Why Do Unions Withhold Pay Information? Evidence from Hollywood

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Abstract

The U.S. National Labor Relations Act jointly legalized the right to unionize and the right to share salary information under the premise that effective collective bargaining hinged upon pay transparency. In this paper we revisit the question of whether unions facilitate pay transparency, and benefit from it. We conduct an experiment with over 1,500 screenwriters and directors at the point where the Hollywood Guilds are renegotiating their multi-year contract with the major U.S. Networks. We find that Guild members highly value information about market pay but cannot access it through the Guild. When we introduce pay transparency, we find that it erodes the perception that the Guild demands will meet member needs in the on-going contract negotiation. In line with our empirical results, we propose a theoretical framework whereby unions withhold pay information to sustain member participation in collective bargaining.

JEL Classification: D83, D84, D91, C93, J16, J31, M12.

Keywords: information diffusion, salary, collective bargaining, privacy, inequality, transparency, gender.

1 Introduction

The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 simultaneously protected the right of workers to unionize and workers' rights to discuss pay. The underlying assumption was that in order to effectively organize and bargain collectively, workers had to be able to share wage information. Unions are uniquely positioned to enforce the diffusion of pay information as they often have access to their members' pay. Indeed, many unions require members to report gross earnings to assess their union membership fees. However, the question of whether worker-led organizations bargain effectively by bringing pay transparency to its members has not been theoretically nor empirically addressed.

In this paper, we explore whether unions reveal pay information, and the impact of that information, in the context of the Writers Guild of America (WGA) and the Directors Guild of America (DGA), two of the oldest and most successful Guilds in America as judged by membership, dues, strikes, and scope of authority (Banks, 2015; Fisk, 2017). We design a survey experiment with WGA and DGA members and run it at the time of contract re-negotiations such that wage transparency would arguably be most relevant for informing member demand.

We elicit beliefs about the distribution of pay among members, and find that writers and directors have little knowledge of other members' pay. We then tell respondents we are considering producing a report on pay but that we first need to gauge whether there is sufficient demand for it. For this purpose, we are asking them whether they would want to see such a report. Specifically, we offered to produce two types of reports in random order: one showing aggregate pay distributions for other individuals in the same occupation as the respondent and another showing a gender breakdown of pay distributions, again for the relevant occupation. We find that private demand for pay transparency is high across the board: over 80% of respondents state they would value the publication of pay information, and would pay for it. Further, women have a higher demand for transparency, especially when it comes to the pay gap report: 90% of them would value a report, and 75% of men. 47% of male respondents and 66% of female respondents mention they would use the pay gap report to negotiate their current or future contracts. More than 40% of women and 25% of men mention they would use it to decide where to work in the future.

Given this high private demand for pay information and the key role

it would play in negotiations, we turn to understanding why it is under-provided. After eliciting their private demand for the reports, we ask writers and directors whether they would be willing to sign a public petition requesting Networks or the Guild to release pay information[1] that would make the production of a pay report possible. We randomized across respondents whether the public use of their preference is used to petition their own Guild, or the Networks. While more than 80% of respondents privately state that they want the researchers to produce pay reports, 40% of respondents are willing to join researchers in a public request for pay data from the Guilds or Networks. While we find no gender difference in willingness to publicly petition, there are significant gender differences in what refrains respondents from publicly asking for this information: while 35% of women cite fears of retaliation by studios and the Guild, only 25% of men do so. Interestingly, members are no more fearful of retaliation by networks than they are of their own worker-lead organization.

Finally, we explore a novel explanation for why unions may not reveal pay information: to sustain participation in collective bargaining. Specifically, revealing pay may lead some members to believe that they would be better off negotiating as individuals, resulting in less union support. To test this hypothesis, we run a randomized experiment measuring the impact of salary information on support for the Guild among Hollywood writers. Specifically, we use the reported pay of our baseline survey respondents to compute the median and mean above the MBA separately for men (+10% for the median and +25% for the mean) and women (+3% and +14%, respectively). We then share this information with all union members through a personalized link. We ask members if the WGA demands at the negotiation table (on-going) meet the needs of all members, either before or after the pay information is shared. We find that the share of respondents who answered that the WGA demands either "Not at all" or "Mostly not" meet the needs of all members was 12% among those who had not yet seen our descriptive statistics and 27% among those who had, a 125% increase. This provides a motive for unions to suppress pay information: when provided with this information,

[1]Both the Networks and Guilds have access to detailed pay data. Indeed, in the process of collecting dues, which are computed as a percentage of earnings, the Guilds require members to report all gross earnings, including base salary, overtime, residuals, deferments, percentage compensation, completion of assignment, vacation and holiday pay, profit participation and fees of all kinds in any Guild category. Networks collect this information directly since they are the contractors.

members are less likely to state the demands of the union are sufficient to meet member needs. To formalise this explanation, we provide a framework that describes the conditions in which unions will choose to disclose pay information. One key take-away from the model is that an informed union leader whose objective function is to maximize the surplus of writers may not want to provide salary information because in doing so they would encourage worker to break the strike and lower the wages for all. In other words, secrecy is solving a collective action problem.

Our work is related to several strands of research. We first build on a literature about the diffusion of information (Bass, 1969; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995) which typically focuses on peer-to-peer interactions and social learning. By contrast, we focus on how organizations facilitate or inhibit the spread of valuable information. The most closely related work in this domain documents that without organizational facilitation, valuable knowledge (notably pay information) may fail to transmit between co-workers (Sandvik et al., 2020; Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2023).

This paper also closely relates to a growing literature on pay transparency and its labor market consequences. In line with previous research on the disparate gender impact of pay secrecy (Roussille, 2023), we find that women would be more likely than men to use pay gap information to negotiate. Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2022) find that employees' have a considerable willingness to pay for both manager and peer salary information, suggesting demand for this information in the face of information frictions. Our paper builds on this research, showing evidence of very high demand for pay transparency from union members. Existing research on pay transparency policies also highlights the tension that while pay transparency may narrow the gender wage gap ((Baker et al., 2023; Roussille, 2023; Duchini et al., 2022), it often correlates with declining overall wage levels (Cullen, 2023). Our paper complements this empirical evidence by providing a theoretical model in which more transparency can lead to a lower union bargaining position, and eventually lower pay for all workers.

Finally, it relates to a longstanding literature looking at the role of unions in determining pay structures and pay disparities. While the dominant view until the 1970s was that unions tended to increase wage inequality (Johnson, 1975), more recent papers have shown that unions play a key role in the overall compression of wages, (Farber et al., 2021). Further, while unions' demands have historically not been focused on furthering gender or racial equality (Baker and Robeson, 1981), recent evidence also suggests that unions

can improve gender equality (Biasi and Sarsons, 2022), and several unions (e.g. the Writers Guild of America[2], United Steelworkers) have publicly expressed support for pay equity (WGA, 2023; United Steelworkers District 6, 2016). Our paper helps reconcile why unions' public support for pay equality has not translated into the disclosure of pay data.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the structure and purpose of the Writers and Directors Guilds. We describe our survey and experiment design in Section 3 and present the results in Section 4.

2 Institutional Background

Similar to workers unions, the West and East Writers Guilds of America are two guilds to which film, television, and radio writers belong. For the remainder of the paper, we refer to both guilds as the WGA. The WGA is governed by elected members and its primary function is to negotiate contracts between the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers and guild members. As such, the Guild yields influence in the wage-setting process. For example, the WGA negotiates minimum base amounts, which operate similar to a minimum wage, guaranteeing that Guild members earn a minimum amount for their work. Over 20,000 writers in Hollywood are represented by the Guild.

Chronicling the history of the WGA, Banks (2015) emphasizes a long-standing tension between fractured interests and solidarity within the Guild. Banks (2015) suggests "a breakdown between the leadership and the membership about what precisely the union wished to accomplish" followed a series of WGA strikes in the 1980s. Throughout these strikes, individual writer's star status became at odds with the collective union mentality. Prior to 2023, the most recent WGA strike was in 2007-2008 and lasted 100 days. Several tensions arose throughout this strike. First, new forms of media (e.g. reality television, streaming) created debate over which types of writers should be represented by the Guild. Moreover, high variance in Guild members' financial status led key interests to diverge. Banks (2015) explains "some of the most egregious infighting during negotiations and strikes came from high-profile writers who felt their needs were not being served." However,

[2]The Writers Guild of America included in their negotiation objectives: "enact measures to combat discrimination and harassment and to promote pay equity" (WGA, 2023)

during the 2007-2008, the WGA was able to address this by centering these high-profile writers.

From the late 1980s to early 2000s, sociologists studied inequity in WGA pay and hiring. As a result of the revealed disparities, the Guild added requirements for producers to read scripts written by women and minorities (Banks, 2015).

The Directors Guild of America represents directors and members of the directorial team (assistant directors, unit production managers, stage managers, associate directors, production associates, and location managers) working in media such as film, television, news, and commercials. Like the WGA, elected members serve the role of negotiating minimum base amounts for members. Both the WGA and the DGA vote for their leadership who then represent the Guild's interests in negotiations. They also collect detailed compensation of members in order to calculate dues, which are a percentage of all gross earnings, including base salary, overtime, residuals, deferments, percentage compensation, completion of assignment, vacation and holiday pay, profit participation and fees of all kinds in any Guild category.

The WGA's and the DGA's multi-year contracts with the networks ended in May and June of 2023, and terms for the subsequent 3 years were expected to be negotiated at that time. The DGA reached a tentative agreement on June 3rd that members ratified on June 23 (DGA, 2023a). The WGA went on strike on May 2, 2023 over a dispute between the WGA and the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers. We fielded our baseline survey June 2023 15-23, when WGA members were in their 6th week of a strike. At this time the strike continues and asserts several goals, including limiting the use of AI in production and improving the residuals that writers receive. A central goal continues to be the renegotiation of minimums at the level of positions, film budgets, media (eg. tv, film, streaming), and product (eg. weekly writers room, episode script).

3 Survey and Experiment Design

3.1 Recruitment and Sample

We recruited current Hollywood writers and directors, targeting all members of the East and West Writers Guilds of America (WGA), as well as the Directors Guild of America (DGA), and non-members in writer or direc-

tor positions with active IMDB profiles. To do so, we collected e-mail addresses through IMDBPro and the public listings of WGA and DGA members (IMDbPro, 2023; WGA, 2023a; DGA, 2023b). We limit the list of writers and directors from IMDBPro in three ways. First, we restricted to individuals who have at least one writing or one directing credit since 2020 to ensure they are currently active. Second, we restrict to individuals who either state that they are members of the WGA or DGA, or who have listed work history in TV or film. Third, we restrict

We sent the final list of 19,916 writers and/or directors an e-mail to participate in our study in June 2023.[3] The writers and directors were told that the researchers are considering producing a report pertaining to writers' and directors' pay negotiations, and that we were seeking their feedback on whether such a report would be useful. Details on the survey design are provided in the next sub-section.

Our response rate was 9.0%, with 5.8% of all respondents completing the entire survey. Of the 1,800 respondents who started the survey, 564 are writers, 456 are directors, and 660 are both writers and directors. The remaining respondents did not identify themselves as either a writer or a director. The majority of completed respondents (83.3%) belong to a guild, although a small minority stated that they are not current members. The sample is 63.4% male and 69.4% white.

Using individual data from IMDb, Table 1 compares the characteristics of all the contacts we could link to an IMDb profile (68% of our final list of 19,916 writers), with the characteristics of survey respondents we could link to an IMDb profile (78% of our 1,461 respondents). Our contacts and respondents look similar. For both groups, approximately 65% are male, their earliest credit is on average 2007, and they have 26 credits. The most notable difference is that our respondents are 8 pp more likely to be writers and 5 pp less likely to be directors than our contacts overall. We also compare these groups by Guild membership status. Among contacts, non-members' earliest credit is on average 9 years later than that of members. Non-members are also less likely to be writers, directors, or work in television than members. Leading up to the contract negotiation, the Guild shared that in 2021-2022 television season 49% of WGA writers earned the minimum (WGA, 2023b). Among our respondents, 35.5% of WGA television writers report typically

[3]We estimate the WGA has 11,500 members and the DGA has 19,000 members (Sakoui, 2023; Koblin and Barnes, 2023).

earning the minimum.

Approximately 1.5 months after sending the initial survey, we sent a follow-up survey to 5,180 writers in our sample. The response rate was 12.7%. Table 2 reports IMDb characteristics of our contacts and respondents. Contacts were limited to known WGA and non-WGA writers. Contacts and respondents are largely similar; respondents are slightly less experiences, measured both by earliest credit year and total credits.

3.2 Survey Design

Respondents first fill out information on their current career, which we use to branch them into survey variations that are tailored to their exact occupation. After filling out the occupation information, respondents were shown an example of what a pay report could look like. We displayed two types of reports: one showing aggregate pay distributions for other individuals in the same occupation as the respondent and another showing a gender breakdown of pay distributions, again for the relevant occupation. We randomized which example respondents were shown first. We then asked a series of questions designed to measure their private interest in each type of report.[4] In addition to the above information, we ask for the individual's beliefs about pay inequality in their occupation.

After eliciting private interest in the reports, we present respondents with a final scenario. We tell them that we are considering sending a petition to either studio networks or to the WGA/DGA to ask for pay data that would help us produce the aforementioned reports. We ask respondents whether they would be willing to include their name and stated private interest in the report as part of the petition. We use this as a public measure for pay transparency.

In the follow-up survey, we disclose to Hollywood write some of the (self-declared) salary information of our baseline survey respondents. Specifically we show them the median and mean above the MBA separately for men and women. We then ask their opinion on whether writers believe the WGA demands meet the needs of all members, randomizing whether we ask this question before or after the report.

[4]Exact questions are shown in Appendix D.

4 Results

4.1 Private and Public Demand for Pay Information

We begin by estimating private demand for a pay report about the overall distribution of pay, and the distribution split by gender. The pay report split by gender contains the information required to reconstruct the entire distribution, and hence, is more informative.

Private demand is measured using responses to the question of whether the respondent would value the proposed pay report,[5] and by measuring willingness to pay for the report following the incentive-compatible BDM procedure (Becker et al., 1964). The results are shown in Figure 2 on the left side of Panel A for the pay gap report, and on the left side of Panel B for the overall report. First, we find that there is high demand for pay transparency: 80% of respondents would privately value the production of the pay gap report and 82% that of overall report. Second, while the pay gap report displays strictly more information than the overall report (i.e. the detailed gender split that can be used to recreate the overall distribution), men privately value the overall pay report more than the split report (p-value $<$ 0.001). Finally, female writers and directors value the both pay reports more than men (p-value $<$ 0.001 for the gaps report, p-value$=$ 0.015 for the overall report), and value the pay gap report significantly more than the overall report (p-value $<$ 0.001). In sum, women appear to be the greater beneficiaries of pay information, and prioritize the two types of reports differently than men.

We next turn to understanding whether these private demands could be leveraged to publicly ask the Guild or Networks for their salary information. Specifically, we ask respondents if we can include their name and private demand for the report in a petition addressed either to the Guild or the Network. We inform them that the petition would ask for the private data these organisations collect on pay such that we could produce our pay report, either the overall report or the report on pay disparities (see Questions 8 and 15 in our survey instrument in Appendix D). This question is incentive-

[5] We consider that a respondent values the report if their answer to "Do you think we should create such report" (Question 7 in our survey instrument in Appendix D) is either "Yes, I would value it significantly" or "Yes, I would be interested to see it". Appendix A shows the results for only those would value significantly.

compatible as it is clear we will (and in fact did)[6] go ahead and request information on pay from the Guild and Networks.

The right hand side of Panel A Figure 2 shows that private demand for the pay report does not directly translate into public requests for the pay gap report[7]: only 41% of women and 34% of men are willing to sign their name on the petition in support of a pay gap report, a significant drop from private support (respectively 90% for women and 75% for men). Panel B shows analogous results for the overall pay report. 86% of women and 81% of men express private interest, while roughly 37% of women and men are willing to publicly request the overall pay report.

4.2 Why is public demand lower than private demand?

We asked individuals who were reluctant to make their private answer public to describe the reasons for their unwillingness. Answers were classified by external reviewers into broad categories. Specifically, three research assistants that were otherwise not involved in the project were separately asked to group the responses. Groupings were then compared and if there was disagreement, they chose the more commonly-chosen group for a given reason. If all three RAs disagreed, they discussed until they came to a consensus.

Figure 3 shows the distribution of reasons that men and women expressed in their open-ended responses, among Guild members who expressed interest in the report. This figure reveals that both men and women mention concerns surrounding retaliation as the primary reason not to publicly request pay information: 34% of men and 46% of women provide this justification (p-value = 0.068).[8] 30% of Guild members interested in the report answer *Retaliation* when asked about petitioning the Guild and 48% answer so when asked about petitioning the Networks (p-value=0.009).

Privacy concerns are the second most cited concern for men (e.g., "I do not want my information to be public"), and more cited by men than women

[6] In between the baseline and follow-up surveys, we reached out to the WGA to request the pay data, using aggregate statistics and omitting the names of our respondents. To date, we have not received a response. See Appendix C for the content of the message.

[7] We consider that a respondent makes a public request if they are first interested in the report, and later agree to make their request public.

[8] One respondent who indicated fear of retaliation from the Guild explained they did not want to make a public request "because I fear the guild would exclude me or penalize me for my petition." Another respondent, instead asked about requesting data from Networks, wrote "I can't give any reason for a studio to not want to hire me."

(p-value = 0.093). Academic use concerns are the second most cited concern for women (e.g., needing more information about the purpose of the pay report). Finally, the least common aggregated reasons cited similarly by both men and women is trust in their Guild (e.g. "I believe the WGA should handle information such as this").

Taken together, these results suggest that although there is widespread support for pay transparency, particularly among women, public statements of support may be suppressed as this population fears retaliation if they express their support.

Open-ended answers elsewhere in our survey suggest why Guild members may have a fear of retaliation. When asked if their Guild is fully forthcoming with data of value, one DGA member wrote: "The DGA is secretive about everything." A WGA-DGA member speculates: "I don't know what information they collect. But I think they have agendas and those in power at the guilds tailor the information to their liking."

4.3 Why would the Guild be reluctant to share salary information?

In the baseline survey, after eliciting interest in our reports, we also ask respondents how they would use the reports if they were published. Figure 4 shows, by gender, how respondents declared they would use the pay gap report.[9] After informational reasons (67% of respondents plan to use the pay gap report "To know where they stand in the pay distribution"), the second most frequent intended use is contract negotiation: 50% of respondents declare they would use the report to negotiate their future contracts (and 21% mention they would use it to renegotiate their current contract). Further, there are significant gender differences in intended uses of the report: Women are 31% more likely than men to plan to use the report to negotiate (p-value¡0.001) and 34% more likely to use it to re-negotiate (p-value=0.003). In contrast, men are 1.7 times more likely to report they would not use the pay gap report than women. This would obviously be an issue for Networks, whose goal is to keep film production costs in check. The fact that respondents would use the reports to individually negotiate their contracts is also potentially worrisome for the WGA as the union aims to centralise demands.

Motivated by these observations from the baseline survey, we run a follow

[9] Appendix Figure 7 reports the same for the overall pay report.

up that further probes a novel explanation for why unions may not reveal pay information: to sustain participation in collective bargaining. Specifically, revealing pay may lead some members to believe that the union is not representing their interests, resulting in less union support. To test this hypothesis, we ran an experiment testing how sharing salary information impacts support for the Guild among Hollywood writers. Specifically, we use (self-declared) salary of our baseline survey respondents to compute the median and mean above the MBA separately for men (+10% for the median and +25% for the mean) and women (+3% and +14%, respectively). We ask respondents their opinions on whether they believe the WGA demands during the negotiation meet the needs of all members and randomize whether this question is asked before (control) or after (treatment) the respondent sees our descriptive statistics on pay inequality. Figure 5 shows how responses differ based on treatment status. The percent of respondents who answered that the WGA demands either "Not at all" or "Mostly not" meet the needs of all members was 12% among those who had not yet seen our descriptive statistics and 27% among those who had, a 125% increase. This may explain why unions may desire to suppress pay information: members are less likely to think the union appropriately represents them when provided with pay information.

5 Theoretical Framework

To help set ideas, we conclude with a model that describes the conditions in which unions will choose to disclose pay information. The model comprises a firm, a union, and a unit measure of workers $\mathcal{I} \equiv [0, 1]$.

5.1 Setup

Payoffs The firm maximizes profits while the workers and the firm maximize utility. The firm is endowed with a decreasing returns to scale revenue-production technology $y(L) = \nu L^{\alpha}$, where L is the mass of labor it employs, ν is a productivity-shifter (initially known only by the firm) and $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ measures the concavity of the firm's production (α is public information).[10]

[10] I think an interesting model of 'crossing the picket line' requires decreasing returns to scale – as in Stole-Zweibel, the firm is willing to pay inframarginal workers more to decrease the bargaining power of marginal workers.

We denote the set of employed workers as $\mathcal{I}^e \subseteq \mathcal{I}$, which has measure $|\mathcal{I}^e|$. Each worker $i \in \mathcal{I}^e$ receives a (potentially-personalised) wage w_i. The firm's profits are thus $\nu |\mathcal{I}|^\alpha - \int_{i \in \mathcal{I}^e} w_i di$.

Employed workers $i \in \mathcal{I}^e$ have utility equal to their wage w_i. The utility of unemployed workers is zero.

The union has utility equal to total worker utility $\int_{i \in \mathcal{I}^e} w_i di$.[11]

Timing and actions. The timing of the model is as follows:

1. The firm learns its productivity $\nu \sim F$.
2. Each worker receives a signal of the firm's productivity $w_{i0} iid \sim G_\nu$. One can think of w_{i0} as an initial wage, although no worker will actually receive it so it's really just a signal of ν. There is a unique distribution G_ν for each value of ν.
3. The union observes each worker's w_{i0}.
4. The union sends a signal $\omega \in \Omega$, which is public information.
5. Each worker i makes an individual wage offer to the firm w_i^{scab}.
6. The firm selects a subset of the individual wage offers to accept. The corresponding set of workers are the firm's *scab workers* $\mathcal{I}^{scab}$.
7. The union makes a wage offer w^{union} on behalf of the remaining workers.
8. The firm decides whether to employ all or none of the remaining workers at wage w^{union}. Let $\mathcal{I}^{union}$ denote the set of employed unionised workers.

5.2 Equilibrium

An equilibrium is a perfect-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the above game. We now show the conditions under which unions will not disclose firm productivity (information on pay).

[11] In particular, it cares about both union and non-union workers.

Lemma 5.1. *All workers will be employed. Union workers will receive wage*

$$w^{union} = \nu \frac{1 - \left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right|^{\alpha}}{1 - \left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right|}. \tag{1}$$

Proof. In Period 8, the firm will accept the union's offer if

$$\nu \left|\mathcal{I}^{scab} \cup \mathcal{I}^{union}\right|^{\alpha} - w^{union} \left|\mathcal{I}^{union}\right| - \int_{i \in \mathcal{I}^{scab}} w_i di \geq \nu \left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right|^{\alpha} - \int_{i \in \mathcal{I}^{scab}} w_i di.$$

This is equivalent to $w^{union} \leq \nu \frac{1-\left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right|^{\alpha}}{1-\left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right|}$. The union can infer ν from $\{w_{i0}\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}$, and so will make the maximal wage offer that will not be rejected. □ □

Let $\bar{w}^{scab}$ denote the firm's willingness to pay for a scab worker in Period 6.

Lemma 5.2. *The firm's willingness to pay for a scab worker is*

$$\bar{w}^{scab} = \nu\alpha \left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right|^{\alpha-1}, \tag{2}$$

and so the set of scab workers satisfies the recursive equation
$\mathcal{I}^{scab} = \left\{i : w_i^{scab} \leq \nu\alpha \left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right|^{\alpha-1}\right\}$.

Proof. Given Lemma 1, the firm can infer that all workers will be employed eventually. It follows that her willingness to pay for a scab worker will satisfy

$$\bar{w}^{scab} = w^{union} + \left|\mathcal{I}^{union}\right| \frac{d}{d\left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right|} \left[-w^{union}\right].$$

Substituting in equation (1), taking derivatives and simplifying implies that $\bar{w}^{scab} = \nu\alpha \left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right|^{\alpha-1}$. □ □

Lemma 5.3. ***Lemma 3:*** *If, off the equilibrium path, all workers know ν in Period 5, then $\left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right| = 1$ and each worker i will be paid wage $w_i = \nu\alpha$.*

Proof: I will first show that $\left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right| = 1$. Assume towards a contradiction that $\left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right| < 1$. It follows from equations (1) and (2) that $\bar{w}^{scab} > w^{union}$. Given that all workers know ν, those workers $i \in \mathcal{I}^{union}$ would be better off offering $w_i^{scab} = \bar{w}^{scab}$, which would be accepted.

Given that $\left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right| = 1$, the claim that $w_i = \nu\alpha$ follows from equations (1) and (2). □

Conjecture 1: The union will never disclose ν in Period 4.
Proof sketch: By Lemma 3, if the union discloses ν, then $\left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right| = 1$ and, for all workers i, $w_i = \nu\alpha$. From equations (1) and (2), both the union wage $\bar{w}^{union}$ and the scab wage $\bar{w}^{scab}$ are strictly greater than $\nu\alpha$ when $\left|\mathcal{I}^{scab}\right| < 1$. If scab workers were paid $\bar{w}^{scab}$, this would complete the proof of Conjecture 1. However, scab workers are not paid $\bar{w}^{scab}$ — they are paid $w_i^{scab} \leq \bar{w}^{scab}$. Nonetheless, I think the fact that w_i^{scab} is chosen optimally means that Conjecture 1 should still go through. □

Conjecture 2: Whether scab workers tend to have high initial wages will depend on the distributions F, G_ν.

The wage offered by a worker in Period 5 will solve

$$w_i^{scab} \in_w \left\{ P\left[\bar{w}^{scab} > w \mid w_{i0}, \omega\right] w + P\left[\bar{w}^{scab} \leq w \mid w_{i0}, \omega\right] E\left[w^{union} \mid w_{i0}, \omega, \bar{w}^{scab} \leq w\right] \right\}.$$

The workers with the lowest w_i^{scab} will become scab workers. It's not obvious to me why there's should be an unambiguous relationship between w_i^{scab} and w_{i0}.

6 Conclusion

This paper explores, both empirically and theoretically, the decision of unions to disclose or withhold pay information. We do so in the context of the Hollywood Guilds, two of the oldest and most successful Guilds in America. We show that although the vast majority of members of the Hollywood Guilds would want more pay information, guild leadership is hesitant to disclose it. To reconcile these empirical facts, we experimentally test one hypothesis: union leaders withhold information to maintain cohesion. Specifically, revealing pay may lead some members to believe that the union is not representing

their interests, resulting in less union support. Our survey experiment reveals that when receiving pay information, members are less supportive of the Guild and feel that they are not properly represented. Our theoretical model then formalises the idea that even a union whose goal is to maximise the surplus of workers should, under certain conditions, limit the information it shares with its members. Future work could expand this experiment to other union settings.

Tables and Figures

Table 1: Baseline Survey Contact and Respondent Characteristics

	All		Guild		Non-Guild	
	(1) Contacts	(2) Respondents	(3) Contacts	(4) Respondents	(5) Contacts	(6) Respondents
% Male	67.9	64.9	67.9	63.7	67.7	69.3
	(0.4)	(1.4)	(0.5)	(1.6)	(0.8)	(2.8)
Earliest Credit Year	2007	2007	2004	2006	2013	2012
	(0.1)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.1)	(0.5)
Total Credits	25.9	26.2	32.3	30.6	10.6	11.3
	(0.8)	(2.5)	(1.0)	(3.1)	(1.5)	(3.4)
Credit Type						
% Writing	38.3	45.8	45.5	53.4	20.9	20.4
	(0.4)	(1.3)	(0.5)	(1.5)	(0.6)	(2.1)
% Directing	43.3	38.4	34.6	29.6	64.5	67.9
	(0.4)	(1.2)	(0.4)	(1.3)	(0.6)	(2.3)
% Producing	18.4	15.8	20.0	17.0	14.6	11.7
	(0.3)	(0.9)	(0.4)	(1.0)	(0.4)	(1.4)
Credit Medium						
% TV	54.5	58.1	66.3	68.3	25.9	23.8
	(0.4)	(1.2)	(0.4)	(1.3)	(0.6)	(2.2)
% Movie	18.5	17.2	16.2	14.6	23.8	25.9
	(0.3)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.9)	(0.5)	(2.0)
Credit Genre						
% Drama	39.5	42.1	43.6	46.3	29.7	27.9
	(0.3)	(1.2)	(0.4)	(1.3)	(0.6)	(2.0)
% Comedy	33.1	34.1	37.3	37.7	22.9	22.0
	(0.3)	(1.1)	(0.4)	(1.3)	(0.5)	(2.0)
Observations	13,024	1,164	9,209	897	3,815	267

Notes: Data from IMDb (IMDb, 2023). 68% of our contact list, and 78% of our respondents, merge to the IMDB data. Guild and Non-Guild classifications defined by contact list source. To obtain *% Male*, we classify first names from the contact list by gender. *Total Credits* is the the total number of credits with which a respondent is credited. Further analyzing their credits, *Credit Type* breaks down the types of credits a respondent is credited with, which are not mutually exclusive on a given project. *Credit Medium* shows what percent of credits are in television and film, which together compose 87% of all projects in the data. *Credit Genre* shows what percent of credits are in the two most common genres in the data: drama and comedy. Finally, *Credit Reviews* report the average IMDb rating out of 10 and number of individual ratings among projects a respondent is credited on.


Table 2: Follow-up Survey Contact and Respondent Characteristics

	All		Guild		Non-Guild	
	(1) Contacts	(2) Respondents	(3) Contacts	(4) Respondents	(5) Contacts	(6) Respondents
% Male	61.5	61.6	61.1	59.2	67.4	69.5
	(0.7)	(2.4)	(0.8)	(2.8)	(2.7)	(4.7)
Earliest Credit Year	2006	2008	2005	2008	2011	2008
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.6)	(0.5)	(1.1)
Total Credits	38.3	33.9	40.3	39.1	11.1	17.3
	(1.4)	(4.7)	(1.5)	(6.1)	(1.4)	(3.6)
Credit Type						
% Writing	79.0	76.2	82.6	83.8	31.4	51.8
	(0.5)	(1.7)	(0.5)	(1.6)	(2.3)	(4.4)
% Directing	13.0	16.2	9.7	9.9	56.9	36.6
	(0.4)	(1.5)	(0.4)	(1.3)	(2.4)	(4.2)
% Producing	8.0	7.6	7.7	6.3	11.6	11.6
	(0.3)	(0.9)	(0.3)	(0.9)	(1.3)	(2.3)
Credit Medium						
% TV	80.1	74.9	83.8	84.0	31.0	45.8
	(0.5)	(1.8)	(0.5)	(1.7)	(2.3)	(4.4)
% Movie	10.5	12.0	9.3	6.9	25.4	28.4
	(0.3)	(1.2)	(0.3)	(1.0)	(1.9)	(3.5)
Credit Genre						
% Drama	50.8	48.0	52.2	50.4	32.8	40.0
	(0.6)	(2.0)	(0.7)	(2.3)	(2.1)	(4.0)
% Comedy	45.2	42.8	46.8	47.8	24.2	26.5
	(0.6)	(2.0)	(0.7)	(2.4)	(1.9)	(3.5)
Observations	4,211	401	3,913	306	298	95


Notes: Data from IMDb (IMDb, 2023). 82% of our contact list, and 75% of our respondents, merge to the IMDB data. Guild and Non-Guild classifications defined by contact list source and baseline survey responses, where applicable. Characteristics follow Table 1.

Figure 1: Private Demand for Pay Reports

PANEL A: Pay Gap Report




PANEL B: Overall Report




Notes: 90% confidence intervals in brackets. Private interest was reported on a 5-point scale, converted here to a binary measure. 81% of respondents made a *Private Request* for the pay gap information, while 83% did so for the overall pay information.

Figure 2: Public and Private Demand for Pay Reports

PANEL A: Pay Gap Report




PANEL B: Overall Report




Notes: 90% confidence intervals in brackets. Respondents were asked either about making a *Public Request* for pay data from their profession's Guild or the networks. The percent making a public request for pay gap information from the Guilds is 40% and from the Networks is 42% (p-value=0.358).

Figure 3: Reasons Unwilling to Publicly Request Pay Gap Information from Guild




Notes: Respondents who did not opt to make their private interest regarding the pay gap report public were asked why, in an open text box. This figure includes respondents who expressed private demand, and who are Guild members. 59% of this sample recorded a reason. 14% gave a reason outside of these four main categories. The reasons were coded into the categories by hand. From left to right, *Retaliation* captures those who feared their career would suffer, from either the Guild or the networks, as a result of publicly requesting the data. Next, those who answered *Privacy* expressed a desire to remain anonymous. Those who expressed *Academic Use Concerns* wanted more information about the researchers and purpose of the study. Finally, the *Trust Guild* group deferred to the opinion of their Guild.

Figure 4: Uses of the Pay Gap Report



Notes: 90% confidence intervals in brackets. Respondents were asked to select all reasons that apply.

Figure 5: WGA Demand Representation



Notes: Responses from follow-up survey to the question "Do most writers think the WGA demands will meet the needs of all WGA members?". Sample is restricted to those who answered within 48 hours of initial distribution, to address spillovers between respondents.

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
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Online Appendix


A Private Demand

Figure 6: Private Demand



Notes: 90% confidence intervals in brackets. This figure replicates the left-hand side of Figure 2, redefining private interest as those who say 'Yes, I would value it significantly" for Question 7 in Appendix D about the relevant report.

Figure 7: Uses of the Overall Pay Report




Notes: Replication of Figure 4 for the overall pay report.


B Pay Information

Figure 8: Pay Information

Panel A: Guild Member Respondents



Panel B: Non-Member Respondents



Notes: Self-reported typical percent earned above the minimum by gender and guild membership status. All positions weighted equally.

C Outreach to the WGA

On August 11, 2023, we sent the following email to the WGA:

Dear Geoff,

I'm writing to follow up on the survey results as you requested. As discussed, we are a team of faculty at Harvard, MIT and UBC, and we've surveyed more than a thousand Guild members on issues of pay transparency and pay equity. We paused further analysis, as we found a result that was disconcerting, and we wanted to address it with you if possible.

We found that over 80% of members wanted more information on pay disparities within the WGA, but that two-thirds of members do not feel comfortable expressing this desire to the networks *or to the Guild*. They specifically cite a fear of backlash if they were to outwardly express their desire for more transparency. This is especially true for women and minorities, who believe they are paid less than white men. All members appear to place great importance on pay information, stating that it would help them with labor organizing, negotiating, and deciding where to work. Based on past Guild reports and an understanding of the information you collect, these data are in your hands, and members know that too.

Given the significant number of writers who would like greater pay transparency, we were going to release our information today so that they could be informed when asked their opinion about contract terms. Since disclosing the fear of backlash from the Guild and lack of information could affect you, we're reaching out to you first. If you wanted to collaborate with us on making the relevant pay information available to Guild members, this would significantly change the narrative of our findings.

Specifically, we would like to collaborate with you on the following:

- First, we would like you to make available your 2021 report of earnings by positions for both TV and film, split by male and non-male WGA members. Ideally you would use the most current data you have, rather than data from 2021.

- Second, we want your permission to do a more in-depth analysis of the drivers of gender disparities in the professions under your umbrella, including permission to analyze the raw data you collect without any censorship. Standard data-use-agreement terms that guarantee the

confidentiality of members in any published report would of course apply.

We greatly appreciate your consideration. In your reply, kindly address each facet of the collaboration we describe separately.

Sincerely,

Zoe Cullen, Assistant Professor Harvard Business School
Nina Roussille, Assistant Professor MIT
Heather Sarsons, Associate Professor UBC
Julia Gilman, Doctoral Candidate MIT

D Survey Instruments

D.1 Sample Main Survey

We are a team of professors from Harvard, MIT, and UBC, with expertise on negotiation. We are considering producing a report pertaining to writers' & directors' career negotiations at every level. Particularly during this historic renegotiation, we want to understand how providing currently inaccessible information may affect you for better or worse.

We will use answers to this 10-minute survey to decide whether to pursue this project and whether to send you the report. All responses will be stored on a secure server and your name will never be released unless you indicate otherwise.

By clicking "Yes" below, you consent to participate in the survey.

Do you want to participate?

Here is some key information about the study:

- We are asking you to take part in a research study because you might be a writer or director, or part of the directing team.
- If you agree to be in this study you will be asked to complete a 10-minute online survey.
- We don't believe there are any risks from participating in this research. All responses will be stored on a secure server and your name will never be released. The study would only use aggregate data.
- We cannot promise any benefits to others from your taking part in this research. However, possible benefits to you include helpful career information.
- Your participation is completely voluntary. You can choose not to participate, or you can agree to participate and change your mind later and your decision will not be held against you. Your refusal to participate will not result in any consequences or any loss of benefits that you are otherwise entitled to receive.

- The identified data collected in this survey and IMDB will be exclusively shared among the co-PIs on the study team.

If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, contact the Research Participant Complaint Line in the UBC Office of Research Ethics at 604-822-8598 or if long distance e-mail RSIL@ors.ubc.ca or call toll free 1-877-822-8598. Taking part in this survey is entirely up to you. If you decide to take part, you may choose to stop filling the survey at any time.

◯ Yes, I want to participate

First, we have some questions to determine which report would be most relevant for you.

Q2

Which roles have you worked in? Select all that apply.

- [ ] Writer
- [ ] Director or Directing Team
- [ ] Producer
- [ ] Actor
- [ ] Other

Q3

Do you primarily work in TV or film?

- ◯ TV
- ◯ Film

Q4

Which type of studio provides a more important source of income for you?

- ◯ Streaming service
- ◯ Traditional studio

Q5

Which type of writing job title is most relevant for your income?

- ◯ Staff Writer
- ◯ Story Editor
- ◯ Executive Story Editor
- ◯ Co-producer
- ◯ Producer
- ◯ Co-executive Producer
- ◯ Showrunner

Q6

Which type of pay structure provides a more important source of income for you?

- ◯ Weekly
- ◯ Episodic


Please note, the following questions refer to the **time worked in the writers room** (as opposed to production) at **streaming services.**

Q7

We will ask you about two reports. Please consider the proposed report showing earnings in the TV writing industry for each gender based on TV writer contracts in the past year.

Here is an example of what we would report about Staff Writers:

WGA-Member Staff Writer Compensation Relative to MBA Minimums at Streaming services (2023)



(Note: this example uses **fake data** for each graph. To preserve anonymity, we would include non-binary individuals in both distributions.)

Do you think we should create such report? The report would be shared with other Staff Writers, and we will use your opinion to decide whether to pursue this project. **Your response will be strictly confidential.**

- -

- ◯ Yes, I would value it significantly
- ◯ Yes, I would be interested to see it
- ◯ Neutral, I would not pay too much attention.
- ◯ No, I would not be interested in such a report.
- ◯ No, such a report would be harmful to me.

Q8

Instead of creating a report, we could use the same resources to transfer rewards to survey respondents.

Below, we will ask you about 5 hypothetical scenarios. In each scenario, you will be presented a choice between accessing the report on pay disparities OR receiving money.

We will randomly choose 10 survey respondents. If you are one of these 10 lucky respondents, we will randomly select one of your 5 choices to send to you if the report is produced.

As a result, it is in your best interest to respond honestly to these scenarios. Please make your choices below, and at the end of the survey you will find out if you are selected.

Between the following two options in each scenario, which one would you prefer?

	Receive Pay Report	Receive Cash
Pay report or $25 Cash Payment	○	○
Pay report or $150 Cash Payment	○	○
Pay report or $500 Cash Payment	○	○

Pay report or $2000 Cash Payment	○ Receive Pay Report	○ Receive Cash
Pay report or $6000 Cash Payment	○	○

Q9

How would you use the report if it were published? Select all that apply. If a reason is not included, please describe it in the "other" option.

- [ ] To personally know where I stand in the pay distribution
- [ ] To decide where to work
- [ ] For labor organizing
- [ ] I wouldn't use it
- [ ] To negotiate new contracts
- [ ] To re-negotiate existing contracts
- [ ] Other

Q10

For which reasons do you think this information would have limited scope? Select all that apply. If a reason is not included, please describe it in the "other" option.

- [ ] I already can access the information about pay that I need
- [ ] Reports like this do not affect compensation or employment
- [ ] The proposed report is missing crucial information
- [ ] It would detract from the purpose of collective bargaining
- [ ] Other

Q11

Which other groups of writers should receive a similar report about their position-level earnings?

We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create. Select all that apply.

- [ ] Showrunners
- [ ] Co-executive producers
- [ ] Producers
- [ ] Co-producers
- [ ] Executive story editors
- [ ] Story editors

Q12

You previously said "Yes, I would value it significantly" about a report on TV writer pay distributions by gender.

We are considering sending a petition to the Networks for the private data they collect on contracts to complement our own pay data collection for the purpose of understanding and reporting on pay disparities.

Would you allow us to include your name and private answer above as part of this public petition?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Q13


(Optional) What is the main reason why you would refuse to sign this petition?

Q14

We would like to ask you the same questions about one alternative report.

We can create a different report displaying overall pay distributions, using the same data on recent contracts.

Here is an example of what we would report about Staff Writers:



(Note: this example uses **fake data**.)

Do you think we should create such report? The report

would be shared with other Staff Writers, and we will use your opinion to decide whether to pursue this project. **Your response will be strictly confidential.**

- ◯ Yes, I would value it significantly
- ◯ Yes, I would be interested to see it
- ◯ Neutral, I would not pay too much attention.
- ◯ No, I would not be interested in such a report.
- ◯ No, such a report would be harmful to me.

Q15

Below you are presented with 5 more hypothetical scenarios, now about the overall pay report.

Between the following two options in each scenario, which one would you prefer?

	Receive Pay Report	Receive Cash
Pay report or $25 Cash Payment	○	●
Pay report or $150 Cash Payment	○	○
Pay report or $500 Cash Payment	○	○
Pay report or $2000 Cash Payment	○	○
Pay report or $6000 Cash Payment	○	○

Q16

How would you use the report if it were published? Select all that apply. If a reason is not included, please describe it in the "other" option.

- [ ] I wouldn't use it
- [ ] To re-negotiate existing contracts
- [ ] To negotiate new contracts
- [ ] For labor organizing
- [ ] To personally know where I stand in the pay distribution
- [ ] To decide where to work
- [ ] Other

Q17

For which reasons do you think this information would have limited scope? Select all that apply. If a reason is not included, please describe it in the "other" option.

- [ ] The proposed report is missing crucial information (e.g., demographics)
- [ ] I already can access the information about pay that I need
- [ ] Reports like this do not affect compensation or employment
- [ ] Other

Q18

Which other groups of writers should receive a similar report about their position-level earnings?

We will use your opinion to decide which reports to create. Select all that apply.

- [ ] Story editors
- [ ] Executive story editors
- [ ] Co-producers
- [ ] Producers
- [ ] Co-executive producers
- [ ] Showrunners

Q19

You previously said "Yes, I would value it significantly" about a report on overall TV writer pay distributions.

We are considering sending a petition to the Networks for the private data they collect on contracts to complement our own pay data collection for the purpose of understanding and reporting on overall pay.

Would you allow us to include your name and private answer above as part of this public petition?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Q20

(Optional) What is the main reason why you would refuse to sign this petition?

Q21

Among Staff Writers in the Guild working at Streaming services, do you think women earn a higher, lower, or the same percent above the MBA minimum as men?

- ◯ Higher
- ◯ The same
- ◯ Lower

Q22

You said that you think that among Staff Writers, women earn a lower percent above the MBA minimum than men.

What percent more do men make than women?

Percent more

Q23

How confident are you in your knowledge of the differences in pay between men and women Staff Writers in the Guild?

- ◯ Not confident at all
- ◯ Slightly confident
- ◯ Somewhat confident
- ◯ Very confident
- ◯ Extremely confident

Q24

What do you think is the most relevant MBA minimum for a typical Staff Writer in the Guild writing at Streaming services in the first half of 2023, in dollars?

$

Q25

What percent above the MBA minimum do you think a typical Staff Writer in the Guild earns from one week in the writers room at a Streaming service in the first half of 2023?

Percent above the MBA minimum

Q26

During your most recent project, do you think you earned a higher, lower, or the same percent above the MBA minimum as the typical Staff Writer in the Guild working at Streaming services?

- ◯ More
- ◯ The same
- ◯ Less

Q27

How confident are you in your knowledge of what the typical Staff Writer in the Guild earns?

- ◯ Not confident at all
- ◯ Slightly confident
- ◯ Somewhat confident
- ◯ Very confident
- ◯ Extremely confident

Q28

What percent above the MBA minimum do you typically earn as a Staff Writer at Streaming services?

Percent above the MBA minimum

Q29

We could include a breakdown of pay by other demographics, e.g. race. Below is a list of the demographics we are considering.

Which, if any, breakdowns would you be interested in seeing? Select all that apply.

- [ ] Networks/streaming services
- [ ] LGBTQ+
- [ ] Race
- [ ] Age
- [ ] Main genre
- [ ] Gender
- [ ] Other
- [ ] None of the above

Q30

Please rank the demographics breakdowns you selected above by dragging them from the one you would be most interested in seeing at the top of the list to the one you would be the least interested in seeing at the bottom of the list.

Gender

Race

Age


LGBT

Main genre

Network

Q31

Out of all the episodes you've worked on in the last year, for what percent did you receive formal credit? (0% = none, 100% = all)



Q32

How would a report on true pay distributions by gender compare to the current views of producers & pay-setting executives?

- ◯ It would reveal more pay inequality than they expect
- ◯ It would reveal less pay inequality than they expect
- ◯ It would be the same pay inequality as what they expect

Q33

What is your gender identity?

- ◯ Man
- ◯ Woman
- ◯ Non-binary
- ◯ Other

Q34

How would you describe your race/ethnicity? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ American Indian or Alaska Native
- ☐ Asian
- ☐ Black or African American
- ☐ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
- ☐ White
- ☐ Hispanic/Latino
- ☐ Other
- ☐ Prefer not to disclose

Q35

Are you a member of the WGA?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Q36

Do you hold an official role in the WGA?

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes, Committee Chair/Vice Chair
- ◯ Yes, Committee Member
- ◯ Yes, Involved but no official position
- ◯ Yes, Prior leadership role
- ◯ Yes, Other

Q37

Is the WGA fully forthcoming with their information of value to you?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No
- ◯ Not sure

Q38

Thank you for finishing this survey. Please leave any feedback you have here.

According to the randomization procedure, any hypothetical questions you answered during this survey will remain hypothetical.

Q39

Would you prefer a $20 Amazon gift card or a donation of your choice as a token of appreciation for your time?

If you select donation, please specify which organization you would like us to donate to.

- ◯ $20 Amazon gift card
- ◯ $20 donation

D.2 Sample Follow-up Survey

Q1

We are a team of professors from Harvard, MIT, and UBC, with expertise on
Thank you to those who completed our initial survey on pay in the screenwri
writing industry.

We are following up with you to share our results and ask one question. Your
participation is fully confidential.

Would you like to participate and view our report update?

Here is some key information about the study:

- We are asking you to take part in a research study because you might be a writer or director, or
directing team.
- If you agree to be in this study you will be asked to complete 1 question and see our results
- We don't believe there are any risks from participating in this research. All responses will be sto
server and your name will never be released. The study would only use aggregate data.
- We cannot promise any benefits to others from your taking part in this research. However, poss
you include helpful career information.
- Your participation is completely voluntary. You can choose not to participate, or you can agree
and change your mind later and your decision will not be held against you. Your refusal to partici
result in any consequences or any loss of benefits that you are otherwise entitled to receive.
- The identified data collected in this survey and IMDB will be exclusively shared among the co-F
team.

If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experier
participating in this study, contact the Research Participant Complaint Line in the UBC Office of Resear
604-822-8598 or if long distance e-mail RSIL@ors.ubc.ca or call toll free 1-877-822-8598. Taking part ir
entirely up to you. If you decide to take part, you may choose to stop filling the survey at any time.

Yes, I would like to proceed

Q2

Do most writers think the WGA demands will meet the needs of all WGA members?

I don't know the WGA demands

Not at all

Mostly not

Somewhat

Mostly

Almost entirely

→

In our initial survey, we asked all Guild members would be interested in a pay report that shows earnings by gender.

We found that **84% of WGA members who responded to our survey want more pay transparency** and would be interested in such a report.

60% of WGA members who are interested in the report decline to ask either the networks or the Guild for this information, mostly **due to retaliation concerns**. This is especially true among women and minorities.

→

Given these results, we have reached out to the Guild, shared our findings, and made the following requests:

1. We asked the Guild make available a new version of their 2021 **report of earnings by positions for both TV and film**. This version would be split by male and non-male WGA members and use the most up-to-date data.

2. We requested permission from the Guild to do a more **in-depth academic analysis** of the drivers of gender disparities in screenwriting and TV writing.

→

At present, our responses suggest the following compensation among WGA writers:

Job Title	Male	Female
Median	Scale + 10%	Scale + 3%
Mean	Scale + 25%	Scale + 14%
Maximum	Scale + 100+%	Scale + 100+%

Note: Standard errors on means are 2.2% for men and 2.0% for women.

We expect to add position-level statistics soon.

→

Given the demand for transparency and existing pay gaps, popular contract clauses to address such disparities could include:

- A guarantee of publishing fine-grained pay data every year to aid Guild members in their negotiations
- Automatic arbitration in the case that a member believes they are paid less than others for equal work

→

Q3

Thank you for taking the time to read our results! Please share any feedback, comments, or questions here. We value your perspective, and will use it to inform our next report.

→