Can Evidence-Based Information Shift Preferences Towards Trade Policy? *

Laura Alfaro
Harvard Business School, NBER and CEPR

Maggie X. Chen
George Washington University

Davin Chor
Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth and NBER

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Abstract

We investigate the role of evidence-based information in shaping individuals' preferences for trade policies, through a series of survey experiments that contain randomized information treatments. Each treatment provides a concise statement of economics research findings on how openness to trade has affected labor market outcomes or prices. Across annual surveys from 2018-2022, each administered to a representative sample of the US general population, we find that information on the impacts of trade influences trade policy preferences in complex ways. Information highlighting the link between trade and manufacturing job losses significantly raises expressed preferences for more limits on trade; this tendency is only partially offset if respondents receive additional information describing the accompanying expansion in non-manufacturing jobs. Strikingly (and rather paradoxically), information on the price benefits of trade (or the cost of tariffs) also induces protectionist policy choices. Our exploration of underlying mechanisms shows that these effects are driven in part by how the received information interacts with respondents' priors, including their perceptions of the economic impact of trade, social concerns, political identity, as well as concerns over trade with China. The findings indicate that individuals' preferences over trade policies are not formed in isolation from the identity of the key countries that the U.S. is trading with, so information that focuses solely on communicating the benefits of trade is unlikely to succeed unless it addresses broader concerns tied to U.S.-China relations.

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1 Introduction

The economic impact of globalization has been a central issue commanding the attention of politicians and policymakers in many developed countries. In the U.S., for example, concerns over how openness to trade might affect jobs and wages have been aired since the early 1990s, and intensified following China's accession to the WTO in 2001.[1] These concerns have sowed the seeds for a backlash against globalization, amid the continuing decline in manufacturing sector employment (see Colantone et al., 2022).[2] Many political actors have tapped into these grievances in campaigns and crusades; recent examples include the Brexit episode in the U.K., the U.S.-China trade war, and the broad calls for export restrictions at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. Often, these campaigns have operated by disseminating political messaging that calls for protectionist measures, rather than communicating evidence-based information on the benefits and costs of openness to trade.

In this paper, we investigate whether and how *evidence-based* information on the gains and losses from trade can influence individuals' preferences towards trade policy. Can information derived from research, communicated in a concise and accessible manner, shift people's views and preferences for trade protection? Understanding how information might shape these policy preferences is critical and urgent in the current information environment. The spread of mobile devices and the rise of social media have substantially lowered the cost of disseminating information, and political actors now regularly use digital platforms to reach out to the public, more often than not with messaging that is anti-globalization in nature. Economists have traditionally viewed trade policy preferences as being driven by whether or not openness to trade aligns with one's economic self-interests (see for example the surveys in Baldwin 1989 and Rodrik 1995). Researchers have more recently pointed to how concerns about the impact on broader society (Mansfield and Mutz 2009), or one's political identity (Grossman and Helpman 2021), can also shape these preferences. By contrast, less is known about how the information that the public is exposed to can in turn affect views towards trade at the individual level and the types of trade policies that get adopted at the country level.[3] From an empirical standpoint, a central challenge lies in the

1. During the mid-1990s, a debate emerged with some economists arguing that trade with low-income countries was responsible for low unskilled wages and increased inequality in developed countries (see Wood, 1995). Others considered instead the role of within-industry specialization and evidence from the factor content of trade to argue that the effect of trade on wage inequality was quantitatively small relative to other potential forces (see Krugman 1995, 2000, Lawrence 1998). For follow-up on this debate, see Krugman (2005), Lawrence (2007), among others.

2. The Global Trade Alert tracks government policies affecting world trade, foreign investment and migration; see https://www.globaltradealert.org.

3. An exception in the literature is Ponzetto et al. (2020) who examine how information can affect support for protectionism in a model setting in which information acquisition is costly.

need to distinguish the effect of information from those of alternative forces, including the possibility that individuals choose their information sources based on their self-interests and pre-existing beliefs.

We address this issue by developing a series of survey experiments, conducted annually on a representative sample of U.S. participants from 2018-2022, that contain randomized information treatments providing a concise summary of evidence established by economic researchers on the gains and losses from trade. By randomizing these treatments across a representative pool of respondents drawn from the general population, the experiment enables us to establish the causal impact of specific information on respondents' subsequent preferences over policies. We focus on evidence-based information, drawing in particular on the body of studies investigating the effects of U.S.-China trade on both labor markets and goods prices, to examine whether communicating such knowledge – that is in principle more objective in nature – can move the policy preferences of a general member of the public. With this question in mind, our work differs from other studies (reviewed in Section 2) which assess individuals' reactions to hypothetical scenarios or statements crafted to illustrate the effects of trade.

Across the various rounds of the survey we administered, we maintained a consistent question format. The survey consists of four main parts, namely: (i) a background section that solicits respondents' demographic characteristics, as well as socioeconomic and political beliefs; (ii) a treatment section that offers evidence-based information on one aspect of the consequences of trade liberalization, either on jobs or on prices; (iii) a post-treatment section that solicits respondents' preferences over economic policies, including trade-related policies; and (iv) a final section that validates how well the participants engaged with the survey and solicits explanations to selected trade policy choices. In all, we have collected responses from around 20,000 participants over time that are representative of the U.S. general population. The relatively long time span of the survey allows us to corroborate our findings over 5 years' of data, in spite of this being a period of unprecedented disruptions to the global economy and fast-changing political developments.

Zooming in on the core part of the survey, namely the randomized information, each treatment group received a concise piece of information on a specific employment or price effect of trade that has been found to be quantitatively important in economics research, in particular, by the recent influential literature on the impacts of the "China Trade Shock". More specifically, the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment provides a statement of the main finding from Autor et al. (2013) that the rise in imports from China hurt the labor market outcomes of manufacturing workers in the U.S. The "Trade Helps Jobs" treatment offers a description of how the growth in imports of goods from China led the U.S. to specialize more in its

service sectors, as established by Caliendo et al. (2019), with the expansion in service sector jobs in turn driving an increase in total jobs in the U.S. economy. The "Trade Helps Prices" treatment highlights how the rise in imports from China led to lower prices, both for durable goods (such as computers, electrical products, and furniture) and non-durable goods (such as apparel). In a converse version, the "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatment describes the findings from Amiti et al. (2019) which show that the tariffs imposed in 2018, particularly on imports from China, raised the prices of tariff-related goods and lowered U.S. real income. While the above narratives build upon evidence on the varying effects of the "China Trade Shock", we also seek to isolate the role of "China" from the role of "trade", by conducting several counterpart "sans China" treatments that present similar information but remove the direct mention of "China".

To make the information as accessible as possible to the general public, each of the narratives is written in simplified, comparable text that eliminates technical jargon, and also includes a figure that visually illustrates the key trends over time with regard to employment or price outcomes. It should be stressed that each of the narratives is evidence-based; in particular, we do not deliberately expose participants to misinformation, falsified accounts, or hypothetical scenarios. Following this treatment section of the survey, we then ask a series of questions to solicit respondents' preferences over a range of policy instruments, such as import tariffs, free trade agreements, and a minimum wage. We elicit these through simple "Yes/No" questions, as well as via a question in which respondents are asked to select their three "Most Preferred" policies out of a menu of eight policy options that includes "More Limits on Imports".[4]

A number of broad findings emerge. First, pooling across all respondents (i.e., examining unconditional means across all control and treatment groups) shows that when asked direct standalone "Yes/No" questions about their preferences for trade restrictions, just over half the respondents agreed with placing more limits on imports (57-62% over the survey rounds). Notably though, this support for import limits is considerably lower when respondents were asked to select their three "Most Preferred" policies out of the menu of 8 policy options: The share of respondents who picked "More limits on imports" was between 23-28% (over the survey rounds). In contrast, "Improving education and worker training", "Higher taxes on top income earners", and "Higher minimum wage" were each selected by 50-70% of respondents, suggesting that the preference for protection is not as strong when ranked against alternative policies that can potentially address labor market concerns. There appears to be a slight uptick in support for limits on imports following the onset of the COVID

4. The different policy options were presented in a random order to each respondent, to avoid biases that might arise if there is a tendency to pick response options that appear earlier in a list.

shock: 23% of participants selected "More limits on imports" as a top-three choice in the pre-pandemic survey runs, but this increased to 27-28% in 2020-2022. The support for trade restrictions also did not subside in 2022 despite rising inflation. The overall message then is that the share of support for more protection has been remarkably stable over time, rather than exhibiting large swings along with broader economic or political conditions.

Second, our experimental findings suggest that exposure to information on the impacts of trade can significantly influence individuals' preferences for trade policy, but in complex and even unanticipated ways. Respondents who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment – based on the Autor et al. (2013) finding on how the surge of imports from China hurt U.S. manufacturing workers – were significantly more likely to express support for more protection relative to the control group that received no information. This treatment effect is robust across all the rounds of the experiment. The magnitude of the effect is also quantitatively important, around one third of the effect of self-identified political position (proxied by the party the respondent supported in the most recent presidential election).

In contrast to the responses to the job-loss-from-trade information, reactions to the job-gains-from-trade information are, however, highly asymmetric. When presented with a "Trade Helps Jobs" treatment that communicates the job creation effect of trade in non-manufacturing sectors, we see again a rise, albeit to a lesser degree, in respondents' overall preferences for trade restrictions. More strikingly, exposing participants to the "Trade Helps Prices" information induces strong protectionist choices: learning that imports from China have contributed to lower prices still raises the propensity of respondents to favor more limits on imports and to support higher tariffs, with a magnitude quantitatively comparable to the effect of exposure to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information. These treatment effects also remain robust throughout the five runs of the experiment from 2018 to 2022, despite the unprecedented array of shocks in this time period. We moreover find that when we exclude any mention of "China" from the wording of the treatment narratives, this reduces but does not fundamentally change protectionist reactions to the information treatments.

Taken together, our findings suggest that individuals do not react symmetrically to information that highlights the gains rather than the losses from trade. While information on manufacturing job losses can raise expressed preferences for protection, information on the service-job or price benefits of trade does not reduce – and in fact provokes – protectionist tendencies. The remainder of our paper seeks to better understand what might be driving this surprising result.

We first show that a basic misunderstanding of the narrative content is unlikely to be a primary explanation.[5] Respondents, on average, were able to correctly recall whether

5. Rho and Tomz (2017) and Stantcheva (2022) document the limited knowledge of the trade models in

they had received a narrative about the effect of trade on "jobs" or "prices". This helps to rule out the possibility that respondents who say received a "prices" treatments were systematically mistaking it for a narrative about the jobs effects of trade, on which they might carry stronger negative prior views. Second, we find that attention appears to matter in explaining the treatment effects: Respondents who spent a longer duration on the survey were more likely to correctly recall the nature of the information. Furthermore, they tended to be swayed by the "Trade Helps Jobs" and "Trade Helps Prices" evidence in that their preferences for protection were dampened relative to those who spent less time on the survey. This finding is particularly relevant in an age of fast information consumption whereby individuals are increasingly exposed to condensed information narratives through digital providers, as it suggests that extended attention (if one can successfully elicit it) may enhance the effectiveness of a narrative.

Next, we explore the role of information composition. While the "Trade Helps Jobs" narrative does not exert a significant effect when presented independently, could it help mitigate the effect of the opposite narrative? When presenting the respondents both sides of evidence, we find that exposure to the "Trade Helps Jobs" information alongside the "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative weakly diminishes respondents' protectionist responses. This suggests that, while exposure to the job-gains-from-trade information alone is not sufficient for shifting trade policy preferences, it can help counteract the effect of the "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative.

Third, we explore whether there were differential treatment effects across respondents depending on their baseline characteristics, with the goal here being to assess whether the information received operates by interacting with and reinforcing other forces that themselves might influence individuals' trade policy preferences. The characteristics considered include proxies for: (a) economic self-interest, such as personal exposure (or perceptions thereof) to the labor market effects of trade, such as via one's industry of employment or education level; (b) sociotropic concerns, such as concerns over income inequality and trust in government; (c) identity politics such as prior political positions and views; and (d) behavioral factors, in particular, the degree of loss aversion. The evidence highlights the particular importance of non-economic factors. Exposure to our information treatments triggers differential and stronger reactions from those with lower household income, negative perceptions of their exposure to trade, less trust in government, right-leaning political position, and stronger loss aversion.

Finally, we search for specific rationales by directly asking respondents who identified

particular those with lower education levels. However, limited understanding does not seem to drive our results.

"More limits on imports" as a top-three preferred policy their reasons behind this choice. Among the potential explanations that we listed, including for example "not persuaded", "imports are a potential threat to national security", and "lower quality of imports", respondents expressed the highest degree of agreement with "concerns over imports from countries like China", with concerns over how "imports might compete for jobs with U.S. workers" being a close second. This pattern holds uniformly across the control group, as well as across all treatment groups (i.e., both those that received a "jobs" or "prices" narrative). That this is true even when "China" was explicitly removed from the wording of the treatment suggests that the role of China as a major trade partner of the U.S. looms large in the minds of the public when the issue of trade is raised. This finding is also echoed in an open-ended question in which respondents were allowed to freely express their reasons for preferring more limits on imports. The word "China" appears with a high frequency, both among respondents who received our baseline treatments that included "China" in the narrative wording, and among those who received narratives "sans China".

Altogether, our findings underscore the challenges faced when using evidence-based information to shape trade policy preferences among the U.S. general public. Exposure to such information does not always move preferences in anticipated directions: The information is likely to reinforce their prior perceptions not just of trade in general, but of trade specifically with China. Our results suggest that individuals' preferences over trade policies are not formed in isolation from the identity of the key countries that the U.S. is trading with. Instead, considerations related to geopolitics that go beyond strictly economic rationales appear to come into play, suggesting that public messaging that focuses solely on communicating the benefits of trade is unlikely to succeed unless is addresses these broader concerns tied to U.S.-China relations.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature. Section 3 elaborates on our survey design and its implementation. Section 4 reports broad patterns of policy preferences. Section 5 presents the baseline evidence on the information treatment effects, while Section 6 discusses evidence related to potential explanatory mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.

2 Related Literature

Our paper builds on an extensive literature on the determinants of trade policy preferences (Rodrik, 1995). Baldwin (1989) divides these into two sets of explanations: those that

pertain to individuals' economic self-interests and non-economic concerns.[6]

The economic self-interest channel generally considers preferences for trade policy as being a function of individuals' endowments or sector-specific skills (Rodrik, 1995; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001a; Blonigen, 2011). If factors are not perfectly mobile, trade will affect income (and hence preferences) based on individuals' factor characteristics (c.f., the specific-factor or Ricardo-Viner model). If factors are mobile, trade will affect income via individuals' factor endowments in relation to their relative abundance in the country (c.f., the Heckscher-Ohlin or Stolper-Samuelson effect). More recently, economists have advanced empirical evidence, that while there are aggregate gains from trade, trade liberalization creates winners and losers. On the one hand, a growing volume of studies led by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013, 2016) and Pierce and Schott (2016) show how import competition, specifically the import surge from China, has reduced manufacturing jobs and low-skill wages in local US labor markets. On the other hand, separate studies argue that cheaper inputs from abroad have made US manufacturing firms more competitive (Amiti et al. 2017) and non-manufacturing employment growth has more than outstripped job losses in the manufacturing sector (Caliendo et al. 2019).[7] Based on the existing theories and evidence, an individual's preferences for trade policy would be determined by the individual's perceived gains or losses from trade.

A second category of factors that may shape individuals' trade policy preferences relates to non-economic concerns, specifically, social and political identity and behavioral patterns. As Grossman and Helpman (2021) note, preferences over trade policy may reflect not only voter's economic incentives and self-interests but also "concerns for members of those groups in society with whom they identify." Changes in such social identity due to, for example, increased income inequality or societal divisions can lead not only to so-called identity politics but also to changes in trade policy. Similarly, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) argue that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the US economy as a whole is affected by trade. In addition to social and political identity, another non-economic factor is the behavior of loss aversion, that is, the manifestation of an asymmetry in value associated with loss versus gains wherein the disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility of acquiring it (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984). Freund and

6. Another branch of the literature has focused on the role of lobbying and interest groups in shaping the " demand-side" of trade policy (see Grossman and Helpman, 1995) Krishna, 1998; Ornelas, 2005; Bombardini, 2008; Blanga-Gubbay, Conconi, and Parente, 2022).

7. It is worth noting that the debate on whether international trade has been the main reason behind stagnated low-skill wages is far from settled in the academic literature. As documented by Lawrence and Lawrence (2012), manufacturing employment has fallen steadily among most developed nations for decades. A leading alternative hypothesis for the swift decline of manufacturing jobs is technological change whereby the rise of computers, automation and robotics has been the main force displacing low-end manufacturing jobs (see Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017).

Ozcan (2008) and Tovar (2009) show that loss aversion can lead to anti-trade bias in trade policy that favors declining and loss-incurring domestic industries.

The above array of hypotheses have been examined in a body of empirical work assessing the determinants of trade policy preferences based on observational survey data. The body of evidence on Stolper-Samuelson vs Ricardo-Viner is relatively mixed; see, for instance, Balistreri (1987), Beaulieu (2002ab), and Mayda and Rodrik (2005). These studies have found little to mixed support for the role of economic self-interests by examining the effects of human capital endowments and industry characteristics (as a proxy for exposure to trade) on expressed policy preferences. For example, using survey data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), Blonigen (2011) finds that despite the evidence on the substantial effect of trade policy on worker income, the relationships between labor market attributes and trade policy preferences are not robust in the US, and suggests that either the measures of labor market attributes are poor or the drives of trade policy preferences go beyond labor market incentives. Blonigen and McGrew (2014), based on similar ANES survey data, explore how task routineness may affect trade policy preferences and find workers performing more routine tasks to be more supportive of import restrictions. The study also shows that education and task routineness are the only two labor market attributes found to be correlated with stated trade policy preferences.[8]

Our paper contributes to the above literature by investigating the role of information pertaining to the gains and losses from trade in shaping individuals' trade policy preferences. Most studies so far have tended to assume individuals are perfectly informed about the positive and negative economic impacts of trade and determine their policy preferences in a full-information environment, while in reality members of the public may be less than fully informed or may even be exposed to a biased set of information. Could access to evidence-based information and becoming better informed on the gains or losses from trade align people's policy choices more closely with their labor market characteristics and economic self-interests? Could learning more about gains from trade mitigate the protectionist desire that is unsupported by economic rationale?

To answer these questions, we use an approach of randomized survey experiments that enables us to address the issue of self-selection and unobservables in determining individuals' exposure to information and establish the causal impact of information on expressed policy preferences. A key challenge in assessing the role of information is potential correlations between individual characteristics and exposure to information the latter of which often relies

8. There is a parallel literature on migration policy preferences that has explored the role of economic circumstances, individual characteristics, and also locational externalities (e.g., fiscal spillovers); see in particular, Scheve and Slaughter (2001b), Hanson et al. (2017), Mayda (2009), Facchini and Mayda (2009), Card et al. (2012), Mayda et al. (2018), Alesina et al. (2019).

on proxy measures in existing surveys. The randomized survey methodology enables us to provide short-term but exogenous treatments to individuals' information set. It also allows us to gain in-depth understanding on individuals' policy choices and underlying rationales.

The methodology of randomized information treatments in general-population surveys has been applied in empirical public finance, to understand support for policies related to redistribution and taxes (Kuziemko et al. 2015; Fisman et al. 2017; Alesina et al. 2018).[9] The evidence from this line of work is, however, mixed; for example, Kuziemko et al. (2015) do not find providing information related to inequality to affect expressed preferences towards taxation, a result attributed to the lack of trust in government. More recent applications that explore the degree of support or opposition for economic policy include Alesina et al. (2019), Facchini et al. (2016) and Grigorieff et al. (2017) on immigration, Hiscox (2006), Nguyen (2017), Rho and Tomz (2017), Di Tella and Rodrik (2019) and Rodriguez et al. (2021) on trade, as well as Stantcheva (2022) on various economic policies.

Specifically on trade-related studies, Rodriguez et al. (2021) examine the role of question framing in respondents' expressed beliefs on the employment and consumption effects of trade. Stancheva (2020) uses surveys to elicit respondents' knowledge and understanding of trade and finds both material self-interest and social and economic concerns to influence people's views on trade policy. The paper also shows that beliefs on efficiency gains and compensatory redistribution can reduce trade opposition. Di Tella and Rodrik (2019) provide information treatments consisting of hypothetical scenarios of job losses (due to demand, technology, management, trade) in an assumptive manufacturing plant, to understand whether and how the various causes of job losses might affect preferences over remedial policies.

Our work complements the above studies by investigating the role of evidence-based information in shaping people's attitudes and policy preferences. Instead of eliciting responses to hypothetical or framed questions, we convey concise, accessible information on the documented gains and losses from trade, in a format similar to information individuals are exposed to on daily digital platforms, and explore whether and how trade policy preferences might be influenced by the information treatments. We also collect detailed information on participants' demographic, economic, social, political and behavioral characteristics and explore slightly differentiated variants of information treatments to assess the underlying explanations for the treatment effects. The analysis highlights complex, and often unanticipated ways in which the public responds to trade-related evidence. Among specific groups characterized with adverse perceptions of trade and China, exposure to information on the

9. This in turn draws on work in the psychology literature on attitudes towards income inequality including, for example, Norton and Ariely (2011), and Chow and Gallak (2012).

effects of trade can trigger reactions unsupported by economic self-interests by provoking priors and broad concerns. Nevertheless, awareness on the gains from trade can still counteract loss-centered narratives and neutralize anti-trade tendencies. These documented findings are robust throughout unprecedented disruptions during the four-year period of the survey including the pandemic, US-China trade war, fast-rising inflation, and other political and economic movements. The results highlight the challenges of communicating the benefits of trade in an environment dominated by contrary prior belief and fast information consumption and offers an explanation for the discrepancy documented in the literature between economic self-interests and trade policy choices.

3 Survey Design: Methodology and Instrument

To overcome the challenge of establishing the causal effect of information, we developed and conducted a series of surveys that contains randomized information treatments to a nationally representative sample of the US population (by age, gender, race, education, and region). Randomized provision of information allows the researcher to estimate a causal effect of information exposure on policy preferences, as the information narratives provided constitute an exogenous source of variation across respondents. By analyzing the collected survey data through multivariate regressions, we can then identify the importance of information relative to other respondent characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education, political ideology, etc.) in driving individual preferences over economic policies.

Mounted on Qualtrics.com, the survey is designed to be relatively short, taking an average of about ten minutes to complete.[10] The survey consists of four main parts, including a background section that solicits respondents' demographic and belief information, a treatment section that offers evidence-based information on either the gains and/or the losses from trade, a section that solicits respondents' preferences over economic policies, and a final section that validates how well the participants have engaged with the survey and explores explanations to their choices.

Part 1: Background. The first section of the survey solicits basic background information from the respondent, including:

(a) Biodata: age; gender; ethnicity; nationality; state of residence; level of education; employment status; sector; occupation; household income;
(b) Economic, social and political beliefs

10. The 2022 survey platform can be accessed at: https://hbs.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV$_e sNIwUlv3V4Iufc$

- Economic: his/her degree of satisfaction with the health of the job market; views future prospects of children born into their community; views on tariff rates; top export destinations; the impact of NAFTA on the respondent's family; view on the job as giving a sense of identity; how big a problem is an inflation in the U.S.
- Social: how big a problem he/she perceives inequality to be in the US today; how much he/she trusts the government; trust in foreigners; willingness to pay more for a US brand;
- Political: self-placement on liberal vs. conservative policy spectrum; which party's candidate he/she supported in the presidential elections;
- Behavioral: loss aversion proxies.

(c) News Sources: frequency he/she follows the news; main news sources (both TV and internet); etc.

Part 2: Information Treatments. The second part of the survey administers the information treatment. Respondents are randomly allocated to the control group or one of the information treatment groups, each with equal probability. Each of the narratives stresses a particular employment or price effect of being open to trade that has been found to be quantitatively important in economics research:

(a) The "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative is a three-sentence summary of the findings from Autor et al. (2013), that points to how the rise in imports from China negatively impacted the labor market outcomes of manufacturing workers in the US.

(b) The "Trade Helps Jobs" narrative is a description of how the rise in imports from China led the US to specialize more in service sectors and in turn to an increase in the total number of jobs in the US economy, as established by Caliendo et al. (2019).

(c) The "Trade Helps Prices" narrative discusses how the rise in imports from China led to lower prices, for both durable goods such as computers, electrical products, and furniture, and non-durable goods such as apparel. In the 2020 and 2021 runs on the survey, we also exposed participants to two variants of this treatment, that were similarly randomized to survey respondents. The first variant replaced the phrase "availability of cheaper goods" with "increased availability of goods", to explore the possibility that the adjective "cheap" might have triggered negative connotations (e.g., associated with "low-quality"). The second variant did not mention "China", referring instead to a generic increase in imports.

(d) Starting in 2020, and following the resurgence in US import tariffs, we also introduced a "Tariff Hurts Prices" narrative based on the findings from Amiti et al. (2019). This

describes how the tariffs imposed in 2018, particularly on imports from China, raised the prices of tariff-related goods, which incurred an estimated loss to US real income of $1.4 billion per month.

To make the information as accessible as possible to the general public, each of these narratives includes text that is simplified to eliminate technical jargon, as well as a figure to visually illustrate the key trends over time with regard to either labor market outcomes or good prices. For example, in the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment, we reproduced Figure 1 from Autor et al. (2013), which overlays the increase in imports from China between 1987-2007 with the contemporaneous decline in manufacturing employment as a share of US employment. Likewise, in the "Trade Helps Jobs" treatment, we created an analogous figure in which the decline in manufacturing employment was replaced in the illustration by the rise in total US nonfarm employment instead.[11] It should be stressed that each of the narratives is evidence-based; in particular, we do not deliberately expose participants to misinformation, falsified accounts, or hypothetical statements. The accompanying tone of each narrative also seeks to be neutral and factual. (The narratives are reproduced in the Appendix.)

Part 3: Policy Preferences. The third section of the survey then solicits preferences over economic policies. The questions we focus on when constructing a measure of preferences for protection are the following:

(a) "Do you support placing more limits on import?" Respondents were asked to respond Yes or No, and "If Yes, on which countries?"

(b) "Would you support an increase in the US tariff rate to reduce imports?" Respondents were asked to respond Yes or No, and "If yes, what would you like the US tariff rate on imports to be?"

(c) "Would you support the US signing free trade agreements with more foreign countries?" Respondents were asked to respond Yes or No.

(d) A simple choice of policy preferences between "higher taxes on top income earners" and "higher tariff rates on imports from foreign countries"; respondents where given the option to select just one of these two policies, or to respond "both" or "neither".

We also sought a better gauge of how strong the preference for protectionism is relative to other policies that can help to address labor market outcomes. Toward this end, we included

11. While an academic citation is provided on the information screen, the identities of the institutions at which the researchers work was not included to avoid possible reputation effects that could potentially bias how much weight the respondents attached to the narratives.

a question in which respondents are presented with a menu of eight policy options, and then asked to identify their three "Most Preferred" and three "Least Preferred" policies. The eight policy options are presented on the survey screen in a random order, to avoid possible biases towards policies based on the order in which they appear as response options:[12]

(a) Higher taxes on top income earners;
(b) Higher minimum wage;
(c) More benefits for the unemployed (e.g., unemployment insurance);
(d) Improving education and worker training;
(e) More limits on imports from foreign countries (e.g., higher tariffs on imports);
(f) Weakening the U.S. dollar, so that U.S. exports are more competitive;
(g) Exiting from existing free trade agreements;
(h) More limits on immigration.

Part 4: Validate and Explain Choices. Starting in the 2020 survey run, we included a fourth section that seeks to validate how well the participants engaged with the survey as well as to solicit their reasons if they had selected "More Limits on Imports" as a top-three preferred policy. The key questions here include:

(a) Did the information that you read earlier in this survey affect your views on trade policy (i.e., the use of tariffs or limits on imports)? (Responses were recorded on a Likert scale with five options, ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree".)
(b) The information that I read earlier in this survey was on the topic of:
    - the relationship between trade and prices
    - the relationship between trade and technology
    - the relationship between trade and jobs
    - I did not receive information on any of the above
(c) Why "More Limits on Imports"? Survey participants who selected this as a top-three preferred policy were directed to this follow-up question where they were reminded of their policy choice. They were then asked to assess the extent to which each of the following reasons might explain their selection of "More Limits on Imports": (Responses were recorded on a Likert scale with five options, ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree".)

12. This follows recommendations of survey practice to avoid choice biases that could arise from the order of response options; see: `https://www.qualtrics.com/support/survey-platform/survey-module/question-options/choice-randomization/`.

- I am concerned about US imports from countries such as China.
- Imports are a potential threat to US national security.
- Imports are often of lower quality.
- Even if imports have also helped to create jobs in certain sectors (lower goods prices), there are other more important concerns.
- I was persuaded that imports have hurt jobs in the US (have lowered goods prices for Americans).
- Imports often compete for jobs with US workers.

We engaged the services of a professional survey company (Qualtrics) to administer the survey online to a nationally representative sample of the US population (by age, gender, race, education, and region).[13] In total, we conducted four annual runs of the survey, which we group in 4 rounds as described below.

The first round of the survey consists of two runs launched in July 2018 and April 2019, which yielded a total of 2,277 usable observations.[14] These surveys offered the "Trade Hurts Jobs," "Trade Helps Jobs," and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments; we have grouped these two pre-pandemic runs of the survey as a single "round" due to the smaller number of observations relative to later editions.[15] The second-round survey was conducted from April-June 2020 to a sample of 6,009 participants; this included the same treatments as in round 1 plus the "Tariff Hurts Prices" narrative, on recent evidence concerning the new US tariffs and their impact on goods prices. This second round also included mixed treatments that combined both the "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Helps Jobs" narratives, as well as the two variants of the "Trade Helps Prices" narratives.[16] The third round, performed

13. The sampling quotas requested were: (i) by gender, female: 50.8%, male: 49.2%; (ii) by age, 18-24: 12.8%, 25-34: 17.7%, 35-44: 16.7%, 45-54: 17.7%, 55-64: 16.4%, 65+: 18.8%; (iii) by race, non-Hispanic White: 61.9%, non-Hispanic Black: 12.3%, Hispanic: 17.4%, Asian: 5.3%, Other: 3.2%; (iv) by education, HS diploma/GED or less: 40.8%, some college (no degree): 20.9%, college degree: 26.9%, graduate degree: 11.4%; and (v) by region, Midwest: 21.33%, Northeast: 18.02%, South: 37.27%, West: 23.38%. Participants who completed the survey received a compensation of around $2.00 each. We did not seek to assemble a longitudinal panel of the same individuals due to budget constraints and low re-contact rates.

14. More specifically, the round 1 sample was composed of around 550 observations assigned to each of the "Control", "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments.

15. In the first run of the survey in July 2018, we also included a "It's not Trade, it's Technology" narrative that presented the argument that "Technological advances in recent decades, such as computerization and automation, have tended to favor skilled workers, while replacing some jobs that used to be performed by unskilled workers." We did not find any statistically significant effects with this information treatment, and omitted it from subsequent survey runs to focus on the jobs- and prices-related treatments.

16. The round 2 sample was composed of around 800 observations each assigned to the "Control", "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments, together with about 500 observations each assigned to the "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices China", and "Trade Helps Prices Cheaper" narratives.

in April 2021, yielded a sample of 4,058 participants[17]; this consisted of all the previous treatments and additional questions with respect to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and US government's relief packages.[18] The fourth round was administered in April 2022 and consisted of 4,186 observations and again in July 2022 with 1,800 observations. In addition to the above questions, we requested views whether the participant considered inflation to be a concern. The different rounds yielded a total sample of over 20,000 survey respondents. In the analysis, we account for and explore the different timings of the three rounds when assessing the effects of the information treatments.

In addition to the information collected in the survey, we also obtain data on the counties in which the respondents are located. We then merge in the identities of the counties for the majority of the respondents on the basis of the city or town names which they provided.[19] This allows us to subsequently merge in a set of location characteristics from standard sources of county-level data for between 96.9% and 98.6% of our observations, depending on the survey run.[20]

4 Broad Patterns of Policy Preferences

In this section, we provide a first look at the broad patterns of policy preferences emerging from the data collected, by examining the composition of the samples with regard to respondent characteristics and expressed preferences over policies.

Table 1 reports summary statistics for each of the three survey rounds on a range of underlying characteristics of the participants. This includes background biographic infor-

17. The round 3 sample was composed of around 450 observations assigned to each of the "Control", "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", "Tariff Hurts Prices", "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices China", and "Trade Helps Prices Cheaper" treatments.

18. These questions include, for example, "whether countries should be able to restrict the movement of people across borders," "whether countries should avoid imposing tariffs on imports of medical products and health equipment," "whether countries should avoid imposing tariffs on imports of goods that are needed in supply chains," "whether countries should be able to restrict the export of medical products and health equipment," "whether countries should keep the manufacture of goods that are needed in supply chains at home and avoid moving production abroad," and "how has the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic affected your views of China?"

19. This was done via a Stata fuzzy merge command (`reclink`). To improve the merge rate, observations with a fuzzy merge score of lower than 0.93 were double-checked manually to see if the name of the city or town could be identified after correcting for spelling errors, the use of abbreviations (e.g., "St." versus "Saint"), and differences between colloquial and formal naming conventions (e.g., "St. Pete" versus "St. Petersburg). For a number of observations where there was potential ambiguity, the IP address coordinates were used to corroborate the likely location of the respondent.

20. As a check of the data consistency and quality, we dropped a small fraction of observations from each survey sample that had respondent IP address coordinates originating from outside the United States. The fraction of observations dropped was less than 0.3% for the entire sample. We also removed observations that took less than half the median completion time to ensure a reasonable amount of time spent in completing the survey.

mation (e.g., gender, age, race), socio-economic characteristics (e.g., education, household income, employment), socio-political attitudes (e.g., candidate supported in the 2016 presidential election), and news consumption patterns. With the information provided by the respondents on their state and city/town of residence, we were further able to merge in location characteristics at the county level; this includes various economic conditions that the respondent would in principle be exposed to, such as the college educated share of the population aged 25 or older (from the American Community Survey), the local share of manufacturing in total employment (from the County Business Patterns dataset), the Autor et al. (2013) China import shock (from the 2000s), and a dummy variable for whether the location is an urban county (from the US Census).[21] Across the columns in Table 1, the respondent and location characteristics are broadly similar across survey rounds. The average characteristics of the respondents, including, for example, gender, age, and education, are broadly consistent with the distributions of the US general population. It is worth noting that across the socio-political attributes, the average respondent exhibited a slight level of distrust in government, considered the impact of NAFTA on their family and the health of the job market somewhat negatively, and expressed a preference for US brands. The participants also viewed both inequality and inflation as a problem, with the concern over inflation appearing stronger in 2022.

Turning to policy preferences, Table 2 (top panel) presents the declared support for protectionist policies when this is posed in a direct "Yes/No" question. When phrased in this manner, a fairly high share of respondents tended to agree with placing more limits on imports (57-62%, across the three survey rounds). Note, however, that the share of respondents favoring alternative policies, such as minimum wages and progressive taxation was consistently higher (65%-80%).[22]

The lower panel summarizes the frequency with which each of the eight options was identified among the respondents' three most-preferred economic policies. While the means reported here are unconditional – in that they are calculated pooling across all survey respondents – they nevertheless bring to light several stylized facts. Anti-global policies received a lower level of respondents' support when compared against alternative tax or labor market policies. The share of respondents who selected "More limits on imports" was in the 23-38% range, while the corresponding shares that picked "More limits on immigration" was about 35%. Only around 12% of respondents identified "Exiting from free trade agreements" as a

21. The college share and manufacturing share variables are constructed for the year 2016.

22. Interestingly, between 65-68% of the survey participants also favored signing new free trade agreements. It is possible that some respondents may not see raising limits on imports and signing more free trade agreements as contradictory, for example since these moves could each be pursued with different foreign countries.

preferred course of action.

In contrast, policies to "Improve education and training", "Higher minimum wage", and "Higher taxes on top income earners" (i.e., more progressive taxes) each received broader support, from about 50-60% of the respondents. Not all public assistance programs received high support though, as only about a quarter of respondents identified "More unemployment benefits" as a preferred policy. The option that received the least support was to "Weaken the US Dollar" (4-7% only).[23] Of note, the ranking of the most-preferred policies was stable across survey runs. Breaking down these preferences over policy by location, the variation across regions is broadly consistent with the well-known geographic divisions in support for the Republican versus Democratic party (available on request).

Over time, rounds 2-4 of the survey uncover a slight uptick in preferences for "More Limits on Imports": 23% of participants selected this as a top-three policy in 2018-2019, rising to 27% in 2020 and at 28% in 2021 and 27% in 2022. This came at the expense of a corresponding waning in support for a "Higher minimum wage", and for "Improving education and training".

A useful point to highlight is the contrast in level of support for protection expressed in the direct "Yes/No" questions, as compared to the shares who picked these among their top-three preferred policies in the lower panel. The latter question format appears to be useful in teasing out how anti-global policies appear to receive less support relative to alternative actions, once respondents are asked to consciously prioritize and rank from a menu of policy options.

5 Baseline Evidence

5.1 Empirical Specification

We turn now to the task of identifying whether and how much the information treatments affected respondents' policy preferences. We evaluate this formally by adopting the following regression specification:

$$\mathbf{1}(Policy_i) \;=\; \sum_{b=1}^{B} \beta_b \mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b) + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i, \tag{1}$$

where $\mathbf{1}(Policy_i)$ is a dummy variable for whether respondent i expressed support for the policy measure in question, while the $\mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b)$'s are dummy variables for whether

23. The summary statistics based on the survey question on one's least-preferred policies yielded a consistent message, with "Improve education and training", "Higher minimum wage", and "Higher taxes on top income earners" being least likely to be selected.

the respondent received the survey format that contained information treatment b. We denote the control group that received no information by $b = 0$, and this is the omitted treatment category in (1). The coefficients β_b, for $b = 1, \ldots, B$, therefore capture the effects of the respective information treatments relative to the control group. These can be accorded a causal interpretation, given the randomization of respondents to treatment narratives. (Appendix Tables 1a-1c confirm that within each survey round, the randomization achieved balance in respondent characteristics across the treatment subsamples.)

We include on the right-hand side of (1) a large vector of controls, X_i, to account for any other systematic correlations between these observed respondent characteristics and expressed policy preferences. This includes: (i) standard biographic variables (such as gender, age group, race, education, employment status, region of birth); (ii) prior political position (namely, the party candidate supported in the 2016 presidential election); and (iii) news consumption habits (i.e., frequency and main news sources). To capture the effects of these preceding variables as flexibly as possible, we control for each using a set of dummies based on the response options from the associated survey question.

We further control in (1) for the role of several county-level socio-economic conditions, specifically how these might have shaped respondents' views towards policy. As described earlier, the county variables we control for are the college-educated share, the manufacturing share in local employment, the Autor et al. (2013) China import shock, and an urban dummy. Each of these location characteristics is constructed at the county-level, except for the China import shock measures which are at the more aggregated commuting-zone level.

Note that the underlying randomization implies that the assignment of information treatments should be orthogonal to any respondent or location characteristics, and so whether or not we control for the vector X_i should not undermine the consistency of the β_b's as estimates of the information treatment effects. That said, we find it useful to control for these characteristics, to provide a point of comparison with what the prior literature has found with regard to correlates of preferences for trade protection.

Last but not least, we also account for several survey features. When the dependent variable is the indicator for whether "More Limits on Imports" was selected as a top-three preferred policy, we include a "randomization order" variable whose value is equal to the position (i.e., first to eighth) in which "More Limits on Imports" appeared to the individual respondent in the menu of eight policy options. This is meant to control for any tendency towards picking policies that appear earlier in the list of response options. We also include dummy variables for whether the survey was taken on a mobile device (to control for possible systematic differences across mobile and non-mobile device users), as well as for the week

the response was recorded (to capture forces related to the weekly news cycle).[24]

In what follows, we cross-validate our findings by using an array of dependent variables that are constructed from the various survey questions that speak to respondents' trade policy preferences. Specifically, we run logit regressions based on equation (1) using in turn the following variables as $\mathbf{1}(Policy_i)$: (i) whether a "Yes" answer was recorded on the binary-response question "Do you support placing more limits on imports?"; (ii) whether a "Yes" answer was recorded on the binary-response question "Would you support an increase in the US tariff rate?"; (iii) whether a "Yes" answer was recorded on the binary-response question "Would you support signing more FTAs?"; (iv) whether the respondent selected "Higher tariffs on imports from foreign countries" or "Both" (higher tariffs and higher taxes on top income earners) on the question soliciting preferences over these two policies; and (v) whether the respondent selected "More limits on imports" as one of his/her three "Most Preferred" out of the list of eight policies. When presenting results from these logit regressions, we will report marginal effects that are evaluated setting the information treatment dummies $\mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b)$ to zero and the respondent characteristics in X_i to their in-sample mean values.

In addition, we report results run via OLS using the first principal component of (i)-(v) as the dependent variable; we subtract the binary-response to the question "Would you support signing more FTAs?" from one prior to taking this first principal component. This yields a measure that is increasing in the intensity of individuals' preferences for protection, that in principle dampens the effect of measurement error that might be inherent in the responses to any single survey question. We report throughout standard errors that are clustered by county of residence. Note that the β_b coefficients obtained from these regressions should be interpreted as information treatment effects holding the extensive set of respondent characteristics constant.[25]

5.2 Effects of Baseline Treatments

We start by analyzing the effects of the information treatments across different rounds of the survey, specifically round 1 (2018-2019) and rounds 2-4 (2020-2022). A comparison of

24. See Couper et al. (2017) for a review of potential quality concerns that arise with mobile web-based surveys.

25. A related concern is over whether responses might reflect experimenter demand effects, wherein participants shade their answers towards what they perceive to be the survey's objective. There are various reasons why we view this as unlikely to be a major problem in our current setting. The information narratives that trade is beneficial for either jobs or prices actually induces a pro-protectionist response, contrary to the anticipated direction of any experimenter demand effects. There are also no monetary stakes that are conditioned on specific responses being given. See also de Quilt et al. (2018) who present evidence that experimenter demand effects are relatively small.

the two sets of results helps to shed light on any common features that are robust across the independently-drawn samples before and after the outbreak of the pandemic.

Baseline Round. Table 3 presents the baseline results obtained from round 1. Relative to the control group, the group receiving the "Trade Hurts Job" treatment exhibits significantly stronger preferences for protectionist trade policies. Exposure to evidence that describes how trade has led to manufacturing job losses raises the respondents' propensity to support "More limits on imports" (Column 1), "US tariff rate increase " (Column 2), and "Higher tariffs" (Column 3), as well as to pick "More limits on imports" as one of their most-preferred policies (Column 5). At the same time, the "Trade Hurts Job" treatment lowers the likelihood of respondents supporting a policy of entering more FTAs, although this effect falls short of statistical significance (Column 4). A similar finding holds when using the principal component response in Column 6: individuals exposed to the "Trade Hurts Job" information overall display stronger support for protectionist trade policies. In terms of quantitative implications, the "Trade Hurts Job" coefficient of 0.282 in Column 6 implies a treatment effect that shifts preferences towards favoring more protection that is about 1/3 the magnitude of the effect of self-identifying as a Republican presidential candidate supporter.

In sharp contrast, we find that communicating evidence that "Trade Helps Jobs" had no significant effect on trade policy preferences.[26] Moreover, exposing participants to the "Trade Helps Prices" information leads to puzzling results: learning evidence showing imports have contributed to lower prices raises the propensity of respondents to favor more limits imports (Column 1), supporting higher tariffs (Column 3) and to select limits on imports as a top-three preferred policy (Column 5). The coefficient estimate when using the first principal component variable in Column 6 is also statistically significant and quantitatively comparable to the effect of exposure to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information.

The above results suggest that, contrary to expectations, receiving information on the impacts of trade can trigger increased preferences for trade protection, regardless of the positive or negative nature of the impact presented. We explore potential explanations to this puzzling finding in the next subsection by introducing variants of the "Trade Hurts Jobs," "Trade Helps Jobs," and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments in rounds 2-3 of our survey experiments.

Subsequent Rounds (2020-2022). In 2020-2022, we conducted additional rounds of the survey to a sample of 11,867 participants. These additional rounds of the survey enable us

26. In early rounds, we found a "It's Technology" narrative, which discussed how automation and other technological progress have led to manufacturing job losses, lowered support for "Higher taxes on top earners", but had little clear bearing otherwise on the remaining policies.

to examine whether individuals' responses to trade-outcome information may have varied as the pandemic disrupted the global economy and US-China trade tensions continued. In these subsequent rounds, in addition to the same treatments as round 1, we also offered three alternative variations. First, we rolled out a new treatment with the "Tariff Hurts Prices" narrative discussing recent evidence concerning the new US tariffs and their impacts on prices. Second, since our baseline narratives center on the impact of trade with China, we explore whether removing the national identity from the information treatment may alter individual trade policy preferences. To this end, we provided an adapted version of each baseline information treatment that excludes the mention of "China" from otherwise identical information. Another concern that may arise in interpreting reactions to the "Trade Helps Prices" information is that participants may associate the phrase "cheap" with "low quality" and respond negatively to the evidence on lower prices. We hence adapted the baseline treatment by replacing references to "availability of cheaper goods" with "increased availability of goods".

We also removed the mention of "cheaper" from the "Trade Helps Prices" narrative in a separate version. Finally, the surveys included additional questions to measure how each individual's view on trade policy might have been directly affected by the pandemic and economic policy.[27]

Table 2 compares the unconditional means of expressed policy preferences in 2018-2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022. Overall, the different rounds display broadly similar patterns in support for trade protection and other economic policy instruments. For example, the responses to "Most Preferred Policies" show a similar policy ranking, with "Higher minimum wage" consistently ranked on the top followed by "Improvement on education" and "More progressive taxes" and with "Weaken the USD" and "Exiting from FTAs" consistently ranked on the bottom. Notably though, the support for more limits on imports rose in both the binary and ranking questions: for example, in the pre-pandemic round, 23% of the respondents ranked "More limits on foreign imports" as one of their most preferred policies, while that share increased to 27-28% in 2020-2022.

Turning to the regression analysis, Table 4 presents results when pooling the Control group with observations that received jobs-related information treatments, while Table 5 presents the findings when pooling the Control group with respondents who received prices-related narratives instead. As discussed earlier, rounds 2 and 3 of the survey incorporate several variants of the information narratives as additional treatment groups, and so we have

27. The sequence of the survey also in part reflects the research process: Our findings from Round 1 prompted us to perform additional surveys both to substantiate the robustness of the initial findings, as well as to probe deeper into explanations for these patterns.

opted to break up the analysis in this manner to avoid cluttering a single regression with up to eight treatment dummies.

When examining the jobs-related treatment effects, we find that all the baseline results documented in 2018-2019 continue to hold broadly in 2020-2022 as shown in Table 4 (Columns 1-6). Once again, the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment exerts a particularly noticeable effect. Exposing participants to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information raised their propensity to select more protectionist policies, while communicating "Trade Helps Jobs" had no significant effects. Interestingly, removing the national identity of the trading partner, China, from the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information only leads to slight decreases in individuals' preferences for trade protection.

In Table 5, we once again replicate the puzzling finding that the "Trade Helps Prices" narrative significantly *raises* preferences for protectionism, albeit with the magnitude of this treatment effect being about half the size of that displayed in Table 3. This reaction remains strong even when the information excludes the mention of "China" or "cheaper." Further, the "Tariff Hurts Prices" narrative induces a similar response to that of "Trade Helps Prices": when provided with the converse information that tariffs have hurt US consumers, participants' preferences also shift towards voicing more support for limits on imports. The persistence of this finding – that narratives related to how trade would benefit goods prices nevertheless induce protectionist reactions – thus appears to be a robust empirical regularity that cannot be easily rejected as an isolated result.[28]

It would also be useful to validate the above result by examining whether the participants in these recent rounds believed that the evidence-based information indeed affected their views on trade policy. Column 0 in both Tables 4 and 5 show that to be the case. When asked the degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected the participant's views on trade policy, the respondents exposed to the "Trade Hurts Jobs", the "Trade Helps Prices" or the "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatment all tended to agree while those receiving the "Trade Helps Jobs" treatment did not. Note that participants exposed to the "Trade Hurts Jobs", the "Trade Helps Prices", or the "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatment were also more likely to have a negative view on the impact of trade for most Americans (Column 0b).[29]

28. The results from pooling rounds 2-4 are qualitatively similar to the results from running each round separately.

29. Appendix Tables 3a and 3b present additional robustness analysis based on alternative samples. For example, our results continue to hold when the regressions are run on observations from rounds 2 and 3 separately. We have also experimented with different ways of combining the information on trade policy preferences across the individual questions, such as using an unweighted average, constructing a dummy variable equal to one if a protectionist answer was recorded on at least three of the five constituent question, or adopting a factor analysis approach; these continue to deliver results that are very consistent with our

The results from the 2021-2022 rounds indicate that despite all the disruptions from the pandemic and ongoing trade war, respondents' trade policy responses to information remain remarkably stable. Information on manufacturing job loss from trade triggers increased preferences for trade protection, while alternative information on potential gains from trade does not lead to symmetric reactions and instead similarly raises protectionist sentiment. The protectionist preferences also cannot be alleviated by simply dropping the identity of the trading partner from the information provided; the public exhibits tendencies to pick import limits regardless of the evidence presented.[30]

Respondent Characteristics. Before moving on to the variants of the treatments, it is helpful at this juncture to briefly discuss what the regression findings in Tables 4-5 suggest about the correlation between respondent characteristics and policy preferences. We report the full set of coefficients estimated from Column 6 of Tables 4 and 5 respectively in Appendix Table 2. It appears that older individuals are more likely to support limits on imports, with the effects increasing steadily across older age bands; while we find no significant differences across gender.

Consistent with previous research, political affiliation is important for explaining support for protectionism. However, in contrast to the pattern documented for the previous decade, participants who supported the Republican candidate in the 2016 presidential election are more likely to favor import restrictions, with the opposite true for Democratic supporters (the omitted category here is respondents who indicated support for neither the Republican nor the Democratic candidate). The effect of education was not significant. at the 10% level in some specifications (Column 2). Interestingly, the regression results also show that the consumption of Fox News is positively correlated with support for restrictions on imports.

We find little evidence that exposure through one's county location to the manufacturing industry affects trade policy preferences: The coefficient of the 2000s Autor et al. (2013) China import shock is imprecisely estimated. Being a county with a lower college-educated share or employed in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors had a positive correlation with preferences for import restrictions. Note too that the "randomization order" variable was also consistently negative and often statistically significant, pointing to the usefulness of the randomized response order as a design feature.

baseline.

30. This finding constitutes a contrast to studies focusing on the role of framing, for example, Rodriguez et al. (2021) who find negative framing of trade raises protectionist tendency, but positive framing has zero effect.

5.3 Mixed Information Treatments

In this subsection, we investigate how mixed information treatments, providing evidence on both the gains and losses from trade, and reversed information treatment, emphasizing the cost of tariffs instead of the price saving from trade, may alter the responses.

First, while the "Trade Helps Jobs" information exerts no significant effect on respondents when presented independently, could it help mitigate the effect of the opposite narrative? How would individuals respond to a balanced set of information?

In Table 6, we hence evaluate the effects of providing both the "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Helps Jobs" treatments, in alternative ordering. We find that exposure to the "Trade Helps Jobs" information after learning "Trade Hurts Jobs" weakly diminishes respondents' protectionist responses. Interestingly, exposure to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information after being communicated "Trade Helps Jobs" contributes to a similar likelihood of selecting "More limits on imports" as receiving only the "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative. One interpretation of these findings is that the ordering of the information may play a role in individuals' response to information and the "Trade Helps Jobs" narrative can potentially help to counteract the effect of the preceding, negative narrative. It is interesting to notice in Column (0c) that individuals who receive the mixed treatments also tend to express a lower level of confidence in their beliefs. This result suggests that being informed of both the positive and negative effects of trade lowers one's certainty about the net impact of trade, which may explain the corresponding less protectionist response.

Next we provide a "reversed" treatment to investigate whether participants may respond differently to the price treatment if the price effects of imports were presented in an opposite manner. In particular, while individuals may place little weight on the price saving effect of trade, we ask next if they may be more concerned about price hikes as a result of tariffs. To explore that, we provide a "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatment (Treatment 4) which describes the evidence from Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019) showing that the tariffs imposed in 2018, particularly on imports from China, raised the prices of tariff-related goods and lowered US real income by $1.4 billion per month. Despite that many participants believed the information affected their views on trade policy, they continued to select protectionist policies.

Overall, looking across the above variants of the survey treatments, two takeaways stand out. First, the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment appears to have a particularly robust ability to shift respondents towards favoring more trade protection. Second, this effect may be partially counteracted when the individuals are presented with a balanced set of information describing both the job losses and gains from imports.

5.4 Attention and Comprehension

One concern that may arise in interpreting the documented responses so far is the degree of attention and comprehension that respondents actually exhibited as they completed the survey. Could the unanticipated response to the "Trade Helps" narratives have been caused by a confusion of the information? We investigate below the respondents' ability to recall information across treatment groups and the role of attention.

Recall Information. Table 7 presents the end-of-survey recollection of treatment information. The regressions are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the control group), those who received the jobs-related treatments (Columns 1 and 2), and those who received the prices-related treatments (columns 3 and 4). Despite the length of the survey, respondents, on average, appeared to be able to recall the basic content of the information, that is, whether the survey they received contained information "about jobs", "about prices", or "others" and the probability of correctly recalling information did not vary across treatments. There is no evidence of systematic confusion of the "Prices" vs. "jobs" narratives. This suggests that the adverse response to the positive trade narrative is unlikely to be driven by participants' misunderstanding of the treatment.[31]

Attention. Nonetheless, we show in Table 8 that attention matters. In particular, as shown in Columns 1 and 3, respondents spending a longer duration on the survey were more likely to correctly recall the nature of the information. Further, respondents that received the "Trade Helps Jobs" information were less likely to prefer trade protection the longer they spent reading the survey. This can be seen in Column 2 where we interact the "Trade Helps Jobs" treatment with an "above-median treatment duration" variable, an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent spent an above-median amount of time on the information treatment screen page relative to all respondents who received the same information treatment. Respondents with an "above-median" treatment duration appeared to have better comprehended, and more positively responded to, all the different variants of the "Trade Helps Jobs" information. Note that for the other treatments, "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", "Trade Helps Prices China", and "Tariff Hurts Prices", even those who spent above median time on the information continued to express more support for protectionism.

These results suggest that attention and comprehension do not appear to be the driving force behind the documented responses to information. The only area in which attention and effort may influence people's reactions to information is positive job-related information, where more time-intensive information treatments may better communicate the benefits of

31. Results are robust to including a dummy variable for whether the respondent was shown a followup "reasons" question, which could have a reminder effect.

trade. For all the other types of information, attention and effort do not appear to alter individuals' instinctive responses.[32] In the next section, we turn to alternative mechanisms that may help explain the consistent preferences for trade protection, irrespective of the information treatments.

6 Exploring the Mechanisms

If the respondents understand the information, why do both the "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments provoke similar protectionist responses? In order to shed light on this question, we seek to explore potential mechanisms underlying the documented effects including the roles of economic interests, social and political concerns, and behavioral factors. We also investigate in depth the rationales provided by the respondents themselves, in particularly, the role of perceptions with regards to the largest trading partner, China.

6.1 Economic and Non-economic Characteristics

We start by augmenting the previous regression analysis (1) with interaction terms between the "Trade Hurts Jobs"/"Trade Helps Prices" dummies and respondent characteristics. In particular, we estimate the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{1}(Policy_i) &= \sum_{b=1}^{B} \alpha_b \, \mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b) \times x_i \\ &\quad + \sum_{b=1}^{B} \beta_b \mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b) + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where $x_i \in X_i$. The objective here is to explore channels through which the "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative might be operating in influencing support for trade policies, to the extent that these mechanisms can be reflected in or proxied by respondent characteristics x_i.

We focus on several key potential motivations of policy preferences which include: (a) economic self-interest, such as those derived from personal exposure to economic outcomes of trade (via industry of employment, local import penetration), the respondent's education level, and household income; (b) sociotropic perceptions, such as those regarding the distri-

32. Round 2 of the survey took place during the early months of the Covid-19 pandemic and also overlapped with political events related to the Black Lives Matter movement. Appendix Table 6 explores whether this could have affected the attention of survey participants. We control here for a county-level measure of Safegraph individual mobility that are constructed by the data provider from cell phone signal data as a proxy for the severity of local Covid-19 lockdowns. We also control for a measure of county-level Black Lives Matter protests. Neither of these controls has a significant effect on preferences over trade policy, nor do they affect the information treatment effect results.

bution of income inequality, trust in government, and the effect of trade; (c) identity politics such as political positions and views; and (d) behavioral factors, in particular, the degree of loss aversion. Note, however, that these categories are certainly not mutually exclusive; some variables such as education and sociotropic views may influence individual preferences through multiple mechanisms.

In Figure 1A-1C, we report the results from interaction specifications run on both the baseline sample and the sample of respondents that spent above-median duration on treatments. For brevity, we present estimates of (2) from OLS regressions using the first principal component measure of preferences for protection as the dependent variable so that the magnitudes of the coefficients plotted can be directly compared.

Economic Self-interest

Exposure to Import Competition. We first analyze whether exposure to adverse effects of import competition due to one's industry of employment or geographic location might lead to resonance with the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information. In particular, based on classical trade theories (such as Stolper-Samuelson), respondents working in the manufacturing sector or living in areas with greater import penetration might, in principle, be more responsive to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment, and by extension, be less receptive to information about the benefits of trade.

We test this hypothesis by interacting the respective treatment dummies with an indicator variable for whether the respondent is from the manufacturing sector (Appendix Table 7a and 7b's Column 1), and with the Autor et al. (2013) measure of China import penetration during the 2000s (Column 2), respectively. As shown in Figure 1.a and Appendix Table 7a-7b, we do not find significant evidence in support of this channel. Respondents' employment in manufacturing or exposure to Chinese import competition explains neither overall preferences for trade protection nor reactions to any of the treatments.

Education. Might education temper protectionist tendencies? In Column 3 of Appendix Table 7a-7b, we explore this possibility by introducing an interaction term between the treatments and a dummy for whether the respondent was a college graduate. Again, we find education to play no significant roles in both the level of protectionist tendency nor reactions to information.

Income. We also examine additional proxies for economic self-interests including, for example, household income and unemployment status. The results in Appendix Tables 7a-7b show that while respondent characteristics that in principle indirectly capture trade exposure via industry, location, and education group do not appear to reinforce the ability of the information treatments to move preferences in a protectionist direction, more direct markers

of exposure measured by household income and reported effects of NAFTA are associated with the degree of protectionist reactions. Respondents with lower household income and reporting negative effects of NAFTA tend to respond more strongly and negatively to trade narratives.

Sociotropic Perceptions

Income Inequality. In addition to economic self-interests, another category that might play a potential role in people's policy preferences is sociotropic concerns. One hypothesis is that participants with stronger concerns regarding how big a problem inequality is in the US today may exhibit more willingness to adopt protectionist policies to address this problem. As seen in Appendix Tables 8a-8b, participants more concerned about income inequality are less likely to favor protectionist policies; instead, they tend to rank alternative economic policies such as more progressive taxes and a higher minimum wage higher on their policy choices (available on request). The interaction effects with the different treatments are again not significant.

Trust in Government. Another hypothesis on preferences for trade protection (especially relative to alternative policy instruments) concerns a potential lack of trust in government. When individuals are less confident in the government's ability to address negative economic outcomes of imports via domestic redistribution policies, they may opt for policies to restrict foreign competition instead. For example, Kuziemko et al. (2015) show that the low trust in government can explain the lack of responsiveness in individuals' preference for redistribution policies even when made aware of the severity of income inequality. This motivates us to examine here whether distrust in governments may feed into more protectionist tendencies, irrespective of information treatments. The results in Appendix Tables 8a-8b offer support to the above hypothesis. We find that while less trust in government leads to overall weaker preferences over the use of trade policy, respondents reporting less trust are more likely to prefer trade protection (as opposed to alternative policy instruments) when receiving the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information.

Pessimistic Views and Domestic Preference. We also consider how other types of perceptions such as a dissatisfaction with the US Job Market and confidence in the outlook for future generations born into their community may explain reactions to the information. The results show that those more dissatisfied with the US job market and more pessimistic about the future of their children are more likely to express trade protection preferences in reaction to the information treatments, regardless of the content of the information. Further, the "tariff hurts prices" narrative appears to reinforce protectionist tendencies for individuals that exhibit willingness to pay more for domestic US brands.

Identity Politics

Could the treatment effects be driven by the role of information in reinforcing or even provoking one's prior beliefs? Instead of being swayed by the evidence, the respondents may simply react to the information following their priors.

Political Belief. To examine this hypothesis and proxy for political priors, we use information on whether the respondent supported the Republican or Democratic presidential candidate in the 2016 election and the political leaning of the newspapers consumed by the respondent. As reported in Appendix Tables 9a-9b, we find that first, respondents who supported the Republican candidate in 2016 exhibit significantly stronger preferences for trade protection, and that Republican support appears to accentuate the information treatment effects associated with the jobs-related treatments, particularly the mixed treatments where both "Trade Helps Jobs" and "Trade Hurts Jobs" are conveyed (Columns 1 and 6) On the other hand, respondents who self-report supporting the Democratic presidential candidate in 2016 are less likely to voice a preference for protection after being presented with information that "Trade Hurts Jobs" or with information that trade has beneficial effects on goods prices (Columns 2 and 7). Political identity in recent years in the US has also been strongly aligned with the news sources that individuals follow. We therefore explore in Columns 3 and 8 a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent supported the Republican presidential candidate and 2016 and reports following right-leaning news sources (including Fox News); the respondent characteristics in Columns 4 and 9 is a dummy variable for Democratic candidate support and following left-leaning news sources. The results are broadly consistent with the prior two columns in each panel, although the interaction coefficients are less precisely estimated, and thus we derive implications of these results with caution. A possible interpretation of the results is that information on trade outcomes, irrespective of gains or losses, tends to amplify and even provoke the trade policy preferences of respondents with a given prior derived from their political identity.

Behavioral Factor

After exploring the potential effects of economic, sociotropic, and political considerations, we next examine the role of behavioral factors, specifically, that of loss aversion in explaining the lack of symmetric reactions we documented earlier to the losses versus the gains from trade. As noted in an extensive literature led by the early work of Kahneman and Tversky (1984) and Kahneman et al. (1991), individuals often place an asymmetric value on losses than gains: the disutility of giving up an object is perceived to be greater that the utility associated with acquiring it. Freund and Ozden (2008) show theoretically that loss aversion and reference dependence can be important in shaping people's preferences over trade policy,

leading to a deviation from free trade that favors loss-making industries. Could loss aversion help explain the unexpected responses to the "Trade Helps Prices" treatment?

Loss Aversion To answer this question, we build on existing studies such as Kahneman et al. (1991) using lab experiments to measure individuals' level of loss aversion and include three questions in the survey to assess the participant's preferences to avoid losses relative to acquiring equivalent gains.[33] In line with the existing evidence, we document an asymmetry in people's value on avoiding losses versus obtaining gains. Most respondents expressed stronger preferences for avoiding the additional surcharge than getting an equivalent discount and weaker willingness to pay than willingness to accept. In Appendix Tables 9a-9b, we show that while this loss aversion does not lead to different responses to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment, it helps explain the protectionist response to the "Trade Helps Prices" treatment. Consistent with the hypothesis put forward in Freund and Ozden (2008), individuals exhibiting stronger degrees of loss aversion are more likely to ignore the price gains of imports by preferring more limits on imports.

While the above mechanisms may certainly overlap and interact with one another, the findings highlight the particular importance of non-economic factors, especially that of priors, identity politics, and loss aversion, in explaining whether and how information might shift individuals' preferences for trade policies. Economic self-interests and the economic outcomes of trade as long emphasized in classical trade theories do not appear as the driving force leading individuals more or less elastic to the information. Providing evidence-based information in the context of our experiment can trigger differential and sometimes unexpected reactions by reinforcing or provoking priors, especially those more pessimistic, right-leaning, and more averse to losses.

6.2 Why Limit Imports? The Role of China

In the remainder of this section, we continue the search for rationales that motivated the preferences for import restrictions by exploiting directly the explanations respondents provided. Our previous results show that amid the ongoing trade war and continuing tension between China and the US, the US public would react adversely to essentially any information pertaining to trade, even if the information does not explicitly mention the identity of

33. Specifically, the following questions are included to measure the willingness to avoid paying versus the willingness to be paid: (i) which of the following would you prefer on your monthly cell phone statement: Avoiding an additional surcharge of $100 vs Getting a discount of $100? (ii) suppose you are given a cell phone with a market value around $500 - please choose one of the options below to indicate the price you would be willing to pay if you had to purchase the cell phone yourself; and (iii) suppose you are given a cell phone with a market value around $500 - please choose one of the options below to indicate the price you would be willing to accept if you were to sell the cell phone.

the trading partner, China. To shed light on the motives behind such responses, we requested explanations for choosing "More limits on imports" despite being exposed to information on positive effects of trade in the last section of the survey.

Table 9 reports the summary statistics on respondents' agreement with a specific reason for picking "More limits on imports" as a top-three policy choice. We find that first, participants receiving the "Trade Helps Prices" and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments are not less unpersuaded. In fact, they are more likely to disagree with the statement that "they picked more limits on imports because they were not persuaded." This piece of finding again confirms that the protectionist response to the "Trade Helps Prices" treatment documented earlier is not driven by the lack of persuasion in this particular treatment, but instead, concerns over jobs, national security, and other important concerns. Similarly, participants informed with "Trade Helps Jobs" are not less convinced than participants told "Trade Hurts Jobs". Instead, the former group preferred more limits on imports because of their particular concerns over imports from China.

Table 10 reports the ordered-logit regressions on the respondents' reasoning and comparison across different treatment groups. The dependent variable in each column is an ordered categorical variable for the degree of agreement with the respective reason, with 1 being "Strongly Disagree" and 5 being "Strongly Agree". Similar to the patterns in Table 10, we find that respondents are most likely to cite "Concerns about imports from China" as their reason for preferring trade protection. After that, the next factor on the list is "Competition with jobs." Comparing respondents receiving information without the mention of China with others shows that excluding the identity of the trading partner lowers the respondents' scores given to each reason, but concerns about China remain as the top factor for selecting import restrictions.

The above finding is also pronounced in respondents' own description of why they chose trade protection. As shown in Figure 2's word cloud analysis drawn from respondents' comments in the open-ended question, "China" appeared frequently as the respodent's rationale for favoring trade restrictions, along with "American Jobs", "Self Reliance", and "America First". The pattern is broadly similar across treatment groups whether or not the information presented included China in the wording.

7 Discussions and Conclusion

Understanding how evidence-based information might shape individuals' attitudes towards globalization and preferences over trade policies is critical, as economists have traditionally viewed trade policy preferences as being driven by economic self-interests, with little analysis

on how the information that the public is exposed to can in turn affect views towards trade We answer the question by developing and administering a series of survey experiments in 2018-2022 that contain randomized information treatments with concise summaries of evidence established by economic researchers on the gains and losses from trade.

Our results suggest that a "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative shifts policy preferences towards being more protectionist, with an elasticity equivalent to a third of the effect of self-identified political position. In contrast, reactions to the job-gains-from-trade narrative are highly asymmetric and display even similar protectionist tendencies. More strikingly, exposing participants to the "Trade Helps Prices" or "Tariff Hurts Prices" information also induces protectionist choices, with a magnitude quantitatively comparable to the effect of the "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative. These findings are robust throughout the five-year period of the survey despite the unprecedented disruptions and fast-evolving political and economic movements and even when the narratives exclude the identity of the trading partner, China. Taken together, our findings on these information treatment effects underscore the challenges of communicating the benefits of trade to the general public through the provision of evidence-based information.

When exploring underlying mechanisms, the analysis points to the particular role of interactions between information and individual priors, including perceptions of the economic impact of trade, social concerns, political identity, as well as concerns over trade with China. Concerns over China, in particular, have been shown to act as a key factor in individuals' preferences for import limits regardless of the narrative presented. These results suggest that individuals' preferences over trade policies are not formed in isolation from the identity of the key countries that the U.S. is trading with. Instead, considerations related to geopolitics that go beyond strictly economic rationales appear to come into play.

Our research sheds light on whether the provision of short evidence-based messaging can help to steer public preferences towards trade policy. The research design allows us to examine the relative ability of pro- versus anti-globalization narratives to gain traction with the general public. This could in turn inform the manner in which public education and messaging could be formulated, in order to more effectively communicate the benefits and costs of globalization to the public. Furthermore, if preferences for trade policies can be steered with simple information treatments in either intended or intended directions, this would open avenues for rethinking the role that information and communication ought to play in the political economy of trade policy formation. The analysis suggests that public messaging that focuses solely on communicating the benefits of trade are unlikely to succeed unless they address broader geopolitical concerns.

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A Appendix

A.1 Survey Treatments

The following preamble is presented at the start of each of the information treatment narratives (excluding the control group).

> How have globalization and imports affected workers and households? Economic researchers have been studying this issue.

"Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative. Based on Autor, Dorn and Hanson (AER 2013):

> A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from China, after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This was a major force behind the fall in U.S. employment in the manufacturing sector, as the figure below shows. This led to weak wage growth for the middle- and low-income workers who used to hold these manufacturing jobs.




FIGURE 1. IMPORT PENETRATION RATIO FOR US IMPORTS FROM CHINA (*left scale*), AND SHARE OF US WORKING-AGE POPULATION EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURING (*right scale*)

"Trade Helps Jobs". Based on Caliendo, Dvorkin and Parro (2019):

> A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from China, after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This enabled the U.S. to specialize more in the service sectors in which

it is particularly productive, helping to increase the number of jobs in the U.S. economy. The figure below shows that the rise in total jobs over the last decades was substantial.



Starting in 2020, two additional treatments were included that mix the "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Helps Jobs" narratives:

- "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs": "Trade Hurts Jobs" is presented first, followed by "Trade Helps Jobs". The narratives are prefaced respectively by: "On the one hand, a line of recent research..." and "On the other hand, another line of recent research...". (The figures from both narratives were included.)

- "Trade Helps Hurts Jobs": This is analogous to "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs", except that the order of the "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Helps Jobs" narratives are reversed.

Starting in 2021, two additional treatments were included that excluded the word "China" from the narratives:


- "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs sans China": A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from the rest of the world, as a result of globalization. This was a major force behind the fall in U.S. employment in the manufacturing sector, as the figure below shows. This led to weak wage growth for the middle- and low-income workers who used to hold these manufacturing jobs.

- "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs sans China": A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from the rest of the world, as a result

of globalization. This enabled the U.S. to specialize more in the service sectors in which it is particularly productive, helping to increase the number of jobs in the U.S. economy. The figure below shows that the rise in total jobs over the last decades was substantial.

"Trade Helps Prices":

A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from China, after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This was a major force behind the availability of cheaper goods, which benefited Americans. As imports from China increased, the prices of durable goods (computers, electrical products, furniture, etc.) and of nondurable goods such as apparel all saw declines, as the figure below shows.



Import Penetration Ratio for US Imports from China (*left scale*),
US Prices for Durables or Apparel (*right scale*)


Two variants of the "Trade Helps Prices" treatment were included in the survey starting in 2020:

- "Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper". The sentence: "This was a major force behind the availability of cheaper goods, which benefited Americans." was replaced by: "This was a major force behind the increased availability of goods, which benefited Americans." This wording was intended to replace the adjective "cheaper", which could have triggered negative views towards imports due to the possible association of "cheaper" with imported goods being of "low quality".

- "Trade Helps Prices sans China". Any references to "China" were removed from the narrative, as follows: "A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from the rest of the world, as a result of globalization. This was a major force behind the availability of cheaper goods, which benefited Americans. As imports from the rest of the world increased, the prices of durable goods (computers, electrical products, furniture, etc.) and of nondurable goods such as apparel all saw declines, as the figure below shows."

"Tariff Hurts Prices":

> A line of recent research has shown that the tariffs in 2018 have raised the cost of living in the United States. Over the course of 2018, the U.S. imposed tariffs on approximately $400 billion of imports, particularly from China. This led to significant increases in U.S. prices of tariff-related goods, as the figure below shows. It is estimated that this increase in prices lowered U.S. real income by $1.4 billion per month.



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Core goods excludes food and energy; tariff-related goods prices includes laundry equipment and other appliances, furniture and bedding, housekeeping supplies, window and floor coverings, auto parts and bicycles.

Table 1
Summary Statistics: Respondent Characteristics by Survey Round

SURVEY:	Round 1, 2018-19 (N=2,277)	Round 2, 2020 (N=6,009)	Round 3, 2021 (N=4,058)	Round 4, 2022 (N=6,035)
Biodata				
Gender: Male	0.49 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.51 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	47.55 [16.78]	45.45 [16.61]	46.55 [16.69]	46.45 [16.78]
Race: White	0.61 [0.49]	0.67 [0.47]	0.62 [0.48]	0.62 [0.49]
Race: African-American	0.11 [0.32]	0.13 [0.33]	0.12 [0.32]	0.12 [0.33]
Race: Hispanic	0.17 [0.37]	0.13 [0.34]	0.18 [0.38]	0.17 [0.38]
Born in US?	0.92 [0.27]	0.92 [0.27]	0.91 [0.28]	0.92 [0.28]
Socio-Economic Characteristics				
Household Income: Average $ (approx.)	58,196 [47,585]	64,886 [54,093]	62,010 [49,462]	58,785.19 [45,827.39]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.81 [4.91]	11.56 [4.86]	11.71 [4.87]	11.70 [4.86]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.40 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.10 [0.30]	0.11 [0.32]	0.10 [0.30]	0.10 [0.30]
Employment Status: Employed	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.08 [0.26]	0.09 [0.28]	0.07 [0.26]	0.07 [0.26]
Employment Sector: Services	0.39 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.39 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Student?	0.03 [0.17]	0.04 [0.20]	0.04 [0.20]	0.03 [0.17]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	---	3.11 [1.47]	3.07 [1.50]	3.06 [1.50]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes				
Last Presidential election: Supported Dem.	0.41 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.49 [0.50]	0.44 [0.50]
Last Presidential election: Supported Rep.	0.34 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]	0.33 [0.47]	0.34 [0.47]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.50 [1.05]	2.79 [1.13]	2.69 [1.11]	2.55 [1.08]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.16 [0.90]	3.35 [0.90]	3.31 [0.87]	3.11 [0.91]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.48 [0.50]	0.35 [0.48]	0.40 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.59 [0.49]	0.65 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]	0.61 [0.49]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	3.01 [0.96]	2.96 [0.95]	2.97 [0.96]	2.99 [0.94]
Inflation in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	---	---	---	3.42 [0.80]
News consumption patterns				
Number of days per week (approx.)	5.02 [2.47]	5.29 [2.34]	5.01 [2.43]	4.87 [2.52]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.29 [0.45]	0.26 [0.44]	0.25 [0.43]	0.26 [0.44]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.17 [0.37]	0.21 [0.40]	0.20 [0.40]	0.16 [0.37]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.16 [0.36]	0.17 [0.38]	0.15 [0.36]	0.16 [0.37]
Location Characteristics				
Share with college and above (age>=25)	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.12]	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.10]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.56 [1.82]	2.57 [2.11]	2.54 [1.77]	2.61 [2.02]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]
Urban?	0.86 [0.35]	0.87 [0.33]	0.86 [0.35]	0.85 [0.35]
Survey Characteristics				
Duration to complete (secs.)	727 [1,513]	912 [2,292]	888 [1,015]	897.27 [924.71]
Treatment duration	47 [66]	28 [84]	28 [58]	26.09 [64.37]
Mobile device?	0.61 [0.49]	0.70 [0.46]	0.58 [0.49]	0.54 [0.50]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumpton, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the survey response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to respondents with "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate".

Table 2
Expressed Policy Preferences: (Unconditional) Respondent Shares

SURVEY:	Round 1, 2018-19 (N=2,277)	Round 2, 2020 (N=6,009)	Round 3, 2021 (N=4,058)	Round 4, 2022 (N=6,035)
Do you support placing more limits on imports?	0.57 [0.49]	0.62 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]	0.58 [0.49]
Would you support an increase in the US tariff rate?	0.28 [0.45]	0.25 [0.43]	0.25 [0.43]	0.32 [0.47]
Prefer: Higher tariff rates on foreign countries?	0.44 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]
Prefer: More progressive taxes?	0.68 [0.46]	0.65 [0.48]	0.68 [0.47]	0.68 [0.47]
Would you support signing more FTAs?	0.68 [0.47]	0.65 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]
Would you support a minimum wage?	0.78 [0.41]	0.80 [0.40]	0.74 [0.44]	0.78 [0.42]
Most Preferred Policies (pick 3 out of 8)				
More limits on foreign imports	0.23 [0.42]	0.27 [0.44]	0.28 [0.45]	0.28 [0.45]
Exiting from FTAs	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.33]	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.33]
More limits on immigration	0.34 [0.47]	0.31 [0.46]	0.37 [0.48]	0.35 [0.48]
Weaken the USD	0.07 [0.26]	0.09 [0.29]	0.09 [0.28]	0.08 [0.28]
More progressive taxes	0.51 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]
Higher minimum wage	0.61 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.56 [0.50]	0.61 [0.49]
More unemployment benefits	0.30 [0.46]	0.34 [0.47]	0.29 [0.45]	0.30 [0.46]
Improvement on education	0.59 [0.49]	0.49 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.56 [0.50]

Notes: Values reported are equal to the share of respondents pooled across all survey treatments who expressed a preference for the policy in question; standard deviations are in brackets. The shares for "Prefer: Higher tariff rates on foreign countries?" and "Prefer: More progressive taxes?" do not sum to one, as respondents were allowed to select both policies in the survey question.

Table 3
Effect of Information Treatments on Preferences Towards Trade Policy
(Round 1, 2018-2019)

Trade Policy Questions:	(1) More limits on imports	(2) US tariff rate increase	(3) Support higher tariff	(4) Support more FTAs	(5) Most Pref.: More limits on Imports	(6) First principal component
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS
Treatment dummies:						
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.060*	0.045*	0.083***	-0.046	0.080***	0.282***
	[0.032]	[0.026]	[0.032]	[0.030]	[0.024]	[0.076]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.007	0.033	0.064	0.017	0.04	0.135
	[0.035]	[0.034]	[0.041]	[0.032]	[0.027]	[0.098]
Trade Helps Prices	0.057*	0.018	0.071*	-0.007	0.069**	0.211**
	[0.034]	[0.030]	[0.039]	[0.032]	[0.028]	[0.089]
Most Pref., Randomization Order					-0.003	0.003
					[0.003]	[0.011]
Last Pres. Election:	-0.042	-0.043*	-0.043	0.091***	-0.064***	-0.259***
Supported Democrat	[0.029]	[0.022]	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.019]	[0.075]
Last Pres. Election:	0.224***	0.147***	0.219***	-0.034	0.092***	0.728***
Supported Republican	[0.030]	[0.028]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.023]	[0.081]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0970	0.103	0.0742	0.0746	0.0783	0.183
Log Likelihood	-1403	-1214	-1448	-1318	-1138	---

Notes: Based on the Round 1 (2018-2019) survey sample; for respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs" and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments. The dependent variable in Columns 1-4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicated support for the policy in a directly-posed question; that in Column 5 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent identified "More limits on imports" among his/her three "Most preferred" out of the list of eight policies; while that in Column 6 is the first principal component constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are: individual dummies for gender, age group, race, level of studies, household income bins, employment status (including broad sector), survey answered on mobile device, BEA region of birth (including foreign-born category), frequency following current affairs, and news program source; county controls for share of college educated, ADH exposure to China imports (2000-2007), manufacturing share of employment, urban dummy, missing county information dummy; survey response week dummies. The "Most Pref., Randomization Order" variable is the rank order in which "More Limits on Imports" was presented among the eight policy options to the respondent in question. Columns 1-5 report marginal effects from logit regressions, evaluated setting the treatment dummies uniformly to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Column 6 reports an OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 4
Exploring the "Jobs" Treatments
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Trade Policy Questions:	(0) Did information affect views?	(1) More limits on imports	(2) US tariff rate increase	(3) Support higher tariff	(4) Support more FTAs	(5) Most Pref.: More limits on Imports	(6) First principal component	(7a) Impact of trade for most Americans?	(7b) Confidence in assessment in (7a)
	Ordered logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Treatment dummies:									
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.048***	0.088***	0.072***	0.034**	-0.038**	0.034**	0.237***	-0.250***	-0.02
	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.016]	[0.043]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.032*	0.021	0.023	0.025	-0.004	0.009	0.076*	-0.024	-0.016
	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.020]	[0.016]	[0.045]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Trade Hurts sans China	0.056**	0.052*	0.080***	-0.007	-0.024	0.002	0.152**	-0.207***	-0.037
	[0.025]	[0.029]	[0.027]	[0.030]	[0.027]	[0.024]	[0.072]	[0.025]	[0.025]
Trade Helps sans China	0.021	0.057**	0.064**	0.015	0.023	-0.006	0.123	-0.019	0.001
	[0.025]	[0.029]	[0.026]	[0.032]	[0.028]	[0.024]	[0.076]	[0.023]	[0.026]
Most Pref., Randomization Order						-0.012***	-0.019***		
						[0.002]	[0.007]		
Last Pres. Election:	0.090***	0.01	0.021*	-0.030*	0.112***	-0.048***	-0.104**	0.080***	0.064***
Supported Democrat	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.012]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.014]	[0.041]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Last Pres. Election:	0.081***	0.195***	0.136***	0.144***	-0.057***	0.139***	0.650***	-0.016	0.065***
Supported Republican	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.046]	[0.016]	[0.015]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	6,994	6,964	6,964	6,964	6,964	6,964	6,994	6,994	6,994
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0461	0.0779	0.0817	0.0461	0.0704	0.0781	0.152	0.0623	0.0292
Log Likelihood	-7880	-4358	-3775	-4603	-4212	-3729	---	-9208	-9556

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) survey samples; for respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs", and "Trade Helps Hurts Jobs" treatments. The dependent variable in Column 0 is an ordered categorical variable for degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected one's views on trade policy (1="Strongly disagree", 5="Strongly agree"); that in Columns 1-4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicated support for the policy in a directly-posed question; that in Column 5 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent identified "More limits on imports" among his/her three "Most preferred" out of the list of eight policies; that in Column 6 is the first principal component constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade; that in Column 7a is an ordered categorical variable asked post-treatment on views on the impact that international trade has had for most Americans (1="Extremely bad", 5="Extremely good"); while that in Column 7b is an ordered categorical variable asking respondents how confident they are in their assessment on the impact international trade has had for most Americans (1="Not at all confident", 5="Extremely confident"). The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. Column 0, 7a and 7b report marginal effects from ordered logit regressions, on the predicted probability that either the fourth or fifth highest ordered category is selected as the response; Columns 1-5 report marginal effects from logit regressions. All marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Column 6 reports an OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 5
Exploring the "Prices" Treatments
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Trade Policy Questions:	(0) Did information affect views?	(1) More limits on imports	(2) US tariff rate increase	(3) Support higher tariff	(4) Support more FTAs	(5) Most Pref.: More limits on Imports	(6) First principal component	(7a) Impact of trade for most Americans?	(7b) Confidence in assessment in (7a)
	Ordered logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Treatment dummies:									
Trade Helps Prices	0.026*	0.056***	0.029**	-0.004	-0.004	0.030**	0.113***	-0.062***	-0.022
	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.015]	[0.042]	[0.016]	[0.015]
Trade Helps Prices sans China	0.004	0.051**	0.043***	-0.007	-0.033*	0.026	0.130***	-0.054***	-0.016
	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.017]	[0.048]	[0.017]	[0.017]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	0.015	0.069***	0.048***	0.021	-0.025	0.028	0.172***	-0.061***	-0.009
	[0.016]	[0.021]	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.017]	[0.050]	[0.017]	[0.017]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.046***	0.040**	0.023	0.019	-0.008	0.023	0.105**	-0.168***	-0.030**
	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.043]	[0.016]	[0.015]
Most Pref., Randomization Order						-0.010***	-0.020***		
						[0.002]	[0.006]		
Last Pres. Election:	0.094***	-0.003	0.014	-0.040***	0.123***	-0.031**	-0.126***	0.106***	0.071***
Supported Democrat	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.012]	[0.038]	[0.013]	[0.014]
Last Pres. Election:	0.081***	0.174***	0.113***	0.141***	-0.038**	0.146***	0.601***	0.017	0.068***
Supported Republican	[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.041]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	8,542	8,542	8,542	8,542	8,542	8,542	8,542	8,542	8,542
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0484	0.0703	0.0746	0.0451	0.0723	0.0761	0.145	0.0517	0.0364
Log Likelihood	-9696	-5378	-4526	-5643	-5127	-4591	---	-11139	-11625

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) survey samples; for respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Helps Prices", "Trade Helps Prices China", "Trade Helps Prices Cheaper", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments. The dependent variable in Column 0 is an ordered categorical variable for degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected one's views on trade policy (1="Strongly disagree", 5="Strongly agree"); that in Columns 1-4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicated support for the policy in a directly-posed question; that in Column 5 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent identified "More limits on imports" among his/her three "Most preferred" out of the list of eight policies; that in Column 6 is the first principal component constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade; that in Column 7a is an ordered categorical variable asked post-treatment on views on the impact that international trade has had for most Americans (1="Extremely bad", 5="Extremely good"); while that in Column 7b is an ordered categorical variable asking respondents how confident they are in their assessment on the impact international trade has had for most Americans (1="Not at all confident", 5="Extremely confident"). The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. Column 0, 7a and 7b report marginal effects from ordered logit regressions, on the predicted probability that either the fourth or fifth highest ordered category is selected as the response; Columns 1-5 report marginal effects from logit regressions. All marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Column 6 reports an OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 6
Exploring the Mixed "Job" Treatments
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Trade Policy Questions:	(0) Did information affect views?	(1) More limits on imports	(2) US tariff rate increase	(3) Support higher tariff	(4) Support more FTAs	(5) Most Pref.: More limits on Imports	(6) First principal component	(7a) Impact of trade for most Americans?	(7b) Confidence in assessment in (7a)
	Ordered logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Treatment dummies:									
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	0.043***	0.053***	0.034**	0.031	-0.035*	0.057***	0.183***	-0.100***	-0.025
	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.049]	[0.017]	[0.017]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	0.052***	0.090***	0.059***	0.023	-0.03	0.030*	0.211***	-0.217***	-0.025
	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.016]	[0.046]	[0.017]	[0.017]
Most Pref., Randomization Order						-0.010***	-0.014*		
						[0.002]	[0.007]		
Last Pres. Election:	0.096***	0.025	0.051***	-0.019	0.108***	-0.032*	-0.029	0.116***	0.063***
Supported Democrat	[0.014]	[0.020]	[0.014]	[0.021]	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.049]	[0.017]	[0.019]
Last Pres. Election:	0.096***	0.200***	0.147***	0.145***	-0.050**	0.153***	0.681***	0.048**	0.055***
Supported Republican	[0.015]	[0.021]	[0.017]	[0.020]	[0.021]	[0.019]	[0.054]	[0.019]	[0.017]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	5,044	5,044	5,044	5,044	5,044	5,044	5,044	5,044	5,044
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0488	0.074	0.0907	0.0486	0.0789	0.0849	0.159	0.0568	0.0335
Log Likelihood	-5657	-3169	-2640	-3323	-3040	-2716	---	-6532	-6860

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) survey samples; for respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs" and "Trade Helps Hurts Jobs" treatments. The dependent variable in Column 0 is an ordered categorical variable for degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected one's views on trade policy (1="Strongly disagree", 5="Strongly agree"); that in Columns 1-4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicated support for the policy in a directly-posed question; that in Column 5 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent identified "More limits on imports" among his/her three "Most preferred" out of the list of eight policies; that in Column 6 is the first principal component constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade; that in Column 7a is an ordered categorical variable asked post-treatment on views on the impact that international trade has had for most Americans (1="Extremely bad", 5="Extremely good"); while that in Column 7b is an ordered categorical variable asking respondents how confident they are in their assessment on the impact international trade has had for most Americans (1="Not at all confident", 5="Extremely confident"). The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. Column 0, 7a and 7b report marginal effects from ordered logit regressions, on the predicted probability that either the fourth or fifth highest ordered category is selected as the response; Columns 1-5 report marginal effects from logit regressions. All marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Column 6 reports an OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 7
End-of-Survey Recollection of Treatment Information
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Sample: "Control" and Jobs treatments	(1) Info received on jobs? Logit	(2) Info received on prices? Logit	**Sample:** "Control" and Prices treatments	(3) Info received on jobs? Logit	(4) Info received on prices? Logit
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.133***	-0.050***	Trade Helps Prices	-0.053***	0.144***
	[0.018]	[0.017]		[0.016]	[0.018]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.152***	-0.066***	Trade Helps Prices sans China	-0.063***	0.155***
	[0.016]	[0.017]		[0.017]	[0.018]
Trade Hurts sans China	0.161***	-0.053*	Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	-0.038**	0.125***
	[0.030]	[0.029]		[0.017]	[0.018]
Trade Helps sans China	0.217***	-0.117***	Tariff Hurts Prices	-0.058***	0.128***
	[0.030]	[0.028]		[0.015]	[0.016]
Info randomization order	-0.027**	0	Info randomization order	-0.003	-0.001
	[0.011]	[0.013]		[0.012]	[0.013]
Last Pres. Election:	0.021	0.045**	Last Pres. Election:	0.011	0.056***
Supported Democrat	[0.015]	[0.018]	Supported Democrat	[0.015]	[0.016]
Last Pres. Election:	0.042**	-0.001	Last Pres. Election:	0.011	0.062***
Supported Republican	[0.016]	[0.019]	Supported Republican	[0.016]	[0.017]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y
Observations	6,964	6,964	Observations	8,542	8,542
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0368	0.0206	(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0387	0.0342
Log Likelihood	-4475	-4700	Log Likelihood	-4691	-5592

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) survey samples; Columns 1-2 are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the omitted category) and those who received the jobs-related treatments, while Columns 3-4 are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment and those who received the prices-related treatments. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 3 is a dummy variable for whether the respondent indicated the information received during the survey was on the relationship between trade and jobs, while that in Columns 2 and 4 is a dummy variable for whether the respondent indicated the information received was on the relationship between trade and prices. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. In Columns 1 and 3 (respectively, Columns 2 and 4), the "Info randomization order" variable is the rank order in which "about jobs" (respectively, "about prices") appeared in the answer options to the respondent in question. All columns report marginal effects from logit regressions; all marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 8
Exploring the Role of Attention Paid as Captured by Treatment Duration
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Sample: "Control" and Jobs treatments	(1) Info recall correct? Logit	(2) First principal component OLS	**Sample:** "Control" and Prices treatments	(3) Info recall correct? Logit	(4) First principal component OLS
Above-median treatment duration	0.230***	---	Above-median treatment duration	0.302***	---
	[0.014]			[0.012]	
Above-median survey duration	-0.024*	0.163***	Above-median survey duration	-0.029***	0.193***
	[0.014]	[0.033]		[0.010]	[0.028]
Trade Hurts Jobs		0.184***	Trade Helps Prices		0.166***
		[0.050]			[0.051]
Trade Helps Jobs		0.133***	Trade Helps Prices sans China		0.192***
		[0.050]			[0.056]
Trade Hurts sans China		0.123	Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper		0.140**
		[0.088]			[0.057]
Trade Helps sans China		0.108	Tariff Hurts Prices		0.178***
		[0.092]			[0.048]
Trade Hurts Jobs		0.110*	Trade Helps Prices		-0.101*
× Above-median treatment duration		[0.064]	× Above-median treatment duration		[0.060]
Trade Helps Jobs		-0.112*	Trade Helps Prices sans China		-0.114
× Above-median treatment duration		[0.059]	× Above-median treatment duration		[0.070]
Trade Hurts sans China		0.059	Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper		0.074
× Above-median treatment duration		[0.106]	× Above-median treatment duration		[0.071]
Trade Helps sans China		0.028	Tariff Hurts Prices		-0.144**
× Above-median treatment duration		[0.114]	× Above-median treatment duration		[0.062]
Most Pref., Randomization Order		-0.019***	Most Pref., Randomization Order		-0.020***
		[0.007]			[0.006]
Last Pres. Election:	-0.003	-0.103**	Last Pres. Election:	-0.005	-0.114***
Supported Democrat	[0.020]	[0.041]	Supported Democrat	[0.014]	[0.038]
Last Pres. Election:	0.032	0.641***	Last Pres. Election:	0.015	0.599***
Supported Republican	[0.020]	[0.046]	Supported Republican	[0.016]	[0.041]
p-value: Main + Interaction Effect = 0			p-value: Main + Interaction Effect = 0		
Trade Hurts Jobs		[0.000]	Trade Helps Prices		[0.222]
Trade Helps Jobs		[0.709]	Trade Helps Prices China		[0.212]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs		[0.044]	Trade Helps Prices Cheaper		[0.001]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs		[0.165]	Tariff Hurts Prices		[0.543]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y
Observations	6,964	6,964	Observations	8,542	8,542
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0532	0.156	(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0903	0.15
Log Likelihood	-4327	---	Log Likelihood	-5383	---

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) survey samples; Columns 1-2 are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the omitted category) and those who received the jobs-related treatments, while Columns 3-4 are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment and those who received the prices-related treatments. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 3 is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent correctly identified the nature of the information received in the survey ("about jobs", "about prices", "none"), while that in Columns 2 and 4 is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Tables 4 and 5) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. "Above-median treatment duration" is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent was in a non-Control group and spent an above-median duration on the information treatment screen page among all respondents who received the same information treatment in the same survey round; while "Above-median survey duration" is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent spent an above-median duration on the entire survey relative to all respondents in the same control or treatment group in the same survey round. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. Columns 1 and 3 report marginal effects from logit regressions; all marginal effects are evaluated setting all right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Columns 2 and 4 report OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 9
Reasons for Picking More Limits on Imports as a Most Preferred Policy: Summary Statistics

Reasons: (5=Strongly agree, 1=Strongly disagree)	Not persuaded	Imports often lower quality	Imports often compete for US jobs	Imports potential threat to National security	Concerned about imports from China	Other more important concerns
Information Treatment received:						
Control (N = 302)	---	3.54 [1.08]	3.85 [1.09]	3.41 [1.12]	3.96 [1.08]	3.61 [1.01]
Trade Hurts Jobs (N = 270)	3.84 [1.02]	3.74 [0.96]	4.09 [0.91]	3.47 [1.00]	4.04 [0.99]	3.81 [0.94]
Trade Helps Jobs (N = 238)	3.62 [1.04]	3.79 [1.04]	4.06 [0.98]	3.69 [1.07]	4.29 [0.97]	3.80 [0.95]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China (N = 183)	3.65 [1.07]	3.64 [1.01]	3.98 [1.01]	3.56 [1.05]	3.83 [1.11]	3.70 [1.02]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China (N = 171)	3.63 [0.92]	3.63 [1.00]	3.92 [0.96]	3.40 [0.99]	3.94 [1.18]	3.60 [0.99]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs (N = 286)	3.44 [1.07]	3.63 [1.09]	3.93 [0.99]	3.43 [1.08]	4.02 [1.02]	3.60 [0.96]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs (N = 248)	3.59 [1.05]	3.77 [1.05]	3.99 [1.03]	3.52 [0.99]	4.09 [1.00]	3.65 [0.94]
Trade Helps Prices (N = 250)	3.30 [1.02]	3.75 [0.99]	4.06 [0.99]	3.43 [1.06]	4.05 [0.98]	3.90 [0.85]
Trade Helps Prices sans China (N = 256)	3.50 [1.08]	3.70 [1.09]	4.09 [1.00]	3.53 [1.13]	4.08 [1.08]	3.81 [1.03]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper (N = 24	3.44 [1.14]	3.78 [1.03]	4.14 [0.96]	3.73 [1.04]	4.16 [0.93]	3.81 [0.94]
Tariff Hurts Prices (N = 245)	3.27 [1.06]	3.61 [1.15]	3.94 [1.05]	3.50 [1.11]	4.12 [1.01]	3.70 [0.99]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets. Based on the sample of Round 3 (2021) and Round 4 (2022) respondents who selected More Limits on Imports as a top three most preferred policy and were directed to these follow-up questions on their reasons for this preference; note that Control group respondents were only directed to these follow-up questions in Round 4 (2022).

Table 10
"Sans China" Treatments and Reasons for Picking "More Limits on Imports"

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable: (5=Strongly agree, 1=Strongly disagree)	Agreement Score: Reason for Limit Imports as Most Pref. Policy			
	OLS			
Assigned Sans China Treatment?	0.317***	---	0.055	---
	[0.075]		[0.067]	
Reason Question:				
Quality Concerns	0.760***	0.760***	0.469***	0.471***
	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.032]	[0.032]
Compete with Jobs	1.077***	1.077***	0.780***	0.780***
	[0.056]	[0.056]	[0.033]	[0.033]
National Security	0.523***	0.523***	0.282***	0.282***
	[0.056]	[0.056]	[0.034]	[0.034]
Concerns about imports from China	1.123***	1.123***	0.855***	0.856***
	[0.054]	[0.054]	[0.032]	[0.032]
Other reasons	0.848***	0.848***	0.503***	0.503***
	[0.054]	[0.053]	[0.033]	[0.032]
Assigned Sans China Treatment? x Reason Question:				
Quality Concerns	-0.287***	-0.287***	0.003	0.002
	[0.080]	[0.080]	[0.068]	[0.067]
Compete with Jobs	-0.259***	-0.259***	0.04	0.038
	[0.082]	[0.082]	[0.069]	[0.069]
National Security	-0.209**	-0.209**	0.031	0.032
	[0.086]	[0.086]	[0.073]	[0.073]
Concerns about imports from China	-0.344***	-0.344***	-0.079	-0.077
	[0.084]	[0.083]	[0.072]	[0.072]
Other reasons	-0.319***	-0.319***	0.025	0.026
	[0.082]	[0.082]	[0.070]	[0.070]
p-value: Main + Interaction Effect = 0				
Quality Concerns	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Compete with Jobs	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
National Security	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Concerns about imports from China	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Other reasons	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Individual, county, week, randomization order controls?	Y	N	Y	N
Individual FEs?	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	8,154	8,154	14,274	14,274
R-squared	0.156	0.463	0.138	0.478

Notes: The regression sample comprises respondents in Round 3 (2021) and Round 4 (2022) who selected "More limits on imports" as a top three "Most preferred" policy out of the list of eight policies. The dependent variable in each column is an ordered categorical variable for degree of agreement with a given reason for selecting "More limits on imports", with 1 being "Strongly Disagree" and 5 being "Strongly Agree". "Assigned sans China Treatments" refer to the respondents who received the Trade Hurts Jobs sans China, Trade Helps Jobs sans China and Trade Helps Prices sans China treatments. The omitted category in columns 1 & 2 is the set of respondents in the Trade Hurts Jobs, Trade Helps Jobs and Trade Helps Prices. In columns 3 & 4, the omitted category is the set of respondents who received all treatments that reference China, i.e. Trade Hurts Jobs, Trade Helps Jobs, Trade Hurts Helps Jobs, Trade Helps Hurts Jobs, Trade Helps Prices and Tariff Hurts Prices. The omitted category for the Reason Questions is "Not persuaded by the treatment". The control variables included in columns 1 & 3 (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes, together with a reason randomization order variable. Individual Fixed Effects are included in place of these controls in columns 2 & 4. Standard errors are clustered by respondent, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 1a
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 1 (2018-2019)

TREATMENT:	Control	Trade Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Prices
Biodata				
Gender: Male	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.50 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	47.14 [17.11]	48.10 [16.78]	47.82 [17.02]	47.17 [16.19]
Race: White	0.60 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.64 [0.48]	0.62 [0.49]
Race: African-American	0.13 [0.33]	0.11 [0.31]	0.11 [0.32]	0.11 [0.31]
Race: Hispanic	0.15 [0.36]	0.18 [0.38]	0.17 [0.37]	0.18 [0.38]
Born in US?	0.92 [0.28]	0.91 [0.29]	0.93 [0.25]	0.92 [0.27]
Socio-Economic Characteristics				
Household Income: Average $ (approx.)	56,283 [46,165]	59,436 [49,180]	60,356 [50,360]	56,851 [44,589]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.84 [4.97]	11.98 [4.87]	11.70 [4.93]	11.73 [4.88]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.41 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.38 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.11 [0.32]	0.09 [0.28]	0.10 [0.30]	0.09 [0.29]
Employment Status: Employed	0.48 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.07 [0.26]	0.08 [0.27]	0.08 [0.27]	0.07 [0.25]
Employment Sector: Services	0.36 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Student?	0.04 [0.20]	0.03 [0.17]	0.03 [0.16]	0.03 [0.17]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes				
Last Presidential election: Supported Dem.	0.42 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]
Last Presidential election: Supported Rep.	0.34 [0.48]	0.34 [0.47]	0.34 [0.47]	0.34 [0.48]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.42 [1.06]	2.45 [1.10]	2.64 [1.02]	2.51 [1.02]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.15 [0.89]	3.12 [0.95]	3.18 [0.86]	3.17 [0.88]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.46 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.59 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]	0.57 [0.49]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	3.07 [0.93]	2.94 [1.01]	3.02 [0.93]	3.01 [0.94]
News consumption patterns				
Number of days per week (approx.)	4.90 [2.52]	5.11 [2.47]	5.03 [2.45]	5.02 [2.44]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.26 [0.44]	0.31 [0.46]	0.28 [0.45]	0.29 [0.45]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.18 [0.38]	0.17 [0.38]	0.18 [0.38]	0.15 [0.36]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.15 [0.36]	0.14 [0.35]	0.16 [0.37]	0.17 [0.38]
Location Characteristics				
Share with college education (age>=25)	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.10]	0.30 [0.11]	0.29 [0.11]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.58 [1.80]	2.50 [1.66]	2.59 [1.83]	2.56 [2.00]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.17 [0.12]	0.17 [0.12]
Urban?	0.89 [0.31]	0.87 [0.34]	0.83 [0.37]	0.84 [0.36]
Survey Characteristics				
Duration to complete (secs.)	594 [571]	619 [406]	936 [2,683]	774 [1,324]
Treatment duration	---	47 [70]	45 [50]	50 [74]
Mobile device?	0.57 [0.50]	0.57 [0.50]	0.65 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets, within each information treatment group. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumpton, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the survey response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to respondents with "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate".

Table 1b
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 2 (2020)

TREATMENT:	Control	Trade Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Jobs	Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Prices	Trade Helps Prices sans China	Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	Tariff Hurts Prices
Biodata									
Gender: Male	0.45 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.44 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.55 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.55 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	44.34 [16.48]	44.88 [17.10]	44.43 [16.88]	44.15 [16.48]	45.31 [16.77]	45.76 [16.75]	48.80 [15.52]	47.32 [16.38]	46.78 [15.91]
Race: White	0.69 [0.46]	0.66 [0.47]	0.67 [0.47]	0.64 [0.48]	0.68 [0.47]	0.69 [0.46]	0.64 [0.48]	0.70 [0.46]	0.65 [0.48]
Race: African-American	0.11 [0.32]	0.13 [0.34]	0.13 [0.34]	0.16 [0.37]	0.12 [0.32]	0.13 [0.34]	0.10 [0.30]	0.13 [0.34]	0.11 [0.31]
Race: Hispanic	0.11 [0.32]	0.14 [0.35]	0.13 [0.33]	0.14 [0.35]	0.13 [0.34]	0.11 [0.32]	0.17 [0.38]	0.10 [0.31]	0.18 [0.38]
Born in US?	0.93 [0.25]	0.93 [0.26]	0.93 [0.26]	0.92 [0.28]	0.91 [0.28]	0.92 [0.27]	0.90 [0.30]	0.93 [0.25]	0.92 [0.27]
Socio-Economic Characteristics									
Household Income: Average $ (approx.)	66,541 [54,351]	64,642 [53,897]	63,792 [54,351]	64,681 [54,427]	66,636 [55,145]	65,231 [52,956]	63,651 [54,416]	63,136 [50,864]	64,825 [55,512]
Education: Average years (approx.)	12.09 [4.83]	11.62 [4.90]	11.74 [4.78]	11.74 [4.82]	11.55 [4.90]	11.66 [4.73]	10.96 [4.92]	11.54 [4.85]	10.68 [4.93]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.36 [0.48]	0.40 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.38 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]	0.38 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.15 [0.36]	0.12 [0.32]	0.12 [0.32]	0.10 [0.30]	0.10 [0.30]	0.10 [0.30]	0.09 [0.29]	0.09 [0.29]	0.13 [0.33]
Employment Status: Employed	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.07 [0.25]	0.09 [0.29]	0.09 [0.29]	0.09 [0.28]	0.11 [0.31]	0.08 [0.27]	0.08 [0.27]	0.07 [0.25]	0.09 [0.28]
Employment Sector: Services	0.37 [0.48]	0.32 [0.47]	0.38 [0.48]	0.37 [0.48]	0.36 [0.48]	0.35 [0.48]	0.38 [0.48]	0.38 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]
Student?	0.04 [0.19]	0.05 [0.22]	0.05 [0.21]	0.05 [0.21]	0.05 [0.22]	0.05 [0.21]	0.03 [0.17]	0.04 [0.20]	0.02 [0.14]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.08 [1.46]	3.09 [1.47]	3.23 [1.44]	3.15 [1.45]	3.10 [1.46]	3.06 [1.52]	3.10 [1.56]	3.02 [1.46]	3.11 [1.48]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes									
Last Presidential election: Supported Dem.	0.41 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]
Last Presidential election: Supported Rep.	0.36 [0.48]	0.35 [0.48]	0.36 [0.48]	0.36 [0.48]	0.37 [0.48]	0.38 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.33 [0.47]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.77 [1.13]	2.79 [1.13]	2.83 [1.14]	2.82 [1.12]	2.77 [1.12]	2.78 [1.11]	2.79 [1.16]	2.83 [1.16]	2.69 [1.15]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.39 [0.91]	3.34 [0.85]	3.34 [0.94]	3.41 [0.88]	3.32 [0.89]	3.35 [0.91]	3.29 [0.95]	3.33 [0.86]	3.33 [0.90]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.34 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]	0.34 [0.47]	0.37 [0.48]	0.34 [0.47]	0.32 [0.47]	0.32 [0.47]	0.33 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.66 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.68 [0.47]	0.63 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.68 [0.47]	0.65 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	2.92 [0.95]	2.95 [0.96]	2.97 [0.94]	2.98 [0.93]	2.98 [0.94]	2.84 [0.98]	3.01 [0.96]	2.93 [0.91]	3.07 [0.95]
News consumption patterns									
Number of days per week (approx.)	5.41 [2.26]	5.24 [2.38]	5.17 [2.45]	5.36 [2.28]	5.16 [2.40]	5.35 [2.30]	5.33 [2.36]	5.58 [2.16]	5.19 [2.39]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.24 [0.43]	0.29 [0.45]	0.24 [0.43]	0.25 [0.44]	0.26 [0.44]	0.25 [0.43]	0.26 [0.44]	0.28 [0.45]	0.22 [0.41]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.22 [0.41]	0.20 [0.40]	0.21 [0.41]	0.20 [0.40]	0.20 [0.40]	0.20 [0.40]	0.21 [0.41]	0.19 [0.39]	0.23 [0.42]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.18 [0.38]	0.17 [0.38]	0.20 [0.40]	0.16 [0.37]	0.17 [0.38]	0.17 [0.38]	0.16 [0.37]	0.19 [0.40]	0.15 [0.36]
Location Characteristics									
Share with college education (age>=25)	0.32 [0.12]	0.31 [0.12]	0.31 [0.12]	0.31 [0.12]	0.32 [0.12]	0.30 [0.11]	0.30 [0.12]	0.31 [0.11]	0.32 [0.12]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.59 [2.02]	2.46 [1.91]	2.71 [2.40]	2.51 [2.18]	2.55 [2.05]	2.60 [2.32]	2.55 [2.34]	2.66 [1.88]	2.51 [1.79]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.15 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.15 [0.11]	0.15 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.12]	0.16 [0.12]	0.16 [0.12]
Urban?	0.89 [0.32]	0.88 [0.33]	0.86 [0.35]	0.87 [0.33]	0.88 [0.33]	0.89 [0.32]	0.84 [0.36]	0.87 [0.34]	0.89 [0.31]
Survey Characteristics									
Duration to complete (secs.)	887 [1,812]	871 [1,204]	952 [2,337]	1,031 [4,706]	924 [1,263]	779 [727]	1,003 [2,240]	831 [1,113]	854 [737]
Treatment duration	7 [10]	26 [78]	33 [96]	32 [165]	26 [44]	34 [46]	31 [60]	34 [42]	28 [55]
Mobile device?	0.71 [0.46]	0.71 [0.46]	0.69 [0.46]	0.70 [0.46]	0.69 [0.46]	0.64 [0.48]	0.72 [0.45]	0.65 [0.48]	0.77 [0.42]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets, within each information treatment group. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumpton, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the survey response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to respondents with "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate".

Table 1c
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 3 (2021)

TREATMENT:	Control	Trade Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Jobs	Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Prices	Trade Helps Prices sans China	Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	Tariff Hurts Prices
Biodata									
Gender: Male	0.46 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.54 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	45.53 [17.23]	45.91 [16.49]	46.29 [16.50]	47.19 [16.97]	45.96 [17.10]	46.76 [16.15]	46.20 [16.43]	47.44 [16.77]	47.65 [16.57]
Race: White	0.61 [0.49]	0.61 [0.49]	0.62 [0.49]	0.64 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.60 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]	0.62 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]
Race: African-American	0.13 [0.33]	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.33]	0.11 [0.31]	0.10 [0.30]	0.12 [0.33]	0.10 [0.30]	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.33]
Race: Hispanic	0.16 [0.37]	0.18 [0.38]	0.18 [0.39]	0.17 [0.37]	0.17 [0.37]	0.18 [0.38]	0.20 [0.40]	0.16 [0.37]	0.19 [0.39]
Born in US?	0.90 [0.30]	0.91 [0.28]	0.91 [0.29]	0.94 [0.24]	0.92 [0.27]	0.91 [0.29]	0.92 [0.28]	0.89 [0.31]	0.93 [0.26]
Socio-Economic Characteristics									
Household Income: Average $ (approx.)	61,560 [50,471]	61,932 [48,021]	60,963 [46,445]	66,472 [54,351]	64,456 [51,312]	59,767 [49,064]	63,182 [49,566]	60,991 [48,760]	58,790 [46,746]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.83 [4.89]	11.57 [4.87]	11.89 [4.82]	11.52 [4.98]	11.86 [4.83]	11.72 [4.80]	11.43 [4.89]	11.95 [4.90]	11.57 [4.89]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.42 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.44 [0.50]	0.40 [0.49]	0.34 [0.48]	0.37 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.09 [0.29]	0.11 [0.32]	0.11 [0.31]	0.08 [0.28]	0.10 [0.30]	0.13 [0.33]	0.11 [0.31]	0.10 [0.30]	0.09 [0.29]
Employment Status: Employed	0.49 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.07 [0.26]	0.07 [0.26]	0.10 [0.30]	0.07 [0.26]	0.05 [0.21]	0.09 [0.28]	0.08 [0.27]	0.06 [0.23]	0.08 [0.27]
Employment Sector: Services	0.38 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.37 [0.48]	0.40 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]
Student?	0.06 [0.24]	0.02 [0.15]	0.04 [0.21]	0.05 [0.21]	0.05 [0.22]	0.02 [0.16]	0.03 [0.17]	0.04 [0.18]	0.05 [0.22]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.14 [1.48]	3.16 [1.48]	3.17 [1.55]	3.07 [1.51]	3.08 [1.52]	2.97 [1.49]	3.08 [1.47]	2.93 [1.45]	3.06 [1.52]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes									
Last Presidential election: Supported Dem.	0.51 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.45 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Last Presidential election: Supported Rep.	0.30 [0.46]	0.32 [0.47]	0.32 [0.47]	0.35 [0.48]	0.32 [0.47]	0.31 [0.46]	0.36 [0.48]	0.31 [0.47]	0.34 [0.47]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.66 [1.11]	2.69 [1.16]	2.63 [1.07]	2.80 [1.16]	2.77 [1.10]	2.59 [1.10]	2.69 [1.08]	2.73 [1.10]	2.61 [1.11]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.30 [0.88]	3.32 [0.92]	3.28 [0.90]	3.40 [0.88]	3.33 [0.85]	3.30 [0.83]	3.33 [0.85]	3.28 [0.87]	3.23 [0.85]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.37 [0.48]	0.42 [0.49]	0.37 [0.48]	0.42 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]	0.37 [0.48]	0.39 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.61 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]	0.66 [0.47]	0.65 [0.48]	0.60 [0.49]	0.64 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	2.94 [1.01]	2.97 [0.98]	3.00 [0.95]	3.01 [0.92]	3.03 [0.92]	3.02 [0.94]	2.93 [0.95]	2.93 [0.98]	2.94 [0.97]
News consumption patterns									
Number of days per week (approx.)	4.94 [2.45]	4.90 [2.45]	4.88 [2.49]	5.25 [2.31]	4.99 [2.47]	4.85 [2.49]	5.10 [2.32]	5.05 [2.45]	5.09 [2.46]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.25 [0.43]	0.26 [0.44]	0.24 [0.43]	0.27 [0.44]	0.24 [0.43]	0.23 [0.42]	0.25 [0.44]	0.27 [0.44]	0.25 [0.44]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.20 [0.40]	0.19 [0.39]	0.19 [0.40]	0.20 [0.40]	0.21 [0.41]	0.22 [0.42]	0.17 [0.38]	0.21 [0.41]	0.19 [0.39]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.15 [0.36]	0.16 [0.37]	0.15 [0.36]	0.14 [0.35]	0.14 [0.35]	0.15 [0.36]	0.17 [0.38]	0.13 [0.34]	0.13 [0.34]
Location Characteristics									
Share with college education (age>=25)	0.30 [0.10]	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.10]	0.31 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.11]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.47 [1.68]	2.46 [1.60]	2.50 [1.60]	2.63 [1.98]	2.57 [1.84]	2.55 [1.84]	2.50 [1.77]	2.53 [1.82]	2.64 [1.75]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.17 [0.12]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.10]	0.16 [0.11]	0.17 [0.12]
Urban?	0.88 [0.33]	0.88 [0.33]	0.86 [0.35]	0.85 [0.36]	0.85 [0.36]	0.86 [0.34]	0.86 [0.35]	0.86 [0.35]	0.85 [0.36]
Survey Characteristics									
Duration to complete (secs.)	881 [853]	873 [1,106]	859 [846]	901 [672]	857 [601]	956 [949]	923 [1,959]	892 [807]	847 [621]
Treatment duration	4 [8]	26 [30]	30 [47]	31 [56]	29 [79]	41 [63]	25 [32]	38 [97]	31 [52]
Mobile device?	0.60 [0.49]	0.57 [0.50]	0.62 [0.49]	0.54 [0.50]	0.57 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]	0.57 [0.50]	0.57 [0.49]	0.56 [0.50]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets, within each information treatment group. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumpton, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the survey response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to respondents with "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate".

Table 1d
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 4 (2022)

TREATMENT:	Control	Trade Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Jobs	Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	Trade Helps Jobs sans China	Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Hurts Jobs
Biodata							
Gender: Male	0.48 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.52 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	46.02 [16.90]	46.58 [16.11]	46.88 [16.84]	47.22 [16.45]	45.77 [17.13]	46.94 [16.14]	46.04 [17.48]
Race: White	0.61 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]	0.58 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.65 [0.48]	0.61 [0.49]
Race: African-American	0.12 [0.33]	0.13 [0.34]	0.11 [0.32]	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.32]	0.13 [0.33]	0.14 [0.35]
Race: Hispanic	0.18 [0.38]	0.15 [0.36]	0.18 [0.39]	0.17 [0.37]	0.18 [0.39]	0.15 [0.36]	0.15 [0.36]
Born in US?	0.91 [0.29]	0.93 [0.26]	0.93 [0.25]	0.92 [0.27]	0.91 [0.29]	0.91 [0.28]	0.90 [0.29]
Socio-Economic Characteristics							
Household Income: Average $ (approx.)	56,923.08 [44,203.50]	58,259.42 [45,365.40]	61,117.38 [47,970.62]	59,667.80 [48,033.16]	55,051.81 [45,223.37]	60,407.24 [44,629.41]	58,900.23 [45,743.64]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.55 [4.81]	11.73 [4.85]	11.71 [4.95]	11.73 [4.90]	11.56 [4.87]	11.98 [4.77]	11.68 [4.88]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.38 [0.49]	0.38 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.38 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.38 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.12 [0.32]	0.11 [0.31]	0.10 [0.30]	0.12 [0.33]	0.09 [0.29]	0.08 [0.28]	0.09 [0.29]
Employment Status: Employed	0.50 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.08 [0.27]	0.05 [0.22]	0.07 [0.25]	0.09 [0.28]	0.07 [0.26]	0.05 [0.22]	0.07 [0.26]
Employment Sector: Services	0.39 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.38 [0.49]	0.43 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]
Student?	0.02 [0.15]	0.03 [0.16]	0.03 [0.17]	0.02 [0.13]	0.04 [0.18]	0.04 [0.20]	0.04 [0.19]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.12 [1.46]	3.13 [1.53]	2.98 [1.53]	3.07 [1.50]	3.03 [1.47]	3.04 [1.48]	3.12 [1.47]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes							
Last Presidential election: Supported Dem.	0.43 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.45 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.42 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]
Last Presidential election: Supported Rep.	0.34 [0.48]	0.31 [0.46]	0.33 [0.47]	0.32 [0.47]	0.29 [0.46]	0.39 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.54 [1.12]	2.57 [1.06]	2.62 [1.08]	2.53 [1.09]	2.57 [1.08]	2.50 [1.02]	2.53 [1.01]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.10 [0.91]	3.23 [0.90]	3.15 [0.86]	3.07 [0.96]	3.12 [0.93]	3.13 [0.89]	3.10 [0.87]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.41 [0.49]	0.45 [0.50]	0.40 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.43 [0.50]	0.41 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.60 [0.49]	0.62 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]	0.59 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	2.99 [0.93]	3.02 [0.92]	3.03 [0.95]	3.04 [0.94]	3.04 [0.93]	2.92 [0.93]	2.91 [0.95]
Inflation in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	3.40 [0.82]	3.45 [0.78]	3.41 [0.80]	3.40 [0.81]	3.40 [0.82]	3.42 [0.79]	3.43 [0.76]
News consumption patterns							
Number of days per week (approx.)	4.86 [2.51]	4.90 [2.52]	5.03 [2.48]	4.68 [2.57]	4.78 [2.56]	4.92 [2.51]	4.90 [2.46]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.24 [0.43]	0.27 [0.44]	0.25 [0.43]	0.28 [0.45]	0.22 [0.42]	0.26 [0.44]	0.26 [0.44]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.15 [0.36]	0.15 [0.36]	0.19 [0.40]	0.16 [0.36]	0.18 [0.38]	0.15 [0.35]	0.15 [0.36]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.16 [0.37]	0.16 [0.37]	0.15 [0.36]	0.16 [0.37]	0.17 [0.37]	0.17 [0.38]	0.15 [0.36]
Location Characteristics							
Share with college education (age>=25)	0.30 [0.10]	0.30 [0.10]	0.29 [0.10]	0.30 [0.11]	0.29 [0.10]	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.63 [2.03]	2.45 [1.72]	2.48 [1.77]	2.60 [1.89]	2.49 [1.80]	2.46 [1.79]	2.72 [2.13]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.10]	0.15 [0.10]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.12]	0.17 [0.11]	0.17 [0.11]
Urban?	0.86 [0.35]	0.85 [0.35]	0.83 [0.38]	0.83 [0.38]	0.85 [0.36]	0.85 [0.35]	0.87 [0.33]
Survey Characteristics							
Duration to complete (secs.)	891.65 [956.84]	862.40 [673.57]	884.85 [644.02]	930.69 [1,177.20]	959.86 [1,132.41]	836.07 [589.66]	944.33 [1,245.98]
Treatment duration	6.30 [41.63]	28.57 [53.28]	28.65 [48.94]	34.06 [125.53]	30.59 [90.46]	35.60 [40.30]	36.64 [55.63]
Mobile device?	0.57 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.43 [0.50]	0.66 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]	0.51 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets, within each information treatment group. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumpton, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the survey response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to respondents with "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate".

Table 1e
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 4 (2022)

TREATMENT:	Trade Helps Prices	Trade Helps Prices sans China	Trade Helps sans Cheaper	Tariff Hurts Prices
Biodata				
Gender: Male	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.45 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.51 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.54 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	47.47 [16.51]	46.83 [16.84]	46.04 [17.00]	45.66 [17.02]
Race: White	0.62 [0.49]	0.64 [0.48]	0.62 [0.48]	0.62 [0.49]
Race: African-American	0.12 [0.33]	0.10 [0.31]	0.10 [0.30]	0.11 [0.31]
Race: Hispanic	0.17 [0.38]	0.17 [0.37]	0.19 [0.40]	0.18 [0.39]
Born in US?	0.93 [0.26]	0.91 [0.29]	0.93 [0.25]	0.93 [0.26]
Socio-Economic Characteristics				
Household Income: Average $ (approx.)	61,636.97 [48,177.08]	60,555.56 [45,293.18]	58,953.49 [46,290.84]	58,484.16 [44,529.14]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.91 [4.89]	11.73 [4.84]	11.44 [4.95]	11.93 [4.84]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.39 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.09 [0.29]	0.09 [0.29]	0.10 [0.29]	0.09 [0.29]
Employment Status: Employed	0.52 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.54 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.06 [0.25]	0.07 [0.26]	0.08 [0.27]	0.07 [0.25]
Employment Sector: Services	0.41 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]
Student?	0.03 [0.16]	0.03 [0.17]	0.03 [0.17]	0.04 [0.20]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.01 [1.51]	2.92 [1.52]	3.09 [1.55]	3.06 [1.47]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes				
Last Presidential election: Supported Dem.	0.46 [0.50]	0.39 [0.49]	0.45 [0.50]	0.45 [0.50]
Last Presidential election: Supported Rep.	0.36 [0.48]	0.37 [0.48]	0.36 [0.48]	0.35 [0.48]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.51 [1.06]	2.53 [1.10]	2.55 [1.10]	2.54 [1.06]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.09 [0.88]	3.06 [0.93]	3.10 [0.93]	3.08 [0.88]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.43 [0.50]	0.40 [0.49]	0.38 [0.49]	0.38 [0.48]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.59 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]	0.60 [0.49]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	3.04 [0.89]	2.91 [1.00]	2.95 [0.96]	3.07 [0.95]
Inflation in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	3.38 [0.79]	3.45 [0.79]	3.41 [0.82]	3.47 [0.78]
News consumption patterns				
Number of days per week (approx.)	5.10 [2.47]	4.82 [2.52]	4.70 [2.54]	4.92 [2.54]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.27 [0.45]	0.25 [0.43]	0.27 [0.45]	0.28 [0.45]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.15 [0.36]	0.18 [0.38]	0.16 [0.37]	0.16 [0.37]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.18 [0.38]	0.16 [0.37]	0.16 [0.36]	0.15 [0.35]
Location Characteristics				
Share with college education (age>=25)	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.10]	0.30 [0.10]	0.30 [0.11]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.74 [1.89]	2.57 [2.51]	2.93 [2.47]	2.61 [2.11]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.17 [0.11]	0.17 [0.11]	0.17 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]
Urban?	0.86 [0.35]	0.87 [0.34]	0.85 [0.36]	0.85 [0.36]
Survey Characteristics				
Duration to complete (secs.)	937.62 [889.05]	862.00 [656.99]	883.00 [1,047.12]	856.57 [618.49]
Treatment duration	29.66 [62.68]	28.71 [36.37]	24.95 [34.15]	26.26 [27.45]
Mobile device?	0.51 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.54 [0.50]	0.45 [0.50]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets, within each information treatment group. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumpton, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the survey response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to respondents with "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate".

Appendix Table 2

Full Results for the Baseline Treatment Effects

(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Dependent Variable: First principal component	(1) OLS		(2) OLS		(3) OLS		(4) OLS	
Treatment dummies: (Omitted: Control group)								
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.211***	[0.042]	0.237***	[0.043]				
Trade Helps Jobs	0.049	[0.047]	0.076*	[0.045]				
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	0.274***	[0.066]	0.152**	[0.072]				
Trade Helps Jobs sans China	0.203***	[0.068]	0.123	[0.076]				
Trade Helps Prices					0.099**	[0.040]	0.113***	[0.042]
Trade Helps Prices sans China					0.096**	[0.046]	0.130***	[0.048]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper					0.156***	[0.049]	0.172***	[0.050]
Tariff Hurts Prices					0.075*	[0.042]	0.105**	[0.043]
Individual Controls:								
Gender (Omitted: Male)								
Female			-0.034	[0.032]			-0.025	[0.032]
Other			-0.364*	[0.214]			-0.258	[0.177]
Age (Omitted: 18-24)								
25-34			0.102**	[0.049]			0.127***	[0.049]
35-44			0.264***	[0.053]			0.267***	[0.056]
45-54			0.433***	[0.055]			0.426***	[0.055]
55-64			0.614***	[0.064]			0.625***	[0.066]
Above 65			0.643***	[0.068]			0.746***	[0.067]
Race (Omitted: White)								
African-American			0.037	[0.053]			0.102**	[0.050]
Hispanic, Latino or Spanish Origin			0.008	[0.049]			-0.014	[0.043]
Asian			-0.085	[0.076]			-0.093	[0.070]
Other			0.021	[0.080]			-0.002	[0.083]
Education: College and above?			-0.053	[0.041]			0.027	[0.035]
Household Income (Omitted: $0-$49,999)								
$50,000-$99,999			0.05	[0.038]			0.091**	[0.036]
$100,000-$150,000			0.095	[0.064]			0.062	[0.052]
$150,000-$200,000			0.083	[0.100]			0.234***	[0.082]
>$200,000			0.243**	[0.103]			0.201**	[0.095]
Unsure			-0.206***	[0.071]			-0.168***	[0.063]
Employment Status (Omitted: Not in labor force)								
Not employed, looking for work			0.012	[0.058]			-0.008	[0.050]
Student			-0.044	[0.082]			0.093	[0.075]
Employed, in Agriculture			0.369***	[0.099]			0.391***	[0.082]
Employed, in Mining			0.309***	[0.111]			0.395***	[0.108]
Employed, in Manufacturing			0.141**	[0.064]			0.166***	[0.058]
Employed, in Services			0.017	[0.045]			0.035	[0.037]
Responded on Mobile Device?			0.134***	[0.035]			0.180***	[0.035]
In most recent presidential election (Omitted: Neither)								
Supported Democrat			-0.104**	[0.041]			-0.126***	[0.038]
Supported Republican			0.650***	[0.046]			0.601***	[0.041]
Frequency following news (Omitted: < once a week)								
1-2 times a week			0.194***	[0.061]			0.058	[0.060]
3-6 times a week			0.225***	[0.058]			0.119**	[0.053]
Daily			0.266***	[0.056]			0.077	[0.049]
Main News Source (Omitted: Broadcast TV news)								
CNN/BBC			-0.090*	[0.048]			-0.126***	[0.042]
Fox News			0.229***	[0.054]			0.326***	[0.048]
Local TV news station			-0.007	[0.047]			0.054	[0.042]
News/Evening News/Other program source			-0.086*	[0.048]			-0.097**	[0.048]
Region of Birth (Omitted: New England)								
Mideast			0.115	[0.081]			0.092	[0.079]
Great Lakes			0.195**	[0.082]			0.103	[0.076]
Plains			0.083	[0.096]			0.039	[0.085]
Southeast			0.06	[0.079]			0.032	[0.075]
Southwest			0.046	[0.088]			0.044	[0.084]
Rocky Mountain			-0.057	[0.127]			-0.088	[0.108]

Far West			0.052	[0.078]			0.061	[0.076]
Others or Missing			-0.163	[0.208]			-0.193	[0.176]
Not born in US			-0.043	[0.096]			-0.098	[0.086]
County Controls:								
Share with college education (age>=25)			-0.403**	[0.165]			-0.322	[0.211]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s			0.003	[0.007]			-0.003	[0.006]
Share of manufacturing in employment			0.319*	[0.181]			-0.044	[0.172]
Urban?			-0.022	[0.053]			0.005	[0.052]
County characteristics filled?			0.068	[0.069]			0.071	[0.093]
Round-Week Dummies: (Omitted: Round 2, Week 1)								
Round 2, Week 2			-0.411	[0.345]			-0.461*	[0.262]
Round 2, Week 3			-0.472	[0.362]			-0.564**	[0.282]
Round 2, Week 4			-0.296	[0.338]			-0.548**	[0.252]
Round 2, Week 5			-0.418	[0.354]			-0.536**	[0.259]
Round 3, Week 1			-0.393	[0.496]			-0.754**	[0.307]
Round 3, Week 2			-0.381	[0.347]			-0.572**	[0.265]
Round 3, Week 3			-0.34	[0.347]			-0.498*	[0.263]
Round 3, Week 4			-0.426	[0.351]			-0.597**	[0.294]
Round 3, Week 5			-0.396	[0.482]			-0.305	[0.327]
Round 4, Week 1			-0.082	[0.436]			-0.27	[0.367]
Round 4, Week 2			-0.303	[0.345]			-0.445*	[0.268]
Round 4, Week 3			-0.366	[0.351]			-0.500*	[0.265]
Round 4, Week 4			-0.211	[0.342]			-0.377	[0.265]
Round 4, Week 5			-0.226	[0.345]			-0.304	[0.281]
Most Pref., Randomization Order			-0.019***	[0.007]			-0.020***	[0.006]
Constant Term	-0.119***	[0.028]	-0.555	[0.366]	-0.119***	[0.028]	-0.322	[0.268]
Observations	6,964		6,964		8,542		8,542	
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.002		0.152		0.001		0.145	

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) survey samples. The dependent variable is the first principal component measure constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. All columns report OLS estimates; Column 2 reports the full set of coefficients from the Table 4, Column 6 specification, while Column 4 reports the full set of coefficients from the Table 5, Column 6 specification. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 3a
Robustness for "Jobs" Treatments: Alternative Samples and Constructions of the Dependent Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Trade Policy Questions:	First principal component	First principal component	First principal component	First principal component	First principal component	Unweighted average	Dummy: ³ 3 protectionist policies	Factor Analysis, first factor
Survey Rounds:	2	3	4	2,3,4 & info recall correct	1,2,3,4	2,3,4	2,3,4	2,3,4
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Treatment dummies:								
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.162***	0.341***	0.255***	0.650***	0.245***	0.049***	0.070***	0.130***
	[0.062]	[0.083]	[0.083]	[0.083]	[0.037]	[0.009]	[0.016]	[0.024]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.033	0.06	0.159*	0.375***	0.083**	0.015	0.018	0.042*
	[0.063]	[0.083]	[0.085]	[0.086]	[0.041]	[0.009]	[0.016]	[0.024]
Trade Hurts sans China			0.152**	0.500***	0.150**	0.030**	0.052**	0.086**
			[0.072]	[0.149]	[0.072]	[0.015]	[0.026]	[0.039]
Trade Helps sans China			0.128*	0.463***	0.127*	0.021	0.039	0.072*
			[0.077]	[0.140]	[0.077]	[0.016]	[0.027]	[0.041]
Most Pref., Randomization Order	-0.024**	-0.023	-0.01	-0.033***	-0.016***	-0.004***	-0.008***	-0.010***
	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.010]	[0.011]	[0.006]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.004]
Last Pres. Election:	-0.244***	0.061	-0.062	-0.241***	-0.139***	-0.032***	-0.032**	-0.046**
Supported Democrat	[0.066]	[0.100]	[0.059]	[0.076]	[0.038]	[0.009]	[0.015]	[0.022]
Last Pres. Election:	0.510***	0.876***	0.660***	0.744***	0.662***	0.131***	0.194***	0.354***
Supported Republican	[0.077]	[0.111]	[0.070]	[0.081]	[0.040]	[0.010]	[0.016]	[0.025]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2,373	1,356	3,235	2,542	8,672	6,964	6,964	6,964
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.171	0.217	0.147	0.193	0.154	0.151	0.117	0.152
Dep. Variable std dev.	1.343	1.395	1.414	1.487	1.391	0.289	0.476	0.751

Notes: The sample in each Column is from the respective survey rounds described in the column headings, for respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Hurts Jobs sans China", and "Trade Helps Jobs sans China" treatments. "Trade Hurts Jobs sans China" and "Trade Helps Jobs sans China" treatments were not assigned in rounds 2 and 3. The dependent variable in Columns 1-4 is the first principal component measure (as in Table 4, Column 6); that in Column 5 constructs the first principal component using the expanded sample that includes Round 1 (2018-2019); that in Column 6 is an unweighted average of the five policy variables in Table 4, Columns 1-5; that in Column 7 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the responses on at least three of these five policy questions favored more protectionism; and that in Column 8 is the first factor from a factor analysis of these five policy variables constructed with two factors; each of these measures is constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade by taking one minus the "Support More FTAs" variable. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. All columns report OLS regressions; the bottom row reports the in-sample standard deviation of the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 3b
Robustness for "Prices" Treatments: Alternative Samples and Constructions of the Dependent Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Trade Policy Questions:	First principal component	First principal component	First principal component	First principal component	First principal component	Unweighted average	Dummy: ≥ 3 protectionist policies	Factor Analysis, first factor
Survey Rounds:	2	3	4	2,3,4 & info recall correct	1,2,3,4	2,3,4	2,3,4	2,3,4
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Treatment dummies:								
Trade Helps Prices	0.069	0.127	0.172**	0.321***	0.131***	0.022**	0.022	0.063***
	[0.061]	[0.089]	[0.081]	[0.076]	[0.038]	[0.009]	[0.016]	[0.023]
Trade Helps Prices sans China	0.089	0.151*	0.165*	0.345***	0.138***	0.027***	0.048***	0.071***
	[0.084]	[0.084]	[0.088]	[0.083]	[0.047]	[0.010]	[0.017]	[0.026]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	0.228***	0.126	0.152*	0.410***	0.180***	0.035***	0.031*	0.094***
	[0.077]	[0.082]	[0.086]	[0.082]	[0.048]	[0.010]	[0.017]	[0.027]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.108	0.064	0.134	0.319***	0.113***	0.021**	0.026*	0.058**
	[0.068]	[0.081]	[0.085]	[0.078]	[0.042]	[0.009]	[0.015]	[0.023]
Most Pref., Randomization Order	-0.018*	-0.021*	-0.024**	-0.020**	-0.017***	-0.004***	-0.007***	-0.011***
	[0.009]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.008]	[0.006]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Last Pres. Election:	-0.06	-0.334***	-0.067	-0.153***	-0.134***	-0.037***	-0.041***	-0.058***
Supported Democrat	[0.060]	[0.079]	[0.062]	[0.056]	[0.036]	[0.008]	[0.014]	[0.021]
Last Pres. Election:	0.589***	0.468***	0.694***	0.691***	0.615***	0.120***	0.173***	0.327***
Supported Republican	[0.069]	[0.088]	[0.069]	[0.061]	[0.040]	[0.009]	[0.015]	[0.022]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	3,344	2,257	2,941	4,392	9,698	8,542	8,542	8,542
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.149	0.153	0.17	0.171	0.146	0.145	0.107	0.144
Dep. Variable std dev.	1.332	1.389	1.407	1.438	1.374	0.286	0.472	0.744

Notes: The sample in each Column is from the respective survey rounds described in the column headings, for respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Helps Prices", "Trade Helps Prices China", "Trade Helps Prices Cheaper", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments. The dependent variable in Columns 1-4 is the first principal component measure (as in Table 5, Column 6); that in Column 5 constructs the first principal component using the expanded sample that includes Round 1 (2018-2019); that in Column 6 is an unweighted average of the five policy variables in Table 5, Columns 1-5; that in Column 7 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the responses on at least three of these five policy questions favored more protectionism; and that in Column 8 is the first factor from a factor analysis of these five policy variables constructed with two factors; each of these measures is constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade by taking one minus the "Support More FTAs" variable. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. All columns report OLS regressions; the bottom row reports the in-sample standard deviation of the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 4
Robustness: Exploring the "Jobs" and "Prices" Treatments Simultaneously
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Trade Policy Questions:	(0) Did information affect views?	(1) More limits on imports	(2) US tariff rate increase	(3) Support higher tariff	(4) Support more FTAs	(5) Most Pref.: More limits on Imports	(6) First principal component	(7a) Impact of trade for most Americans?	(7b) Confidence in assessment in (7a)
	Ordered logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Treatment dummies:									
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.048***	0.090***	0.072***	0.036**	-0.038**	0.033**	0.243***	-0.247***	-0.022
	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.015]	[0.043]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.031*	0.022	0.023	0.026	-0.006	0.007	0.079*	-0.024	-0.018
	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.015]	[0.044]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	0.057**	0.053*	0.080***	-0.007	-0.025	0.002	0.153**	-0.203***	-0.034
	[0.025]	[0.028]	[0.027]	[0.030]	[0.027]	[0.023]	[0.071]	[0.025]	[0.025]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China	0.02	0.055**	0.062**	0.015	0.023	-0.005	0.123	-0.02	0.004
	[0.025]	[0.028]	[0.026]	[0.032]	[0.028]	[0.023]	[0.076]	[0.022]	[0.026]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	0.031**	0.045**	0.031**	0.034*	-0.037**	0.049***	0.169***	-0.092***	-0.031**
	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.048]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	0.039**	0.083***	0.054***	0.026	-0.032*	0.025	0.199***	-0.205***	-0.029
	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.020]	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.044]	[0.016]	[0.018]
Trade Helps Prices	0.029*	0.057***	0.029**	-0.005	-0.002	0.030**	0.109***	-0.059***	-0.022
	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.042]	[0.016]	[0.015]
Trade Helps Prices sans China	0.006	0.043**	0.040***	-0.009	-0.02	0.019	0.102**	-0.047***	-0.014
	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.047]	[0.017]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	0.017	0.060***	0.044**	0.017	-0.012	0.02	0.140***	-0.055***	-0.007
	[0.017]	[0.020]	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.049]	[0.017]	[0.016]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.047***	0.039**	0.022	0.018	-0.005	0.023	0.100**	-0.164***	-0.029*
	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.043]	[0.016]	[0.015]
Most Pref., Randomization Order						-0.010***	-0.018***		
						[0.001]	[0.004]		
Last Pres. Election:	0.097***	0.011	0.024***	-0.040***	0.124***	-0.041***	-0.112***	0.103***	0.065***
Supported Democrat	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.027]	[0.009]	[0.010]
Last Pres. Election:	0.082***	0.190***	0.126***	0.141***	-0.032***	0.145***	0.631***	0.01	0.070***
Supported Republican	[0.010]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.031]	[0.011]	[0.010]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	16,102	16,102	16,102	16,102	16,102	16,102	16,072	16,072	16,072
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0454	0.0691	0.0771	0.0433	0.0675	0.0753	0.146	0.0539	0.0316
Log Likelihood	-18186	-10101	-8716	-10670	-9785	-8725	---	-21311	-21965

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) survey samples; including respondents in the "Control" group and those who received the various "Jobs" or "Prices" treatments. The dependent variable in Column 0 is an ordered categorical variable for degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected one's views on trade policy (1="Strongly disagree", 5="Strongly agree"); that in Columns 1-4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicated support for the policy in a directly-posed question; that in Column 5 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent identified "More limits on imports" among his/her three "Most preferred" out of the list of eight policies; that in Column 6 is the first principal component constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade; that in Column 7a is an ordered categorical variable asked post-treatment on views on the impact that international trade has had for most Americans (1="Extremely bad", 5="Extremely good"); while that in Column 7b is an ordered categorical variable asking respondents how confident they are in their assessment on the impact international trade has had for most Americans (1="Not at all confident", 5="Extremely confident"). The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. Column 0, 7a and 7b report marginal effects from ordered logit regressions, on the predicted probability that either the fourth or fifth highest ordered category is selected as the response; Columns 1-5 report marginal effects from logit regressions. All marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Column 6 reports an OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 5
Summary Statistics: End-of-Survey Recollection of Treatment Information

SURVEY:	Round 2, 2020 (N=6,009)	Round 3, 2021 (N=4,058)	Round 4, 2022 (N=6,035)
Share of respondents who said information was about jobs	0.34 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]	0.35 [0.48]
Share of respondents who said information was about prices	0.52 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]
Share of respondents who said no information received	0.14 [0.35]	0.14 [0.35]	0.14 [0.35]
Correctly identified nature of information treatment	0.47 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]
Conditional on receiving a treatment about jobs, correctly identified as such	0.42 [0.49]	0.49 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]
Conditional on receiving a treatment about prices, correctly identified as suc	0.59 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]
Conditional on receiving no information treatment, correctly identified as suc	0.19 [0.40]	0.25 [0.43]	0.22 [0.42]

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), and Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) survey samples.

Appendix Table 6
Robustness: Controlling for Covid Mobility and Black Lives Matter Events
(Round 2, 2020 only)

Sample: "Control" and Jobs treatments	(1) First principal component OLS	(2) First principal component OLS	**Sample:** "Control" and Prices treatments	(3) First principal component OLS	(4) First principal component OLS
Indicator: Above Median Safegraph Mobility	-0.013		Indicator: Above Median Safegraph Mobility	-0.058	
	[0.054]			[0.059]	
Indicator: BLM Events		0.082	Indicator: BLM Events		0.017
		[0.095]			[0.073]
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.167***	0.166***	Trade Helps Prices	0.069	0.07
	[0.062]	[0.063]		[0.062]	[0.062]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.032	0.035	Trade Helps Prices sans China	0.091	0.09
	[0.063]	[0.064]		[0.084]	[0.085]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	---	---	Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	0.228***	0.230***
				[0.077]	[0.078]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China	---	---	Tariff Hurts Prices	0.110	0.11
				[0.068]	[0.069]
Most Pref., Randomization Order	-0.020**	-0.024**	Most Pref., Randomization Order	-0.018*	-0.018*
	[0.009]	[0.011]		[0.009]	[0.009]
Last Pres. Election:	-0.157***	-0.245***	Last Pres. Election:	-0.062	-0.057
Supported Democrat	[0.054]	[0.066]	Supported Democrat	[0.060]	[0.061]
Last Pres. Election:	0.622***	0.517***	Last Pres. Election:	0.591***	0.597***
Supported Republican	[0.062]	[0.078]	Supported Republican	[0.070]	[0.070]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y
Observations	2,373	2,373	Observations	3,344	3,344
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.168	0.172	(Pseudo) R-squared	0.149	0.149

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020) survey sample; Columns 1-2 are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the omitted category) and those who received the jobs-related treatments, while Columns 3-4 are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment and those who received the prices-related treatments. The dependent variable is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Tables 4 and 5) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. All columns report OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 7a
Exploring Mechanisms for "Jobs" Treatments: Economic Self Interest
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade					
	Economic Self-Interest					
Respondent variable (z-scored):	Employed in Manuf.	ADH 2000s China Shock Exposure	Education: Less than College	Unemployed	Household inc. <$50,000	Nafta: Bad impact on family
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.160***	0.162***	0.158***	0.157***	0.159***	0.150***
	[0.050]	[0.051]	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.050]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.106**	0.106**	0.109**	0.107**	0.104**	0.097*
	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.049]	[0.051]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	0.092	0.082	0.095	0.077	0.088	0.098
	[0.087]	[0.087]	[0.087]	[0.087]	[0.087]	[0.088]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China	0.086	0.086	0.092	0.091	0.088	0.094
	[0.092]	[0.093]	[0.095]	[0.093]	[0.095]	[0.092]
Respondent variable	0.029	-0.019	0.021	-0.01	0.082*	0.045
	[0.028]	[0.023]	[0.028]	[0.027]	[0.043]	[0.028]
Trade Hurts Jobs	-0.015	0.093	-0.025	0.001	0.024	-0.063
× Respondent variable	[0.047]	[0.062]	[0.051]	[0.049]	[0.050]	[0.046]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.011	0.024	-0.084*	-0.019	-0.052	-0.119**
× Respondent variable	[0.046]	[0.035]	[0.046]	[0.042]	[0.046]	[0.049]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	-0.018	0.092	-0.117	0.188**	-0.019	-0.114
× Respondent variable	[0.076]	[0.069]	[0.079]	[0.076]	[0.077]	[0.083]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China	0.048	-0.037	-0.004	0.034	0.03	-0.027
× Respondent variable	[0.072]	[0.104]	[0.084]	[0.068]	[0.075]	[0.069]
Trade Hurts Jobs × Resp. variable	0.003	-0.064	0.08	0.032	0.029	0.095
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.064]	[0.077]	[0.062]	[0.066]	[0.064]	[0.066]
Trade Helps Jobs × Resp. variable	0.028	0.017	0.111*	-0.005	0.145**	0.214***
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.054]	[0.054]	[0.057]	[0.056]	[0.059]	[0.060]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China × Resp. variable	0.171	-0.065	0.179*	-0.142	0.185*	0.358***
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.116]	[0.124]	[0.104]	[0.099]	[0.107]	[0.110]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China × Resp. variabl	0.017	0.006	0.192*	0.074	0.142	0.163
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.126]	[0.131]	[0.108]	[0.129]	[0.115]	[0.116]
Individual, county, week, randomization order controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Treatment dummy interactions with "Above-median treatment duration"?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	6,964	6,964	6,964	6,964	6,964	6,964
R-squared	0.154	0.154	0.156	0.155	0.155	0.159

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) survey samples; for respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs", and "Trade Helps Hurts Jobs" treatments. The dependent variable is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Tables 4 and 5) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes; all columns also control for dummy variables for the party supported in the most recent presidential election, as well as the randomization order in which "More Limits on Imports" appeared in the Most Preferred policy question. "Above-median treatment duration" is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent was in a non-Control group and spent an above-median duration on the information treatment screen page among all respondents who received the same information treatment in the same survey round. All columns are OLS regressions examining triple interactions between the treatment dummies, the respective respondent variable (expressed as a z-score), and "Above-median treatment duration". The main effect of the treatment duration dummy and its double interaction with the respondent variable are dropped, as the treatment duration dummy is equal to 0 for all observations in the Control group; the double interaction terms between the treatment dummies and "Above-median treatment duration" are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 7b
Exploring Mechanisms for "Prices" Treatments: Economic Self Interest
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade					
	Economic Self-Interest					
Respondent variable (z-scored):	Employed in Manuf.	ADH 2000s China Shock Exposure	Education: Less than College	Unemployed	Household inc. <$50,000	Nafta: Bad impact on family
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trade Helps Prices	0.136***	0.135***	0.135***	0.135***	0.134***	0.129**
	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.051]	[0.050]	[0.052]
Trade Helps Prices sans China	0.155***	0.157***	0.156***	0.154***	0.157***	0.150***
	[0.055]	[0.055]	[0.056]	[0.055]	[0.055]	[0.056]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	0.109*	0.109*	0.117**	0.108*	0.108*	0.094
	[0.057]	[0.057]	[0.058]	[0.057]	[0.057]	[0.059]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.148***	0.149***	0.148***	0.149***	0.148***	0.140***
	[0.047]	[0.047]	[0.047]	[0.047]	[0.048]	[0.048]
Respondent variable	0.035	-0.003	0.018	-0.004	0.084**	0.046
	[0.028]	[0.023]	[0.028]	[0.026]	[0.037]	[0.028]
Trade Helps Prices	-0.022	-0.039	-0.059	0.017	-0.078	-0.053
× Respondent variable	[0.043]	[0.038]	[0.049]	[0.054]	[0.048]	[0.044]
Trade Helps Prices sans China	0.051	0.049	-0.023	0.06	0.037	-0.119**
× Respondent variable	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.056]	[0.049]	[0.053]	[0.047]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	0.01	-0.026	-0.172***	-0.007	0.004	-0.122**
× Respondent variable	[0.047]	[0.036]	[0.051]	[0.048]	[0.054]	[0.054]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.047	0.011	-0.054	0.02	-0.009	-0.105**
× Respondent variable	[0.046]	[0.042]	[0.044]	[0.047]	[0.047]	[0.048]
Trade Helps Prices × Resp. variable	0.036	0.017	-0.014	-0.008	0.076	0.09
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.057]	[0.047]	[0.059]	[0.067]	[0.059]	[0.067]
Trade Helps Prices sans China × Resp. varial	-0.094	-0.064	0.033	-0.150**	0.056	0.198***
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.074]	[0.051]	[0.069]	[0.069]	[0.073]	[0.074]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper × Resp. va	0.019	0.079	0.142**	0.012	-0.062	0.266***
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.067]	[0.051]	[0.068]	[0.070]	[0.069]	[0.070]
Tariff Hurts Prices × Resp. variable	-0.04	-0.017	0.101	-0.046	0.048	0.178***
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.061]	[0.060]	[0.067]	[0.062]	[0.066]	[0.059]
Individual, county, week, randomization order controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Treatment dummy interactions with "Above-median treatment duration"?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	8,542	8,542	8,542	8,542	8,542	8,542
R-squared	0.146	0.146	0.147	0.146	0.147	0.149

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) survey samples; for respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Helps Prices", "Trade Helps Prices China", "Trade Helps Prices Cheaper", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments. The dependent variable is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Tables 4 and 5) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes; all columns also control for dummy variables for the party supported in the most recent presidential election, as well as the randomization order in which "More Limits on Imports" appeared in the Most Preferred policy question. "Above-median treatment duration" is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent was in a non-Control group and spent an above-median duration on the information treatment screen page among all respondents who received the same information treatment in the same survey round. All columns are OLS regressions examining triple interactions between the treatment dummies, the respective respondent variable (expressed as a z-score), and "Above-median treatment duration". The main effect of the treatment duration dummy and its double interaction with the respondent variable are dropped, as the treatment duration dummy is equal to 0 for all observations in the Control group; the double interaction terms between the treatment dummies and "Above-median treatment duration" are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 8a
Exploring Mechanisms for "Jobs" Treatments: Sociotropic Concerns
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade					
	Sociotropic concerns					
Respondent variable (z-scored):	Inequality in the US a problem?	Inflation in the US a problem?	Willing to pay more for a US brand	Trust in Government	Dissatisfied with US job market?	Disagree children will have a better life
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.151***	0.167*	0.150***	0.159***	0.146***	0.158***
	[0.050]	[0.094]	[0.048]	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.052]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.105**	0.143	0.097**	0.100**	0.102**	0.100**
	[0.049]	[0.097]	[0.048]	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.050]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	0.085	0.077	0.121	0.09	0.086	0.083
	[0.088]	[0.090]	[0.085]	[0.087]	[0.086]	[0.087]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China	0.085	0.072	0.105	0.088	0.101	0.086
	[0.092]	[0.096]	[0.092]	[0.093]	[0.093]	[0.093]
Respondent variable	-0.150***	0.073**	0.318***	0.041	-0.063*	-0.049**
	[0.028]	[0.037]	[0.025]	[0.026]	[0.033]	[0.025]
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.035	-0.106	-0.043	-0.041	-0.025	0.041
× Respondent variable	[0.045]	[0.077]	[0.046]	[0.047]	[0.055]	[0.053]
Trade Helps Jobs	-0.014	-0.015	-0.037	0.012	-0.033	-0.007
× Respondent variable	[0.050]	[0.075]	[0.042]	[0.047]	[0.055]	[0.053]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	0.074	-0.120*	0.03	0.085	0.014	-0.028
× Respondent variable	[0.083]	[0.069]	[0.070]	[0.076]	[0.087]	[0.072]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China	0.056	-0.141**	-0.089	-0.014	0.145*	0.105
× Respondent variable	[0.070]	[0.070]	[0.075]	[0.072]	[0.075]	[0.080]
Trade Hurts Jobs × Resp. variable	-0.071	0.198	0.09	-0.029	0.098*	0.042
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.060]	[0.130]	[0.059]	[0.061]	[0.056]	[0.065]
Trade Helps Jobs × Resp. variable	-0.035	0.117	0.071	-0.058	-0.031	0.125*
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.066]	[0.126]	[0.056]	[0.061]	[0.059]	[0.067]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China × Resp. variable	-0.056	0.157	-0.039	-0.331***	0.287***	0.190*
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.109]	[0.101]	[0.106]	[0.106]	[0.109]	[0.105]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China × Resp. variable	-0.051	0.189	0.142	-0.101	-0.169	0.033
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.112]	[0.119]	[0.099]	[0.110]	[0.114]	[0.112]
Individual, county, week, randomization order controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Treatment dummy interactions with "Above-median treatment duration"?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	6,964	3,235	6,964	6,964	6,964	6,964
R-squared	0.164	0.152	0.201	0.155	0.158	0.155

Notes: See notes to Appendix Table 7a.

Appendix Table 8b
Exploring Mechanisms for "Prices" Treatments: Sociotropic Concerns
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade					
	Sociotropic concerns					
Respondent variable (z-scored):	Inequality in the US a problem?	Inflation in the US a problem?	Willing to pay more for a US brand	Trust in Government	Dissatisfied with US job market?	Disagree children will have a better life
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trade Helps Prices	0.142***	0.159*	0.121**	0.123**	0.126**	0.127**
	[0.051]	[0.095]	[0.049]	[0.052]	[0.051]	[0.052]
Trade Helps Prices sans China	0.147***	0.215**	0.140***	0.154***	0.153***	0.156***
	[0.055]	[0.106]	[0.054]	[0.055]	[0.056]	[0.055]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	0.096*	0.148	0.108*	0.09	0.103*	0.093
	[0.058]	[0.103]	[0.056]	[0.058]	[0.058]	[0.060]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.153***	0.115	0.153***	0.129***	0.142***	0.146***
	[0.048]	[0.098]	[0.047]	[0.048]	[0.047]	[0.049]
Respondent variable	-0.142***	0.076**	0.327***	0.048*	-0.061*	-0.055**
	[0.028]	[0.038]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.033]	[0.025]
Trade Helps Prices	-0.019	-0.058	-0.048	0.069*	-0.04	0.004
× Respondent variable	[0.048]	[0.078]	[0.046]	[0.042]	[0.049]	[0.048]
Trade Helps Prices sans China	0.05	-0.105	-0.032	0.088*	-0.027	-0.006
× Respondent variable	[0.056]	[0.076]	[0.051]	[0.046]	[0.057]	[0.050]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	-0.028	-0.106	-0.035	0.107**	-0.144***	-0.047
× Respondent variable	[0.053]	[0.076]	[0.051]	[0.050]	[0.056]	[0.055]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.091**	-0.099	-0.021	0.124***	-0.066	0.016
× Respondent variable	[0.045]	[0.080]	[0.043]	[0.041]	[0.046]	[0.047]
Trade Helps Prices × Resp. variable	-0.041	-0.007	0.105*	-0.024	0.024	0.028
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.062]	[0.111]	[0.059]	[0.057]	[0.058]	[0.058]
Trade Helps Prices sans China × Resp. variab	-0.127*	0.201	0.034	-0.109	-0.015	0.088
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.074]	[0.138]	[0.072]	[0.077]	[0.074]	[0.070]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper × Resp. vari	0.033	0.172	0.1	-0.313***	0.314***	0.236***
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.075]	[0.118]	[0.071]	[0.074]	[0.077]	[0.071]
Tariff Hurts Prices × Resp. variable	-0.102*	0.191	0.121**	-0.172***	0.118**	-0.019
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.059]	[0.140]	[0.055]	[0.055]	[0.058]	[0.062]
Individual, county, week, randomization order controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Treatment dummy interactions with "Above-median treatment duration"?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	8,542	2,941	8,542	8,542	8,542	8,542
R-squared	0.156	0.174	0.199	0.151	0.151	0.148

Notes: See notes to Appendix Table 7b.

Appendix Table 9a
Exploring Mechanisms for "Jobs" Treatments: Behavioral, Political Identity
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade		
	Behavioral	**Identity Politics**	
Respondent variable (z-scored):	Loss Aversion: No Fees vs. Discount	Republican Support in last Pres. Election	Democrat Support in last Pres. Election
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.151***	0.151***	0.154***
	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.050]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.105**	0.105**	0.106**
	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.050]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	0.088	0.076	0.096
	[0.087]	[0.088]	[0.087]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China	0.09	0.069	0.089
	[0.094]	[0.091]	[0.092]
Respondent variable	0.028	0.299***	-0.035
	[0.033]	[0.031]	[0.031]
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.075	-0.063	0.067
× Respondent variable	[0.055]	[0.048]	[0.048]
Trade Helps Jobs	-0.012	0.003	-0.011
× Respondent variable	[0.054]	[0.052]	[0.046]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	0.003	-0.11	0.159*
× Respondent variable	[0.089]	[0.088]	[0.090]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China	-0.016	-0.187**	0.091
× Respondent variable	[0.086]	[0.084]	[0.083]
Trade Hurts Jobs × Resp. variable	-0.068	0.1	-0.192***
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.068]	[0.061]	[0.060]
Trade Helps Jobs × Resp. variable	0.051	0.128**	-0.110*
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.062]	[0.065]	[0.059]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China × Resp. variable	-0.02	0.222*	-0.233**
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.113]	[0.118]	[0.115]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China × Resp. variable	0.044	0.243**	-0.191*
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.112]	[0.110]	[0.111]
Individual, county, week, randomization order controls?	Y	Y	Y
Treatment dummy interactions with "Above-median treatment duration"?	Y	Y	Y
Observations	6,964	6,964	6,964
R-squared	0.155	0.157	0.156

Notes: See notes to Appendix Table 7a.

Appendix Table 9b
Exploring Mechanisms for "Prices" Treatments: Behavioral, Political Identity
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade		
	Behavioral	**Identity Politics**	
Respondent variable (z-scored):	Loss Aversion: No Fees vs. Discount	Republican Support in last Pres. Election	Democrat Support in last Pres. Election
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trade Helps Prices	0.132***	0.133***	0.136***
	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.050]
Trade Helps Prices sans China	0.162***	0.156***	0.164***
	[0.055]	[0.055]	[0.055]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	0.109*	0.109*	0.108*
	[0.057]	[0.057]	[0.057]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.147***	0.148***	0.151***
	[0.048]	[0.047]	[0.047]
Respondent variable	0.03	0.284***	-0.042
	[0.033]	[0.031]	[0.030]
Trade Helps Prices	0.079	-0.148***	0.063
× Respondent variable	[0.056]	[0.052]	[0.051]
Trade Helps Prices sans China	0.04	-0.077	0.107**
× Respondent variable	[0.061]	[0.057]	[0.053]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	-0.007	-0.022	0.04
× Respondent variable	[0.059]	[0.055]	[0.051]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.04	-0.048	0.072
× Respondent variable	[0.050]	[0.047]	[0.047]
Trade Helps Prices × Resp. variable	0.025	0.232***	-0.180***
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.064]	[0.061]	[0.063]
Trade Helps Prices sans China × Resp. variable	0.073	0.098	-0.256***
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.068]	[0.069]	[0.069]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper × Resp. variable	0	0.087	-0.153**
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.068]	[0.070]	[0.067]
Tariff Hurts Prices × Resp. variable	-0.019	0.181***	-0.240***
× Above-median treatment duration	[0.059]	[0.061]	[0.061]
Individual, county, week, randomization order controls?	Y	Y	Y
Treatment dummy interactions with "Above-median treatment duration"?	Y	Y	Y
Observations	8,542	8,542	8,542
R-squared	0.149	0.15	0.149

Notes: See notes to Appendix Table 7b.

Figure 1A
Interactions between Treatment and Respondent "Economic Self-Interest" Variables
(Top panel: "Jobs" treatments; Bottom panel: "Prices" treatments)




Figure 1B
Interactions between Treatment and Respondent "Sociotropic Concern" Variables
(Top panel: "Jobs" treatments; Bottom panel: "Prices" treatments)




Figure 1C
Interactions between Treatment and Respondent "Political Identity" and "Loss Aversion"
(Top panel: "Jobs" treatments; Bottom panel: "Prices" treatments)




Figure 2
Word Clouds
(Left Column: With "China" in the treatment wording; Right Columns: "sans China")

Which Countries to limit imports from? (Trade Hurts/Helps Jobs & Trade Helps Prices)



Which Countries to limit imports from? (Trade Hurts/Helps Jobs sans China & Trade Helps Prices sans China)



Why MP limit imports: Other (Trade Hurts/Helps Jobs & Trade Helps Prices)



Why MP limit imports: Other (Trade Hurts/Helps Jobs sans China & Trade Helps Prices sans China)

