Inequality and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Open Economy

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The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Bank of Canada

MOTIVATION

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- This paper: **normative** perspective on monetary policy in Open-Eco HANK

Main tradeoffs and results

Aggregate shocks $\Rightarrow$ output, national income $\Rightarrow$ consumption risk & inequality

TRADE-OFFS

Stabilizing consumption inequality

vs

$$\underbrace{\underbrace{\text{Closing output gap} + \text{stabilizing inflation}}_{\text{closed-eco RANK}} + \text{manipulating ToT}}_{\text{open-eco RANK}}$$

RESULTS

Conditions for "SOE-HANK divine coincidence"

Plausible calibration $\Rightarrow$ More output and exch-rate stabilization than in RANK

Model

Households

- SOE à la Galí Monacelli (2005) + incomplete markets
- Perpetual youth demographics with turnover rate $1 - \vartheta$
- 2 groups of HHs:
  - **Unconstrained** (share $1 - \theta$) $\Rightarrow$ trade **non-state contingent** 1-period real actuarial bond
  - **Hand-to-Mouth** (share θ) $\Rightarrow$ cannot access asset markets
- All HHs subject to uninsured idiosyncratic shocks – in addition to aggregate shocks
- **CARA-Normal** structure as in Acharya et al. (2023)

Unconstrained households

- CARA-Normal structure $\Rightarrow$ linear policy rules $\Rightarrow$ **linear aggregation** details
- Group-u Euler equation:

$$\Delta c_{t+1}(u) = \underbrace{\frac{1}{\gamma}\ln\left(\frac{\beta R_t}{1+\tau^\star}\right)}_{\text{intertemporal substitution}} + \underbrace{\frac{\gamma}{2}\sigma^2_{c_u,t+1}}_{\text{prec. saving}}$$

where

$$c_t(u) = (1-\vartheta)\sum_{s=-\infty}^{t}\vartheta^{t-s}\int c_t^s(i,u)di$$

and

$$\sigma_{c_u,t} \approx \mu\,\sigma_{y,t} + (1-\mu)\,\sigma_{c_u,t+1}, \quad \sigma_{y,t} = \sigma_y e^{-\varphi\widehat{y}_t}$$

Hand-to-Mouth households

- Consume current income so that

$$c_t(h) = \frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} y_t$$

where

$$c_t(h) = (1-\vartheta) \sum_{s=-\infty}^{t} \vartheta^{t-s} \int c_t^s(i,h) di$$

and

$$\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} = \left(\frac{1-\alpha Q_t^{1-\eta}}{1-\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \equiv p_H(Q_t)$$

- Consumption of HtM highly responsive to Q_t ("real income channel")

Households: Demand system and labour supply

- Demand system as in Galí-Monacelli with home bias $1-\alpha$ and elasticities details
  - η btw. H vs. F goods
  - ν across countries
  - ε across varieties
- Utilitarian unions set wages and demand uniform labor from HHs details
- Flexible wages + sticky prices as in Galí-Monacelli (2005)

Rest of model

- **NKPC:**

$$\pi_{H,t} = \kappa \left(\hat{w}_t - z_t - \hat{p}_{H,t} \right) + \beta \pi_{H,t+1}$$

- **Home goods:**

$$\frac{z_t n_t}{1 + \frac{\Psi}{2} \left(\ln \Pi_{Ht} \right)^2} = y_t = c_{Ht}(Q_t, c_t) + c^*_{Ht}(Q_t, c^*)$$

- **Home savings:**

$$\underbrace{(1-\theta)\vartheta a_{t+1}}_{A_{t+1}} = R_t [\underbrace{(1-\theta)\vartheta a_t}_{A_t} + p_{Ht} y_t - c_t]$$

- **RIR parity:**

$$\ln R_t = \ln R^*_t + \ln \frac{Q_{t+1}}{Q_t} - \wp a_{t+1}$$

Optimal policy

Social Welfare Function

Planner maximises

$$\mathbb{W}_0 = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \Bigg[\underbrace{(1-\vartheta) \sum_{s=-\infty}^{t} \vartheta^{t-s} \int \Big(-\frac{1}{\gamma} e^{-\gamma c_t^s(i)} \Big) di - v(n_t)}_{\text{flow utility to planner at time } t} \Bigg]$$

Social Welfare Function

Planner maximises

$$\mathbb{W}_0 = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \Bigg[\underbrace{u(c_t)}_{\substack{\text{felicity of} \\ \text{notional RA } (<0)}} \times \underbrace{\Sigma_t}_{\substack{\text{welfare cost of} \\ \text{inequality}}} - v(n_t) \Bigg]$$

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RANK: $\Sigma_t = 1$

Social Welfare Function

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RANK: $\Sigma_t = 1$

HANK: $\Sigma_t > 1$

Welfare cost of inequality Σ_t

- Overall index Σ_t combines **within** ($\Sigma_{u,t}, \Sigma_{h,t}$) and **between** ($\Upsilon_t$) group inequalities

$$\Sigma_t = (1-\theta)\, e^{-\gamma\theta\Upsilon_t}\Sigma_{u,t} + \theta e^{\gamma(1-\theta)\Upsilon_t}\Sigma_{h,t}$$

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$$\Sigma_t = (1-\theta)\, e^{-\gamma\theta\Upsilon_t}\Sigma_{u,t} + \theta e^{\gamma(1-\theta)\Upsilon_t}\Sigma_{h,t}$$

- Within **unconstrained**:

$$\Sigma_{u,t} = e^{\frac{\gamma^2\sigma^2_{c_u,t}}{2}}\left[1-\vartheta+\vartheta\Sigma_{u,t-1}\right]$$

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$$\Sigma_{u,t} = e^{\frac{\gamma^2\sigma^2_{cu,t}}{2}}\left[1-\vartheta+\vartheta\Sigma_{u,t-1}\right]$$

- Within **HtM**:

$$\Sigma_{h,t} = \frac{1-\vartheta}{e^{-\frac{\gamma^2\sigma^2_{y,t}}{2}}-\vartheta}$$

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- Within **HtM**:

$$\Sigma_{h,t} = \frac{1-\vartheta}{e^{-\frac{\gamma^2\sigma^2_{y,t}}{2}}-\vartheta}$$

- **Between**:

$$\Upsilon_t = c_t(u) - c_t(h)$$

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$$\Sigma_{h,t} = \frac{1-\vartheta}{e^{-\frac{\gamma^2\sigma^2_{y,t}}{2}}-\vartheta}$$

- **Between**:

$$\Upsilon_t = c_t(u) - c_t(h)$$

- $\Upsilon_t > 0 \Rightarrow$ relatively less weight on inequality within group u

Policy Instruments

- **Fiscal policy**: $\{\tau, \tau^\star, \tau^w, \tau_t^a\}$ optimally set ex ante and unresponsive to aggregate shocks

- **Monetary policy**: $\{i_t\}$ adjusted optimally in response to aggregate shocks

Policy Instruments

- **Fiscal policy**: $\{\tau, \tau^\star, \tau^w, \tau_t^a\}$ optimally set ex ante and unresponsive to aggregate shocks
  - τ balances monopolistic distortions
  - τ^w balances labour-wedge distortions
  - $\tau^\star$ kills steady-state capital outflow
  - τ_0^a kills unhedged interest-rate exposure
  - results in **constrained-efficient** steady state

- **Monetary policy**: $\{i_t\}$ adjusted optimally in response to aggregate shocks

Domestic productivity shocks


Domestic productivity shock

- **RANK** benchmark: Galí & Monacelli (2005)
- With $\gamma = \eta = \nu = 1$, **domestic PPI stability** is optimal $\Rightarrow$ "inward-looking" policy
- Optimal allocation features

$$c_t = p_H(Q_t)y_t \qquad a_t = 0 \qquad \Pi_{H,t} = 1 \qquad \forall t \geq 0$$

- Implementable by monetary policy **with or without** international risk sharing
  (in latter case, HHs **choose** not to borrow/lend from abroad)

z_t-SHOCK (RANK)



SOE-HANK divine coincidence


Proposition: Under "Cole-Obstfeld" elasticities ($\gamma = \eta = \nu = 1$) and acyclical income risk ($\varphi = 0$), optimal monetary policy implements strict producer price stability in SOE-HANK, regardless of the fraction of HtM households (θ) or the size of income risk ($\sigma_{y,t}$).

Intuition:

- Acyclical risk $\Rightarrow$ within-group inequality cannot be manipulated by the central bank
- Cole-Obstfeld $\Rightarrow$ unconstrained as a whole do not save $\Rightarrow$ no between-group inequality

Sketch of proof: Show that dynamics under planner's FOCs replicates flex-price allocation

z_t-shock (HANK, Cole-Obstfeld, acyclical risk)




Breakdown of divine coincidence

Former calibration is an (unrealistic) **benchmark**


Switch to:

- countercyclical risk $\Rightarrow \varphi = 5$ as in Acharya et al. (2023)
- Higher trade elasticities, smaller EIS $\Rightarrow \eta = 1.5, \nu = 4, \gamma = 2$ as in Egorov-Mukhin (2023)

z_t-shock (HANK, CO, countercyclical risk)




z_t-SHOCK (HANK, NON-CO, COUNTERCYCLICAL RISK)



Capital flow shocks

R^*-shock (HANK, non-CO, countercyclical risk)



Conclusion

- Acyclical risk + Cole-Obsftfeld $\Rightarrow$ **SOE-HANK divine coincidence**
  (i.e., Cole-Obstfeld matters for ToT manipulation **and** for inequality)

- Breaks down under more plausible risk (counter)cyclicality and (higher) trade elasticities

- Optimal policy implements **less volatile** exchange rate and output in HANK
  - **[unequal exposures]** $\Rightarrow$ reduces differences in real incomes btw u and h HHs
  - **[countercyclical risk]** $\Rightarrow$ reduces fluctuations of within-group inequality

Unconstrained households

Newborn i at date s max

$$\mathbb{E}_s \sum_{t=s}^{\infty} (\beta\vartheta)^{t-s} \Big(\quad u\left(c_t^s(i,u)\right) - v\left(n_t\right) \quad \Big)$$

s.t.

$$c_t^s(i,u) + (1+\tau^*)\frac{\vartheta}{R_t} a_{t+1}^s(i) = \mathbf{y}_t^s(i,u) + (1-\tau_t^a) a_t^s(i) \qquad a_t^t(i) = a_t$$

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$$\mathbf{y}_t^s(i,u) = (1-\tau^w) w_t n_t e_t^s(i,u) + \mathcal{D}_t + \mathcal{T}_t + \mathbb{T}_t$$

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$$e_t = 1 + \sigma_t \xi_t, \quad \xi_t = \xi_{t-1} + \upsilon_t$$

Unconstrained households

Newborn i at date s max

$$\mathbb{E}_s \sum_{t=s}^{\infty} (\beta\vartheta)^{t-s} \left(-\frac{1}{\gamma} e^{-\gamma c_t^s(i)} - v\left(n_t\right) \right)$$

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$$\mathbf{y}_t^s(i,u) = \underbrace{\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} y_t}_{\text{national income}} + \mathbb{T}_t + \sigma_{y,t}\xi_t^s(i) \qquad \sigma_{y,t} = \sigma_y e^{-\varphi \widehat{y}_t}$$

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Euler equation:

$$e^{-\gamma c_t^s(i,u)} = \left(\frac{\beta R_t}{1+\tau^\star}\right) \mathbb{E}_t \left[e^{-\gamma c_{t+1}^s(i,u)} \right]$$

back

Demand system

- Final cons. goods produced by competitive retailers aggregating varieties from all countries
- Their production functions are

$$c = \left[\alpha^{\frac{1}{\eta}} c_F^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + (1-\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} c_H^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}}\right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} \quad c_H = \left[\int_0^1 c_H(j)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} dj\right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}} \quad c_F = \left[\int_0^1 c_k^{\frac{\nu-1}{\nu}} dk\right]^{\frac{\nu}{\nu-1}}$$

- Let $p_{H,t}, p_{F,t}$ be the prices of the home and foreign baskets in terms of home consumption
- Profit minimisation + zero-profit condition gives the demands

$$c_{H,t} = (1-\alpha) p_{H,t}^{-\eta} c_t \quad c_{F,t} = (1-\alpha) p_{F,t}^{-\eta} c_t$$

where

$$(1-\alpha) p_{H,t}^{1-\eta} + \alpha p_{F,t}^{1-\eta} = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad p_{F,t} = Q_t$$

- Conversely, the demand for home goods by the RoW is

$$c_{Ht}^* = \alpha \left(\frac{p_{H,t}}{Q_t}\right)^{-\nu} c^*$$

back

Labour supply

- Setup similar to Auclert et al. (2023): Each HH supplies a continuum of labour types to a continuum of unions, each of which demands the same number of hours from all members
- Each union is benevolent and utilitarian, and sets wages accordingly
- With flexible wages, the optimality condition boils down to

$$\underbrace{(1-\tau^w)\,w_t}_{\text{post-tax wage}} = \underbrace{\mathcal{M}_w}_{\text{markup}} \times \underbrace{\frac{v'(n_t)}{u'(c_t)\,\Sigma_t}}_{\text{"avg. MRS"}}$$

where

$$\Sigma_t = (1-\vartheta)\sum_{s=-\infty}^{t}\vartheta^{t-s}\int e^{-\gamma[c_t^s(i)-c_t]}di$$

captures the dispersion in marginal utility between the members of every union

back