1. Contact Information:

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2. Graduate Study:

Ph.D. Economics, Yale University, 2020 - expected May 2026
M.A. Economics, Yale University, 2020 - expected May 2023

Comprehensive Examinations: Macroeconomics, Microeconomics
Oral Examinations: Labor Economics, Political Economy

Fields of Interest: Labor Economics, Political Economy, Applied Microeconomics

Coursework Completed:
- Microeconomics I, II
- Macroeconomics I, II
- Econometrics I, II
- Computational Methods for Economics (Audit)
- Labor Economics I, II
- Industrial Organization I (Audit), II
- Political Economy of Development
- Political Economy of Trade
- Empirical Methods in Economics
- Advanced Microeconomic I (Audit)
- Public Finance I
- American Economic History

3. Research Interests:

I am third-year PhD student in Economics at Yale University and my fields of specialization are labor economics and political economy. I am broadly interested in studying and researching what determines workers' wages in today's economy, and how wage determination is impacted by labor market and political institutions. I am particularly focused on understanding the role of the firm, including the strategies and challenges they face when hiring labor, as a fundamental factor in current wage dynamics. Furthermore, I am interested in exploring and learning more about the

intersection of these issues with digitization, especially as the rise of digital economies change the nature and quality of current work and the relationship between workers and firms.

My current main project is titled “Assets, Quit Behavior and Wage Markdowns” and explores a currently unstudied facet of frictional monopsony. The project will attempt to understand to what degree the makeup of worker’s assets in the US economy can increase workers’ attachment to underpaying firms, and as such, the distribution of market power in the economy. Switching jobs is risky for workers because they might experience temporary loss of income. Workers with more assets will be able to attempt to switch more easily than poorer workers. The need for private insurance will increase the attachment of poorer workers to their firms, and in equilibrium, will generate larger amounts of wage monopsony in their firms of origin. I will attempt to estimate using a causal design and administrative data from US financial institutions the elasticity of quitting of workers with respect to wage conditional on their asset levels, a measure of worker’s ability of quit as wage changes. With these estimates, I will develop and calibrate a structural model of risky job transitions with endogenous assets that is able to rationalize the estimates found. Beyond estimating the importance of this channel with the model, I also hope I will be able to estimate counterfactuals of interest like spillover effects of debt relief policies into job transitions and earnings growth.

My other current work relates to the political economy of labor market institutions. I am working on a project that attempts to bring a political economy lens to the large diversity across states of the strictness of occupational licenses. I hypothesize that the variation on strictness can be explained by the different political strength of occupational groups in different states as measured by political donations. Additionally, I am also coauthoring a paper with Prof. Seth Zimmerman to understand the impact of belonging to elite networks at Harvard and Yale on different outcomes of graduates, including political participation, patenting and entrepreneurship. This project extends Prof. Zimmerman current work with more disaggregated data coming from recent digitization of numerous college archives in order to understand with greater detail how social capital translates into real world outcomes.

I am very interested in exploring digitization as a fundamental angle to understand current labor market and political institutions. One current question of interest is the effect of the online compensation platforms on labor market competitiveness and workers’ outcomes. Increasingly, firms are using compensation platforms that aggregate compensation information from market competitors as a way

to gather information on appropriate compensation for workers. The platforms also use proprietary algorithms to make earnings recommendations to firms based on worker's characteristics and present labor market conditions. On one hand, the increased provision of information could help firms set market-level wages to recruit and retain workers from opposite firms, decreasing wage markdowns. On the other, the use of such platforms could potentially allow for indirect coordination on wages between workers through these platforms decreasing market competitiveness and negatively affecting workers in the long run. The question lends itself to interesting empirical analysis. I am excited to participate in the tutorial to learn more about digitization and discuss with faculty and fellow students this and other potential research questions.