New Deal, Same Compromise?

Measuring the Effect of Racially Linked Welfare Policies on Program Participation and Children's Development

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Abstract

This paper studies the implementation and nullification of man-in-the-house (MITH) rules that were part of state Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs from the 1940s to the 1960s. I use variation in states uses of these rules to estimate difference-in-difference (DiD) evaluations of the long-term impacts of MITH rules on families' access to economic resources through traditional welfare programs.

MITH rules, or substitute father rules, denied AFDC benefits to families in circumstances where welfare staff suspected an AFDC parent (generally a single mother) of "cohabiting in, or outside of, the home (i.e. the AFDC parent's primary residence)" with a nondisabled person. The rules limited families' participation in the AFDC cash welfare program on the extensive margin, and there is reason to believe that these rules were disproportionately enforced among Black families. I find that states' enforcement of MITH rules reduces White and non-White families' participation in AFDC; compared to 1948 participation rates, however, the decline among non-White families is strikingly larger than the decline among White families, particularly in Southern states. The U.S. Supreme Court's *King v. Smith* decision in 1968 invalidated MITH rules and led to a 15% increase over 1965 levels in non-White families' participation in AFDC.

Relative high school completion rates declined 0.08–1.5 percentage points among Black birth cohorts that graduated after MITH rules were adopted. Conversely, education attainment rose 1.0–1.4 percentage points among Black cohorts experiencing increased access to AFDC due to the Supreme Court invalidating MITH rules in *King v. Smith*. These results offer new evidence on the long-term impacts of children's access to cash assistance programs and the consequences of historical welfare policies that disproportionately excluded non-White families from the social safety net.

1. Introduction

A robust literature documents the importance of social safety-net programs both for ensuring that all families have access to adequate resources and for improving children's well-being in adulthood. In this paper, I measure the effect of state-level policies that alter families' access to AFDC on children's human capital and economic well-being in adulthood. AFDC was the cornerstone of the American social safety net for low-income families with children during much of the 20th century. Established under the Social Security Act of 1935, the program provided monthly cash assistance benefits to single-parent families.

Many studies identify the effect of income support programs using historical expansions in families' access to programs that provide nutrition assistance (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program), medical care (Medicaid), or wage supplements (Earned Income Tax Credit, or EITC) (Bailey et al., 2020; Barr et al., 2022; Bastian & Michelmore, 2018; Dahl & Lochner, 2012; Dave et al., 2015; East, 2020; Hoynes et al., 2015; Hoynes et al., 2016; Miller & Wherry, 2019). The results of those studies show that long-term improvements in children's development outweigh or seriously mitigate direct costs and short-term spillover costs such as lower parental employment. We have less evidence on the impacts of traditional cash welfare programs, such as the former AFDC program, however. Notable exceptions to our lack of evidence include evaluations of income support programs that closely mirror cash welfare benefits provided by AFDC (Akee, Copeland, Costello, et al., 2018; Akee, Copeland, Keeler, et al., 2010; Akee, Simeonova, et al., 2013), and Mothers' Pensions programs that were in place in some states from 1911 to 1935 (Aizer et al., 2016).

In this paper I use an understudied source of variation in the administration of AFDC benefits: state-level implementation of MITH rules and the Supreme Court's subsequent ban of those rules, to identify the impact of low-income families' access to cash assistance. MITH rules stipulated that monthly AFDC benefits could be denied to families when frontline welfare staff suspected that an AFDC household head, generally a single mother, was cohabitating in, or outside of, the home with a nondisabled person. Between 1948 and 1964, 19 states and the

District of Columbia (20 jurisdictions; hereafter, MITH states), enacted MITH rules as part of their AFDC program.[1]

MITH rules emerged as AFDC's growing caseload put pressure on state budgets in the late 1940s and early 1950s. As written, MITH rules were race neutral, but contemporaneous studies suggest that states disproportionately enforced MITH rules among Black families seeking assistance (Bell, 1965). Historical accounts link AFDC's introduction to racial politics that prioritized an administrative structure intended to protect local discretion to implement policies and practices, like MITH rules, that could temper non-White families' access to cash welfare programs (Alston & Ferrie, 1985; Katznelson, 2006; Katznelson & Mulroy, 2012; Lieberman, 1998; Quadagno, 1984).[2] Notwithstanding the potential political motivations of AFDC's decentralized design, states' implementation of MITH rules coincided with demographic contexts and programmatic trends that led non-White families, who were more likely to meet the AFDC income requirements (Sterner, 1943), to constitute a larger share of the population of families on whom MITH rules were enforced.

The emergence of MITH rules offers variation in which states adopted the rules, the timing of adoption, and differences in the intensity of exposure by race. I leverage these sources of variation in a difference-in-difference (DiD) strategy that compares the impact of MITH rules on the average monthly AFDC caseloads in MITH states with the change in average monthly AFDC caseload in non-MITH states. The potential variation resulting from racial differences in the intensity of exposure allows for a triple difference analysis; in those instances, I investigate caseload changes by race to interrogate the racial disparity in the policy's impact. I carry out this analysis using a monthly panel of AFDC caseload data from 1936 to 1980, which I supplement with archival data on states' adoption of MITH rules. I link these historical data to the decennial censuses (I use those from 1950 to 2000) and the American Community Survey (ACS; from

1. The name of the cash welfare program was changed from Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1962 (Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation n.d.). For brevity, I refer to the program as "AFDC" throughout this paper. From here, I refer to "MITH states" as those that adopted those rules, and "non-MITH states" as those that did not adopt them. The 19 MITH states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia; the District of Columbia is also a MITH jurisdiction.

2. From 1948 to 1967 AFDC administrative data distinguished only the racial categories of White and non-White.

2001 to 2019) (Ruggles et al. 2022)—both of which identify respondents' year and state of birth—to estimate the long-run effects of MITH exposure on education and earnings in adulthood.[3] I find that states' adoption of MITH rules disproportionately reduced non-White families' participation in AFDC; this was particularly true in Southern states, where the reduction in non-White families' participation (compared to 1948 participation rates) more than doubled the reduction I observe among White families. MITH rules subsequently reduced high school completion rates among Southern-born Black cohorts by 0.08–1.5 percentage points, a decline driven primarily by fewer high school completions among Black men. The reductions I observe suggest an 11– to 30–percentage point reduction when scaled by non-White families pre-MITH participation in AFDC.

In 1968 the Supreme Court nullified states' use of MITH rules in the *King v. Smith* decision. This ruling held that AFDC benefits could not be withheld from children under the pretext that they have a substitute father. The invalidation of states' use of MITH rules provides the opportunity to test whether "turning off" MITH rules has an expansionary effect on AFDC participation. As I show in this paper, although there is minimal change in White participation in AFDC, non-White children's participation in the program increased by 15%–20% after the *King* decision. The increased participation in AFDC corresponds with improvements in Black children's high school completion rates compared to their White peers by 1.2–1.4 percentage points. When scaled by non-White families' participation in AFDC in the mid- to late-1960s, these results suggest a 12%–17% increase in high school completion among the children who were most likely to benefit from increased access to AFDC's economic support.

The social safety-net literature has established that income support programs promote children's and families' well-being. My study contributes to this rich literature by expanding our understanding of how traditional cash welfare programs impact children's development. First, in contrast to most of the literature, I am able to use both contractions and expansions in program participation to identify changes in low-income families' access to resources. The effects I measure for children who experience contracted access to AFDC are consistent with evaluations of SNAP, Medicaid, and EITC, which find human capital effect sizes that range from .06 to .30

3. All references to state(s) of birth include the 50 states and the District of Columbia, and exclude US territories.

standard deviations (Almond et al., 2018). Interestingly, I complement the results from Akee, Copeland, Keeler, et al. (2010) and find effects for cohorts that experienced changes in access to welfare resources later in childhood.

Second, the ability to study both the introduction and invalidation of MITH rules provides a unique opportunity to assess whether contractions and expansions in the social safety net have commensurate effects on children's outcomes, because different families might respond differently to the distinct policy shocks. For example, contractions in access to resources could have a more negligible effect on children's outcomes if families can substitute public assistance with in-kind aid from other programs or from family members, or if families find other ways to blunt the impact of declining household resources for children. Alternatively, families might be quicker to economize in response to negative changes in household income than they are to spend more freely in response to improvements in household income. Differences in how families respond to the accessibility of income support programs could lead to outcomes that are more consequential for children when AFDC participation declines than when it expands. My results suggest that, for this regulatory policy, expanding and contracting access to cash welfare has differing effects on program participation but qualitatively similar effects on cohort-level changes in children's educational attainment. However, differences in how non-White families' participation changed after the introduction and invalidation of MITH rules suggest that the invalidation of those rules did not fully offset the effects of their introduction.

In addition, this study contributes to our understanding of how race interacts with the design and implementation of social policy. Studies across multiple policy domains demonstrate how policies and public resources can differentially promote or hinder children's and families' well-being and economic activity along racial lines (Aaronson et al., 2021; Chay et al., 2009, 2014; Johnson & Jackson, 2019; Ray, et al., 2022; Rothstein, 2017; Rothstein & Schanzenbach, 2021; Turner & Bound, 2003). Studies that focus on expansionary policy shocks to the social safety net generally find effects that are more substantial for minoritized children, which illustrates the social safety net's potential to remedy the consequences of past policies and practices that facilitated racially disparate economic outcomes (Bailey et al., 2020; Dahl & Lochner, 2012; Hoynes et al., 2015; Miller & Wherry, 2019). Conversely, by enumerating the consequences of a racially linked welfare policy, this study demonstrates instances where the

denial of an income support program has differentially hindered the well-being of minoritized children.

2. AFDC and MITH Rules

In 1935 the Roosevelt administration submitted the draft Economic Security Bill to Congress; this was the starting point for what would become the Social Security Act that same year. Among other initiatives, this bill proposed using federal funds to nationalize income assistance programs (Katznelson, 2013). Included in the bill was a plan to nationalize preexisting state-led Mothers' Pension programs under a new Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, which would be renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1962.[4] AFDC was distinct from other programs established by the Social Security Act in that it built on an existing localized system of Mothers' Pension assistance (Kingdon, 2014; Lieberman, 1998; Skocpol, 1992).

2.1. AFDC Rules

The transition of cash assistance from individual state programs to a national (but still state-managed) system of assistance illustrates how AFDC could underserve non-White families. Black families composed a smaller share of the population in Midwestern and Northern states, where cash assistance for low-income single mothers was quickly adopted; the benefits provided these states offered a more robust level of assistance. The majority of Black families lived in Southern states (Collins, 2021), and those were the last states to enact Mothers' Pension legislation (Skocpol, 1992). Within states, legislation permitted rather than required local governments to implement the pension program, resulting in the absence of Mothers' Pension programs in Southern counties that had a higher share of Black residents and, usually, White elected officials (Howard, 1992). In some Southern states racial exclusion was more explicit, and welfare offices barred Black families from participating regardless of local officials' decision to establish pension programs (Leff, 1973). As a result, Black households were underrepresented in Mothers' Pension caseload, given their share of low-income families within the broader population (Aizer et al., 2016; Leff, 1973).

4. As noted above, for brevity I refer to the ADC and AFDC programs as AFDC throughout this paper.

The national AFDC program limited some of the racial disparity in access to cash assistance that had been observed under state Mothers' Pension programs. For example, AFDC required all jurisdictions within a state to operate the program. At the same time, modeling AFDC after the Mothers' Pension program maintained an administrative structure that protected some local discretion to implement policies and practices that could constrain access for Black families (Katznelson, 2006; Lieberman, 1998). State rules and regulations could alter who receives and who retains benefits in a formally neutral yet racially discriminatory manner in practice, effectively targeting a subset of eligible AFDC families (Herd & Moynihan, 2018; Ray et al., 2020; Schneider & Ingram, 1993). In addition, caseworkers could selectively enforce state rules and regulations among specific subgroups (Lipsky, 1980; Soss et al., 2011).

In this study, I focus on a specific welfare regulation—MITH rules—that emerged from the legacy of Mothers' Pension and the political compromises that forged the AFDC program (Katznelson, 2013; Katznelson & Mulroy, 2012). Prior qualitative research suggests MITH rules were emblematic of welfare policies whose criteria differentially exposed Black families to enforcement by limiting access to AFDC; these policies also were disproportionately enforced among low-income, single-parent Black households (Bell, 1965).

2.2. MITH Rules

As written, MITH rules appear to be a tool to address fraud or abuse in the program, which is a sentiment that emerged in the 1950s among policymakers and the public. As noted above, MITH rules, or substitute father regulations, denied AFDC benefits to families in circumstances where frontline welfare staff suspected an AFDC parent (generally a single mother) of cohabiting in, or outside of, the home with a non-disabled person. Because Congress designed AFDC to support dependent children, state policymakers and welfare agencies viewed the presence of substitute parents as an indication that a child was not deprived of parental support and that he or she benefited from a breadwinner in the home. States' definitions of substitute parents, usually operationalized as substitute fathers, hinged on whether there was cohabitation.

States' definitions of cohabitation were generally vague and subjective. For instance, caseworkers could disqualify families from AFDC benefits if they suspected that a male sexual partner visited the home regularly, even if he visited as infrequently as every 6 months (*King v.*

Smith, 1968). Once caseworkers suspected the presence of a substitute father, mothers bore the responsibility of disproving that a man was in the home or that she was cohabiting with a man outside the home. In Alabama, for example, a substitute father was a married or unmarried man who (a) lived in the home with the child's natural or adoptive mother for the purpose of cohabitation, (b) visited frequently for the purpose of cohabitating with the child's natural or adoptive mother, or (c) cohabited with the child's natural or adoptive mother elsewhere (*King v. Smith*, 1968). As the details of Alabama's MITH rules make clear, the policy did not hinge on the economic circumstances of children. The binding criterion for enforcing MITH rules hinged on welfare staff suspecting cohabitation, which is a euphemism for a sexual relationship. A mother's male sexual partner was deemed a substitute father and thus was considered a non-absent parent, rendering the child ineligible for AFDC benefits. Whether the man was the child's biological father, adoptive father, legal stepfather, or whether he provided any economic support, was irrelevant to caseworkers' application of MITH rules.

The AFDC evaluation literature has yet to explore the rich variation in MITH welfare rules. MITH rules provide a unique opportunity to evaluate the long-term impacts of families' access to traditional cash welfare programs, such as AFDC. While the policy does not alter standard eligibility criteria, such as family composition or income, the policy's enforcement can impact families' participation on the extensive margins. Under MITH rules, welfare agencies could deem new applicants as ineligible for AFDC or could remove current families from the caseload. Between 1948 and 1964, 20 jurisdictions enacted MITH rules as part of their AFDC program. As can be seen in Figure 1, most MITH states were in the South, with states adopting the policy at an even pace between 1948 and 1964. In addition to MITH's temporal and geographic variations, three demographic factors suggest Black families experienced the most significant exposure to the policy's enforcement: (1) changing composition of families receiving AFDC, (2) differences in nonmarital births, and (3) the overrepresentation of Southern states among MITH states.

First, the composition of families receiving AFDC changed rapidly during the program's first 30 years. When the Roosevelt administration implemented the ADC program, later renamed AFDC, in 1936, more than 60% of beneficiaries were widowed families, and were essentially an extension of the population that had been served by the Mothers' Pension. By 1960 only 8% of AFDC cases were widowed families, with a growing number of AFDC cases involving divorced,

separated, or unwed families, with most of the shift going to the latter (Abramovitz, 2017; Hoey, 1939). Researchers have noted how policy changes in other income-support programs contribute to these compositional changes, such as widowed families' increased access to Social Security (Abramovitz, 2017; Lieberman, 1998). In 1939 dependents of and survivors of covered workers became eligible to receive Social Security benefits. Still, domestic workers and farmworkers did not become eligible for Social Security benefits until 1950; 50%–65% of African Americans were domestic workers or farmworkers between 1930 and 1950 (Bedell, 1953; DeWitt, 2010). Consequently, Social Security became a program that could crowd out low-income White families' participation in AFDC, while AFDC became the program that low-income Black families with children primarily relied on.

Differences in nonmarital births represent the second indicator foreshadowing Black families' differential exposure to MITH enforcement. Nonmarital births indicate families who are likely to be eligible for and to participate in AFDC. Despite comparable growth rates between racial groups, Black children were overrepresented in the population of nonmarital births (Figure 2).

Third and finally, Southern states are overrepresented among MITH states (Figure 1). Notwithstanding the demographic shifts induced by the Great Migration that stretched from the 1910s to the 1970s (Boustan, 2016; Derenoncourt, 2022), most Black families lived in Southern states during the era of MITH adoption. The demographic context and programmatic background for MITH's introduction meant that non-White families, which were the families who were more likely to meet the AFDC income requirements (Sterner, 1943), were also more likely to make up the families against whom states could enforce MITH rules. At the same time, these families were less likely to have access to income supports through other avenues.

In 1968 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states' use of MITH rules was inconsistent with the federal AFDC statute. In its *King v. Smith* decision, the Court concluded that the AFDC statute's reference to the word "parent" included only individuals with a state-imposed duty of support, and that states could not disqualify children from AFDC based on the presence of a substitute father. The Court's decision applied nationally but was differentially binding for the 19 states and the District of Columbia with MITH rules. The Court's decision potentially expanded access to AFDC resources in MITH states without altering the population of eligible families

based on household size and income criteria, and provided an exogenous shock in families' access to cash welfare. If states' enforcement of MITH rules had had a greater impact on non-White families than on White families, then invalidating the use of MITH rules might also have had differentially expanded those families' participation in AFDC.

Most recent evaluations of income support programs focus on policy variation that expands access to economic resources (Boudreaux et al., 2016; Currie & Gruber, 1996; Dahl & Lochner, 2012; Hoynes & Schanzenbach, 2009). One notable exception to that focus is the literature on the 1996 welfare reform legislation and preceding demonstration projects. For example, several studies evaluate the contractionary pressures of welfare reform policies, such as work requirements, time limits, and block granting of federal funds (Bitler & Hoynes, 2010; Blank, 2002; Bloom & Michalopoulos, 2001; Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Ziliak, 2016). I use temporal, geographic, and demographic variation linked to the introduction and invalidation of MITH rules to evaluate the impact on families of expanding and contracting access to cash welfare. Given the literature on expansions to income support programs (Bastian & Michelmore, 2018; Hoynes et al., 2016; Miller & Wherry, 2019), I expect the introduction of MITH rules to have a contractionary effect on families' participation in AFDC, resulting in fewer economic resources available to low-income families and a dampening effect on educational attainment and earnings for birth cohorts exposed to the welfare policy. Conversely, I expect the invalidation of MITH rules to expand families' participation in AFDC, increase economic resources for low-income families, and improve exposed children's developmental trajectory. Given prior qualitative work highlighting the propensity of caseworkers to enforce disciplinary welfare rules on Black families (Bell, 1965), I expect program participation and cohort effects to be more significant for non-White families and Black birth cohorts than it is for White families and White birth cohorts.

3. Data

My analysis of MITH rules uses data from several sources. First, I use data from states' annual plans to the former U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). The data are from legal filings of the Supreme Court's *King v. Smith* decision. The policy data published in the filing identify which states adopted MITH rules by 1967, the month and year HEW approved the state's MITH policy, and the month and year that states submitted amendments to

their MITH policy as part of their state AFDC plan. I link the information on MITH rules to a state-by-state monthly panel of administrative AFDC caseload data from 1936 to 1996 published in reports by the Social Security Administration or HEW (Goodman-Bacon & Schmidt, 2020). These data report three caseload measures: total caseload, total number of all recipients, and total number of child recipients. The total caseload approximates the number of families participating in the cash welfare program and is available for the entire panel period. From 1936 to 1950 the total number of recipients and the total number of child recipients are equivalent and identify the number of children who received welfare benefits. During that period states made welfare payments only for children in participating households. In 1950 Congress expanded program eligibility to include mothers; thus, from 1950 onward, the total number of recipients captures the number of parents and children for whom states made payments. The data also include indicators for the racial composition for the years 1948 and 1953, and annually from 1958 to 1996. Due to the White-centric data from this era, I coarsely define a participating family's race as White or non-White. Given the missing years of racial composition data, I linearly interpolate the race share data between 1948 and 1958. Historical caseload data and information on states' implementation of MITH rules allow me to investigate the regulation's effects on AFDC program participation by race. To develop my primary measure of program participation, caseload, and recipients per 10,000 women ages 15–55, I merge the caseload data with annual state population data estimates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) program.

I use data from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses and the 2001–2019 ACSs to measure the effect of children's exposure to MITH rules on their human capital accumulation and economic well-being. Both surveys consistently capture respondents' highest level of educational attainment, employment, earnings, and family income. Critically, the surveys identify an individual's birth state, current residence, and basic demographic information; they capture a large sample of relevant birth cohorts. The large sample size is essential given the share of the population that participated in AFDC. During the period of MITH's introduction, 1% to 2% of all families and 5% to 10% of non-White families participated in AFDC. Between 1965 and 1970, 2% to 4% of all families and 10% to 20% of non-White families participated in the program. The large sample sizes improve the likelihood I can identify changes among children

from households for whom MITH's introduction and invalidation potentially altered their participation in AFDC.

I use two samples to evaluate the introduction and invalidation of MITH rules: First, to evaluate the introduction of MITH rules, I use a sample of individuals born between 1920 and 1950. This sample yields birth cohorts that cover the staggered introduction of MITH rules from 1948 to 1964. The MITH introduction sample includes (1) cohorts that turn age 18 before the policy's rollout and are no longer eligible to receive AFDC payments as dependents, and (2) cohorts that turn age 18 after states adopt MITH rules and thus experience varying measures of exposure to the MITH rules as children.

The proximity of the Supreme Court invalidating MITH rules to MITH adoption complicates identifying a comparison group that is not impacted by MITH adoption or MITH invalidation. Cohorts born between 1951 and 1967 were dependent children during the adoption of MITH rules and the Supreme Court's invalidation of MITH rules in 1968. In light of this challenge, I use a sample of individuals born between 1964 and 1975 to study the invalidation of MITH rules. This decision yields a sample of cohorts that are minimally exposed to MITH rules (1964–1968) and cohorts that were never exposed to MITH rules (1968–1975). For both the adoption and invalidation samples, I facilitate completed education by restricting the samples to include only individuals who are age 26 and older. I also test the sensitivity of restricting the sample to individuals who reside in their same state of birth to minimize potential bias from Great Migration effects on migrants' developmental trajectory and long-term well-being (Boustan, 2016; Derenoncourt, 2022).

In addition to the individual-level data in the decennial censuses, I leverage the availability of state-level data to account for potential confounders. I use the 1940 census of population and the same year's census of agriculture to identify the percent of the state's population that lives in urban areas, is Black, is younger than age 5, and is older than age 65. I also identify the share of land used for farming, and the log of state population (Hoynes & Schanzenbach, 2009). I use data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis's Regional Economic Information System to measure state-cohort exposure to real government transfers between 1958 and 1980; and infant mortality data from National Vital Statistics System–Natality (NVSS-N) files to approximate cohorts' exposure to health care.

I next turn to discussion of the first four tables: Tables 1 and 2 display baseline state demographic characteristics and AFDC program characteristics, respectively. Tables 3 and 4 display summary statistics for the 1920–1949 and 1963–1974 birth cohorts, respectively.

Table 1 shows that the population of MITH states is generally younger, more likely to be non-White, and less concentrated in urban centers. A larger share of the population in MITH states has fewer than 4 years of education, and fewer residents have obtained a high school diploma. The per capita income of MITH states is approximately 60% the income of non-MITH states, though average unemployment levels in 1940 were noticeably lower in MITH states.

Table 2 details noticeable differences in the composition of state welfare caseloads and participation rates. On average, Whites compose a larger share of the total AFDC caseloads in MITH states (69%) than in non-MITH states (63%). The level and differences in caseload composition are almost identical for child recipients. White families in MITH states participate in AFDC at nearly twice the rate as White families in non-MITH states. The difference in the rate at which White children participate in the program compared with non-White children is noticeably smaller but is still 30% larger in MITH states. Meanwhile, the opposite is true when comparing non-White families' participation in AFDC. In non-MITH states, non-White families participate in AFDC at almost twice the rate of non-White families in MITH states. Shifting to child participation rates, the gap is smaller but is still 31% higher in non-MITH states.

Table 3 shows that changes in basic demographic characteristics (birth year, race, gender, etc.) surrounding the timing of states' adoption of MITH rules are comparable between cohorts from MITH and non-MITH states. Among states that adopted MITH rules, the average child is from a state that adopted the policy in 1957 and was exposed (predicted to graduate high school after the policy is adopted) for approximately 6 years. Sixty percent of children graduating high school in a MITH state after 1947 were exposed to MITH rules. High school completion rates among pre-1948 and post-1948 cohorts are larger in non-MITH states than they are in MITH states. As expected, the nominal change in high school completion among cohorts from MITH states is larger than the nominal change in high school completion among cohorts from non-MITH states by 4 percentage points (+ 22 vs. + 18 percentage points, respectively). These descriptive trends are consistent with my expectation that the educational landscape experienced by cohorts from MITH states between 1948 and 1968 is on a different trajectory, and substantiate

concerns that non-MITH cohorts might not represent a reasonable counterfactual for the educational trends of MITH cohorts, necessitating a within-treatment analysis.[5]

Table 4 presents summary statistics for cohorts surrounding the timing of MITH nullification. The changes in cohort racial and gender composition are identical for MITH and non-MITH states. In MITH states the average child was exposed to a welfare program with MITH rules for approximately 3 years before the Supreme Court's *King v. Smith* ruling in 1968. Because the pre-*King* cohorts in MITH states were exposed to a policy that could reduce program access before being exposed to a policy change that could expand access, my analysis of the *King* decision's impact on individual-level outcomes may understate the impact of the Court's ruling had these baseline cohorts been exposed to a static welfare program.

My analytic strategy relies on the assumption that MITH rules are an exogenous shock to families' access to welfare resources. The political and legislative histories of AFDC and its predecessor, ADC, raise the potential for selection into states' adoption of MITH rules. States that adopt MITH rules might have been predisposed to administer policies that constrict access to welfare programs, particularly for non-White families, and to facilitate environments that led to worse outcomes for low-income and Black families. I interrogate this potential threat to causally identifying the effect of MITH rules by testing whether 1940 state-level demographic and economic characteristics predict if states adopt MITH rules and, if so, when they adopt them. The demographic characteristics include the share of the population that is younger than age 5, is older than age 65, is Black, lives in an urban area, and has a high school diploma. I include a log of state population, state unemployment, per capita income, and share of land used for farming as proxies for state economic characteristics.

Table 5 displays results from each model. Column 1 regresses state characteristics on an indicator of MITH adoption and shows that no characteristics are statistically significant predictors (at the 5% level) of whether states adopt MITH rules as part of AFDC. More-significant concentrations of Black residents suggest a greater propensity to adopt MITH rules; however, the coefficient is only marginally significant (at the 10% level). The correlation

5. For MITH adoption, I define "treatment" as an indicator for states adopting a MITH rule or individuals from MITH states graduating after a MITH rule is adopted. For MITH invalidation, I define "treatment" as an indicator for MITH states post-*King* or individuals from MITH states born after *King*.

between racial composition and MITH adoption is consistent with the historical context discussed above. The specification used in Column 2 adds an indicator for whether the Census Bureau designates the state as part of the South region, which reduces the significance of racial demographics and raises the importance of states' age profiles (share of the population younger than age 5) and geographic distributions (share of population living in urban areas), though neither is statistically significant. Column 3 tests the relationship between observable characteristics and the year of adoption. The results suggest that states that were experiencing higher unemployment rates in 1940 were more likely to adopt MITH rules earlier, though the coefficient is only marginally significant. Column 4 limits the sample to Southern MITH states, raising the significance of unemployment in foreshadowing the timing of adoption.

4. Analytic Strategy

I use variation in the adoption and timing of states' implementation of MITH rules and the differentially binding nature of the Supreme Court's *King v. Smith* (1968) decision that invalidated enforcement of MITH rules to identify the effect of state MITH rules on both participation in AFDC and individual outcomes. The state-level variation in these two forms of MITH policy events (adoption and invalidation) allows for a DiD identification strategy to estimate the causal effect of this welfare policy. My central analytic assumption is that the trajectory of program participation and cohort outcomes in states that never adopt MITH rules are sufficient counterfactuals for the outcomes in MITH states, had the states not adopted MITH rules as part of their AFDC program.

Equation 1 specifies this primary analytic strategy. For both MITH policy events (state-by-state implementation and national repeal), the first difference compares the average monthly AFDC caseload in states that adopt the regulations against the average monthly AFDC caseload in states that do not implement MITH rules. The second difference compares the average monthly AFDC caseloads in states before the policy event to the monthly AFDC caseload after the policy event. FE represents flexible event-study in the equations.

$$AFDC_{st} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(MITH\ Policy\ Event_{st}) + \varphi_s\ (State\ FE_s) + \lambda_t(Year\ FE_t) + X_{st}B + \varepsilon_{ist} \ldots X(1940charact_s * Year) \quad (1)$$

In the simplest version of this model that evaluates the adoption of MITH rules, I regress monthly AFDC caseloads for state (*s*) in year (*t*) on a time-varying indicator for whether the state (*s*) has adopted MITH rules at time (*t*). States that have adopted MITH rules in a given year (*t*) are coded as 1, and states that have not adopted MITH rules are coded as 0. In all models assessing the impact of MITH adoption, I restrict the sample to caseload data for 1936–1967. For models estimating the impact of MITH invalidation, I restrict the sample to caseload data from 1964 to 1975. B_1 is the parameter of interest and captures the causal effect of MITH rules on monthly AFDC caseloads if the caseload trends in MITH states had mirrored the caseload trends in states that did not adopt MITH rules.

Three critical assumptions are embedded in this identification strategy. First, the strategy assumes that the state's adoption of MITH rules represents a policy and administrative practice change rather than a codification of existing welfare practices. Second, it assumes that the timing of states' adoption of MITH rules is effectively random and is not influenced by observable or unobservable developments that impact caseloads and policy implementation. Finally, the strategy assumes that adoption has an immediate and sustained effect on AFDC participation. I supplement this primary analytic strategy with flexible event-study and triple difference models to address potential concerns with these assumptions. The flexible event-study analysis (specified in Equation 2) allows me to inspect for pre-policy trends in monthly AFDC caseloads due to endogenous implementation of MITH rules. In this model, I replace the single, time-varying indicator for treatment with a series of event-time indicator variables. Event-time indicators code each calendar year relative to the year a state adopts MITH rules ($I\tau = 0$).

$$AFDC_{st} = \beta_0 + \sum_{-5}^{5} \gamma I\tau(t - \tau_0) + \varphi_s\,(State\ FE_s) + \lambda_t(Year\ FE_t) + \varepsilon_{ist\ldots} X(1940charact_s * Year) \quad (2)$$

If there are no differential pre-trends, the gamma estimates for the years before MITH rules were implemented will be indistinguishable. Similarly, if MITH rules have an immediate and sustained effect on caseloads, the gamma estimates for the years after MITH rules were implemented would be indistinguishable. For Equations 1 and 2, I test the sensitivity of rules to specifications that control for 1940 state-level characteristics interacted with linear time trends (1940 characteristics x Year).

To further interrogate the assumptions of the DiD framework, I relax the assumption that non-MITH states best represent the counterfactual trend for MITH states. Since MITH rules are believed to disproportionately target non-White families' participation in AFDC, I use data on the racial composition of each state's caseload to explore heterogeneous effects by race, proxying a triple difference specification. This strategy, specified in Equation 3, assumes that the effect of MITH policies on White AFDC participation captures any difference between the counterfactual trend of non-White cases in MITH states and the observed trend of non-White cases in non-MITH states. Put differently, the triple difference specification identifies any differential effect of MITH rules on non-White families over and above the impact of those rules on White AFDC caseloads. The specification uses White AFDC caseloads as an additional counterfactual in the event observable or unobservable developments are correlated with the MITH policy events.

$$AFDC_{st} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(MITH_{st}) + \beta_2(Race) + \beta_3(MITH_{st} * Race_{st}) + \varphi_s\,(State\ FE_s) + \lambda_t(Year\ FE_t) + \varepsilon_{st} \ldots X(1940charact_s * Year) \quad + X(1940charact_s * Year * Race) \quad (3)$$

The model specifications I use for MITH invalidation mirror the specifications for MITH adoption (Equations 1–3). The critical distinction is that treatment applies to all states but is differentially binding for states with MITH rules. Instead of using a time-varying indicator for treatment, I define "treatment" as an indicator both for being post-*King* and for whether the state ever adopted MITH rules. In all models, I restrict the sample to caseload data for 1964–1975.

I use similar specifications for my second-stage analysis of cohort-level outcomes. Cohort-level analyses leverage three sources of variation: (1) variation in the timing and binding nature of MITH policy events, (2) variation in the share of childhood that children were exposed to MITH policies, and (3) variation by race in the magnitude of MITH effects on program participation. The specifications regresses measures of educational attainment and adult earnings for individual (*i*) in state (*s*) in expected graduation cohort (*b*) on a cohort-varying indicator of exposure to the MITH policy event. Expected graduation cohort is linear combination of birth year plus 18.

$$Y_{isb} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(MITH\ Policy_{st}) + \varphi_s\,(State\ FE_s) + \lambda_t(Year\ FE_b) \quad X_{st}B \quad + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (4)$$

Similar to my strategy for program participation outcomes, I supplement this primary analytic strategy with flexible event-study and triple difference models. The flexible event-study

analysis (specified in Equation 5) allows me to explore the relationship between age at policy change and adult outcomes, and to inspect for pre-policy trends in the process. In the context of MITH adoption, consider an individual who is expected to graduate from high school in 1955. If the individual was born in a state that adopted MITH rules in 1960, their event-time is equal to –5, and they were never exposed to MITH rules during childhood. If the same individual resided in a state that adopted MITH rules in 1950, their event-time is coded as 5, meaning they were exposed to MITH rules for 5 years of their childhood. Using this event-time coding structure, I replace the single treatment indicator with a series of event-time indicator variables. Event-time codes each year relative to the year an individual was exposed to the MITH policy event, with each event-time indicator identifying the individual's graduation year relative to the policy change.

$$Y_{ist} = \beta_0 + \sum_{-5}^{5} \gamma I\tau(t - \tau_0) + \varphi_s\,(State\ FE_s) + \lambda_b(Year\ FE_b) + (State_s * Year) + X_{st}B + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (5)$$

Equation 5 assumes that the outcomes for birth cohorts of never-treated states are the appropriate counterfactual for the outcomes of birth cohorts of MITH states. Prior work on educational outcomes and the returns to education suggests this could be a strong assumption (Card & Krueger, 1992, 1996). The adoption of MITH rules coincides with rapid growth in national high school attendance and completion rates. Existing literature attributes some of this drastic growth in high school completion during the early- and mid-20th century to increased investment and improved quality of public education, compulsory schooling rules, and changes in child labor laws (Angrist & Krueger, 1991; Goldin, 1998; Goldin & Katz, 2008; Lleras-Muney, 2002). While many regions experienced rapid growth in educational attainment earlier in the century, growth in Southern states occurred later, and overlapped with the period of MITH implementation (1948–1964). In addition to these aggregate changes in the education landscape, Card and Krueger's analyses of school quality and the returns to education highlight how the quality of schooling experienced by Black cohorts drastically improved during this period and continued and corresponded with increased years of education (Card & Krueger, 1992, 1996). If MITH rules disproportionately impact Black birth cohorts in the South, and the educational outcomes of these cohorts are partially a function of region-specific trends in education policy that begin prior to the adoption of MITH rules, then never-treated states (which are primarily Northern and Western states) might not be the proper counterfactual. I inspect the sensitivity of

the results for cohort outcomes by using later- or last-treated states as the counterfactual and estimating effects for Southern MITH states.

5. Impact of MITH Rules on Program Participation

5.1. Program Participation

5.1.1. MITH Adoption

Table 6 presents parameterized estimates for changes in participation in the AFDC program. Panel A displays results using the full sample of states. Panel B presents results for MITH states and Panel C presents results for Southern MITH states. Columns 1 and 2 present results for non-White participation in AFDC and Columns 3 and 4 present results for White participation. The first row in each panel provides results for program participation operationalized as total cases per 10,000 women ages 15–55. The second row in each panel present results for child recipients per 10,000 women ages 15–55. These outcomes present program participation in the context of a population most likely to participate, or most at risk of participating, in the AFDC program. Columns 1 and 3 present baseline DiD estimates of the effect of MITH rules on participation in AFDC. Columns 2 and 4 present results from models control for 1940 characteristics interacted with linear time trends.

I find that MITH rules diminish the rate at which White and non-White families participate in the program. Nevertheless, the effect on non-White families' participation rate is nearly double that of the effect on White families. Non-White participation declines by 84 cases per 10,000 women ages 15–55 compared to 45 cases for Whites. When I control for linear trends in state characteristics, the effect for non-White participation is more than five times that of White participation. Notwithstanding the level differences in AFDC participation by race, compared to 1948 participation levels, White families' participation rate in AFDC declines by 18%–39% while non-White families' participation declines by 35%–49%. These results show that MITH rules have a contractionary effect on AFDC participation across all groups. The pattern of results is similar for child recipiency rates. I find that adopting MITH rules corresponds with fewer welfare payments on behalf of 335 non-White children and 137 White children. Similar to case-level measures of participation, I find that the effect of MITH rules is marginally sensitive to controlling for linear trends in 1940 state characteristics, but that the racial heterogeneity is qualitatively similar across the model specifications.

Panels B and C in Table 6, which use the last-treated state in the relative samples as the counterfactual instead of never-treated states, display similar patterns of the effect of MITH rules. For discussion, I focus on the results in Panel C. For these specifications Alabama's AFDC caseload operates as counterfactual. In Southern states MITH rules decrease non-White participation by approximately 58 cases (32%) and marginally increase White participation by 6 cases (5%), though the effect for White families is not statistically significant. Child participation rates decline 40% among non-Whites (191 children per 10,000 women 15-55) compared to a marginal increase of 5% among Whites (the estimates for White children are not statistically significant). These results, which are conditional on MITH adoptions in Southern states, are robust to controlling for linear trends in state characteristics.

Figures 3 and 4 depict the effect of MITH adoption on monthly AFDC cases and on monthly AFDC child recipients, respectively, in an event-study framework. The flexible event-study specification aligns with the results from Columns 1 and 3 in Panel A of Table 6. The figures offer visual evidence to support the feasibility of my identification strategy, displaying the evolution of non-White participation rates (displayed in blue) and White participation rates (displayed in red). Neither White families' nor non-White families' AFDC participation rates exhibit a statistically significant trend in case- or recipient-level participation rates before states implement MITH. The impact of MITH rules on AFDC participation is dynamic, and the trajectory differs across racial groups. For White families, participation rates decline steadily once states enforce MITH rules. Meanwhile, non-White families' participation rates decline rapidly within the first 3 years of enforcement, before leveling off 4–6 years after adoption.

So far, the results demonstrate the contractionary effect of MITH rules on families' access to assistance through AFDC and the disparate effect on non-White children and families. This analysis implies that the program participation declines equate to consequential household resource changes. I assume that MITH rules contracted participation among families who received or would have received meaningful welfare payments; I further assume that excluded families do not fully offset the decline in welfare resources with other income sources. Without detailed case-level or survey data on recipients' or applicants' household income, I cannot precisely identify who was excluded from the program following the adoption of MITH rules or

subsequent changes in their level of household resources. I test the feasibility of this assumption using data issued by states between 1940 and 1966 on the average benefit payment.

5.1.2. MITH Invalidation

Next, I turn to the effect of the Supreme Court's 1968 ruling in *King v. Smith* on program participation. The Court's invalidation of MITH rules removed a barrier to accessing welfare benefits, potentially increasing program participation among low-income families in MITH states. Since the adoption of MITH rules disproportionately impacted non-White families' participation in AFDC, I would expect the Supreme Court's decision to invalidate the use of MITH rules to generate more-substantial effects for non-White participation in AFDC. Table 7 presents estimates for the effect of the Supreme Court's ruling on program participation. Columns 1 and 2 estimate changes in non-White AFDC participation and Columns 3 and 4 estimate changes in White AFDC participation. Within each demographic grouping, the first column presents results from the baseline DiD specification and the second column adds contemporaneous controls for state-level characteristics and spending on government transfer programs.

Unlike states' adoption of MITH rules, the Supreme Court's *King v. Smith* decision leads to differing effects on White and non-White families' participation in AFDC (Table 7). For White families, the legal repeal of MITH has a negative effect on participation in AFDC. The results from the baseline specification are statistically significant at a 5% level, yet are not robust to controlling for state-level characteristics or government transfers. While the *King* decision had a muted impact on White families' participation in AFDC, it had an expansionary effect on non-White families' participation in AFDC. The baseline specification suggests marginal increases in AFDC participation, though the effects are not statistically significant. When I control for contemporaneous state characteristics and government transfer spending, I find non-White participation increases by 68 cases and approximately 268 children; note, however, that only the effect of children per 10,000 women is statistically significant at the 5% level. The imprecision of some of these estimates is not surprising given the dynamic effect of MITH adoption on program participation and the relatively close proximity of adoption and repeal. The results from Column 2 in Table 7 suggest that the *King* decision led to a 18% increase in

non-White families' participation in AFDC and an approximately 21% increase in the number of welfare payments on behalf of non-White children.

Figures 5 and 6 display the effect of the Supreme Court's invalidation of MITH rules in an event-study framework disaggregated by race for AFDC cases and child recipients (per 10,000 women ages 15–55). The coefficients identify changes in program participation in MITH states for which the *King* decision was binding. Note that the coefficient for $t = 0$ corresponds to 1968. Since the Supreme Court announced its decision in June that year, the first full year post-decision is 1969, or $t = 1$. The pattern of results is consistent across each measure of program participation. The results affirm the expansionary effect of the Court's ruling and further illustrate the effectiveness of MITH rules in inhibiting non-White families' access to state welfare programs.

5.2. Adult Outcomes

5.2.1. MITH Adoption

I use the change in welfare participation surrounding the adoption and later invalidation of MITH rules to explore the impacts of AFDC on long-term outcomes. Table 8 presents baseline DiD results on high school completion for the full sample of adults exposed to MITH adoption during childhood. Columns 1–3 present results for Black birth cohorts and Column 4–6 present results for White cohorts. Panel A presents results using birth cohorts from all states. Panels B and C limit the sample to cohorts from MITH states and Southern MITH states, respectively. Panels B and C test the sensitivity of the results to varying counterfactuals.

In Table 8, Panel A, I find that Black and White birth cohorts exposed to MITH rules experienced improved high school graduation rates (about 3.2 and 3.9 percentage points, respectively) relative to birth cohorts from never-treated states. Panel B estimates the results using only the sample of cohorts from MITH states. I narrow the analysis to this sample of individuals to estimate differences in educational outcomes between cohorts from early- and later-adopting MITH states. The estimates in Panel B are based on birth cohorts that would have graduated before the final two states—Indiana and New Mexico—adopted MITH rules in 1964. Though none of the results is statistically significant, the results together suggest contradictory

changes in high school completion among Black and White cohorts. The coefficient for White cohorts remains positive, suggesting a 0.7 percentage point increase in high school completion, while the coefficient for Black cohorts is negative, suggesting a 1.0 percentage points reduction in high school completion. The effect among Black cohorts appears to be driven by declines among Black men, which is marginally significant. Panel C further restricts the sample to cohorts from Southern states, with estimates based on birth cohorts that would have graduated by 1962, the year Alabama adopted the rules. Again, the results suggest increases in White cohorts' high school completion, and reductions in Black cohorts' high school completion rates. The aggregate effect for Black cohorts is marginally significant at the 10% level, with larger reductions among Black men.

Table 9 replicates the results but limits the analysis to respondents who are non-movers (i.e., who reside in their state of birth at the time of the survey). The pattern of results across racial groups and samples of states is qualitatively similar, though estimates are smaller in magnitude and generally less precise. Tables 10 (all respondents) and 11 (non-moving respondents) estimate the effect of the exposure to MITH rules on years of education. Consistent with the patterns I observe in high school completion rates for southern-born Black cohorts, the results suggest declines in years of education that range from 0.05 to 0.09 years (6% to 12%) of a school year.

Figures 7, 8, and 9 display changes in high school completion following the implementation of MITH rules in an event-study framework. Each figure corresponds to the state samples used in Table 8, with results disaggregated by race. Figure 7 displays results from specifications that include cohorts from non-MITH states in the analytic sample. Figures 8 and 9 present results using only cohorts from MITH and Southern MITH states, effectively estimating comparisons between cohorts from early- and later-adopting MITH states. The results in Figure 7 indicate that cohorts from non-MITH states do not provide a satisfactory counterfactual for the trend in educational outcomes for Black (or White) cohorts born in MITH states. Narrowing the analysis to MITH (Figure 8) and Southern MITH (Figure 9) states appears more consistent with the assumption that cohorts from early and later-adopting MITH states were on similar educational trajectories. I do not observe a differential pre-trend in high school completion rates leading up to MITH rules in Figure 8 or Figure 9. The lack of a pre-trend suggests that the educational trajectory of cohorts from later-adopting MITH states better captures the trajectory

of educational outcomes if MITH states had not adopted MITH rules. There does appear to be a distinct change in high school completion following the implementation of MITH rules. While the individual event-year coefficients in Figure 8 are imprecise, the results indicate that Black high school completion rates begin to decline after states adopt MITH rules. I gain precision when focusing on states with large numbers of Black residents (Figure 9). The change in high school completion among Black cohorts from Southern MITH states is dynamic and mirrors the pattern I observe in program participation, steadily increasing in magnitude as states ramp up enforcement. At the same time, White cohorts generally experience improvements in high school completion.

I next explore whether the reductions in high school completion and years of educational attainment I observe translate into reductions in adult wages and earnings. Tables 12 and 13 present results for all adult and for non-moving adult survey respondents, respectively. Each specification for wage outcomes includes controls for experience (calculated as age minus years of schooling minus 6) and experience squared. Given the pattern of education outcomes, the results for wages and earnings are generally counterintuitive. Panel A of Table 12 and Panel A of Table 13 suggest that Black and White cohorts from MITH states experienced reduced earnings compared to their peers from non-MITH states. The nominal reduction for White cohorts is larger, but, as a percentage of race-specific mean earnings, the reductions are qualitatively similar across racial groups. Panels B and C of Tables 12 and 13 indicate positive changes in earnings for Black and White cohorts from early-adopting MITH states compared to cohorts from later-adopting MITH states. Figures 10, 11, and 12 display event-study results for wage and earnings outcomes. Consistent with the results in Tables 12 and 13, the event-study estimates are noisy for Black and White cohorts, and suggest a minimal change in the earnings of adults exposed to the policy.

5.2.2. MITH Invalidation

Table 14 presents changes in high school completion for adults exposed to the Supreme Court's invalidation of MITH rules as children. Columns 1–6 report results for Black cohorts, and Columns 7–12 report results for White cohorts, respectively. The odd-numbered columns present baseline results with birth cohort and state-of-birth fixed effects. The even-numbered

columns include controls for the average level of spending on other income support programs that a state-specific cohort experienced between in utero and age 6.

The baseline estimates suggest that high school completion increased among Black birth cohorts from MITH states who were born after the landmark decision. The effect is stronger among cohorts born in Southern MITH states. A portion of this effect appears to be correlated with children's exposure to the rollout of other income support programs. Even after conditioning on these environmental factors and policy developments, high school completion rates appear to increase by approximately 0.8–1.3 percentage points. Consistent with the effects I observe in program participation, the effects for Black cohorts are larger than the effects for White cohorts (1.3 percentage points vs. 0.6 percentage points). In Table 15 I replicate this analysis using a sample of non-moving respondents. The magnitude of the effects is larger for this sample, while the pattern across racial groups is qualitatively similar. Tables 16 and 17 present results for high school completion. The coefficients for high school completion suggest marginal improvements, although they are imprecisely estimated and indistinguishable from changes experienced among White cohorts.

Figures 13 and 14 display event-study results for high school completion. Note that the event-study coefficients plot estimates relative to cohorts who were born in 1967, the year before the Supreme Court nullified MITH rules. Cohorts born after the Supreme Court's decision are fully exposed to the ruling's impact on participation in AFDC, while cohorts born immediately before the ruling are partially exposed. The slow 20-year rollout of MITH rules and their dynamic effect on participation in AFDC present a challenge for identifying cohorts with minimal exposure to adoption of those rules as well as minimal exposure to their invalidation.

Figure 13 displays results for all respondents and Figure 14 displays results for non-moving respondents. The coefficients in both figures compare changes in the Black cohort's rate of high school completion relative to the White cohort's rate following the U.S. Supreme Court's invalidation of MITH rules. This specification allows me to use White cohorts, which experienced minimal changes in program participation, as a control for time-varying changes in MITH states. While the coefficients in Figure 13 are generally imprecise, the pattern suggests a pre-trend in high school completion when using the full sample of survey respondents. When I narrow the sample to non-moving individuals, the difference in the year before MITH rules were

implemented in the trajectory of Black and White high school completion rates exhibits a more muted qualitative trend that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. After *King*, high school completion rates for Black cohorts born post-decision rise by approximately 1.0 percentage point.

5.2.3 Practical Significance

The changes in high school completion among cohorts exposed to MITH adoption and invalidation approximate intent-to-treat effects for each MITH policy event. Since not all individuals are from AFDC-eligible households, the estimates likely understate the full impact of reducing or expanding access to AFDC for children whose participation in AFDC is impacted by MITH rules. During MITH implementation (1948–1964), state welfare agencies made AFDC payments on behalf of 5% to 8% of non-White individuals. Between 1965 and 1970, non-White participation rates in MITH states ranged between 8% to 15%. Scaling the reduced form estimates by non-White recipiency rates suggests that MITH rules reduced high school completion rates by 19% to 31% and that *King v. Smith* increased high school completion by 7% to 16% among children most likely to participate in the AFDC's cash welfare program. The changes I observe in children's development following MITH-induced fluctuations in families' access to income assistance are consistent with results from the broader literature evaluating the impact of children's exposure to expansions in the EITC, Medicaid, and nutrition assistance (e.g., SNAP and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children [WIC]).

5.3. Robustness Checks

Over the past 3 years, several methodological papers have identified flaws when using two-way fixed-effects (TWFE) to derive DiD estimates of staggered policy changes (Callaway & Sant'Anna, 2019; de Chaisemartin & D'Haultfœuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Sun & Abraham, 2021). TWFE specification strategies can lead to estimates that include comparisons using already-treated individuals, entities, or cohorts as a counterfactual for the not-yet-treated individuals, entities, or cohorts. The consequence is results that might be biased in magnitude or incorrectly signed, especially if a relatively small sample of never-treated units or units' exposure to treatment is concentrated or unevenly distributed. The critiques raised in the

literature are most relevant to my analysis of implementation of MITH rules, which is identified from states' staggered implementation of MITH rules. Figures 14 and 15 display my baseline results for White and non-White program participation alongside three alternative DiD estimators. The pattern across the four estimators is consistent. This should be expected given the balanced progression of treated states' adoption of MITH rules and the relatively large sample of never-treated states. As noted in the literature (Callaway & Sant'Anna, 2019; de Chaisemartin & D'Haultfœuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Sun & Abraham, 2021), the alternative estimators identify better pre-trends and more-stable post-treatment effects for event-years 5–9.

The results presented on changes in high school completion following MITH implementation might be more vulnerable to the literature's critiques. When interpreting the impact of MITH implementation on high school completion, I focus on comparisons between cohorts exposed to MITH rules earlier and those exposed later to discount the secular changes in the education landscape. Following Goodman-Bacon's (2018) discussion of the potential bias embedded in TWFE, I decompose the baseline estimates into the three comparisons underlying the aggregate TWFE estimate: (1) MITH versus non-MITH states, where cohorts from non-MITH states function as the counterfactual; (2) early- versus later-adopting MITH states, where cohorts from the last-adopting state(s) function as the counterfactual; and (3) later- versus early-adopting MITH states, where already-treated cohorts from early-adopting states function as the counterfactual.

Tables 18–23 display results from the decomposition exercise for high school completion rates disaggregated by race, gender, and mover status. Each table omits the portion of the TWFE estimate derived from bad comparisons that use already-treated cohorts as counterfactuals to estimate the policy's effect. The results suggest that comparing the outcomes of birth cohorts from MITH states to cohorts from non-MITH states could be influenced by regional differences in the educational landscape. Like the baseline analysis, I implement the decomposition for varying samples of states and disaggregate the results by race. The decomposition exercises suggest that the aggregate TWFE estimates for Black cohorts might be partially biased upward (i.e., less negative) when the derivation includes information from bad comparisons, and might understate the negative impact of states adopting MITH rules for Black cohorts' high school completion. The magnitude of the early versus late coefficients for the MITH and Southern MITH samples are consistent with but slightly larger than the aggregate TWFE estimates

presented in Table 8. The early versus late coefficients for White cohorts remain small in magnitude but suggest marginal reductions in high school completion rates among cohorts in early-adopting states compared to cohorts in later-adopting states. The decomposition exercise supports my finding from the baseline analysis that MITH rules reduced educational attainment among low-income Black cohorts born in Southern states, and that the reductions are largest among Black men.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, I have presented new evidence on the consequences of welfare policies that alter low-income families' access to monthly income support programs. MITH rules, formally race-neutral policies enacted by states between the 1940s and 1960s, disproportionately reduced non-White families' participation in the former AFDC program and subsequently reduced the educational attainment of Black children born in Southern states. The expansionary effect of the Supreme Court's invalidation of these welfare rules in 1968 on Black families' participation in AFDC demonstrates how effective these rules were at disproportionately reducing Black Southern families' access to public assistance. The shifts in Black children's high school completion following MITH's adoption and invalidation demonstrate that expansionary and contractionary welfare policies can be consequential for children's development and might not have perfectly offsetting effects. This study demonstrates how a formally race-neutral social policy can lead to the denial of resources that differentially hinder the well-being of minoritized children.

These results also contribute to literature evaluating the impact of government transfer programs on children's long-term outcomes. The degree to which cash welfare is an efficient tool for mitigating the consequences of experiencing poverty remains a topic of contentious debate. The AFDC program was eliminated largely out of concern that the program harmed children and incentivized dependency. Meanwhile, the temporary expansion of the Child Tax Credit in 2021 and localities' implementation of guaranteed income programs are piloting a form of public assistance that closely mirror the assistance provided by AFDC. These findings show that supporting families through cash welfare programs might be beneficial for long-run child outcomes.

Table 1: State Demographic Characteristics at Baseline

	All (1)	MITH States (2)	Non-MITH States (3)	Diff (4)
1940 State Characteristics				
Total Population	5,308,961	3,451,802	6,506,954	-3,055,152
	(3,749,514)	(1,595,989)	(4,248,027)	(1,004,857)
Age 5 yo (or younger) (%)	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.021
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.003)
Age 65 yo (or older) (%)	0.10	0.09	0.11	-0.022
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.005)
Non-White (%)	0.11	0.20	0.05	0.152
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.030)
Black (%)	0.10	0.19	0.04	0.156
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.026)
Urban (%)	0.57	0.42	0.66	-0.242
	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.045)
HS Diploma (%)	0.14	0.12	0.15	-0.036
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.009)
4 Years School (or less) (%)	0.10	0.15	0.07	0.086
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.012)
Per Capita Income (2018 $)	606.31	437.67	714.27	-276.607
	(206.32)	(161.81)	(153.02)	(45.830)
Unemployment Rate (%)	0.10	0.08	0.11	-0.033
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.007)
Farm Land Use (%)	0.59	0.63	0.57	0.055
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.058)
Observations	51	20	31	

Note. This table presents baseline state-level demographic summary statistics using the 1940 decennial census. Column 1 reports aggregate summary statistics. Columns 2 and 3 report observation means conditional on whether states ever adopted MITH rules. Column 4 tests whether these differences in state-level characteristics are statistically significant. Summary statistics (Columns 1–3) and regression results (Column 4) are weighted by state population.

Table 2: AFDC Program Characteristics at Baseline

	All (1)	MITH States (2)	Non-MITH States (3)	Diff (4)
1948 AFDC Program Measures				
Total Cases	16,965	13,400	19,231	-5,831
	(13,388)	(6,248)	(16,094)	(3,795)
Total Child Recipients	42,259	34,257	47,348	-13,090
	(32,017)	(14,845)	(38,633)	(9,101)
Total Cases per 10,000 Women Ages 15-55	106	133	89	45
	(55)	(71)	(35)	(15)
Total Child Recipients per 10,000 Women Ages 15-55	270	344	224	121
	(142)	(175)	(93)	(38)
White Cases	11,133	9,270	12,153	-2,883
	(7,512)	(4,463)	(8,648)	(2,206)
White Child Recipients	27,681	23,579	29,929	-6,351
	(17,874)	(10,725)	(20,608)	(5,262)
White Cases per 10,000 Women 15-55	82	110	67	44
	(48)	(60)	(32)	(13)
White Child Recipients per 10,000 Women 15-55	209	284	168	116
	(126)	(152)	(86)	(34)
Non-White Cases	5,442	4,199	8,121	-3,922
	(5,021)	(2,451)	(7,553)	(1,434)
Non-White Child Recipients	14,636	11,097	21,647	-10,551
	(12,667)	(6,062)	(18,357)	(3,554)
Non-White Cases per 10,000 Women 15-55	301	233	436	-203
	(252)	(222)	(258)	(71)
Non-White Child Recipients per 10,000 Women 15-55	769	602	1,098	-496
	(619)	(544)	(642)	(175)
White (%)	0.69	0.66	0.72	-0.057
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.047)
Average Total Benefit	661.91	416.41	818.02	-401.615
	(244.70)	(137.40)	(150.54)	(41.835)
Observations	51	20	31	

Note. This table presents baseline participation rates for state AFDC programs. Column 1 reports aggregate participation. Columns 2 and 3 report mean participation rates conditional on whether states ever adopted MITH rules. Column 4 tests whether these differences in program participation are statistically significant. Summary statistics (Columns 1–3) and regression results (Column 4) are weighted by state population.

Table 3: Summary Statistics for 1920-1949 Birth Cohorts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	All	MITH States	Non-MITH States	MITH States		Non-MITH States	
				Pre-MITH Cohorts	Post-MITH Cohorts	Pre-MITH Cohorts	Post-MITH Cohorts
Birth Year	1934	1934	1934	1925	1940	1925	1940
	(9)	(9)	(9)	(3)	(6)	(3)	(6)
Treatment Year	1957	1957	n/a	1957	1957	n/a	n/a
	(4)	(4)		(4)	(4)		
MITH Exposure	0.15	0.35	0.00	0.00	0.57	0.00	0.00
	(0.35)	(0.48)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.50)	(0.00)	(0.50)
Years of MITH Exposure	5.65	5.65	n/a	0.00	5.65	n/a	n/a
	(4.04)	(4.04)		(0.00)	(4.03)		
Black	0.09	0.16	0.04	0.15	0.16	0.03	0.04
	(0.28)	(0.36)	(0.19)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.17)	(0.37)
Female	0.52	0.53	0.52	0.54	0.52	0.53	0.51
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Mover	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.52	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
HS Diploma	0.71	0.64	0.77	0.51	0.71	0.67	0.83
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Years of Education	11.84	11.37	12.19	10.59	11.86	11.58	12.60
	(1.08)	(1.12)	(0.91)	(1.15)	(0.78)	(0.92)	(0.78)
Wages & Earnings ($)	12,403.10	11,094.85	13,336.08	5,458.93	13,785.26	6,955.76	16,689.38
	(10,325.74)	(9,103.38)	(11,021.53)	(4,609.36)	(9,481.26)	(5,610.69)	(9,481.26)
Employed (%)	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.49	0.66	0.52	0.69
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.21)
Observations	8,172,491	3,472,377	4,700,114	1,355,258	2,117,119	1,925,842	2,774,272

Note. This table presents summary statistics for 1920–1949 birth cohorts surveyed in the 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes individuals born in the United States who were at least 25 years old at the time of the survey. Column 1 reports aggregate sample means. Columns 2 and 3 report conditional means based on whether a respondent's state of birth adopted MITH rules as part of its AFDC program. Columns 4 and 6 report means for 1920–1930 birth cohorts predicted to graduate high school (= birth year + 18) before the first state adopted MITH rules in 1948. Columns 5 and 7 report means for 1931–1949 birth cohorts predicted to graduate high school after the first state adopted MITH rules.

Table 4: Summary Statistics for 1963-1974 Birth Cohorts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	All	MITH States	Non-MITH States	MITH States		Non-MITH States	
				Pre-King Cohorts	Post-King Cohorts	Pre-King Cohorts	Post-King Cohorts
Birth Year	1968	1968	1968	1965	1971	1965	1971
	(4)	(4)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Treatment Year	1958	1958	n/a	1957	1958	n/a	n/a
	(4)	(4)		(4)	(4)		
MITH Exposure	0.20	0.46	0.00	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.40)	(0.50)	(0.00)	(0.13)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Years of MITH Exposure	2.71	2.71	n/a	3.16	0.00	n/a	n/a
	(1.71)	(1.71)		(1.40)	(0.00)		
Black	0.13	0.20	0.08	0.20	0.19	0.08	0.09
	(0.34)	(0.40)	(0.27)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.27)	(0.39)
Mover	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.51	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
HS Diploma	0.93	0.91	0.95	0.90	0.91	0.95	0.95
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Years of Education	13.24	13.00	13.43	12.86	13.11	13.31	13.54
	(0.50)	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.41)	(0.45)
Wages & Earnings ($)	35,443.11	31,386.55	38,419.61	30,816.62	31,865.59	38,142.53	38,670.95
	(15,167.12)	(12,780.19)	(16,064.32)	(12,823.80)	(12,724.36)	(16,241.92)	(12,724.36)
Employed (%)	0.77	0.75	0.79	0.75	0.76	0.79	0.79
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Observations	5,915,603	2,551,741	3,363,862	1,182,899	1,368,842	1,618,208	1,745,654

Note. This table presents summary statistics for 1963–1974 birth cohorts surveyed in the 1990–2000 decennial censuses and the 2001–2010 ACSs. The sample includes individuals born in the United States who were at least 25 years old at the time of the survey with non-missing education observations and who were residing in their state of birth. Column 1 reports aggregate sample means. Column 2 and 3 report means conditional on whether the respondent's state of birth adopted MITH rules as part of its AFDC program. Columns 4 and 6 report means for 1963–1967 birth cohorts before the U.S. Supreme Court's King v. Smith ruling. Columns 5 and 7 report means for 1963–1974 birth cohorts born after the King v. Smith decision was announced.

Table 5: Determinants of MITH Adoption Using 1940 State Characteristics

	MITH (1)	MITH (2)	MITH-Year (3)	MITH-Year (4)
1940 State Characteristic				
Log Population	0.03	0.00	2.79	5.06
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(4.60)	(3.05)
Age 5 yo (or younger) (%)	0.44	0.28	2.64	11.34
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(11.65)	(6.83)
Age 65 yo (or older) (%)	0.12	0.10	-0.59	1.88
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(6.38)	(2.79)
Black (%)	0.23	-0.06	3.64	1.40
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(4.27)	(2.22)
Urban (%)	0.21	0.24	-3.65	-4.97
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(5.68)	(3.75)
HS Diploma(%)	-0.04	0.10	3.82	3.18
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(5.08)	(2.34)
Per Capita Income (2018 $)	-0.08	-0.13	3.00	5.62
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(5.25)	(2.95)
Unemployment Rate (%)	-0.04	-0.06	6.17	7.15
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(3.11)	(1.92)
Farm Land Use (%)	-0.02	-0.01	1.96	-3.23
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(2.87)	(2.13)
Southern States		0.27	5.23	
		(0.24)	(2.63)	
Observations	48	48	20	14

Note. Data are from the 1940 decennial census at the state level. Columns 1 and 2 test whether state-level characteristics predict whether a state ever adopts MITH rules. Columns 3 and 4 test whether state-level characteristics predict when states adopt MITH rules. Column 4 limits the analysis to states that adopt MITH rules and are identified by the Census Bureau as part of the South region. Alaska, Colorado, and Hawaii are dropped due to missing data. Estimates are weighted using the 1940 state population.

Table 6: Effect of MITH Rules on Participation in AFDC

	Non-White		White	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: All States				
Cases per 10,000 Women 15-55	-84.15	-118.04	-44.63	-20.70
	(35.86)	(25.63)	(7.71)	(5.31)
Child Recipients per 10,000 Women 15-55	-335.19	-364.91	-136.56	-62.73
	(106.92)	(80.21)	(23.32)	(15.78)
Panel B: MITH Outcomes				
Cases per 10,000 Women 15-55	-67.66	-61.98	-3.82	-3.41
	(13.64)	(13.89)	(4.74)	(5.72)
Child Recipients per 10,000 Women 15-55	-221.45	-208.84	-19.02	-17.29
	(44.24)	(41.89)	(14.17)	(16.77)
Panel C: Southern MITH States				
Cases per 10,000 Women 15-55	-58.33	-33.76	6.31	7.74
	(16.89)	(19.28)	(7.33)	(8.62)
Child Recipients per 10,000 Women 15-55	-190.87	-137.83	12.62	14.88
	(56.59)	(60.66)	(22.38)	(24.68)
1948 Base Levels in MITH States				
Cases per 10,000 Women 15-55	243		112	
Child Recipients per 10,000 Women 15-55	633		290	
1948 Base Levels in Southern MITH States				
Cases per 10,000 Women 15-55	181		114	
Child Recipients per 10,000 Women 15-55	482		302	

Notes: This table presents results for the effect of states' adoption of 'Man in the House (MITH)' rules on monthly participation in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Each coefficient reports two-way fixed effect difference-in-difference estimates (DID) of changes in program participation rates. Columns 1 and 2 report results for Non-White families' program participation. Columns 3 and 4 report results for White families program participation. The odd number columns report the main difference-in-difference results with state and year fixed effects. The even number columns include controls for 1940 state-level characteristics interacted with linear calendar year trends. Models are weighted by each state's population of women 15-55. Standard errors are clustered by state.

Table 7: Effect of King v. Smith on Program Participation

	Non-White		White	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: All States				
Cases per 10,000 Women 15-55	17.72	67.56	-41.22	-8.28
	(49.41)	(39.45)	(13.87)	(6.67)
Child Recipients per 10,000 Women 15-55	199.32	268.34	-78.80	-4.38
	(136.14)	(111.11)	(29.64)	(17.78)
State FE	X	X	X	X
Year FE	X	X	X	X
Controls		X		X
1965 Base Levels in MITH States				
Cases per 10,000 Women 15-55	388		56	
Child Recipients per 10,000 Women 15-55	1,301		161	

Note. This table presents results for the effect of the Supreme Court's King vs. Smith (1968) decision on monthly participation in the AFDC program. Each coefficient reports two-way fixed effect (TWFE) DiD estimates of changes in program participation rates. Columns 1 and 2 report results for non-White families' program participation. Columns 3 and 4 report results for White families' program participation. The odd-numbered columns report the main DiD results with state and year fixed effects (FE). The even-numbered columns include contemporaneous controls for state-level characteristics and spending on government transfer programs. Models are weighted by each state's population of women ages 15–55. Standard errors are clustered by state.

Table 8: Effect of MITH Rules Exposure on High School Completion

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.0326	0.0377	0.0268	0.0384	0.0433	0.0332
	(0.0139)	(0.0146)	(0.0145)	(0.0093)	(0.0108)	(0.0084)
Observations	1,244,730	698,031	546,699	11,623,403	6,001,285	5,622,118
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure	-0.0102	-0.0054	-0.0157	0.0066	0.0092	0.0041
	(0.0084)	(0.0105)	(0.0088)	(0.0107)	(0.0123)	(0.0098)
Observations	932,567	525,554	407,013	4,166,977	2,168,920	1,998,057
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure	-0.0157	-0.0134	-0.0181	0.0073	0.0045	0.0109
	(0.0081)	(0.0085)	(0.0102)	(0.0073)	(0.0086)	(0.0075)
Observations	727,111	411,214	315,897	1,777,122	933,093	844,029
Birth State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Birth Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Note. This table presents results for the effect of states' adoption of MITH rules on high school completion rates. Each coefficient reports TWFE DiD estimates of changes in high school completion rates after states adopt MITH rules. Columns 1 and 4 report results for the entire sample of Black and White respondents. Columns 2 and 5 report results for Black and White women, respectively, while Columns 3 and 6 report results for Black and White men, respectively. Each panel estimates DiDs for varying samples of states. All models include birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts predicted to graduate (= birth year + 18) before the invalidation of MITH rules in 1968. The analysis is conditional on respondents with non-missing education observations. Each specification is weighted using the perwt (person weight) provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). Standard errors are clustered by state of birth.

Table 9: Effect of MITH Rules Exposure on High School Completion (Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.0425	0.0493	0.0348	0.0360	0.0432	0.0286
	(0.0140)	(0.0151)	(0.0150)	(0.0099)	(0.0120)	(0.0090)
Observations	671,786	383,545	288,241	7,072,034	3,666,596	3,405,438
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure	-0.0073	-0.0039	-0.0114	0.0120	0.0148	0.0094
	(0.0082)	(0.0113)	(0.0084)	(0.0114)	(0.0143)	(0.0095)
Observations	462,443	265,909	196,534	2,557,936	1,336,252	1,221,684
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure	-0.0078	-0.0063	-0.0095	0.0127	0.0080	0.0187
	(0.0100)	(0.0113)	(0.0118)	(0.0095)	(0.0106)	(0.0095)
Observations	337,300	195,444	141,856	1,096,149	578,158	517,991
Birth State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Birth Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Note. This table presents results for the effect of states' adoption of MITH rules on high school completion. Each coefficient reports TWFE DiD estimates of changes in high school completion rates after states adopt MITH rules. Columns 1 and 4 report results for the entire sample of Black and White respondents. Columns 2 and 5 report results for Black and White women, respectively, while Columns 3 and 6 report results for Black and White men, respectively. Each panel estimates DiDs for varying samples of states. All models include birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts predicted to graduate (= birth year + 18) before the invalidation of MITH rules in 1968. The analysis is conditional on respondents ages 25–65 who reside in their state of birth with non-missing education observations. Each specification is weighted using the perwt provided by the IPUMS. Standard errors are clustered by state of birth.

Table 10: Effect of MITH Rules Exposure on Years of Education

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.2656	0.2520	0.2922	0.1290	0.1081	0.1554
	(0.0950)	(0.0903)	(0.1056)	(0.0408)	(0.0397)	(0.0446)
Observations	1,244,730	698,031	546,699	11,623,403	6,001,285	5,622,118
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure	-0.0390	-0.0123	-0.0654	-0.0032	0.0036	-0.0085
	(0.0776)	(0.0828)	(0.0798)	(0.0549)	(0.0500)	(0.0642)
Observations	932,567	525,554	407,013	4,166,977	2,168,920	1,998,057
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure	-0.0939	-0.0757	-0.1089	0.0153	-0.0067	0.0422
	(0.0800)	(0.0837)	(0.0855)	(0.0358)	(0.0311)	(0.0474)
Observations	727,111	411,214	315,897	1,777,122	933,093	844,029
Birth State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Birth Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Note. This table presents results for the effect of states' adoption of MITH rules on years of education. Each coefficient reports TWFE DiD estimates of changes in high school completion rates after states adopt MITH rules. Columns 1 and 4 report results for the entire sample of Black and White respondents. Columns 2 and 5 report results for Black and White women, respectively, while Columns 3 and 6 report results for Black and White men, respectively. Each panel estimates DiDs for varying samples of states. All models include birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts predicted to graduate (= birth year + 18) before the invalidation of MITH rules in 1968. The analysis is conditional on respondents with non-missing education observations. Each specification is weighted using the perwt provided by the IPUMS. Standard errors are clustered by state of birth.

Table 11: Effect of MITH Rules Exposure on Years of Education (Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.3910	0.3495	0.4653	0.1330	0.1195	0.1510
	(0.1102)	(0.1048)	(0.1256)	(0.0402)	(0.0411)	(0.0427)
Observations	671,786	383,545	288,241	7,072,034	3,666,596	3,405,438
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure	-0.0165	-0.0075	-0.0181	0.0199	0.0214	0.0204
	(0.0988)	(0.1070)	(0.1002)	(0.0599)	(0.0600)	(0.0641)
Observations	462,443	265,909	196,534	2,557,936	1,336,252	1,221,684
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure	-0.0513	-0.0504	-0.0440	0.0381	-0.0056	0.0904
	(0.1069)	(0.1184)	(0.1028)	(0.0331)	(0.0283)	(0.0424)
Observations	337,300	195,444	141,856	1,096,149	578,158	517,991
Birth State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Birth Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Note. This table presents results for the effect of states' adoption of MITH rules on years of education. Each coefficient reports TWFE DiD estimates of changes in high school completion rates after states adopt MITH rules. Columns 1 and 4 report results for the entire sample of Black and White respondents. Columns 2 and 5 report results for Black and White women, respectively, while Columns 3 and 6 report results for Black and White men, respectively. Each panel estimates DiDs for varying samples of states. All models include birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts predicted to graduate (= birth year + 18) before the invalidation of MITH rules in 1968. The analysis is conditional on respondents ages 25–65 who reside in their state of birth with non-missing education observations. Each specification is weighted using the perwt provided by the IPUMS. Standard errors are clustered by state of birth.

Table 12: Effect of MITH Rules Exposure on Adult Wages and Earnings

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	-519.14	-589.18	-393.69	-1,353.81	-898.28	-1,209.62
	(161.74)	(161.15)	(193.07)	(352.28)	(231.39)	(431.74)
Observations	773,566	385,914	387,652	6,924,332	2,892,595	4,031,737
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure	75.13	22.21	116.66	65.93	68.65	79.28
	(112.99)	(73.49)	(186.16)	(198.31)	(89.27)	(161.77)
Observations	566,514	281,134	285,380	2,391,764	993,700	1,398,064
Panel B: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure	185.45	131.02	212.68	65.35	205.79	-5.22
	(160.60)	(86.56)	(272.53)	(91.18)	(111.50)	(150.58)
Observations	433,770	213,636	220,134	1,000,841	419,449	581,392
Birth State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Birth Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Note. This table presents results for the effect of states' adoption of MITH rules on adult wages. Each coefficient reports TWFE DiD estimates of changes in high school completion rates after states adopt MITH rules. Columns 1 and 4 report results for the entire sample of Black and White respondents. Columns 2 and 5 report results for Black and White women, respectively, while Columns 3 and 6 report results for Black and White men, respectively. Each panel estimates DiDs for varying samples of states. All models include birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts predicted to graduate (= birth year + 18) before the invalidation of MITH rules in 1968. The analysis is conditional on respondents with non-missing education observations. Each specification is weighted using the perwt (person weight) provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). Standard errors are clustered by state of birth.

Table 13: Effect of MITH Rules Exposure on Adult Wages (Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	-834.35	-1,047.10	-474.43	-1,323.57	-1,086.02	-1,254.06
	(245.55)	(295.82)	(233.41)	(405.41)	(322.90)	(517.94)
Observations	412,682	211,334	201,348	4,192,664	1,766,520	2,426,144
Panel B: MITH States MITH						
Exposure 105.05		41.77	221.58	66.47	87.06	106.80
	(162.08)	(166.31)	(181.27)	(178.58)	(109.17)	(221.42)
Observations	276,959	141,934	135,025	1,443,986	609,427	834,559
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure	314.41	287.25	407.86	127.45	279.30	-22.43
	(174.35)	(166.41)	(218.92)	(70.20)	(133.37)	(112.62)
Observations	197,188	100,691	96,497	603,647	259,445	344,202
Birth State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Birth Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Note. This table presents results for the effect of states' adoption of MITH rules on adult wages. Each coefficient reports TWFE DiD estimates of changes in high school completion rates after states adopt MITH rules. Columns 1 and 4 report results for the entire sample of Black and White respondents. Columns 2 and 5 report results for Black and White women, respectively, while Columns 3 and 6 report results for Black and White men, respectively. Each panel estimates DiDs for varying samples of states. All models include birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts predicted to graduate (= birth year + 18) before the invalidation of MITH rules in 1968. The analysis is conditional on respondents ages 25–65 who reside in their state of birth with non-missing education observations. Each specification is weighted using the perwt provided by the IPUMS. Standard errors are clustered by state of birth.

Table 14: Effect of King v. Smith on High School Completion

Exposure Definition: Birth Year Relative to King v. Smith	Black Cohorts						White Cohorts					
	All		Women		Men		All		Women		Men	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: All States												
MITH Exposure	0.011	0.007	0.010	0.007	0.013	0.008	0.006	0.003	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.007
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	1,119,621	1,118,551	600,596	600,046	519,025	518,505	8,292,136	8,277,099	4,198,232	4,190,651	4,093,904	4,086,448
Panel B: Southern MITH States												
MITH Exposure	0.013	0.010	0.012	0.011	0.015	0.010	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.004	0.008	0.012
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Observations	945,859	944,789	508,268	507,718	437,591	437,071	6,584,024	6,568,987	3,331,731	3,324,150	3,252,293	3,244,837
Birth State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Birth Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Controls		X		X		X		X		X		X

Note. This table presents results for the Supreme Courts' invalidation of MITH rules on high school completion rates. Each coefficient reports TWFE DiD estimates of changes in high school completion rates for cohorts born after the Supreme Court decision. The odd-numbered columns report results from baseline models that include birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. The even-numbered columns include controls for cohorts' infant mortality and the level of transfer spending each cohort experienced. Columns 1–2 and Columns 7–8 report results for the entire sample of Black and White respondents. Columns 3–4 and 9–10 report results for Black and White women, respectively, while Columns 5–6 and 11–12 report results for Black and White men, respectively. Panel A reports the change in high school completion among cohorts from all MITH states relative to cohorts from non-MITH states. Panel B reports the change in high school completion only among cohorts from Southern MITH states (cohorts from the remaining MITH states are excluded from the sample). Data are from the 1990–2000 decennial censuses and 2001–2019 ACSs. The sample includes individuals from 1963–1974 birth cohorts ages 26–65 at the time of the survey with non-missing education observations. Each specification is weighted using the perwt provided by the IPUMS. Standard errors are clustered by state of birth.

Table 15: Effect of King v. Smith on High School Completion (Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Birth Year Relative to King v. Smith	Black Cohorts						White Cohorts					
	All		Women		Men		All		Women		Men	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: All States												
MITH Exposure	0.010	0.009	0.010	0.009	0.011	0.010	0.007	0.003	0.005	0.002	0.004	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Observations	763,378	763,324	416,727	416,701	346,651	346,623	5,115,072	5,111,975	2,585,873	2,584,425	2,529,199	2,527,550
Panel B: Southern MITH States												
MITH Exposure	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.014	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.008	0.007	0.006	0.010	0.015
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Observations	634,311	634,257	347,244	347,218	287,067	287,039	3,974,022	3,970,925	2,007,731	2,006,283	1,966,291	1,964,642
Birth State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Birth Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Controls		X		X		X		X		X		X

Note. This table presents results for the Supreme Courts' invalidation of MITH rules on high school completion rates. Each coefficient reports TWFE DiD estimates of changes in high school completion rates for cohorts born after the Supreme Court decision. The odd-numbered columns report results from baseline models that include birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. The even-numbered columns include controls for cohorts' infant mortality and the level of transfer spending each cohort experienced. Columns 1–2 and Columns 7–8 report results for the entire sample of Black and White respondents. Columns 3–4 and 9–10 report results for Black and White women, respectively, while Columns 5–6 and 11–12 report results for Black and White men, respectively. Panel A reports the change in high school completion among cohorts from all MITH states relative to cohorts from non-MITH states. Panel B reports the change in high school completion only among cohorts from Southern MITH states (cohorts from the remaining MITH states are excluded from the sample). Data are from the 1990–2000 decennial censuses and the 2001–2019 ACSs. The sample includes individuals from 1963–1974 birth cohorts ages 26–65 with non-missing education observations. The analysis is conditional on respondents residing in their birth state at the time of the survey. Each specification is weighted using the perwt provided by the IPUMS. Standard errors are clustered by state of birth.

Table 16: Effect of King v. Smith on Years of Education

Exposure Definition: Birth Year Relative to King v. Smith	Black Cohorts						White Cohorts					
	All		Women		Men		All		Women		Men	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: All States												
MITH Exposure	0.081	0.020	0.091	0.030	0.075	0.010	0.003	0.007	-0.017	0.002	0.013	0.023
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Observations	1,119,621	1,118,551	600,596	600,046	519,025	518,505	8,292,136	8,277,099	4,198,232	4,190,651	4,093,904	4,086,448
Panel B: Southern MITH States												
MITH Exposure	0.099	0.027	0.108	0.039	0.097	0.017	0.025	0.055	0.002	0.053	0.058	0.048
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Observations	945,859	944,789	508,268	507,718	437,591	437,071	6,584,024	6,568,987	3,331,731	3,324,150	3,252,293	3,244,837
Birth State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Birth Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Controls		X		X		X		X		X		X

Note. This table presents results for the Supreme Courts' invalidation of MITH rules on years of education. Each coefficient reports TWFE DiD estimates of changes in high school completion rates for cohorts born after the Supreme Court decision. The odd-numbered columns report results from baseline models that include birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. The even-numbered columns include controls for cohorts' infant mortality and the level of transfer spending each cohort experienced. Columns 1–2 and Columns 7–8 report results for the entire sample of Black and White respondents. Columns 3–4 and 9–10 report results for Black and White women, respectively, while Columns 5–6 and 11–12 report results for Black and White men, respectively. Panel A reports the change in high school completion among cohorts from all MITH states relative to cohorts from non-MITH states. Panel B reports the change in high school completion only among cohorts from Southern MITH states (cohorts from the remaining MITH states are excluded from the sample). Data are from the 1990–2000 decennial censuses and 2001–2019 ACSs. The sample includes individuals from 1963–1974 birth cohorts ages 26–65 at the time of the survey with non-missing education observations. Each specification is weighted using the perwt provided by the IPUMS. Standard errors are clustered by state of birth.

Table 17: Effect of King v. Smith on Years of Education (Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Birth Year Relative to King v. Smith	Black Cohorts						White Cohorts					
	All		Women		Men		All		Women		Men	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: All States												
MITH Exposure	0.0756	0.0255	0.0832	0.0201	0.0732	0.0373	-0.0016	0.0078	-0.0252	-0.0016	0.0170	0.0215
	(0.0391)	(0.0439)	(0.0427)	(0.0495)	(0.0401)	(0.0463)	(0.0218)	(0.0182)	(0.0231)	(0.0193)	(0.0197)	(0.0220)
Observations	763,378	763,324	416,727	416,701	346,651	346,623	5,115,072	5,111,975	2,585,873	2,584,425	2,529,199	2,527,550
Panel B: Southern MITH States												
MITH Exposure	0.0975	0.0450	0.1055	0.0440	0.0944	0.0467	0.0191	0.0418	-0.0098	0.0355	0.0482	0.0472
	(0.0403)	(0.0486)	(0.0423)	(0.0497)	(0.0426)	(0.0560)	(0.0220)	(0.0201)	(0.0208)	(0.0195)	(0.0263)	(0.0239)
Observations	634,311	634,257	347,244	347,218	287,067	287,039	3,974,022	3,970,925	2,007,731	2,006,283	1,966,291	1,964,642
Birth State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Birth Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Controls		X		X		X		X		X		X

Note. This table presents results for the Supreme Courts' invalidation of MITH rules on years of education. Each coefficient reports TWFE DiD estimates of changes in high school completion rates for cohorts born after the Supreme Court decision. The odd-numbered columns report results from baseline models that include birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. The even-numbered columns include controls for cohorts' infant mortality and the level of transfer spending each cohort experienced. Columns 1–2 and Columns 7–8 report results for the entire sample of Black and White respondents. Columns 3–4 and 9–10 report results for Black and White women, respectively, while Columns 5–6 and 11–12 report results for Black and White men, respectively. Panel A reports the change in high school completion among cohorts from all MITH states relative to cohorts from non-MITH states. Panel B reports the change in high school completion only among cohorts from Southern MITH states (cohorts from the remaining MITH states are excluded from the sample). Data are from the 1990–2000 decennial censuses and the 2001–2019 ACSs. The sample includes individuals from 1963–1974 birth cohorts ages 26–65 with non-missing education observations. The analysis is conditional on respondents residing in their birth state at the time of the survey. Each specification is weighted using the perwt provided by the IPUMS. Standard errors are clustered by state of birth.

Table 18: Effect of MITH Rules on High School Completion Using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.072	-0.024	0.040	0.040	-0.003	0.039
			(0.014)			(0.009)
Observations		1,296,394			12,046,415	
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.024	-0.010		-0.003	0.004
			(0.008)			(0.011)
Observations		932,567			4,166,977	
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.028	-0.016		-0.002	0.003
			(0.008)			(0.005)
Observations		727,111			1,777,122	

Note. This table presents decomposition results for the effect of MITH rules on high school completion per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the TWFE average treatment effect (ATE) component derived from a comparison between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes all individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old at the time of the survey.

Table 19: Effect of MITH Rules on High School Completion Using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Men)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.073	-0.008	0.037	0.030	-0.006	0.035
			(0.015)			(0.009)
Observations		569,930			5,831,248	
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.009	-0.014		-0.006	0.003
			(0.008)			(0.010)
Observations		407,013			1,998,057	
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.030	-0.017		0.001	0.008
			(0.009)			(0.005)
Observations		315,897			844,029	

Note. This table presents decomposition results for the effect of MITH rules on high school completion per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from a comparison between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes all men from 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old at the time of the survey.

Table 20: Effect of MITH Rules on High School Completion Using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Women)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.074	-0.017	0.044	0.050	-0.001	0.044
			(0.015)			(0.010)
Observations		726,464			6,215,167	
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.017	-0.007		-0.001	0.005
			(0.009)			(0.012)
Observations		525,554			2,168,920	
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.026	-0.014		-0.006	-0.002
			(0.008)			(0.007)
Observations		411,214			933,093	

Note. This table presents decomposition results for the effect of MITH rules on high school completion per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from a comparison between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes all women from 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old at the time of the survey.

Table 21: Effect of MITH Rules on High School Completion Using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.097	-0.003	0.040	0.045	-0.000	0.039
			(0.014)			(0.009)
Observations		1,296,394			12,046,415	
Panel A: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.003	-0.010		-0.000	0.004
			(0.008)			(0.011)
Observations		932,567			4,166,977	
Panel A: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.015	-0.016		0.005	0.003
			(0.008)			(0.005)
Observations		727,111			1,777,122	

Note. This table decomposes the effect of MITH rules on high school completion per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the component of the ATE that is derived from comparisons between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the baseline ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses and include individuals from the 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old and who resided in their state of birth at the time of the survey.

Table 22: Effect of MITH Rules on High School Completion Using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Men Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.096	-0.006	0.037	0.036	-0.003	0.035
			(0.015)			(0.009)
Observations		569,930			5,831,248	
Panel A: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.007	-0.014		-0.003	0.003
			(0.008)			(0.010)
Observations		407,013			1,998,057	
Panel A: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.016	-0.017		0.010	0.008
			(0.009)			(0.005)
Observations		315,897			844,029	

Note. This table decomposes the effect of MITH rules on high school completion per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the component of the ATE that is derived from comparisons between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the baseline ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses and include men from the 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old and who resided in their state of birth at the time of the survey.

Table 23: Effect of MITH Rules on High School Completion Using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Women Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.099	0.008	0.044	0.053	0.002	0.044
			(0.015)			(0.010)
Observations		726,464			6,215,167	
Panel A: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		0.008	-0.007		0.002	0.005
			(0.009)			(0.012)
Observations		525,554			2,168,920	
Panel A: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.014	-0.014		0.000	-0.002
			(0.008)			(0.007)
Observations		411,214			933,093	

Note. This table decomposes the effect of MITH' rules on high school completion rates per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the component of the ATE that is derived from comparisons between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the baseline ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses and include women from the 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old and who resided in their state of birth at the time of the survey.

Table A1: Effect of MITH Rules on Years of Education using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.544	-0.015	0.336	0.153	-0.063	0.158
			(0.099)			(0.045)
Observations		1,296,394			12,046,415	
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.012	-0.025		-0.063	-0.005
			(0.079)			(0.065)
Observations		932,567			4,166,977	
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.170	-0.081		-0.011	0.010
			(0.083)			(0.034)
Observations		727,111			1,777,122	

Note. This table presents decomposition results for the effect of MITH rules on years of education per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from a comparison between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes all individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old at the time of the survey.

Table A2: Effect of MITH Rules on Years of Education using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Men)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.593	-0.001	0.392	0.148	-0.077	0.194
			(0.110)			(0.050)
Observations		569,930			5,831,248	
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		0.004	-0.022		-0.077	-0.002
			(0.078)			(0.075)
Observations		407,013			1,998,057	
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.177	-0.067		0.009	0.048
			(0.083)			(0.042)
Observations		315,897			844,029	

Note. This table presents decomposition results for the effect of MITH rules on years of education per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from a comparison between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes all men from 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old at the time of the survey.

Table A3: Effect of MITH Rules on Years of Education using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Women)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.496	-0.025	0.302	0.157	-0.050	0.130
			(0.092)			(0.043)
Observations		726,464			6,215,167	
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.024	-0.018		-0.050	-0.006
			(0.081)			(0.059)
Observations		525,554			2,168,920	
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.164	-0.082		-0.031	-0.021
			(0.084)			(0.031)
Observations		411,214			933,093	

Note. This table presents decomposition results for the effect of MITH rules on years of education per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from a comparison between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes all women from 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old at the time of the survey.

Table A4: Effect of MITH Rules on Years of Education Using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.583	0.019	0.336	0.200	-0.043	0.158
			(0.099)			(0.045)
Observations		1,296,394			12,046,415	
Panel A: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		0.026	-0.024		-0.043	-0.005
			(0.078)			(0.065)
Observations		932,567			4,166,977	
Panel A: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.160	-0.080		0.012	0.010
			(0.083)			(0.033)
Observations		727,111			1,777,122	

Note. This table decomposes the effect of MITH rules on years of education per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the component of the ATE that is derived from comparisons between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the baseline ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses and include individuals from the 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old and who resided in their state of birth at the time of the survey.

Table A5: Effect of MITH Rules on Years of Education Using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Men Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.642	0.006	0.390	0.199	-0.050	0.193
			(0.109)			(0.050)
Observations		569,930			5,831,248	
Panel A: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		0.016	-0.022		-0.050	-0.003
			(0.078)			(0.075)
Observations		407,013			1,998,057	
Panel A: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.164	-0.067		0.046	0.048
			(0.083)			(0.042)
Observations		315,897			844,029	

Note. This table decomposes the effect of MITH rules on years of education per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the component of the ATE that is derived from comparisons between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the baseline ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses and include men from the 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old and who resided in their state of birth at the time of the survey.

Table A6: Effect of MITH Rules on Years of Education Using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Women Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	0.526	0.031	0.303	0.202	-0.036	0.130
			(0.092)			(0.043)
Observations		726,464			6,215,167	
Panel A: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		0.036	-0.018		-0.036	-0.006
			(0.080)			(0.059)
Observations		525,554			2,168,920	
Panel A: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-0.156	-0.082		-0.024	-0.021
			(0.084)			(0.031)
Observations		411,214			933,093	

Note. This table decomposes the effect of MITH rules on years of education per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the component of the ATE that is derived from comparisons between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the baseline ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from 1950–2000 decennial censuses and include women from the 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old and who resided in their state of birth at the time of the survey.

Table A7: Effect of MITH Rules on Wages in Adulthood using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	-444	-56	-170	-606	390	-1,113
			(124)			(342)
Observations		840,885			7,598,208	
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-59	115		390	132
			(117)			(183)
Observations		589,210			2,514,136	
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		342	224		404	61
			(166)			(88)
Observations		452,552			1,056,375	

Note. This table presents decomposition results for the effect of MITH rules on adult wages per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from a comparison between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes all individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old at the time of the survey.

Table A8: Effect of MITH Rules on Wages in Adulthood using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Men)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	130	-319	18	-704	452	-1,324
			(150)			(467)
Observations		419,271			4,399,894	
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-345	132		452	210
			(158)			(265)
Observations		296,146			1,465,256	
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		414	235		364	31
			(234)			(151)
Observations		229,123			611,655	

Note. This table presents decomposition results for the effect of MITH rules on adult wages per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from a comparison between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes all men from 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old at the time of the survey.

Table A9: Effect of MITH Rules on Wages in Adulthood using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Women)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	-858	67	-404	-525	328	-978
			(133)			(235)
Observations		421,614			3,198,314	
Panel B: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		88	23		328	73
			(106)			(117)
Observations		293,064			1,048,880	
Panel C: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		270	130		445	240
			(133)			(141)
Observations		223,429			444,720	

Note. This table presents decomposition results for the effect of MITH rules on adult wages per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from a comparison between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from 1950–2000 decennial censuses. The sample includes all women from 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old at the time of the survey.

Table A10: Effect of MITH Rules on Wages in Adulthood Using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	-667	-149	-163	-570	347	-1,104
			(124)			(340)
Observations		840,885			7,598,208	
Panel A: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-147	115		347	133
			(119)			(178)
Observations		589,210			2,514,136	
Panel A: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		284	212		119	54
			(167)			(85)
Observations		452,552			1,056,375	

Note. This table decomposes the effect of MITH rules on adult wages per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the component of the ATE that is derived from comparisons between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the baseline ATE estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses and include individuals from the 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old and who resided in their state of birth at the time of the survey.

Table A11: Effect of MITH Rules on Wages in Adulthood Using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Men Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	-86	-101	10	-555	444	-1,309
			(151)			(463)
Observations		419,271			4,399,894	
Panel A: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-183	140		444	211
			(160)			(256)
Observations		296,146			1,465,256	
Panel A: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		365	232		26	26
			(238)			(148)
Observations		229,123			611,655	

Note. This table decomposes the effect of MITH rules on adult wages per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the component of the average treatment effect that is derived from comparisons between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the baseline average treatment effect estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses and include men from the 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old and who resided in their state of birth at the time of the survey.

Table A12: Effect of MITH Rules on Wages in Adulthood Using Goodman-Bacon Decomposition (Women Non-Mover)

Exposure Definition: Expected HS Graduation Relative to MITH Year	Black Cohorts			White Cohorts		
	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE	Treat-Never	Early-Late	TWFE
Panel A: All States						
MITH Exposure	-1,082	-189	-386	-603	249	-976
			(131)			(233)
Observations		421,614			3,198,314	
Panel A: MITH States						
MITH Exposure		-188	16		249	75
			(108)			(116)
Observations		293,064			1,048,880	
Panel A: Southern MITH States						
MITH Exposure		204	109		211	232
			(132)			(140)
Observations		223,429			444,720	

Notes: Note. This table decomposes the effect of MITH' rules on adult wages per Goodman-Bacon (2021). Columns 1–3 report results for Black cohorts. Columns 4–6 report results for White cohorts. The first column in each demographic group identifies the component of the average treatment effect that is derived from comparisons between MITH state cohorts and non-MITH state cohorts. The second column identifies the TWFE ATE component derived from comparisons between treated cohorts from MITH states that adopted the rule early to untreated cohorts (predicted to graduate before MITH rules) from MITH states that adopted the rule later. The third column reports the baseline average treatment effect estimate using TWFE. All models include birth state and birth year fixed effects. Data are from the 1950–2000 decennial censuses and include women from the 1920–1949 birth cohorts who were at least 26 years old and who resided in their state of birth at the time of survey.

Timing of State Adoption of MITH Rules
1948-1964




Figure 1: Note: This map shows the collection of states that adopt MITH rules as part of their AFDC program. States shaded in red adopted MITH rules between 1948 and 1964. States that are not shaded did not formally adopt MITH rules. Darker-shaded states adopted MITH rules early during this period, while lighter-shaded states adopted MITH rules later during this period. The 19 MITH states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia; the District of Columbia is also a MITH jurisdiction.







Figure 2: Note: This figure plots the year-to-year change in the number of nonmarital births disaggregated by race. Due to data limitations, race is operationalized as White and non-White."



Panel A




Panel B




Panel C

Figure 3: Note: This figure plots the results of a flexible model estimating a DiD. Panel A presents results using the full sample of states. Panel B and C present results conditional on MITH states. Each point can be interpreted as the effect of being X years removed from adopting MITH rules. The shaded region identifies the 95% confidence interval. AFDC participation is defined as the number of AFDC cases (a proxy for families) per 10,000 women ages 15–55. This flexible model includes state and calendar year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Red identifies changes in White families' AFDC participation. Blue identifies changes in non-White families' participation in AFDC.

Panel A



Panel B



Panel C




Figure 4: Note: These figure panels plot the results of a flexible model estimating a DiD. Panel A presents results using the full sample of states. Panels B and C present results conditional on MITH states. Each point can be interpreted as the effect of being X years removed from adopting MITH rules. The shaded region identifies the 95% confidence interval. AFDC participation is defined as the number of AFDC child recipients per 10,000 women ages 15-55. This flexible model includes state and calendar year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Red identifies changes in White families' AFDC participation. Blue identifies changes in non-White families' participation in AFDC.




Figure 5: Note: This figure plots the results of a flexible model estimating a DiD. Each point can be interpreted as the effect of being X years removed from King v. Smith (1968) decision. The shaded region identifies the 95% confidence interval. AFDC participation is defined as the number of AFDC cases (a proxy for families) per 10,000 women ages 15–55. This flexible model includes state and calendar year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Grey identifies changes in White families' AFDC participation. Red identifies changes in non-White families' participation in AFDC.




Figure 6: Note: This figure plots the results of a flexible model estimating a DiD. Each point can be interpreted as the effect of being X years removed from King v. Smith (1968) decision. The shaded region identifies the 95% confidence interval. AFDC participation is defined as the number of AFDC child recipients per 10,000 women ages 15-55. This flexible model includes state and calendar year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Grey identifies changes in White families' AFDC participation. Red identifies changes in non-White families' participation in AFDC.




Figure 7: Note. This figure presents results from separate flexible DiD models for Black and White adults' exposure to the implementation of MITH rules during childhood. Predicted graduation relative to MITH adoption categorizes individuals' expected graduation year (= birth year + 18) relative to their birth state's implementation of MITH rules. Zero corresponds to birth cohorts predicted to graduate the year MITH rules are adopted. Each plotted coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of exposure to MITH rules relative to birth cohorts expected to graduate high school the year before MITH rules implementation (X = –1). Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are displayed for each coefficient. Data are from the 1950–2000 censuses. The analytic sample includes U.S. individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts with non-missing education observations. Each model is estimated using TWFE and includes birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state of birth.




Figure 8: Note. This figure presents results from separate flexible DiD models for Black and White adults' exposure to the implementation of MITH rules during childhood, conditional on being born in a state that adopts MITH rules (early- vs. later-adopting comparison). Predicted graduation relative to MITH adoption categorizes individuals' expected graduation year (= birth year + 18) relative to their birth state's implementation of MITH rules. Zero corresponds to birth cohorts predicted to graduate the year MITH rules are adopted. Each plotted coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of exposure to MITH rules relative to birth cohorts expected to graduate high school the year before implementation of MITH rules (X = –1). Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are displayed for each coefficient. Data are from the 1950–2000 censuses. The analytic sample includes U.S. individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts with non-missing education observations. Each model is estimated using TWFE and includes birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state of birth.




Figure 9: Note. This figure presents results from separate flexible DiD models for Black and White adults' exposure to the implementation of MITH rules during childhood conditional on being born in a Southern state that adopts MITH rules (early vs. later-adopting comparison). Predicted graduation relative to MITH adoption categorizes individuals' expected graduation year (= birth year + 18) relative to their birth state's implementation of MITH rules. Zero corresponds to birth cohorts predicted to graduate the year MITH rules are adopted. Each plotted coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of exposure to MITH rules relative to birth cohorts expected to graduate high school the year before implementation of MITH rules implementation (X = –1). Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are displayed for each coefficient. Data are from the 1950–2000 censuses. The analytic sample includes U.S. individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts with non-missing education observations. Each model is estimated using TWFE and includes birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state of birth.




Figure 10: Note. This figure presents results from separate flexible DiD models for Black and White adults' exposure to the implementation of MITH rules during childhood. Predicted graduation relative to MITH adoption categorizes individuals' expected graduation year (= birth year + 18) relative to their birth state's implementation of MITH rules. Zero corresponds to birth cohorts predicted to graduate the year MITH rules are adopted. Each plotted coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of exposure to MITH rules relative to birth cohorts born expected to graduate high school the year before the implementation of MITH rules (X = –1). Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are displayed for each coefficient. Data are from the 1950–2000 censuses. The analytic sample includes U.S. individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts with non-missing education observations. Each model is estimated using TWFE and includes birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state of birth.




Figure 11: Note: Note. This figure presents results from separate flexible DiD models for Black and White adults' exposure to the implementation of MITH rules during childhood conditional on being born in a state that adopts MITH rules (early- vs. later-adopting comparison). Predicted graduation relative to MITH adoption categorizes individuals' expected graduation year (= birth year + 18) relative to their birth state's implementation of MITH rules. Zero corresponds to birth cohorts predicted to graduate the year MITH rules are adopted. Each plotted coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of exposure to MITH rules relative to birth cohorts expected to graduate high school the year before implementation of MITH rules (X = –1). Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are displayed for each coefficient. Data are from the 1950–2000 censuses. The analytic sample includes U.S. individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts with non-missing education observations. Each model is estimated using TWFE and includes birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state of birth.




Figure 12: Note. This figure presents results from separate flexible DiD models for Black and White adults' exposure to the implementation of MITH rules during childhood conditional on being born in a Southern state that adopts MITH rules (early- vs. later-adopting comparison). Predicted graduation relative to MITH adoption categorizes individuals' expected graduation year (= birth year + 18) relative to their birth state's implementation of MITH rules. Zero corresponds to birth cohorts predicted to graduate the year MITH rules are adopted. Each plotted coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of exposure to MITH rules relative to birth cohorts expected to graduate high school the year before implementation of MITH rules (X = –1). Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are displayed for each coefficient. Data are from the 1950–2000 censuses. The analytic sample includes U.S. individuals from 1920–1949 birth cohorts with non-missing education observations. Each model is estimated using TWFE and includes birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state of birth.



Figure 13: Note. This figure presents results from flexible DiD models comparing changes in the Black cohort's rate of high school completion relative to White cohorts following the U.S. Supreme Court's invalidation of MITH rules. "Birth Year Relative to 1968" categorizes individuals' birth year relative to King v. Smith. Zero corresponds to birth cohorts born in the year of the 1968 decision. Each plotted coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of invalidating MITH rules for cohorts born after King v. Smith in MITH states, where the decision was binding, relative to cohorts born the year before the decision (X = –1). Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are displayed for each coefficient. Data are from the 1990–2000 censuses and 2001–2019 ACSs. The analytic sample includes U.S.–born individuals from 1963–1974 birth cohorts with non-missing education observations. Each model is estimated using TWFE and includes birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state of birth.







Figure 14: Note. This figure presents results from flexible DiD models comparing changes in the Black cohort's rate of high school completion relative to White cohorts following the U.S. Supreme Court's invalidation of MITH rules. "Birth Year Relative to 1968" categorizes individuals' birth year relative to King v. Smith. Zero corresponds to birth cohorts born in the year of the 1968 decision. Each plotted coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of invalidating MITH rules for cohorts born after King v. Smith in MITH states, where the decision was binding, relative to cohorts born the year before the decision (X = –1). Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are displayed for each coefficient. Data are from the 1990–2000 censuses and 2001–2019 ACSs. The analytic sample includes U.S.–born individuals from 1963–1974 birth cohorts with non-missing education observations who reside in their state of birth at the time of the survey. Each model is estimated using TWFE and includes birth state, birth year, and survey year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state of birth.



Panel A




Panel B




Panel C


Figure 15: Note. This figure compares results from TWFE models with alternative DiD estimators. Panel A displays results using the full sample of states. Panels B and C present results conditional on MITH states.



Panel A



Panel B



Panel C

Figure 16: Note. This figure compares results from TWFE models with alternative DiD estimators. Panel A displays results using the full sample of states. Panels B and C present results conditional on MITH states.

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