The Roots of the Modern American Presidential Campaign*

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Abstract

Campaign tours have become an essential component of U.S. presidential elections. How and when did they begin? We explore the early history of in-person political campaigning in the United States by reconstructing the first presidential campaign tours from historical newspaper clippings. We analyze the decision to campaign, the determinants of where candidates campaigned, and the outcomes of early in-person campaigns. We document an evolving norm of campaigning. We find that counties with a denser railroad network are more likely to be visited. However, this does not survive the inclusion of county fixed effects, indicating that the within-county expansion of the railroad network did not cause that county to be included in a campaign route. Finally, we find evidence that being visited on a campaign tour increased voter turnout in a county. However, we do not find a clear effect of campaign visits of a given candidate on his electoral performance.

JEL codes: N41, D72, P16.

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1 Introduction

Campaign tours have become an essential component of U.S. presidential elections. How and when did they begin? We explore the early history of in-person political campaigning in the United States by reconstructing the first presidential campaign tours from historical newspaper clippings. We analyze the decision to campaign, the determinants of where candidates campaigned, and the outcomes of early in-person campaigns. We focus on characterizing the role of supply and demand factors in establishing and normalizing presidential campaign tours.

Before the 1840s, presidential candidates were not expected to campaign at all, in person or otherwise. The general feeling was that the office of the president should be "neither sought nor declined" (Ellis and Dedrick, 1997). While it became more common in the years that followed, the practice of actively campaigning for the presidency remained controversial late into the 19th century (Ellis and Dedrick, 1997). Even as campaigning for the presidency became more normal, the method by which candidates reached the electorate differed substantially. Some candidates used the railroad to make campaign visits all over the country in the run-up to presidential elections. The first presidential candidate to undertake a campaign tour by rail was William Henry Harrison (Whig) in 1836. During his campaign for Illinois senator in 1858, Abraham Lincoln travelled the state by rail for the Lincoln-Douglas debates (Starr, 1927). While some candidates took advantage of this new means of campaigning, others decided to stay home and greet visitors with short speeches. This was known as "front-porch campaigning" (Ellis and Dedrick, 1997). By the 1900s, large campaign tours had become typical of presidential campaigns.

The shift to in-person presidential campaigning could not have happened without the construction of the railroad. The expansion of the railroad network in the U.S. during the nineteenth century greatly facilitated cross-country travel. Since its introduction in the early 1830s, the railroad network expanded rapidly. With an extension of 3,328 miles by 1840, it had already surpassed the canal network. By 1860, the railroad network grew tenfold, to more than 30,000 miles (Taylor, 1951). The railroad has been linked to higher trade and

regional price convergence (Donaldson, 2018), higher agricultural land values (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016), urbanization (Atack, Bateman, Haines, and Margo, 2010), school enrollment (Atack, Margo, and Perlman, 2011), banking (Atack, Jaremski, and Rousseau, 2014a) and industrialization (Atack and Margo, 2011; Berger, 2019).

We can think of the expansion of the railroad as increasing the supply of campaign tours. The demand for campaign tours may have increased over time as candidates learned that they are effective at improving electoral outcomes. The purpose of the paper is to shed light on the relative importance of these supply- and demand-side factors. We do this by creating a comprehensive database of presidential and vice presidential campaign tours during this period of transition. We focus our analysis on three questions: (i) Who campaigned?; (ii) Where did candidates choose to visit, and why?; and (iii) How did campaigning affect electoral outcomes?

We build a unique dataset containing every presidential and vice presidential campaign from 1872 to 1908, which captures the period in which in-person political campaigning became normal. We do this from historical newspaper clippings, using the website newspapers.com. We combine data on campaign tours with county-year level data on voting behavior, railroad access, demographic composition, industrial and occupational structure, and other characteristics.

We focus on three questions: (1) Who campaigned? (2) Where did candidates campaign? and (3) What were the consequences of campaigning? We find that younger candidates and vice presidential candidates were more likely to undertake large campaigns, while incumbents were less likely to do so. We also document an evolving norm of undertaking campaign tours. In the 1870s, campaign tours were uniformly small, and by the 1900s campaigns were uniformly large. The transition occurs in the 1880s and 1890s, which saw a steady increase in campaigning on average, but also a lot of variation across candidates.

In our analysis of where candidates campaigned, we find some evidence that candidates chose routes strategically. Even conditional on county and region-year fixed effects, they were more likely to visit counties with a previously close election. Interestingly, we find little

evidence that changes in accessibility influenced the likelihood of campaigning in a given place. While campaigning always occurred by rail, the changes in the density of a railroad network does not positively affect the likelihood of campaigning in a given county. Rather, candidates were travelling to established urban areas with established railroad networks.

Lastly, we find that campaigning has a positive effect on voter turnout. Moreover, there is a positive effect both of being a campaign stop, and being located along a campaign route. This suggests a possible reason for why campaigning in person caught on so quickly. On the other hand, there is no consistent effect of campaigning on the electoral performance of the campaigner, which is a bit of a puzzle.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some related literature. In Section 3, we describe the history of campaigning in the 19th century, from secondary sources. In Section 4, we describe the construction of our dataset. In Section 5, we analyze the characteristics of candidates who chose to do campaign tours. In Section 6, we analyze the choice of campaign route. In Section 7, we analyze the effect of campaigning on voter turnout and electoral competition. In Section 8, we conclude.

2 Related literature

Our paper is related to a few literatures in political economy. In investigating the role of the railroad expansion on campaigning, we relate to the literature on technological change and political participation. We are also related to the literature on the impact of campaigning on electoral outcomes.

2.1 Technological change and political participation

There is a growing literature that studies the connection between technological change and political participation and competition. For instance, the wave of protests in North Africa and the Middle East – known as the Arab Spring – has been linked to the availability of mobile phones and social networks, which made it possible for protesters to coordinate

(Pierskalla and Hollenback, 2013; Steinert-Threlkeld, 2017; Acemoglu, Hassan, and Tahoun, 2018).

There are three main areas in which technological change can impact electoral outcomes. First, changes in the media industry can affect how information is transmitted to voters (Strömberg, 2015). Previous research finds that voter turnout increased after the introduction of new newspapers (Gentzkow, Petek, Shapiro, and Sinkinson, 2014) and radio (Strömberg, 2004), but decreased after the introduction of television (Gentzkow, 2006). Even in the early 19th century, voter turnout in the U.S. increased with connection to the telegraph network, which allowed local communities to be kept up to date on news from Washington (Wang, 2023).

Second, changes in the voting technology have been shown to have an effect on turnout. For instance, the introduction of electronic voting positively affected turnout (Fujiwara, 2015). This is not the case for early voting: studies show a small positive effect or even a negative effect (Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, Miller, and Toffey, 2008; Burden, Canon, Mayer, and Moynihan, 2014). The secrecy of the ballot does not seem to improve turnout (Heckelman, 1995); however, changing voters' perception about it does (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Hill, 2013). The secrecy of the ballot can also have an effect on voting behavior itself (Baland and Robinson, 2008). Free mail delivery in the U.S. increased voter turnout during the early 20th century (Perlman and Schuster, 2016).

Finally, changes in transportation technology can significantly reduce the cost of campaigning for politicians. One such change is the expansion of the railroad network in the U.S. during the nineteenth century. Since its introduction in the early 1830s, the railroad network expanded rapidly. With an extension of 3,328 miles by 1840, it had already surpassed the canal network. By 1860, the railroad network grew tenfold, to more than 30,000 miles (Taylor, 1951). The railroad has been linked to higher trade and regional price convergence (Donaldson, 2018), higher agricultural land values (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016), urbanization (Atack, Bateman, Haines, and Margo, 2010), school enrollment (Atack, Margo, and Perlman, 2011), banking (Atack, Jaremski, and Rousseau, 2014b) and

industrialization (Atack and Margo, 2011; Berger, 2019).

2.2 Impacts of campaigning on electoral outcomes

The direct effect of campaigning on turnout has not been well documented in the literature to date. Estimating its causal effect is difficult because campaigning is likely to be endogenous to electoral outcomes. Candidates are more likely to campaign in places where they believe it will be more effective. For example, Strömberg (2008) shows that swing states with more electoral votes get more visits from presidential candidates during election years. In order to obtain casual estimates of the effect of campaigning on electoral outcomes, it is necessary to identify plausibly exogenous variation in campaigning. One potential such source of variation is physical accessibility – some places are simply more difficult to get to than others, and we should expect to see fewer campaign visits in these places. A change in physical accessibility – through the introduction of a new transportation technology such as railroads, for example – may facilitate identification of the causal effect of campaigning on electoral outcomes. One example of this is Selb and Munzert (2018), who analyze the effect of Hitler's campaigning during 1927-1933. The authors include distance to the nearest airfield as a covariate, as Hitler chartered a plane to get to some of the campaign events.

In a paper closely related to ours, Buggle and Vlachos (2022) study the effect the of 1896 campaign of William Jennings Bryan on electoral outcomes. The authors show that the Democratic vote share was higher in counties where Bryan gave a speech during his 1896 campaign, and they offer strong evidence that this is causal. We will explore the effect of campaigning on electoral performance for *all* campaigns during our sample period. We reproduce the finding that Bryan's 1896 campaign stops yielded greater Democratic vote shares. However, this results does not hold across campaigns.

3 Historical background

Before the 1840s, presidential candidates were not expected to campaign at all, in person or otherwise. By the early 20th century, campaigning was commonplace. There are qualitative accounts of the transition from one extreme to the other, which we will summarize in this section. Our paper adds a quantitative dimension to this topic.

In the early 19th century, the received wisdom was that the office of the president should be "neither sought nor declined" (Ellis and Dedrick, 1997). While surrogates frequently spoke on behalf of presidential candidates across the county, the candidate himself was expected to remain above the fray. One of the early candidates to deviate from this behavioral norm was William Henry Harrison in 1840. Ellis and Dedrick (1997) write that, in the early run-up to the 1840 election, Harrison made no public appearances, insisting that "the dignity of the presidency... prevented any man from actively seeking office" (p. 209). He radically changed course in September of 1840, undertaking a month-long speech-giving tour by rail. Interestingly, this appears to have been motivated by a desire to demonstrate to the public that he was not too old for the job, as his detractors claimed. This objective is apparent in the partisan press coverage of his September tour. For instance, the Cincinnati Gazette published the following description of a speech in Dayton, Ohio: "Compared with other men the writer of this has lately seen and heard, less in years than the General, there is not any marked difference of manner or matter. The fire of his eye is not dimmed by age, nor has the strength of his manly intellect suffered in the least. He will go into the Presidential Chair a veteran in wisdom and experience, and he will grasp the helm of state with a steady hand and firm resolution" (gaz, 1840).

It became gradually more common for presidential candidates to make political statements and campaign for votes during the second half of the 19th century. While some candidates traveled by rail to give speeches, others decided to stay home and greet visitors with short speeches, a strategy that became known as front-porch campaigning. The 1896s Presidential campaign is famous for William Jennings Bryan's ambitious speaking tour as well as for William McKinley's front-porch campaign. Bryan gave 600 speeches during this

campaign, attended by roughly 5 million Americans in 27 states. McKinley's 300 speeches from home were seen by roughly 750,000 people (Ellis and Dedrick, 1997). While Bryan was not the first to undertake a significant campaign tour, his 1896 tour was the most extensive to date.

Campaigning for president remained somewhat controversial into the early 20th century. Criticisms of candidates' campaigning practices had a distinctly partisan flavor. Ellis and Dedrick (1997) quote Republican John Hay as praising Blaine's 1884 speaking tour as "bold" and "brilliant" while in 1896 "condemned Byran for 'begging for the Presidency as a tramp might beg for a pie"' (p. 213). Figure 1 includes a political cartoon that derides Bryan's campaign strategy, implicitly connecting his decision to speak directly to the people with populist policies. Even in 1904, Theodore Roosevelt, a gifted campaigner who had undertaken an extensive tour in 1900 as McKinley's running mate, opted not to take the stump as a sitting president, indicating that political speeches were still considered somewhat undignified.

4 Data

4.1 Campaign stops and routes

We generate a database of campaign routes of presidential candidates from 1872 to 1908, inclusive. We do this using the website newspapers.com, which is an online repository for digital images of historical newspapers. The site contains images from more than 9,000 American newspapers, going back as far as the 18th century. All newspaper articles are searchable.

For each election, we know the names of the major party candidates and the date of each party's convention (where the party's candidate is formally nominated). We search for mentions of each candidate's name in U.S. newspapers on every day between the convention and the election. We collect clippings of coverage of the candidate's whereabouts, and we use this to construct his campaign route. Figure 2 includes an example of such a clipping,

about William Jennings Bryan's 1896 presidential campaign.

We construct campaign routes by connecting campaign stops, in chronological order, along the railroad network. We assume that candidates took the most direct route between consecutive stops. We use GIS data from Atack (2017), who digitizes maps of the railroad network from approximately every five years from 1840 to 1890, except for the 1850s where maps were available every two years. We describe the precise method for imputing campaign routes in Appendix A. Appendix B contains maps of all presidential and vice-presidential campaign routes from 1872-1908.

The accuracy of this method can be verified by checking our routes against secondary sources: campaign histories have been written about select presidential campaigns, including that of William Jennings Bryan in 1896. Figure 3 superimposes a map of Bryan's 1896 campaign as reconstructed from newspaper clippings over a map published in Bryan (1897), a book recounting his historic campaign tour. There is more or less perfect overlap between these two routes.

We include campaigns of all candidates who get more than 3% of the total vote. Weaver, who ran for the Greenback party in 1880 and the Populist party in 1892, is the only third party candidate who gets more than 3% of the vote. Some other third party candidates get just under 3% of the vote and are omitted. We test the sensitivity of our results to omitting all third party candidates. Table 1 shows the list of campaigns included in our data. It also shows candidates' party, age, number of states and counties visited, and distance traveled, in kms. Appendix B shows maps for all campaigns included in our dataset.

4.2 Electoral outcomes and county characteristics

Data on electoral outcomes are from Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (2006). These are county-level presidential election returns data, indicating the number of votes each candidate in each election received. These data also include voter turnout, which is the number of votes cast divided by the eligible population, which is linearly interpolated between census years.

County-level census data are from Haines (2010) whenever possible. These are digitized

tables from published censuses, which contain select variables at the county level. Certain variables – like the occupational distribution at the county level – are not available in the published census. We construct these from full count census microdata (Ruggles, Fitch, Goeken, Jacker, Nelson, Roberts, Schouweiler, and Sobek, 2021)

5 Who campaigned?

We have collected information on 11 presidential elections spanning over 40 years. Table 1 shows all candidates considered, together with their running-mates. We have collected data on age, party, and number of states, counties and distance traveled from the campaign routes described in the previous section.

Which presidential candidates traveled more? Figure ?? plots the distance traveled and counties visited by presidential candidates in our sample. We can clearly distinguish three different groups. The first group comprises the campaigners: Blaine, Bryan's three campaigns, Taft and Weaver's two campaigns. These candidates traveled more than 10,000 km and visited at least 40 counties. The second group is comprised of candidates with an intermediate level of campaigning: Cleveland's 1884 and 1888 campaigns, Garfield, Grant's two campaigns, Greeley, Hayes, Harrison's two campaigns, McKinley's 1900 campaign, Parker, Seymour and Tilden. Finally, the third group is composed of candidates who did very little traveling, usually from their home to vacation residences: Cleveland's 1892 campaign, Hancock, McKinley's 1896 campaign and Roosevelt.

There are some interesting facts emerging from this analysis. First, the extent of campaigning increases over time, but there is a lot of variation in the extent of campaigning especially in the 1880s and 1890s. Among the campaigners, there are two candidates from the 1880s, while in the group of stayers there are two candidates from the 1890s and one from 1904. More direct evidence of this can be seen in Figure 6, where a steady increase in the average number of counties visited and distance traveled can be seen starting from 1870. The coefficient of variation, however, increases until 1890 for the number of counties

(1880 for distance traveled) to decrease in the last decade analyzed.

The second fact is the tendency for incumbents to travel less. With the exceptions of Harrison and McKinley, all incumbents traveled less than when they were running for the first time. This fact probably contributes to not seeing campaigning increasing over time. An interesting example of this is Roosevelt's 1904 campaign. Even though he was campaigning as vice-president in 1900, in 1904 he was running as incumbent since McKinley was assassinated in 1901. He is by far the candidate with the most kms traveled during the 1900 campaign (almost 43,000). But then in 1904 he is in the group of stayers, with just 455 km traveled and only 4 counties visited. This was explicitly because he thought it would be inappropriate for a sitting president to take the stump (Ellis and Dedrick, 1997).

Figure 5 shows total distance traveled and counties visited by each campaign ticket, that is, adding presidential and vice-presidential candidates' visits. Compared to the pattern seeing in Figure ??, we see here that campaigning increases over time. When we analyze the top tercile of campaigns, all but one occurred after 1890. At this point, there are large campaigns for virtually every ticket, although whether the presidential or vice-presidential candidate is the dominant campaigner varies by ticket.

We estimate a simple model of ticket campaign to assess whether there is some substitution between presidential and vice presidential candidates, and also to analyze which candidates' characteristics matter for campaigning. We thus estimate the following model:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + Pres_{it} + X_{it}\beta + \delta_t + e_{it} \tag{1}$$

where Y_{ct} is the number of counties visited by candidate c in election year t, or the log of distance traveled, or a dummy equal to 1 if the candidate is classified as campaigner. $Pres_{ct}$ is a dummy for whether the candidate is running for President. X_{it} are candidates' characteristics (age, age^2, party, macro regions of birth dummies, and occupation dummies).

Table 2 shows the results, with the number of counties as the dependent variable in columns 1-3, log(distance) in columns 4-6, and the campaigner dummy in columns 7-9. The results show that presidential candidates are more likely to travel less than vice-presidential

candidates (columns 4-5), although the difference is not statistically significant when we include ticket fixed effects (column 6). There is no significant difference in the number of counties visited or whether the candidate is classified as campaigner. There is some evidence (although not very robust) of younger candidates more likely to campaign more, and there are no differences by whether the candidate is a Democrat or Republican.[1]

6 Where did candidates campaign?

In this section, we characterize the counties that were visited by presidential candidates. Figure 7 plots the share of counties that receive a presidential campaign visit, unweighted and weighted by county population. The unweighted share captures the share of counties that are visited, and the weighted share captures the share of the population living in a county that is visited. In the early 1870s, very few counties received presidential visits. However, counties that did receive visits were typically very populous. For example, in 1872, only three percent of counties in the United States were visited. Nonetheless, 15 percent of the U.S. population lived in counties that received a visit in that year. In the run-up to the 1908 election, 12 percent of counties were visited on presidential campaign tours, and a full 33 percent of the U.S. population lived in counties that were visited. The northeast and midwest were significantly more likely to be visited than other regions of the countries, and this remains true throughout the sample period.

Table 3 contains mean characteristics of counties that were and were not visited during each decade of our sample period. Visited counties had a denser railroad network than counties that were not visited, although this difference became less dramatic over time. In the 1870s, the mean visited county had almost twice the railroad coverage (measured as the share of the county's area located within five kilometres of a railroad) as the mean non-visited county. In the 1900s, this ratio had fallen to 1.4. Visited counties were substantially more likely to have had a close previous election, and this remains true through the period.

[1]There is a positive effect of other party candidates on being classified as campaigner, and this effect is driven by Weaver, who is the only third-party candidate in our sample.

Visited counties were significantly larger, more urban, more white, more literate, and had a larger share of workers employed in manufacturing.

These descriptive figures are difficult to interpret. First, there are substantial differences in the likelihood of being visited across regions. County characteristics, such as the urban population share, also vary systematically by region. For example, the urban population share is much higher in the northeast than it is the south, and the northeast was a much more popular campaign destination than the south. So, were visited counties more likely to have large urban populations because candidates preferred to campaign in cities or large towns? Or, is this simply a by-product of candidates' preference for campaigning in more urban regions of the country?

To say something more concrete about causality, we run a series of regressions, at the county-year level, of an indicator for a county being visited on a matrix of salient county characteristics (which vary across time and space). We include a series of fixed effects, which allows us to approach an estimate of the causal effect of these characteristics on the likelihood of being visited. Our most stringent specification is:

$$D_{ct}^{stop} = \alpha + X_{ct}\beta + \delta_{rt} + \gamma_c + e_{ct} \tag{2}$$

Here, X_{ct} is a matrix of county characteristics; δ_{rt} is a region-by-year fixed effects; and γ_c is a county fixed effect. Thus, β captures the effect of a change in X in a particular county, controlling for region-specific annual shocks to both X and the likelihood of being visited. We cluster standard errors are the county level.

In this section, we are interested in the relative importance of supply and demand factors in affecting the growth of campaign travel. An obvious supply-side factor is the cost of travel, which was greatly affected by the growth of the railroad network during the 19th century. It is clear that the existence of the railroad was necessary for national campaign touring. There was no other way to travel the country in a timely fashion. To this point, every campaign stop has a railway station.[2] Moreover, many newspaper clippings we use

[2]There is one campaign stop that is not connected to the railroad. The newspaper article that mentions

to construct campaign routes make explicit reference to the way in which the candidate travelled there. It is always by rail.

Another salient characteristic is electoral competitiveness. This affects the return to visiting a county. If a county is a safe bet for a given party, there is probably no benefit attached to visiting that county. However, if the previous election in that county was close (say, a margin of error of 10 percentage points), a visit from the presidential candidate has the potential to change the result in that county. Voter turnout may also matter for decisions about where to visit.

We first explore the relative importance of these supply and demand factors at the state level. As is the case in modern elections, campaign routes were typically planned at a high level before specific campaign stops were selected. In other words, candidates chose to campaign in specific *state* before choosing which cities or counties to visit within these states.[3] We regress and indicator for state s being visited in a campaign in year t on a series of state-year characteristics. To capture transit costs, we calculate a measure of lowest travel cost from the most populous city in state s from Washington, DC in year t. We follow Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016). The cost to travel from A to B depends on two factors: the distance between A and B and the extent of railroad connection between A and B. The lowest cost way to travel is always by rail. If B does not have a railroad connection, the lowest cost way to travel from A is to cover as much distance as possible by rail and the remainder by wagon, which costs 35 times more per unit of distance than rail.[4]

Other key characteristics include an indicator for whether or not the state was a "swing state" in the previous election, and voter turnout in last election. These both represent demand-side factors in the campaign decision. We also include the number of newspapers in the state, although this theoretical effect of this characteristic on the return to visiting

it is clear that the candidate made a special trip to this location by boat.

[3] Hilpert (2015) recounts how Roosevelt, in negotiating campaign details with party leaders, stated his preference for doing one or two stops in each state, and then rely on newspapers to expand his message across the rest of the population.

[4] See Appendix A.1 for more details of the construction of these variables.

a state is more difficult to predict. On the one hand, more newspapers at the state level might imply that campaign visits are more broadly publicized, which may increase the return to visiting that state. On the other hand, if newspapers are a substitute way of gaining traction with the electorate, candidates may be less inclined to visit states with a larger media presence.

Our results are presented in Table 4. In columns (1)-(3), we include year but not state fixed effects. We find that states that were lower cost to visit were significantly most likely to be visited. This survives the inclusion of latitude and longitude controls, indicating that states in which the most populous city is connected to the railroad were more likely to be visited. We also find that swing states from the previous election are significantly more likely to be visited, as are states with higher voter turnout in the previous election and states with more newspapers. These findings are generally robust to the inclusion of controls for time-varying state characteristics, such as population, the urban population share, and industrial and occupational structure. In column (4), we add state fixed effects to the regression, and all of these results vanish. This means that we cannot be sure that any of the above effects are causal. In particular, *changes* in a state's effective distance to DC or the expected electoral return to visiting that state do not seem to affect the probability of adding that state to a campaign route.

In Table 5, we estimate our baseline regression model, with a small set of X variables, progressively adding fixed effects. Here, we measure travel cost using railroad density at the local level.[5] In columns (1) and (2), we include only year fixed effects. Directionally, these specifications tell more or less the same story as Table 3. Counties that were visited had a larger share of their area within five kilometres of a railroad. And, they were more likely to have had a close election in the previous year. In column (3), we add region fixed effects, which shrinks the coefficient on railroad density by half, but does not change the coefficient on electoral competitiveness. In column (4) we add state fixed effects, which again halves the coefficient on railroad density and causes it to become insignificant. With county

[5]Practically, this measure is almost identical to the travel cost measure we used in Table 4, as almost all of the variation in this measure is driven by railroad density.

(column 5) and county and region-year (column 6) fixed effects, there is a large, significant, negative coefficient on railroad density. Having a previous close election continues to have a significant, positive effect on the probability of being visited when county fixed effects are included, although this does not survive the inclusion of region-year fixed effects. Voter turnout has a generally positive effect on the likelihood of being visited. Counties that are larger and located in a candidate's state of birth are also more likely to be visited.

In Table 6, we add additional time-varying county characteristics to the regressions. These are linearly interpolated between census years. Again, we progressively add fixed effects in each column. With other county controls included, the coefficient on railroad density becomes zero, even when only year fixed effects are included. And, the strong negative coefficient remains when county and region-year fixed effects are included.

Other variables have a significant effect on the likelihood of being visited. Candidates were more likely to visit places with a shrinking male population share, and places with aging populations. They were also more likely to visit places with a growing white population share. Interestingly, holding constant all other variables, candidates were less likely to visit places with increasing adult literacy rates. They were significantly more likely to visit places with an increasing share of middle-skill, white collar workers, and a decreasing share of unskilled laborers. Increasing manufacturing employment shares are also positively linked to receiving a campaign visit.

We learn a few things about the determinants of campaign routes during this period. Strikingly, improvements in a county's railroad accessibility did not make them more likely to be visited. This suggests that accessibility was not a limiting factor in candidates' decisions about where to go. In other words, presidential and vice-presidential candidates were not "supply constrained." It seems that the construction of the railroad was a necessary but not sufficient condition for campaigning to take hold. The growth of campaigning lagged substantially behind the construction of the railroad.

On the other hand, candidates seem to have made intentional choices about which counties to visit based on their anticipated electoral return. They visited more contested

counties. They also visited counties with particular socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, including more urban counties. Campaign routes were largely "demand driven." This raises the natural question of what generated the increase in demand for campaigning? It may be that a slow process of learning the outcomes of campaigning drove its widespread adoption. We explore these outcomes in the next section.

7 What were the effects of in-person campaigning?

In this section, we explore the relationship between campaign visits and electoral outcomes at the county level. We look at two outcomes: turnout and electoral competition.

7.1 Campaigning and electoral competition in aggregate

Before investigating the causal effect of campaigning on electoral outcomes, we present some suggestive evidence about the relationship between campaigning and outcomes in aggregate. Figure 8 plots voter turnout in Panel A and the share of the national popular vote to the Republican candidate in Panel B. Both panels plot the same series for the entire country and for the entire country excluding the South. We do this because our period of analysis overlaps with the enactment of measures intended to disenfranchise Black voters in southern states, and these measures affected both turnout and partisan vote shares (Kousser, 1974). While Republican vote shares do not obey much of a secular time trend, there is a clear decline in voter turnout over the period, particularly following the 1890s, which is not limited to the South. This is documented in the literature, and may be partially driven by a reduction in fraudulent voting behavior over time (Burnham, 1986).

Figure 9 plots national turnout against total distance travelled by presidential and vice presidential candidates in a single election year. Even when the South is excluded from this scatter plot (Panel B), there is a clear negative relationship between overall voter turnout and the extent of campaigning. This is not surprising, however, as the downward trend in voter turnout coincided with an upward trend in the extent of campaigning. We

investigate the relationship between campaigning and voter turnout more thoroughly later in this section.

How was campaigning related to electoral performance? It is not obvious at first glance that campaigning improved the performance of individual candidates. In fact, most of the famous early campaigners (e.g. Greeley in 1872, Blaine in 1884, Bryan in 1896, 1900, and 1908) were not elected. In Figure 10 we plot popular vote share against campaign distance travelled at the ticket-year level, and there is evidence of a weak positive relationship between campaign distance travelled and electoral performance at the national level. In Figure 11, we plot the gap in popular vote share (Republican - Democrat) against the gap in campaign distance travelled (again, Republican - Democrat). Here, there is slightly stronger suggestive evidence that campaigning *more* than one's opponent may have helped at the ballot box. Again, we investigate this in more detail later in the section.

7.2 Turnout

Our most stringent empirical specification is:

$$y_{ct} = \alpha + \phi D_{ct}^{campaign} + X_{ct}\beta + \delta_{rt} + \gamma_c + e_{ct} \tag{3}$$

where y_{ct} is voter turnout in county c in election year t, and $D_{ct}^{campaign}$ is an indicator constructed in three alternative ways: It can be equal to one if county c was visited by a presidential or vice-presidential candidate in year t ($D^{campaign} = D^{stop}$), or if the route connecting each of his campaign visits intersects county c ($D^{campaign} = D^{route}$), or if either the stop or the route are in county c ($D_{campaign} = D^{stop+route}$). Our preferred specification is the latter, since we want to capture all stops, even those that might not have been recorded in newspapers because they were too short or because the candidate only waved or shook hands with the crowd. For instance, Hilpert (2015) describes several unscheduled stops during Roosevelt's 1900 "whistle-stop" campaign. These incidental visits are more arguably exogenous to voter turnout.

X_{ct} is a matrix of county characteristics; δ_{rt} are region-by-year fixed effects; and γ_c is a county fixed effect. We generally estimate this equation using OLS, except when X_{ct} includes lagged turnout, in which case we use the Arellano-Bond (Arellano and Bond, 1991) estimator. In this specification, ϕ captures the effect on turnout of a county being visited in a campaign, holding county characteristics (fixed and unobservable, as well as variable and observable) constant, and controlling for region-specific annual shocks to both turnout and the likelihood of being visited. We cluster standard errors at the county level.

We present our main results graphically in Figure 12. Full regression results are presented in Appendix D. The figure plots the coefficient on $D_{campaign}$ from equation 3, progressively adding fixed effects to the regressions. The top panel, our preferred specification, includes counties with campaign stops as well as those that were part of the campaign route. The middle panel includes only campaign stops. The bottom panel shows the effect of being part of the campaign route, thus excluding counties with campaign stops from the treatment group. In all specifications in the top panel, counties with campaign stops experience significantly higher voter turnout. The coefficients shrink as geographic fixed effects are added, suggesting a degree of selection in the choice of counties to campaign in. Even in the most stringent specification, which controls for lagged turnout and region-specific annual shocks, being on the campaign route increases voter turnout by 1.1 percentage point, which translates to increasing turnout by 1.6 percent. Results in the middle panel are strickingly similar, although magnitudes are somewhat smaller. Finally, the bottom panel shows similar results, although when regional trends are included the effect is no longer significant at 95% confidence. We regard these results as using the most exogenous change in campaigning, as the treatment only include counties that were part of the campaign route, thus not necessarily targeted as part of the campaign.[6]

The results shown in Figure 12 are estimated including all counties in our sample. Thus, we are comparing counties that are in the campaign route to others that are very unlikely to be visited. Figure C.1 reports results when we only use counties that neighbor visited

[6] An alternative interpretation is that we measure campaign stops with some noise, and thus including the routes allows us to better measure the total effect of campaigns.

counties as controls. We also investigate the robustness of our results to omitting the South. Measures aimed at disenfranchising Black voters in southern states coincided with the increase in campaigning, and little campaigning occurred occurred in the region. Thus, we are concerned that the positive relationship between turnout and campaign visits may be driven by developments unrelated to campaigning in the southern U.S. Figure C.2 omits the South. This reduces the coefficient on campaign visits, especially for specifications with fewer geographic fixed effects. However, the positive relationship between turnout and campaign visits remains quite robust.

We investigate the effect of campaigning on turnout by party, candidate (i.e. presidential or vice-presidential), and year. Figure 13 indicates that Republican visits have a larger positive effect on turnout than Democratic visits.[7] Figure 14 shows that visits by presidential candidates have a larger positive effect on turnout that vice-presidential candidates. Finally, Figure 15 indicates quite a bit of heterogeneity in the relationship between campaign visits and turnout by election year. The estimates are much less precise since they rely on cross-sectional variation only, and are estimated with state fixed effects.

Tables D.1, D.2 and D.3 in the Appendix show regression coefficients for the full set of controls. Most of the political controls have the predicted sign. Being in the home state (either of the presidential or vice-presidential candidate) increases turnout (except when controlling for past turnout). Having a more dense railroad network has a positive effect on turnout, as occurs with having an active local media (proxied by the number of local newspapers). Previous turnout increases turnout, but a previous close election does not.

Taken together, these findings suggest that campaigning had a positive, causal effect on voter engagement. While there is not relationship between the extent of campaigning and voter turnout at the national level, this masks a significant local effect. Counties that received campaign visits – even short or incidental campaign stops – experienced an increase in voter turnout, and this effect is relatively robust. This may explain why campaigning became a common practice by the early 20th century.

[7] Figures C.3 and C.4 replicate Figure 13 for only stops and only routes, respectively. Figure C.5 omits the South.

7.3 Electoral competition

Next, we explore the effect of campaigning on the absolute margin of victory at the county level. Our most stringent specification is:

$$mv_{ct} = \alpha + \phi_R D_{ct}^{campaign,R} + \phi_D D_{ct}^{campaign,D} + \phi_O D_{ct}^{campaign,O} + X_{ct}\beta + \delta_{rt} + \gamma_c + e_{ct} \quad (4)$$

Here, mv_{ct} is equal to the Republican vote share minus the Democratic vote share in county c in year t. The campaign indicators are disaggregated by party: $D^{campaign,R}$ is equal to 1 if county c was visited by a Republican candidate in year t, $D^{campaign,D}$ is defined similarly for Democratic candidates, and $D^{campaign,O}$ for third parties. All other variables are defined as in Equation 3. If visiting a county causes that candidate's vote share to increase, we should see $\phi_R > 0$ and $\phi_D < 0$.

We report results from our baseline specification in Figure 16 (full regression results are presented in Table D.6). In this specification, a county is part of a campaign if it is either a campaign stop or route.[8] Our results underscore the importance of selection into being visited during a presidential campaign, especially for Republican candidates. Without county fixed effects, we estimate positive and significant values for ϕ_R, suggesting that a Republican candidate visiting a county improves Republican performance. However, this effect vanishes when we include county fixed effects, and changes sign when we control for lagged margin of victory. Thus, it appears that Republican candidates visited places where they had historically performed well. However, visiting these counties did not improve their performance relative to past years.

For Democrats, the picture is slightly different. When no county fixed effects are included, there is no significant relationship between Democratic campaign visits and Democrats' performance. However, when county fixed effects are included, ϕ_D has the expected sign and is significantly different from zero. Thus, when a Democratic candidate visits a particu-

[8] We repeat this specification using only stops and only routes in Figures C.6 and C.7. We also repeat this exercise using only neighboring counties as controls in Figure C.8, and omitting the South in Figure C.9. The results are virtually unchanged.

lar county, the performance of the Democratic candidate improves relative to that county's average. Still, this does not survive the inclusion of region by year fixed effects, or the inclusion of lagged margin of victory. So the results are not totally clear. The picture looks similarly muddy when we restrict the control group to neighboring counties or omit the South.

In Figure 17, we estimate a version of Equation 4 at the election year level. By necessity, this specification omits county and year fixed effects, but it includes census controls and state fixed effects. In the figure, we differentiate between different types of campaign years: those with one-sided campaigns (in which one party's candidate campaigned significantly more than the others), and an "other" category, which captures years in which more than one party conducted a major campaign. Years in which no significant campaign tours occurred are indicated in grey.

In most campaign years, there is no significant relationship between campaign visits on electoral performance. There are, however, some interesting exceptions. In the post-1890 period, there are two one-sided campaigns: William Jennings Bryan's (D) 1896 campaign, and Theodore Roosevelt's (R) 1904 campaign (which was in fact conducted by his running mate, Charles Fairbanks). In both of these campaigns, visiting a particular county was associated with an improvement in electoral performance. This reproduces the result from Buggle and Vlachos (2022) for Bryan's campaign. However, it paints a slightly more nuanced picture. Campaigning seems most likely to be correlated with electoral performance in years in which the campaign is one-sided.

Perhaps there is no consistent relationship between electoral performance and campaign visits because candidates tended to campaign in the same counties. We test this conjecture by including indicators for Republican visits, Democratic visits, and an interaction between the two. The coefficient on Republican visits, for instance, will capture the effect of being visited by the Republican candidate and *not* the Democratic candidate. We present these results in Figure 18. There is a slightly larger positive effect of *exclusive* own-party visits on own-party performance. However, this does not survive the inclusion of region-year fixed

effects, or the exclusion of the South (Figure C.11).

By the end of the 1890s, it appears that candidates believed that abstaining from campaigning meant risking an electoral disadvantage. The narrative evidence supports the idea that an opponent's campaigning decision had an effect on a candidate's behavior:

> The 1908 campaign began with both candidates, William Howard Taft as well as Bryan, intent on conducting a front-porch campaign reminiscent of McKinley's 1896 campaign. By the end of the summer, though, Bryan had reverted to his old ways. Taft, concerned with Bryan's popularity as well as by the paucity of people visiting his Cincinnati front stoop, decided that he, too, needed to take the stump (Ellis and Dedrick, 1997).

Our findings lend some modest support to this view. But the impact of campaigning on electoral performance at the local level seems to be highly idiosyncratic across candidates. This contrasts with our findings on voter turnout: there is a relatively robust positive effect of campaign visits on voter engagement. It is possible that the risk candidates perceived from allowing their opponents to run one-sided campaigns stemmed from the effect of campaigning on turnout. For example, a Republican candidate would not want to allow his Democratic opponent to increase turnout in traditionally Democratic counties at the expense of Republican counties.

8 Discussion

We uncover a number of interesting features about the growth of presidential campaigning in the United States. First, the evidence belies a straightforward narrative about the impact of technological change on political behavior. Certainly, the expansion of the railroad was a necessary precondition for campaign travel to occur. However, campaign travel was technologically feasible long before it became commonplace. Instead, we see evidence of a gradually evolving norm of political behavior that lagged behind technological change.

The evidence points to this evolution being driven by strategic considerations. Candidates visited counties that were politically valuable. And, campaign visits had a causal effect on mobilizing voters to the polls. There is no clear effect of campaigning on electoral

performance at the local level. However, there is some suggestive evidence that allowing an opponent to run a one-sided campaign was risky. These results may explain why campaign tours became such a fixture in American presidential elections.

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
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
Figures

Figure 1: Cartoon ridiculing campaign of W. J. Bryan, 1896



Notes: "Blowing himself around the country", by John S. Pughe.
Source: Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/91482121/.

Figure 2: Newspaper clipping from campaign of W. J. Bryan, 1896



BRYAN IN MICHIGAN.

TRAVELLED FOUR HUNDRED MILES AND MADE A DOZEN SPEECHES


To Mining People in the Strongest District in Allegiance to the Republican Party—Spoke to Large Audiences and Was Greeted With Enthusiasm at Many Places.

By Telegraph to the Morning Star.

WATERSMEET, MICH., October 14.—Candidate Bryan's special train travelled from Duluth through Minnesota and Wisconsin all night, and after laying for three hours this morning on a siding near Saxon, resumed its travels at 8 o'clock. The train consisted of four cars, one for baggage and another for the train crew, the third for the use of the party of well-known Michigan people accompanying Mr. Bryan, and the last special coach for the candidate's use. The train will remain intact until Detroit is reached Sunday.


Notes: Published in The Wilmington Morning Star on October 15, 1896. Obtained from newspapers.com on August 17, 2017.

Figure 3: Campaign Route for W. J. Bryan, 1896: comparison between Bryan's map and our reconstruction




Notes: Segments in red show the campaign route of Bryan in 1896, constructed by connecting campaign stops obtained from newspapers clippings. The map shows Bryan's third and fourth trips, from September 11 to November 2, 1896. Source: Bryan (1897) and own calculations.

Figure 4: Presidential visits




Notes: The figure shows total distance traveled by each presidential candidate on kms on the x-axis, and the number of counties visited on the y-axis. The data was constructed by connecting campaign stops obtained from newspapers clippings. Table 1 shows details on each presidential and vice-presidential campaign in 1872-1908.

Figure 5: Combined Presidential and Vice-Presidential visits




Notes: The figure shows total distance traveled by each presidential ticket on kms on the x-axis, and the number of counties visited on the y-axis. The data was constructed by connecting campaign stops obtained from newspapers clippings. Table 1 shows details on each presidential and vice-presidential campaign in 1872-1908.

Figure 6: Average and Coefficient of Variation of Counties Visited and Distance Travelled by Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates by Decade




Notes: The figure shows the average and the coefficient of variation of counties visited (left panel) and distance traveled (right panel) by presidential and vice-presidential candidates in each decade.

Figure 7: Share of Counties Visited




Notes: Panel A contains the share of counties visited in each year, unweighted. Panel B contains the share of counties visited in each year, weighted by population size.

Figure 8: Electoral Outcomes in Aggregate




Notes: The figure shows aggregate voter turnout (left panel) and Republican vote share (right panel) in 1872-1908. Dark dots include all counties in the data, while grey dots excludes counties in the South.

Figure 9: Campaigning and National Voter Turnout




Notes: The figure shows the correlation between distance traveled in kms and voter turnout in 1872-1908. The left panel includes all counties in the data, while the right panel excludes counties in the South.

Figure 10: Campaigning and National Popular Vote Share




Notes: The figure shows the correlation between distance traveled in kms and popular vote share in 1872-1908. The left panel includes all counties in the data, while the right panel excludes counties in the South.

Figure 11: Campaigning Gaps and National Popular Vote Gaps




Notes: The figure shows the correlation between the gap in distance traveled (the difference between Republicans and Democrats) in kms and the gap in popular vote share (the difference between Republicans and Democrats) in 1872-1908. The left panel includes all counties in the data, while the right panel excludes counties in the South.

Figure 12: The effect of campaign visits on turnout




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 3, progressively including controls and fixed effects. Detailed results are shown in Tables D.1, D.2 and D.3 in the Appendix.

Figure 13: The effect of campaign visits on turnout: Republicans vs Democrats




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 3, considering campaign stops and routes for Republican, Democrats and Other candidates separately, and progressively including controls and fixed effects. Detailed results are shown in Panel B of Table D.4 in the Appendix.

Figure 14: The effect of campaign visits on turnout: Presidential vs Vice-Presidential Visits




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 3, considering campaign stops and routes, and progressively including controls and fixed effects. Detailed results are shown in Table D.5 in the Appendix.

Figure 15: The effect of campaign visits on turnout: By election




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 3, considering campaign stops and routes, estimated separately for each election in the data. The regression includes controls, year and state fixed effects.

Figure 16: The effect of campaign visits on margin of victory: stops + routes




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 4, considering campaign stops and routes for Republican, Democrats and Other candidates separately, and progressively including controls and fixed effects. Margin of victory is computed as the difference between Republican and Democrats vote shares. Detailed results are shown in Table D.6 in the Appendix.

Figure 17: The effect of campaign visits on margin of victory: by election



Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 4, considering campaign stops and routes for Republican, Democrats and Other candidates separately, estimated separately for each election in the data. The regression includes controls, year and state fixed effects. Margin of victory is computed as the difference between Republican and Democrats vote shares.

Figure 18: The effect of campaign visits on margin of victory: Counties visited by each candidate or both



Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 4, considering campaign stops and routes, progressively including controls and fixed effects. Margin of victory is computed as the difference between Republican and Democrats vote shares. Only REP candidate is a dummy taking the value of 1 when only the Republican candidate visited county c in election year t. Only DEM candidate is a dummy taking the value of 1 when only the Democrat candidate visited county c in election year t. Both DEM and REP is a dummy taking the value of 1 when both Republican and Democrat candidates visited county c in election year t.

Tables

Table 1: Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates' Campaign Trips

Election		Presidential candidates					Vice-presidential candidates				
Year	Party	Name	Age	States (N)	Counties (N)	Distance (km)	Name	Age	States (N)	Counties (N)	Distance (km)
1872	REP	Ulysses S. Grant	50	4	12	2,566	Henry Wilson	60	8	13	12,391
1872	DEM	Horace Greeley	61	12	36	5,005	Benjamin G. Brown	46	7	9	7,579
1876	REP	Rutherford B. Hayes	54	2	3	3,725	William A. Wheeler	57	4	6	2,709
1876	DEM	Samuel J. Tilden	62	2	6	2,194	Thomas A. Hendricks	57	5	10	5,320
1880	REP	James A. Garfield	48	3	26	2,407	Chester A. Arthur	51	2	7	2,964
1880	DEM	Winfield Scott Hancock	56	1	3	129	William H. English	58	3	5	2,625
1880	GBK	James B. Weaver	47	16	40	19,756	Barzillai J. Chambers (*)	62			
1884	REP	James G. Blaine	54	13	138	12,712	John A. Logan	58	13	54	19,502
1884	DEM	Grover Cleveland	47	3	19	3,302	Thomas A. Hendricks	65	6	23	9,004
1888	DEM	Grover Cleveland	51	4	8	2,844	Allen G. Thurman	75	8	22	7,239
1888	REP	Benjamin Harrison	55	2	13	1,350	Levi P. Morton	64	1	3	467
1892	DEM	Grover Cleveland	55	3	5	113	Adlai Stevenson	57	14	45	23,588
1892	REP	Benjamin Harrison	59	3	9	5,650	Whitelaw Reid	55	5	15	11,578
1892	POP	James B. Weaver	59	24	75	27,791	James G. Field	66	11	25	11,677
1896	DEM	William Jennings Bryan	36	27	381	31,567	Arthur Sewall	60	8	16	4,432
1896	REP	William McKinley	53	1	3	689	Garret Hobart	52	3	9	6,602
1900	DEM	William Jennings Bryan	40	20	253	21,925	Adlai Stevenson	65	13	61	17,229
1900	REP	William McKinley	57	3	4	7,157	Theodore Roosevelt	42	22	264	41,589
1904	DEM	Alton B. Parker	52	3	10	2,148	Henry G. Davis	81	4	11	8,061
1904	REP	Theodore Roosevelt	46	2	4	434	Charles W. Fairbanks	52	28	84	34,658
1908	DEM	William Jennings Bryan	48	22	179	22,308	John W. Kern	58	13	25	13,427
1908	REP	William Howard Taft	51	23	191	18,474	James S. Sherman	53	7	30	10,852

Notes: Data on candidates' age was obtained from Wikipedia. Data on states and counties visited, as well as distance covered in km, was constructed by connecting campaign stops obtained from newspapers clippings.

Table 2: Who campaigns? Ticket regressions

	N counties			log(distance)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
President	-14.203	10.239	19.212	-1.371***	-1.024**	-0.859
	(28.002)	(23.684)	(35.565)	(0.465)	(0.413)	(0.624)
Age	-5.603**	-5.345***	-4.393	-0.053**	-0.050**	-0.037
	(2.597)	(1.836)	(3.542)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.050)
Other party	-30.770	-49.445		1.292***	1.014**	
	(45.668)	(44.248)		(0.362)	(0.371)	
Republican	-35.916	-48.115*		-0.408	-0.550	
	(28.623)	(24.311)		(0.519)	(0.452)	
Incumbent	2.279	47.688		0.544*	1.232***	
	(23.004)	(29.972)		(0.265)	(0.431)	
Midwest	43.688	16.465	5.483	1.019**	0.645**	0.268
	(27.373)	(24.524)	(34.816)	(0.399)	(0.300)	(0.490)
South	15.761	5.645	-9.244	0.376	0.271	0.638
	(37.435)	(34.226)	(74.745)	(0.718)	(0.648)	(1.697)
Decade FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Occupation FEs	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Ticket FEs	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Observations	43	43	43	43	43	43
Output mean	50.116	50.116	50.116	8.601	8.601	8.601

Notes: The table shows estimates from equation 1. In columns 1-3 the dependent variable is the number of counties visited, while in columns 4-6 the dependent variable is the log of distance traveled in kms. Standard errors, clustered at the ticket level, are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.

Table 3: Summary Statistics: Counties Visited

Decade	1870s		1880s		1890s		1900s	
Visited	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Share 5km from RR	0.38	0.75	0.49	0.84	0.52	0.80	0.61	0.84
Previous close election	0.24	0.34	0.23	0.43	0.28	0.44	0.21	0.29
Previous voter turnout	0.70	0.70	0.73	0.82	0.74	0.75	0.65	0.79
# Newspapers	3.12	19.68	3.73	16.03	4.44	12.23	4.77	12.25
Population	18,092	118,370	19,691	104,931	20,111	71,220	23,884	81,602
Urban pop share	0.06	0.40	0.07	0.36	0.09	0.32	0.11	0.34
Foreign born pop share	0.10	0.17	0.09	0.14	0.10	0.13	0.08	0.13
While pop share	0.83	0.96	0.83	0.96	0.85	0.91	0.84	0.96
Male pop share	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.53	0.52	0.52	0.52
Adult literacy rate	0.77	0.92	0.82	0.94	0.86	0.92	0.89	0.96
Share manufacturing wkrs	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.06
N	4,099	77	6,548	274	4,480	527	6,658	843

Notes: The table shows averages for census characteristics in counties where candidates made campaign stops (even columns) and counties where they did not (odd columns).

Table 4: Determinants of Where Candidates Campaigned: State Level Regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log transit cost from DC	-0.120	-0.133	-0.076	0.010
	(0.027)***	(0.049)***	(0.037)**	(0.100)
Previous swing state	0.115	0.107	0.076	0.028
	(0.051)**	(0.046)**	(0.041)*	(0.051)
Previous turnout	0.498	0.370	0.217	0.055
	(0.148)***	(0.146)**	(0.171)	(0.216)
1000's of newspapers	0.120	0.111	0.071	-0.011
	(0.030)***	(0.028)***	(0.023)***	(0.048)
Year fixed effects	X	X	X	X
Lat. & long. controls		X	X	
Census controls			X	X
State fixed effects				X
Observations	424	424	423	423
Adjusted R^2	0.265	0.307	0.359	0.377

Notes: The table shows estimates of equation 2. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 if state s was part of a campaign route in year t. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.

Table 5: Determinants of Where Candidates Campaigned: County Level Regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Share 5km from RR	0.067	0.053	0.025	0.011	-0.096	-0.104
	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)	(0.015)***	(0.015)***
Distance to DC	0.011	0.012	0.005	-0.006		
	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.007)	(0.015)		
In candidate birth state	0.094	0.082	0.074	0.067	0.063	0.009
	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.011)
Log population	0.069	0.075	0.077	0.084	0.021	0.033
	(0.005)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.009)**	(0.010)***
Previous close election		0.018	0.017	0.015	0.015	0.008
		(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)*
Previous voter turnout		0.083	0.047	-0.001	0.039	0.015
		(0.009)***	(0.010)***	(0.009)	(0.008)***	(0.008)*
N	22763	21586	21586	21586	21586	21586
Adjusted R^2	0.144	0.152	0.160	0.189	0.075	0.151
Year FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Region FEs			X			
State FEs				X		
County FEs					X	X
Region X Year FEs						X

Notes: The table shows estimates of equation 2. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 if county c was part of a campaign route in year t. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.

Table 6: Determinants of Where Candidates Campaigned: Census Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Share 5km from RR	0.005	-0.008	-0.003	-0.060	-0.070
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.014)***	(0.014)***
Previous close election	0.015	0.015	0.013	0.013	0.007
	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.005)**	(0.005)
Previous voter turnout	0.071	0.050	0.026	-0.003	0.003
	(0.008)***	(0.009)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)	(0.008)
# Newspapers	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.002
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)*	(0.001)
Urban pop share	0.159	0.143	0.144	0.171	0.137
	(0.025)***	(0.024)***	(0.024)***	(0.041)***	(0.040)***
Foreign born pop share_interp	-0.115	-0.133	-0.126	-0.478	-0.072
	(0.025)***	(0.028)***	(0.036)***	(0.091)***	(0.096)
Male pop share	0.573	0.159	0.066	-0.335	-0.521
	(0.141)***	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.207)	(0.246)**
Under 20 pop share	-0.233	-0.443	-0.192	-0.834	-0.606
	(0.061)***	(0.074)***	(0.076)**	(0.126)***	(0.142)***
Homogeneity of FB pop	0.043	0.034	0.042	0.034	-0.036
	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.018)*	(0.018)**
White pop share	0.083	0.110	0.092	0.100	0.194
	(0.012)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.051)**	(0.053)***
Adult literacy rate	-0.147	-0.157	-0.188	-0.166	-0.123
	(0.021)***	(0.022)***	(0.025)***	(0.032)***	(0.030)***
Share high white collar	-0.962	-1.085	-1.053	-0.922	-1.458
	(0.183)***	(0.183)***	(0.191)***	(0.317)***	(0.317)***
Share low white collar	2.658	2.401	2.137	2.870	3.088
	(0.387)***	(0.388)***	(0.364)***	(0.571)***	(0.550)***
Share skilled blue collar	0.279	0.353	0.336	-0.270	0.058
	(0.125)**	(0.126)***	(0.122)***	(0.173)	(0.168)
Share unskilled	-0.136	-0.105	-0.013	0.078	-0.011
	(0.024)***	(0.025)***	(0.024)	(0.037)**	(0.036)
Share no occ	-0.008	-0.020	0.055	0.012	0.025
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Gini farmland inequality	-0.070	-0.058	-0.064	0.070	0.118
	(0.025)***	(0.025)**	(0.026)**	(0.034)**	(0.036)***
Distance to DC	-0.017	0.003	-0.019		
	(0.004)***	(0.007)	(0.014)		
In candidate birth state	0.067	0.061	0.060	0.057	0.007
	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.010)***	(0.009)***	(0.011)
Log population	0.015	0.022	0.023	-0.007	0.002
	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.010)	(0.010)
N	21316	21316	21316	21316	21316
Adjusted R^2	0.208	0.211	0.231	0.093	0.159
Year FEs	X	X	X	X	X
Region FEs		X			
State FEs			X		
County FEs				X	X
Region X Year FEs					X

Notes: The table shows estimates of equation 2. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 if county c was part of a campaign route in year t. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.

Appendix

A. Data Construction

A.1. Data Sources

Campaign stops were collected from newspaper clippings obtained from the website newspapers.com. For each candidate-election, we searched articles between the dates of the party convention (i.e. the official start of the campaign) and the day of the election. We record each town/location where the candidate was reported to have been, with its corresponding date. The sample includes all candidates who obtained more than 3% of the vote at the national level.

We use data from Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) to construct campaign routes for each candidate, as well as the measures of railroad connectivity for each county. We created two variables: Railroad density, constructed as the share of the county area covered by railroads, with buffers of 5mi around the railroad line, and Travel Cost from DC, constructed as the lowest cost connection between the centroid of a county and Washington D.C. We use Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) estimates of travel costs for railroad ($0.0063*km) and wagon ($0.231*km) and find the least costly path. Distance covered by wagon is computed as the euclidean distance between the county centroid and the closest railroad line, using the `cKDTree` function from the SciPy Python library. Distance covered by railroad is computed using the Dijkstra algorithm (`shortest_path` function from the NetworkX Python library).

Data on electoral outcomes comes from Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (2006). Turnout is defined as the share of votes cast in an election to the estimated number of white males aged 20 and above in that election. We winsorize turnout at 100%. Margin of victory is constructed as the vote share of the Republican candidate minus the voteshare of the Democratic candidate in the county.

County level census data comes from Haines (2010) whenever possible. For variables not included in the published census volumes, we aggregate full count microdata from Ruggles, Nelson, Sobek, Fitch, Goeken, Hacker, Roberts, and Warren (2024) to the county level. We linearly interpolate between decades.

Data for newspaper access comes from the Library of Congress Directory of Newspapers (scrapped in 2011 by the Bill Lane Center for the American West, https://west.stanford.edu). The directory includes the dates of publication for each newspaper in the U.S., as well as its city of publication. We aggregate the data at the county level, and construct the variable Newspapers, with the number of newspapers issued in a given county in a given year.

A.2. Campaign Routes

We construct campaign routes for all presidential and vice-presidential candidates in Table 1. To this end, we geolocate each campaign stop, and connect consecutive stops through the existing railroad network in that campaign year using the Dijkstra algorithm (shortest_path function from the NetworkX Python library). We create two variables: stop, which takes

the value of 1 if a county has a stop of a given campaign (computed using the `within` function of the GeoPanda Python library), and route, taking the value of 1 if the county is cut across by the campaign route (computed using the `intersect` function of the GeoPanda Python library). Only 12 of the 1,763 counties with stops in our dataset are not connected to the railroad network. Appendix B shows maps for all campaign routes in our sample.


A.3. Sample Definition

We include presidential elections in 1872–1908.


We follow Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) to have consistent county definitions between 1870 and 1890. However, we keep 1870 boundaries, so that we aggregate voting data for counties that split over time. We exclude counties with population below 1,000. Our final dataset has 2,556 counties.

B. Campaign Maps


Routes by Grant & Wilson (REP) in the 1872 US presidential election




Routes by Greeley & Brown (DEM) in the 1872 US presidential election




Routes by Hayes & Wheeler (REP) in the 1876 US presidential election




Routes by Tilden & Hendricks (DEM) in the 1876 US presidential election




Routes by Garfield & Arthur (REP) in the 1880 US presidential election




Routes by Hancock & English (DEM) in the 1880 US presidential election




Routes by Blaine & Logan (REP) in the 1884 US presidential election




Routes by Cleveland & Hendricks (DEM) in the 1884 US presidential election




Routes by Cleveland & Thurman (DEM) in the 1888 US presidential election




Routes by Harrison & Morton (REP) in the 1888 US presidential election




Routes by Cleveland & Stevenson (DEM) in the 1892 US presidential election




Routes by Harrison & Reid (REP) in the 1892 US presidential election




Routes by Weaver & Field (POP) in the 1892 US presidential election




Routes by Bryan & Sewall (DEM) in the 1896 US presidential election




Routes by McKinley & Hobart (REP) in the 1896 US presidential election




Routes by Bryan & Stevenson (DEM) in the 1900 US presidential election




Routes by McKinley & Roosevelt (REP) in the 1900 US presidential election




Routes by Parker & Davis (DEM) in the 1904 US presidential election




Routes by Roosevelt & Fairbanks (REP) in the 1904 US presidential election



Routes by Bryan & Kern (DEM) in the 1908 US presidential election




Routes by Taft & Sherman (REP) in the 1908 US presidential election




C. Additional Figures

Figure C.1: The effect of campaign visits on turnout: only neighboring counties as controls




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 3, progressively including controls and fixed effects. In the top panel, counties included in the control group are those neighbor to at least one campaign route. In the middle panel we also include candidates' routes. In the bottom panel we include neighboring counties and exclude stops.

Figure C.2: The effect of campaign visits on turnout: excluding the South




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 3, progressively including controls and fixed effects. All counties in the South are excluded.

Figure C.3: The effect of campaign visits on turnout by party: only stops




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 3, considering campaign stops and routes for Republican, Democrats and Other candidates separately, and progressively including controls and fixed effects. Detailed results are shown in Panel A of Table D.4 in the Appendix.

Figure C.4: The effect of campaign visits on turnout by party: only routes




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 3, considering campaign stops and routes for Republican, Democrats and Other candidates separately, and progressively including controls and fixed effects. Detailed results are shown in Panel C of Table D.4 in the Appendix.

Figure C.5: The effect of campaign visits on turnout by party: excluding the South




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 3, considering campaign stops and routes for Republican, Democrats and Other candidates separately, and progressively including controls and fixed effects. All counties in the South are excluded.

Figure C.6: The effect of campaign visits on margin of victory: only stops




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 4, considering campaign stops for Republican, Democrats and Other candidates separately, and progressively including controls and fixed effects. Margin of victory is computed as the difference between Republican and Democrats vote shares. Detailed results are shown in Table D.7 in the Appendix.

Figure C.7: The effect of campaign visits on margin of victory: only routes




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 4, considering campaign routes for Republican, Democrats and Other candidates separately, and progressively including controls and fixed effects. Margin of victory is computed as the difference between Republican and Democrats vote shares. Detailed results are shown in Table D.8 in the Appendix.

Figure C.8: The effect of campaign visits on margin of victory: stops + routes, neighboring counties as controls




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 4, considering campaign stops for Republican, Democrats and Other candidates separately, and progressively including controls and fixed effects. Margin of victory is computed as the difference between Republican and Democrats vote shares. Counties included in the control group are those neighbor to at least one campaign route.

Figure C.9: The effect of campaign visits on margin of victory: Stops + routes, excluding the South




Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 4, considering campaign stops and routes for Republican, Democrats and Other candidates separately, and progressively including controls and fixed effects. Margin of victory is computed as the difference between Republican and Democrats vote shares. All counties in the South are excluded.

Figure C.10: The effect of campaign visits on margin of victory: Stops + routes, Presidential vs Vice-Presidential Visits



Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 4, considering campaign stops and routes for Republican and Democrat presidential and vice-presidential candidates separately, and progressively including controls and fixed effects. Margin of victory is computed as the difference between Republican and Democrats vote shares.

Figure C.11: The effect of campaign visits on margin of victory: Counties visited by each candidate or both (excluding the South)



Notes: The figure shows estimates of equation 4, considering campaign stops and routes, progressively including controls and fixed effects. Margin of victory is computed as the difference between Republican and Democrats vote shares. Only REP candidate is a dummy taking the value of 1 when only the Republican candidate visited county c in election year t. Only DEM candidate is a dummy taking the value of 1 when only the Democrat candidate visited county c in election year t. Both DEM and REP is a dummy taking the value of 1 when both Republican and Democrat candidates visited county c in election year t. All counties in the South are excluded.

D. Additional Tables

Table D.1: The Effect of Campaigning on Turnout: Stops + Routes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Campaign stop + route	5.133***	4.183***	2.420***	1.663***	0.826***	1.102***
	(0.321)	(0.310)	(0.238)	(0.222)	(0.218)	(0.237)
Log population	-0.253	0.173	-0.430	-1.725**	-1.033	-2.377**
	(0.420)	(0.402)	(0.322)	(0.850)	(0.887)	(1.140)
In candidate birth state	7.569***	4.447***	4.067***	3.835***	2.978***	-0.335
	(0.365)	(0.313)	(0.268)	(0.276)	(0.283)	(0.259)
Share 5km from RR	10.909***	2.706**	2.807***	1.220	3.538**	6.584***
	(1.040)	(1.071)	(0.717)	(1.418)	(1.436)	(1.223)
Urban pop share	-13.477***	-10.993***	-6.630***	-13.163***	-17.217***	-11.050***
	(2.214)	(1.981)	(1.510)	(3.000)	(2.950)	(2.837)
Foreign born pop share	-23.908***	-44.499***	-49.605***	-81.871***	-38.151***	-30.223***
	(2.486)	(2.066)	(2.638)	(6.473)	(7.637)	(8.119)
Homogeneity of FB pop	8.611***	7.176***	7.561***	-4.219**	-10.488***	-3.100*
	(1.379)	(1.256)	(0.950)	(1.926)	(1.997)	(1.855)
Male pop share	54.429***	50.396***	28.065***	83.374***	87.544***	61.506***
	(2.222)	(2.234)	(1.808)	(8.749)	(8.517)	(8.421)
Adult literacy rate	-24.939***	-41.578***	-48.557***	-79.797***	-62.000***	-15.797***
	(3.941)	(3.723)	(3.429)	(5.439)	(6.047)	(4.693)
Share high white collar	199.637***	196.616***	150.623***	164.734***	143.480***	107.410***
	(17.517)	(16.616)	(14.076)	(22.763)	(21.980)	(21.741)
Share low white collar	-127.556***	-109.366***	-43.834**	70.423**	46.460	-21.475
	(26.088)	(24.645)	(21.201)	(35.846)	(34.216)	(33.673)
Share skilled blue collar	1.277	3.674	-35.050***	-77.912***	-77.951***	-69.008***
	(9.691)	(9.100)	(7.358)	(11.390)	(11.840)	(14.200)
Share unskilled	-17.448***	-8.998***	-9.272***	10.942***	7.049	-15.449***
	(2.235)	(2.337)	(1.832)	(4.113)	(4.422)	(4.135)
Share no occ	17.459***	15.988***	3.669	14.476***	3.620	-5.044
	(4.868)	(4.488)	(3.446)	(4.631)	(4.606)	(3.635)
# newspapers	0.022	0.001	0.033	0.332***	0.208***	0.354***
	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.056)
Lagged turnout						0.252***
						(0.016)
Lagged close election						-0.372
						(0.233)
Observations	22,423	22,423	22,423	22,423	22,423	18,826
Output mean	68.741	68.741	68.741	68.741	68.741	69.035
Year FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Region FEs		X				
State FEs			X			
County FEs				X	X	X
Region X Year FEs					X	X

Notes: In columns 1-5, standard errors, clustered at the ticket level, are presented in parentheses. In column 6 standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.

Table D.2: The Effect of campaign on Turnout: Only Stops

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Campaign stop	6.053***	4.619***	2.710***	2.043***	1.717***	1.195***
	(0.389)	(0.385)	(0.314)	(0.286)	(0.287)	(0.302)
Log population	-0.130	0.239	-0.426	-1.763**	-1.056	-2.452**
	(0.421)	(0.404)	(0.322)	(0.851)	(0.887)	(1.142)
In candidate birth state	7.999***	4.734***	4.149***	3.874***	2.994***	-0.290
	(0.368)	(0.310)	(0.268)	(0.275)	(0.283)	(0.259)
Share 5km from RR	12.282***	3.834***	3.454***	1.411	3.675**	6.697***
	(1.037)	(1.070)	(0.712)	(1.419)	(1.435)	(1.226)
Urban pop share	-14.575***	-11.766***	-6.944***	-13.276***	-17.359***	-11.130***
	(2.249)	(2.016)	(1.519)	(3.010)	(2.953)	(2.836)
Foreign born pop share	-25.283***	-45.590***	-49.877***	-82.681***	-38.131***	-30.249***
	(2.471)	(2.052)	(2.631)	(6.462)	(7.624)	(8.124)
Homogeneity of FB pop	9.334***	7.733***	7.742***	-4.053**	-10.466***	-3.123*
	(1.377)	(1.254)	(0.951)	(1.927)	(1.997)	(1.855)
Male pop share	55.427***	51.205***	28.336***	83.213***	87.334***	61.430***
	(2.222)	(2.239)	(1.809)	(8.760)	(8.515)	(8.424)
Adult literacy rate	-25.530***	-42.156***	-48.894***	-80.116***	-61.987***	-15.909***
	(3.946)	(3.740)	(3.438)	(5.441)	(6.043)	(4.690)
Share high white collar	201.651***	198.414***	151.503***	167.533***	145.365***	108.196***
	(17.689)	(16.784)	(14.178)	(22.803)	(21.993)	(21.756)
Share low white collar	-138.556***	-116.379***	-46.871**	67.396*	42.508	-20.954
	(26.224)	(24.840)	(21.334)	(35.823)	(34.172)	(33.684)
Share skilled blue collar	6.792	7.536	-33.679***	-78.433***	-78.170***	-69.095***
	(9.908)	(9.342)	(7.421)	(11.407)	(11.837)	(14.200)
Share unskilled	-16.464***	-8.509***	-9.226***	11.049***	7.024	-15.440***
	(2.232)	(2.338)	(1.831)	(4.109)	(4.419)	(4.134)
Share no occ	18.710***	16.864***	3.981	14.613***	3.545	-4.991
	(4.914)	(4.529)	(3.458)	(4.630)	(4.606)	(3.632)
# Newspapers	0.013	-0.005	0.030	0.336***	0.207***	0.356***
	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.056)
Lagged turnout						0.252***
						(0.016)
Lagged close election						-0.407*
						(0.234)
Observations	22,423	22,423	22,423	22,423	22,423	18,826
Output mean	68.741	68.741	68.741	68.741	68.741	69.035
Year FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Region FEs		X				
State FEs			X			
County FEs				X	X	X
Region X Year FEs					X	X

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the ticket level, are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.

Table D.3: The Effect of campaign on Turnout: Only Routes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Campaign route	4.072***	3.401***	2.019***	1.182***	0.247	0.691***
	(0.359)	(0.351)	(0.266)	(0.257)	(0.251)	(0.250)
Log population	-0.480	-0.070	-0.715**	-1.801**	-1.105	-2.709**
	(0.433)	(0.417)	(0.326)	(0.872)	(0.908)	(1.190)
In candidate birth state	8.085***	4.993***	4.121***	3.984***	3.072***	-0.186
	(0.397)	(0.345)	(0.303)	(0.311)	(0.335)	(0.293)
Share 5km from RR	10.830***	2.723**	2.884***	1.258	3.413**	6.376***
	(1.065)	(1.094)	(0.726)	(1.457)	(1.466)	(1.251)
Urban pop share	-14.721***	-11.937***	-7.732***	-13.762***	-17.481***	-10.072***
	(2.267)	(2.007)	(1.532)	(3.146)	(3.081)	(3.010)
Foreign born pop share	-22.553***	-44.103***	-50.482***	-84.518***	-39.926***	-35.558***
	(2.564)	(2.132)	(2.719)	(6.701)	(7.871)	(8.774)
Homogeneity of FB pop	8.499***	7.366***	7.387***	-4.260**	-10.514***	-3.307*
	(1.422)	(1.308)	(0.981)	(1.996)	(2.061)	(1.916)
Male pop share	53.168***	49.475***	27.743***	85.305***	88.799***	62.257***
	(2.240)	(2.251)	(1.815)	(8.737)	(8.475)	(8.546)
Adult literacy rate	-24.944***	-41.607***	-48.107***	-78.735***	-61.023***	-13.442***
	(3.976)	(3.747)	(3.420)	(5.488)	(6.033)	(4.714)
Share high white collar	203.442***	194.936***	151.422***	166.946***	148.160***	123.592***
	(18.378)	(17.247)	(14.691)	(24.343)	(23.388)	(23.038)
Share low white collar	-154.065***	-117.202***	-43.989*	51.829	28.711	-53.224
	(28.276)	(26.606)	(22.657)	(38.294)	(36.078)	(36.447)
Share skilled blue collar	1.291	3.591	-38.496***	-82.071***	-82.226***	-71.850***
	(10.215)	(9.556)	(7.796)	(11.907)	(12.404)	(14.986)
Share unskilled	-17.106***	-8.839***	-8.896***	10.998***	7.903*	-15.613***
	(2.271)	(2.353)	(1.878)	(4.163)	(4.439)	(4.203)
Share no occ	17.258***	16.508***	3.308	14.019***	3.023	-4.889
	(4.973)	(4.613)	(3.509)	(4.795)	(4.785)	(3.737)
# newspapers	0.200***	0.124**	0.178***	0.522***	0.310***	0.449***
	(0.059)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.064)
Lagged turnout						0.236***
						(0.016)
Lagged close election						-0.520**
						(0.251)
Observations	20,720	20,720	20,720	20,720	20,720	17,214
Output mean	67.955	67.955	67.955	67.955	67.955	68.228
Year FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Region FEs		X				
State FEs			X			
County FEs				X	X	X
Region X Year FEs					X	X

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the ticket level, are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.

Table D.4: Effect of campaign on Turnout by Party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Only Stops						
Democrat stop	4.727***	3.528***	1.682***	1.214***	0.553	-0.074
	(0.486)	(0.476)	(0.391)	(0.375)	(0.377)	(0.413)
Republican stop	6.164***	4.752***	3.285***	3.030***	2.388***	1.769***
	(0.472)	(0.442)	(0.364)	(0.327)	(0.309)	(0.286)
Other party stop	-1.975*	-0.655	-0.688	0.859	1.018	1.675
	(1.187)	(1.212)	(1.108)	(0.936)	(0.905)	(1.044)
Lagged turnout						0.218***
						(0.016)
Lagged close election						-0.400*
						(0.229)
Observations	22485	22485	22485	22485	22485	18873
Output mean	68.719	68.719	68.719	68.719	68.719	69.013
Panel B: Routes + Stops						
Democrat route	3.850***	2.579***	1.103***	0.991***	0.282	-0.719***
	(0.351)	(0.321)	(0.263)	(0.261)	(0.260)	(0.259)
Republican route	4.810***	4.342***	2.902***	2.741***	2.004***	1.551***
	(0.365)	(0.343)	(0.267)	(0.263)	(0.253)	(0.217)
Other party route	-0.284	0.923*	1.109**	1.872***	1.817***	2.430***
	(0.523)	(0.499)	(0.444)	(0.438)	(0.437)	(0.464)
Lagged turnout						0.215***
						(0.016)
Lagged close election						-0.382*
						(0.228)
Observations	22485	22485	22485	22485	22485	18873
Output mean	68.719	68.719	68.719	68.719	68.719	69.013
Panel C: Only Routes						
Democrat route	3.006***	1.912***	0.793***	0.710**	0.050	-0.940***
	(0.409)	(0.370)	(0.306)	(0.306)	(0.310)	(0.274)
Republican route	4.164***	3.904***	2.595***	2.440***	1.590***	1.479***
	(0.430)	(0.411)	(0.324)	(0.329)	(0.318)	(0.239)
Other party route	0.024	1.137**	1.417***	1.933***	1.816***	2.451***
	(0.570)	(0.548)	(0.485)	(0.486)	(0.488)	(0.519)
Lagged turnout						0.196***
						(0.016)
Lagged close election						-0.381
						(0.246)
Observations	20782	20782	20782	20782	20782	17261
Output mean	67.933	67.933	67.933	67.933	67.933	68.206
Year FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Region FEs		X				
State FEs			X			
County FEs				X	X	X
Region X Year FEs					X	X

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the ticket level, are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.

Table D.5: Effect of campaign routes on Turnout: Presidential vs. Vice-Presidential routes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Presidential route	3.645***	3.012***	2.056***	1.692***	1.084***	0.882***
	(0.311)	(0.297)	(0.245)	(0.236)	(0.240)	(0.267)
Vice-Presidential route	3.584***	2.929***	1.552***	0.760***	0.266	0.346
	(0.333)	(0.311)	(0.251)	(0.245)	(0.248)	(0.246)
Lagged turnout						0.252***
						(0.016)
Lagged close election						-0.384*
						(0.234)
Observations	22423	22423	22423	22423	22423	18826
Output mean	68.741	68.741	68.741	68.741	68.741	69.035
Year FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Region FEs		X				
State FEs			X			
County FEs				X	X	X
Region X Year FEs					X	X

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the ticket level, are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.

Table D.6: Effect of campaign stop + routes: Electoral competition by party (Rep-Dem)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Republican route	4.122***	3.951***	2.927***	-0.074	-0.859***	-1.273***
	(0.689)	(0.652)	(0.605)	(0.345)	(0.319)	(0.388)
Democrat route	-0.136	-0.376	-0.978	-1.463***	0.209	-0.456
	(0.695)	(0.672)	(0.624)	(0.382)	(0.369)	(0.432)
Other party route	-1.885*	0.915	0.017	-0.341	-0.780	-1.223
	(1.086)	(1.040)	(0.864)	(0.698)	(0.694)	(0.804)
Log population	-1.468	-1.696*	-0.105	4.488***	7.669***	4.137***
	(1.037)	(0.918)	(0.833)	(1.347)	(1.448)	(1.309)
In candidate birth state	2.888***	2.413**	1.798***	1.596***	1.522***	3.628***
	(1.032)	(0.961)	(0.337)	(0.324)	(0.373)	(0.429)
Share 5km from RR	17.350***	4.608**	-0.514	-5.340**	-1.074	-1.698
	(2.200)	(2.290)	(2.072)	(2.372)	(2.450)	(1.964)
Urban pop share	-22.005***	-17.729***	-8.867**	-9.273**	-17.129***	-12.845***
	(5.006)	(4.029)	(3.477)	(4.316)	(4.201)	(3.958)
Foreign born pop share	91.568***	48.030***	7.050	-85.050***	-82.521***	-26.331**
	(6.801)	(6.549)	(7.443)	(10.976)	(11.217)	(10.542)
Homogeneity of FB pop	-5.802*	-1.971	2.422	-19.056***	-14.932***	-3.446
	(3.408)	(3.111)	(2.876)	(3.111)	(3.356)	(2.891)
Male pop share	41.011***	32.487***	1.169	21.330	24.105	1.200
	(5.872)	(5.592)	(4.897)	(15.348)	(15.283)	(13.123)
Adult literacy rate	-16.161	-53.166***	-70.869***	-100.560***	-88.310***	-34.629***
	(10.747)	(8.475)	(7.393)	(8.583)	(9.899)	(7.022)
Share high white collar	47.433	21.682	28.527	81.568**	80.237**	64.577**
	(37.119)	(34.434)	(30.750)	(36.214)	(35.159)	(28.905)
Share low white collar	-152.796***	0.895	35.194	56.927	19.816	0.067
	(55.749)	(47.669)	(41.427)	(54.832)	(53.554)	(48.063)
Share skilled blue collar	141.789***	96.020***	27.112*	-13.671	-41.168*	9.952
	(24.076)	(20.100)	(16.396)	(21.576)	(22.566)	(16.876)
Share unskilled	-3.540	6.393	20.425***	54.777***	56.669***	31.845***
	(5.128)	(5.200)	(4.711)	(6.748)	(7.128)	(7.964)
Share no occ	36.665***	24.841***	-0.376	13.672*	9.299	4.817
	(10.736)	(8.851)	(7.680)	(7.313)	(7.512)	(7.042)
# newspapers	0.093	-0.080	-0.085	-0.054	-0.073	-0.070
	(0.131)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.078)	(0.073)	(0.083)
Lagged margin of victory						0.426***
						(0.018)
Observations	22,420	22,420	22,420	22,420	22,420	18,825
Output mean	-5.176	-5.176	-5.176	-5.176	-5.176	-5.471
Year FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Region FEs		X				
State FEs			X			
County FEs				X	X	X
Region X Year FEs					X	X

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the ticket level, are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.

Table D.7: Effect of campaign stops: Electoral competition by party (Rep-Dem)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Republican stop	3.192***	2.269***	0.010	-2.591***	-1.461***	-0.937
	(0.876)	(0.819)	(0.747)	(0.488)	(0.436)	(0.628)
Democrat stop	-0.105	-0.652	-1.696**	-0.310	-0.505	-0.979
	(0.857)	(0.876)	(0.751)	(0.552)	(0.487)	(0.650)
Other party stop	-1.890	2.880	-0.314	0.528	-0.699	-5.171**
	(2.673)	(2.658)	(2.167)	(1.936)	(1.764)	(2.246)
Log population	-1.389	-1.642*	-0.063	4.547***	7.676***	4.217***
	(1.040)	(0.920)	(0.834)	(1.346)	(1.448)	(1.310)
In candidate birth state	3.232***	2.735***	1.930***	1.511***	1.520***	3.555***
	(1.039)	(0.961)	(0.328)	(0.323)	(0.374)	(0.425)
Share 5km from RR	17.678***	5.025**	-0.360	-5.430**	-1.185	-1.795
	(2.190)	(2.299)	(2.074)	(2.369)	(2.446)	(1.963)
Urban pop share	-22.482***	-18.018***	-8.676**	-9.231**	-17.048***	-12.402***
	(5.008)	(4.038)	(3.487)	(4.305)	(4.201)	(3.968)
Foreign born pop share	91.277***	47.637***	6.915	-84.887***	-82.589***	-26.350**
	(6.793)	(6.556)	(7.457)	(10.974)	(11.222)	(10.554)
Homogeneity of FB pop	-5.527	-1.727	2.500	-19.202***	-14.935***	-3.472
	(3.393)	(3.099)	(2.874)	(3.107)	(3.357)	(2.891)
Male pop share	41.634***	33.075***	1.576	21.428	24.212	1.125
	(5.872)	(5.594)	(4.898)	(15.341)	(15.271)	(13.105)
Adult literacy rate	-16.541	-53.747***	-71.506***	-100.352***	-88.373***	-34.504***
	(10.775)	(8.489)	(7.407)	(8.562)	(9.886)	(7.007)
Share high white collar	45.348	20.009	25.130	78.779**	78.518**	63.989**
	(37.159)	(34.491)	(30.846)	(36.215)	(35.223)	(28.989)
Share low white collar	-154.023***	0.682	39.464	61.605	23.595	0.468
	(55.964)	(47.870)	(41.635)	(54.985)	(53.695)	(48.111)
Share skilled blue collar	147.023***	100.250***	29.244*	-13.746	-40.980*	9.725
	(24.095)	(20.164)	(16.403)	(21.550)	(22.563)	(16.884)
Share unskilled	-3.157	6.479	20.412***	54.575***	56.705***	31.731***
	(5.137)	(5.203)	(4.710)	(6.737)	(7.121)	(7.962)
Share no occ	37.875***	25.535***	0.019	13.349*	9.366	4.705
	(10.743)	(8.862)	(7.682)	(7.317)	(7.510)	(7.055)
# newspapers	0.097	-0.076	-0.073	-0.056	-0.072	-0.074
	(0.133)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.078)	(0.073)	(0.083)
Lagged margin of victory						0.426***
						(0.018)
Observations	22,420	22,420	22,420	22,420	22,420	18,825
Output mean	-5.176	-5.176	-5.176	-5.176	-5.176	-5.471
Year FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Region FEs		X				
State FEs			X			
County FEs				X	X	X
Region X Year FEs					X	X

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the ticket level, are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.

Table D.8: Effect of campaign routes: Electoral competition by party (Rep-Dem)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Republican route	4.106***	4.474***	4.192***	1.410***	-0.342	-1.237***
	(0.840)	(0.808)	(0.755)	(0.397)	(0.367)	(0.405)
Democrat route	-0.416	-0.415	-0.692	-1.659***	0.168	-0.226
	(0.801)	(0.771)	(0.718)	(0.417)	(0.414)	(0.439)
Other party route	-1.770	0.658	0.166	-0.296	-0.855	-0.880
	(1.149)	(1.121)	(0.931)	(0.753)	(0.748)	(0.893)
Log population	-2.106**	-1.981**	-0.095	4.402***	7.665***	3.485**
	(1.064)	(0.967)	(0.874)	(1.397)	(1.510)	(1.395)
In candidate birth state	4.386***	3.421***	2.029***	1.739***	2.141***	4.033***
	(1.114)	(1.042)	(0.397)	(0.365)	(0.436)	(0.469)
Share 5km from RR	17.029***	4.093*	-0.918	-5.016**	-1.219	-2.152
	(2.276)	(2.360)	(2.138)	(2.455)	(2.532)	(2.014)
Urban pop share	-23.833***	-19.378***	-10.474***	-10.757**	-18.665***	-9.010**
	(5.435)	(4.221)	(3.663)	(4.568)	(4.416)	(4.141)
Foreign born pop share	93.272***	48.833***	6.060	-88.638***	-80.434***	-39.976***
	(7.104)	(6.834)	(7.763)	(11.469)	(11.710)	(11.232)
Homogeneity of FB pop	-4.422	0.172	3.933	-18.372***	-15.605***	-3.661
	(3.535)	(3.225)	(2.969)	(3.244)	(3.482)	(2.962)
Male pop share	39.162***	31.146***	0.934	21.031	24.065	-2.282
	(5.955)	(5.649)	(4.938)	(15.499)	(15.484)	(13.152)
Adult literacy rate	-17.397	-54.099***	-71.153***	-99.317***	-88.258***	-34.940***
	(10.832)	(8.508)	(7.427)	(8.705)	(10.018)	(7.111)
Share high white collar	51.098	24.234	28.660	109.885***	96.231**	63.192**
	(39.882)	(36.581)	(33.125)	(39.340)	(38.097)	(30.528)
Share low white collar	-186.802***	13.815	53.436	45.747	11.986	24.161
	(64.797)	(53.746)	(46.848)	(60.065)	(58.223)	(52.287)
Share skilled blue collar	148.521***	97.492***	24.343	-15.898	-40.851*	8.707
	(26.146)	(21.401)	(17.311)	(23.202)	(24.154)	(17.188)
Share unskilled	-4.597	6.030	22.077***	57.655***	57.741***	33.764***
	(5.312)	(5.345)	(4.852)	(6.897)	(7.272)	(8.080)
Share no occ	32.188***	22.279**	-1.764	14.411*	8.823	5.032
	(10.929)	(9.011)	(7.887)	(7.649)	(7.906)	(7.281)
# newspapers	0.456***	0.001	-0.046	0.005	-0.025	-0.070
	(0.122)	(0.096)	(0.085)	(0.101)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Lagged margin of victory						0.399***
						(0.018)
Observations	20,717	20,717	20,717	20,717	20,717	17,213
Output mean	-6.307	-6.307	-6.307	-6.307	-6.307	-6.679
Year FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Region FEs		X				
State FEs			X			
County FEs				X	X	X
Region X Year FEs					X	X

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the ticket level, are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.