliefs that determine voting for the BNP and also drive segregation (i.e., white flight). Third, the exclusion restriction would be violated if the instruments predicted voting for the BNP through channels other than their influence on South Asian settlement patterns – i.e., if the pull factors determining past non-South Asian settlement correlate with current location-specific characteristics, such as inequality or economic vulnerability, that themselves drive voting for the BNP. We present robustness checks that speak to each of these concerns in Section 3.3.

3.2 Main Results

Panel A of Table 1 displays estimations of Equation 2. OLS results in column 1 suggest a positive correlation between the segregation of a constituency's South Asian community and voting for the BNP while voting for the BNP is decreasing in the relative size of the South Asian minority group. The comparable IV estimate in column 2 confirms these patterns and the first stage regression results, shown in Panel B of the table, demonstrate that the instruments separately identify variation in each of the endogenous regressors. We may naively expect the OLS results to be biased away from 0 if unobserved anti-South Asian sentiment increases both BNP voting and segregation. However, because individuals are not restricted to only move across neighborhoods *within* a constituency but might also move *across* constituencies, the influence of anti-South Asian sentiment on settlement patterns in a given constituency is ambiguous. Empirically, we find that the IV coefficients are greater in magnitude.

We find that a one standard deviation increase in segregation causes a rise in the BNP's vote share of about 41 percent relative to mean for the UK General Election. In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in the share of the South Asian population reduces voting for the BNP by 48 percent relative to the mean; however, eligible voters include all UK citizens and Commonwealth Citizens and so this result likely reflects, to some degree, the fact that non-White British voters are unlikely to vote for the BNP – this issue is further addressed in our discussion of spillover effects below. While the baseline specification measures the combined extensive margin (decision to field a BNP candidate) and intensive margin (vote share conditional on running) we find similar results when isolating to the intensive margin (columns 3 and 4): a standard deviation rise in segregation or decline in the minority share increases the BNP's vote share relative to mean by 23% and 22%, respectively.

Culture × Economics. Our baseline specification includes indicators for quintiles of the population in the lowest social grade and so we measure the effect of settlement patterns

on voting *within* constituencies with comparable socioeconomic status. A key question in the political economy literature, however, is whether the *interaction* of cultural and economic factors drives the recent rise in right-wing populism (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2022). To assess the degree to which cultural and economic factors might interact, in Table 2 we separately estimate the effects of settlement patterns for areas with high and low socioeconomic status. The OLS results suggest that the effect of settlement patterns on support for the BNP is entirely driven by constituencies with low socioeconomic status (column 1); however, when we instrument for South Asian settlement patterns using historical immigration, we find the effects of settlement patterns exist in both sets of constituencies (column 2). Not accounting for endogenous sorting then generates potentially misleading results.

Salience. Our baseline specification seeks to separately estimate two dimensions of settlement patterns, the targeted minority's relative size and its spatial distribution; however, it is possible that these dimensions interact. While South Asians represent the largest minority group in England and Wales in 2011, the median constituency was less than 2% South Asian and one in four constituencies were less than 0.7% South Asian. In Table 2, we re-estimate Equation 2 after separately binning constituencies into those with a large and small minority share using the cutoff of 3.4% (the 66^{th} percentile). OLS results suggest that the influence of South Asian settlement patterns on voting for the BNP is entirely driven by constituencies with a relatively large South Asian community (column 3). IV results show the same pattern for segregation but fail to reject equality in the effect of the minority share across constituencies with small/large minority communities (column 4). Overall, the findings are consistent with minority settlement patterns only influencing support for the BNP when variation in those patterns is salient – e.g., when the South Asian community is large enough to be visible even if segregated.

Spillovers. We consider the influence of settlement patterns at the level of the constituency as this is the level at which voting occurs. However, it could be that an individual's views are not solely influenced by segregation in their own constituency but also the greater area in which they live. For this reason, in Table 3 we add to the baseline regression the average of the dissimilarity index and minority share for all neighboring/adjacent constituencies – we instrument for each of these measures using the average of the corresponding instruments. While OLS results suggest a small and not statistically significant effect of neighbors' segregation on voting for the BNP, IV results show that a standard deviation rise in the average of neighbors' segregation increases the BNP vote share by 30% relative to mean. On the other hand, OLS results suggest that White British voters respond to a larger South Asian minority share in neighboring constituencies by

increasing support for the BNP – note, unlike the constituency-specific minority share, here the increase in neighbors' South Asian community does not 'mechanically' decrease the BNP vote share because these individuals do not vote in the constituency of interest; however, the effect is not precisely estimated once accounting for endogenous settlement patterns.

3.3 Robustness

Alternative Instruments. In Table 4, we consider alternative constructions of our baseline instruments as robustness checks to address possible violations of the identifying assumption. First, the IV strategy relies on the past settlement patterns of non-South Asian immigrants to predict South Asian settlement patterns. It it is possible that the location choices of non-South Asian immigrants were driven by the same antipathy that may determine contemporaneous South Asian settlement patterns and voting for the BNP. To address this issue, we reconstruct the instrument dropping immigrants from ethnic groups that might be expected to face a similar antipathy due to their (perceived) ethnicity or religion; specifically, we use only the settlement patterns of Europeans from outside the UK and Ireland (column 2). Second, our instrument strategy does not similarly predict White British settlement patterns; the antipathy that underlies voting for the BNP may drive White British individuals to segregate themselves into non-South Asian neighborhoods (e.g., 'white flight'), which in turn may influence current settlement patterns. Therefore, we reconstruct our instruments fixing White British settlement patterns as they were 40 years prior: we replace 2011 with 1971 White British population shares in Equation 6 and the 2011 population with the 1971 population in Equation 4 (column 3). Comparing the regression results in each case to the baseline in column 1, we find that our coefficient estimates remain largely unchanged and are precisely estimated, even though the predictive power is reduced to a degree for these alternative instruments.[10]

Location Characteristics. A remaining concern is that the features of a location that determine historical immigration patterns (a neighborhood's pull factor) influence voting for the BNP through channels other than settlement patterns. In addition to the significant work tying exposure to immigration to increased support for extreme right parties in Europe, other work demonstrates that vulnerability to economic shocks or austerity may also be key drivers (e.g., Dal Bó et al. (2017) and Fetzer (2019)); neighborhoods and constituencies that drew in migrants historically might systematically differ in access to public goods, such as affordable

[10]Further, we show that while South Asian-White British segregation is significantly correlated with voting for the BNP, the segregation of other groups is not (see Appendix Table A.3).

housing, or other socioeconomic characteristics, such as inequality, that relate to these drivers. In Table 5, we consider the degree to which these alternative mechanisms might explain our results by controlling for location characteristics in 2011. While the instrumentation strategy relies on the past settlement choices of non-South Asian immigrants, our results are robust to controlling for exposure to immigration (column 2). We also find that the results are not simply driven by a correlation between settlement patterns and variation in inequality: accounting for economic vulnerability (column 3) or the socioeconomic distribution (column 4) causes some fluctuation in the coefficients but does not change our main results. Finally, we demonstrate that while voting for the BNP may be correlated with a higher share of employment in certain industries, the industrial makeup of each constituency does not drive our results (column 5).

Placebo Instrument. As previously discussed, the potential concerns regarding violations of the identifying assumption come from two sources in instrument construction: (1) the use of historical non-South Asian immigrant settlement patterns to measure the 'pull factor' and (2) the inclusion of current White British settlement patterns in the instrument for segregation. In the previous sections, we show our results are robust to using alternative measures for each of these instrument components that are unlikely to suffer from endogeneity concerns and to controlling for potential correlates of instrumented settlement patterns shown to relate to extreme right support. As an alternative test, we reconstruct our instruments fixing these components as in the baseline instruments but replacing the South Asian 'push factors' in Equations 3 and 5 with the comparable push factors for Europeans (e.g., we replace aggregate South Asian immigration flows with European flows). In Table 6, we compare the reduced form effect of our instruments for South Asian settlement patterns (columns 1 and 3) to these placebo instruments (columns 2 and 4) to consider the degree to which these instrument components might directly explain support for the BNP. The instrument and placebo instrument are, by construction, highly correlated and yet we find that the placebo segregation instrument does not predict BNP voting.[11] On the other hand, the placebo instrument for the minority share does predict a reduction in voting for the BNP – because the placebo instrument predicts an increased (European) ethnic minority share, this may again in part reflect the fact that non-White British individuals are unlikely to vote for the BNP.

[11] A test for rejecting the equality of the IV and placebo coefficients has a p-value of 0.11 and 0.08 in a regression with all constituencies and constituencies in which the BNP ran, respectively.

3.4 Dynamics of Segregation Effect on Extreme Politics

Aggregate voting data does not allow us to identify the individuals that switch to supporting the BNP or separately identify voting patterns for White British and South Asian voters; however, we can explore the dynamics of the relationship between South Asian-White British segregation and political support. To do so, we construct a panel dataset using six general elections (1983, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, and 2015) and consider the specification

$$V_{L,t} = \alpha_L + \alpha_t + \sum_{k=1997}^{2010} \beta_k Dissimlarity_{L,1971} \times D_k + \zeta_k Minority\ Share_{L,1971} \times D_k + \varepsilon_{L,t} \quad (7)$$

where $V_{L,t}$ is an electoral outcome, $Dissimlarity_{1971}$ and $Minority\ Share_{1971}$ are 1971 South Asian-White British segregation and South Asian minority share (standardized measures), D_k is an indicator for each election k, and α_t and α_L are election and constituency fixed effects – the 1983 General Election is treated as a baseline so β_{1983} and ζ_{1983} are omitted (except for UKIP regressions in which the 1997 General Election is treated as baseline).[12] In a second specification, we add interactions between the indicators D_k and controls for the 1971 measures of the foreign-born share, public housing share, and the share of economically-active individuals in each of nine socioeconomic group categories and each of seven industry categories; in our most conservative specification, we additionally add region-by-election fixed effects α_{Gt}.

Panel A of Figure 4 shows that historical South Asian-White British segregation only begins to influence voting for the BNP in the 2000s, coinciding with the shift in BNP rhetoric to targeting Asian Muslims.[13] This result is specific to the BNP and not a general pattern in extreme right support: Panel B shows that the UKIP vote share declines in constituencies with higher historical South Asian-White British segregation during the 2000s until 2015. Panels C through E of Figure 4 demonstrate a simultaneous shift in the importance of historical South Asian-White British segregation for voting for the main British parties. Beginning in the 2000s, we find lower support for the center-right and center Conservative and Liberal Democrats parties and increased support for the center-left Labour party in constituencies that experienced higher levels of segregation historically. These patterns are robust to controlling for non-linear time trends in historical socioeconomic factors; the patterns for extreme right voting remain but the results for the main parties tend not to be robust in the most conservative specification that

[12] For the elections considered, the BNP stood for election in 172, 117, 63, 156, 325, and 8 constituencies and UKIP stood for election beginning in 1997 in 109, 472, 509, 530, and 573 constituencies.

[13] Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5 provide full regression results and Appendix Table A.6 provides regression results showing that segregation does not affect BNP support in 1983 (see Appendix A for further details).

additionally removes a region-specific non-linear time trend (results for Labour support remain significant at 10%).

Overall, our findings suggest that the BNP's shift to targeting Asian Muslims in the 2000s succeeded in gaining electoral support in areas with higher South Asian-White British segregation; when the BNP stops widely contesting elections in 2015, segregation instead increases support for the party that is closest on the left-right political spectrum. Further, this shift in support for the extreme right appears to only reflect half of a larger story, with simultaneous movements in electoral support towards the center-left in constituencies with higher historical South Asian-White British segregation.

4 Political Views

In studying support for extreme political views, voting data has the advantage of allowing us to consider realized political behavior. However, aggregate data has the disadvantages, for example, that it is not measured separately by ethnicity and does not allow us to take into account strategic voting. In this section, we rely on individual-level survey data to determine how ethnic settlement patterns affect political views associated with authoritarian-populism and ethnic-based resentment with government.

We first limit our sample to individuals who identify as White British to estimate the degree to which South Asian settlement patterns push majority individuals towards political views associated with the BNP. However, we also consider the parallel effects for South Asian individuals. While variation in settlement patterns may be the antecedent cause of changes in either or both group's political views, each group's subsequent behavior might affect that of the other in a manner that amplifies or mutes the initial effects.

To study political views, we consider linear probability models of the form

$$Belief_{jL} = \beta Dissimilarity_L + \zeta Minority\ Share_L + X_j'\sigma + C_L + \delta_G + \eta_L \tag{8}$$

where $Belief_{jL}$ is a measure of individual j's response to a survey question, $Dissimilarity_L$ measures South Asian-White British segregation in the individual's parliamentary constituency, $Minority\ Share_L$ is the South Asian population share in the constituency, and X_j include the individual's age, an indicator for identifying as female, and an indicator for university equivalent education. We include region indicators δ_G and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade C_L.

As before, a key concern for identification is the potential influence of unobserved ethnic-based sentiments on both political views and South Asian-White British settlement patterns – i.e., the possibility that anti-South Asian sentiment among White British individuals or preference for homophily among South Asian individuals is reflected in political beliefs and drives South Asian settlement decisions. To overcome this concern, we will use the instrumental variables strategy previously described. To alleviate concerns that IV results are driven by correlations between instrumented settlement patterns and local factors, we also consider the robustness of our results to controlling for location-based characteristics (immigration, economic vulnerability, inequality, and industry) that have previously been shown to influence support for extreme right political views.

Government Institutions and Democracy. Distrust in institutions has been identified as a defining feature of right-wing populism (Dal Bó et al., 2021; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2022; Norris & Ingelhart, 2019). On the other hand, dissatisfaction with democracy has been shown to represent a response of the general public to the electoral success of right-wing parties (Fahey et al., 2022). While it is possible that these contrasting views among different segments of society might be generated in response to one another, we consider whether ethnic settlement patterns might also be a driver.

In Table 7, we measure distrust with an indicator that takes a value of 1 for a response of 0 to 2 on a 10-point scale to a question about how much one trusts a given institution. We consider the effect of settlement patterns on distrust in parliament, politicians, and the police for White British individuals (columns 1 to 3) and South Asian individuals (column 5 to 7), respectively. For a given institution, 3% to 15% of White British respondents and 5% to 13% of South Asian respondents report distrust; therefore, while there is variation across institutions and groups, distrust appears to be low on average. However, we see that South Asian-White British segregation results in an increased probability of expressing distrust in institutions for White British respondents (significant at 10% for parliament and police); as shown in Appendix Figure A.2, the coefficient estimates remain largely unchanged in regressions adding controls for factors such as immigration or economic vulnerability that have been shown to influence support for right-wing populism (the results for parliament and police do not remain statistically significant at 10% in all cases). For South Asians, segregation does not appear to generate distrust.

We also examine the relationship between ethnic settlement patterns and the probability that a respondent states that they are very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in the country (response of 4 on a 4-point scale). On average, the probability of expressing

dissatisfaction is low (8%) and does not meaningfully differ across groups. While we find no effect of segregation on White British respondents' dissatisfaction with democracy (column 4), segregation increases the probability that a South Asian individual reports dissatisfaction (column 8).[14] Overall, these findings suggest that segregation leads both majority and minority individuals to be less satisfied with government, though for different reasons – we do not find consistent effects of the minority share on distrust and dissatisfaction for either group.

Ethnic-Based Favoritism. An entire section of the BNP political manifesto is dedicated to the subject of 'renationalizing' the welfare state to ensure that public goods are provided for 'the British people' first and not to 'foreign scroungers' (BNP, 2010). In Table 8, we assess the degree to which South Asian settlement patterns might influence individual's beliefs regarding government favoritism. While we find no effect of settlement patterns on White British respondents' belief that the government treats them unfairly (column 1), segregation increases the probability that a White British individual believes the government looks after ethnic minorities better than the majority (column 2). On the other hand, we find that segregation increases the probability that a South Asian individual believes that the government treats people like them (column 3) or of their ethnicity (column 4) unfairly. Again, controlling for local socioeconomic factors does not cause a significant change in the estimated effect of segregation on views regarding government favoritism – the results for White British respondents do not remain significant in all cases while those for South Asians do (see Appendix Figures A.2 and A.3). Segregation then pushes the groups in opposite directions, with White British respondents more likely to agree with the BNP's common refrain that minority groups are 'put first' by government while South Asian respondents are more likely to not only disagree but believe the opposite.

5 Mechanisms: Social Beliefs and Behavior

The sociology and social psychology literature provides theories that can be used to link the interactions of two ethnic groups, and their spatial settlement patterns, to prejudiced beliefs and antipathy. In this section, we consider the degree to which these theories might help explain the identified variation in political beliefs among both the majority and minority group. We

[14]Because the EMBES was a post-election survey, we may be concerned that this result reflects South Asian individuals's response to BNP electoral success. To allay this concern, we run a regression controlling for the 2010 BNP vote share as a possible mediator and find that the effect is in fact being driven by segregation (0.326, s.e. 0.116). We also find that the estimated effect is is robust to controlling for additional local factors that might influence political views (see Appendix Figure A.3).

again utilize the specification defined in Equation 8 to determine the influence of South Asian-White British settlement patterns on the behavior and beliefs of survey respondents.

Contact. The intergroup contact theory introduced by Allport (1954) posits that under certain conditions exposure of different groups to one another will reduce prejudice between them. Specifically, the theory predicts that cooperative interaction between two groups of perceived 'equal status' towards a common goal, acting within the boundaries of local customs, will reduce prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998). We test whether changes in intergroup contact might act as a bridge in explaining the effect of settlement patterns on extreme political views by estimating the effect of settlement patterns on measures of (a lack of) contact. We consider as an outcome an indicator for whether all or most of a White British respondent's coworkers belong to their own ethnic group in column 1 of Table 9 and the same for a South Asian respondent's coworkers, friends, neighbors, or co-worshipers in columns 2 through 5.

The probability of randomly picking two working individuals who are both White British in the White British respondents' constituencies is 79% on average while the probability of picking two Asian/Asian British workers in the South Asian respondents' constituencies is 9% on average; randomly picking three or four workers in this manner, the averages decline to 71% and 65% for White British and 5% and 2% for South Asian respondents, respectively. Yet, 89% of White British respondents and 25% of South Asian respondents say that all or most of their coworkers belong to their own ethnicity, suggesting segregation in the workplace that is not simply explained by the group's relative size. According to the OLS specifications, residential segregation exacerbates this with a one standard deviation increase associated with a rise in the probability of having all or mostly co-ethnic co-workers by 2 and 8 percentage points for White British and South Asian respondents, respectively. Similarly, a rise in segregation increases the probability a South Asian respondent has all or mostly co-ethnic friends and neighbors (we find no effect for co-worshipers). These effects exist when accounting for the South Asian minority share, which reduces the probability of having all or mostly co-ethnic coworkers for White British respondents (significant at 10%) and increases the probability of having of all or mostly co-ethnic friends and neighbors for South Asians.

When instrumenting for settlement patterns, the effect of segregation on the probability of having all co-ethnic coworkers moves towards 0 and is no longer statistically significant for White British respondents. This difference in results is consistent with bias in the OLS estimate driven by, for example, unobserved racism causing White British individuals to choose 'white' workplaces and South Asians to be segregated into 'non-white' neighborhoods. Another

explanation is that within group affinity among South Asians leads to self-segregation both in residential communities and the workplace. On the other hand, the effect of segregation remains significant for co-ethnic coworkers and neighbors (at 10%) for South Asian respondents; particularly for workplace isolation, these results are robust to controlling for location-specific characteristics, such as immigration or inequality, that might also influence contact across groups (see Appendix Figure A.3). While segregation then does not appear to lead to the seclusion of the majority White British, there is some evidence suggesting that it causes reduced intergroup contact for South Asians.

Identity. Concentration theory asserts that segregation of an outgroup highlights its within-group homogeneity and between-group differences, accentuating the majority group's perception of cultural differences and reinforcing prejudices (Hawley (1944) as cited in van der Waal et al. (2013)). The BNP's rhetoric exactly plays on this concern over cultural differences. The importance of national/cultural identity is a dominant theme in BNP rhetoric, with the party providing its own definition of British identity and warning of its impending extinction; the BNP also specifically highlights parts of Muslim culture that it argues are at odds with British ideals (BNP, 2010).

The 2010 BES surveys did not ask White British respondents about their perception of cultural differences with South Asian individuals but did ask South Asian respondents. Only 8% of all South Asian respondents identify as only Asian and not British, with the majority identifying as a mixture of the two. Only 16% of South Asian respondents say they have almost nothing in common with other British people. On average then, South Asian respondents see themselves as British or, at the least, as partly integrated within British society. However, across both OLS and IV specifications, segregation appears to cause South Asian respondents to more closely identify with their Asian identity and see greater differences with other British people – results that are largely robust to accounting for other location-based characteristics (see Appendix Figure A.3). A one standard deviation rise in segregation increases the probability of a respondent identifying as only Asian and reporting having nothing in common with other British people by 5 and 6 percentage points, respectively.

To understand the link between segregation of the South Asian community and White British concerns regarding identity, we utilize questions from the 2017 and 2019 BES surveys regarding which factors are important for "being truly British." Table 11 reports the effect of settlement patterns on the probability that a respondent considers it very important that an individual is born in Britain (column 1), has British ancestry (column 2), follows Britain's

customs and tradition (column 3), speaks English (column 4) or considers all four factors very important (column 5). According to the OLS specifications, segregation only affects the probability of finding ancestry, and the combination of all four characteristics, very important to being British. This is not innocuous as non-White British ancestry is the one characteristic which is inherent to being ethnically South Asian: while South Asians are born in Britain, take part in British traditions/culture, and speak English, they will always have South Asian ancestry. The results of the IV specifications demonstrate that segregation increases the probability that a White British respondent believes birthplace, ancestry, practicing British traditions (at 10%), and all four characteristics are very important. The influence of segregation on the importance White British place on ancestry and all four characteristics is robust to controlling for additional local factors. However, results for the importance placed on being born in Britain are not robust to controlling for a constituency's population share of non-South Asian immigrants while the results for British traditions are marginally significant at baseline and not statistically significant in most cases controlling for these additional factors (see Appendix Figure A.2).

6 Conclusion

What has led to the recent rise in extreme right politics in democratic countries? We focus on a key feature of extreme right rhetoric, the framing of society into a distinct native group ("us") in danger from a targeted minority ("them"), and ask where this division might appeal to voters. We propose that this categorization and ranking of society might take root in areas where ethnic minority settlement patterns make this particular social cleavage salient.

A key obstacle in identifying the influence of settlement patterns on political behavior is endogenous sorting: individual's location decisions may depend on unobserved local factors that themselves influence political behavior. To overcome this concern, we build on the method of Burchardi et al. (2019) which identifies variation in a group's contemporaneous settlement patterns driven by the historical immigration patterns of other groups. Importantly, we advance this approach to generate two instruments that allow us to separately identify variation in the group's relative size (minority share) and spatial distribution (segregation measured as the dissimilarity index). Using this IV strategy, we show that a rise in South Asian-White British segregation causes increased support for the BNP while accounting for variation in the relative size of the South Asian community. A series of papers have considered the link between the size of a location's foreign born or ethnic minority population and the recent rise in support for

the extreme right. This paper demonstrates the important role that segregation, a correlated dimension of ethnic settlement patterns, plays in determining political beliefs.

Another key contribution of this paper is that we address both majority and minority groups in considering the influence of settlement patterns on political behavior; we accomplish this by going beyond voting behavior to examine political views more generally and even further to study social views and behavior. South Asian-White British segregation pushes individuals of the White British majority towards political view points associated with authoritarian populism and beliefs that might represent increased ethnic-based resentment – two key elements of extreme right rhetoric. At the same time, segregation leads South Asian individuals to express dissatisfaction with the way democracy functions in the country and parallel beliefs regarding ethnic-based differential treatment by the government. While ethnic settlement patterns may be the initial driver of this wedge in views, the political views of one group may also further drive the observed views of the other. These potentially reinforcing movements of each group's beliefs in opposing directions are also reflected in the aspects of social identity that the BNP targets. Increased segregation is associated with White British individuals narrowing their definition of British identity in a way that likely excludes South Asians while South Asians characterize their identity as further from that of other British people.

This paper seeks to identify one societal driver of support for extreme right views: ethnic segregation. An open question, however, regards timing: what led to the *recent* rise in support for extreme right groups? The BNP had existed for decades (longer as part of the National Front) and yet did not see electoral success until the early 2000s. We provide evidence that this rise in electoral success is driven, at least in part, by a sudden influence of South Asian-White British segregation on BNP support.

Consistent with our empirical findings, researchers and BNP members alike attribute the party's rise in the 2000s to its exploitation of heightened awareness around (radical) Islam due to events such as the 7/7 London bombings or 9/11 (Copsey, 2007; Pidd, 2018; Wood & Finlay, 2008). Recent work by Bonomi et al. (2021) provides an explanation for such shifts in political views: individuals might switch between various social identities (e.g., economic or cultural) in response to policy conflicts causing a certain societal categorization to become more salient. Our findings are consistent with this line of reasoning: BNP rhetoric finds fertile ground in areas with greater South Asian-White British segregation, but only after that societal division is made salient. However, these results are not definitive proof of this theory as we cannot determine whether the effects are driven by an increased importance of the policy conflict around Islam

(Asian Muslims) and/or the simultaneous shift in party rhetoric – i.e., it is possible that the shift in BNP rhetoric simply gave voice to a pre-existing voting block. Further research is necessary to identify whether it is the combination of a spark (such as a terrorist attack) along with existing societal divisions (e.g., ethnic, religious) that results in such political shifts.

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
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
Figure 1: Linking Dissimilarity and Minority Share for the South Asian Ethnic Group




Note: This figure plot the South Asian-White British dissimilarity index against the South Asian share of total population for UK 2010 General Election constituencies. The solid horizontal and vertical lines each demarcate the median values while highlighted and labeled points represent constituencies whose disaggregated maps of South Asian settlement are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Spatial Patterns In South Asian Settlement

(a) Different Dissimilarity Indexes but Similar South Asian Population Shares




(b) Similar Dissimilarity Indexes but Different South Asian Population Shares




Note: These choropleths are a visual representation of the dissimilarity index, with shade representing the size of the South Asian population relative to the South Asian-White British combined population within each neighborhood. Panel A compares two constituencies, Oldham East and Saddleworth (left map) and Uxbridge and South Ruislip (right map), with similar proportion of the total population identifying as South Asian but different South Asian and White British segregation. Panel B shows two constituencies, Leicester East (left map) and Wrexham (right map), with similar dissimilarity between the South Asian and White British groups but different overall percent of South Asians in the total population. Each panel also reports dissimilarity index (D), South Asian minority share (share), and area for each constituency.

Figure 3: Growth in South Asian-White British Segregation 1971 to 2011


(a) Observed Change



(b) Counterfactual Change Holding South Asian Settlement Constant




(c) Counterfactual Change Holding White British Settlement Constant



Note: These figures plot the observed change in South Asian-White British segregation between 1971 and 2011 (Panel A) as well as the counterfactual change holding constant South Asian settlement patterns (Panel B) and White British settlement patterns (Panel C) as they were in 1971. Observations are 2010 General Election constituencies and constituencies are organized across all figures by their observed growth in segregation within each Government Office Region (GOR), as listed on the x-axis.

Figure 4: Event Study of South Asian-White British Segregation Effect on Political Support



Note: This figure displays the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the dissimilarity index in Equation 7 where the vote share for the BNP (Panel A), UKIP (Panel B), Conservative party (Panel C), Liberal Democrats (Panel D), or Labour (Panel E) is regressed on standardized measures of the 1971 South Asian-White British dissimilarity index and South Asian minority share each interacted with election indicators (standard errors are clustered at the constituency level). Coefficient estimates are shown for a specification with constituency and election fixed effects (squares), a specification that adds interactions between 1971 socioeconomic measures and year fixed effects (triangles), and a specification that additionally adds region-by-year fixed effects (circles). All coefficients are relative to the omitted coefficient for the baseline year 1983 (or 1997 in Panel B). Full regression results and further details are reported in Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5.

TABLE 1: THE IMPACT OF SOUTH ASIAN SETTLEMENT PATTERNS ON SUPPORT FOR THE BRITISH NATIONAL PARTY

	BNP Vote Share		BNP Vote Share Conditional on Running	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A:				
Dissimilarity	0.026***	0.068***	0.021**	0.063***
	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.021)
Minority Share	-0.052***	-0.119***	-0.033***	-0.106***
	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.031)
Observations	573	573	325	325
R^2	0.392	-	0.425	-
KP F-Stat	-	64	-	29
Panel B: First Stage for	Column 2		Column 4	
	Dissimilarity	Minority Share	Dissimilarity	Minority Share
$\widehat{\text{Dissimilarity}}$	1.006***	0.287***	1.013***	0.327***
	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.085)	(0.082)
$\widehat{\text{Minority Share}}$	-0.122	1.002***	-0.217	0.960***
	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.142)	(0.109)
Observations	573	573	325	325
R^2	0.470	0.630	0.476	0.615
SW F-Stat	141	134	65	87
Region Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 2 where the BNP candidate vote share (columns 1 and 2) or BNP candidate vote share conditional on running (columns 3 and 4) is regressed on the dissimilarity index and population share of the South Asian ethnic group. Columns 1 and 3 report OLS results while columns 2 and 4 report IV results. Panel B reports the results for the corresponding first stage regressions. All regressions include indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade. Panel A reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic and Panel B reports the Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable. Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 2: Heterogeneity in South Asian Settlement Pattern Effects

	BNP Vote Share			
	High vs. Low Socioeconomic Status		High vs. Low Minority Share	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dissimilarity × High	0.003	0.047**	0.045***	0.078***
	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.026)
Dissimilarity × Low	0.045***	0.077***	-0.011	0.018
	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.026)
Minority Share × High	-0.022	-0.116***	-0.080***	-0.148***
	(0.021)	(0.042)	(0.014)	(0.036)
Minority Share × Low	-0.065***	-0.120***	0.103	-0.293*
	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.096)	(0.172)
Observations	573	573	573	573
R^2	0.404	-	0.421	-
KP F-Stat	-	27	-	19
Dissimilarity Low-High p-Value	0.0015	0.2578	0.0001	0.0235
Minority Share Low-High p-Value	0.0430	0.9229	0.0578	0.3698
Region Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports OLS (columns 1 and 3) or IV (columns 2 and 4) estimates of a regression similar to Equation 2 where the BNP vote share is regressed on the dissimilarity index, and South Asian population share but where coefficients are estimated separately for constituencies with high and low socioeconomic status (columns 1 and 2) or high and low minority shares (columns 3 and 4). High socioeconomic status is an indicator for the bottom three quintiles of constituencies in terms of population share assigned lowest social grade and high minority share is an indicator for top tercile of constituencies in terms of minority share. All regressions include indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified in the lowest social grade; regressions in columns 3 and 4 add the indicator for a high minority share. This table reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic and the corresponding first stage results are reported in Appendix Table A.7, including the Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable. Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 3: Spillover Effects of South Asian Settlement Patterns

	BNP Vote Share			
	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A:				
Dissimilarity	0.026***	0.023***	0.068***	0.060***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Minority Share	-0.052***	-0.096***	-0.119***	-0.171***
	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.041)
Neighbors' Dissimilarity		0.016		0.082**
		(0.016)		(0.041)
Neighbors' Minority Share		0.096**		0.070
		(0.038)		(0.053)
Observations	573	571	573	571
R^2	0.041	0.085		
KP F-Stat			64	16

Panel B: First Stage for	Column 4			
	Dissimilarity	Minority Share	Neighbors' Dissimilarity	Neighbors' Minority Share
$\widehat{\text{Dissimilarity}}$	0.981***	0.256***	0.061	0.038
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.037)	(0.024)
$\widehat{\text{Minority Share}}$	-0.241*	0.941***	0.031	-0.083
	(0.132)	(0.138)	(0.072)	(0.080)
$\widehat{\text{Neighbors' Dissimilarity}}$	0.196	0.246***	1.092***	0.423***
	(0.127)	(0.091)	(0.070)	(0.047)
$\widehat{\text{Neighbors' Minority Share}}$	0.164	0.026	-0.082	1.028***
	(0.198)	(0.189)	(0.119)	(0.108)
Observations	571	571	571	571
R^2	0.474	0.639	0.619	0.738
SW F-Stat	100	78	149	155
Region Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 2 where the BNP candidate vote share is regressed on the dissimilarity index and population share of the South Asian ethnic group in columns 1 and 3 while columns 2 and 4 add to this baseline specification variables for the mean of adjacent/neighboring constituencies' dissimilarity index and minority share. Columns 1 and 2 report OLS results while columns 3 and 4 report IV results. Panel B reports the results for the four first stage regressions corresponding to column 4. All regressions include indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade. Panel A reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic and Panel B reports the Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable. Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 4: Alternative Instrument Construction

	BNP Vote Share		
	Baseline Instrument (1)	Only Rest of Europe (2)	1971 Settlement of White British (3)
Dissimilarity	0.068***	0.082***	0.069***
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.026)
	[0.035,0.100]	[0.038,0.149]	[0.028,0.130]
Minority Share	-0.119***	-0.217***	-0.111***
	(0.029)	(0.051)	(0.025)
	[-0.166,-0.072]	[-0.341,-0.134]	[-0.151,-0.070]
Observations	573	573	573
SW F-Stat: Diss.	141	46	40
SW F-Stat: Min. Share	134	28	165
KP F-Stat	64	14	15
Region Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 2 where the BNP vote share is regressed on the dissimilarity index and population share of the South Asian ethnic group for the 2010 UK General Election. All regressions include indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the social grade. Column 1 reports results using the baseline instrument. Column 2 reports results where the instrument is constructed using only migrants from the rest of Europe. Column 3 repeats the baseline instrument but replaces observed White British settlement patterns with 1971 patterns of settlement for the dissimilarity index and replaces the 2011 total population with the 1971 population in the denominator of the minority share instrument. The Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable is reported as well as the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk first stage F statistic. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses while two-step identification-robust 95% confidence sets robust to weak instruments (Chaudhuri & Zivot, 2011) are reported in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 5: Robustness of Settlement Pattern Effects to Local Characteristics

	BNP Vote Share					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dissimilarity	0.068***	0.049***	0.062***	0.049***	0.061***	0.040***
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Minority Share	-0.119***	-0.057***	-0.127***	-0.097***	-0.118***	-0.070**
	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.028)
Non-South Asian Immigrant Share		-0.084***				-0.053**
		(0.016)				(0.023)
Share in Public Housing			-0.019			0.031
			(0.015)			(0.019)
Share with Deprivation			0.154***			0.090*
			(0.031)			(0.050)
Social Grade AB Share				-0.202***		-0.076
				(0.041)		(0.063)
Social Grade C1 Share				-0.031		0.028
				(0.054)		(0.058)
Social Grade C2 Share				-0.070		0.016
				(0.055)		(0.081)
Agr, Mining, Energy Share					0.172	0.148
					(0.217)	(0.215)
Manufacturing Share					0.491***	0.406**
					(0.182)	(0.188)
Construction Share					0.753***	0.496**
					(0.167)	(0.206)
Distribution, Services Share					0.495**	0.322
					(0.230)	(0.220)
Transport/Comm. Share					0.545***	0.415**
					(0.202)	(0.198)
Financial Share					0.504**	0.416**
					(0.207)	(0.193)
Public Share					0.430**	0.302
					(0.203)	(0.200)
Observations	573	573	573	573	573	573
SW F-Stat: Diss.	141	132	157	126	119	143
SW F-Stat: Min. Share	134	120	140	80	63	126
KP F-Stat	64	59	71	48	39	60
Region Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 2 where the BNP vote share is regressed on the dissimilarity index and population share of the South Asian ethnic group. Column 1 provides the baseline specification, including indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade (DE). Columns 2 through 6 use data from the 2011 census to add controls for the share of the population that is non-South Asian foreign-born; the share of households living in public housing and identified as suffering at least one dimension of deprivation; the population share assigned to the higher three social grades; and the share of economically active working in each industry (with 'Other' as the omitted group), respectively. Column 6 then provides results of a specification where all controls are included. The Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable is reported as well as the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk first stage F statistic. Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 6: IV Placebo: Reduced Form Effect of Settlement Patterns on BNP Support

	BNP Vote Share		BNP Vote Share Conditional on Running	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
S. Asian $\widehat{\text{Dissimilarity}}$	0.034**		0.029**	
	(0.015)		(0.013)	
	[0.015]		[0.014]	
S. Asian $\widehat{\text{Minority Share}}$	-0.128***		-0.116***	
	(0.028)		(0.028)	
	[0.029]		[0.030]	
Placebo $\widehat{\text{Dissimilarity}}$		0.005		-0.000
		(0.011)		(0.010)
		[0.011]		[0.010]
Placebo $\widehat{\text{Minority Share}}$		-0.303***		-0.299***
		(0.056)		(0.056)
		[0.056]		[0.056]
Observations	573	573	325	325
R^2	0.406	0.408	0.448	0.464
Dissimilarity Difference p-value	0.1136		0.0812	
Region Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports reduced form estimates of Equation 2 where the BNP vote share is regressed on the instruments for the dissimilarity index and population share of the South Asian ethnic group for all constituencies (columns 1 and 2) or constituencies in which BNP candidates ran (columns 3 and 4). Columns 1 and 3 include as regressors our baseline instruments for the settlement patterns of the South Asian ethnic group. Columns 2 and 4 include as regressors placebo instruments that combine the baseline pull factor with a European (placebo) push factor in Equations 3 and 5. All regressions include indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade. The p-value for the test of equality between the coefficients for the dissimilarity instrument and placebo instrument is reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and bootstrapped robust standard errors in brackets (the bootstrap is based on 2,000 samples). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 7: Effect of Segregation on Trust in Institutions and Satisfaction in Democracy

	White British				South Asian			
	Distrust Parliament	Distrust Politicians	Distrust Police	Dissatisfied with Democracy	Distrust Parliament	Distrust Politicians	Distrust Police	Dissatisfied with Democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A:	IV Specification							
Dissimilarity	0.312*	0.575***	0.142*	-0.145	0.044	0.053	-0.013	0.275***
	(0.177)	(0.198)	(0.086)	(0.209)	(0.086)	(0.174)	(0.070)	(0.096)
Minority Share	0.036	-0.385*	-0.089	0.133	0.052	0.095	-0.041	-0.090
	(0.230)	(0.224)	(0.122)	(0.283)	(0.112)	(0.156)	(0.100)	(0.121)
Observations	1,484	1,460	1,554	1,541	1,358	1,405	1,461	1,418
SW F-Stat: Diss.	40	40	38	42	37	41	39	39
SW F-Stat: Min. Share	71	71	71	82	16	17	17	16
KP F-Stat	16	16	15	17	8	8	9	8
Panel B:	OLS Specification							
Dissimilarity	0.228***	0.163**	0.103**	-0.027	-0.007	-0.010	-0.028	0.118*
	(0.068)	(0.078)	(0.042)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.100)	(0.046)	(0.066)
Minority Share	-0.228*	-0.197	-0.055	-0.061	-0.016	0.087	-0.020	0.028
	(0.131)	(0.163)	(0.053)	(0.108)	(0.056)	(0.079)	(0.054)	(0.064)
Observations	1,484	1,460	1,554	1,541	1,358	1,405	1,461	1,418
R^2	0.017	0.024	0.017	0.017	0.020	0.017	0.018	0.014
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.104	0.153	0.033	0.082	0.132	0.051	0.051	0.077
Region Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 8 where the dependent variable is an indicator for a response of 2 or less on a scale from 0 (no trust) to 10 (a great deal of trust) to a question about how much trust the individual has in the Parliament at Westminster (columns 1 and 5), politicians (columns 2 and 6), or the police (columns 3 and 7) or an indicator for a response of "very dissatisfied" to the question, how satisfied/dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in the country (columns 4 and 8). The sample of individuals include those that identify as White British in columns 1 to 4 and those who identify as South Asian for columns 5 to 8. The regressors in each case are the dissimilarity index and population share of the South Asian ethnic group with IV results in Panel A and OLS results in Panel B. All regressions include indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade as well as controls for the respondent's age, gender, and an indicator for university equivalent education. The Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable is reported as well as the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk first stage F statistic. Standard errors are clustered by constituency. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 8: Effect of Segregation on Feelings Ethnic Favoritism by Government

	White British		South Asian	
	Gov't Unfair to People Like Me	Gov't Better to Ethnic Minorities	Gov't Unfair to People Like Me	Gov't Unfair to People of my Ethnicity
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A:	IV Specification			
Dissimilarity	-0.216	0.608**	0.413**	0.559***
	(0.292)	(0.282)	(0.175)	(0.187)
Minority Share	0.260	-0.567	0.039	-0.245
	(0.369)	(0.406)	(0.164)	(0.170)
Observations	1,583	1,566	1,444	1,443
SW F-Stat: Diss.	41	40	41	40
SW F-Stat: Min. Share	81	80	16	16
KP F-Stat	16	15	8	8
Panel B:	OLS Specification			
Dissimilarity	0.063	0.153	0.131**	0.247***
	(0.105)	(0.124)	(0.065)	(0.083)
Minority Share	-0.312	-0.173	-0.074	-0.105
	(0.189)	(0.178)	(0.092)	(0.086)
Observations	1,583	1,566	1,444	1,443
R^2	0.023	0.063	0.031	0.027
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.289	0.518	0.121	0.136
Region Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 8 where the dependent variable is an indicator for a response of "strongly disagree" or "disagree" to the statement that the government treats people like me fairly (columns 1 and 3); an indicator for a response of "strongly agree" or "agree" to the statement that the government treats ethnic minorities better than the majority (column 2); or an indicator for a response of "strongly disagree" or "disagree" to the statement that the government treats people of my ethnicity fairly (column 4). The sample of individuals include those that identify as White British in columns 1 to 2 and those who identify as South Asian for columns 3 to 4. The regressors in each case are the dissimilarity index and population share of the South Asian ethnic group with IV results in Panel A and OLS results in Panel B. All regressions include indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade as well as controls for the respondent's age, gender, and an indicator for university equivalent education. The Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable is reported as well as the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk first stage F statistic. Standard errors are clustered by constituency. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 9: Effect of Segregation on Contact

	All or Most Belong to Own Ethnic Group Among:				
	White British	South Asian			
	Coworkers	Coworkers	Friends	Neighbors	Co-Worshipers
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A:	IV Specification				
Dissimilarity	-0.030	0.544**	0.246	0.638*	-0.221
	(0.190)	(0.224)	(0.173)	(0.382)	(0.278)
Minority Share	-0.438*	-0.206	0.116	-0.047	0.202
	(0.233)	(0.331)	(0.252)	(0.495)	(0.279)
Observations	1,555	992	1,443	1,403	1,224
SW F-Stat: Diss.	39	51	38	38	36
SW F-Stat: Min. Share	79	15	16	16	16
KP F-Stat	15	8	8	8	8
Panel B:	OLS Specification				
Dissimilarity	0.140**	0.497***	0.272**	0.465**	0.008
	(0.070)	(0.135)	(0.126)	(0.193)	(0.130)
Minority Share	-0.270*	0.166	0.334***	0.877***	0.215
	(0.148)	(0.111)	(0.113)	(0.176)	(0.137)
Observations	1,555	992	1,443	1,403	1,224
R^2	0.038	0.125	0.074	0.196	0.087
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.887	0.249	0.552	0.314	0.770
Region Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 8 where the dependent variable is an indicator for a response of "all" of "most" to the question, how many belong to your own ethnic group of your coworkers (columns 1 and 2), friends (column 3), neighbors (column 4), or co-worshipers (column 5). The sample of individuals include those that identify as White British in column 1 and those who identify as South Asian for columns 2 to 5. The regressors in each case are the dissimilarity index and population share of the South Asian ethnic group with IV results in Panel A and OLS results in Panel B. All regressions include indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade as well as controls for the respondent's age, gender, and an indicator for university equivalent education. The Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable is reported as well as the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk first stage F statistic. Standard errors are clustered by constituency. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 10: Effect of Segregation on South Asian's Perception of Own Identity

	Identify as Asian not British	Commonality Own Ethnic	No Commonality Other British
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A:	IV Specification		
Dissimilarity	0.309*	-0.015	0.333**
	(0.169)	(0.208)	(0.165)
Minority Share	0.279	0.050	0.350*
	(0.223)	(0.161)	(0.196)
Observations	1,445	1,460	1,457
SW F-Stat: Diss.	38	39	39
SW F-Stat: Min. Share	17	17	17
KP F-Stat	9	9	9
Panel B:	OLS Specification		
Dissimilarity	0.179*	0.021	0.239**
	(0.097)	(0.110)	(0.106)
Minority Share	-0.115*	0.073	0.188**
	(0.070)	(0.081)	(0.094)
Observations	1,445	1,460	1,457
R^2	0.054	0.025	0.078
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.080	0.847	0.160
Region Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 8 where the regressors in each case are the dissimilarity index and population share of the South Asian ethnic group with IV results in Panel A and OLS results in Panel B. The dependent variable is an indicator that an individual identifies as "Asian not British" (column 1), an indicator that the individual thinks they have "a great deal" or "fair amount" in common with people of their own ethnic group (column 2), or an indicator that the individual thinks they have "not very much" or "nothing at all" in common with other British people (column 3). All regressions include indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade as well as controls for the respondent's age, gender, and an indicator for university equivalent education. The sample of individuals includes those that identify as South Asian. The Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable is reported as well as the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk first stage F statistic. Standard errors are clustered by constituency. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 11: Effect of Segregation on White British's Concept of British Identity

	Very Important for British Identity				
	Born in Britain (1)	British Ancestry (2)	British Traditions (3)	Speaks English (4)	All Four (5)
Panel A:	IV Specification				
Dissimilarity	0.436**	0.478***	0.401*	0.294	0.492***
	(0.198)	(0.173)	(0.228)	(0.187)	(0.143)
Minority Share	-0.984***	-0.543*	-1.225***	-0.447	-0.707***
	(0.343)	(0.294)	(0.393)	(0.357)	(0.233)
Observations	2,592	2,584	2,594	2,609	2,541
SW F-Stat: Diss.	65	66	67	67	65
SW F-Stat: Min. Share	74	77	78	76	78
KP F-Stat	31	32	32	32	32
Panel B:	OLS Specification				
Dissimilarity	0.110	0.158**	0.142	0.096	0.175***
	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.066)
Minority Share	-0.293	-0.249	-0.538***	-0.068	-0.267**
	(0.188)	(0.160)	(0.202)	(0.167)	(0.127)
Observations	2,592	2,584	2,594	2,609	2,541
R^2	0.081	0.084	0.099	0.056	0.073
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.278	0.195	0.417	0.671	0.141
Region Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 8 where the dependent variable is an indicator for a response of "very important" to the question "how important do you think the following is for being truly British" for being born in Britain (column 1), having British ancestry (column 2), following Britain's customs and traditions (column 3), or speaking English (column 4). In column 5, the dependent variable is an indicator that the respondent chose "very important" for all four characteristics. The regressors in each case are the dissimilarity index and population share of the South Asian ethnic group with IV results in Panel A and OLS results in Panel B. All regressions include indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade as well as controls for the respondent's age, gender, and an indicator for university equivalent education. The Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable is reported as well as the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk first stage F statistic. Standard errors are clustered by constituency. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Online Appendix

"Segregation and the March Right: Evidence from England and Wales"

Lisa Tarquinio and Sergio Villar Vallenas

Appendix A Data and Additional Results

A.1 UK Census Data

A.1.1 Neighborhoods and Census Geography

The Output Area (OA) – consisting of between 40 and 200 households each – is the most granular level at which data is reported for the 2011 UK Census. However, to maintain confidentiality of the reported data, statistical disclosure control measures are implemented. These measures include record switching, whereby households may be randomly relocated to another geography if certain characteristics are especially uncommon and therefore identifiable (Longhurst et al., 2007). Because our dissimilarity measure for South Asians is highly dependent on population counts within specific geographies, this method of data manipulation could potentially introduce significant measurement error. However, records were swapped primarily across different OAs but generally *within* Middle-Layer Super Output Areas (MSOAs), which contain populations of about 7,700 on average. Therefore, we aggregate data from the census to the MSOAs, which we use as 'neighborhoods' for constructing the segregation measure.

A.1.2 Aggregate Population Counts

Throughout this paper we rely on 2011 UK census data provided by ONS (2017a). The 2011 UK Census reports full population count tables for England and Wales by detailed ethnic groups, which fall under five larger racial groups: White, Black/African/Caribbean/Black British (hereafter black), Asian/Asian British, Mixed/Multiple groups, and Other. Within each of these five larger groups, there are between 26 and 71 sub-ethnic groups. White English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British individuals constitutes the largest ethnic group, accounting for just over 80 percent of the total population for England and Wales, and therefore can be considered the majority group. From the remaining 20 percent of the population we group together more detailed ethnicity groups into the larger minority groups that might be impacted by anti-ethnic

or anti-immigrant sentiment. We first construct an ethnic group for non-white South Asians, excluding individuals who identify as white and therefore may be White British individuals born in South Asia. We then use the detailed ethnicity categories to define each remaining group, again using these detailed characteristics to exclude individuals who may be ethnically White British or South Asian. The five additional ethnic minority groups are defined in Table A.1. Non-white South Asians (referred to here as South Asians) account for nearly 6 percent of the population in England and Wales while the remaining five minority categories make up about 10 percent.[1]

The 2011 census also provides full population counts by country or region of birth and period of arrival to the UK. We aggregate the country/region of birth data for the immigrant population counts to six regions that can be mapped to the ethnic minority groups discussed above (see Table A.1). We then construct immigration waves for each region based on the reported period of arrival to the UK: before 1961, 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2003, 2004-2006, 2007-2009, and 2010-2011. We define waves of immigration to the UK based on the population of first generation immigrants residing in England and Wales in 2011 as this is the first census in which migrants' year of arrival is reported. For this reason our measure of migration waves $I^t_{r,i}$ may differ from those observed in the period t due to mortality, return migration, or internal migration that may have occurred between period t and 2011. In addition, there might be some measurement error in using year of arrival as year of immigration because the question for year of arrival does not explicitly state that the individual should report the year in which the individual first arrived to reside in the UK but does state that short trips outside of the UK should not be considered. To predict South Asian settlement patterns, we use the immigration of the five regions defined in Table A.1, excluding South Asia. We exclude Irish immigrants from this list and the instrument construction as their settlement patterns might more closely relate to those of White British individuals than the average immigrant.

We also use the 2011 census population counts by socioeconomic status or social grade; this measure is imputed from census characteristics and reported as one of four categories: higher/intermediate managerial/administrative/professional occupations (AB); supervisory, clerical and junior managerial/administrative/professional occupations (C1); skilled manual occupations (C2); and semi-skilled and unskilled manual occupations and unemployed/lowest grade

[1]Irish account for 1 percent of the population and the remaining 3 percent of individuals were not categorized into a specific ethnic minority group because the information provided was not sufficient for distinguishing between groups. For example, individuals who identified as 'British Asian' were not categorized because it was not clear whether they were South Asian or East/Southeast Asian.

occupations (DE). We use the share of the population categorized into the fourth category as our key measure of relative socioeconomic class at the constituency level.

We use data from the 1971 census to determine immigrant settlement patterns. We use population counts by country of birth reported at the enumeration district level and use geographic boundary files to overlay enumeration districts onto 2011 MSOAs to construct the share of the enumeration district that falls into each MSOA. For each MSOA, we then calculate the population count as the area-weighted-sum of counts across all historic enumeration districts. We use population counts for all residents by country of birth to identify individuals born in the UK and South Asia (India, Pakistan/Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka). Then, because data on ethnicity is not available in the 1971 census, we estimate White British and South Asian populations as those born in the UK and South Asia, respectively, to construct segregation measures for 1971.

We construct additional measures for socioeconomic conditions in 1971. We use data on place of birth to construct the share of the population that is foreign born. To identify the baseline industrial makeup of each area, we use data from a 10% sample that lists the industry of economically active individuals which we then use to determine the share of the working population employed in each of seven industry categories; we also use this sample to construct the share of the population assigned to each of nine socioeconomic group categories. We then use data on household tenure type reported as the count per 1000 private households present. We construct the share of households in public housing as the share of all private households that are listed as rented from the Council.

A.2 Combining Data Across Geographic Units

To map count data (e.g., population, votes) across census, administrative, and political units, we use geographic boundary files provided by Dorling (2003), ONS (2017b), and Walford (2006). For census geography, OAs map wholly into MSOAs. We also, however, map OAs and MSOAs to 2011 Westminster parliamentary constituencies (PCONs). In some cases MSOAs need to be split because they fall across PCON boundaries. In these cases, we overlay the relevant geographic boundary files and assign OAs to the PCON in which we estimate the greatest overlap (i.e., we use a best match approach). We then construct 'split' MSOAs (neighborhoods) based on the constituent OAs for each PCON and their assigned MSOA – as discussed above, this may generate some measurement error due to swapping of data across OAs. The 1971 census data is reported at the level of the enumeration district (ED) and so we map EDs to the 'split' MSOA for each 2011 PCON and use area weighting to generate measures of settlement

patterns and socioeconomic conditions in 1971 at the 2011 PCON level.[2]

We also collect voting data from the general elections held in 1983, 1997, 2001, 2005, and 2010 which are reported at the level of the PCON but the PCON boundaries change over time. Therefore we map all voting data to the 2011 PCON level by first matching historical PCONs to 2011 PCONs and keeping all matches for which the area represents at least 1% of the historical PCON; we then use area weighting to convert votes/electorate counts in a historical PCON to counts for the 2011 PCON.

A.3 1983 General Election: Segregation and Voting

To determine whether South Asian settlement patterns influence voting in the first general election contested by the BNP, we estimate the specification

$$V_L = \beta Dissimilarity_{L,1971} + \zeta Minority\ Share_{L,1971} + \theta' X_{L,1971} + \delta_G + e_L \tag{A.1}$$


where V_L is a vote share in the 1983 General Election in constituency L and *Dissimlarity* and *Minority Share* are 1971 South Asian-White British segregation and South Asian minority share. In Appendix Table A.6, we report results without additional controls (columns 1 and 4), with indicators for regions δ_G (columns 2 and 5), and with additional controls X that include 1971 measures of the share of households in social housing, foreign-born population share, economically-active population share in each of 9 socioeconomic group categories, and economically-active population share in each of 7 industry categories (columns 3 and 6). In Panel A, we show that South Asian-White British segregation does not appear to influence voting for the extreme right in the 1983 election (columns 1 to 3), even when limiting to the constituencies in which the BNP/NF stood for election (column 4 to 6).[3] Note, this null result is not due to measurement error generated by mapping 1983 vote shares to 2010 parliamentary constituency boundaries: the null result holds when reconstructing our settlement pattern measures for the 1983 constituency boundaries, treating 1971 census enumeration districts as neighborhoods (Panel B).

[2]We also map 1971 EDs directly to 1983 PCONs using a best match approach.


[3]The BNP split from the NF in 1982 but the two parties' vote shares are reported jointly here.

Figure A.1: Predicting Neighborhood South Asian Populations

(a) Neighborhood South Asian Population (Levels)




(b) Ratio of Neighborhood to Constituency South Asian Population (Shares)




Note: This figure provides binned scatter plots comparing the average of an observed neighborhood-level measure to the average of the predicted measure for the South Asian population in levels (Panel A) or the ratio of the neighborhood South Asian population to the constituency South Asian population (Panel B) as described in Equations 3 and 5, respectively. Each point represents about 20 neighborhoods. Each figure also plots the regression of the actual population measure on the predicted population measure at the neighborhood level; the regression in Panel A has an R^2 of 0.40 while that of Panel B is 0.47.

FIGURE A.2: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL VIEWS ROBUSTNESS FOR WHITE BRITISH RESPONDENTS

(A) DISSIMILARITY




(B) MINORITY SHARE




Note: This figure reports IV coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered by constituency) for the dissimilarity index (Panel A) and minority share (Panel B) from regressions for White British survey respondents corresponding to Table 7 (black), Table 8 (green), Table 9 (blue), and Table 11 (red). The first estimate in each group provides the baseline specification, including indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade as well as controls for the respondent's age, gender, and an indicator for university equivalent education. The subsequent estimates use the 2011 census to add controls for the share of the population that is non-South Asian foreign-born; the share of households living in public housing and identified as suffering at least one dimension of deprivation; the population share assigned to each of the higher three social grades; the share of economically active working in each industry (with 'Other' as the omitted group); and all additional controls, respectively. Shading represents the range for the Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable while the point shape represents p-values less than 5% (circle), less than 10% (square), or greater than 10% ("x").

FIGURE A.3: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL VIEWS ROBUSTNESS FOR SOUTH ASIAN RESPONDENTS

(A) DISSIMILARITY



(B) MINORITY SHARE



Note: This figure reports IV coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered by constituency) for the dissimilarity index (Panel A) and minority share (Panel B) from regressions for South Asian survey respondents corresponding to Table 7 (black), Table 8 (green), Table 9 (blue), and Table 10 (red). The first estimate in each group provides the baseline specification, including indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade as well as controls for the respondent's age, gender, and an indicator for university equivalent education. The subsequent estimates use the 2011 census to add controls for the share of the population that is non-South Asian foreign-born; the share of households living in public housing and identified as suffering at least one dimension of deprivation; the population share assigned to each of the higher three social grades; the share of economically active working in each industry (with 'Other' as the omitted group); and all additional controls, respectively. Shading represents the range for the Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable while the point shape represents p-values less than 5% (circle), less than 10% (square), or greater than 10% ("x").

Table A.1: Definition of Ethnic Minority Groups and Mapping to Regions of the World

Group	Definition	Region	Share
Arab/North African	all primary ethnicities that include any country or group of people that are found in the MENA region	Middle East and North Africa (MENA)	0.8
Caribbean/Latin American	primary ethnicities in other, black, and mixed/-multiple whose detailed ethnicity includes the Caribbean or any non-Asian primary ethnicity that indicates Cuba or a country of South or Central America in the detailed ethnicity	South and Central America and the Caribbean	2.0
East/Southeast Asian	primary ethnicities in white, other, Asian, and mixed/multiple that list any country in East and Southeast Asia as the detailed ethnicity	East or Southeast Asia	1.2
South Asian	primary ethnicity in other, Asian, and mixed/multiple combined with a detailed ethnicity that lists a country or group located in South Asia	South Asia	5.9
Sub-Saharan African	primary ethnicities in other, black, and mixed/-multiple whose detailed ethnicity does not include Arab/African, Morocco, or North African	Central, West, East, and South Africa	2.2
White European	primary ethnicity is white with a detailed ethnicity that lists a European country outside the UK and Ireland	Europe (excluding UK and Ireland)	3.4

Note: This table provides the definition used for each ethnic minority group along with the group's population share and linked region of the world for the 2011 Census. In each case, ethnic minority groups are meant to exclude individuals who might be ethnically White British (e.g. excluding white individuals from regions with areas formerly colonized by Britain). Not all options for detailed ethnicity fall cleanly into a single group. For example, we assign Kurdish populations to the Middle East and North Africa though there is a Kurdish population in Turkey (Europe). Likewise we assign any detailed ethnicity that states "Africa" without listing a specific country or region to Sub-Saharan African.

Table A.2: Constituency Summary Statistics

	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: General Election 2010					
BNP Vote Share	573	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.15
Dissimilarity	573	0.32	0.13	0.06	0.77
Minority Share	573	0.05	0.09	0.00	0.54
$\widehat{\text{Dissimilarity}}$	573	0.21	0.08	0.11	0.63
$\widehat{\text{Minority Share}}$	573	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.44
Lowest Social Grade Share	573	0.26	0.08	0.09	0.51
Panel B: British Election Study (BES) 2010					
BNP Vote Share	1591	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.11
Dissimilarity	1591	0.31	0.12	0.10	0.77
Minority Share	1591	0.03	0.07	0.00	0.54
$\widehat{\text{Dissimilarity}}$	1591	0.20	0.06	0.12	0.47
$\widehat{\text{Minority Share}}$	1591	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.44
Lowest Social Grade Share	1591	0.25	0.08	0.10	0.44
Panel C: British Election Study (BES) 2017/2019					
BNP Vote Share	2637	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.15
Dissimilarity	2637	0.32	0.13	0.10	0.77
Minority Share	2637	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.53
$\widehat{\text{Dissimilarity}}$	2637	0.21	0.07	0.11	0.55
$\widehat{\text{Minority Share}}$	2637	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.42
Lowest Social Grade Share	2637	0.25	0.07	0.09	0.51
Panel D: Ethnic Minorities British Election Study (EMBES) 2010					
BNP Vote Share	1481	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.15
Dissimilarity	1481	0.41	0.17	0.10	0.77
Minority Share	1481	0.25	0.16	0.01	0.54
$\widehat{\text{Dissimilarity}}$	1481	0.29	0.12	0.11	0.63
$\widehat{\text{Minority Share}}$	1481	0.13	0.09	0.01	0.44
Lowest Social Grade Share	1481	0.31	0.09	0.09	0.51

Note: This table reports constituency-level summary statistics for the BNP vote share, dissimilarity index, minority share, dissimilarity index instrument, minority share instrument, and share of the population that is classified into the lowest social grade. Panel A report statistics for the UK General Election constituencies (2011 Westminster parliamentary constituencies). Panels B and C report data for the General Election constituencies in which the respondents to the BES 2010 and BES 2017/2019 reside (168 and 422 unique constituencies, respectively). Panel D reports data for the General Election constituencies in which the respondents to the EMBES 2010 reside (141 unique constituencies).

Table A.3: Ethnic Segregation and Support for the Extreme Right

	BNP Vote Share					
	South Asian	White European	Sub-Saharan African	Caribbean/Latin American	Arab/North African	East/Southeast Asian
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dissimilarity$_{Group}$	0.026***	0.009	-0.008	-0.014	0.002	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Minority Share$_{Group}$	-0.052***	-0.242***	-0.038	-0.213***	-0.349***	-0.339***
	(0.012)	(0.042)	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.117)	(0.113)
Observations	573	573	573	573	573	573
R^2	0.392	0.406	0.368	0.400	0.386	0.381
Region Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 2 where the BNP vote share is regressed on the dissimilarity index between the White British ethnic group and each ethnic group as well as the population share of the given ethnic minority group for the 2010 UK General Election. All regressions include indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade. Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table A.4: Time-Varying Relationship between South Asian Settlement Patterns and Extreme Right Voting

	BNP Vote Share			UKIP Vote Share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dissimilarity (1971) × 1997	0.0000	-0.0002	-0.0004			
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)			
Dissimilarity (1971) × 2001	0.0024**	0.0019*	0.0023*	-0.0025***	-0.0001	0.0006
	(0.0009)	(0.0011)	(0.0012)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)
Dissimilarity (1971) × 2005	0.0082***	0.0042***	0.0035**	-0.0032***	-0.0023**	0.0002
	(0.0012)	(0.0014)	(0.0017)	(0.0007)	(0.0009)	(0.0009)
Dissimilarity (1971) × 2010	0.0122***	0.0059***	0.0049***	-0.0022**	-0.0025**	-0.0003
	(0.0011)	(0.0012)	(0.0014)	(0.0009)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)
Dissimilarity (1971) × 2015	0.0000	0.0002	0.0001	0.0149***	0.0030	0.0051**
	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0024)	(0.0022)	(0.0024)
Minority Share (1971) × 1997	0.0002	0.0001	0.0001			
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)			
Minority Share (1971) × 2001	0.0007	0.0005	0.0009	-0.0009*	0.0010	-0.0005
	(0.0005)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Minority Share (1971) × 2005	-0.0005	0.0021	0.0018	-0.0012	0.0013	-0.0001
	(0.0011)	(0.0014)	(0.0013)	(0.0008)	(0.0012)	(0.0008)
Minority Share (1971) × 2010	-0.0067***	-0.0020	-0.0020*	-0.0031***	0.0015	-0.0000
	(0.0012)	(0.0013)	(0.0012)	(0.0009)	(0.0012)	(0.0010)
Minority Share (1971) × 2015	0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0227***	-0.0008	-0.0036
	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0033)	(0.0022)	(0.0026)
Observations	3,425	3,425	3,425	2,856	2,856	2,856
R^2	0.562	0.656	0.685	0.868	0.909	0.918
Time Fixed Effects	Year	Year	Region-Year	Year	Year	Region-Year
Constituency Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls (1971) × Election	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 7 where the vote share for the BNP (columns 1 to 3) or UKIP (columns 4 to 6) is regressed on the 1971 dissimilarity index and the 1971 South Asian population share (each demeaned and divided by the standard deviation) each interacted with indicators for each election. The interaction with the indicator for the 1983 General Election is omitted in columns 1 to 3 while the interaction with the indicator for the 1997 General Election is omitted in columns 4 to 6. Columns 1 and 4 include constituency and election fixed effects. Columns 2 and 5 add 1971 measures of the share of households in social housing, foreign-born population share, economically-active population share in each of 9 socioeconomic group categories, and economically-active population share in each of 7 industry categories, each interacted with election indicators. Columns 3 and 6 additionally add region-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by constituency are reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table A.5: Time-Varying Relationship between South Asian Settlement Patterns and Voting for Main Parties

	Conservative Vote Share			Liberal Democrat Vote Share			Labour Vote Share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Dissimilarity (1971) × 1997	-0.0076	-0.0086	-0.0135	-0.0060	-0.0034	-0.0026	0.0066	0.0043	0.0076
	(0.0070)	(0.0091)	(0.0097)	(0.0071)	(0.0090)	(0.0095)	(0.0093)	(0.0121)	(0.0127)
Dissimilarity (1971) × 2001	-0.0538***	-0.0147*	-0.0045	-0.0426***	-0.0230***	-0.0130	0.0887***	0.0299***	0.0176*
	(0.0076)	(0.0077)	(0.0078)	(0.0074)	(0.0088)	(0.0093)	(0.0092)	(0.0097)	(0.0098)
Dissimilarity (1971) × 2005	-0.0615***	-0.0176**	-0.0055	-0.0371***	-0.0196**	-0.0145	0.0837***	0.0281***	0.0159*
	(0.0080)	(0.0081)	(0.0083)	(0.0074)	(0.0091)	(0.0097)	(0.0087)	(0.0095)	(0.0095)
Dissimilarity (1971) × 2010	-0.0617***	-0.0173**	-0.0059	-0.0344***	-0.0177*	-0.0133	0.0797***	0.0264***	0.0159*
	(0.0081)	(0.0082)	(0.0084)	(0.0076)	(0.0094)	(0.0098)	(0.0088)	(0.0097)	(0.0095)
Dissimilarity (1971) × 2015	-0.0677***	-0.0194**	-0.0067	-0.0278***	-0.0151*	-0.0112	0.0783***	0.0260***	0.0138
	(0.0087)	(0.0088)	(0.0090)	(0.0070)	(0.0087)	(0.0092)	(0.0091)	(0.0099)	(0.0097)
Minority Share (1971) × 1997	-0.0046	-0.0093	-0.0110	-0.0040	-0.0074	-0.0082	0.0117	0.0195*	0.0229**
	(0.0057)	(0.0084)	(0.0092)	(0.0080)	(0.0114)	(0.0116)	(0.0075)	(0.0116)	(0.0115)
Minority Share (1971) × 2001	-0.0037	0.0005	-0.0070	-0.0025	0.0134	0.0072	0.0033	-0.0163*	-0.0049
	(0.0078)	(0.0080)	(0.0086)	(0.0069)	(0.0096)	(0.0096)	(0.0090)	(0.0090)	(0.0093)
Minority Share (1971) × 2005	-0.0039	-0.0044	-0.0122	0.0083	0.0168*	0.0124	-0.0044	-0.0141	-0.0033
	(0.0078)	(0.0082)	(0.0095)	(0.0072)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)	(0.0087)	(0.0097)	(0.0089)
Minority Share (1971) × 2010	-0.0060	-0.0044	-0.0127	0.0014	0.0079	0.0025	0.0154*	-0.0036	0.0098
	(0.0083)	(0.0086)	(0.0103)	(0.0077)	(0.0109)	(0.0108)	(0.0086)	(0.0092)	(0.0086)
Minority Share (1971) × 2015	-0.0115	-0.0180**	-0.0281***	0.0011	0.0102	0.0079	0.0337***	0.0096	0.0240**
	(0.0077)	(0.0082)	(0.0099)	(0.0073)	(0.0104)	(0.0107)	(0.0102)	(0.0104)	(0.0109)
Observations	3,425	3,425	3,425	3,425	3,425	3,425	3,425	3,425	3,425
R^2	0.595	0.719	0.747	0.541	0.593	0.612	0.607	0.719	0.741
Time Fixed Effects	Year	Year	Region-Year	Year	Year	Region-Year	Year	Year	Region-Year
Constituency Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls (1971) × Election	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Note: This table reports estimates of Equation 7 where the vote share for the Conservative party (columns 1 to 3), Liberal Democrats (columns 4 to 6), or Labour (columns 7 to 9) is regressed on the 1971 dissimilarity index and the 1971 South Asian population share (each demeaned and divided by the standard deviation) each interacted with indicators for each election. The interaction with the indicator for the 1983 General Election is omitted. Columns 1, 4, and 7 include constituency and election fixed effects. Columns 2, 5, and 8 add 1971 measures of the share of households in social housing, foreign-born population share, economically-active population share in each of 9 socioeconomic group categories, and economically-active population share in each of 7 industry categories, each interacted with election indicators. Columns 3, 6, and 9 additionally add region-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by constituency are reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

TABLE A.6: THE IMPACT OF SOUTH ASIAN SETTLEMENT PATTERNS ON VOTING IN THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTION

	BNP/National Front Vote Share					
	All Constituencies			BNP/NF Stood		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A:	2010 Parliamentary Constituency Boundaries					
Dissimilarity (1971)	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.006
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Minority Share (1971)	-0.006	-0.001	0.012	-0.047**	-0.045*	0.024
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.042)
Observations	569	569	569	168	168	168
R^2	0.000	0.001	0.047	0.024	0.020	0.171
Panel B:	1983 Parliamentary Constituency Boundaries					
Dissimilarity (1971)	-0.000	-0.001	-0.002	-0.004	-0.006	-0.015
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Minority Share (1971)	-0.008	-0.007	0.006	-0.065***	-0.061**	-0.003
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.054)
Observations	547	547	547	93	93	93
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.049	0.035	0.033	0.303
Region Indicators	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Socioeconomic Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of Equation A.1 where the BNP and National Front combined vote share is regressed on the 1971 South Asian-White British dissimilarity index and South Asian minority share. Columns 2 and 5 add indicators for region while columns 3 and 6 additionally add controls for 1971 measures of the share of households in social housing, foreign-born population share, economically-active population share in each of 9 socioeconomic group categories, and economically-active population share in each of 7 industry categories. Columns 1 to 3 report results for all constituencies while column 2 to 6 limit to constituencies in which the BNP/NF stood for election. Panel A report the results when the 1983 voting data and 1971 settlement patterns are mapped to the 2010 parliamentary constituency boundaries while Panel B reports the results when the voting data is measured at the 1983 parliamentary constituency boundaries and the 1971 settlement patterns are mapped to the 1983 constituency boundaries. Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table A.7: First Stage Regressions for Heterogeneity in South Asian Settlement Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: First Stage for Table 2 Column 2	Dissimilarity × High	Dissimilarity × Low	Min. Share × High	Min. Share × Low
$\widehat{\text{Dissimilarity}}$ × High Status	0.951***	-0.038*	0.060	0.011
	(0.094)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.021)
$\widehat{\text{Dissimilarity}}$ × Low Status	-0.037*	1.089***	-0.015**	0.392***
	(0.021)	(0.087)	(0.006)	(0.083)
$\widehat{\text{Minority Share}}$ × High Status	-0.270***	0.151**	0.811***	-0.050
	(0.097)	(0.065)	(0.095)	(0.080)
$\widehat{\text{Minority Share}}$ × Low Status	0.162***	-0.282**	0.039	1.172***
	(0.059)	(0.112)	(0.028)	(0.126)
Observations	573	573	573	573
R^2	0.827	0.885	0.717	0.719
SW F-Stat	103	142	97	171
Panel B: First Stage for Table 2 Column 4	Dissimilarity × High	Dissimilarity × Low	Min. Share × High	Min. Share × Low
$\widehat{\text{Dissimilarity}}$ × High Minority Share	0.961***	-0.045*	0.371***	-0.001
	(0.082)	(0.027)	(0.082)	(0.003)
$\widehat{\text{Dissimilarity}}$ × Low Minority Share	-0.071**	0.894***	-0.071***	0.062***
	(0.030)	(0.099)	(0.022)	(0.011)
$\widehat{\text{Minority Share}}$ × High Minority Share	-0.474***	0.110***	0.861***	0.007*
	(0.109)	(0.037)	(0.113)	(0.004)
$\widehat{\text{Minority Share}}$ × Low Minority Share	0.498***	-0.786***	0.237***	0.258***
	(0.125)	(0.199)	(0.091)	(0.036)
Observations	573	573	573	573
R^2	0.909	0.802	0.712	0.648
SW F-Stat	140	82	110	121
Region Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Each panel of this table reports four first stage regression results for IV estimates of an equation similar to Equation 2 where the BNP vote share is regressed on the dissimilarity index and population share of the South Asian ethnic group but coefficients are estimated separately for constituencies with high and low socioeconmic status (Panel A) and high and low minority shares (Panel B). The regression results in Panel A correspond to the IV regression results reported in column 2 of Table 2 while the regressions results reported in Panels B correspond to regression results reported in column 4 of Table 2. All regressions include indicators for region and indicators for the quintiles of the population share that is classified as the lowest social grade; regressions in Panel B add the indicator for a high minority share. The the Sanderson-Windmeijer first stage F-statistic for each endogenous variable is reported. Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.