Understanding of Trade*

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Abstract

I study how people understand and reason about trade and which factors shape their views on trade policy. I design and run large-scale surveys and experiments in the U.S. to elicit respondents' knowledge and understanding of trade. I also ask about their perceived economic gains and distributional impacts from trade and their views on trade restrictions and compensatory redistribution for those hurt by trade. People's understanding of the price, wage, and welfare effects of trade is mixed. In general, respondents are optimistic about the efficiency gains from trade, but also understand that there may be adverse distributional consequences from it. Respondents' own exposure to trade through their sector, occupation, skill, and local labor market shapes their perceptions of the impacts of trade on themselves, others, and on the broader U.S. economy. I also find patterns consistent with the idea of "diffuse gains and concentrated losses": respondents' perceived benefits as consumers are nonsalient and unclear to them, while those in at-risk jobs starkly perceive the threats from trade. Beyond material self-interest, people have broader social and economic concerns that strongly influence their views on trade policy. The belief that is most predictive of support for open trade is that trade generates efficiency gains. Furthermore, people who believe that those hurt by trade can be helped using other tools (compensatory redistribution) do not oppose free trade, even if they think that it will entail adverse distributional consequences. The results highlight the importance of compensatory redistribution as an indissociable part of trade policy in people's minds.

Keywords: Trade, Surveys, Perceptions, Experiment, Trade policy, Protectionism.

JEL Codes: F1, F13, D72, D91

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1 Introduction

Trade is one of the areas in which there is widespread agreement among economists. Many economists tend to believe that, on balance, free trade is beneficial: even though some people will win and others will lose, the overall gains from trade are large enough that "losers can be compensated."[1] Yet, there is no consensus on free international trade among people in the U.S. Historically, trade restrictions and barriers have been the norm rather than the exception. The last decade has seen intense debates about import competition and their far-ranging economic, social, and political consequences[2] and a resurgence of protectionist proposals.

In this paper, I try to answer two sets of questions. First, do people understand how trade and trade policy work? How do they reason about trade policy? For instance, do they understand the impacts of trade on prices or wages? Second, which factors shape citizens' support for different types of trade policies? Do they support free trade purely out of material self-interest, or do they have broader social and economic concerns? Do they perceive the efficiency and distributional impacts of trade differently? How do they think about trade restrictions versus compensatory transfers to help those who are negatively impacted by trade? Understanding which factors matter most to citizens when they think about trade policy, which groups tend to hold different views, and where (potentially correctible) misperceptions are is an important step toward explaining citizens' current stance on trade policy and predicting its future evolution.

To answer these questions, I design and run new large-scale surveys and experiments in the U.S. Surveys are a key tool for getting into people's minds and studying otherwise invisible things such as perceptions, attitudes, reasonings, and views, which present challenges for economists' traditional – and often preferred– revealed preference approach. Because surveys are such a flexible tool, there is always the possibility to collect additional data, to change the design of the current survey (including the experimental treatments), or to ask questions in a different way, leaving the opportunity to explore more ideas, test for robustness, or approach the question from different angles.


Before describing the survey and methods used, it is helpful to consider a stylized framework to think about the drivers of trade policy views, as illustrated in Figure 1. At the top of the figure, I first distinguish between two facets of trade policy: trade restrictions (e.g., tariffs and quotas) and compensatory redistribution to mitigate adverse distributional consequences from trade (e.g., direct assistance or retraining for those hurt by trade). These two sides of trade policy can both be shaped by either self-interest (the left panel) or by broader economic and social concerns (the right panel). Self-interest can arise from respondents' benefits as consumers (Box I) in terms of the prices and variety of goods that they can purchase. It can also stem from their role as workers and their exposure through their occupation, sector of work, local labor market, or human capital (Box II). It is often thought that the gains to consumers are diffuse and widespread, while the losses to workers are large and concentrated (see, among others, Autor (2018), Autor et al. (2016) and Broda and Weinstein (2006)).

Focusing on material self-interest as it relates to the labor market only, the two workhorse models of trade give clear predictions about which people should oppose open trade more. The factor endowment (Heckscher-Ohlin) model makes several assumptions, including that factors of production are mobile across sectors within a country. Stolper and Samuelson (1941) show that in this setting, free trade will benefit the owners of the factors of production that are abundant relative to the rest of the world and hurt others. In the U.S., this has typically been taken to mean that trade would benefit higher-skilled workers and hurt

[1] https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/free-trade/

[2] See, among others, Autor et al. (2013) and Mutz (2021) as well as the papers reviewed in more detail below.

Figure 1: The Factors Shaping Views on Trade Policy



lower-skilled ones. The specific-factor model (or Ricardo-Viner) is based on the idea that some factors of production cannot move across sectors, at least in the short run. In this case, free trade will hurt those working in import-competing sectors and benefit those in export-oriented sectors. From the standpoint of purely material self-interest, the factor endowments model suggests that higher-skilled workers should be more supportive of free trade. The specific factor model implies that those employed in industries with comparative advantage and that export abroad should be more supportive of open trade than those working in sectors that are subject to international competition from imports.[3]

Beyond their own material self-interest, people can also have broader social and economic concerns, represented in the right part of Figure 1. They may care about the efficiency gains from trade in the form of higher competitiveness, innovation, and growth (Box III). They may also worry about distributional consequences of trade as it impacts inequality and different groups, e.g., the middle class or the poor versus the rich (Box IV). Finally, other factors such as patriotism, partisanship, and geopolitical concerns may also influence people's views on trade policy (Box V). The arrows on the diagram represent possible channels. In particular, while self-interest can shape views on trade policy directly (Arrow A), it can also act indirectly by influencing respondents' perceptions of the overall perceived efficiency and distributional effects (Arrows B and C).

To disentangle the role of these factors in shaping trade policy views, I design and run two large-scale surveys that elicit respondents' perceptions of each of the elements in the diagram. I start with open-ended questions that capture people's first-order concerns about trade without being primed by particular answer

[3]For a review of the effects of trade for distributional consequences, and, hence, individual attitudes, see Rodrik (1995).

options. The answers to these questions are investigated using text analysis methods. The surveys then contain detailed questions that test respondents' understanding of trade, including a "problem-set" style series of questions about the price, wage, and welfare effects of trade in different sectors and countries under hypothetical scenarios. I also elicit people's views on the actual (not hypothetical) efficiency impacts and distributional effects of trade in the U.S. Respondents are further asked about their policy views on a range of possible interventions related to trade restrictions (e.g., overall trade barriers or support for protection of specific sectors) and compensatory redistribution (e.g., direct assistance, retraining, or wage subsidies to low-income workers). In addition, I construct a series of objective measures of exposure to trade based on respondents' education level, sector of work, occupation, and local labor market. Thus, I have both objective and subjective measures of respondents' exposure to trade that can influence their material self-interest.

In order to test whether understanding of trade can be improved with information and to study which factors causally drive people's views on trade policy, I design two types of experimental treatments. The first type consists of information treatments in the form of pedagogical videos that explain to respondents the impacts of trade policy on efficiency, distribution, or both. The second type is priming treatments that do not provide any information, but rather prompt respondents to think about the impacts that trade has on them – either as consumers or as workers – through a series of questions.

The main findings are as follows. First, people's understanding of trade and trade policy is imperfect. Answers to questions about the price or wage effects of trade are only slightly more accurate than random answers. Respondents are better at predicting the impacts of tariffs or export taxes and seem to somewhat understand the concept of comparative advantage and the existence of gains from trade. When asked about the effects of trade in the U.S., many respondents believe in positive efficiency gains in the form of higher competitiveness, innovation, and growth. Respondents also understand that trade can have adverse distributional consequences. Thus, there is broad agreement on some of the winners from trade, namely large companies and high-income households. There is more pessimism and disagreement on the extent to which trade benefits workers, the poor, and the middle class, and on how it shapes inequality and unemployment in the U.S.

Second, respondents' own exposure (both actual and perceived) to trade through their work is significantly correlated with their support for trade restrictions. What is more surprising is that it not only shapes their assessment of how trade affects them, but also their broader perceptions of the efficiency and distributional impacts of trade on the U.S. as a whole (i.e., the path through Arrows B and C in Figure 1 is empirically important). For instance, respondents who perceive themselves as made worse off by trade and those who are objectively more exposed to trade are less likely to believe that trade decreases prices in the U.S., that it fosters innovation or growth, or that it does not have adverse distributional impacts.

Third, respondents seem to perceive gains from trade as consumers (Box I) as vague and diffuse. They are divided on whether trade lowers prices or increases the variety of goods in the U.S. or in their own consumption basket. Those that are experimentally prompted to think about their gains from trade as consumers do not change their views on trade. On the contrary, respondents who feel impacted as workers (Box II) perceive the threats and costs as salient. Although a minority of respondents feels directly threatened by trade via their job, this exposure is pivotal for their views on trade. Indeed, respondents who are primed to consider the threats from trade for their job significantly reduce their support for open trade. These findings lend support to the idea that losses from trade in the labor market are concentrated and large, while consumer gains are widespread and diffuse.

Fourth, people's views on trade are strongly driven by broader economic and social concerns beyond their own material self-interest. The belief that is most predictive of support for open trade is that trade generates a variety of efficiency gains (Box III). The belief that trade has adverse distributional consequences can reduce support for free trade, but only if respondents believe that losers cannot be compensated with appropriate policies (Box IV). People who believe that those hurt by trade can be helped using other tools (i.e., compensatory redistribution) do not oppose free trade, even if they are convinced that it will entail adverse distributional consequences. Instead, they support more redistribution. The information treatments confirm these findings. Respondents who see explanations about the efficiency implications of free trade increase their support for it. Those who are told about potentially adverse distributional consequences and possible interventions to compensate losers do not change their views on free trade, but increase their support for compensatory redistribution.

These findings highlight that the two facets of trade policy – trade barriers and compensatory transfers – are driven by different considerations and are both indissociable in people's minds. They point to the need of providing such redistribution and making sure that citizens understand it, if support for free trade is to be maintained.

This paper is part of a broader agenda that uses social economics surveys to better understand the reasoning that shapes people's policy views. The website understandingeconomics.org provides the data for several other policies (such as health insurance, the income tax, and the estate tax).

Related Literature. In the political science and political economy literatures, attitudes toward trade have been related to various characteristics measuring self-interest and broader social attitudes. One focus has been on evaluating the relative explanatory powers of the factor endowment and the specific factor models. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Value Survey (WVS), Mayda and Rodrik (2005) proxy for human capital with educational attainment and occupational categories and find strong support for both models: individuals with higher levels of human capital exhibit higher support for trade only in countries where these skills are abundant; those in import-competing industries are more supportive of trade barriers than those in non-tradable sectors. These findings are echoed by O'Rourke et al. (2001). Beaulieu et al. (2011) build a model of intra-industry trade and show empirically that skilled workers are more supportive of such trade. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) instead mostly find evidence in favor of the factor endowment model. Owen and Johnston (2017) expand the definition of sectors threatened by trade by using the interaction of routine occupation and "offshorability." The fact that there is evidence for both models suggests that different people may have different mental models of trade, including different time horizons over which they envision its effect. In the current paper, I therefore directly elicit people's understanding and perceptions of the mechanisms of trade policy.

Further evidence on the impacts of people's own experience on trade attitudes comes from Mansfield et al. (2019): those that lost their jobs in import-competing sectors following the Great Recession became more anti-trade. The literature has also suggested that self-interested behavior has limited explanatory power overall (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009). I find that personal experience shapes people's policy views directly in line with material self-interest, but also indirectly by changing their perceptions of the effects of trade for the U.S. as a whole, as depicted in Figure 1.

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) emphasize the importance of education as a vehicle for new economic ideas and information that shape attitudes toward trade, not just as a proxy for factor endowment. This is aligned with Mansfield and Mutz (2009), who find that views about the effects of trade on the U.S. as a whole and

out-group anxiety matter more than pure self-interest. Margalit (2012) also confirms that people care not only about the material consequences of trade, but also about its perceived social and cultural consequences. Likewise, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find a more important role for broader factors like relative income, degrees of neighborhood attachment, and nationalism/patriotism. A theoretical model of voters' preferences over trade policy that reflects their concerns for members of those groups in society with whom they identify is developed in Grossman and Helpman (2020).

Policy preferences regarding international trade in the U.S. and in particular support for protectionism – the so-called "globalization backlash" – driven by concerns about impacts on labor markets have been analyzed in Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Walter (2021). Lü et al. (2012) show that support for sector-specific trade protection depends on workers' earnings in the sector, suggesting a concern for inequality. Hanson et al. (2007) compare individual preferences for two different "globalization strategies," namely an import-based versus immigration-based one, depending on their impacts on public finances.

Like the current paper, other work also provides experimental evidence for factors that shape trade attitudes. Hiscox (2006) shows that giving respondents information about job losses due to trade decreases their support for free trade; telling them that trade reduces prices does not change their views. Alfaro et al. (2022) show that telling respondents about research findings on the job losses or gains from trade, or on price effects of trade or tariffs can change people's views on trade. Rodrik and Di Tella (2020) ask respondents to imagine different types of shocks that cause job loss and find that trade-related shocks, especially when in the form of outsourcing to a developing country, generate more demand for protectionism. These findings are consistent with the results of my priming treatments, where I ask people to think about the effects of trade on themselves either as consumers or as workers. However, the interpretation of these "reduced-form" results calls for a more in-depth analysis of the mental models of respondents and their understanding of trade, as I do in this paper. Thus, I disentangle how respondents reason about the mechanisms, costs, and benefits of trade, and determine which considerations are salient and matter to them (see the factors in Figure 1). For instance, respondents are divided on whether trade lowers the prices of goods they buy, and they have heterogeneous levels of worries about and exposures through their own job. Furthermore, they have much broader concerns than just their own self-interest.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the survey, data collection, and sample. Section 3 applies text analysis methods to the open-ended questions to elicit people's first-order concerns on trade policy. Section 4 analyzes respondents' knowledge and understanding of how trade and trade policy work "technically," while Section 5 focuses on people's perceived personal, efficiency, and distributive impacts of trade and trade policy. Section 6 studies the factors that shape views on trade policy and leverages the experimental components of the survey. Section 7 concludes.

2 Survey, Data Collection, and Sample

In this section, I briefly describe the survey, data collection process, and the sample. Appendix A-5 provides more detailed information on these aspects, including on what precautions were taken to ensure a high response and data quality.[4]

[4]For an overview of how large-scale online surveys are run and for how to address common concerns about them, see also Stantcheva (2021).

2.1 Data Collection and Final Sample

Data collection. I conducted two different surveys of U.S. residents between 18 and 70 years of age. The first survey (1,771 respondents) took place between August and September 2019 andthe second one (2,148 respondents) between November and December 2020. Both surveys were designed using the online platform *Qualtrics*. Participants were enrolled by the commercial survey company *Respondi* (https://www.respondi.com/EN/) and its U.S.-based partners and receive survey links via a dashboard and email.

Final sample. Table 1 shows the characteristics of the samples relative to those of the U.S. population in 2019 (see Appendix A-5.3). Survey 1 is representative of the US population (column 1) along the dimensions of age, gender, and income (which were targeted specifically), as well as along non-targeted dimensions such as marital status and employment. Survey 2 intentionally focuses on respondents in the labor force only and is broadly representative of that population (column 3) along the dimensions of gender, age, income, employment, marital status, and college education. In both surveys, respondents were more likely to have completed high-school (and, in the case of Survey 1, to be college-educated) and to be unemployed.[5] African-American and Hispanic people are underrepresented. To address the small imbalances in the sample, I re-weighted the sample so that it is representative along the unemployment, education, and race dimensions as well. This did not change any of the results in significant ways, so my benchmark results are on the unweighted sample. I only use Survey 2 in the experimental part (Section 6) and when describing personal impacts from trade in Section 5.

2.2 The Survey Structure

The survey structure is illustrated in Figure 2, with the full questionnaires for Surveys 1 and 2 are available in Appendices A-3 and A-4, with a link which leads to the web interface of each survey. Below, text in italics represents actual survey text. The order of these question blocks was randomized in order to test for framing effects on policy views and survey fatigue. In practice, there was no difference in policy views and no evidence for survey fatigue (see Appendix A-5). I now provide more details on some of these blocks.


Background socio-economic questions

I collected information on respondents' gender, age, income, highest level of education achieved, sector of occupation, employment status, marital status, number of children, place of residence, and political leaning. I also asked them about their main sources of economic news, whether they try to stay informed of economic issues, their overall media and social media consumption, and their field of study in college.


[5] This likely reflects the fact that people have more time to take surveys during periods of unemployment spells.

Figure 2: Outline of Surveys

(a) Outline of Survey 1



(b) Outline of Survey 2



Notes. The figure shows the blocks of each survey and different treatment branches. The numbers next to the arrows represent the shares of the sample in each branch. In Survey 1, the order of the questions related to Efficiency and Distributional impacts inside the *Reasoning about trade* block and the Policy views block was randomized.

Open-Ended Questions

Open-ended questions are important to elicit first-order, intrinsic concerns that people have before they are prompted to think of a particular aspect of trade with more directed survey questions (Stantcheva and Ferrario, 2022). I ask respondents about the *"main considerations"* that come to their mind when they think about trade policy, what the *"goals"* of trade policy should be, what its *"shortcomings"* are, what the effects on the U.S. economy from trade restrictions are, and which groups gain or lose from changes in trade barriers. The responses to these questions are studied using text analysis methods in Section 3.

Understanding of trade

In the *Knowledge about trade* part, respondents are asked about factual knowledge (e.g., to which countries the U.S. mainly exports and from which countries it imports). In addition, in the *Understanding of trade* block, I walk respondents through a "problem set" style case study to test their understanding of the price, wage, and distributional effects of trade and trade policy. To this end, I ask respondents to imagine various hypothetical scenarios "holding everything else constant."

Experimental parts

In the experimental part of Survey 1, respondents are randomly split into five groups. Four treatment groups are shown one of four videos that emphasize different aspects of trade and trade policy, while the control group does not see any video.

- The *Distributive effects* video emphasizes the distributional impacts of trade policy on both consumers and the labor market.
- The *Efficiency effects* treatment shows trade's efficiency implications.
- The *Economist* treatment brings together both the distributional and the efficiency considerations and highlights the trade-offs, much like a simple introductory and very concise economics course on the issue might do.
- The *Economist U.S.-specific* treatment is identical to the *Economist* treatment but specifically refers to the U.S. instead of generic countries A and B. Because these last two treatments had very similar effects, I pool them together in the analysis and in the survey flow figure.

The experimental part of Survey 2 instead consists of priming treatments that do not provide any information, but rather ask respondents to think about the effects of trade policy on themselves.

- The *Own consumption* treatment specifically asks them questions about the effects of trade on the prices and variety of goods they buy.
- The *Own job risks* treatment instead asks respondents about the threats to their own job.

The experimental treatments and results are covered in Section 6. Screenshots from these videos are in Figures 3-5. Each video can be seen by clicking the links below the screenshots.

Reasoning about trade

In this section, respondents are asked to think in more detail about how trade and trade policy work, particularly about its efficiency and distributional effects. What price effects and impacts on the broader economy will they trigger? What are the distributional consequences for different groups of people? These series of questions are critical because they explicitly elicit the chains of effects and mechanisms that respondents have in mind when they think about trade and trade policy. Contrary to the questions in the "Understanding of trade" block above, the questions here are not hypothetical. Instead respondents are asked about what they think actually happens in the US.

When asking about these mechanisms, respondents are randomized into one of two branches, which feature a different phrasing of some of these questions. The "generic" branch asks questions about the U.S. as a whole or about other people (e.g., *"Overall, has international trade decreased the prices of goods sold in the U.S.?"*) with an impersonal formulation. Respondents in the second branch see a "personalized" phrasing for some questions only. For instance, *"Overall, has international trade decreased the prices of goods that you buy regularly?"* or *"Overall, has international trade made the firms in your sector of work more competitive and improved their productivity?"* Respondents in the personalized branch are also asked whether they feel that they have been made worse off or better off from trade, which will be used as a measured of their perceived exposure to trade.

Policy views

In the final part of the survey, I ask respondents about their views on trade policy, compensatory redistribution (targeted at those who lose from trade) and general redistribution policy (aimed at lower-income people more generally). I also ask them a range of questions about their views on government.

Survey 2

Survey 2 asks similar socio-economic background and policy views questions. It contains different experimental treatments, as described above. It also asks a range of other questions related to the labor market, economic insecurity, and on the household's impacts from Covid-19 (since it was run after the start of the pandemic), which are not used in the paper.

3 People's First-Order Concerns: Text Analysis of the Open-Ended Survey Questions

The answers to the open-ended questions can help shed light on people's first-order concerns without them being prompted to think about specific answer options (Stantcheva and Ferrario, 2022). This section provides the results from the topic analysis applied to the responses of several of the survey's open-ended questions (listed at the start of the paragraphs below). Appendix Figure A-1 shows word clouds to assess the frequency of different terms in the answers. More details on the text analysis methods and example answers for each topic described below are in Appendix A-1.

"When you think about trade policy and whether the U.S. should put some restrictions on trade with other countries, such as tariffs, what are the main considerations that come to

your mind?" Panel A of Figure 6 shows the topic distribution that appears in the answers to this question, segmented by respondents' political leaning (Republican versus Democrat). The keywords for each topic are listed below the figure. Words are defined by their "stems:" i.e., words with the same root, such as "policy" and "policies" or "be" and "was," are treated identically.

There are six different topics that arise from the text analysis: The *Price* topic includes stem keywords such as *price, inflation, afford, cost, expense.* An example answer in this topic could be: "*My main concern is prices going up.*" The *Distributive* topic includes keywords such as *suffer, affect, hurt, hit, lose* in combination with *farmer, business, firm, poor, sector.* An example answer is "*I don't want anybody to have to suffer like the farmers or any others with paying extra taxes for food and goods.*" The *Labor* topic includes keywords such as *labor, job, employ, wage, worker*, as in "*How it affects employment and current wages.*" The *Fair Trade & International Relations* topic includes keywords such as *fair, retaliatory, imbalances, justice, reciprocity.* For example: "*I think trade policies need to be fair for all. Tariffs must be introduced only when there is a likelihood of unfair transactions between countries. Trades should be a mutually beneficial agreement.*" The *Protectionism* topic includes keywords as *restrict, tariff* in combination with words such as *fine, good, need, reason, necessary.* An example answer is "*I believe that we need tariffs, especially with China because they have been taking advantage of this country for years.*" The *Does not Know* topic includes keywords such as *unsure, don't know, don't understand.*

Prices and *Distributive* concerns are more widespread among Democrats, while *Protectionism* and *Fair Trade & International Relations* concerns are more prevalent among Republicans. Worries about *Efficiency* and *Labor* (i.e., jobs and employment) are equally represented in both political groups, as are answers that express a lack of knowledge about the topic.

"What would be the effects on the U.S. economy if barriers to trade, such as tariffs, were increased?" is another open-ended question analyzed in Panel B of Figure 6. Responses can be classified based on the domain they mention (e.g., *Efficiency* or *Distributive* concerns, as described above) and the direction of the effect perceived (positive vs. negative). For instance, *Negative Price* effects refer to thinking prices will go up in response to trade restrictions. *Positive Reallocation* refers to respondents mentioning that trade restrictions will lead to a reallocation of production to the US. Democrat respondents are significantly more likely to mention negative effects of trade restrictions on prices and efficiency. Republican respondents are more likely to talk about *Positive reallocation* effects, with trade restrictions encouraging a shift back to domestic production and supporting the idea of 0"made in the USA."[6]

"Which groups of people do you think would gain if trade barriers such as tariffs were increased?" Panel C of Figure 6 plots the frequency with which various groups, people, or entities are mentioned in response to this open-ended question about those who would benefit from trade barriers. Democrats often tend to mention "the Rich," "Government and Politicians," "Big Companies," and "Nobody" (suggestive of the view that, ultimately, everyone loses from trade barriers). Among Republicans, mentions include "the U.S.," "everyone," "workers," "manufacturers," and "domestic businesses."

[6]Panel B of Appendix Figure A-2 shows that those who are more knowledgeable about trade (as measured by their correct answers to the questions described below in Section 4) are more likely to mention *Negative Price*, *Negative Efficiency*, and *Negative Distributive* effects from trade restrictions.

4 Understanding of Trade

In this section, I present the results on how people understand the mechanisms and the different effects of trade and trade policy. The questions asked for this purpose are stylized and hypothetical: respondents are asked to imagine various scenarios, in a controlled "problem set" style fashion, holding everything else constant. The goal here is to see whether respondents can reason about the effects of trade in consistent and accurate ways. Section 5 instead asks respondents about their perceived effects on the U.S. economy today (not hypothetically, and not holding anything constant). For the rest of the analysis, all variables are defined in more detail in Appendix A-6.

A short "problem set" style series of questions. Respondents were presented with the case of two industries: the car and the laptop industry. They were told that *"the U.S. is a large net exporter of laptops (meaning that it sells more laptops abroad than it purchases from abroad and that U.S. laptops are a large share of all laptops sold in the world), and a large net importer of cars (meaning that it purchases more cars from abroad than it sells abroad and that cars purchased by customers in the U.S. are a large share of worldwide car purchases). The laptop sector employs many high-skilled, college-educated workers. The car sector employs many low-skilled workers. Cars are produced for cheaper abroad, while laptops are produced for cheaper in the U.S."*

Respondents were then asked to imagine what happens in several scenarios, such as an increase in car imports to the U.S. and an increase in laptop exports from the U.S. The questions were phrased carefully so as to pin down the "model," i.e., respondents were asked to imagine what happens in each sector (the "short-run," specific factor model) and then what happens if workers can switch sectors (the "long-run," factor endowment model).

Figure 8 shows the share of respondents who agree with each of the statements listed on the vertical axis, split by level of education (Panel A) and by whether a respondent thinks they are made better or worse off by trade (Panel B). While there is no unambiguously correct answer under all possible assumptions and models, the answers are oriented such that agreeing with the statements listed is consistent with a benchmark textbook model (e.g., Krugman et al. (2017)), as well as with recent empirical evidence on the effects of trade protection (e.g., Amiti et al. (2019) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2019)). The gray line shows the expected share of respondents who would agree with the statements if they randomly guessed answers.

Welfare effects. Respondents are divided on the issue of whether consumers who purchase cars in the US benefit if car imports increase. In addition, 75% of college-educated respondents and 59% of non-college-educated ones believe that both trade partners are generally made better off by trade rather than one country gaining at the expense of the other one. The third question in the figure considers a scenario in which the U.S. can produce cars at a lower cost than the foreign country. Respondents are asked whether, under some circumstances, it would still make sense to import cars from abroad. 77% of college-educated respondents against 64% of non-college-educated ones agree it makes sense. This suggests that respondents either understand the concept of comparative advantage or have in mind some love-for-variety or quality differential.

Price and wage effects. Respondents have disparate views about the price and wage effects of exports and imports, suggesting that it is difficult for them to anticipate these equilibrium effects. In many answers under the headers of "effects on prices" and "effects on wages" respondents are almost evenly split between agreeing and disagreeing. For instance, if the U.S. started importing more cars and producing fewer cars

domestically, only around one quarter of respondents believe that the price of cars in the U.S. would decrease, and around half think that wages in the U.S. car sector would decrease. This may explain why only 55% of respondents think that households who purchase cars in the U.S. would be made better off by increases in car imports in the U.S. (and is consistent with the large disagreements on the effects of trade on overall prices in the U.S. in Section 5).

Effects of tariffs and export taxes. There is more widespread agreement about the effects of tariffs and export taxes. Around 70% of respondents agree that an export tax on U.S. laptops would increase prices abroad and that a car import tariff would increase prices of cars in the U.S.

Factual knowledge about trade. I also asked respondents a series of questions on the main imports, exports, and trading partners of the U.S. Figure 7 shows that 71% of respondents correctly answer that the country from which the U.S. imports the most is China. Smaller shares of respondents (between 4% and 7%) answer Mexico, Japan, Canada, or the U.K. When asked to which country the U.S. exports the most, 44% of respondents answer China again, and 19% chose the correct answer, Canada. Mexico is a close third with 14% of respondents choosing it. Almost 80% of respondents know what an import tariff is, but less than half know what an import quota is (not shown on the figure).

Heterogeneity in knowledge and willingness to pay for information about trade. To evaluate respondents' willingness to pay for information, I implement the following procedure: In the final part of the survey, respondents were informed that they were automatically enrolled in a lottery to win $1000 and asked whether they were willing to forfeit a randomized amount of their lottery gain (between $1, $2, $5, and $10) in order to receive the accurate answers to all the knowledge questions. They had to commit to forfeiting that amount before they knew whether they had won the lottery or not. This allows me to study the willingness to pay for information. The share of respondents who agree to pay the randomized amount proposed in exchange for accurate truthful information is 38%.

Table 2 highlights some of the heterogeneity in knowledge across respondents. The outcome variables are the share of correct answers in the case study questions (column 1) and the willingness to pay for correct answers, controlling for the randomized price of information. Women, Black respondents, Hispanic respondents, younger respondents, those without a college degree, and Republican respondents tend to answer less accurately (see Table A-1 for heterogeneity in answers for each individual question). Those who feel that they have been made better off from trade answer more accurately, are more likely to believe in welfare gains from trade, and are more willing to pay for the information. More knowledgeable people are consistently more willing to pay for information, which could be one of the channels through which misinformation can persist (Alesina et al. (2018) and Alesina et al. (2022)).

Summary. In sum, respondents are divided about the effects of trade when asked hypothetical and precise questions about its mechanisms. There is little agreement on the effects of trade on prices or wages in different sectors. There is more alignment on the overall welfare effects of trade or the effects of trade-related taxes (import or export taxes). There are some differences by college education and own experience, but only small partisan gaps in understanding. Those made worse off by trade anticipate more negative overall effects from open trade, even in these hypothetical scenarios.

5 Perceived Efficiency and Distributional Effects of Trade

I now turn to the perceived efficiency and distributional effects of trade and trade policy, as well as perceived personal impacts. While Section 4 asked hypothetical questions in a controlled problem-set type environment, this section describes respondents' perceived (non-hypothetical) impacts from trade in the U.S. These perceptions are summarized in Figures 9 and 10, which show the shares of respondents who agree with the statements listed. In addition, Appendix Tables A-2 to A-5 contain more detailed information on each of these channels.[7]

5.1 Perceived Personal Impacts from Trade

Across the two surveys, several questions were asked about the respondent's own experience (in Survey 1, this was only done for respondents in the personalized branch). Panel A of Figure 9 shows the shares of respondents who agree with the statements listed. For respondents in survey 1, we can further split into those who answer that they are *better off from trade* and those who think they are *worse off from trade*.

The results show that people are divided on whether trade has increased the prices of goods they buy and are somewhat more convinced that trade has increased the variety of goods available. Regarding their labor market experience, a minority of respondents thinks that trade is a major threat to their sector or job. They tend to rank trade on par with immigration as a potential negative influence on their job. On balance, when asked about their own experience, 61% of respondents think they have been made better off, and 39% think they have been made worse off. These views are consistent with the idea that losses from trade in the labor market are concentrated, while consumer gains are diffuse and widespread.

Subjective and objective exposure to trade. How does respondents' perceived exposure to trade align with their objective exposure to trade, according to different measures used in the literature? First of all, following the literature using educational achievement as a measure of factor endowment, we can see that college-educated respondents are significantly less likely to feel negatively impacted both in their role as consumers and workers (see Appendix Table A-5). Second, I consider five primary measures: 1) whether the sector of the respondent is a *tradable sector*, like in Mayda and Rodrik (2005); 2) the extent to which the respondent's occupation is routine-intensive as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Autor and Dorn (2013), and Goos et al. (2014); 3) the extent to which the respondent's occupation is both routine-intensive and easily offshorable from Owen and Johnston (2017);[8] 4) whether the respondent's occupation is in a position of comparative advantage from the point of view of international competition, following Owen and Johnston (2017); and 5) the exposure through the local labor market, as measured by the change in Chinese import exposure per worker in a region from Autor et al. (2013). Using these measures, I build indicators for exposure and interactions between them.

Panel B of Figure 9 shows the correlation between respondents' perceived exposure to trade and these objective exposure measures. In general, a respondent's (objective) negative exposure to trade through their sector, occupation, or local labor market is significantly positively correlated with feeling that trade has

[7] For instance, the case study explicitly asked questions conditional on workers moving across sectors versus not moving. Here, we are asking respondents to give their overall perceived impact, which will depend on the model they have in mind (e.g., a short run or longer-run model).

[8] According to Owen and Johnston (2017), routine is characterized by repetition or rule-following procedures, which in the U.S. will be subject to competitive pressure. Offshorability measures whether job tasks are location dependent and require face-to-face interaction. In countries like the U.S., they show that those in routine occupations are more anti-trade and this effect will be magnified by those in more offshorable occupations.

made them worse off and that it has negatively affected their job. People exposed to trade through their job also feel worse off as consumers and are less likely to believe that trade has reduced the prices of goods they buy, perhaps because they feel that their purchasing power is lower than it would be otherwise.

There is a positive correlation between subjective and objective exposure, although it is not perfect. This points to two possible interpretations, with implications for work using these objective exposure measures. First, sector, occupation, or local labor market measures may be too coarse to capture fine-grained individual experience. In that sense, individuals may have more accurate and precise assessments of the threats they face. Second, individuals' subjective perceptions may be exaggerated or understated. If this is the case, perceptions arguably matter more for policy views than objective exposure, as will be discussed in the rest of the analysis.

Summing up. In sum, respondents are divided in the perceived effects of trade on their consumption bundles and their jobs. Those who are in sectors, occupations, or labor markets more negatively exposed to trade or that have no college education believe they have been hurt more by trade both in their role as workers and as consumers. On balance, more respondents think they are made better off than worse off, consistent with the idea that consumer benefits are diffuse and that direct losses (through one's job) are concentrated.

5.2 Perceived efficiency effects of trade

Panel A of Figure 10 focuses on the efficiency implications of trade. These questions were asked with identical phrasing to both respondents in the generic and personalized branches. For the latter, we can distinguish between those who think they are better off from trade and those who think they are worse off.

Views on these topics are clearly divided, but generally optimistic. For instance, 61% of respondents think that international trade increases competition among firms in the U.S., 69% that it fosters innovation, and 62% that it generates more GDP growth. Divisions are not along political lines (see Table A-2).

Respondents' own experience is significantly correlated with their views about the effects of trade on the US overall (arrow B in Figure 1). Those who think they are made worse off are less likely to say that trade has increased innovation, GDP growth, or the value of the U.S. dollar and that both trade partners are made better off through trade.

Measures of objective exposure to trade are also correlated with perceived efficiency effects for the U.S. as a whole, although the correlation is somewhat weaker than for perceived exposure (see Panel C in Table A-2). Respondents in sectors, occupations, or labor markets threatened by trade are typically less likely to think that trade has led to efficiency gains. Those in comparative advantage occupations are significantly more likely to think so.

More educated respondents systematically perceive higher efficiency gains from trade (see Panel A in Table A-2). If we consider education primarily as a proxy measure for factor endowment, this result suggests that those more likely to gain from trade also perceive higher benefits of it for the U.S. as a whole. At the same time, some of the papers reviewed in the literature section suggested that education can change people's views beyond their self-interest. Indeed, conditional on education, income does not have a significant effect on perceived efficiency effects.

5.3 Perceived distributional impacts of trade

Panels B and C of Figure 10 consider beliefs about the distributional impacts of trade. It is worth noting that the empirical evidence on the distributional effects of trade is mixed. While the literature is too abundant for an exhaustive review, a few recent papers focus on estimating the overall distributional effects that arise through the consumption ("expenditure") channel and the labor market ("earnings") channel. Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) find that the gains from trade on the consumption side seem skewed toward poorer households, because a higher share of their consumption baskets is made of goods that are traded. On the contrary, Borusyak and Jaravel (2021) find that the expenditure channel of trade is close to distributively neutral for the US. The earnings channel yields overall small effects on income inequality because trade tends to generate within-income rather than across-income deciles distributional effects. For Ecuador, Adão et al. (2022) find that earnings inequality is higher than it would be in the absence of trade, with the largest gains from trade occurring at the top of the income distribution.

Perceived impacts on different groups. Panel B of Figure 10 shows the share of respondents who believe that the groups listed have gained from trade. Around 70% of respondents agree that large corporations have gained from trade and 61% think that high-income earners have gained from trade. Only one fifth of respondents think that small businesses have benefitted and those made worse off from trade almost never think so. Respondents are three times less likely to say that the middle-class and low-income earners have gained from trade than they are to say so about high-income-earners. Republicans are slightly more optimistic about the benefits of trade for the less well-off (see Appendix Table A-3).

Perceived impacts on the labor market and consumers. Overall, respondents are aware of the fact that trade can have adverse distributional consequences through the labor market. Panel C of Figure 10 shows that more respondents (63%) believe that high-skilled workers could easily change sector of work if their jobs were destroyed by trade than that low-skilled workers could switch sector (37%). 79% of people think that trade is the reason for "*unemployment in some sectors and the decline of some industries in the U.S.*" Trade and automation are tied for the main perceived cause of the loss of manufacturing jobs, ahead of immigration.

Regarding the impacts of trade on consumers, 57% of respondents believe that international trade tends to decrease the prices of goods in the U.S. These divided views presumably reflect the tension that people feel between the different ways in which trade affects the relative prices of imports versus exports and the difficulty in knowing the counterfactual prices absent trade.

As a consequence of the perception that labor market costs are higher for lower-income workers and the lack of conviction about consumer gains, around two thirds of respondents think that trade is a major reason for the "*rise in inequality*" in the U.S. Importantly, despite being aware of the potential adverse distributional consequences of trade, a majority (62%) of respondents believe that, in principle, trade could make everyone better off because it is possible to "*compensate those who lose from it through appropriate policies.*"

Heterogeneous perceptions by actual and perceived exposure to trade. Respondents who perceive to have been made worse-off by trade and those in sectors or occupations negatively affected by trade are significantly less likely to think that trade has helped U.S. workers overall, more likely to think that trade has adverse distributional consequences, and less likely to believe that losers from trade can be appropriately compensated. The opposite holds for college-educated respondents.

Summing up. Overall, respondents are pessimistic about the benefits of trade for the middle class, low-income earners, and small businesses. Yet, they generally agree that high-income earners or large corporations have gained from trade. Respondents' own exposure to trade (objective and subjective) is correlated with their assessment of the overall benefits of trade for others and those exposed to trade through their sector, occupation, or local labor market perceive worse overall distributional consequences of trade. The college-educated consistently hold more positive views of trade, and partisan gaps are relatively modest (see Appendix Tables A-3 and A-4).

6 Views on Trade Policy

This section analyzes the factors that shape respondents' views on trade policy, as illustrated in Figure 1. Trade policy is multifaceted: in addition to trade restrictions that can take various forms (e.g., restrictions for specific items and for particular industries), there is redistribution policy. The latter can be in two forms: compensatory redistribution and general redistribution.

Compensatory redistribution involves policies targeted to those displaced by trade in the form of, e.g., direct assistance, retraining, or transfers. An example in the US is the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. General redistribution consists of income-targeted policies such as transfers to the unemployed or the poor and wage subsidies. It is an indirect way to help those affected by trade because it can be viewed as social insurance against shocks to income, including trade shocks. None of these policies are akin to the textbook "lump-sum" transfers compensation. Instead, they are all, to some extent, distortionary and costly in efficiency terms. Thus, respondents are not asked about the ideal, theoretical, and costless compensation, but rather about these more realistic policies that are similar to existing ones.

Respondents' views on the design of trade policy are presented in more detail in Appendix Table A-6. Most respondents (63%) are supportive of free trade. Nevertheless, the idea that the U.S. should protect infant industries, food imports for food security reasons, and several strategic industries is relatively widespread.[9] Respondents are also asked about their preferred policy to help workers in declining industries. 53% believe direct assistance and retraining are the best policies; 11% prefer production subsidies in affected sectors. Finally, 36% think import restrictions are the best solution. Furthermore, many respondents believe that the government should be responsible for regulating trade (61%) and ensuring the stability of the dollar (75%) (see Appendix Table A-8).

6.1 Experimental Design

I start by describing the experimental components of the paper, which then allows me to discuss how the factors highlighted in the framework of Figure 1 shape respondents' policy views, combining correlations and experimental evidence.

Information treatments. Survey 1 shows respondents one of three videos in a randomized manner. The control group sees no video. The *Distribution* and *Efficiency* treatment videos take the example of two countries, called A and B. A produces cars at a lower cost than B, while B produces clothing at a lower cost.

The *Distribution* video states that openness to trade can increase the flow of goods and services, but that there may be winners and losers from trade. Starting from the labor market effects, the video shows that, in

[9] These policy views can be compared to the results in Costinot et al. (2015) that optimal import tariffs should be uniform and optimal export subsidies should be weakly decreasing with respect to comparative advantage.

the exporting car sector, workers' earnings and the number of jobs could increase. However, in the sectors threatened by imports (clothing), the number of jobs and wages may decrease. Turning to the consumer side, the video describes that, when there is more trade, the imported goods in country A (clothing) become cheaper, and the variety of goods increases. Therefore, households who consume the imported goods benefit and consumers overall may also gain from the variety of goods available for purchase. The winners from trade are thus generally a large group. Those who lose are often a smaller group, but their losses can be acute. Finally, respondents are shown that the government can help workers in the sectors hurt by trade by providing more generous unemployment benefits and targeted training programs to help them acquire new skills and find new jobs.

The *Efficiency treatment* video shows that trade can impact the productivity and competitiveness of firms and workers. If A and B open up more to trade, then the car sector in country A will export more and generate higher profits. On the contrary, companies in the clothing sector in country A may shrink and even exit the market. Trade may also increase knowledge and technological diffusion and lead to productivity gains in both countries. The market sizes for both countries increase, which may force industries to be more efficient in order to remain competitive.

The *Economist* treatment simply appends the *Redistribution* and *Efficiency* treatments into a longer, more comprehensive video.[10]

Priming treatments. Survey 2 leverages a different type of treatment. Instead of showing respondents information, a randomly selected subsample is walked through questions priming them to think about how their own job (*"Own Job Risks"* treatment) or the price and variety of goods they purchase (*"Own Consumption"* treatment) may be affected by trade. For instance, they are asked *"How likely do you think it is that, over the next 10 years, your job will be outsourced, off-shored, or automated because of competition with foreign countries?"* or *"Can you think of some goods only produced in foreign countries that you regularly buy and consume because of trade with foreign countries?"*[11]

6.2 Determinants of Policy Views on Trade

To summarize views on trade policy, I create two outcome variables: *Support for free trade* captures whether the respondent thinks that the U.S. should aim to reduce trade barriers. *Support for Redistribution* measures support for redistribution policy. It is constructed following the methodology of Kling et al. (2007). It consists of an equally weighted average of the z-scores of all redistribution-related variables and is further divided by its standard deviation.[12]

In Panel A of Figure 11, the outcome variable is *Support for free trade*. The various groups of rows, delimited with dashed lines, show coefficients from different regressions. "Individual covariates" displays coefficients on the full set of individual covariates. "Exposure to trade" shows coefficients on perceived and

[10] As explained in Section 2, this treatment came in two versions that are pooled together because their effects are broadly similar. The first version is "generic," referring to the countries as A and B. The "U.S.-specific" version explicitly refers to country A as the United States and to country B as a foreign country. The goal was to see whether there would be peculiar reactions if the treatment was about the U.S. specifically.

[11] The answers to these questions, which are interesting per se and not only in their role as treatments, were already summarized in Section 5.

[12] More precisely, the index is higher for respondents who agree that the best tools to help workers are more generous transfers and direct assistance to workers (rather than restricting imports or subsidizing production in their industry) and who want to increase spending on support and retraining programs for workers displaced by international competition and trade. It is also increasing in support for more general (non-trade specific) redistributive spending such as help for those out of work, better schools for children from low-income families, and wage subsidies.

objective exposure measures (included one at a time). "Beliefs" shows the coefficients on variables and indices that measure beliefs about trade, introduced in Section 5.2, included all at once and controlling for individual covariates. The final set of rows shows the effects of all the informational and priming treatments. Panel B performs the same analysis using as the outcome variable *Support for Redistribution*.

Consumer gains

I start with the "self-interest" part of the framework and with respondents' perceived gains as consumers (Box I in Figure 1). Section 3 showed that the topic of prices is salient and comes to people's minds frequently when thinking about trade. Section 5 also highlighted that people are divided in their beliefs about whether trade has overall decreased the prices of goods in the U.S. or of goods that they buy, although they are somewhat more convinced that trade increases the variety of goods available. It is understandable that the effects of trade on overall prices are hard to assess, given that the relative prices of different goods can move differently. It is thus difficult to imagine the counterfactual prices without trade, while it is likely easier to grasp the overall increase in the variety of goods.

Figure 11 shows that the belief that prices decrease from trade is not significantly related to either support for trade or support for redistribution. Consistent with this lack of correlation, the experiment of priming people to think of their benefits as consumers, specifically of the prices and variety of goods that they purchase, does not move their support for trade either. These patterns are in line with the view that although many people believe they gain as consumers from trade, these benefits are diffuse and people take them as given. They are thus not a major predictor of support for trade.

Own job risks

I next consider the second "self-interest" part of the framework, which relates to respondents' exposure to trade in the labor market (Box II of Figure 1).

Figure 11 highlights that respondents who feel worse off from trade and who are more negatively exposed to trade through their occupation or sector are significantly less likely to support free trade.[13] The opposite holds for those in comparative advantage sectors. There are no differences in support for redistribution between these groups. The experimental evidence confirms these patterns: Respondents who are primed to think about possible negative impacts of trade on their job (in the *Own job risk* treatment) reduce their support for free trade significantly. These findings are consistent with the idea that trade creates a concentrated set of losers: Although a minority of respondents feel directly impacted in their job (as shown in Section 5), these potential losses are salient and loom large. Thus, to some extent, views on trade are shaped by self-interest when it comes to one's potential job risks, which are more salient than the diffuse consumption benefits.

Note also that college-educated respondents support both free trade and redistribution significantly more. While higher support for trade among the college-educated is in line with the factor endowment model, if education is taken as a proxy for skill, higher support for redistribution (even conditional on income) cannot easily be explained with narrow self-interest. Instead, it may point to the idea raised in the introduction that education may shape views about the economy.

[13] They are also more likely to support imposing trade restrictions to help workers (see Table A-6).

Belief in the efficiency gains from trade

Respondents' broader economic and social concerns also influence their policy views, as represented on the right side of Figure 1. Starting from the perceived efficiency gains from trade (Box III), recall from Section 5 that respondents' views on the efficiency impacts of trade are divided, but on average lean positive.

Panel A of Figure 11 shows that beliefs in efficiency gains from trade are significantly correlated with more support for free trade. This can be seen both in the correlations and in the experimental effects: the *Efficiency* treatment significantly improves support for free trade. Thus, the channel represented by Arrow C in the framework of Figure 1 seems pertinent. Views on compensatory redistribution are also correlated with views on efficiency gains from trade. Respondents who believe that trade can improve innovation, competitiveness, and GDP are more supportive of redistribution policy to help those who do not benefit from these efficiency gains.

Furthermore, Section 5 emphasized that respondents who feel that trade has impacted them negatively are less optimistic about efficiency gains. In conjunction with the effects of beliefs in efficiency highlighted here, this suggests that the indirect channel represented by Arrow B in Figure 1 may also be relevant. Below, I perform a decomposition analysis to see to what extent this is the case.

Perceived distributional impacts of trade and the importance of compensating losers

Next, I focus on the perceived distributional impacts of trade (Box IV in Figure 1). The strongest predictor of support for free trade is the belief that, in principle, losers can be compensated. Other perceptions of the distributional impacts of trade are only weakly correlated with views on trade. Those who believe that trade is a major reason for unemployment and hurts U.S. workers are somewhat less likely to support free trade. As long as respondents believe that adverse consequences from trade on some groups can be dampened by redistributive policy, they are likely to support more free trade, even if they believe that there are adverse distributional consequences. The perceived distributional impacts of trade also substantially matter for support for compensatory redistribution. Respondents who believe that trade hurts low-income and low-skilled workers and that it fosters inequality support redistribution much more.

These correlational findings are confirmed experimentally. The *Distributive effects* treatment tells respondents about possible adverse consequences, but also about redistributive policies that could remedy them. The correlations described above suggest that these two pieces of information should move respondents in opposite directions when it comes to support for trade (so that the sign of the net effect is theoretically ambiguous), yet push them toward more support for redistribution. This is consistent with the treatment effects of the *Distributive effects* video: It has no significant effect on support for trade and strongly increases support for redistribution policy. The *Economist* treatment also improves support for redistribution, as it similarly emphasizes the distributional consequences of trade and potential solutions for them, while in addition showcasing trade's efficiency benefits. Thus, the effect from perceived distributional impacts of trade to views on trade policy – represented by arrow C in Figure 1 – is important.

Furthermore, recall that those who are materially negatively affected by trade – whether subjectively or objectively through their sector, occupation, or labor market – perceive worse overall distributional effects of trade (Section 5). As just shown, these perceptions are correlated with lower support for free trade and higher support for compensatory transfers. Therefore, the effect of own exposure to trade on perceptions of its distributional impacts may provide an additional, indirect channel – represented by Arrow B in Figure 1) – through which exposure affects policy views.

The picture that arises is thus that, even if people understand that there could be adverse distributional impacts from trade, they will still support free trade as long as they believe that losers can be compensated. Respondents that hold this belief also support more redistribution policy to buffer some of the adverse consequences. Hence, people care both about efficiency and distributional effects, but these beliefs shape different aspects of their policy views, i.e., views on free trade itself versus views on redistribution to deal with the adverse consequences. Put simply, people believe that efficiency gains are more relevant for trade policy; distributional concerns can be "fixed" by other policies. However, absent the belief that losers can be helped, distributional worries decrease support for trade. An important lesson here is that policy has to convincingly take action to compensate those who lose in order to maintain support for free trade. This is also consistent with the discussion in Blanchard and Tirole (2021), Rodrik and Stantcheva (2021a), and Rodrik and Stantcheva (2021b), who emphasize that a backlash against openness and free trade can stem from the perception that the losers are left alone and that nothing is done to shelter them from the adverse distributional consequences.

Direct and indirect effects from self-interest

In line with the framework of Figure 1, the results described above show that respondents that are affected through their labor market are less likely to support free trade through two channels. First, there is the direct self-interest channel, represented by Arrow A in the figure. Second, their own experience influences their broader economic and social concerns about trade, which in turn affect their policy views (the path through Arrows B and C in the figure). This leads to the question: What is the relative importance of these two channels?

To answer this question, I perform a Gelbach decomposition of the effect of own exposure (Gelbach, 2016). In essence, this method compares the coefficient from a partial regression, in which support for free trade is regressed on a measure of personal exposure and other controls to the coefficient from a full regression, in which the controls for the "beliefs" from Figure 11 are added. The decomposition shows how much of the effect of personal exposure goes through these beliefs versus how much of the effect persists despite controlling for them, which is the unexplained part of the effect of exposure. The latter can be interpreted as the direct self-interest channel (arrow A). Figure 12 shows the results for several measures of exposure: perceived exposure, being in a routine and offshorable occupation, being in a comparative advantage occupation, and being in a tradable sector. The direct self-interest channel (i.e., the unexplained part of the gap) is around 30% for the perceived measure of exposure, around 50-70% for exposure based on occupation, and 84% for exposure based on sector. While it is difficult to rigorously compared these magnitudes, a clear result is that there is a significant role for the direct self-interest channel, as well as for the indirect channel whereby exposure shapes one's broader economic and social concerns. Furthermore, the decomposition shows that the differences in views between those negatively exposed to trade and those that are not, are mainly explained by the key factors already highlighted above, namely whether they believe it is possible to compensate losers and whether they believe in the efficiency effects of trade.


Scope of government, patriotism, and partisanship

Some of the other determinants of trade policy views (Box V) are shown in Appendix Tables A-6 to A-8. Trust and belief in a broad scope for government are also strong predictors of support for redistribution policies, in line with earlier results (Kuziemko et al. (2015) and Stantcheva (2021)). Those who worry about

geopolitical ramifications from trade restrictions, i.e., retaliatory responses, are more likely to support policies to compensate losers from trade rather than support outright trade restrictions. Patriotism is significantly correlated with support for trade restrictions in many industries and to protect U.S. workers, as well as with lower support for compensatory transfers.


Partisanship also matters for views on free trade, but bigger differences arise in support for compensatory transfers and redistribution. Most respondents remain supportive of free trade overall: Only 28% of Democrats, as compared with 43% of Republicans, believe the U.S. should not aim for free trade. Restrictions of food imports to ensure food security (as opposed to providing subsidies for the food sector) are supported by 33% of Democrats and 45% of Republicans. The infant industry argument resonates across both sides of the political aisle with around 54% of all respondents. The lack of large partisan gaps on trade, which stands in contrast with that on many other policies (see Alesina et al. (2022), Alesina et al. (2018) and Stantcheva (2021) among others) is also seen in the fact that, historically, both Democrat and Republican U.S. presidents have introduced protectionist measures early in their first terms (Amiti et al. (2019)). There are, however, substantial partisan gaps that arise in support for compensatory and general redistribution. Between 38% and 46% of Democrats favor higher taxation to fund transfers to the unemployed, income support for workers displaced by international trade, and wage subsidies. The share of Republicans who support such measures is consistently between 14 and 18 percentage points lower.

FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS TREATMENT




Link to the videos.

Figure 4: Efficiency effects treatment



Link to the videos.

Figure 5: Economist (= Efficiency + Distributive effects) treatment



Link to the videos.

7 Conclusion

The new survey evidence in this paper shows that people have varying degrees of understanding of how trade and trade policy work. Overall, many believe in positive efficiency gains from trade, but also understand that trade can have adverse distributional consequences. There is broad consensus that large companies

and high-income households benefit from trade and that lower-income or middle-class households and small businesses do not benefit as much. Views are split on how trade influences inequality, unemployment, and the labor market in the U.S.

Respondents' own experience, as measured by their exposure to trade through their sector, occupation, and local labor market shapes their policy views both directly (through self-interest) and indirectly, by influencing their understanding and reasoning about the broader efficiency and distributional impacts from trade. Respondents that are or feel more negatively affected by trade appear to extrapolate from their experience and hold more negative beliefs about the effects of trade on other groups (e.g., the middle class or small businesses), inequality, prices, innovation, and competitiveness.

The evidence also confirms that the gains from trade to consumers may be diffuse, while the losses of affected workers are concentrated and salient. When respondents are experimentally prompted to think about their benefits from trade as consumers, there is no change in their support for free trade. On the contrary, respondents who are prompted to think about the impacts of trade on their job reduce their support for free trade.

Yet, people's policy views on trade do not only reflect self-interest. Respondents also care about the distributional and efficiency impacts of trade on others and on the U.S. economy. The belief that trade leads to efficiency gains is correlated with stronger support for free trade. The belief that trade has adverse distributional impacts is important too, but is modulated by the belief that losers can be compensated with appropriate policies. Respondents who think that it is possible to have compensatory transfers support more free trade, even if they believe that there are negative distributional consequences from it, and they also support more compensatory redistribution to help those who have been hurt. These links are confirmed experimentally by showing respondents' pedagogical videos on the efficiency or distributional impacts of trade which, respectively, increase support for free trade and redistribution.

Trade policy has two facets that go hand in hand: trade barriers (or lack thereof) and compensatory redistribution. The results reveal that people support more open trade because they believe there are efficiency gains from it and that appropriate policies can compensate losers. In particular, respondents who think trade has adverse distributional consequences do not necessarily support trade restrictions, but they support compensatory redistribution to help losers from trade. Conversely, respondents who think that losers from trade cannot be well-compensated support more trade barriers. This highlights the importance of providing compensatory transfers and making sure that people understand them. Absent such compensation and an understanding of it, the adverse distributional consequences of trade–which are, to some extent, unavoidable– can generate support for trade restrictions and a backlash against free trade.

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Table 1: Sample Characteristics as Compared to the US Population

	US Population	Survey 1	US Population in the Labor Force	Survey 2
Male	.48	.5	.52	.49
18-29 years old	.22	.23	.21	.26
30-39 years old	.21	.21	.24	.22
40-49 years old	.2	.2	.23	.2
50-59 years old	.19	.18	.2	.21
60-69 years old	.18	.18	.12	.11
$0-$19,999	.12	.15	.07	.16
$20,000-$39,999	.15	.19	.14	.19
$40,000-$69,999	.21	.23	.21	.22
$70,000-$109,999	.21	.19	.23	.18
$110,000+	.31	.25	.35	.25
Four-year college degree	.21	.28	.24	.23
High-school graduate or less	.39	.19	.34	.23
Employed	.71	.68	.96	.9
Unemployed	.02	.05	.03	.09
Married	.56	.56	.58	.56
White	.59	.78	.6	.69
Black/African-American	.11	.06	.11	.11
Hispanic/Latino	.2	.06	.2	.08
Asian/Asian-American	.07	.06	.06	.04
Democrat	.30	.33	.30	.45
Republican	.26	.34	.26	.29
Independent and other	.44	.32	.44	.26
Voted for Clinton at the 2016 presidential election	.48	.39	.48	.46
Voted for Trump at the 2016 presidential election	.46	.45	.46	.45
Sample size		1771		2148

Notes. The table displays statistics for the overall U.S. population, as compared to the samples of respondents for Surveys 1 and 2. Survey 1 was aimed to be nationally representative. Survey 2 was targeted towards respondents in the labor force. The third column shows the statistics only for the population in the labor force, in order to be comparable with Survey 2. For this column, the statistics related to political affiliation and vote during the 2016 election are computed on the overall U.S. population, as this data is not available for the subsample of U.S. citizens in the labor force. See Online Appendix A-5.3 for details on how the summary statistics on the U.S. population are constructed using IPUMS-CPS-ASEC data for March 2019.


Table 2: Understanding of Trade and Willingness to Pay

	Correct Answers to the Case Study	Willingness to Pay	Willingness to Pay
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Individual Characteristics			
Female	-0.04***	-0.11***	-0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Has children	0.02	0.09***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Black	-0.06***	0.00	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Hispanic	-0.06***	-0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Other	-0.02	-0.07*	-0.06
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.00	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.03**	0.05	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	0.01	-0.05	-0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.02	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College Degree	0.07***	0.05*	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Republican	-0.04***	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.04***	-0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Correct Answers to the Case Study			0.38***
			(0.05)
Panel B: Effect of Trade			
Better off from Trade	0.09***	0.10*	0.06
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Panel C: Summary Statistics			
Control mean	0.51	0.38	0.38
Democrat control mean	0.52	0.39	0.39
Observations	1771	1771	1771

Notes. The table is based on survey 1 respondents only (who were asked the knowledge questions). For column (1), the dependent variable is the share of correct answers in the case study ("problem-set style questions") of Survey 1. In columns (2) and (3), the outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent is willing to pay to obtain the correct answers to the case study, where the price of information was randomized between \$1, \$2, \$5, and \$10. Regressions include controls (not shown) for employment status, treatment branch, and price of information. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 6: Topic Analysis of Open Ended Questions


(a) When you Think about Trade Policy and whether the U.S. should put some Restrictions on Trade with other Countries, such as Tariffs, what are the Main Considerations that Come to your Mind?



Keywords

Price:	*cost, price, afford, pay & more, inflationa, inflat, expens, (impact, suffer, affect, hurt, effect, hit, loos, lost, pay) & (consum, citizen, peopl, american, household);*
Fair Trade & Int. Relations:	*fair, unfair, imbal, balanc, justic, equal, even & (share, valu), reciproc, cooper, mutual & (benefit, benefici), equit, take & advantag play & field, china, retali, retaliatori, (other, foreign, those, relat, relationship, certain) & countri, mexico, intern & trade, negoti, renegoti, advantag & us, trade & war, isol, isolation, isolationist, world & economi, pay & back, cheat;*
Protectionism:	*made & (usa, america, us), (buy, protect, support) & (usa, america, american, local), (restrict, tariff) & (fine, good, need, use, reason, some, necessari);*
Efficiency:	*effici, compet, competit, innov, technolog, ineffici, growth, gdp, tax, economi, more & varieti, stock & market;*
Labor:	*labor, job, unemploy, salari, union, wage, outsourc, worker, employe, employ, retrain;*
Distributive:	*(impact, suffer, affect, hurt, effect, hit, loos, lost, difficult, difficulti, problem, horribl) & (farmer, busi, busine, busin, firm, poor, poorer, middleclass, middl & class, industri, sector), winner, loos, corpor, workingclass, (expens, under) & (busi, busin, busine), lower & class, better & compani;*
Does Not Know:	*idk, unsur, know, know & enough, (dont, do & not, not) & (care, know, understand, knowledg), na, (not) & (sure, knowledg, opinion), no & (opinion, idea, comment), noth & say.*

(B) What do you Think would be the Effects on the U.S. Economy if Barriers to Trade, such as Tariffs, were Increased?



Keywords

Negative Price: *(hit, destroy, bad, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, recess, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, hit, loos, lost, damag, pay, worst, wors, fragil, pay, cost, impact) & (consumer, peopl, citizen, household, american, us), (increas, higher, high, up, rais, more, soar) & (price, cost), pay, inflationa, inflat, expens, hard & purchas, afford, less & cheap;*

Negative Efficiency: *(destroy, bad, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, kill, death, shrink, declin) & (effici, compet, competit, innov, technolog, growth, economi), (increas, higher, high, up, rais, more, soar) & tax, ineffici, recess, depress, loss, economi & (collaps, down, shrink, hurt, crash, wors, slowdown, hamper, slow, hinder, negat), (slow, reduc) & growth, decreas & gdp;*

Negative Distributive: *(hit, destroy, bad, affect, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, recess, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, hit, loos, lost, damag, pay, worst, wors, fragil, pay, cost, out & work) & (manufactur, farmer, busi, busine, busin, job, firm, poor, poorer, middleclass, middl & class, workingclass, compani, bottom, industri, lower & class, sector), layoff, bankrupt, bankruptci, poor & poorer;*

Negative Labor: *(hit, destroy, bad, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, recess, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, hit, loos, lost, damag, pay, worst, wors, loss) & (labor, job, unemploy, salari, union, wage, outsourc, worker, employe, employ, manufactur, manufact, manufacur, manufactrur, manugfactur), (increas, high) & unemploy, retrain, (decreas, low, lower) & (salari, wage, employ), (few, fewer, lessen) & job;*

Positive...: Words included: *good, posit, benefit, benefici, better, thrive, strengthen, improv, stronger, help, nice, great, bolster, improv, increas*;


Words excluded: *catastroph, loss, lose, destroy, bad, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, kill, death, shrink, declin, lost, price, cost, afford, expens, (pay & more), inflat;*

...Reallocation: *own, ourselv, domest, work, job, farmer, demand, local, (product, buy, protect, support, good, posit, benefit, benefici, better, thrive, strengthen, improv, stronger, help, nice, great, economy) & (our, usa, america, american, us);*

...Levelling of Trade Relations: *fair, (other & countri), china, chines;*

...without Justification: Answers in the *Positive* section that were neither in *Reallocation* nor in *Levelling of Trade Relations.*


(c) Which Groups of People do you Think would Gain if Trade Barriers such as Tariffs were Increased?




Notes. The figure shows selected results from the topic analysis of three open-ended policy questions, by political affiliation. The questions are verbatim in each panel's title. In Panels A and B, bars represent the share of respondents in each group using one or more of the keywords attributed to each topic, with associated 90% confidence intervals. The keywords for each topic are listed below the figure. Above each pair of bars, I also display the coefficient and standard error of an indicator variable for political affiliation in a regression that has as outcome a topic indicator (equal to 1 if the topic is mentioned), controlling also for the full set of individual covariates (gender, age, ethnicity, income, education, having children, political leaning) and length of the answer. Panel C reports the frequencies of the words mentioned by political affiliation. See Section A-1 for more information about the topics.

Figure 7: Knowledge about Trade Policy

(a) From Which Country Does the U.S. Import the Most?



(b) From Which Country Does the U.S. Export the Most?




(c) Knowledge about Trade Barriers

Share of respondents that knows what is an import tariff	78%
Share of respondents that knows what is a quota	48%


Notes. Panels A and B show, respectively, the distribution of responses to the question: *"From which country does the U.S. import the most?"* and *"To which country does the U.S. export the most?"* Correct answers are in green. Panel C displays the share of respondents that know what are import tariffs and quotas.

FIGURE 8: UNDERSTANDING OF TRADE AND TRADE POLICY: ANSWERS TO THE "PROBLEM-SET" STYLE QUESTIONS

(A) BY EDUCATION





(B) BY PERCEIVED EXPOSURE TO TRADE



Notes. The figure reports the share of respondents who agree with each statement on the y-axis, with 90% confidence interval. The gray line represents the expected share of respondents who would agree to each statement if they were choosing answers randomly. In Panel A, the dots show the shares among respondents with a college degree (in orange) and without a college degree (in grey). In Panel B, shares are shown for respondents who think they are better off from trade (in green) and those who think they were made worse off (in red). For Panel A, the sample considered includes only respondents who did not see any of the videos and who are in the "generic phrasing" branch. For Panel B, the sample includes only respondents in the "personnalized branch".

Figure 9: Personal Exposure to International Trade







Notes. In Panel A, the bars show the share of respondents in each survey/group who agree with the statements, together with 90% confidence intervals. The questions from Survey 1 are asked in the "personalized phrasing" branch; the questions from Survey 2 were asked in the "*Own job risks*" or "*Own consumption*" branches (see Figure 2). Panel B shows the correlation between the objective measures of exposure and respondents' perceived exposure to international trade, controlling for gender and age, with 90% confidence intervals. All exposure variables are defined in Appendix A-6 (paragraph "Exposure to Trade").

FIGURE 10: PERCEIVED EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF TRADE AND TRADE POLICY


(A) PERCEIVED EFFICIENCY EFFECTS



(B) PERCEIVED DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS: DO THESE GROUPS GAIN FROM TRADE?



(c) Perceived Distributional Impacts




Notes. The bars show the share of respondents in each survey/group who agree with the statements, together with 90% confidence intervals. Panel A focuses on questions concerning the efficiency mechanisms of trade policy, Panel B on distributional mechanisms, and Panel C on whether specific groups have gained from trade. All questions except one (marked with S2) were asked in Survey 1. Respondents all see the exact same phrasing of these questions. However, for respondents who were in the "personalized branch," we can further split by whether they believe they are made "Better Off" or "Worse Off" from trade.

Figure 11: Policy Views

(a) Support for Free Trade


(b) Support for Redistribution




Notes. These figures report regression coefficients where the outcome variables are *Support for free trade* (in Panel A) and *Support for Redistribution* (in Panel B). The various groups of rows, delimited with dashed lines, show coefficients from different regressions. "Individual covariates" displays coefficients on the full set of individual covariates. "Exposure to trade" shows coefficients on perceived and objective exposure measures (included one at a time). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the measures *Comparative advantage occupation* and *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*. "Beliefs" shows the coefficients on variables and indices that measure beliefs about trade, introduced in Section 5.2 and included all at once. The final set of rows shows the effects of all the informational and priming treatments. Confidence intervals are at the 95% level. All variables are detailed in Appendix A-6.

Figure 12: Gelbach Decomposition of Support for Free Trade


(a) Those who Perceive they are Worse off from Trade Support less Free Trade because they...




(b) Those who are in Routine & Offshorable Occupations Support less Free Trade because they...



(c) Those who are in Tradable Sectors Support less Free Trade because they...



(d) Those who are in Comparative Advantage Occupations Support more Free Trade because they...



Notes. These figures show the results from a Gelbach decomposition. The bars represent how much of the gap in support for free trade between individuals that are negatively exposed to trade and those that are not can be explained by the "Beliefs" from Figure 11. A different measure of exposure is considered in each panel. Color codes are as follows: *green* corresponds to efficiency-related beliefs, *red* to beliefs about distributional mechanisms, and *blue* to trust in government; and gray to *Other mechanisms*. Only respondents in Survey 1 are included. For more details on the methodology used for the decomposition, see Gelbach (2016) and the main text, Section 6.

ONLINE APPENDIX for

"Understanding of Trade" by Stefanie Stantcheva

A-1 Sample of Answers to the Open-ended Questions

"*When you think about trade policy and whether the U.S. should put some restrictions on trade with other countries, such as tariffs, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?*"

1. **Prices:**

   "The effect on prices of goods and services I use."

   "The consumer has to pay for these through price hikes."

   "Concerns that some items will no longer be available or be priced to high for some americans to afford."

2. **Fair Trade & International Relations:**

   "I think it should be fair and equal going in both directions, our products to other countries and other country's products to us."

   "Retaliation from countries who are used to having no restrictions or tariffs."

   "I believe in equitable reciprocity as the guideline."

3. **Protectionism:**

   "I would like to see more products made in America."

   "I think we should support american made products and less reliant on foreign."

   "Generally believe in free trade but, at times such as with China, tariffs are necessary."

4. **Efficiency:**

   "Other countries shouldn't be able to dump cheaply made goods that make it impossible for domestic companies to compete."

   "Allow to US products being competitive on the market."

   "Of course we lose in stock market and other markets."

   "The economy will be hurt and we will end up in a recession."

5. **Labor:**

   "Tariffs should be put only on goods where it is economically responsible to create the jobs and economy in the US."

   "How it affects employment and current wages. Also, what price restrictions will be placed upon us."

   "I worked in manufacturing in the early 2000's and saw many jobs disappear overseas - tariffs are very important to even the playing field."

6. Distributive:

"How it will effect the businesses here."

"I don't want anybody to have to suffer like the farmers or any others with paying extra taxes for food and goods."

"This is a complex issue that I do not know very much about, but from what I've read and talked to others about, I'm worried that adding or raising tariffs will just past the cost onto the already struggling middle and lower classes in America. Inflation increases at a rate well above pay and we are not able to keep up."

"No consideration. Tariffs cause a lot of economic problems for lower classes and farmers."

7. Does Not Know:

"I don't know much about trade policy, so I have no opinion at the moment."

"I'm not sure."

"I am not knowledgeable to make an informed statement."

"*What would be the effects on the US economy if barriers to trade, such as tariffs, were increased?*"

1. Negative Price:

"More expensive goods for the citizens of the US."

"Prices of day to day products will rise."

"Increased prices on imported goods that we need."

2. Negative Efficiency:

"Everything would become more costly, it would be much harder to get outside products that we do not/cannot produce. It would wound our economy because we are not self sufficient and its not efficient to try to be. This would also make all of our products cost more so other countries would be less inclined to buy from us."

"The economy would suffer negatively."

"It would devastate the economy in the short term."

"The economy would go downhill, because without foreign competition, local prices will increase."

"Eventually a fair system needs to be worked out so US businesses can fairly compete at home and abroad."

3. Negative Distributive:

"It would cause a lot of small businesses that rely on exporting to fail. Sawmill rely on exporting lumber."

"The buying power of the population would decrease because the cost of goods would increase. The problem is that the effects of any tariffs could never be felt equally across the different areas of the population. In the current case, the farmers would be most affected since they would not be able the provide for their families. The question I would have, would be can they be able to withstand the pressure of the outstanding bills."

"Consumer goods will be more expensive, small businesses like mine will go bankrupt."

4. Negative Labor:

"We would lose jobs."

"Low wage and unemployment."

"Companies would go out of business because their product isn't being purchased which leads to layoffs/bankruptcies and therefore higher unemployment and eventually a recession."

5. Positive Reallocation:

"It might increase opportunities for businesses in our own country."

"I think it would be better for our economy. That way maybe it would encourage businesses not to take jobs & money to other countries."

"If we started to manufacture the products here that we are importing from elsewhere, it would strengthen our economy and create jobs."

6. Positive Levelling of Trade Relations:

"If our trade agreements aren't fair, then we should increase tariffs to offset the difference."

"I think when we get China and other major countries that we trade with to treat us respectfully and fairly we will all benefit."

"I think that it could be positive for the economy if we don't make them too high. If they are too high that could discourage other countries from doing business with us."

7. Positive without Justification:

"Very good."

"It might be not so good on the short term but much better on the long term."

"May help in the long run."

A-2 Additional Tables and Figures

FIGURE A-1: WORDCLOUDS

(A) WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT TRADE POLICY AND WHETHER THE U.S. SHOULD PUT SOME RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS TARIFFS, WHAT ARE THE MAIN CONSIDERATIONS THAT COME TO YOUR MIND?



(B) WHAT WOULD BE A "GOOD" TRADE POLICY IN YOUR VIEW? WHAT WOULD BE THE GOAL OF A GOOD TRADE POLICY?




(C) WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE ISSUES WITH OR SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT U.S. TRADE POLICY?




Notes. The figure shows word clouds based on the text analysis of the open-ended questions of Survey 1. Each panel refers to the open-ended question indicated in the caption. Raw answers are processed by removing *stop* words and the words explicitly used in the text of the questions and all *don't know* answers. See Stantcheva and Ferrario (2022) for a summary on the methods of analysis.

Figure A-2: Topic Analysis of Open Ended Questions by Share of Correct Answers to the Case Study

(a) When you think about trade policy and whether the U.S. should put some restrictions on trade with other countries such as tariffs, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?




(b) What do you think would be the effects on the U.S. economy if barriers to trade, such as tariffs, were increased?



Notes. The figure shows the share of respondents who mentioned the topics enumerated on the x axis. The green bars correspond to the respondents who answered correctly to more than two thirds of the questions in the "problem set" of Survey 1. The gray bars correspond to the other respondents. See Figure 6 for more details on how the topics were designed.

Figure A-3: Understanding of Trade by Political Affiliation



Notes. The figure reports the percentage of respondents who agree with each statement on the x-axis, with 90% confidence intervals. The gray line represents the expected share of respondents who would agree with each statement if they were to pick answers randomly. The blue and red dots are the shares computed on the subsamples of democrats and republicans respondents, respectively. Answers are taken from to the case study of Survey 1. The sample considered includes only respondents who were not in any video course and who were not in the "Me" randomization group.

Table A-1: Understanding of Trade: Problem Set Style Questions

	Consumers benefit if imports ↑	Both countries better off from trade	Justifiable to import even if US more productive	U.S. prices ↓ if U.S. cars imports ↑	Prices abroad ↓ if U.S. laptop exports ↑	U.S. wages ↓ if U.S. cars imports ↑	U.S. wages ↑ if U.S. laptop exports ↑	Wages of car workers moving to laptop sector ↑ if car imports ↑	Your wage ↓ if U.S. imports in your sector ↑	Your wage ↑ if U.S. exports in your sector ↑	Prices abroad ↑ if export tax ↑	U.S. prices ↑ if import tax ↑	Share of correct answers
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Panel A: Personal characteristics													
Female	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.14***	-0.06***	-0.06**	0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.04	-0.12***	0.05*	-0.01	-0.04***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Age 30-49	-0.03	0.00	-0.05*	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.05	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Age 50-69	-0.12***	0.01	-0.05	-0.07**	0.02	0.08**	-0.03	0.09**	0.11***	-0.06*	0.16***	0.20***	0.03*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
College	0.04	0.11***	0.09***	0.07***	0.06**	0.04	0.04	0.12***	0.04	0.11***	0.03	0.06**	0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Republican	0.04	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.07**	0.01	-0.02	-0.08***	0.02	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.04***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Middle-income	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.04	0.06*	0.02	-0.00	0.00	0.04	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
High-income	0.02	0.04	0.05*	0.05*	0.04	-0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Panel B: Video treatment effects													
Efficiency Effects	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.06	-0.01	-0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Distributive Effects	-0.03	-0.10***	-0.05	0.07*	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	0.05*	-0.09***	-0.04	0.10***	0.03	0.09***	0.04	0.06*	0.08**	0.11***	-0.01	0.00	0.04***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Panel C: Exposure													
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	-0.19***	-0.31***	-0.19***	-0.06	-0.06	-0.03	-0.08	-0.14***	-0.01	-0.15***	-0.02	0.03	-0.10***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Routine occupation	-0.10***	-0.07***	-0.10***	0.00	0.01	0.07***	-0.00	-0.03	0.08***	-0.08***	0.01	0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.08***	-0.01	-0.04	0.04*	0.07	0.10***	0.00	-0.01	0.11***	-0.04**	0.06**	0.06**	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Local labor market	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.03	0.07*	0.01	0.05	0.07***	0.01	0.08***	0.00	0.02*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Tradable sector	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.10***	-0.07***	-0.13***	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05**	-0.02	-0.03	-0.06	-0.06***
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.02*	0.00	0.03***	0.03**	0.01	-0.00	-0.01**	-0.00	-0.01	0.02**	-0.01	-0.02**	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics													
Control mean	0.55	0.68	0.71	0.26	0.40	0.50	0.41	0.46	0.38	0.44	0.65	0.66	0.51
Democrat control mean	0.53	0.72	0.74	0.26	0.38	0.52	0.40	0.51	0.40	0.43	0.66	0.68	0.52
Observations (Panels A and B)	1761	1761	1760	1762	1762	1761	1762	1761	1763	1763	1763	1762	1754
Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure)	390	390	390	390	390	390	390	389	390	390	390	390	389
Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation)	1707	1707	1706	1708	1708	1707	1708	1707	1709	1709	1709	1708	1700

Notes. The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 and they refer to questions asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and B include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for all treatments in Survey 1 and for question formulation (either 'Me' or 'Generic'). Each measure of exposure in Panel C was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the commuting zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel D provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-2: Perceived Efficiency Effects

	Trade ↑ competition in the U.S. (1)	Trade ↑ innovation in the U.S. (2)	Trade ↑ GDP growth of the U.S. (3)	If U.S. exports ↑ value of $ ↑ (4)	Both countries better off from trade (5)	Believes in efficiency gains (6)
Panel A: Personal characteristics						
Female	-0.14***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.17***	-0.09***	-0.36***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Age 30-49	-0.08**	-0.04	-0.07*	0.04	0.00	-0.17**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Age 50-69	-0.12***	-0.03	-0.12***	0.00	0.01	-0.28***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
College	0.10***	0.11***	0.10***	0.10***	0.11***	0.31***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Republican	0.01	0.05*	0.00	-0.01	-0.05*	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Middle-income	0.08***	0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.12**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
High-income	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.08
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Panel B: Video treatment effects						
Efficiency Effects	0.06	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Distributive Effects	0.04	-0.06	0.01	0.03	-0.10***	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	0.09***	0.06**	0.04	0.03	-0.09***	0.20***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Panel C: Exposure						
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.32***	-0.07	-0.31***	-0.74***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Routine occupation	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.07	-0.09***	-0.07***	-0.29***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.05*	-0.07***	-0.01	-0.18**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Local labor market	-0.09***	-0.04	0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.09
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Tradable sector	-0.04	-0.05**	-0.06*	-0.08**	-0.04	-0.16**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.03**	0.01	0.02**	0.02**	0.00	0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics						
Control mean	0.61	0.69	0.62	0.53	0.68	-0.00
Democrat control mean	0.60	0.66	0.61	0.52	0.72	-0.03
Observations (Panels A and B)	1762	1763	1763	1763	1761	1765
Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure)	390	390	390	390	390	390
Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation)	1708	1709	1709	1709	1707	1711

Notes. The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 and refer to questions asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and B include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for all treatments in Survey 1 and for question formulation. Each measure of exposure in Panel C was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel D provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-3: Perceived Distributional Impacts: Do these Groups Gain from Trade?

	Large Corporations (1)	Small Businesses (2)	High Incomes (3)	Middle Incomes (4)	Low Incomes (5)
Panel A: Personal characteristics					
Female	-0.04	-0.13***	-0.05	-0.12***	-0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	0.05	0.03	0.12***	-0.02	-0.05*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.11***	-0.11***	0.10**	-0.16***	-0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College	0.10***	0.06***	0.08***	0.07***	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Republican	-0.07**	0.03	-0.11***	0.04	0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-income	-0.05	-0.05	-0.07**	-0.03	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-income	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06*	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects					
Efficiency Effects	0.06	-0.00	0.03	0.00	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Distributive Effects	0.02	-0.04	0.02	0.00	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	0.03	-0.00	0.00	0.02	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Exposure					
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	-0.08	-0.19***			
	(0.05)	(0.04)			
Routine occupation	-0.07**	-0.14***	-0.04	-0.15***	-0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.04	-0.14***	-0.00	-0.13***	-0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Local labor market	-0.01	-0.07***	0.00	-0.06*	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Tradable sector	0.02	-0.02	-0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.00	0.03**	0.01	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics					
Control mean	0.67	0.19	0.61	0.23	0.20
Democrats control mean	0.72	0.17	0.64	0.21	0.17
Observations	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372
Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure)	390	390			
Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation)	1708	1708	1328	1328	1328

Notes. The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 and refer to questions asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and B include respondents who were asked questions in a neutral way and controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for all treatments in Survey 1. Each measure of exposure in Panel C was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Columns (3)-(5) include respondents who were asked questions in a neutral way only. Panel D provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-4: Perceived Distributional Effects

	It's easy to change sector x low-skilled workers	It's easy to change sector x high-skilled workers	Trade is a major reason x unemployment and & decline of industries	Major reason x job loss in manufacturing is: Automation	Trade	Immigration	Overall trade helped U.S. workers	Trade is a major reason for rise in inequality	Trade ↓ prices of goods sold in the U.S.	More trade can make all better off	Believes Trade has adverse distributional impacts
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Panel A: Personal characteristics											
Female	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.07**	-0.06**	0.02	0.04**	-0.16***	-0.04	-0.10***	-0.09***	0.27***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Age 30-49	0.01	-0.06*	0.06	0.01	-0.05*	0.05**	-0.05	0.05	-0.01	-0.04	0.17**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Age 50-69	-0.10***	-0.06	-0.05	-0.07**	0.06*	0.02	-0.15***	-0.13***	-0.07*	-0.09**	0.33***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
College	0.02	0.08***	0.04	0.06**	-0.02	-0.04**	0.15***	0.01	0.14***	0.10***	-0.12**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Republican	0.16***	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.03**	0.02	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.12***	-0.32***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Middle-income	-0.04	-0.02	-0.08**	0.06**	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.09**	0.03	0.00	-0.08
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
High-income	0.01	-0.06*	-0.10***	0.09***	-0.05	-0.04*	0.01	-0.07*	-0.00	0.03	-0.15**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Panel B: Video treatment effects											
Efficiency Effects	-0.01	0.08**	0.03				-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	0.04	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)				(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Distributive Effects	-0.03	0.04	0.04				-0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.04	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)				(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	-0.02	0.07**	0.02				0.05	0.02	0.08***	-0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Panel C: Exposure											
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)							-0.35***	0.08*		-0.21***	0.62***
							(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.07)
Routine occupation	-0.12***	-0.10***	-0.15***	-0.04	0.04*	0.00	-0.12***	-0.16***	-0.09***	-0.10***	0.14
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.13***	-0.10***	-0.14***	-0.02	0.02	-0.00	-0.08**	-0.15***	-0.03	-0.08***	0.13**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Local labor market	-0.03	-0.01	0.04	-0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.01	-0.02	0.10
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Tradable sector	0.01	0.01	0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.06***	0.01	0.09*	-0.04	-0.09***	0.10
	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.15)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02**	-0.01**	-0.00	0.04***	0.02	0.02*	0.03***	-0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics											
Control mean	0.37	0.63	0.45	0.42	0.47	0.11	0.50	0.38	0.57	0.62	0.00
Democrat control mean	0.32	0.60	0.48	0.47	0.44	0.09	0.49	0.46	0.58	0.71	0.18
Observations (Panels A and B)	1373	1372	1372	2148	2148	2148	1373	1372	1372	1369	1374
Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure)	0	0	0	0	0	0	390	390	0	390	390
Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation)	1329	1328	1328	2140	2140	2140	1329	1328	1328	1325	1330

Notes. The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 and refer to questions asked in Survey 1, except for variables in columns (4)-(6), which refer to Survey 2. Regressions of columns (1), (2), (3) and (9) are based on the control group of survey 1 and thus excluded respondents in the "Me" randomization group. Regressions in Panels A and B include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for the treatments in both surveys. Each measure of exposure in Panel C was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and relevant treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel D provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-5: Personal Impacts from Trade

	Trade ↓ prices of goods you buy (1)	Trade ↑ varieties of goods you buy (2)	Easy x you to find a job in a different sector (3)	Your wage has not grown as fast due to competition (4)	Trade ↑ unemployment in your sector (5)	Trade threat x future of your sector (6)	Your job likely to be offshored, outsourced or automated (7)	Automation had a negative impact on your job (8)	Trade had a negative impact on your job (9)	Immigration had a negative impact on your job (10)	You are worse off from trade (11)
Panel A: Personal characteristics											
Female	-0.26***	-0.05	-0.12**	-0.12***	-0.08	-0.00	-0.08***	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.16***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Age 30-49	-0.22***	0.02	-0.04	0.02	0.14*	0.11**	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Age 50-69	-0.29***	0.06	-0.13	-0.11**	-0.01	-0.02	-0.11***	0.01	0.08***	0.12***	0.13
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)
College	0.08	0.11***	0.05	0.07	-0.05	-0.02	0.03	-0.05***	-0.09***	-0.06**	-0.12**
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Republican	-0.03	-0.05	0.14**	-0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.05*	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Middle-income	0.15**	0.10**	0.13**	0.01	-0.07	-0.05	-0.06	-0.04**	-0.02	-0.04	-0.11
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)
High-income	0.20***	0.04	0.01	0.04	-0.01	0.07	0.01	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.07**	-0.00
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Panel B: Exposure											
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	-0.22***		-0.13**		0.06						
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)						
Routine occupation	-0.17***	-0.10*	-0.06	-0.10***	0.05	-0.00	-0.03*	0.09***	0.12***	0.12***	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.12***	-0.03	-0.05	-0.11***	0.04	0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.06	0.07***	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Local labor market	-0.10	-0.00	-0.08	-0.00	0.09	-0.05	0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Tradable sector	-0.17**	-0.01	0.04	0.14***	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.07***	0.06***	0.03	0.12***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.04**	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.02***	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics											
Control mean	0.46	0.66	0.57	0.46	0.33	0.29	0.19	0.15	0.25	0.32	0.39
Democrat control mean	0.45	0.70	0.52	0.55	0.33	0.32	0.23	0.13	0.20	0.27	0.42
Observations (Panels A and B)	390	720	390	708	390	708	707	2127	2120	2092	390
Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure)	390	0	390	0	390	0	0	0	0	0	
Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation)	380	718	380	704	380	704	703	2119	2113	2085	380

Notes. The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6. Variables in columns (1), (3), (5) and (11) refer to questions asked in Survey 1. All other variables refer to questions asked in Survey 2. Regressions in Panel A include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for the treatments in both surveys. Each measure of exposure in Panel B was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and relevant treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel C provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-6: Policy Views on Free Trade

	The U.S. should aim at reducing barriers and increasing trade (1)	The U.S. should restrict food imports to ensure food security (2)	The U.S. should protect their infant industries (3)	Restrict imports best way to help U.S. workers (4)	Transfers & retraining best way to help U.S. workers (5)	Subsidize production best way to help U.S. workers (6)	The U.S. should protect minerals and metals, petroleum, chemicals or machinery sectors (7)	The U.S. should protect from trade more than 3 types of goods (8)
Panel A: Personal characteristics								
Female	-0.13***	-0.05***	0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.02*	-0.09***	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 30-49	0.02	-0.05**	-0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.07***	0.04	-0.07***	0.09***	-0.05**	-0.04**	-0.04	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
College	0.15***	-0.05***	-0.01	-0.08***	0.05***	0.03**	-0.05*	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Republican	-0.15***	0.12***	0.07***	0.15***	-0.12***	-0.03**	0.08***	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-income	0.03	0.06***	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.06*	-0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-income	0.08***	0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Mechanisms								
Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness and GDP	0.08***	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trade decreases prices of consumer goods	0.03	0.06**	0.03	-0.04	0.06**	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Large Companies won more than small ones	0.01	-0.05	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs	0.03	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.08**	0.06*	0.02	0.02	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Sector switch easier if high skill	0.03	-0.10***	-0.02	-0.05*	0.06**	-0.02	-0.06**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trade major reason for rise in inequality	0.02	-0.03	0.07**	0.03	-0.04	0.00	0.07**	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts US workers	-0.03**	0.07***	0.05***	0.03*	-0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Possible to compensate losers through policies	0.12***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06**	0.04	0.02	-0.08***	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Supports government intervention	0.03***	-0.06***	0.04**	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Is patriotic	0.02	0.08***	0.06***	0.07***	-0.07***	0.01	0.08***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel C: Video treatment effects								
Efficiency Effects	0.13***	0.00	0.11***	-0.01	-0.03	0.03	-0.07*	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Distributive Effects	0.00	-0.02	0.05	-0.03	0.05	-0.02	0.04	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	0.04	0.05*	0.08**	-0.04	0.05*	-0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Own Job Risks	-0.07***	0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.02	-0.01		
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)		
Own Consumption	0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	-0.05*	0.03*		
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)		
Panel D: Exposure								
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	-0.22***	0.02	0.06	0.11**	-0.05	-0.06*	0.09*	0.11**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Routine occupation	-0.14***	-0.01	-0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.09**	-0.02***	-0.04*	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.09***	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Local labor market	-0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Tradable sector	-0.07**	0.04	-0.01	0.02*	-0.01	-0.01	0.06	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.03***	0.01**	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01**	0.01***	0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Panel E: Descriptive statistics								
Control mean	0.63	0.39	0.54	0.36	0.53	0.12	0.49	0.53
Democrat control mean	0.72	0.33	0.52	0.28	0.57	0.14	0.46	0.53
Observations (Panels A and C)	3911	3905	3908	3912	3912	3912	1765	1765
Observations (Panel B)	1368	1366	1368	1368	1368	1368	1368	1368
Observations (Panel D - Perceived Exposure)	390	390	389	390	390	390	390	390
Observations (Panel D - Exposure by Occupation)	3849	3843	3846	3850	3850	3850	1711	1711

Notes. The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6. Variables in columns (1)-(6) refer to questions asked both surveys. Variables in columns (7)-(8) refer to questions asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and C include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for the treatments in both surveys. Regressions in panel B also include the mechanisms listed in the table and only include observations from Survey 1. Each measure of exposure in Panel D was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and relevant treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel E provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-7: Policy Views on Redistribution

	Support for redistribution index	The government should provide more transfers to those out of work	better schools for low income children	income support for workers displaced by international trade	subsidies to pay health insurance	wage subsidies to working poor
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Personal characteristics						
Female	-0.00	-0.07***	0.04**	-0.03*	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	0.04	0.05**	-0.01	-0.02	0.05**	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 50-69	-0.06	-0.03*	-0.04*	-0.03	0.00	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College	0.17***	0.08***	0.05**	0.05***	0.05***	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Republican	-0.56***	-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.13***	-0.24***	-0.18***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Middle-income	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-income	-0.06	0.00	-0.04	-0.01	-0.07***	-0.07***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel B: Mechanisms						
Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness and GDP	0.09***	0.04***	0.04***	0.03**	0.04***	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trade decreases prices of consumer goods	0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Large Companies won more than small ones	0.07	-0.04	0.12***	0.11***	0.04	0.06*
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs	0.14**	-0.01	0.09***	-0.00	0.07**	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Sector switch easier if high skill	0.18***	-0.01	0.08***	0.09***	0.03	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trade major reason for rise in inequality	0.28***	0.20***	0.06**	0.10***	0.13***	0.16***
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts US workers	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.04***	-0.01	0.03**
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Possible to compensate losers through policies	0.26***	0.06**	-0.00	0.06**	0.07***	0.08***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Supports government intervention	0.26***	0.08***	0.07***	0.06***	0.10***	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Is patriotic	-0.21***	-0.02	-0.10***	-0.03**	-0.07***	-0.06***
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Panel C: Video treatment effects						
Efficiency Effects	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.08**	0.08*	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Distributive Effects	0.30***	0.07*	0.05	0.15***	0.07*	0.07*
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	0.18***	0.04	0.02	0.09***	0.05	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Own Job Risks	-0.02	-0.00	0.04*	0.03	-0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Own Consumption	-0.04	-0.02	0.03	0.00	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel D: Exposure						
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	-0.05	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.12**
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Routine occupation	-0.06	-0.06***	0.03*	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.03	-0.05***	0.05***	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.03**
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Local labor market	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Tradable sector	-0.08	-0.04**	-0.01	-0.08***	0.00	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.01	0.02**	-0.01	0.01**	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Panel E: Descriptive statistics						
Control mean	0.01	0.29	0.47	0.37	0.37	0.37
Democrat control mean	0.31	0.38	0.55	0.44	0.51	0.46
Observations (Panels A and C)	3913	3905	3903	3902	3905	3902
Observations (Panel B)	1368	1367	1365	1367	1367	1366
Observations (Panel D - Perceived Exposure)	390	390	390	388	390	389
Observations (Panel D - Exposure by Occupation)	3851	3843	3841	3840	3843	3840

Notes. The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 and refer to questions which were asked in both surveys. Regressions in Panels A and C include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for the treatments in both surveys. Regressions in panel B also include the mechanisms listed in the table and only include observations from Survey 1. Each measure of exposure in Panel D was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and relevant treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel E provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-8: Scope of Government

	Government should be responsible for:							
	Reducing income differences (1)	Reducing wealth transmission (2)	Ensuring health care (3)	Reducing opportunity differences (4)	Regulating trade (5)	Stabilizing financial system (6)	Stabilizing dollar (7)	Providing minimum living (8)
Panel A: Personal characteristics								
Female	-0.05**	-0.10***	0.01	-0.04*	0.04*	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 30-49	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.05	0.03	0.00	0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.17***	-0.19***	-0.05	-0.16***	0.02	0.07**	0.06*	-0.13***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
College	0.02	0.05**	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.06**	0.04	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Republican	-0.31***	-0.15***	-0.34***	-0.31***	-0.06*	-0.12***	-0.07***	-0.32***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-income	-0.07**	-0.05	-0.03	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-income	-0.09***	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.06*	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Mechanisms								
Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness and GDP	0.01	0.02*	0.03**	0.03*	0.01	0.04***	0.04***	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trade decreases prices of consumer goods	-0.05*	-0.01	-0.07***	-0.03	-0.09***	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Large Companies won more than small ones	0.05*	-0.03	0.05*	0.02	0.12***	0.14***	0.17***	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs	0.04	0.04	0.13***	0.07**	0.03	0.03	0.05*	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Sector switch easier if high skill	-0.04*	-0.07***	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.05*	-0.00	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trade major reason for rise in inequality	0.20***	0.17***	0.14***	0.15***	0.13***	0.09***	0.08***	0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts US workers	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.03**	0.02	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Possible to compensate losers through policies	0.06**	0.03	0.06**	0.05*	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Supports government intervention	0.15***	0.11***	0.16***	0.16***	0.11***	0.09***	0.08***	0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Is patriotic	-0.04***	0.02	-0.06***	-0.05***	0.04**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Panel C: Video treatment effects								
Efficiency Effects	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Distributive Effects	0.00	-0.00	-0.03	0.05	0.03	-0.03	-0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel D: Exposure								
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	0.06	-0.07	-0.03	-0.07	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Routine occupation	-0.07**	-0.12***	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.09**	-0.08***	-0.07**	-0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.08***	-0.11***	-0.04***	-0.06**	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.05***	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Local labor market	-0.03	-0.08***	-0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Tradable sector	0.06*	-0.00	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.06	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.02*	0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Panel E: Descriptive statistics								
Control mean	0.44	0.31	0.66	0.49	0.61	0.69	0.75	0.56
Democrat control mean	0.62	0.38	0.84	0.66	0.69	0.77	0.80	0.73
Observations (Panels A and C)	1761	1760	1761	1761	1760	1761	1760	1760
Observations (Panel B)	1367	1366	1367	1367	1366	1367	1367	1366
Observations (Panel D - Perceived Exposure)	390	390	390	390	390	390	389	390
Observations (Panel D - Exposure by Occupation)	1707	1706	1707	1707	1706	1707	1706	1706


Notes. The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 and refer to questions which were asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and C include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for the treatments in both surveys. Regressions in panel B also include the mechanisms listed in the table and only include observations from Survey 1. Each measure of exposure in Panel D was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and relevant treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel E provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-3 Questionnaire First Survey

The questionnaire is available here: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0qhj8nbFK7k2NA9.

A-3.1 Consent Form

FIGURE A-4: CONSENT PAGE



Academic Research Survey We are a non-partisan group of academic researchers from the Economics Department at Harvard University. Our goal is to learn about people's attitudes on several issues. Please read the information below before consenting to begin the research study.

• This survey is voluntary. You have the right to not answer any question, and to stop the survey at any time or for any reason (to exit the survey, simply close this window). We expect that it will take about 20 minutes. You will likely learn a lot!

• Your name will never be recorded by researchers. Results may include summary data, but you will never be identified. The data will be stored on Harvard servers and will be kept confidential. The collected anonymous data may be made available to other researchers for replication purposes.

• You will be compensated for this interview conditional upon (i) completing the survey and (ii) passing our survey quality checks, which use sophisticated statistical control methods to detect incoherent and rushed responses. **Responding without adequate effort may result in your responses being flagged for low quality and you may not receive your payment.**

Please note that it is very important for the success of our research that you **answer honestly** and **read the questions very carefully** before answering. If at any time you don't know an answer, please give your best guess **without consulting any external sources**. However, please be sure to spend enough time reading and understanding the questions.

You are encouraged to print or take a screenshot of this page for your records. If you have any questions about this study, you may contact us at studysocialsciences2018@gmail.com.

This research has been reviewed and approved by the Harvard University Area Institutional Review Board ("IRB"). You may talk to them at (617) 496-2847 or cuhs@harvard.edu if:

• Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team.
• You cannot reach the research team.
• You want to talk to someone besides the research team.
• You have questions about your rights as a research subject.
• You want to get information or provide input about this research.

○ Yes, I would like to take part in this study, and confirm that I LIVE IN THE U.S., and I am 18 or older

○ No, I would not like to participate

A-3.2 Background Questions

1. What is your gender?

   Male; Female

2. What is your age?

3. What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year?

   $0-$9999; $10000-$14999; $15000-$19999; $20000-$29999; $30000-39999; $40000-$49999; $50000-$69999; $70000-$89999; $90000-$109999; $110000-$149999; $150000-$199999; $200000+

4. Were you born in the United States?

   Yes; No

5. In which ZIP code do you live?

6. Please indicate your marital status

   Single; Married; Legally separated or divorced; Widowed

7. How many children do you have?

   I do not have children; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

8. *Screening Question 1.* Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both strongly agree and strongly disagree among the alternatives below, no matter what your opinion is.

   Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "It is easy to find accurate and reliable information in the media these days."

   Strongly agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly disagree

9. How would you describe your ethnicity/race?

   European American/White; African American/Black; Hispanic/Latino; Asian/Asian American; Mixed race; Other (please specify)

10. Which category best describes your highest level of education?

    Primary education or less; Some High School; High School degre/GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)

11. (If highest level of education superior to "High School" to 10) What is/was your field of study in college? If multiple degrees apply, please select the field corresponding to your last degree.

    Accounting/bookkeeping; Administrative science/public administration; Advertising; Agriculture/ horticulture; Allied health; Anthropolgy; Architecture; Art; Aviation/aeronatics; Biology; Business administration; Chemistry; Child/human/family development; Comm. disorders; Communications/speech; Computer science; Counseling; Criminology/criminal justice; Dance; Dentistry; Economics; Education; Educational administration; Electronics; Engineering; English; Environmental science/ecology; Ethnic studies; Fashion; Finance; Fine arts; Food science/nutrition/culinary arts; Foreign language; Forestry; General sciences; General studies; Geography; Geology; Gerontology; Health; History; Home economics; Human services/human resources; Humanities; Industrial relations; Industry and techn; Information technology; Journalism; Law; Law enforcement; Liberal arts; Library science; Marketing; Mathematics; Mechanics/machine trade; Medicine; Music; Nursing; Other; Other vocational; Parks and recreation; Pharmacy; Philosophy; Physical education; Physics; Political science/international relations; Psychology; Public relations; Social sciences; Social work: Sociology; Special education; Statistics/biostatistics; Television/film; Textiles/cloth; Theater arts; Theology; Urban and regional planning; Veterinary medicine; Visual arts/graphic design/design and drafting; Other

12. What is your current employment status?

    Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner; Unemployed and looking for work; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree

13. (If "Full-time employee", "Part-time employee", or "Self-employed or small business owner" to 12) Which category best describes your main occupation?

    Managers; Professionals; Technicians and associate professionals; Clerical support workers; Service and sales workers; Agricultural workers; Craft and related trades workers; Platnt and machine operators, and assemblers; Elementary occupations; Armed forces occupations

14. *[For health and trade surveys only]* (If "Full-time employee", "Part-time employee", or "Self-employed or small business owner" to 12) Are you employed in one of the following sectors? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

    Agriculture, plantations, other rural sectors; Basic metal production; Chemical industries; Commerce; Construction; Education; Financial services, professional services; Food, drink, tobacco; Forestry, wood; Health services; Hotels, tourism, catering; Mining; Mechanical and electrical engineering; Media, culture, graphical; Oil and gas production, oil refining; Postal and telecommunications services; Public service; Shipping, ports, fisheries, inland waterways; Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear; Transport (including civil aviation, railways, road transport); Transport equipment manufacturing; Utilities (water, gas, electricity); None of the above

15. (If "Unemployed and looking for work', "Not currently working and not looking for work", or "Retiree" to 12) Even if you are not currently working, which category best describes your latest occupation? Check the one that applies. If you have had multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

    Same options as above

16. *[For health and trade surveys only]* (If "Unemployed and looking for work", "Not currently working and not looking for work", or "Retiree" to 12) Even if you are not currently working, in what sector does your latest occupation fall into? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

    Same options as above

17. Are you covered by Medicaid, Medical Assistance, or Medicaid?

    Yes; No

18. Did you, or anyone in your household, receive food stamps or use a food stamp benefit card at any time during 2018?

    Yes; No

19. At any time during 2018, even for one month, did you or anyone in your household receive any cash assistance from a state or county welfare program such as welfare or welfare to work, TANF, general assistance, diversion payments or refugee cash?

    Yes; No

20. If you had to use one of these five commonly-used names to describe your social class, which one would it be?

    Lower Class or Poor; Working Class; Middle Class; Upper-middle Class; Upper Class

21. On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?

    Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very conservative

22. What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

    Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated

23. (If respondent answered "Other" to previous question) Please specify your political affiliation.

24. Did you vote in the last presidential election?

    Yes; No

25. (If "Yes" to 24) In the last presidential election, supported:

    Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump; Jill Stein; Gary Johnson; Other

    (If "No" to 24) Even if you dit NOT vote, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your vies more closely.

    Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump; Jill Stein; Gary Johnson; Other

26. Are you registered to vote at your current address?

    Yes; No

27. There are many types of elections such as federal elections for president and members of Congress, primary elections where voters choose party nominees, local elections for city council and school boards, and special elections when vacancies arise in between scheduled elections.

    Which best describes how often you vote, since you became eligible?

    Every election without exception; Almost every election, may have missed one or two; Some elections; Rarely; Don't vote in elections

28. Did you vote in the November midterms elections?

    Yes; No

29. (If "Yes" to 28) Which party did you vote for?

    Republican Party; Democratic Party; Other

30. (If "No" to 28) Which party would you have liked to support?

    Republican Party; Democratic Party; Other

31. Thinking about various sources of news available today, what would you say is your main source of news about current events in the U.S. and around the world?

    TV; Newspaper (print); Magazine; Radio; Internet; Word of mouth; Other; None, I don't follow the news

32. Please specify

33. (If respondent gets their news mostly from online newspapers) Would you say that you access most of the articles you read through a social media like Facebook or Twitter or by going directly on the website of the newspaper?

    Mostly through social media; Mostly through the newspaper's website

34. In general, how important do you think it is to stay informed about economic policy?

    Very important; Somewhat important; Not very important; Not important at all

35. (If "Very important" or "Somewhat important" at 34) What would you say are the main reasons why you wish to be well informed about economic policy?

    You may select several options.

    Affects personal finances; Affects business or profession; Relevant to stock market and investments; Economic issues are important politically and might affect my vote; To be a responsible citizen, I like to keep informed

36. How knowledgeable do you consider yourself on economic policies and issues?

    Highly knowledgeable; Somewhat knowledgeable; Not very knowledgeable; Not knowledgeable at all

37. For the following sources of information, how often would you say you use them to stay informed about economic policy?

    Often; Regularly; Occasionally; Rarely; Never

    - TV
    - Newspapers (print)
    - (online)
    - Magazines
    - Radio
    - Internet
    - Word of mouth

A-3.3 Patriotism

1. How proud are you to be an American?

   Extremely proud; Very proud; Moderately proud; Only a little proud; Not at all proud

2. How important do you believe it is to have been born in the United States or to have an American family background to be truly American?

   Very important; Somewhat important; Not important at all

3. Do you agree with the following statement: "Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others"?

   Completely agree; Mostly agree; Mostly disagree; Completely disagree

A-3.4 Open-ended questions

We now want to ask you a few broader questions. Please use the text boxes below and write as much as you feel like. Your opinion and thoughts are important to us! There is no right or wrong answer.

1. When you think about trade policy and whether the U.S. should put some restrictions on trade with other countries such as tariffs, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?
2. What would be a "good" trade policy in your view? What would be the goal of a good trade policy?
3. What do you think are the issues with or shortcomings of the current U.S. trade policy?
4. What do you think would be the effects on the U.S. economy if barriers to trade, such as tariffs, were increased?
5. Which groups of people do you think would gain if trade barriers such as tariffs were increased?

A-3.5 Personal Exposure

1. Do you feel that U.S. trade policy has important, direct effects on your own life?

   Yes; No

A-3.6 Knowledge about policy

In this section, all respondents will receive the following screening question.

- In order to facilitate our research on decision making we are interested in knowing certain factors about you, the decision maker. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then some of our manipulations that rely on changes in the instructions will be ineffective. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question below. Instead, simply put the slider to 98. Thank you very much.

  Out of 100 adults in the U.S., how many are currently paying any income tax at all?

1. Do you know what an import tariff is?

   Yes; No

2. Do you know what an import quota is?

   Yes; No

3. The U.S. imports both industrial (i.e., non-agricultural) and agricultural goods. What share of the goods that the U.S. imports do you think are agricultural goods?

   Slider going from 0 to 100

4. Of all the goods that the U.S. imports, what share do you think is subject to a tariff or import duty?

   Slider going from 0 to 100

5. To which country does the U.S. export the most, in terms of the net dollar value?

   Brazil, Canada; China; France; Germany; India; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Mexico; Netherlands; South Korea; Switzerland; Taiwan; United Kingdom

6. From which country does the U.S. import the most, in terms of the net dollar value?

   Brazil, Canada; China; France; Germany; India; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Mexico; Netherlands; South Korea; Switzerland; Taiwan; United Kingdom

7. Over time, do you think trade between the U.S. and other countries has decreased, stayed more or less the same, or increased?

   It has decreased; It has stayed more or less the same; It has increased

A-3.7 Videos Treatments

Randomized groups of respondents see one of three videos. In each case, the videos introduced by the following:

- Recent academic research has studied what the effects of trade policy are. We will now show you one short video (with sound) that summarizes some key ideas of these studies. Please pay attention to the information provided as you will be asked questions about it later. Do not skip forward or close the page while the video is running.

  Please proceed to the next page when you are ready. Note that you will not be able to move forward with the survey before the end of the short video. The video lasts about 2 and a half minutes.

- Links to the videos can be found here: Redistributional treatment, Efficiency treatment, Economist treatment, US-specific economist treatment.

A-3.8 Mechanisms

1. *CONTROL GROUP.* As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it? Please rate on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being "lost a lot" and 5 "gained a lot".

   - Large corporations
   - Small businesses
   - High-income households
   - Middle-income households
   - Low-income households

   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following firms have lost or gained from it? Please rate on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being "lost a lot" and 5 "gained a lot".

   - Large corporations

- Small businesses

2. *"ME" RANDOMIZATION.* On balance, would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries has made you better off or worse off?

   Better off; Worse off

   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. Please specify the extent to which you think you have lost or won as trade with other countries has increased, on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being "lost a lot" and 5 "gained a lot").

3. Which statement comes closest to your view?

   CONTROL GROUP. More international trade can make everyone in the U.S. better off. Even if some people lose from it, it creates sufficient gains so that even those who lose from it can be compensated through appropriate policies; Free trade will entail winners and losers and it will be impossible to compensate those who lose from it.

   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. (If "Worse off" to 2) More international trade can make everyone in the U.S. better off. Even if people like me may lose from it, it creates sufficient gains so that even we who lose from it can be compensated through appropriate policies; Free trade will entail winners and losers and it will be impossible to compensate people like me who may lose from it

   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. (If "Better off" to 2) More international trade can make everyone in the U.S. better off. Even if certain people may lose from it, appropriate policies can enable them to be compensated through the sufficient gains made by people like me; Free trade will entail winners and losers and it will be impossible to compensate people who, unlike me, may lose from it

4. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you feel that most American jobs are being affected by US trade policy?

   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. Do you feel that your own job is being affected by U.S. trade policy?

   Yes; No

5. *O*verall, has international trade helped or hurt U.S. workers?

   Helped U.S. workers; Hurt U.S. workers

6. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you think it is easy for low-skilled workers to find a job in a different sector from the one they are currently working in?

   Yes; No

7. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you think it is easy for high-skilled workers to find a job in a different sector from the one they are currently working in?

   Yes; No

8. *"ME" RANDOMIZATION.* Would it be be easy for you to find a job in a different sector from the one you are currently working in?

   Yes; No

9. To what extent do you think that trade with other countries is a major reason for:

   A great deal; A lot; A moderate amount; A little; None at all

- *CONTROL GROUP.* Unemployment in some sectors and the decline of some industries in the U.S.
- *"ME" RANDOMIZATION.*Unemployment in your sector and the decline of some industries in the U.S.
- A rise of inequality in the U.S.

10. *CONTROL GROUP.* Overall, has international trade decreased the prices of goods sold in the U.S.?

    "ME" RANDOMIZATION. Overall, has international trade decreased the prices of goods that you buy regularly?

    Yes; No

11. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you think that international trade has made firms in the U.S. more competitive and improved their productivity?

    "ME" RANDOMIZATION. Overall, has international trade made the firms in your sector of work more competitive and improved their productivity?

    Yes; No

12. Do you think that the competitive pressure from international trade has increased innovation in the U.S.?

    Yes; No

13. Overall, do you think that international trade has increased the growth of the GDP in the U.S.?

    Yes; No

14. If the U.S. exports more goods abroad, what do you think will happen to the value of the dollar?

    It will increase; It will not change; It will decrease

15. When two countries trade with each other, would you say that, in general, both are made better off from the trade or that one gains at the expense of the other one?

    In general, both countries are better off; In general, one country gains, the other one loses; In general, both countries lose

16. Imagine the U.S. was better at producing cars than Germany, meaning that it is able to produce better cars at a lower price. Would it still make sense under some circumstances for the U.S. to import cars from Germany?

    Yes, it makes sense for the U.S. to import cars from Germany under some circumstances; No, the U.S. should not import cars from Germany if it's better at producing them

17. Let us now consider the following simplified example of what happens economically when there is more trade in some goods. Take for instance the car industry and the laptop industry.

    The U.S. is a large net exporter of laptops (meaning that it sells more laptops abroad than it purchases from abroad and that U.S. laptops are a large share of all laptops sold in the world), and a large net importer of cars (meaning that it purchases more cars from abroad than it sells abroad and that cars purchased by customers in the U.S. are a large share of worldwide car purchases).

The laptop sector employs many high-skilled, college-educated workers. The car sector employs many low-skilled workers. Cars are produced for cheaper abroad, while laptops are produced for cheaper in the U.S.

Imagine now that the U.S. starts importing even more cars and producing less cars domestically.

What will happen to the price of cars in the U.S.?

It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase

18. Would you say that households who purchase cars in the U.S. are now better off?

    Yes; No

19. What will happen to the wages of low-skilled workers working in the car sector?

    Wages will decrease; Wages will remain the same; Wages will increase

20. Imagine also that the U.S. starts producing and exporting more laptops.

    What will happen to the price of U.S. laptops abroad, i.e., in the countries where the U.S. sells laptops?

    It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase

21. What will happen to the wages of high-skilled workers working in the laptop sector?

    Wages will decrease; Wages will remain the same; Wages will increase

22. Imagine now that over time, some low-skilled workers from the car sector are able to quit their jobs and find new jobs in the laptop sector.

    What will happen to their wages now if the U.S. exports more laptops?

    Wages will decrease; Wages will remain the same; Wages will increase

23. If the U.S. were to impose an export tax on laptops, what would happen to the price of laptops abroad?

    It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase

24. If the U.S. were to impose an import tariff on cars sold in the U.S, what would happen to the price of cars in the U.S?

    It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase

25. If exports from your sector to other countries would increase, what do you think will happen to your wage?

    It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase

26. If the U.S. started to import more of the goods produced in your sector, what do you think would happen to your wage?

    It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase

A-3.9 Policy Views

In this section, all respondents get the following screening question:

- When a big news story breaks people often go online to get up-to-the-minute details on what is going on. We want to know which websites people trust to get this information. We also want to know if people are paying attention to the question. To show that you've read this much, please ignore the question and select ABC News and The Drudge Report as your two answers.

  When there is a big news story, which is the one news website that you would visit first? (Please only choose one)

1. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

   "Increasing trade with other countries and reducing barriers to trade is something the U.S. should aim for."

   Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree

2. How fair would you rate the current U.S. trade policy?

   Very fair; Somewhat fair; Somewhat unfair; Very unfair

3. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current U.S. trade policy?

   Very satisfied; Somewhat satisfied; Somewhat dissatisfied; Very dissatisfied

4. Do you think some industries should be protected from foreign competition using tariffs or other import restrictions? Select all that apply:

   Dairy products; Agricultural products (fruit, vegetables, plants); Beverages and tobaccos; Minerals and metals; Petroleum; Chemicals; Animal products (meat, fish); Textiles, clothing leather and footwear; Machinery, transport, equipment and cars; Manufactured goods

5. Do you think particular goods should be protected from foreign competition using tariffs or other import restrictions? Select all that apply.

   Cars; Washing machines; Solar panels; Shoes; Machinery; Oil; Vegetables; Fruits; Toys; Meat; Fish; Milk; Steel; Textiles; Clothing; Coffee and tea; Chemicals

6. CONTROL GROUP: In your view, what is the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that's declining and threatened by foreign competition? Please rank the following options from best (1) to worst (3).

   Restrict imports in that industry; Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs; Subsidize production in the sector

   "ME" RANDOMIZATION: In your view, what is the best policy tool to help workers in your industry against the threat of foreign competition? Please rank the following options from best (1) to worst (3).

   Restrict imports in your industry; Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs; Subsidize production in your sector

7. What do you think is the best policy tool to ensure national food security?

   Restrict food imports from abroad; Provide more production subsidies in the food sector

8. If the U.S. starts imposing tariffs on many goods that it imports, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that other countries follow suit and also impose tariffs?

   Very likely, likely; Unlikely; Very unlikely

9. CONTROL GROUP: Let us consider a given relatively new industry in which other countries are currently able to produce goods for cheaper than American firms.

   In your opinion, does it make sense to protect the American firms in this industry by using tariffs or import restrictions (even if this means higher prices for consumers) or is it better to let the American firms immediately face foreign competition, forcing them to become more competitive?

   It makes sense to protect for a while; It makes sense to let these firms face foreign competition to become more competitive

   "ME" RANDOMIZATION: Imagine that the goods or services currently produced in your sector or industry can actually be produced in a cheaper way in another country.

   In your opinion, would it make sense to protect the American firms in your sector or industry by using tariffs or import restrictions (even If this means higher prices for consumers) or would it be better to let the American firms in your sector or industry immediately face foreign competition, forcing them to become more competitive?

   It makes sense to protect for a while; It makes sense to let the firms in my sector face foreign competition to become more competitive

10. For these different groups, please tell me if you think that they're are paying their fair share in federal taxes, paying too much, or paying too little?

    ... pay much more than their fair share in income taxes; ... pay more than their fair share in income taxes; ... pay their fair share in income taxes; ... pay less than their fair share in income taxes; ... pay much less than their fair share in income taxes

    - High-income households...
    - Middle-class households...

11. Take the following government services. For each of them, say if would you like it to receive increased funding (even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas), decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere) or would you like for its funding to be left unchanged?

    - Transfers and income support programs for those out of work
    - Better schools for children from low-income families
    - Income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade
    - Subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care
    - Wage subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages

      More of this service, more taxes; Service and taxes as now; Less of this service, reduced taxes.

A-3.10 Government Questions

1. Which groups of people do you think oppose free trade?

   Text Box

2. Which statement comes closest to your views about more trade between the US and other countries? "When there is more trade between the US and other countries...

   ... most people gain, but a few people lose a lot."; ... most people lose, but a few gain a lot."

3. How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right?

   Almost always; A lot of the time; Not very often; Almost never

4. Some people think the government is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and businesses. Others think that government should do more to solve our country's problems. Which come closer to your own view?

   Government is doing too much; Government is doing just the right amount; Government should do more

5. Next, we'd like you to think more broadly about the purposes of government.

   Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens?

   You may use any number from 1 to 5.

   1; 2; 3; 4; 5

6. Of every tax dollar that goes to the federal government in Washington, D.C., how many cents would you say are wasted?

   Slider going from 0 to 100

7. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way the federal government in Washington is dealing with the problems the country is facing today?

   Very satisfied; Somewhat satisfied; Somewhat dissatisfied; Very dissatisfied

8. Consider now a list of functions the federal government could serve.

   On a 1 to 5 scale, please say how much responsibility you think the government should have for each — with 1 meaning the government should have no responsibility at all and 5 meaning the government should have total responsibility in this area:

   - Reducing income differences between the rich and the poor
   - Reducing the transmission of wealth from one generation to the other
   - Making sure Americans have adequate health care
   - Reducing the differences in opportunities between children from wealthy and poor families
   - Regulating trade to and from the U.S. to protect American producers and consumers

- Maintaining a stable financial system and ensuring that credit markets work
- Ensuring a stable dollar
- Providing a minimum standard of living for all

A-3.11 Willingness to pay for information

By taking this survey, you are automatically enrolled in a lottery to win $1000. In a few days you will know whether you won the $1000. The payment will be made to you in the same way as your regular survey pay, so no further action is required on your part.
Are you are interested in learning the correct answers to all the questions about trade policy in the U.S.? If you are, you can forfeit part of your gain (should you win the lottery) in exchange for the correct answers. If you select that option, you will be given the right answers on the next page. You will only pay the amount selected if you do, in fact, win the lottery.
Note: This information would be very hard to find online on your own. It is the result of a lot of careful research and you cannot easily find the correct answers.
In case you win the lottery are you willing to give up ($1 / $2 / $5 / $10 [1]) to receive all the correct answers to the questions about trade policy in the U.S.?

No, I am not willing to pay anything (We will not provide you with the correct answers); Yes, I am willing to pay $1 / $2 / $5 / $10 (We will provide you with all the correct answers on the next page. You will only pay this amount out of your lottery earnings if you do win the lottery).

A-3.12 Self-reported questions

1. It is vital to our study that we only include responses from people that devoted their full attention to this study. Otherwise years of effort (the researchers' and the time of other participants) could be wasted. You will receive credit for this study no matter what, however, please tell us how much effort you put forth towards this study.

   I put forth almost no effort; I put forth very little effort; I put forth some effort; I put forth quite a bit of effort; I put forth a lot of effort

2. Also, often there are several distractions present during studies (other people, TV, music, etc.). Please indicate how much attention you paid to this study. Again, you will receive credit no matter what. We appreciate your honesty!

   I gave this study almost no attention; I gave this study very little attention; I gave this study some of my attention; I gave this study most of my attention; I gave this study my full attention

A-3.13 Feedback

1. Do you feel that this survey was biased?

   Yes, left-wing bias; Yes, right-wing bias; No, it did not feel bias

2. Please feel free to give us any feedback or impression regarding this survey.

[1] Note: the amount is randomized among participants.

A-4 Questionnaire Second Survey

The questionnaire is available here: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bO6NvZAXlJKePHL.

A-4.1 Background questions

1. What is your gender?

   Male; Female

2. What is your age?

3. Do you live in the US?

4. In which state do you currently reside?

5. In which zip code do you live?

6. Were you born in the United States?

   Yes; No

7. Please indicate your marital status

   Single; Married; Legally separated or divorced; Widowed

8. How many children do you have?

   I do not have children; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

9. How would you describe your ethnicity/race?

   European American/White; African American/Black; Hispanic/Latino; Asian/Asian American; Mixed race; Other (please specify)

10. What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year?

    $0-$9999; $10000-$14999; $15000-$19999; $20000-$29999; $30000-$39999; $40000-$49999; $50000-$69999; $70000-$89999; $90000-$109999; $110000-$149999; $150000-$199999; $200000+

11. CAPTCHA

12. Which category best describes your highest level of education?

    Primary education or less; Some High School; High School degree / GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)

13. *Screening Question 1* Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both strongly agree and strongly disagree among the alternatives below, no matter what your opinion is. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "It is easy to find accurate and reliable information in the media these days."

14. *Screening Question 2* This is a question to check whether you are paying attention and reading the questions carefully. Please select both "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree" to move forward.

15. On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?

    Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very conservative

16. What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

    Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated

17. Did you vote during the 2016 presidential election?

18. *IF YES TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* In the 2016 presidential election, you supported:

    Clinton, Trump, Stein, Johnson, Other

19. *IF NO TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* Even if you did NOT vote, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views more closely.

    Clinton, Trump, Stein, Johnson, Other

20. Did you vote during the 2020 presidential election?

    Yes ; No

21. IF YES TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION Who did you vote for?

    Joe Biden, Donald Trump, Other

22. IF NO TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION Even if you did NOT vote, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views more closely

    Joe Biden, Donald Trump, Other

23. What is your current employment status?

    Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or business owner; Temporarily furloughed; Unemployed and looking for work; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree

24. *IF "FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE","PART-TIME EMPLOYEE" OR "SELF-EMPLOYED OR BUSINESS OWNER* What is the title of your job?

    [text]

25. *IF "UNEMPLOYED AND LOOKING FOR WORK", "NOT CURRENTLY WORKING AND NOT LOOKING FOR WORK", OR "RETIREE"* What was the title of your latest job?

    [text]

26. *IF "FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE","PART-TIME EMPLOYEE" OR "SELF-EMPLOYED OR BUSINESS OWNER* Which category best describes your main occupation?

    Managers; Professionals; Technicians and associate professionals; Clerical support workers; Service and sales workers; Agricultural workers; Craft and related trades workers; Plant and machine operators, and assemblers; Elementary occupations; Armed forces occupations

27. *IF "FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE","PART-TIME EMPLOYEE" OR "SELF-EMPLOYED OR BUSINESS OWNER* Are you employed in one of the following sectors? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

    Agriculture, plantations, other rural sectors; Basic metal production; Chemical industries; Commerce; Construction; Education; Financial services, professional services; Food, drink, tobacco; Forestry, wood; Health services; Hotels, tourism, catering; Mining; Mechanical and electrical engineering; Media, culture, graphical; Oil and gas production, oil refining; Postal and telecommunications services; Public service; Shipping, ports, fisheries, inland waterways; Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear; Transport (including civil aviation, railways, road transport); Transport equipment manufacturing; Utilities (water, gas, electricity); None of the above

28. *IF "UNEMPLOYED AND LOOKING FOR WORK", "NOT CURRENTLY WORKING AND NOT LOOKING FOR WORK", OR "RETIREE"* Even if you are not currently working, which category best describes your latest occupation? Check the one that applies. If you have had multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

    Same options as above

29. *IF "UNEMPLOYED AND LOOKING FOR WORK", "NOT CURRENTLY WORKING AND NOT LOOKING FOR WORK", OR "RETIREE"* Even if you are not currently working, in what sector does your latest occupation fall into? Check the one that applies. If you have had multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

    Same options as above

30. *IF UNEMPLOYED* How many months have you been unemployed?

31. *IF UNEMPLOYED* Did you become unemployed during the COVID-19 crisis?

32. *IF YES* Do you expect to be rehired once the pandemic is over?

A-4.2 Views on economic insecurity

A-4.2.1 Current situation

Please respond to the following questions based on your/your household's current financial situation.

1. Please select the option that best describes your financial situation, where basic expenses include housing, bills and food:

    - I am often unable to meet by basic expenses
    - I can afford my basic expenses, but just barely and with little to no money left over
    - I can meet my basic expenses, and have some money left over for discretionary spending and savings
    - I can meet my basic expenses, and have a significant portion of my income left over for discretionary spending and savings

2. *IF NOT MARRIED* Suppose that you lost your income next month. Please tell us how you would deal with the lost income (Check all that apply)

- Borrowing from a family member
- Borrowing from friends
- Government assistance (unemployment or social assistance benefits)
- Temporary "gig" employment
- Savings
- Selling something
- Paying with credit card
- Community assistance
- Other (please specify)

3. IF NOT MARRIED: Suppose that you have an emergency expense that costs $400. Which of the following best describes how you would pay for this expense?

   - Using my income flow
   - Borrowing from a family member
   - Borrowing from friends
   - Temporary "gig" employment
   - Savings
   - Selling something
   - Paying with credit card
   - Community assistance
   - I wouldn't be able to pay for the expense right now
   - Other (please specify)

4. *IF MARRIED* Suppose that you or your partner lost your income next month. Please tell us how you would deal with the lost income (Check all that apply)

   - Relying on spouse's income only
   - Borrowing from a family member
   - Borrowing from friends
   - Government assistance (unemployment or social assistance benefits)
   - Temporary "gig" employment
   - Savings
   - Selling something
   - Paying with credit card
   - Community assistance
   - Other (please specify)

5. *IF MARRIED* Suppose that you have an emergency expense that costs $400. Which of the following best describes how you would pay for this expense?

    - Using my household's income flow
    - Borrowing from a family member
    - Borrowing from friends
    - Temporary "gig" employment
    - Savings
    - Selling something
    - Paying with credit card
    - Community assistance
    - I wouldn't be able to pay for the expense right now
    - Other (please specify)

A-4.2.2 COVID

1. Did your household benefit from any COVID-19 related measures implemented by the federal or state government in the last months? Please select all that apply.

    - Business Assistance Programs
    - Tax reliefs (deferment of tax payments)
    - Enhanced employment benefits (paid leave)
    - Other social help than healthcare (education, food, direct financial aid)
    - Unemployment insurance
    - Help on unavoidable expenditures (ex: moratorium on utility bills, delaying mortgages, eviction, insurance)
    - Other
    - My household did not benefit from any federal or state COVID-19 related measure.

A-4.2.3 Expectations

1. Over the next 6-12 months, do you expect your income to

    Decrease/Stay the same/increase

2. *IF MARRIED/DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP* Over the next 6-12 months, do you expect your partner's income to

    Decrease/Stay the same/increase

3. *IF NOT MARRIED* How likely do you think the following events are *[sliding scale from "not likely at all" to "extremely probable"]*

    - Losing your job in the next month

- Losing your job in the next 6 months

4. *IF MARRIED* How likely do you think the following events are *[sliding scale from "not likely at all" to "extremely probable"]*

   - Losing your job in the next month
   - Losing your job in the next 6 months
   - Your partner losing his/her job in the next month
   - Your partner losing his/her job in the next 6 months

5. How much would your sense of economic security change if the government implemented more measures to provide the following? *[1- Same, 2 - Slightly better, 3 - Much better]*

   - Increased unemployment benefits and other social benefits
   - Access to good job opportunities
   - Better education for my children so they have the right skills for the future
   - Better job-seeking and skills training support
   - More generous retirement pensions
   - More affordable housing (e.g., public housing, support for renters or home-buyers)
   - Better access to funds to start a business
   - A guaranteed transfer sufficient to cover my basic needs (e.g., government payment of basic income)
   - Better healthcare

6. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "I think that the government would (or does) provide my family and me with adequate income support in the case of income loss due to" *[from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree]*

   - Unemployment
   - Illness/disability
   - Becoming a parent
   - Old age

7. Over the next 10 years, do you expect your economic situation to be

   Much worse; Slightly worse; Same; Slightly better; Much better

8. IF HAS CHILDREN Relative to the life opportunities you have had, do you expect your children's life opportunities to be

   Much worse; Slightly worse; Same; Slightly better; Much better

A-4.2.4 Past Experiences

1. Looking back over your life, how often have there been times in your life when you think you have lived in poverty by the standards of that time?

   Never; Sometimes; Often; Always

2. How many times have you been unemployed in your life?

   0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5+

3. *IF MORE THAN 0 TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* During those times when you were unemployed, did you ever make use of a public job search assistance program?

4. *IF YES TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* On a scale from 0-10, how satisfactory was your experience with the public job search assistance program? *[Scale from 0 to 10]*

   - Could you tell us why? [text]

5. Do you feel that your own efforts in life have paid off?

A-4.3 Views on Good Jobs

A-4.3.1 Ideal Job

1. What do you consider to be a "good job"? You can describe features including, but not limited to the hours worked, benefits, compensation, use of skills, and more.

   [text]

2. What do you consider to be a "bad job"?

   [text]

3. What would be your ideal occupation?

   [text]

4. When looking for a new job, how important are the following factors? [Likert scale from Not important at all" to "extremely important"]

   - Compensation, including bonuses.
   - Benefits, including retirement benefits, child and health care benefits
   - Not too long work hours and sufficient time off
   - Ability to have flexible work hours
   - Ability to work remotely
   - Good relationship with colleagues
   - Good relationship with manager or boss
   - Using my skills well
   - Autonomy and creativity

- Opportunities for professional development and career growth
- Passion for the work
- Contributing to society
- Safe physical environment

5. How important are the following factors in determining who currently has access to "good jobs"? [Likert scale from "Not important at all" to "extremely important"]

   - Educational attainment
   - Experience in the labor market
   - Being able to live in the areas that have those jobs
   - Rich family background
   - Personal connections to people in those jobs
   - Information about which jobs are available and how to successfully apply for those jobs
   - Gender
   - Race and/or being an immigrant
   - Innate ability

6. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: [1- Strongly disagree; 5- Strongly agree]

   - "My job is better than the jobs my parents had when they were my age"
   - "I can access "good jobs" within commuting distance of where I live."

7. Which statement best describes where "good jobs" are located?

   - "good jobs" are concentrated in and around most large cities
   - "good jobs" are concentrated in and around some large cities
   - "good jobs" are concentrated only in some regions of the United States
   - There are "good jobs" everywhere

8. IF SINGLE Have you ever moved to a different part of the country for work-related reasons? Please check all that apply.

   - Yes, for a new job
   - Yes, because my employer relocated me
   - No, I have never moved for work-related reasons

9. IF NOT SINGLE Have you ever moved to a different part of the country for work-related reasons? (Check all that apply)

   - Yes, For a new job
   - Yes, Because my employer relocated me
   - Yes, For my spouse's job

- No, I have never moved for work-related reasons

10. IF NO Have you ever considered relocation?
11. IF NO Which of the following best describes the barriers to your relocation? (Check all that apply)
    - Members of my household would be unable to find a job if we relocated
    - I don't want to live far away from my family, friends and community
    - I take care of family members and friends in this area
    - I enjoy where I live, even if the job opportunities are limited
    - I am afraid I would be unable to find a job even if I relocated
    - I couldn't afford to relocate
    - Other (please specify) *[text]*

A-4.3.2 Job Characteristics

Again, we will ask you some questions about your main paid job, meaning the job where you spend most hours. For all questions referring to your job, please answer with regards to your main paid job. If you are currently temporarily furloughed or unemployed, please answer with respect to your last main job in mind. If you are self-employed, please answer with respect to your main work activity.

1. What are the best features of your job?

   [text]

2. What features of your job could be improved?

   [text]

3. How many hours do you usually work per week in your main job?

   1-9; 10-19; 20-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; 60+

4. Considering everything about your job, including things like pay, fringe benefits, working conditions and the kind of work you do, how would you rate your job on a scale from 0–10?
5. IF SELF EMPLOYED: Check all the reasons why you became self-employed:
    - Wanted to start my own business
    - Too low pay
    - Lack of career progression
    - No other alternatives for work
    - To acquire different skills
    - Too many work hours
    - Too much work-related stress
    - Lack of flexibility in work hours

- Inability to work remotely
- Health and safety risks
- Work too physically demanding

6. In the past 12 months, have you considered getting a new job?
7. *IF YES* Check all the reasons why you considered getting a new job
   - To start my own business
   - Too low pay
   - Career progression
   - To gain a different experience and acquire different skills
   - Too many work hours
   - Too much work-related stress
   - Lack of flexibility in work hours
   - Inability to work remotely
   - Health and safety risks
   - Work too physically demanding
   - Other (please specify)
8. *IF NO* Check all the reasons why you have not considered getting a new job
   - I like my current job
   - Pay and fringe benefits offset the downsides of my job
   - I don't have time to search for a new job
   - I don't know how to look for another job
   - Other (please specify)
9. Relative to other workers in the US, my job is:

   "Far below average" to "Far above average"
10. Relative to workers with my level of education and background, my job is:

    "Much worse" to "Much better
11. Relative to workers with jobs similar to mine, my level of skills and qualifications is:

    "Much worse" to "Much better"
12. Would you rather have:
    - a job with low risk of dismissal but with few opportunities of finding another job a in case of dismissal
    - a job with fairly high risk of dismissal but with a lot of opportunities of finding a new job in case of dismissal

13. In January 2020, before the covid-19 outbreak, the unemployment rate among young people between 20 and 24 years old was more than twice as high as the unemployment rate among people above 35 years older.. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? *[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*

    - The young do not have adequate skills to get jobs
    - There are not enough good jobs for the young
    - Young people are not very interested in employment or in building careers
    - Young people do not try hard enough to get jobs

A-4.4 Trust in government

1. How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right?

   Almost never; Not very often; A lot of time; Almost always

2. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: *[from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*

    - "Policy decisions in American politics are transparent, meaning that everyone can see how they were made"
    - "I trust the government to design policies that benefit people like me."

A-4.5 Treatment Questions

A-4.5.1 Jobs Treatment

1. What are the main considerations that come to your mind when you think about the U.S. trading with foreign countries and how your job has been affected by it?

   [text]

2. Since 2000, more than 5 million jobs in the manufacturing sectors have been lost. One of the causes behind this decline is the increased competition with foreign countries that pay lower wages to their workers. How serious of a threat do you think trade with foreign countries pose for the future of your sector?

   Not serious at all; Not very serious; Somewhat serious; Very serious

3. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Because of trade and the resulting competition with foreign countries that pay lower wages to their workers, my wage has not grown as fast as it would otherwise have."

   Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree or disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

4. How likely do you think it is that, over the next 10 years, your job will be outsourced, offshored, or automated because of competition with foreign countries?

   Very unlikely; Somewhat unlikely; Somewhat likely; Very likely

A-4.5.2 Consumers Treatment

1. Imagine the U.S. did not trade goods and services with other countries. What are the main things you feel like you'd be missing?

   [text]

2. Can you think of some goods only produced in foreign countries that you regularly buy and consume because of trade with foreign countries? Please describe.

   [text]

3. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? *[from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*

   - Trade with other countries has decreased the prices of the goods I regularly buy by increasing competition among firms.
   - Trade with other countries has increased the variety of the goods I have access to in ordinary stores.

A-4.6 Policy Views

1. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Increasing trade with other countries and reducing barriers to trade is something the U.S. should aim for."

   Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree

2. How fair would you rate the current U.S. trade policy?

   Very fair; Somewhat fair; Somewhat unfair; Very unfair

3. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current U.S. trade policy?

   Very satisfied; Somewhat satisfied; Somewhat dissatisfied; Very dissatisfied

4. In your view, what is the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that is declining and threatened by foreign competition? Please rank the following options from best (1) to worst (3).

   Restrict imports in that industry; Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs; Subsidize production in the sector

5. What do you think is the best policy tool to ensure national food security?

   Restrict food imports from abroad; Provide more production subsidies in the food sector

6. If the U.S. starts imposing tariffs on many goods that it imports, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that other countries follow suit and also impose tariffs?

   Very unlikely, unlikely; Likely; Very likely

7. Let us consider a given relatively new industry in which other countries are currently able to produce goods for cheaper than American firms. In your opinion, does it make sense to protect the American firms in this industry by using tariffs or import restrictions (even if this means higher prices for consumers) or is it better to let the American firms immediately face foreign competition, forcing them to become more competitive?

It makes sense to protect for a while; It makes sense to let these firms face foreign competition to become more competitive

8. Take the following government services. For each of them, say if would you like it to receive increased funding (even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas), decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere) or would you like for its funding to be left unchanged?

    - Transfers and income support programs for those out of work
    - Better schools for children from low-income families
    - Income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade
    - Subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care
    - Wage subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages More of this service, more taxes; Service and taxes as now; Less of this service, reduced taxes.

A-4.7 Role of government in ensuring economic security

We would now like to ask you about your views on what role the government should play in providing good jobs and ensuring a certain level of economic security. We define good jobs as "a stable formal-sector position that comes with core labor protections and enables provides income for housing, food, transportation, education, and other family expenses, as well as some savings."

1. Do you agree with the following statement? "The government has the ability and the tools to stimulate the creation of more good jobs"

    [Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]

2. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: *[1- Strongly disagree, 5- Strongly agree]*

    - "Government should prioritize the quantity of jobs available, even if that means giving up minimum standards of pay and quality."
    - "Government should guarantee all jobs meet a minimum standard of quality and pay, even if that means that some people stay unemployed"

3. Do you support or oppose the following proposals: *[Strongly oppose to Strongly support]*

    - Government should raise the minimum wage.
    - Government should design additional regulations to improve work conditions.
    - Government should provide or subsidize the provision of continuing education and training programs.
    - Government should provide subsidies for businesses to create and provide more good jobs.

4. Do you support or oppose the following policies to improve access to good jobs for more people: *[Strongly oppose; Slightly oppose; neither support nor oppose; slightly support; strongly support]*

- Providing more dual education programs, which provide formal academic training as well as job experience, in partnership between local universities and employers
- Expanding social insurance and benefits, including unemployment benefits, so that everyone can benefit from them regardless of whether they are on part-time work contracts, alternative work arrangements, or the gig economy.
- Improving publicly provided job search assistance
- Implementing a job search assistance program that coordinates with local employers specifically.

5. There has been considerable concern in recent years about the loss of manufacturing jobs in the US. What do you think these job losses are mainly due to?
   - Technological changes (e.g., automation)
   - Globalization, trade and outsourcing
   - Immigration
6. How about your job? Please tell us to what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job.
   - Technological developments
   - Globalization and trade
   - Immigration
7. Suppose a large firm that employs 30,000 people in the US is closing permanently because foreign competitors can produce the goods more cheaply. Do you agree or disagree that the government should do the following: *[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*
   - Provide transfers to unemployed workers
   - Provide training and job placement services to unemployed workers
   - Raise import tariffs on foreign goods
   - Try to create good jobs in other sectors/firms
   - Do nothing
8. Now suppose instead the firm is closing permanently because it's moving production to a country outside the US. Do you agree or disagree that the government should do the following: *[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*
   - Provide transfers to unemployed workers
   - Provide training and job placement services to unemployed workers
   - Raise import tariffs on foreign goods
   - Try to create good jobs in other sectors/firms
   - Nationalize/take over production
   - Do nothing

9. Now suppose instead the firm is closing permanently because of management failure. Do you agree or disagree that the government should do the following: *[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*

    - Provide transfers to unemployed workers
    - Provide training and job placement services to unemployed workers
    - Raise import tariffs on foreign goods
    - Try to create good jobs in other sectors/firms
    - Nationalize/take over production
    - Do nothing

10. Now suppose instead the firm is not closing permanently, but it's employing new technologies and replacing workers with robots. Do you agree or disagree that the government should do the following: *[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*

    - Provide transfers to unemployed workers
    - Provide training and job placement services to unemployed workers
    - Raise import tariffs on foreign goods
    - Try to create good jobs in other sectors/firms
    - Nationalize/take over production
    - Do nothing

11. Are you a member of a union?

A-4.8 Feedbacks

1. Do you feel that this survey was biased?

   Yes, left-wing bias; Yes, right-wing bias; No, it did not feel bias

2. Please feel free to give us any feedback or impression regarding this survey.

   [text]

A-5 Survey and Data Quality

This Appendix is based on the more detailed explanation of the survey data collection in Stantcheva (2021).

A-5.1 Ensuring High Quality Answers

I employed several methods to ensure the highest possible quality of answers. In the survey's landing page – the consent page –, respondents are warned that low quality responses will be flagged and their payment possibly withheld. I also attempt to make them feel involved and socially responsible by emphasizing that we are non-partisan academic researchers seeking to advance social studies. I highlight that it is "very important for the success of our research that you answer honestly and read the questions very carefully before answering." Questions are also designed so as to prevent careless answers: for instance, percentages are constrained to add up to 100%, and respondents are alerted with a pop-up message if there is an inconsistency. Often, rather than using data entry boxes, I let respondents select numbers using sliders.

I also keep track of and check the time spent by the respondent on the survey as a whole, as well as on individual pages and questions, which permits flagging respondents who spend too little time on questions. For the benchmark sample, I drop respondents in the bottom 5% of the survey time distribution. None of our results are affected by trimming these outliers. A randomized subsample of respondents was also provided with financial incentives for correct responses to the policy knowledge questions. This is expected to encourage respondents to pay more attention. In addition, three screening questions are interspersed in the survey. They ask respondents to ignore the question and select a given or several given answer options. This checks for whether respondents are reading the questions carefully – a respondent who simply rushes to click through the answers is unlikely to read and understand the instructions.

Finally, respondents are asked whether they thought the survey was biased more in favor of left-wing or right-wing opinions. 80% of the respondents thought the survey was not biased. 12% thought it was left-wing biased and 8% thought it was right-wing biased.

A-5.2 Sample

Response rates and composition of the panel. The commercial survey company that distributed the surveys sets projects live on the dashboard in their platform for respondents who receive an invite through various channels, including email. They set quotas based on the need of the sample (e.g., "nationally representative") and define how many clicks are needed in each one of the quotas to reach the targets. Furthermore, their invitations can be targeted sample for the demographic profile required on my end (nationally representative). Indeed, the survey company can pre-target income, age, and gender (as well as other characteristics, which I did not target). To compute the average response rate, they take a ratio of the people who completed the study over the number of people that opened the invite (regardless of how they received it). For a nationally representative sample, with invitations that are targeted, it is reasonable to expect to have 8,000 to 10,000 exposures to achieve 2000 completes. The values per group vary with males, ages 16-24 and high-income earners being the hardest groups to reach with varying response rates below 10%. Hence, these groups need to receive more targeted invites in order to meet the quotas.


The demographic breakdown for whole U.S. panel (the largest pool of respondents available to take any survey) is as follows:

- Gender: 65% female / 35% male.
- Age: 6% 13-17 / 23% 18-24 years old / 25% 25-34 years old / 20% 35-44 years old / 21% 45-64 years old / 5% 65+ years old.
- Income: 26% Less than $25,000 income / 25% $25,000-$49,000 / 21% $50,000-$74,000 / 13% $75,000 - $99,000 / 15% $100,000 or more.

How are respondents initially recruited by the survey company and how do the become members of the panel? The respondents are recruited through a variety of channels: databases of potential participants who declare that they will cooperate for future data collection if selected, generally in exchange for a reward or incentive. This includes traditional access panels, co-branded panels, or opt-in databases of individuals who agreed to complete research projects and undertake other non-market research activities (watch ads, download an app, complete marketing offers, etc., also known as loyalty programmes, or rewards communities within GPT (Get paid to) sites.) The databases are formed via social media, online and offline advertising (connected TV, radio, online, through mobile apps), member referrals, as well as through partnerships with firms such as United Airlines, Hilton Hotels and more (which also contribute to offering rewards in the form of "points" for their loyalty programs). The recruitment process is 'open to all' through any of the marketing channels in which they are recruiting from and they encourage members to refer people from their network to join.

Selection into the survey and attrition. Respondents were only told the length of the survey, but neither the topic nor the sender. After clicking on the link, respondents were channeled to a consent page (see Appendix Figure A-4) that informed them that they were about to take an academic research survey, destined solely for research purposes run by non-partisan researchers. They were asked to respond accurately to the best of their knowledge and assured that participation was entirely voluntary. Respondents were then guided through some screening questions that ensured that the final sample was nationally representative along gender, age, and income dimensions or, in the case of the second survey, targeted toward people who were of working age (students, respondents not looking for work and retirees were excluded from the sample). Thus, if respondents decided to drop out at some point during the survey – e.g., upon learning the topic of the survey – all their demographic and background information would be known, and I could check for differential attrition by observable characteristics such as political affiliation. Respondents were rewarded by the survey company only if they fully completed the survey. Rewards are organized by the survey company and take various forms, including cash and tokens or points, in partnership with airlines, hotels, or retail stores. The median time for completion of the surveys was 33 and 22 minutes, respectively.

Figure A-5: Distribution of Time Spent on the Surveys



(a) Survey 1 (b) Survey 2

Notes. The figures show the distribution of the time (in minutes) spent by respondents to complete the Survey 1. The mean is represented by a vertical blue line, and the median by a vertical red line.

Table A-9: Minutes Spent per Block, per Page, and per Question

	Survey 1		
	Block	Page	Question
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Open-ended Questions	5.19	1.04	1.04
Knowledge about Trade	2.62	26.4sec	15.6sec
Reasoning about Trade	2.8	28.2sec	13.8sec
Understanding of Trade	3.14	37.8sec	15.6sec
Policy Views	5.17	39sec	24sec
Views on Government	3.13	31.2sec	23.4sec

Notes. The table shows how many minutes on average respondents spent per block (column 1), per page (column 2), and per question (column 3) for Survey 1.

Testing for survey fatigue. Table A-10 tests for survey fatigue i n Survey 1, leveraging the fact that the order of some blocks was randomized. The blocks are the policy views block, the set of questions asking about distributional impacts, and the set of questions asking about efficiency effects. In the table, each column has as outcome variable the time (in minutes) spent per survey page in each block. The explanatory variables include indicators for whether the block was seen earlier or later on in the survey. Because these indicators are insignificant, the takeaway is that there is no significant difference in the time per page spent based on the order, suggesting that survey fatigue is not a big issue for this survey.

TABLE A-10: TEST FOR SURVEY FATIGUE BASED ON RANDOMIZATION OF BLOCK ORDER

	Minutes spent per page on Distributional Impacts (1)	Minutes spent per page on Efficiency Effects (2)	Minutes spent per page on Policy Views (3)
Order: Distributional First	0.50		
	(0.38)		
Order: Efficiency First	0.36	-0.12	-0.14
	(0.38)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Order: Efficiency Second		-0.15	
		(0.13)	
Order: Policy Views First			-0.19*
			(0.11)
Women	0.19	0.12	0.07
	(0.35)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Has children	-0.09	-0.06	-0.08
	(0.33)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Black	-0.04	-0.16	0.03
	(0.68)	(0.23)	(0.20)
Hispanic	1.85***	-0.16	-0.21
	(0.64)	(0.22)	(0.18)
Other	-0.07	-0.10	-0.06
	(0.56)	(0.19)	(0.16)
Annual Income: 40k-69k	0.48	-0.05	-0.14
	(0.44)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Annual Income: 70k+	0.06	0.02	-0.06
	(0.42)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Republican	0.04	-0.10	-0.14
	(0.39)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Democrat	0.22	-0.05	-0.12
	(0.39)	(0.13)	(0.11)
College Degree	0.40	-0.08	-0.19*
	(0.37)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Economics related major	-0.59	0.24	0.01
	(0.56)	(0.19)	(0.16)
Working	0.35	-0.27	0.20
	(0.92)	(0.31)	(0.26)
Not working	0.08	0.08	0.31
	(0.97)	(0.33)	(0.28)
Retiree	0.09	-0.25	0.26
	(0.99)	(0.34)	(0.28)
Knowledgeable	-0.53	0.06	0.05
	(0.37)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.44	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.46)	(0.16)	(0.13)
Sample mean	0.70	0.49	0.63
Observations	569	569	569

Notes. The dependent variables are the average number of minutes spent per page on the Distributional Impacts part in block Reasoning about Trade (column 1), the Efficiency Effects part in block Reasoning about Trade (column 2) and on the Policy Views block. The independent variables "Order: Distributional first" and "Order: Efficiency first" are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent was randomly assigned to the group that saw respectively the Distributional Impacts part or the Efficiency Effects part first. Other respondents saw the Policy Views block first. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-5.3 Data to Assess Sample Representativeness

To compute the population characteristics in Table 1, we use the IPUMS-CPS, ASEC data from March 2019 (Flood et al., 2020). We construct variables and categories that are as comparable as possible between our sample data and the population statistics. The shares computed are based on the following IPUMS-CPS, ASEC data:

- **Age bracket**: AGE variable divided in brackets

- **Household income bracket**: FTOTVAL variable divided in brackets
- **Education**: EDUC variable split into categories as follows

  High School or Less: "none or preschool," "grades 1, 2, 3, or 4," "grades 5 or 6," "grades 7 or 8," "grade 9," "grade 10," "grade 11," "12th grade, no diploma."

  4-Year College or More: "bachelor's degree."

- **Employment**: the variable is built as follows

  Employed: It is the sum of employed and self-employed. For self-employed, CLASSWKR is "self-employed, not incorporated" and "self-employed, incorporated". For employed workers, EMPSTAT is "armed forces," "at work," "has job, not at work last week" but CLASSWKR is not "unpaid family worker."

  Unemployed: EMPSTAT is "unemployed, experienced worker," "unemployed, new worker" and CLASSWKR not "self-employed, not incorporated," "self-employed, incorporated," "unpaid family worker."

- **Marital status**:

  Married: MARST is "married, spouse present," "married, spouse absent."

  Not Married: MARST is "separated," "divorced," "widowed," "never married/single."

- **Race and ethnicity**:

  Black/African-American: RACE = "black", HISPAN="not hispanic."

  White: RACE = "white", HISPAN="not hispanic."

  Asian/Asian-American: RACE = "asian", HISPAN="not hispanic."

  Hispanic/Latino: HISPAN is not equal to "not hispanic."

For party affiliation, data is taken from Gallup (2019). In particular, the question asked was *"In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or an independent?."* The share of "Independent" respondents in the samples is computed aggregating the "Independent" and the "Non-affiliated." Finally, the data for the 2016's Presidential election were taken from Leip (2019).

A-6 Variables Definition

Core respondents characteristics

Female: respondent is female.
Male: respondent is male.
Age 18-29: respondent's age is between 18 and 29 years.
Age 30-49: respondent's age is between 30 and 49 years.
Age 50-69: respondent's age is between 50 and 69 years.
White: respondent's ethnicity is European American/White.
Black/African-American: respondent's ethnicity is African American/Black.
Hispanic/Latino: respondent's ethnicity is Hispanic/Latino.
Asian/Asian-American: respondent's ethnicity is Asian/Asian American.
Other races: respondent's ethnicity is not among those listed above.
Kids: respondent has children.
Low-Income: respondent's household income is below $39,000.
Middle-Income: respondent's household income is between $40,000 - $69,000.
High-Income: respondent's household income is above $70,000.
Student: respondent is student.
Working: respondent is full-time or part-time employee, or self-employed, or small business owner.
Not working: respondent is unemployed and looking for work or not currently working and not looking for work.
Retiree: respondent is retiree.
Married: respondent is married.
Republican: respondent's political affiliation is Republican.
Democrat: respondent's political affiliation is Democrat (usually omitted category in the regressions).
Independent and others: respondent's political affiliation is independent or other or non-affiliated.
Economics related major: respondent has a college degree with an economics-related major.
College (degree): respondent has at least a 4-year college degree.

Treatments

Distributive Effects: in Survey 1, respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on the distributional impacts of trade and trade policy.
Efficiency Effects: in Survey 1, respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on the efficiency effects of trade and trade policy.
Economist (= Efficiency + Distributive): in Survey 1, respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on both efficiency effects and distributional impacts of trade and trade policy.
Own consumption: in Survey 2, respondent was randomized to be primed to think about the effects of trade on consumers.
Own job risks: in Survey 2, respondent was randomized to be primed to think about the effects of trade on jobs.

Mechanisms

Efficiency.

Trade ↑ competition in the U.S.: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that international trade has made firms in the U.S. more competitive and improved their productivity (*Yes/No* Question).

Trade ↑ competition in your sector: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade made firms in their sector of work more competitive and improved their productivity (*Yes/No* Question).

Trade ↑ innovation in the U.S.: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the competitive pressure from trade has increased innovation in the U.S. (*Yes/No* Question).

Trade ↑ GDP growth of the U.S.: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that international trade has increased the U.S.'s GDP growth (*Yes/No* Question).

If U.S. exports ↑ value of $ ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the value of the dollar will increase (as opposed to "will decrease" and "will not change") if the U.S. exports more goods abroad.

Both countries better off when trading: indicator variable equal to one if respondent answers "both countries are better off" (as opposed to "one country gains, the other one loses" and "both countries lose") to the question "When two countries trade with each other, would you say that, in general, both are made better off from trade or that one gains at the expense of the other one?"

Distributional (General).

Large corporations gained from trade: indicator variable equal to one if, when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?," respondent rated "Large corporations" 4 or more on a scale from 1 ("lost a lot") to 5 ("gained a lot").

Small businesses gained from trade: indicator variable equal to one if, when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?," respondent rated "Small businesses" 4 or more on a scale from 1 ("lost a lot") to 5 ("gained a lot").

High-income households gained from trade: indicator variable equal to one if, when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?," respondent rated "High-income households" 4 or more on a scale from 1 ("lost a lot") to 5 ("gained a lot").

Middle-income households gained from trade: indicator variable equal to one if, when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?," respondent rated "Middle-income households" 4 or more on a scale from 1 ("lost a lot") to 5 ("gained a lot").

Low-income households gained from trade: indicator variable equal to one if, when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?," respondent rated "Low-income households" 4 or more on a scale from 1 ("lost a lot") to 5 ("gained a lot").

It's easy to change sector x low-skilled workers: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it is easy for low-skilled workers to find a job in a different sector from the one they are currently working in (*Yes/No* question).

It's easy to change sector x high-skilled workers: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that

it is easy for high-skilled workers to find a job in a different sector from the one they are currently working in (*Yes/No* question).

Trade major reason x unemployment & decline of industries: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is a major reason for unemployment in some sectors and the decline of some industries in the U.S. from "A moderate amount" to "A great deal."

Main cause x loss of manufacturing jobs (S2): Automation: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that job losses of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. are mainly due to "Technological changes (e.g., automation)" (as opposed to "Globalization, trade and outsourcing" and "Immigration").

Main cause x loss of manufacturing jobs (S2): Trade: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that job losses of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. are mainly due to "Globalization, trade and outsourcing" (as opposed to "Technological changes (e.g., automation)" and "Immigration").

Main cause x loss of manufacturing jobs (S2): Immigration: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that job losses of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. are mainly due to "Immigration" (as opposed to "Globalization, trade and outsourcing" and "Technological changes (e.g., automation)").

Overall trade helped U.S. workers: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that, overall, trade has helped U.S. workers (as opposed to "Hurt U.S. workers").

Trade major reason x rise in inequality: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is a major reason for a rise of inequality in the U.S. from "A moderate amount" to "A great deal."

Trade ↓ prices of goods sold in the U.S.: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade decreased the prices of goods sold in the U.S. (*Yes/No* question).

More trade can make all better off (Losers can be compensated): indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that more international trade can make everyone better off by compensating those who lose with transfers (as opposed to "it will be impossible to compensate those who lose from it").

Large companies won more than small ones: indicator variable equal to one if respondent assigns a higher value to "Large corporations" with respect to "Small businesses," on a scale from 1 ("Lost a lot") to 5 ("Gained a lot"), when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?."

High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs: indicator variable equal to one if respondent assigns a higher value to "High-income households" with respect to "Low-income households," on a scale from 1 ("Lost a lot") to 5 ("Gained a lot"), when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?."

Sector switch easier if high-skill: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it is easy to find a job in a different sector for high-skill workers, but not for low skill workers.

Distributional (Personal).

Trade ↓ prices of goods they buy: indicator variable equal to one if respondent agrees with the statement that trade decreased the prices of goods they regularly buy.

Trade ↑ varieties of goods they buy: indicator variable equal to one if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that trade has increased the variety of the goods they have access to in ordinary stores.

Their wage growth slower due to foreign competition: indicator variable equal to one if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that, because of trade and the resulting competition with foreign countries that pay lower wages to their workers, their wage has not grown as fast as it would otherwise have.

Trade is a major reason x unemployment in their sector: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is a major reason for the rise of unemployment in their sector from "*A great deal*" to "*A moderate amount*."
Trade is a threat x future of their sector: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is a "Very serious" threat for the future of their sector.
Their job likely to be outsourced or offshored: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it is "Very likely" that, over the next 10 years, their job will be outsourced, offshored, or automated because of competition with foreign countries.
Extent to which job negatively affected by: Automation: sample average of values selected by respondents to the question "To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?" for the option "Automation," where 0 indicates a positive impact and 10 a negative impact.
Automation had a negative impact on their job: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected a value from 0 to 4 as answer to the question "To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?" for the option "Automation," where 0 indicates a negative impact and 10 a positive impact.
Extent to which job negatively affected by: Trade: sample average of values selected by respondents to the question "To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?" for the option "Globalization and trade," where 0 indicates a positive impact and 10 a negative impact.
Trade had a negative impact on their job: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected a value from 0 to 4 as answer to the question "To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?" for the option "Trade," where 0 indicates a negative impact and 10 a positive impact.
Extent to which job negatively affected by: Immigration: sample average of values selected by respondents to the question "To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?" for the option "Immigration," where 0 indicates a positive impact and 10 a negative impact.
Immigration had a negative impact on their job: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected a value from 0 to 4 as answer to the question "To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?" for the option "Immigration," where 0 indicates a negative impact and 10 a positive impact.
They are better off (or worse off) from trade: indicator variable equal to one if respondent answered "Better off" (respect. "Worse off") to the question "Would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries has made you better off or worse off?"

General knowledge of the mechanisms of trade policy.
The variables in this block refer to questions asked after the following preamble: "*The U.S. is a large net exporter of laptops (meaning that it sells more laptops abroad than it purchases from abroad and that U.S. laptops are a large share of all laptops sold in the world), and a large net importer of cars (meaning that it purchases more cars from abroad than it sells abroad and that cars purchased by customers in the U.S. are a large share of worldwide car purchases). The laptop sector employs many high-skilled, college-educated workers. The car sector employs many low-skilled workers. Cars are produced for cheaper abroad, while laptops are produced for cheaper in the U.S. Imagine now that the U.S. starts importing even more cars and*

producing less cars domestically."

Consumers benefit if imports ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that households who purchase cars in the U.S. are better off after the U.S. starts importing more cars (*Yes/No* question).

Justifiable to import even if U.S. more productive: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it makes sense for the U.S. to import cars from Germany under some circumstances, even though the U.S. was better at producing them, i.e., able to produce them at a lower price (*Yes/No* question).

U.S. prices ↓ if U.S. cars imports ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the price of cars in the U.S. will decrease (as opposed to "It will remain the same" and "It will increase") if the U.S. starts producing less and importing more cars.

Prices abroad ↓ if U.S. laptop exports ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the price of U.S. laptops abroad will decrease (as opposed to "It will remain the same" and "It will increase") if the U.S. starts producing and exporting more laptops.

U.S. wages ↓ if U.S. cars imports ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that wages of low-skilled workers working in the car sector will decrease (as opposed to "Wages will remain the same" and "Wages will increase") if the U.S. starts importing more cars.

U.S. wages ↑ if U.S. laptop exports ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that wages of high-skilled workers working in the laptop sector will increase (as opposed to "Wages will remain the same" and "Wages will decrease") if the U.S. starts importing more laptops.

Wages of car workers moving to laptop sector ↑ if car imports ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that wages of those low-skilled workers moving to the laptop sector will increase (as opposed to "Wages will remain the same" and "Wages will decrease").

Your wage ↓ if U.S. imports in your sector ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that their wage will decrease (as opposed to "It will remain the same" and "It will increase") if imports in their sector increase.

Your wage ↑ if U.S. exports in your sector ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that their wage will increase (as opposed to "It will remain the same" and "It will decrease") if exports from their sector to other countries increase.

Prices abroad ↑ if export tax ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the price of laptops sold abroad will increase (as opposed to "It will remain the same" and "It will decrease") if the U.S. were to impose an export tax on laptops.

U.S. prices ↑ if import tax ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the price of cars sold in the U.S. will increase (as opposed to "It will remain the same" and "It will decrease") if the U.S. were to impose an import tariffs on cars.

Correct answers to the case study: share of correct answers to the trade case study in Survey 1. The questions considered are all the ones in this block + the variable *Both countries better off when trading.*

Policy views

The U.S. should aim at ↓ barriers and ↑ trade: indicator variable equal to one if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that "Increasing trade with other countries and reducing barriers to trade is something the U.S. should aim for."

Support for free trade: same as the above variable.

The U.S. should restrict food imports to ensure food security: indicator variable equal to one if respondent

believes that the best policy to ensure national food security is restricting imports (as opposed to"Provide more subsidies").

The U.S. should protect their infant industries: indicator variable equal to one if respondent thinks it makes sense to protect infant industries for a while by means of tariffs or import restrictions (as opposed to "let these firms immediately face foreign competition to become more competitive").

Restrict imports best way to help U.S. workers: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that is declining and threatened by foreign competition is restricting imports in that industry (as opposed to "Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs" and "Subsidize production in the sector").

Transfers & retraining best way to help U.S. workers: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that is declining and threatened by foreign competition is providing more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs (as opposed to "Restrict imports in that industry" and "Subsidize production in the sector").

Subsidize production best way to help U.S. workers: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that is declining and threatened by foreign competition is subsidizing production in the sector (as opposed to "Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs" and"Restrict imports in that industry").

The U.S. should protect minerals and metals, petroleum, chemicals or machinery sectors: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent believes that the U.S. should provide protection against foreign competition to either of the following options: "minerals and metals," "petroleum," "chemicals or machinery" when asked "Do you think some industries should be protected from foreign competition using tariffs or other import restrictions? Select all that apply."

The U.S. should protect from trade more than 3 types of goods: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the U.S. should protect more than 3 types of goods from foreign competition when asked whether "particular goods should be protected from foreign competition using tariffs or other import restrictions."

Views on government

Trust government: respondent answers "Almost always" or "A lot of the time" to the question "How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right?."

Government purposes: respondent says the "Government should do more" to solve their country's problems (as opposed to "Government is doing too much" and "Government is doing just the right amount").

Government involvement: respondent rates theirselves 4 or more following the question "Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens?".

Transfers to those out of work: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service "Transfers and income support programs for those out of work" should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to "decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)" or "funding to be left unchanged."

Better schools for low-income children: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service "Better schools for children from low-income families" should receive increased funding even if this means

more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to "decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)" or "funding to be left unchanged."

Income support and retraining for workers displaced by int. trade: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service "Income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade" should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to "decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)" or "funding to be left unchanged."

Subsidies to pay health insurance: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service "Subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care" should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to "decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)" or "funding to be left unchanged."

Wage subsidies to working poor: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service "Wage subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages" should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to "decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)" or "funding to be left unchanged."

The next variables are defined out of the following question: "Consider now a list of functions the federal government could serve. On a 1 to 5 scale, please say how much responsibility you think the government should have for each — with 1 meaning the government should have no responsibility at all and 5 meaning the government should have total responsibility in this area."

Government should be responsible for reducing income differences: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Reducing income differences between the rich and the poor."

Government should be responsible for reducing wealth transmission: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Reducing the transmission of wealth from one generation to the other"

Government should be responsible for ensuring health care: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Making sure Americans have adequate health care."

Government should be responsible for reducing opportunity differences: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Reducing the differences in opportunities between children from wealthy and poor families."

Government should be responsible for regulating trade: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Regulating trade to and from the U.S. to protect American producers and consumers."

Government should be responsible for stabilizing financial system: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Maintaining a stable financial system and ensuring that credit markets work."

Government should be responsible for stabilizing dollar: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Ensuring a stable dollar."

Government should be responsible for providing minimum living: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Providing a minimum standard of living for all."

Patriotism

Proud to be American: variable summarizing how proud the respondent is to be American, with values from 1 ("Not at all proud"), to 5 ("Extremely proud").

Important to be born in the U.S.: variable summarizing how important it is for the respondent to be born in the U.S., with values from 1 ("Not important at all") to 5 ("Very important").

Own culture superior: variable summarizing how much the respondent agrees with the statement that their own culture is superior to others, with values from 1 ("Completely disagree") to 4 ("Completely agree").

Exposure to Trade

Objective Exposure Based on Tradable Sector: The indicator of exposure to trade based on sector follows the specification of Mayda and Rodrik (2005). We split respondents' sectors into 2 categories: tradables and non-tradables. Tradable sectors are manufacturing sectors that are included in Table 9 of Mayda and Rodrik (2005).

Objective Exposure Based on Routine Occupation: The measured exposure depending on routine occupation is based on a measure of routine (Autor et al. (2003), Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Autor and Dorn (2013)). Data is taken from the replication packet of Owen and Johnston (2017), based on the definition of RTI (Routine Task Intensity Index) of Goos et al. (2014). In order to aggregate the detailed classification of occupations, I compute a weighted mean of RTI across occupations. The weights are the ones given in the dataset. I then create an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent is in the top 50th percentile in terms of RTI. This indicator variable is used to build interaction variables. I also create three indicator variables for low, middle and high routine occupations. Low routine occupations are those in the bottom 33th percentile, middle routine occupations are between the 33th percentile and the 66th percentile and high routine occupations are in the top 66th percentile. When the coefficient for routine occupation is displayed, it corresponds to the indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is above 66th percentile. I also control for being being in a middle routine occupation (between the 33th and the 66th percentiles).

Objective Exposure Based on Routine x Offshorable Occupation: First, I determine the level of offshorability for each occupation. The methogology is analogous to the *Measured exposure based on routine occupation* and data also comes from Owen and Johnston (2017) and is based on the methodology of Blinder et al. (2009). Then I define an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent has an occupation above the median both in terms of offshorability and routine. The coefficient that is used in regressions corresponds to this indicator variable that I just described. I also control for being in a non-offshorable and routine occupation and also for being in a non-offshorable and non-routine occupation, so that the displayed coefficient captures the effect of routine in offshorable occupations only.

Objective Exposure Based on Comparative Advantage Occupation: Data is taken from the replication packet of Owen and Johnston (2017). This index is a continuous measure of comparative advantage and comparative disadvantage by occupation (see section *Research Design* of Owen and Johnston (2017) for more details on the computations of comparative advantages by occupation). The methodology is analogous to the *Measured Exposure Based on Routine Occupation*, except that I include the continuous measure into the regressions.

Objective Exposure Based on Local Labor Market: The measured exposure based on local labor market follows the methodology of Autor et al. (2013). The replication package is available on David Dorn's website section P3, so that I obtain an index by commuting zone from 1991 to 2007. Then, I run the first stage regression, which consists in regressing imports penetration in the U.S. on imports penetration in other

countries.[2] Based on the predicted values, I determine an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent is in a commuting zone that is in the top 50th percentile in terms of exposure. As for the routine index, I also determine three indicator variables for low, middle and high exposed commuting zones. Low exposed areas are those below the 50th percentile, middle exposed are between the 50th and the 80th percentiles and high exposed are above the 80th percentile.

Interactions of Objective Measures: I also obtain further measures of exposure by interacting indices. I consider four interactions: (1) high labor market exposure and being in a tradable sector[3], (2) being in a tradable sector and in a high routine occupation[4], (3) being in a tradable sector, in a routine occupation and in a highly exposed labor market, (4) being in an offshorable occupation and in a tradable sector[5].

Better off from trade: indicator variable equal to one if respondent answered "Better off" to the question "*On balance, would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries has made you better off or worse off?*"

Worse off from trade: indicator variable equal to one if respondent answered "Worse off" to the question "would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries has made you better off or worse off?"

Feels impacted by trade: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent believes that "U.S. trade policy has important, direct effects" on their own life (*Yes/No* question).

Willingness to pay

Willingness to pay: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is willing to pay either \$1, \$2, \$5 or \$10, according to which branch he was randomized into, to learn the correct answers to various questions (payment is conditional on winning the \$1,000 lottery in which the respondent is automatically enrolled by taking the survey).

Indices

The summary indices that aggregate information over the same domain are constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007). Each indice consists of an equally weighted average of the z-scores of its components with signs oriented consistently within domain. Variables are transformed into z-scores by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation, so that each z-score has mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the control group. To further ease interpretation, the resulting indice is itself standardized by subtracting the mean in the control group and dividing by the standard deviation, so that each index has mean zero and standard deviation one.

Believes in efficiency gains: indice capturing whether the respondents believes in efficiency gains for the U.S. in terms of decreased prices, competition, innovation and GPD growth. It combines the variables *Trade ↓ prices of goods sold in the U.S.*, *Trade ↑ competition in the U.S.*, *Trade ↑ innovation in the U.S.* and *Trade ↑ GDP growth of the U.S.*.

Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness and GDP: index capturing whether the respondents believes in efficiency gains for the U.S. in terms of competition, innovation and GPD growth. It combines the variables

[2] See Autor et al. (2013) for more details on the instrumental variable procedure and how the index is built.

[3] In regressions, I also control for being both in a tradable sector and in a low exposed labor market, so that I capture the difference with non tradable sectors.

[4] In regressions, I also control for being both in a tradable sector and in a low routine occupation, so that I capture the difference with non tradable sectors.

[5] In regressions, I also control for being both in a tradable sector and in a low offshorable occupation, so that I capture the difference with non tradable sectors.

Trade ↑ competition in the U.S., *Trade ↑ innovation in the U.S.* and *Trade ↑ GDP growth of the U.S.*.

Believes trade has adverse distributional impacts: indice summarizing how much the respondent believes that trade has adverse distributional impacts. It includes the variables *Large corporations gained from trade*, *Small businesses gained from trade*, *High-income households gained from trade*, *Middle-income households gained from trade*, *Low-income households gained from trade*, *Trade major reason x unemployment & decline of industries*, *Trade major reason x rise in inequality*, *More Trade can make all better off (Losers can be compensated)*, *Overall trade helped U.S. workers*, *It's easy to change sector x low-skilled workers*. The sign of the variables entering the index is oriented so that a higher index means that trade had more adverse distributional impacts.
Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts U.S. workers: indice capturing whether the respondent believes that trade is a major reason for unemployment and hurts U.S. workers. It combines the variables *Trade major reason x unemployment & decline of industries* and *Overall trade helped U.S. workers*. The sign is oriented so that a higher index means that trade had a greater detrimental effect on U.S. workers.

Supports government intervention: indice capturing the respondent's support for government intervention. It includes the variables *Trust government*, *Government purposes* and *Government involvement*.
Is patriotic: indice summarizing the extent to which the respondent is patriotic. It includes the variables *Proud to be American*, *Important to be born in the U.S.*, *Own culture superior*.
Support for redistribution: indice summarizing the respondent's support for redistribution programs. It includes the variables *Transfers to those out of work*, *Better schools for low-income children*, *Income support and retraining for workers displaced by int. trade*, *Subsidies to pay health insurance*, *Wage subsidies to working poor* and *Transfers & retraining best way to help U.S. workers*.

A-7 Classifications of Sectors and Occupations

Table A-11: Classification of Occupations

Occupation	Sample Share	RTI (Normalized)	RTI (Indicator Variable)	Offshorability (Normalized)	Offshorability (Indicator Variable)	Comparative Advantage (Normalized)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Agriculture	.5%	29	1	0	0	100
Armed forces	.8%	7	0	12	0	0
Clericals	10.9%	90	1	100	1	35
Craft and trade	3%	77	1	34	0	30
Elementary occupations	2.4%	85	1	21	0	34
Managers	32.3%	0	0	37	0	39
Plant and machine operators	2.6%	100	1	70	1	41
Professionals	23.8%	13	0	56	1	32
Service and sales	13.6%	42	1	4	0	0
Technicians	8.4%	46	1	38	1	23
Unknown	1.6%					

Notes. This table presents summary statistics on the occupations included in the survey. The first column displays the share of respondents in each occupation. The normalized indexes (second, fourth and sixth columns) are computed so that the occupation with the highest index has a value of 100 and the one with the lowest index has a value of 0. The indicator variables (third and fifth columns) are the ones included in regressions. All measures are taken from the replication package of Owen and Johnston (2017).

Table A-12: Classification of Sectors

Sector	Sample Share	Tradable Sector
	(1)	(2)
Agriculture, plantations and other rural sectors	2.1%	0
Basic metal production	1.3%	1
Chemical industries	1.1%	1
Commerce	2.4%	0
Construction	6.5%	0
Education	8.5%	0
Financial and professional services	10%	0
Food, drink, tobacco	7%	1
Forestry, wood	.3%	1
Health services	10.9%	0
Hotel, tourism, catering	2%	0
Mechanical and electrical engineering	1.7%	0
Media, culture, graphical	1.8%	0
Mining	.2%	1
Public Services	4.9%	0
Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear	.9%	1
Transport	1.7%	0
Transport equipment manufacturing	.9%	1
Utilities (water, gas, electricity)	.9%	0
Unknown	35.1%	

Notes. This table presents summary statistics on the sectors included in the survey. The first column displays the share of respondents in each occupation. The column *Tradable Sector* corresponds to an indicator variable equal to 1 if the sector is a tradable one according to the classification of Mayda and Rodrik (2005). More precisely, tradable sectors include manufacturing and agricultural sectors.

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