Taking Part without Blending In: Legalization Policies and the Integration of Immigrants

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Abstract

The acculturation of immigrants is typically conceptualized by scholars as assimilation: their cultural identities dissolve into the larger culture so that they can enter mainstream societal institutions. However, one can happen without the other: when legalization policies remove barriers to joining these institutions, immigrants can participate with larger society without eliminating their cultural distinctiveness. I provide a conceptual framework which explains immigrants' choice to either weaken or strengthen their cultural ties when acquiring legal status. Employing a regression discontinuity design using the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program's eligibility criteria, I show that this legalization program allowed unauthorized immigrants to the U.S. to maintain their cultural identity (by keeping naming practices), while promoting their participation with larger society (by learning English and participating in the labor market). This suggests that legalization policies can promote the integration of immigrants as opposed to their assimilation, by allowing diversity in common institutions.

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Introduction

Immigration has irreversibly changed the U.S. demographic landscape: the foreign-born share of the U.S. population is currently at its highest level since 1910, accounting for 13.5% of the total population. With fertility rates at a historic low, in ten years' time net international migration is projected to be the main driver of U.S. population growth.

Understanding the consequences of these profound trends for the politics and social fabric of the U.S. requires understanding how immigrants make a series of choices about participation with larger society and about cultural maintenance—the extent to which they retain identification with their culture of origin. Classical theories which address these choices—which have had the most normative influence on policymakers and public opinion—claim that these decisions are interrelated: participation (including acquiring citizenship and voting) must go hand-in-hand with detachment from culture of origin through a linear process initiated by learning the host country's language, values and norms, and propelled by entering host societal institutions (Gordon, 1964). If true, this challenges a central tenet of the more modern theories, which hold that the maintenance of distinctive cultural identities is compatible with participation in host societal institutions—and that government policy can and should promote both goals (Kymlicka, 1995; Berry, 1997).

Empirically, recent work has shown that acquiring citizenship promotes immigrants' participation with larger society, improving their labor prospects and economic well-being (Bratsberg, Ragan and Nasir, 2002; Bevelander and Pendakur, 2010), enhancing their social contact with the dominant group (Avitabile, Clots-Figueras and Masella, 2013; Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono, 2017) and increasing their political participation (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono, 2015). A few studies go further to claim that the process of acquiring citizen rights strengthens immigrants' identification with the receiving society, leading them to break ties to their culture of origin (Brubaker, 2009; Gerhards and Hans, 2009)

Taken together, these separate lines of empirical research would support the classical

theories by suggesting that participation with larger society cannot happen without the elimination of cultural distinctiveness. But these studies have not considered the effects of a single policy on both participation and cultural distinctiveness. As a result, prior to the present work, we have lacked causal evidence about the simultaneous effects of legalization policies on immigrants' cultural identity and life opportunities.

The modern accounts present different psychological, philosophical and practical explanations for participation in mainstream institutions with cultural maintenance. To be able to engage with these theories' central points in explaining a legalization policy, I synthesize their relevant parts into a simple framework. In this, immigrants determine their level of attachment to their culture of origin after an exogenous policy shock, like legalization, which expands their opportunities to participate with larger society. The change in policy reduces both the benefits of cultural maintenance (by increasing access to the host country's common institutions) and the costs of cultural maintenance (by reducing concerns about being targeted for discrimination). Because there is no reason to presume that benefits decrease more than costs, it is possible *a priori* that policies promoting the legalization of immigrants can also lead them to reinforce their identification with their culture of origin.

Evidence is presented from the 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA), which provides protection from deportation and temporary work authorization to unauthorized immigrants to the U.S. Crucially, to be eligible for DACA, immigrants must have been born after June 15, 1981; this exact date of birth discontinuity allows me to identify the effects of the legalization policy by leveraging the quasi-random assignment of DACA eligibility among immigrants with birth dates close to the arbitrary eligibility cutoff.

To assess immigrants' level of attachment to their culture of origin I employ a measure of ethnic distinctiveness of the first names of immigrants' children, using comprehensive vital statistics data from the state of Florida. To measure immigrants' level of participation with larger society, I use indicators of social integration (such as ability to speak English) and economic integration (employment status and wages) from the American Community Survey

Public Use Microdata Sample.

I find that compared to barely non-DACA-eligible mothers, barely DACA-eligible mothers learn English and participate more in the labor market, confirming the relationship between legalization and participation. But this is not accompanied by the elimination of their cultural distinctiveness: the first names given by barely DACA-eligible mothers to their children are in fact *more* ethnically distinctive than those given by barely non-eligible mothers. As predicted by the theoretical framework, the effect of DACA on cultural maintenance is larger for mothers with spouses from the same country of origin (for whom the benefits of sustained cultural attachment are higher), and in counties with a higher pre-legalization deportation rate (who no longer bear the costs of being targeted by immigration authorities for their cultural ties). Altogether these findings indicate that attaining legal status leads to integration—participation with cultural maintenance—rather than assimilation.

A Framework for Immigrants' Cultural Maintenance

Studies have consistently shown that legalization policies promote immigrants' contact and participation with larger society: their economic performance in terms of employment and wages expands and they depend less on welfare (Bevelander and DeVoretz, 2008; Dancygier and Laitin, 2014), they learn the host country's language (Avitabile, Clots-Figueras and Masella, 2013) and get informed in that language (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono, 2017), their feelings of being discriminated against recede and they join social clubs formed by the majority group (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono, 2017), and their political knowledge, efficacy and participation increases (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono, 2015). On the other hand, a few other studies suggest that these policies via participation in common institutions help dissolve cultural differences between minority immigrants and the rooted majority (Brubaker, 2009; Gerhards and Hans, 2009). Yet, scholars have often highlighted the possibility for immigrants to enter mainstream societal

institutions without requiring them to eliminate their cultural distinctiveness, as long as the barriers to full participation in a society are removed, including fluency in the host country's language (Kymlicka, 1995; Berry, 1997). Given substantive evidence provided by previous studies, we can expect that legalization policies will lead immigrants to participate more with larger society within common institutions. However, can we assume that these policies will lead them to erase their cultural identity, and therefore to their assimilation? Or, is there room to accommodate diversity within common institutions, and therefore to expect that legalization policies will promote the integration of immigrants? To answer these questions we need a framework that helps us characterize the contexts in which immigrants will decide to weaken their cultural ties, or instead to strengthen them.

My approach to answering these questions begins with insights from social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978), self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) and identity economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Social identity and self-categorization theorists have defined group membership as a psychological state. These theorists argue that individuals structure their perception of themselves and others based on abstract social categories, that they then internalize these categories as aspects of their self-concepts, and that group behavior results from perceiving themselves as members of the same social category (Tajfel, 1978). The motivating principle for group-belongingness is a desire for a positive and secure self-concept, which can be achieved by making social comparisons that differentiate oneself from others in terms of positively valued group characteristics, and ones that differentiate one's own group from other groups (Turner et al., 1987). Building on social identity theory, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) argue that the process of making such comparisons to differentiate an individual's group from other groups defines the behaviors that are appropriate for any person in that individual's group. By following these behaviors (or norms), individuals strengthen their self-concept, and therefore derive utility. To the contrary, deviating from these behaviors, and particularly for individuals with a strong positive attachment to their group (strong identifiers), generates a loss of sense of self, and accordingly a utility loss.


Consequently, maximizing such utility by following the group's prescribed behaviors is what determines the identity choice.

However, following the group's prescribed behaviors may be harmful, particularly for individuals who belong to minority groups that can be discriminated against by the majority (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Quillian et al., 2017) and can be a more visible target for authorities (Gelman, Fagan and Kiss, 2007), and for those who are unauthorized and may face fear of deportation (Provine and Doty, 2011). We can thus expect individuals from minority groups to choose identities that simultaneously maximize the benefit and minimize the social costs of affirming their self-concept. Therefore, when such costs outweigh the benefit from group attachment, minority group individuals will choose identities which are detached from their group. This argument can help explain, as previous studies have shown, why minority immigrants hide their cultural identity when confronted with physical violence (Fouka, 2019), high economic penalties (Arai and Skogman Thoursie, 2009), and hostile immigration enforcement local laws (García, 2014).

Therefore, when choosing between preserving or breaking ties to culture, immigrants will balance the benefit of group identification against the cost of displaying group characteristics. Immigrant legalization policies could affect both the benefits and costs of group attachment, and therefore *a priori* the effect that these policies can have on immigrants' cultural maintenance is ambiguous. On the one hand, acquiring legal status reduces the benefit of cultural group attachment: immigrants change their time horizons towards a future in the host country, and they feel recognized by the state and larger society. Given this, the psychological burden of detaching from their cultural group diminishes, and therefore identifying with the characteristics and behaviors of the majority generates positive psychological benefits. In particular, weak identifiers start off with a lower benefit of group attachment, and therefore for them, the process of identifying with another group is easier than for strong identifiers, even after acquiring legal status. On the other hand, obtaining legal status reduces the cost of cultural group attachment: the native-born are more welcoming when they acknowledge

that immigrants have similar rights (Schachter, 2016), and therefore immigrants may feel less discriminated against (Bevelander, 2011). Moreover, when immigrants are in the host country without authorization, acquiring legal status decreases their fear of deportation, and therefore their psychological distress (Venkataramani et al., 2017; Patler and Pirtle, 2018). Accordingly, behaviors that conform to immigrants' cultural group norms become relatively less costly, and this cost decreases more for those exposed to greater threats before legalization.

When policies reduce the benefit of group attachment more than the cost, immigrants will break ties to their culture of origin. In contrast, they will reinforce those ties when the benefit decreases less than the cost. Figure 1 presents a summary of this argument, and in Appendix A, I formalize the argument with a theoretical decision model of immigrants' cultural maintenance.



(a) Benefit Decreases More than Cost

(b) Benefit Decreases Less than Cost

Notes: (a) illustrates the case in which the legalization policy decreases more the benefit than the cost of cultural group attachment, and (b) presents the case in which the cost decreases more than the benefit. The solid lines depict the scenario without legal status, and the dotted lines the scenario with legal status. The vertical lines illustrate the value of cultural identity that maximizes the utility of group attachment, given the benefit and cost.

Figure 1: Summary of Framework on Cultural Identity

I use first names given to children as a measure of immigrants' cultural identity. For immigrants and their descendants, first names are a good indicator of maintenance of cultural

identity, given that they quantify the competing influences of two cultural groups (Sue and Telles, 2007; Elchardus and Siongers, 2011). As cultural markers, given names reveal the problem that minority immigrants confront in their decision to acculturate. While parents want to maintain their culture of origin and transmit it to their children (Bisin and Verdier, 2000), they also wish to furnish them with identities that do not arouse prejudice among the majority (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Milkman, Akinola and Chugh, 2012; Quillian et al., 2017), and that can, if needed, go unremarked by the authorities. Therefore, the naming decision reveals the degree to which minority immigrants feel constrained by the host society (Alba and Nee, 2003). Unlike intermarriage and other indicators of discontinuation of cultural ties that require the consent of the native-born, the naming decision is an individual choice controlled only by the parents (Fouka, 2019, 2020).

Under this framework for immigrants' cultural identity, we would expect that unauthorized minority immigrants will consider two aspects when deciding on children's first names: the value of transmitting their culture of origin to their children, and the risks that this decision can bring about, in terms of both the social stigma that a distinctively ethnic name can trigger, and the personal worry of deportation and family separation that the exposure of their identity can evoke.

The 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program

As a case study, I use the 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA), which is the most extensive policy directed toward unauthorized immigrants in the United States since the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). On June 15, 2012, acknowledging that comprehensive immigration reform would be difficult to achieve, President Obama announced via executive order the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. The policy does not grant legal permanent immigration status nor a pathway to citizenship, but protects from deportation unauthorized immigrants who were under the age

of 31 as of June 15, 2012, by granting them a 2-year renewable deferred action status, and temporary work authorization. Additionally to the age eligibility criterion, unauthorized immigrants must have entered the U.S. under the age of 16, continuously resided in the country since June 15, 2007, be physically present at the time of application, have entered without inspection or fell out of lawful visa status before June 15, 2012, have a high school or GED degree or be enrolled in school, and have no major criminal convictions.

As of December 31, 2016, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services has granted deferred status to 770,477 people under DACA, 78% of recipients are from Mexico, which is also the single largest source of all immigrants to the U.S. both from Latin America (55%) and from the world (29%) (Barreto and Segura, 2014). Although DACA recipients arrived in the U.S. as children, many are now adults and have become parents to U.S. citizen children. At the time the policy was announced about 200,000 children had parents who were DACA-eligible (Capps, Fix and Zong, 2016). To apply for DACA, individuals have to provide documentation that they meet the eligibility criteria—passport or birth certificate from country of origin for the age eligibility criterion and school or medical records proving age of entry to the US—, and pay a processing fee of $465. About 90% of the applications that comply with the required documentation are approved (US Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2017), and roughly 83% of recipients who were eligible to renew reapplied after the first 2-year period (Mathay and McHugh, 2015).

Such a high renewal application rate may reveal the belief among recipients that the program will persist in the long-term, and accordingly that the program may have helped change their time horizons towards a future in the U.S., providing an incentive to adopt the host country's norms. Therefore, the benefit of cultural group attachment may have decreased with the program. In addition, previous studies have estimated a decline in deportation risk of 100% (Kuka, Shenhav and Shih, 2020) and that the program has reduced deportation worry and psychological distress among recipients (Venkataramani et al., 2017; Patler and Pirtle, 2018) and their children (Hainmueller et al., 2017). Accordingly, the program helped

reduce the fear of threat of deportation, and therefore the cost of displaying cultural group attachment may have decreased. Given this, we need to determine how the program affected the balance between benefits and costs of group attachment, and therefore the incentives to maintain cultural ties.

The empirical evidence I present in the following sections suggests that in the case of legalization policies of unauthorized immigrants to the U.S., the costs of displaying cultural origins decrease more than the benefits, allowing immigrants to maintain their cultural heritage, while promoting their participation with larger society.

Data and Empirical Strategy

I assess the effects of the DACA program on the integration patterns of Mexicans who represent roughly 80% of the DACA population.

Cultural Maintenance

To assess the effects on cultural maintenance, I compute a measure of ethnic distinctiveness of first names applicable to the names of children of minorities in the U.S., similar to that in previous literature (Fryer Jr and Levitt, 2004; Goldstein and Stecklov, 2016; Fouka, 2020, 2019). The measure—the Mexican Name Index (MNI)—is based on the frequency of a name among children born in the U.S. to Mexican mothers in a fixed age cohort, relative to its frequency among the total children born to Americans and to Mexicans in that same cohort.[1] The measure ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating a stronger intensity of "Mexicanness" of a particular name. Accordingly, names with high values of the MNI reveal parents' preferences to maintain their cultural heritage and identity. I present the formula to compute the MNI and explain more about its interpretation in Appendix B. The data used to compute the MNI consists of every registered birth record in Florida between 2004

[1]Throughout, I refer to Mexican-born and American-born people as "Mexican" and "American", respectively.

and 2016 from the Bureau of Vital Statistics, Florida Department of Health, and includes the date of birth and full name of child and mother, the country of birth, race and level of education of both parents, and the residential address of the mother. The data for the main analysis goes from June 15, 2012 (when DACA was announced) to December 31, 2016 (the most recent available date in the Florida birth data). However, I use data from before the program was announced (January 1, 2004 to June 14, 2012) to compute the MNI and implement placebo tests.

For the regression discontinuity (RD) design falsification tests, I use the American Community Survey (2007–2011) to construct predetermined variables that are correlated with both the naming decision and the potential to manipulate the declared birth date to be eligible for DACA. These variables are pre-DACA background characteristics at the mothers' ZIP Code of residence: median household income, percentage of the population 5 years and over who speak Spanish at home, percentage of the population who is Mexican, and the percentage of the population 18 to 24 without a high school degree. I also use the deportation rate at the mother's county of residence as a predetermined covariate. This variable is the ratio between the number of deportations under the Secure Communities Program between 2009 and the second quarter of 2012 to the number of noncitizens. The deportation data is from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse and the noncitizen population number from the ACS.

As of December 2016, the state of Florida had approved 31,656 DACA requests (80% from Mexicans) (US Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2017)—which puts Florida among the top 5 states with DACA recipients. During the main period of analysis, 30,744 children were born in Florida to Mexican mothers who reside in the U.S. for whom it is possible to compute the MNI (with names that were also given to at least one child born in the previous five years to either Mexican or American mothers). Figure C1 in Appendix C presents a map with the distribution of births from Mexican mothers across ZIP Codes. The map shows that births were geographically dispersed across the state, and with a higher concen-

tration roughly in areas with more DACA recipients: Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, and North Port-Sarasota-Bradenton. The data for the analysis on cultural maintenance contains 30,555 birth records that have information about the mother's ZIP Code and county of residence. Such information allows matching the birth records to background characteristics of the mother using the ACS ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs). However, I show that the estimated effects are substantively unchanged if I use all of the birth records (30,744), regardless if they were matched or not to background characteristics.

To analyze if the deferred action status acquired by Mexican immigrants affects their maintenance of culture of origin, I compare the Mexicanness of names given by Mexican DACA-eligible mothers to the Mexicanness of names given by Mexican non-DACA-eligible mothers by employing an RD design that leverages the DACA age eligibility criterion establishing that recipients must have been under age 31 as of June 15, 2012, and exploited in a previous study by Hainmueller et al. (2017). Under this age criterion, a person born on June 16, 1981 meets the DACA age eligibility requirement, whereas a person born on June 14, 1981 does not.

The DACA-eligibility effect on cultural maintenance is obtained by estimating the following linear equation:

$$MNI_{i,j} = \alpha + \tau DACA_i + \beta\left(dob_i - c\right) + \gamma DACA_i\left(dob_i - c\right) + \epsilon_{i,j} \tag{1}$$

where $MNI_{i,j}$ is the Mexican Name Index value of child j's name given by mother i, $(dob_i - c)$ is the running variable which measures the distance in days from mother i's date of birth (dob_i) to the DACA eligibility birth date cutoff (c) of June 15, 1981, $DACA_i$ is mother i's DACA-eligibility which takes a value of one when $dob_i \geq c$ indicating that the mother i is eligible for DACA, and a value of zero otherwise.

The DACA-eligibility effect τ captures the average change in the MNI of children born to mothers with birth dates at the DACA birth date cutoff when changing their status from

DACA-ineligible to DACA-eligible. τ is estimated by fitting Equation 1 to a sample that includes only mothers whose birth dates are within the mean squared error (MSE) optimal bandwidth around the birth date cutoff of June 15, 1981. The MSE-optimal bandwidth is obtained by employing Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014)'s adaptive bandwidth selection algorithm with default specifications.[2] The standard errors $\epsilon_{i,j}$ are clustered by mother to account for dependence of names from children born to the same mother.

Participation with Larger Society

To assess effects of the DACA program on immigrants' participation with larger society, I use measures of their ability to speak English, their participation in English language institutions (the labor market and military service), and the quality of these institutions (annual salary and health insurance coverage). The data for these measures are from the American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample (2012–2016), but I employ only data from the post-DACA period (2013 to 2016), and a subsample formed of Mexican women who are not U.S. citizens and entered the country before 2007. This subsample resembles the data I use in the analysis of effects on maintenance of culture of origin, and it contains 93,715 respondents.


Like in the analysis of cultural maintenance, I employ an RD design that exploits the DACA age eligibility criterion, but in this case, respondents' eligibility is defined only with their quarter and year of birth, given that the ACS PUMS does not include day of birth. Therefore, the running variable becomes discrete with many observations accumulated at each of the quarter-year values, and consequently under the continuity-based approach each mass point would be treated as one observation. In this case there are only 324 mass points, so the continuity-based approach may not be appropriate for the RD design given that the error of the approximation of the regression functions at the cutoff increases.

[2]The defaults are: symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth, a triangular kernel, a polynomial of order one, and a regularization term that avoids poor behavior of the resulting bandwidth selectors when the estimated biases are close to zero.

Instead, following the local randomization approach of Cattaneo, Frandsen and Titiunik (2015) I estimate the DACA-eligibility effect on participation with larger society with the difference-in-means between the outcomes of DACA-eligible and ineligible respondents inside the largest window of quarters around the birth date cutoff in which pre-DACA available characteristics (in this case year of entry to the U.S. and race) are balanced between eligible and ineligible respondents. Such window is chosen with the data-driven method of Cattaneo, Titiunik and Vazquez-Bare (2016) with default specifications, and its resulting size is four quarters around the birth date cutoff (third quarter of 1981).[3]

It is important to mention that the DACA-eligibility effect captured by this difference-in-means estimator and by $\hat{\tau}$ in Equation 1 measures the intention-to-treat effect of mothers' DACA eligibility, given that neither with the birth data nor with the ACS PUMS it is possible to know if all mothers who where born after the DACA birth date cutoff also complied with the other eligibility criteria, or afterwards applied and became DACA recipients. Moreover, among mothers who comply with the DACA age eligibility criterion, some may hold legal permanent status or already be citizens, and therefore are not affected by the policy. These two cases of non-compliance may lead to underestimating the DACA-eligibility effect. Likewise, the policy effect would be underestimated when mothers who do not comply with the age criterion manage to be eligible by manipulating their birth dates on the DACA application, but such manipulation is not also done on the birth registry or when they respond to the ACS.

[3]The defaults are: symmetric windows around the birth date cutoff which increase by the minimum possible size (one quarter), assume complete randomization to test the sharp null hypothesis with a difference-in-means under the Fisherian approach, 1,000 simulations for the calculation of Fisherian p-values in each window, and a threshold probability of 0.15 to reject the sharp null of no difference for any observation.



Notes: Lines represent the average MNI (with 95% confidence intervals) from local linear regression fitted to the sample of mothers with birth dates within the MSE-optimal symmetric bandwidth of +/- 1,332 days around the DACA eligibility cutoff. Points are the average MNI for equally spaced mimicking-variance bins. The effective sample size is 11,560.

Figure 2: DACA eligibility and naming patterns

The main result is illustrated in Figure 2 which compares the Mexicanness of names given by Mexican barely DACA-eligible mothers to the Mexicanness of names given by Mexican barely non-DACA-eligible mothers. The MNI increases by 2.51 points at the birth date cutoff where mothers become eligible for DACA. The size of this effect corresponds to an increase of 3.5% relative to the average MNI from barely DACA-ineligible mothers of 70.8, and it is equivalent to the difference amongst girls between the name "Kimberly" (an Old English-origin name) to the Latin-origin name "Valeria".

Table 1 presents the RD estimates of the effect of mothers' DACA eligibility on naming patterns. The robust bias-corrected p-value and 95% confidence interval (CI) in Row (1)

indicate that the increase of 2.51 points in the Mexicanness of names of children born to barely DACA-eligible mothers is statistically significant.[4] Row (2) adds pre-DACA control variables which include race of the mother, sociodemographic characteristics of the mother's ZIP Code of residence and the deportation rate by mother's county of residence, while Row (3) adds dummy variables for child's birth year, to account for differences on naming trends of younger mothers (the majority of the DACA-eligible) who are more likely to have children in recent years as opposed to older mothers (the majority of non-DACA-eligible). The results in Row (2) show that the DACA eligibility effect is robust to controlling for mothers' pre-DACA background characteristics—the point estimate is roughly the same as in Row (1), and the range of the confidence interval is smaller, as is expected when controlling for predetermined variables that are continuous at the cutoff. The results in Row (3) suggest that the DACA eligibility effect is robust to controlling for shocks to naming trends, which are orthogonal to the legalization policy, but that may be affecting the fashionability of a name among Mexican mothers. Differently to the sample used in previous specifications, the sample in Row (4) employs all of the records of children born to Mexican mothers in the post-DACA period (total of 30,744 birth records), instead of using only those with information about mother's ZIP Code and county of residence, for which it is possible to construct pre-DACA control variables (30,555 birth records). These results show that the DACA eligibility effect is not sensitive to removing records of children for which there is no background information of the mother's residence.[5]

[4]The robust bias-correction accounts for the bias introduced by the local approximation of the linear polynomial around the birth date cutoff, and for the variance in the estimation of that bias. Therefore, the robust-bias corrected CI is centered around the bias-corrected point estimate (τ - $\hat{\text{bias}}$) and it employs a larger standard error in contrast to the conventional one. This process of recentering and rescaling restores a valid standard normal distributional approximation when the MSE-optimal bandwidth is used (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014).

[5]Moreover, focusing on mothers within the MSE-optimal bandwidth who have children both before and after the announcement of DACA with a difference-in-differences model that controls for mother's time-invariant observed and unobserved characteristics, the DACA-eligibility effect, although noisy, has the same direction and similar magnitude: eligible mothers choose names that are 2.4% more Mexican.

Table 1: DACA-eligibility effect on naming practices

	RD estimator	SE	p-value	95% CI	MSE-optimal bandwidth	Effective N	N	Controls	Sample
				Dependent variable: MNI					
(1)	2.51	1.20	0.042	$[0.11, 5.61]$	1332	11560	30555	N	Post-DACA
(2)	2.56	1.19	0.037	$[0.17, 5.64]$	1309	11357	30555	Y	Post-DACA
(3)	2.55	1.20	0.038	$[0.16, 5.64]$	1303	11296	30555	Y_{full}	Post-DACA
(4)	2.54	1.20	0.039	$[0.14, 5.67]$	1312	11447	30744	N	Post-DACA all
	Placebo Tests			*Dependent variable:* MNI/CNI					
(5)	0.92	1.08	0.406	$[-1.46, 3.60]$	1563	14014	29395	N	Pre-DACA
(6)	-0.95	1.12	0.343	$[-3.82, 1.33]$	1327	11262	34876	N	Cubans Post-DACA
	Alternative Explanation			*Dependent variable:* Fertility					
(7)	0.01	0.01	0.232	$[-0.01, 0.04]$	1504	11861	27822	N	Post-DACA

Notes: 'RD Estimator' is from a linear regression fitted on the sample within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth of days around the birth date cutoff of June 15, 1981. 'SE' is the estimators' standard error. The 'p-value' and '95% CI' are robust bias-corrected. 'Effective N' is the size of the sample within the MSE-optimal bandwidth, and 'N' the total sample size. Controls include pre-DACA background characteristics of the mother (race, sociodemographics of mother's residence ZIP Code from 2007 to 2011, and deportation rate at mother's county of residence from 2009 to the second quarter of 2012). In Row (3), *full* controls adds dummies for child's year of birth. Except for Rows (6) and (7), the dependent variable is the Mexican Name Index (MNI) and ranges from 0 to 100. Bigger values indicate that the name is more Mexican. In Row (6) the dependent variable is the Cuban Name Index (CNI) which is the analogous to the MNI for children born in the U.S. to Cuban mothers, and in Row (7) Fertility refers to the number of births per mother during the post-DACA period. *Post-DACA* is the sample of children born to Mexican mothers during the period June 15, 2012 to December 31, 2016 and *Pre-DACA* from January 1, 2009 to June 14, 2012. *Post-DACA all* contains all of the records of children who were born in Florida to Mexican mothers, regardless of having information about the mother's ZIP Code and county of residence. *Cubans Post-DACA* is the sample of children born to Cuban mothers from June 15, 2012 to December 31, 2016. Standard errors are clustered by mother. The data are from the registered birth record from the Bureau of Vital Statistics, Florida Department of Health, the 2007-2011 American Community Survey, and TRAC Immigration.

Two placebo tests further suggest that the legalization policy is what drives immigrants' decision on cultural maintenance: Row (5) in Table 1 shows the comparison of the MNI between barely DACA-eligible and ineligible Mexican mothers who gave birth to children before the announcement of DACA (in the period between January 1, 2009 and June 14, 2012), and who therefore were not affected by the policy at the time when they registered the birth. The second placebo test, in Row (6), presents the DACA-eligibility effect on the

Cuban Name Index (CNI) of children born to Cuban mothers in the post-DACA period.[6] For the case of Florida, Cubans are a sound placebo group because their population is at least as big as the Mexican population, but they are not affected by DACA: as of December 2016 there were no Cuban DACA recipients (US Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2017), probably as a result of the U.S. policy that until January 2017 granted expedited legal permanent resident status. In both of these tests, the RD estimate is smaller in absolute terms (about three times smaller) and not statistically significant. These results rule out alternatives to DACA (confounders associated with being born just before or after the DACA cutoff date) that could explain the observed behavior of immigrant mothers towards cultural maintenance.

Furthermore, in Row (7), there is no evidence of an effect on fertility (the number of children per mother) which further suggests that the observed effect on cultural maintenance is not an artifact of an increase in the number of children born to DACA-eligible mothers[7]: both non-DACA-eligible and DACA-eligible mothers had on average 1.09 children per mother during the post-DACA period, but the latter, who are protected against deportation, and therefore face smaller costs of displaying their cultural identity, choose more Mexican names for their child.

Relatedly, there is no evidence of selection bias associated to not observing children born to DACA-ineligible mothers—either because they are deterred from having children, deported after the announcement of the program, or because lacking legal status, they decided to leave. Missing barely ineligible mothers could bias upward the DACA-eligibility effect on the MNI. Particularly, if those who leave the U.S. (or stay but decide to not have children) give more Mexican names compared to ineligible mothers who stay and have children. Figure

[6]The CNI is the MNI for Cuban names and is computed in an analogous manner.

[7]This is equivalent to saying that there is no selection problem in terms of differences between the DACA-eligible and non-DACA-eligible underlying populations and their potential outcomes. Therefore, absent an effect on fertility it is fair to compare the naming choice of DACA-eligible and non-DACA-eligible mothers by assuming that their underlying populations are the same.

D1 in Appendix D suggests that this is not the case: there are no missing barely ineligible mothers. The density of mothers is continuous at the birth date cutoff. The implausibility of such bias is further reinforced by not finding differences in mother's characteristics across ineligible and eligible samples around the birth date cutoff, as suggested in the left-hand side graph in Figure E1, which shows continuity in mother's pre-DACA characteristics at the cutoff.

The RD design falsification tests in Appendix E suggest that there is no manipulation of mothers' birth dates: there is continuity of mothers' pre-DACA background characteristics around the birth date cutoff, and the density functions for DACA-ineligible and DACA-eligible mothers at the birth date cutoff are continuous. Therefore, these tests suggest that the RD design isolates the causal effects of mothers' DACA eligibility at the birth date cutoff. Moreover, supporting the robustness of the results, there are no discontinuities in the MNI at any point other than the birth date cutoff, and the DACA-eligibility effect on the MNI is robust to the choice of bandwidth.

In summary, the results suggest that eligibility for deferred action status allows undocumented immigrants to maintain their cultural heritage and identity. In Appendix F, I show that this effect is not exclusive to the case of DACA, and that it replicates for the case of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act—a legalization policy which granted lawful permanent status and the path to citizenship to about 3 million unauthorized immigrants.

Moderators of the Legalization Policy on Cultural Maintenance

To provide evidence that the changes in naming practices as a result of gaining legal status are driven by changes in the benefits to maintaining culture of origin or the costs of displaying cultural ties, I explore the DACA-eligibility effect in groups which can be assumed to differ in either quantity. According to the framework, the DACA-eligibility effect on cultural maintenance should be larger for strong identifiers, because their higher initial benefit of cultural group attachment makes it more difficult for them to identify with the majority group,

even after acquiring legal status. Therefore we should observe DACA-eligible homogamous mothers—as strong identifiers—give more ethnically distinctive names to their children than DACA-eligible heterogamous mothers. Table 2 presents the results from comparing the DACA-eligibility effect across samples of homogamous and heterogamous mothers. The values of the RD estimator indicate that indeed the effect on the Mexicanness of children's names is bigger for mothers with Mexican spouses (Row (1)) than for mothers with non-Mexican spouses (Row (2)). Similarly, the DACA-eligibility effect on cultural maintenance should be larger for those in areas exposed to higher deportation threats, because the pre-legalization cost of cultural group attachment is higher there. Accordingly, we should observe DACA-eligible mothers in counties with a high pre-DACA deportation rate give more ethnically distinctive names to their children (even if the risk of deportation comes primarily from broader cultural maintenance practices). Rows (3) and (4) in Table 2 compare the DACA-eligibility effect across the sample of mothers in counties with a pre-DACA deportation rate above the median and the sample of mothers in counties with a deportation rate below the median. As expected, those who are exposed to a higher threat of deportation give more Mexican names to their children (Row (3) vs. Row (4)). These results suggest that acquiring legal status affects the choice of cultural maintenance by altering the balance between benefits and costs of cultural group attachment.

A second alternative explanation to the empirical results is that the legalization policy intensifies discrimination against those who get legal status and then seek to integrate into broader society: absent the possibility to hide their identifying ethnic characteristics (Fearon, 2013), they retreat into their own community. Although it is unlikely that discrimination is driven by economic factors because the number of DACA recipients entering the labor market is small and their skills are complementary to those of the native-born workers (Peri and Sparber, 2009), a discriminatory reaction could still have occurred as the majority group sought to protect its traditional values (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). However, as presented in the next section, such a retreat seems unlikely to have occurred given that

Table 2: Moderators of DACA-eligibility on naming practices

	Dependent variable: MNI							
	RD estimator	SE	p-value	95% CI	MSE-optimal bandwidth	Effective N	N	Sample
(1)	3.67	1.30	0.007	$[1.12, 7.05]$	1250	8034	21609	Homogamous
(2)	-1.00	2.63	0.686	$[-7.48, 4.92]$	1705	2998	6957	Heterogamous
(3)	4.68	1.83	0.015	$[1.01, 9.43]$	1107	4630	15090	High Deportation
(4)	0.98	1.50	0.564	$[-2.50, 4.58]$	1722	7575	15465	Low Deportation
(5)	4.18	1.55	0.010	$[1.11, 8.19]$	1431	5917	15173	High % Mexicans
(6)	0.97	1.67	0.502	$[-2.57, 5.24]$	1444	6476	15382	Low % Mexicans

Notes: 'RD Estimator' is from a linear regression fitted on the sample within the symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth of days around the birth date cutoff of June 15, 1981. 'SE' refers to the estimators standard error. The 'p-value' and '95% CI' are robust bias-corrected. 'Effective N' refers to the size of the sample within the MSE-optimal bandwidth, and 'N' to the total sample size. The dependent variable is the Mexican Name Index (MNI) and ranges from 0 to 100. Bigger values indicate that the name is more Mexican. *Homogamous* comprises the sample of children born to Mexican mothers with Mexican spouses, *Heterogamous* sample of children born to Mexican mothers with non-Mexican spouses, *High Deportation* sample of children born to Mexican mothers who reside in counties with a deportation rate above the median (defined as number of deportations under the Secure Communities Program from 2009 to the second quarter of 2012 over non-citizen population), *Low Deportation* sample of children born to Mexican mothers who reside in counties with a deportation rate below the median, *High % Mexicans* sample of children born to Mexican mothers who reside in ZIP Codes with a proportion of Mexicans above the median, and *Low % Mexicans* mothers who reside in ZIP Codes with a proportion of Mexicans below the median. Standard errors are clustered by mother. The data are from the registered birth record from the Bureau of Vital Statistics, Florida Department of Health, the 2007-2011 American Community Survey, and TRAC Immigration.

DACA-eligible women gain English-language proficiency, which indicates a greater ability to integrate into the larger society.

Another alternative comes from Bisin and Verdier (2000)'s model on the intergenerational transmission of cultural traits. Bisin and Verdier (2000)'s framework assumes that parents wish to transmit their own traits to their children, that their children's identity is determined by the interaction between the direct socialization effort of parents and the indirect influence of the larger society, and that parents who belong to the same cultural group are better at socializing their children. A prediction of this model is that members of the minority group in areas in which their group is smaller relative to the size of the majority will invest more into

socializing their children to transmit to them their own cultural traits. Under this framework, we should observe DACA-eligible mothers who live in areas in which their cultural group is smaller give more ethnically distinctive names to their children than DACA-eligible mothers in areas in which their cultural group represents a larger fraction of the population. The results presented in Rows (5) and (6) in Table 2 suggest to the contrary, that the DACA-eligibility effect on the Mexicanness of children names is bigger for mothers in ZIP Codes with a proportion of Mexicans above the sample's median (Row (5)) than for mothers who live in ZIP Codes with a fraction of Mexicans below the median (Row (6)). Therefore, there is no indication that minority immigrants maintain their cultural identity because they invest more in their children's' socialization to prevent the influence of larger society.

Moreover, consistent with the *Politics of In-between* argument which states that immigrants' capacity to participate in the host country is constrained by the cost of disloyalty to the ingroup (Jones-Correa, 1998), such reinforcement of cultural ties may be a way to avoid discrimination from members of the cultural group of origin by communicating to them their belonging to the group, even though their future in the host country has been extended, while others may be left behind.

A final alternative interpretation is suggested by Brewer (1991)'s model of optimal distinctiveness. In Brewer (1991)'s framework, individuals desire to attain an optimal balance of inclusion and distinctiveness within and between social groups, and therefore identification with one's own cultural group is the result of these two opposing needs—when there is too much inclusion in the majority group, there is a need for cultural distinctiveness. Accordingly, when minority immigrants are recognized by authorities and the larger society with legal status, they will assert their cultural heritage. However, testing these last two theories is left for future research.

Effects of the Legalization Policy on Participation with Larger Society

So far the estimated results suggest that legalization of immigrants allows them to maintain their cultural heritage and identity. Does this mean that policies may be promoting the formation of ethnic enclaves and contributing to the so called "challenge" (Huntington, 2010) posed by immigrants' resistance to the English language? Or, to the contrary, are legalization policies helping immigrants enter mainstream societal institutions while allowing them to maintain and feel comfortable with their cultural identity? In this section, I assess (using data from the ACS PUMS and employing an RD design under the local randomization approach) the effect of the DACA program on immigrants' ability to speak English—an important determinant of participation with the institutions of the host society among Mexican immigrants (Barreto and Muñoz, 2003), and on their participation in the labor market and military service.

The RD estimates in Table 3 suggest that among women who report speaking Spanish at home (100% of respondents in the sample), those that are DACA-eligible are recorded to speak English better—a difference of 8.7% with respect to the average DACA-ineligible woman. With regards to economic integration, DACA eligibility has a positive effect on the rate of employment (6.5% increase), salary (5%) and health insurance coverage (3%), and in terms of civic engagement, on average more DACA-eligible women are on active duty in the military, although the effect is substantively small: 0.12% compared to the average of DACA-ineligible women inside the window of four quarters around the birth date cutoff in which local randomization is assumed to hold. Since the number of respondents inside such window is large (about 5,023), in this case, I focus on large-sample approximations for inference. The large-sample p-value associated to the effect on ability to speak English and employment status is below the significance level of 0.05, whereas the DACA eligibility effect on military service is only statistically significant at the 10% level. The effects on annual

Table 3: DACA-eligibility effect on measures of participation with larger society

	Dependent variable	RD estimator	Finite sample p-value	Finite sample 95% CI	Large sample p-value	Effective N	N
(1)	English ability	0.032	0.016	$[0.010, 0.050]$	0.019	5023	93715
(2)	Employment status	0.028	0.035	$[0.000, 0.050]$	0.049	5023	93715
(3)	Annual salary	407.216	0.347	$[-400, 1000]$	0.340	5023	93715
(4)	Health insurance	0.012	0.344	$[-0.010, 0.040]$	0.368	5023	93715
(5)	Military service	0.001	0.116	$[0.000, 0.002]$	0.083	5023	93715

Note: The 'RD estimator' under the local randomization approach assumes complete randomization inside the window in which pre-DACA available characteristics are balanced across groups, and is the difference-in-means between DACA-eligible and ineligible respondents inside that window. The size of the window is four quarters around the cutoff. Respondents with birthdays $\leq$ Q2 1981 are DACA-ineligible and with birthdays $\geq$ Q3 1981 are DACA-eligible. 'Finite sample p-value' and 'Finite sample 95% CI' correspond to the Fisherian inference framework, a randomization-based method which tests a sharp null hypothesis of no effect for any unit. The 'Large sample p-value' corresponds to the Neyman approach, a normal approximation method that tests the null hypothesis of no difference in means. 'Effective N' is the number of observations inside the window, and 'N' the total number of observations in the sample. Among those who report to speak Spanish at home, *English Ability* takes value 1 if the respondent speaks English very well or well, and value 0 if she does not speak well or does not speak at all, *Employment status* takes value 1 if the respondent is employed, and value 0 if unemployed or not in the labor force, *Annual salary* is wages or salary income in the past 12 months, *Health insurance* takes value 1 if respondent has health insurance coverage, and value 0 otherwise, and *Military service* takes value 1 if respondent has been on active duty in the military, and value 0 if has never served in the military. The data are from the 2012–2016 American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample, and the sample is comprised of Mexican women, who are not U.S. citizens, who entered the country before 2007, and who responded to the survey during the post-DACA period (2013–2016).

salary and health insurance coverage are not statistically significant at conventional levels.[8]

[8]Nevertheless, the results are similar with finite sample randomization-based inference. For example, the Fisherian 95% confidence interval for the DACA eligibility effect on ability to speak English suggests that assuming complete randomization of respondents to DACA eligibility inside the four quarters window around the birth date cutoff and a constant treatment effect model, all DACA-eligibility effects between 0.01 and 0.05 fail to be rejected with a randomization-based 5%-level test. In other words, the evidence based on a local randomization RD framework is consistent with positive true effects of DACA-eligibility on ability to speak English. Likewise, for the other measures of integration, the Fisherian 95% confidence

Falsification tests presented in Appendix G provide evidence to support the RD local randomization assumptions within the window used in the main analysis (of four quarters around the birth date cutoff), and therefore suggest that the design identifies the effects of DACA eligibility within this window.

These results provide evidence of economic integration and civic engagement of immigrants when they are granted work authorization and protection from deportation. Moreover, specifically among Mexican immigrants who maintain their cultural heritage by speaking Spanish at home, those who acquire legal status invest more in establishing relationships with the dominant group by also learning English.

Two potential channels can explain why the legalization policy affects immigrants' participation with larger society: instrumentally, a legal status grants immigrants access to better jobs either because it signals to employers an investment in local human capital, such as ability to speak the host country's language, or because employers have incentives to hire individuals with lower probability of return migration (Bevelander and DeVoretz, 2008) or attracting legal trouble. These labor-market opportunities create the incentives for immigrants to invest in skills that facilitate their labor mobility—learning the host country's language, for example. Also, the opportunity to enter a broader labor market fosters common institutions that bring together members of different cultural groups, promoting inter-group relationships that will be intimately tied up with immigrants' life in the host country. Psychologically, a legal status affects immigrants' sense of security and self-efficacy, empowering them to search for better jobs or demand higher wages. Also, it may increase immigrants' sense of belonging given that they are recognized by state authorities and the rooted society. A stronger sense of belonging may increase immigrants' willingness to invest in local human capital like language acquisition (Dancygier and Laitin, 2014). Furthermore, a legal status may change the majority's attitudes towards recognizing immigrants more as their equals (Aptekar, 2015), and therefore decrease immigrants' feelings of being a discriminated group,

interval suggest non-negative true effects on employment and military service, and either negative or positive true effects on salary and health insurance.

leading them to increase their social interactions with the larger society.

Conclusion

In this paper, I showed that granting legal status to immigrants allows them to maintain their culture of origin (by naming practices), promoting their participation with larger society (by learning English, participating in the labor market, and even possibly joining the military). I explained these results with a framework of immigrants' choice of cultural identity that reconciles findings from previous studies with the present results, by characterizing the contexts in which minority immigrants will strengthen or weaken their ties to culture of origin. I provided evidence to support that immigrants will strengthen their ties to culture when the costs of cultural group attachment decrease more than the benefits, by showing that immigrants who are granted legal status, and whose benefits of group attachment are hardly affected (mothers with spouses from the same country of origin), or whose costs are quite changed (mothers in counties with high deportation rates), will reinforce their cultural group attachment.

Altogether, the present findings indicate that integration (participation with cultural maintenance, under Kymlicka (1995)'s definition) is an acculturation strategy available to minority immigrants to the U.S., and therefore, multiculturalism can be construed not as accepting marginalization of immigrant groups, but as seeking integration on better terms. Accordingly, immigrant legalization policies (which remove constraints on the opportunities of the undocumented and their kin), paired with multiculturalist policies (designed to accommodate diversity within common institutions) may promote full participation of immigrants in their host countries, while assimilationist policies may not. However, we must acknowledge that these policies can cause a backlash amongst non-immigrant groups, and therefore can create ethnic tensions which in turn, would inhibit integration. But failure to adopt such policies may instead directly lead to immigrants' marginalization. In any case, if

the problem is not with the willingness of immigrants to integrate, but rather the backlash against immigrant multiculturalism amongst the native-born citizens, then the problem that needs to be addressed is the attitudes of the majority, not the demands of the immigrants who are contributing to their host societies.

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Appendices

A A Decision Model on Cultural Maintenance

Consider a community that receives undocumented Mexican immigrants. Each immigrant i becomes mother to one child and chooses a first name $\eta \in [0, 1]$ for that child. The continuous value η represents the ethnic content of the name such that higher values reflect more Mexican distinctive names. The utility from chosen name η depends on the degree to which immigrant i benefits from maintaining her culture of origin, and on her fear of deportation and feelings of being discriminated against, given her revealed identity:

$$u_i(\eta, \alpha) = \iota_i(\eta, \alpha) - c_i(\eta, \alpha) \tag{2}$$

where $u_i(\cdot)$ is continuously differentiable in both arguments, η and α. The partial derivative of $\iota_i(\cdot)$ with respect to η is positive, $\iota_{i\eta}(\cdot) > 0$, reflecting the positive self-concept of asserting her identity by choosing a distinctively Mexican name for her child. Low values of η generate psychological costs (or a loss of sense of self) from failing to conform to her own group identity. Similarly, the partial derivative of $c_i(\cdot)$ with respect to η is positive, $c_{i\eta}(\cdot) > 0$ suggesting the increased fear of deportation from exposing her identity, and the distaste of the dominant group for those with distinctively Mexican first names.

The parameter α captures the legal status of i, and enters in both $\iota_i(\cdot)$ and $c_i(\cdot)$ by multiplying η. A legal status shifts i's horizons towards a long-term future in the host country, and expresses recognition from the state and the larger society, affecting her perception of membership of a new social group—the rooted society—, and therefore reducing the psychological cost from deviating from her cultural identity. In this case, the cross partial derivative of $\iota_i(\cdot)$ with respect to η and α is negative $\iota_{i\eta\alpha}(\cdot) < 0$, suggesting that the benefit of maintaining cultural identity decreases when acquiring a legal status in the host country. Mothers who are more attached to their cultural identity, and therefore have a stronger preference

for transmitting their own cultural traits—for example, those who marry someone from the same cultural group compared to those who marry heterogamously— experience a higher psychological cost from failing to conform to their cultural identity. Thus, for mother i who marries homogamously the value of $\iota_{i\eta\alpha}(\cdot)$ is smaller in absolute terms than for a mother who marries heterogamously. In other words, the decrease in the benefit of maintaining cultural identity when acquiring legal status is smaller for homogamous mothers.

On the other hand, with protection against deportation i is less afraid of expressing her cultural identity, and she may feel less discriminated against, given that a legal status grants her recognition of state authorities and the rooted society. From the perspective of the larger society, granting legal status to i may lead them to recognize her more as their equal,[9] and therefore if i feels less discriminated against by the rooted society she may perceive a lower risk of attachment to her cultural group. Accordingly, the cross partial derivative of $c_i(\cdot)$ with respect to η and α is negative $c_{i\eta\alpha}(\cdot) < 0$, suggesting that risks of maintaining cultural identity decrease when acquiring a legal status.

The equilibrium $\eta^* \in [0, 100]$ solves

$$\iota_{i\eta}(\eta, \alpha) - c_{i\eta}(\eta, \alpha) = 0 \tag{3}$$

Comparative statics on Equation 3 with respect to α help analyze how policies granting legal status to minority immigrants affect their decision on first names for children:

$$\frac{d\eta}{d\alpha} = -\frac{\iota_{i\eta\alpha}(\cdot) - c_{i\eta\alpha}(\cdot)}{\iota_{i\eta\eta}(\cdot) - c_{i\eta\eta}(\cdot)} \tag{4}$$

where $\iota_{i\eta\eta}(\cdot) - c_{i\eta\eta}(\cdot) < 0$, given that $u_i(\cdot)$ is a concave function and Equation 3 is an equilibrium. By assumption, $\iota_{i\eta\alpha}(\cdot) < 0$ and $c_{i\eta\alpha}(\cdot) < 0$. Thus, when $\iota_{i\eta\alpha}(\cdot) - c_{i\eta\alpha}(\cdot) < 0$—

[9] A conjoint experiment that asks white Americans to select preferred neighbors and indicate interest in friendship with hypothetical immigrant-origin individuals shows that they are more receptive to relationships with immigrants that become citizens or that are legal than with undocumented immigrants (Schachter, 2016).

with legal status the reduction in i's benefit of maintaining her cultural identity is bigger than the reduction in risks of exposing her cultural traits—we would expect i to choose a less distinctive Mexican name for her child. Alternatively, when $\iota_{i\eta\alpha}(\cdot) - c_{i\eta\alpha}(\cdot) > 0$—the fear of threat of deportation and feelings of discrimination from exposing cultural identity decrease more than the psychological cost of weakening cultural ties—we would expect i to choose a more distinctive Mexican name.

B Mexican Name Index (MNI)

To capture the choice of immigrants to maintain their culture of origin, I follow previous literature and compute a measure of ethnic distinctiveness of first names applicable to the names of children of minorities in the U.S. (Fryer Jr and Levitt, 2004; Goldstein and Stecklov, 2016; Fouka, 2020, 2019). The measure is called the Mexican Name Index (MNI) and is based on the frequency of a name among Mexicans in a fixed cohort, relative to its frequency among the population composed by Americans (the majority group) and Mexicans (the minority group of interest) in that same cohort. The group, either American or Mexican, is defined by the mother's country of birth. The MNI defines the intensity of ethnic content of a particular name in birth cohort c as

$$MNI_{name,c} = \frac{\Pr(name|Mexican, c)}{\Pr(name|Mexican, c) + \Pr(name|American, c)} \times 100 \tag{5}$$

and it ranges from 0 to 100. A value of zero denotes that a name is never used among children born to Mexican mothers while a value of 100 implies that a name is never present among children born to American mothers. Names that are pronounced the same but spelled differently are treated as distinct names. If Mexicans and Americans are equally likely to choose a name, the MNI takes value of 50, which captures that the name is not distinctively Mexican if it is popular as well among Americans, even if it is a Mexican-sounding name. Instead, the name is considered as neutral. Therefore, for children born to Mexican mothers,

a higher value of the MNI indicates a stronger intensity of *Mexicanness* of a particular name, and accordingly it reveals the mothers' preference to maintain their cultural heritage and identity.

To capture what Mexican mothers perceive as an ethnically distinctive name at the point of choosing their child's name and to avoid contamination from changes in naming practices in later generations, for every year of birth the information to compute the index comes only from the birth data of children born five years before that year. Table B1 presents the names of children born to Mexican mothers in the pre-DACA period (from January 1, 2009 to June 14, 2012) with the highest and lowest MNI. The highest scoring names are either Spanish origin names like Ximena and Gerardo, or names that are popular in Mexico like Dayana and Brayan, which are Spanish phonetic spellings of the names Diana and Brian (or Bryan), respectively. On the other hand, mothers who choose more Mexican names have lower attained education levels, live in poorer neighborhoods, and among a larger Mexican community as shown in Table B2, which presents the linear relationship between naming practices and background characteristics of mothers who gave birth during the pre-DACA period.

Table B1: Most and Least Mexican names

Most Mexican		Least Mexican	
Name	MNI	Name	MNI
Girls			
Dayana	99.45	Sophia	30.25
Ximena	99.37	Isabella	34.26
Lizbeth	99.09	Abigail	36.43
Guadalupe	99.07	Kaylee	45.58
Alondra	98.55	Victoria	49.14
Boys			
Brayan	99.80	Ethan	17.73
Yahir	99.42	Jacob	19.66
Gerardo	97.76	Jayden	21.95
Axel	97.60	Matthew	28.07
Jesus	97.59	Michael	32.83


Notes: The table shows the value of the Mexican Name Index (MNI) for the 5 most and least Mexican distinctive names among children born in Florida to Mexican mothers before the announcement of DACA (January 1, 2009 to June 14, 2012). The ranking accounts for names that appear at least 50 times in this sample. The data are from the registered birth record from the Bureau of Vital Statistics, Florida Department of Health.

Table B2: Naming patterns and background characteristics

	Dependent variable:
	Mexican Name Index (MNI)
Education	−4.284
	(0.154)
Median income ZIP	−0.00005
	(0.00002)
Deportation Rate	−46.896
	(27.934)
% Speak Spanish ZIP	−0.018
	(0.011)
% Mexican ZIP	0.125
	(0.017)
Observations	29,135

Notes: The table shows estimated coefficients from the linear regression of Mexican Name Index (MNI) on background characteristics of the mother. Clustered standard errors by mother are shown in parenthesis. *MNI* ranges from 0 to 100, higher values indicate a more Mexican name. *Education* is an ordinary 8 category variable for mother's level of education, *Median income ZIP* is the median household income at the mother's residence ZIP Code, *Deportation rate* is the number of deportations under the Secure Communities Program over the non citizen population at the mother's county of residence, *% Speak Spanish ZIP* is the percentage of the population 5 years and over in the mother's residence ZIP code who speak Spanish at home, and *% Mexican ZIP* is the percentage of the population at the mother's residence ZIP Code who is Mexican. The sample includes mothers who gave birth during the pre-DACA period (January 1, 2009 to June 14, 2012). The names data and mother's education are from the registered birth record from the Bureau of Vital Statistics, Florida Department of Health, ZIP Code-level characteristics from the 2007-2011 American Community Survey, and deportation data from TRAC Immigration.


C Additional Figures



Notes: Colors correspond to the deciles of the distribution of number of births from Mexican mothers as a percentage of the total number of births in a ZIP Code from June 15, 2012 to December 31, 2016.

Figure C1: Births by Mexican mothers in Florida

D Continuity of Density of Mothers at the Birth Date Cutoff




Notes: The graph shows the density of mothers around the DACA age eligibility cutoff, and test for continuity of the density at the cutoff using local quadratic polynomial density estimators and robust bias-corrected inference. The sample includes only observations within the MSE-optimal bandwidth used in the estimation of DACA-eligibility effects on the MNI.

Figure D1: Density of mothers around the DACA age eligibility cutoff

E RD Design Falsification Tests Under the Continuity-Based Approach

Two conditions are necessary to causally identify the policy effect under the continuity-based approach of the RD design: the birth date cutoff needs to be an arbitrary date, and mothers' birth dates may not be manipulated. When these two conditions hold, all available covariates that would be expected to be correlated with naming practices and with eligibility for DACA under manipulation of the age-eligibility criterion should be continuous around the birth date cutoff. What's more, the density of mothers' birth dates should be continuous around the birth date cutoff. The left-hand side graph in Figure E1 shows that indeed mothers' pre-DACA background characteristics are continuous at the birth date cutoff. At




Notes: The graph on the left tests for continuity of mothers' pre-DACA background characteristics using a local linear regression with a symmetric MSE-optimal bandwidth of days around the DACA eligibility cutoff. The vertical line indicates a p-value = 0.15. The graph on the right tests for manipulation of mothers' birth dates using local polynomial density estimators for continuity of the density functions at the cutoff.

Figure E1: Tests for manipulation of mothers' birth dates

the same time, the right-hand side graph provides no evidence of manipulation of mothers' birth dates—the density functions for DACA-ineligible and DACA-eligible mothers at the birth date cutoff are continuous, and the test-statistic under the null of no manipulation has a p-value = 0.79,[10] providing evidence that DACA-ineligible mothers born just before the birth date cutoff are exchangeable with DACA-eligible mothers born just after the cutoff, and therefore, that the RD design does in fact identify the causal effect of DACA eligibility at the birth date cutoff.

The presence of discontinuities on the MNI away from the birth date cutoff would cast doubt on the RD design, and therefore the left-hand side graph in Figure E2 tests for this possibility, using placebo cutoffs that incrementally decrease or increase by 100 days away from the cutoff. The graph exhibits a few placebo cutoffs where the point estimate of the

[10]These falsification tests employ the local polynomial density estimators proposed in Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2019).



Notes: The graph on the left tests for discontinuities away from the birth date cutoff with placebo cutoffs that incrementally decrease or increase by 100 days away from the birth date cutoff, and the graph on the right for sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth. MSE stands for mean squared error optimal bandwidth and CER refers to a bandwidth that minimizes the coverage error from the robust bias corrected confidence intervals obtained with the MSE-optimal bandwidth.

Figure E2: Robustness tests

effect on MNI is larger than the actual birth date cutoff. However, it shows that the only cutoff with a statistically significant discontinuity on the MNI is the actual cutoff. Moreover, the right-hand side graph illustrates that the DACA-eligibility effect on the MNI is robust to the choice of bandwidth. Choosing an MSE-optimal bandwidth, twice or half as big as the MSE-optimal, or a CER bandwidth, twice or half as big as the CER, barely changes the estimated causal effect.[11]

[11] A CER bandwidth is a bandwidth that minimizes the coverage error from the robust bias corrected confidence intervals obtained with the MSE-optimal bandwidth.


F Effect of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act on Cultural Maintenance

In this section, I show that the response of minority immigrants to acquiring legal status by reinforcing their cultural heritage and identity is not exclusive to the case of DACA. Specifically, I find evidence in the same direction for the case of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) which was passed and signed into law by Ronald Reagan on November 6, 1986 to enhance the controls on the hiring of unauthorized immigrants, but that also granted lawful permanent status and the path to citizenship to about 3 million undocumented immigrants (87% Hispanics) between the years of 1987 and 1990. With data about every child born in California from 1970 to 1995 (over thirteen million births) drawn from the *California Birth Index, 1905-1995* of the California Office of Health Information and Research[12], I compute the same measure of intensity of ethnic content of first names but for the names of children born to Hispanic mothers—the Hispanic Name Index (HNI)—, and estimate the effect of the policy with a difference-in-differences model that compares the "Hispanicness" of names given by Hispanic mothers to the "Whiteness" of names given by White mothers before and after the passage of the 1986 IRCA.

The change in the ethnic maintenance pattern of Hispanics is illustrated in Figure F1, which suggests that after the IRCA is signed into law Hispanic mothers choose more ethnically distinctive names for their children. The figure also shows that the parallel-trends assumption holds. Table F1 presents the estimated coefficients from the difference-in-differences model. Column (1) shows the comparison between Hispanics and Whites across cohorts born before and after the legalization policy. Column (2) introduces year of birth and ethnicity fixed effects and Column (3) adds county of birth fixed effects. To account

[12]Each birth record in this dataset is an abstract of a person's birth certificate that only includes date of birth, child's full name, county of birth, gender, and mother's maiden name. To have information on the ethnic origin of the children, I predict the race of the mother by applying the method in Imai and Khanna (2016).

for differences in naming trends between Hispanics and Whites, Column (4) introduces linear ethnicity trends and Column (5) adds also county of birth fixed effects. Across model specifications the interaction coefficient reflects an increase in the HNI of children born to Hispanic mothers after the passage of the IRCA.



Notes: The figure plots the mean HNI by semester of birth for California-born children to Hispanic mothers (dark line) and to White mothers (light line). The vertical line corresponds to November 6, 1986, the day when the IRCA was signed into law. The data are from the California Birth Index, 1905-1995.

Figure F1: IRCA and naming patterns across Hispanics and Whites

Table F1: The 1986 IRCA effect on naming practices


	Dependent variable: HNI				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Hispanic	3.110				
	(0.031)				
Born after	−3.201				
Nov 6, 1986	(0.020)				
Hispanic ×	1.757	1.842	1.700	1.626	1.622
Born after Nov 6, 1986	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Observations	8,623,546	8,623,546	8,623,546	8,623,546	8,623,546
Adjusted R^2	0.010	0.011	0.017	0.011	0.017
Year of birth FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ethnicity FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
County of birth FE	N	N	Y	N	Y
Linear ethnicity trends	N	N	N	Y	Y

Notes: The data consist of children born in California between 1980 and 1995 to Hispanic and White mothers. Children are assigned the ethnicity of the mother. Data are from the California Birth Index, 1905-1995. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in all columns.

G RD Design Falsification Tests Under the Local Randomization Approach

Within the window used in the main analysis in which pre-DACA characteristics are balanced across DACA eligible and ineligible respondents (of four quarters around the birth date cutoff), the number of observations just above the cutoff (2445) is roughly similar to the number of observations just below the cutoff (2578), and the *p-value* of a binomial test with probability of success equal to 1/2 is 0.063, suggesting that respondents' DACA eligibility is as if assigned with a coin toss. Secondly, there is no statistical evidence of imbalance of predetermined covariates across DACA eligible and ineligible respondents. As shown in Figure G1 (left side), the *p-values* of a difference-in-means test within the window where

DACA eligibility is assumed to be randomly assigned are all bigger than 0.15. Finally, Figure G1 (right side) illustrates that the results on ability to speak English and employment status are not sensitive to the choice of window.



Notes: The graph on the left tests for difference in means of predetermined covariates across DACA eligible and ineligible respondents within the window used in the main analysis. The vertical line indicates a $p-value = 0.15$. The graph on the right for sensitivity to the choice of window by considering windows of two, three and four quarters around the birth date cutoff ($-/+$2Qtr, $-/+$3Qtr, $-/+$4Qtr).

Figure G1: Falsification analysis