The Interdependence of Rules and Culture in Commons Management

Devesh Rustagi*

Abstract

Culture and institutions are expected to interact with each other, but there is hardly any evidence on the importance of this interaction for economic outcomes. I investigate how the interaction between formal rules regulating resource use and informal cultural values promoting cooperation affects successful management of forest commons in Ethiopia. I find that groups achieve best forest outcomes when they have both rules and values, but not when they have only one of these. Identification strategies that account for non-random formation of groups and pre-existing differences show that these findings are not due to omitted variables. Falsification tests based on detailed aspects of forest ecology lend further support to these results. These effects arise because rules offer the possibility to punish free riders, which results in cooperators having optimistic beliefs that others will also contribute, eventually resulting in higher cooperation. Data from household surveys and behavioral experiments confirm this: groups with rules spend much more time monitoring their forest, hold optimistic beliefs about others' contributions, and also contribute higher amount in the public goods game. These findings imply that both culture and institutions are required in resolving the problem of collective action.

JEL: D78, H41, O13, Q20

Keywords: Rules, civic values, commons management, public goods game, Ethiopia

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I. Introduction

Many economic activities require cooperation. Prominent examples include team work in organizations, tax compliance, donations to charities, and provision of a wide variety of public goods. However, cooperation is difficult to achieve due to the free rider problem: individuals who do not cooperate cannot be excluded easily from enjoying the benefits of cooperation. Despite this difficulty, we observe a large variation in success. Understanding the determinants of this variation is of crucial importance in designing policies that encourage cooperation.

Among the determinants, institutions and culture are expected to play an important role in mitigating the free rider problem. Institutions are formal written down rules that could foster cooperation by placing constraints on opportunistic behaviors through the punishment of rule violators (see North 2000, Ostrom 1990, Alesina and Giuliano 2015). In contrast, culture or informal codes of conduct are values and beliefs that are shared by a social group. Culture may encourage cooperation by discouraging free riding through internal guilt and shame, as well as through disapproval by the social group (see Elster 1989, North 2000, Guiso et al. 2006, Alesina and Giuliano 2015).

There is compelling empirical evidence that institutions and culture matter for economic outcomes.[1] So far, this evidence is largely based on studying the effects of institutions and culture in isolation by holding the other side fixed. Recent evidence, however, suggests that institutions and culture do not operate in isolation. Rather, they interact with each other resulting in stable patterns of conduct in which the two could be complements or substitutes.[2] This interaction is believed to matter for economic outcomes, but there is hardly any empirical evidence.

In this paper, I examine how the interaction between local institutions and culture affects the successful management of commons.[3] My focus is on a forest commons management program in Ethiopia, which was launched to mitigate high deforestation from unregulated livestock grazing. This resulted in the disappearance of young trees considered vital for healthy forest growth (Kubsa and Tadesse 2002). Under the program, several groups of the Oromo people were offered secure property rights to manage their forest as a common property. The groups confront cooperation dilemmas while managing their commons and vary widely in their success. This provides a setting conducive to studying the role of institutions and culture. Following Ostrom (1990), Bardhan (2000), and Balland and Platteau (1996), I consider formal written down rules regulating the

[1] see for example, Ostrom 1990, Balland and Platteau 1996, Acemoglu et al. 2001, La Porta 2008, Algan and Cahuc 2010, Tabellini 2010, Guiso et al 2009, and Aesina and Giuliano (2015) for a review.

[2] see for instance, Tabellini 2008, Aghion et al. 2010, Alesina and Giuliano 2015, Guiso et al. 2016, Bisin and Verdier 2017, Lowes et al. 2017, Rustagi 2019).

[3] A growing number of studies examine the effect of local level institutions and culture on economic outcomes (see for instance, Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), and Tabellini (2010).

extent of resource extraction from the commons as a proxy for local institutions.[4] As a proxy for culture, I consider the social norm of conditional cooperation, which prescribes cooperation provided others do the same (Elster 1989, Bicchieri 1990, Putnam et al. 1993).[5]

There are theoretical reasons on why the interaction between rules and conditional cooperation should matter for successful commons management. A model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) offers three insights. First, norms of conditional cooperation are unlikely to sustain cooperation on their own. This is because the presence of conditional cooperators changes a cooperation dilemma into a coordination problem. The equilibrium selection depends on beliefs that conditional cooperators hold about contribution by others. Laboratory evidence shows that conditional cooperators contribute initially because of optimistic beliefs. However, after experiencing free riders their beliefs turn pessimistic, resulting in free riding by everyone and breakdown of cooperation (Ostrom 1992, Fehr and Gächter 2000). Further evidence shows that this breakdown occurs even in the absence of free riders because of 'self-serving' conditional cooperators, who contribute less than what the other group members contribute (Fischbacher and Gächter 2010).

Second, formal rules alone may not be enough to sustain cooperation. This is because rules require enforcement to be effective. Generally, this enforcement is carried out by a third party like the police in cities or conductors on public transport. However, in the context of commons management, rules are often enforced by individual users themselves. This engenders a second order free rider problem: it is individually costly to enforce rules but enforcement generates group level benefits. Since individuals are better off if others bear the cost of enforcement, selfish individuals are unlikely to enforce rules. In the absence of enforcement, rules become 'paper tigers'.

Third, both conditional cooperation and rules are required to sustain cooperation. When there are formal rules regulating resource use, conditional cooperators would be willing to incur the cost of enforcement to ensure that free riders get punished. This is because conditional cooperators experience disutility from unfavorable payoff inequality they experience when others defect on their contribution. Rules makes it possible for conditional cooperators to discipline free riders, resulting in what Elinor Ostrom (1992) described as "covenants with a sword". Rule enforcement in return bolsters the beliefs of individuals that others will not defect on their contribution, resulting in higher levels of cooperation.

In summary, theory provides four insights: (a) groups without conditional cooperators and rules are expected to perform poorly in managing their commons; (b) groups with

[4]see also Tang 1991, Dayton-Johnson 2000, Agrawal 2001, Persha et al. 2011. Examples of these rules includes the number of trees one can harvest from the forest or the number of cows one can graze on the grassland or the number of days one can use water from the irrigation system.

[5]Putnam et al. write that in a civic community, citizens need not behave as altruists, but pursue what Tocqueville ([1835] 1969) calls "enlightened self-interest" that is "alive to the interests of others".

conditional cooperators alone but without rules are unlikely to produce superior outcomes; (c) groups with rules alone but without conditional cooperators are also unlikely to witness superior outcomes; (d) groups with both conditional cooperation and rules are expected to have superior outcomes.

I test these insights using detailed data on the performance of each group in managing its commons. The performance was assessed twice by the program agency using the count of young trees per hectare. This data was then used to decide on a monetary fine that each group must pay for poor performance. It was believed that property rights and monetary fines would generate incentives for groups to manage their forests successfully. However, because the fine was set at the group level and not the individuals who free ride, it did not resolve the free rider problem. The performance data reveals large variation in outcome: while some groups have only 13 young trees per hectare, others have over 165 young trees.

One challenge in tying this variation to an interaction between rules and conditional cooperation, is how to measure these. There are many different kinds of rules which could affect commons management success. Drawing on studies that attribute the disappearance of young trees chiefly to unregulated livestock grazing, I focus on written down rules that restricting grazing inside the forest; these rules are considered vital for the survival of young trees (Amente 2005). The rules prescribe the number of months in a year a group bans grazing by fellow members inside the group managed forest. 46 percent of the groups ban grazing for 2-5 months in a year and enforce it through decentralized monitoring by members. In the remaining groups, grazing is allowed throughout the year.[6]

When it comes to measuring conditional cooperation, the challenge comes from using observed cooperation behavior because it could be confounded with benefits from reputation formation, repeated interaction, and beliefs about the behavior of others.[7] To address this challenge, I follow Fischbacher et al. (2001) and use a one-shot anonymous public goods game, which rules out repeated interaction and reputation formation from playing a role. In the experiment, two players are randomly assigned to an experimental group. I implement the game in the strategy method, wherein each player decides her contribution conditional on all possible contribution decisions of the other player (making beliefs redundant). A free rider contributes zero in all decisions regardless of what the other player contributes, whereas a conditional cooperator increases her contribution in the contribution of the other player. Since groups comprise largely of free riders and conditional cooperators, I follow Fischbacher et al. (2001) and use the Spearman rank

[6]Of course, there are also other formal rules that might play a rule, such as those specifying the boundary or the set of users who have rights to access the resource. I take cognizance of such rules while conducting the empirical analysis.

[7]Although culture includes both values and beliefs, it is important to separate the two while measuring conditional cooperation. This is because groups could have the same norm but differ in their beliefs, resulting in multiple equilibria.

correlation between self and other players' contribution to construct a continuous measure of conditional cooperation. The experiment reveals large variation in conditional cooperation, which ranges from zero to 0.92.

I regress young tree count on measures of conditional cooperation, grazing rules, and an interaction term between these two variables. Identifying the effect of this interaction is very difficult because group formation, rules, and conditional cooperation are not randomly assigned. This could result in omitted variables bias: groups with stronger conditional cooperation and grazing rules are likely to differ from the remaining groups in observable and unobservable ways.[8] Ideally, one would like to form groups exogenously with high, medium, and lower levels of conditional cooperation and then randomly assign grazing rules to one-half of the groups within each stratum. A clean experiment like this may be impossible in the context of commons management, but it lays down two requirements for the interaction effect to be interpreted as causal: exogenous formation of groups and random assignment of grazing rules. I attempt to achieve this herculean task using a number of strategies.

First, historical records concur that the Oromo formed clan-based groups. I construct clan fixed effects from detailed data on the clan of each household to absorb clan specific differences. Groups are located within villages, so I include village fixed effects to to account for village specific differences. The combination of clan and village fixed effects allows me to mitigate the concern over non-random formation of groups. Second, I account for pre-existing differences in forest quality by showing that pre-program forest management outcome is uncorrelated with conditional cooperation, grazing rules, and the interaction term. Third, Rustagi (2020) shows that the variation in conditional cooperation and grazing rules is driven mainly by exogenously determined distance of groups to local markets. I control for market distance in all the regressions. Fourth, I control for several important determinants of success like altitude, economic heterogeneity, social heterogeneity, duration of being under the program, and group size. Conditional on these controls, the variation is conditional cooperation and grazing rules across groups appears to be idiosyncratic. To lend support to this argument, I conduct a number of novel falsification tests based on detailed aspects of Ethiopian forest ecology, which increase the confidence that the main results are not due to omitted variables.

I find that the coefficients on both conditional cooperation and grazing rules are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. This result implies that in groups with conditional cooperation but without grazing rules and vice versa forest management outcomes are not significantly different from groups that lack both conditional cooperation and rules. In contrast, the interaction enters with a large positive and significant coefficient. The marginal effect of one standard deviation increase in the interaction term is 29 more

[8]Reverse causality is unlikely to pose a concern because conditional cooperation and rules pre-date the outcome assessment.

young trees per hectare, which is large relative to the sample mean of 67 young trees. These results persist in magnitude and significance when I use the outcome from second forest assessment, which was carried out seven years after the first assessment. This persistence shows that the main results are not due to some idiosyncratic events (rainfall shocks) that selectively affected groups with both higher conditional cooperation and grazing rules in a given year.

I proceed by conducting falsification tests that rely on detailed aspect of local forest ecology. The forest commons are found on the Bale Mountains of Ethiopia. While groups differ in altitude (controlled for in regressions), its effect is somewhat mediated as the forests lie a few degrees north of the equator. As a result, most groups comprise of both broadleaf and coniferous trees. I use a unique species specific data on the distribution of young and mature trees per hectare. I start by showing that the interaction term has no effect on the frequency of mature trees of either the broadleaf or the coniferous type. This is reassuring because livestock cannot browse away mature trees.

Second, evidence from ecological studies suggests that browsing should affect the frequency of only young broadleaf trees, but should have little bearing on young coniferous trees that are unpalatable to livestock. In line with ecological studies, I find that the interaction term has a large positive and significant effect on the distribution of young broadleaf trees, but the effect on young coniferous trees is both economically and statistically insignificant.

For omitted variables bias to explain away the main results, they must be specifically correlated with young broad leaf trees. While I believe this to be unlikely, I proceed with a third test to rule this out. Ecological studies further suggest that within young broadleaf tree species, the effect should be larger for species most prone to browsing damage. This is exactly what I find: the marginal effect of the interaction term is large and statistically significant for young trees of *Hagenia abyssinica*, which is highly palatable and nutritive to livestock, and thus prone to severe browsing damage (Amente 2005). Again, no effect is observed for mature Hagenia trees. For these findings to be spurious, omitted variables must be specifically correlated with the frequency of young Hagenia trees, which is highly unlikely. Together, these results confirm the importance of the interaction between conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws for the successful management of forest commons.

Theory suggests that the positive effect of the interaction term is due to the enforcement of grazing rules by conditional cooperators, which in return leads to group members having optimistic beliefs about contribution by others. To shed light on these mechanisms, I focus on a sample of users who behave as conditional cooperators, that is, individuals for whom the Spearman correlation is $p - value < 0.05$ (see Fischbacher et al. 2001). Holding the type fixed, I show that conditional cooperators from groups with grazing rules spent twice as much time monitoring their forest than conditional co-

operators from groups without grazing rules. Stronger enforcement leads to individuals from groups with grazing rules expecting free riders to be punished with nearly 100 percent likelihood. Such large differences in enforcement and punishment likelihood affect beliefs. Individuals from groups with grazing rules are 100 percentage points more likely to report fewer grazing violations than individuals from groups without grazing rules. Data on beliefs over others' contribution in the public goods game further confirms this result – conditional cooperators from groups with grazing rules hold optimistic beliefs about contribution by others than conditional cooperators from groups without grazing rules. Finally, optimistic beliefs result in higher contribution in the public goods game. Together, these patterns clearly suggest that enforcement leads to optimistic beliefs which then translate into higher cooperation outcomes.

This paper contributes to the growing literature on understanding the determinants of collective action, in particular, the successful provision of public goods and common property resources. Thus far, the focus of field studies has been on the importance of rules and culture as if they operate in isolation (see for instance Tang 1991, Balland and Platteau 1996, Bardhan 2000, Dayton-Johnson 2000, Agrawal 2001, Persha et al. 2011). This paper adds to the literature by showing that it is the interaction between rules and culture which matters for successful provision of commons. In this sense, the paper complements laboratory findings on the interaction between conditional cooperation and rules by taking into consideration a richer context and policy environment (Gaechter and Thoeni 2005, Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2007, Ones and Putterman 2007).

A closely related paper is by Rustagi et al. (2010), who show a composite effect of conditional cooperation on forest management outcomes. This paper goes beyond in several ways. First, it underpins the mechanism through which the effect unfolds by taking into consideration the rich data on grazing rules and its interaction with conditional cooperation. Second, the paper uses novel and unique data made available by the program agency on species specific distribution of young and mature trees to study carefully the effect of the interaction between conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws on forest management success. Third, the paper also highlights the importance of channels via which the interaction effect may arise using a combination of new survey and experimental data not discussed in any of the previous studies.

The paper is structured as follows: Section II describes the field setting, Section III describes data used in this study, Section IV discusses the empirical specification and strategy. Section V presents results on the association of the forest management outcome with conditional cooperation, grazing bylaws and their interaction term. Section VI discusses the channels, and Section VII offers concluding remarks.

II. Field Setting

The study takes place in the largest forest commons management program in Ethiopia. The program was launched in 2000 by German Organization for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the Oromia state government to conserve the Adaba-Dodola forest protection area. Before the program launch, browsing of young trees by a large number of livestock led to severe forest degradation characterized by: a) high deforestation rate of 3 percent per year (Kubsa and Tadesse 2002) and, b) very low forest growth of just 1m3/hectare/year in the pre-program period (Trainer 1996).

During the program period, 56 groups located inside the forest were made direct beneficiaries of the program. The entire forest area was sub-divided into blocks and each block was placed under the management of a group. Negotiations were held across neighboring groups to reach a consensus on block boundaries. These boundaries are located deep inside the forest away from the settlements, so the negotiations did not introduce any selection at the margin via the reassignment of members to one or the other group. Each group was given formal property rights to manage its forest block as a common property. For logistical reasons, the program was rolled out over time. The program features and implementation authorities were the same in each stage.[9] Under the program, group members are allowed to graze livestock, harvest timber and non-timber forest products for self-consumption and sale, and maintain existing homesteads and farms inside the forest. In return for these benefits, the groups are required to maintain existing forest cover, restrict further expansion of agriculture and settlement inside the forest, and prevent outsiders from accessing the forest.

The performance of each group in managing its forest is to be assessed every five years by the local forest administration. During the assessment, the program agency collects data on the number of young and mature trees per hectare (see section III). The young tree count is used to determine rent that each group must pay annually to the administration. The rent is progressive and groups with lower young tree count pay a higher rent; this is expected to provide incentives for groups to manage their forest better. The first assessment was conducted in 2005. The second assessment was conducted in 2012-13 and this data are available for only some groups.

While managing their forest as a common property, group members face a free rider problem. Though there is punishment for poor performance in the form of a rent, it is targeted at the group and not the individuals who free ride. Thus, for resolving this within group free rider problem formulation and enforcement of rules regulating forest use is considered crucial to create an enabling environment for conditional cooperators. However, because rule enforcement in decentralized contexts is prone to a second order free rider problem, the support of conditional cooperators is warranted for success.

[9] Group level characteristics are uncorrelated with the program stage.

III. Data

The paper uses five data sources. The data on group performance in forest management were obtained from program offices in Adaba and Dodola, and were subsequently verified using data obtained independently from the main program office in Addis Ababa. This data includes number of young and mature trees per hectare of group managed forest and is averaged over all relevant tree species. The data on grazing bylaws were obtained using in-depth community and household level surveys with group members. The data on conditional cooperation were obtained through a behavioral experiment with group members. In addition to these three sources, I also consider two additional data sources. One of these is species specific number of young and mature trees per forest hectare. The other is survey and experimental data on channels via which the interaction of rules and conditional cooperation affect forest management outcomes. I describe the first three data sets below, while the remaining two are discusses in section V and VI respectively. Of the 56 groups in the study area, the paper covers 51 groups because data on outcomes was not available for two groups and a pilot was conducted in three groups which are excluded from the study.

III.A. Group Performance in Forest Management

The performance of groups in managing their forest in the program period is assessed as the number of young trees per hectare. A tree is defined as young if is at least two meters tall and (depending on the species) has a diameter at breast height of $\leq$40 cm or $\leq$ 25 cm. According to forestry studies, the young tree count is a robust measure of group performance in the program period because excessive browsing by livestock in the pre-program period resulted in their disappearance from the forest. Left with only mature trees, the forest would have died in a few decades. Thus, the natural regeneration of a forest depends in part on the number of young trees with a potential to form a long-term mature stand (Trainer 1996, Amente 2005).

Data on the number of young trees is available from two assessments. The first assessment was conducted in 2005 and covers all 51 groups in the sample. The second assessment was conducted in 2012 and covers only 27 of the 51 groups in the sample. I use data from the first assessment to report the main results, whereas data from the second assessment are used to show persistence in results over time. Panel A, Table 1 shows that the average number of young trees is 66.79 (s.d. 34.61) in 2005 and 62.78 (s.d. 38.79) in 2012-13. There is a strong positive correlation between the two assessments (r = 0.78, p-value $<$ 0.000), suggesting that the groups that performed well in 2005 also performed well in 2012-13.

In addition to the data on young trees, the program office also collected data on mature trees in 2005, as well as 2012-13. Since mature trees must have been young in the past,

I consider the variation in their survival in 2005 as reflecting group performance in the pre-program period. Panel A, Table 1 shows that the average number of mature trees in 2005 is 54.88 (s.d. 19.89).

III.B. Grazing Bylaws

In the period preceding the program, browsing of young trees by high livestock numbers led to severe forest degradation. This is reflected in a large number of cattle heads estimated to be 480,000 and very low forest growth of just $1m^3$ per hectare per year in the pre-program period (Trainer 1996, Kubsa and Tadesse 2002). Consequently, bylaws regulating grazing inside the forest are considered critical for natural forest regeneration (Amente 2005).

Panel B in Table 1 shows that 46 percent of the groups have grazing bylaws. In these groups, grazing inside the forest and on the same spot is forbidden for 2-5 months in a year (the modal response is three months). The average for the full sample is 1.47 months in a year (s.d. 1.70), but 3.26 months (0.689) for the sample of groups with grazing bylaws.

The restrictions on grazing are put in place during the rainy season when tree seeds germinate. The violation of bylaws is subject to graduated sanctioning: first violation is let off with a warning, second and third violations are slapped with monetary fines per cattle, whereas fourth violation may even lead to expulsion from the group. Since forest commons involve decentralized governance, their enforcement is prone to second order free rider problem: individual group members are better off if others pay the cost to enforce the bylaws.

III.C. Conditional Cooperation

Measuring conditional cooperation in the field is challenging due to confounding motivations accruing from repeated interactions and reputation formation. In addition, it is very difficult to infer the absence of conditional cooperation from groups in which little cooperation is observed because of multiple equilibria arising from differences in beliefs about the behavior of others: conditional cooperators with optimistic beliefs are expected to cooperate, whereas those with pessimistic beliefs are expected to defect. Thus, it is plausible that groups with similar degrees of conditional cooperation are classified differently, resulting in a large measurement error. To circumvent these concerns, I follow Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) and elicit conditional cooperation in a one-shot anonymous public goods game. The game is implemented in the strategy method, which allows me to reliably measure conditional cooperation by making beliefs redundant, but without inducing any bias (Brandts and Charness 2011, Fischbacher et al. 2012). The instruction and procedures are listed in Rustagi et al. (2010).

The Experiment. – During the game, two players were randomly assigned to an experimental group. Each player received an endowment of six bills of one Ethiopian Birr (the daily wage) and had to decide how many bills to keep in his pocket and how many to contribute to a public good called "project". Any amount in the project was multiplied by 1.5 and then distributed equally between the two players, regardless of their contribution. Because the marginal per capita return from contributing one Birr to the project is 0.75, it is always in the material self-interest of a player to contribute nothing. Yet, if both players contributed their entire endowment, each player's earnings increased from 6 to 9 Birr; this created a cooperation dilemma similar to what members experience while managing their commons.

Each player took an unconditional and a conditional decision in the game. In the unconditional decision, players contributed simultaneously and stated their beliefs about the contribution of the other player. In the conditional decision, the strategy method was used, wherein players were visualized one-by-one the seven possible contribution decisions of the other player and then asked to state their own contribution for each of these, making beliefs redundant. The payoff of player i is given by:

$$\pi_i = 6 - C_i + 0.75(C_1 + C_2), \tag{1}$$

where $i = (1, 2)$, C_i denotes contribution of player i to the project, 0.75 is the marginal per capita return from investing into the public good, and $(C_1 + C_2)$ is the total value of the public good. To ensure incentive compatibility, both decisions were made payoff relevant. A die was rolled to determine for which player the unconditional decision is taken; this was matched with the other player's conditional decision to calculate payoffs.

The experiment and the first round of household and community survey were conducted from March-May in 2008. This was the first time ever that individuals took part in an experiment. Each session lasted about three hours including instructions (see Appendix C). Of the 1349 members residing in 51 groups, 709 members took part in the experiment, implying a response rate of 53 percent. On average, each player earned 7.5 Birr, which is slightly over one day's wage in 2008 in the largest town in study area.

Measuring conditional cooperation. – Following Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), I calculate for each player the Spearman correlation between self and other player's contribution in the conditional decision. The higher the Spearman ρ the higher is the propensity to cooperate conditionally. I then aggregate the Spearman ρ over individuals from a group to obtain group specific averages. If a group comprises chiefly of conditional cooperators, the average Spearman ρ will be close to 1, but zero if it is dominated by free riders. Though, the Spearman ρ is also zero for altruists and other types of flat contributions, the share of these two types in the sample is negligible (< 2 percent each). The average propensity to cooperate conditionally in the sample is 0.495

(s.d. 0.276, Table 1, Panel B).

III.D. Descriptive Statistics

Figure 1 shows the raw association of young trees per hectare with conditional cooperation, grazing bylaws and an interaction between the two. It is based on indicator variables for conditional cooperation whereby '1' means conditional cooperators are in majority (average Spearman $rho = 0.72$), otherwise '0' (average Spearman $rho = 0.27$) and grazing bylaws whereby '1' means grazing bylaws are present, otherwise '0'. In the figure, 'None' implies conditional cooperation = 0 and grazing bylaws = 0; 'CC only' implies conditional cooperation = 1, grazing bylaws = 0; 'GB only' implies conditional cooperation = 0, grazing bylaws = 1; and 'Both' implies, conditional cooperation = 1, grazing bylaws = 1.

The average forest management outcome in groups from the baseline category (None) is 48 young trees per hectare. The performance of groups with CC only is indistinguishable from the performance of groups in None (marginal effect = -0.09 young trees), suggesting that having conditional cooperators in majority alone does not lead to better forest outcomes. Although, the performance of groups in GB only is slightly higher than in groups with None (marginal effect = 14.81 young trees), the difference is not statistically significant (p-value > 0.30); this suggests that having grazing bylaws alone also does not lead to better forest outcomes either. However, groups with Both, wherein conditional cooperators are in majority and grazing bylaws are present witness much better forest outcomes (marginal effect = 35 young trees) and the difference is also statistically significant (p-value < 0.05).




Figure 1: Association of young trees with conditional cooperation, grazing bylaws and their interaction term

Notes: The categories are based on indicator variables for conditional cooperators in majority (1=majority, 0=otherwise) and the presence of grazing bylaws (1=Present, and 0=Absent). None implies conditional cooperation = 0 and grazing bylaws = 0; CC only implies conditional cooperation = 1, grazing bylaws = 0; GB only implies conditional cooperation = 0, grazing bylaws = 1; and Both implies, conditional cooperation = 1, grazing bylaws = 1. The final bar shows the total effect of the interaction term, which is highly significantly different from zero. The marginal effect of the interaction term is also statistically significant.

IV. Empirical Specification and Strategy

I model the association of forest management outcomes with conditional cooperation, grazing bylaws, and their interaction term using the following OLS specification which is in the spirit of differences-in-difference estimation:

$$y_{icv} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 y_{icv0} + \beta CC_{icv} + \gamma GB_{icv} + \delta(CC * GB)_{icv} + \mathbf{X}_{icv}\lambda + \theta_c + \eta_v + \epsilon_{icv} \quad (2)$$

where y_{icv} is the average number of young trees per hectare in group i with dominant clan c, and village v. y_0 is the pre-program forest management outcome. CC is the average propensity to cooperate conditionally, which is measures as the Spearman rho between own and other players' contribution in the public goods game. GB is grazing bylaws, measured as the number of months grazing inside the forest is forbidden. $CC * GB$ is the

interaction between conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws. $\mathbf{X}$ is a vector of control variables that are hypothesized in the literature to matter for commons management success. θ_c and η_v are fixed effects for the dominant clan in the group and the village in which the group is situated. ϵ_{icv} is an idiosyncratic error term. The coefficients of interest are β, γ, and δ, which capture respectively the effect of conditional cooperation alone (when there are no grazing bylaws), grazing bylaws alone (when there is no conditional cooperation), and the marginal effect of the interaction between conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws on forest management outcome. To the extent the groups comprise of free riders and conditional cooperators, β and γ are not expected to be significantly different from zero. In contrast, δ is expected to be positive and > 0.

Following seminal studies on commons management (Ostrom 1990, Balland and Platteau 1996, Bardhan 2000, and Agrawal 2001), I control for a variety of important variables. These include pre-program group performance, proxies of geography (elevation, forest type, border with non-forest areas), proxies of economic heterogeneity (market distance, Gini of cattle ownership), social heterogeneity (share of female members, clan heterogeneity, settlement fragmentation), duration of being under the program (months), and group size. In addition, while conducting robustness checks, I further control for leader type (Koseld and Rustagi 2015) and Gini of land ownership.

To estimate the effect of conditional cooperation, grazing bylaws, and their interaction on commons management success, an ideal experiment is the one in which the researcher a) sorts individuals by types (conditional cooperators or free riders) to form groups exogenously, such that groups have high, medium, and lower share of conditional cooperators; b) stratifies groups by the share of conditional cooperators and randomly assigns grazing bylaws to one-half of the groups within each stratum. A key advantage of this approach is that random assignment ensures conditional cooperation, grazing bylaws, and their interaction is uncorrelated with potential outcomes.

However, such clean experimental data may be difficult to obtain because it is impossible to form groups exogenously and then randomly assign bylaws to some but not the others outside the lab. Therefore, researchers often have to deal with observational data which is prone to omitted variables bias – groups with higher levels of conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws differ from the rest in many observable and unobservable dimensions. One way to alleviate this concern is to use instrumental variables strategy. However finding instruments that affect only conditional cooperation and not grazing bylaws (and vice versa) is very difficult because the exclusion restriction is unlikely to hold.

In the face of these limitations, I combine a number of identification strategies to mitigate this concern. As the thought experiment described above lays out, for these effects to be interpreted as causal, we need exogenous formation of groups and random assignment of grazing bylaws. Historical records by eminent historians concur that the

Arsi Oromo formed clan-based settlements in the historical past (Pankhurst 1998). From the survey data on the clan of each household in the study area, I see that 85 percent of the people still reside in their ancestral clan homeland. Therefore, I can use clan fixed effects to absorb pre-existing clan specific differences. In addition, the groups today are part of a larger administrative unit called *kebele*, which is synonymous with a village. To ensure that the interaction term is not picking up village specific differences, I also include village fixed effects. Thus, the combination of clan and village fixed effects allows me to mitigate the concern over omitted variables bias from non-random formation of groups.

It is plausible that groups with different levels of conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws differ in their pre-program forest outcomes. I show in Table 2 that this is not the case. The mature tree count is uncorrelated with conditional cooperation, grazing bylaws, as well as their interaction term. The coefficients are not only very small in magnitude but are also individually as well as jointly statistically insignificant. Moreover, since the specification in equation 2 controls for the mature tree count, the omitted variables bias must come from sources that affect young tree count independently of mature trees. To gauge the scope of some of these factors, I show in Table 2 that other proxies of forest condition, such as forest area per person, forest area per cattle, and the importance of forest in the livelihood of group members is uncorrelated with conditional cooperation, grazing bylaws, and their interaction term.

Rustagi (2020) shows that the variation in conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws is largely due to the distance of groups from local markets. Therefore, I account for market distance in all these regressions. Conditional on the inclusion of pre-existing differences, market distance, and other relevant controls, it is likely that the variation in conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws across groups is idiosyncratic.

Another possibility is that groups with higher levels of conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws experienced in the assessment year favourable weather conditions resulting in better forest outcomes. I doubt that this was the case, as the groups cover a small geographical area and experience very similar weather shocks. Nonetheless, to alleviate this concern, I use data from the second assessment to test whether the results still persist over time.

Finally, I conduct novel sensitivity analyses and falsification tests which tighten the scope of omitted variables. Studies in ecology suggest that livestock grazing affects primarily the frequency of young broadleaf trees, but it has no consequences for young coniferous trees as these are unpalatable to livestock (Regassa 2003, Tesfaye et al. 2002). Therefore, I expect the interaction term to have a bearing only on the count of young broadleaf trees but not young coniferous trees. In addition, since livestock browsing cannot take mature broadleaf and mature coniferous trees from the forest, the interaction term should have no bearing on the count of mature trees of either type. Finally, ecological studies find that one particular tree species called *Hagenia abbysinica* is particularly prone to live-

stock browsing because of the nutritive value of its leaves (Amente 2005). Consequently, I test whether the interaction term matters for the survival of young trees of this species, without affecting the mature ones. Together, for these effects to be driven by bias, the omitted variables must be correlated with factors affecting specifically the count of young Hagenia trees, which besides the grazing ban, seem very unlikely.

V. Results

Table 3 presents the main results. Since conditional cooperation, grazing bylaws and their interaction term are measured on different scales, I standardize these variables using z-scores to make the coefficients comparable. Column 1 is without any controls and shows that the coefficients on conditional cooperation (CC) and bylaws alone (GB) are small in magnitude and also individually as well as jointly statistically insignificant (see p-value = 0.35). However, the coefficient on the interaction term (CC*GB) is large in magnitude and statistically significant at the 5-percent level. According to this estimate, one standard deviation increase in the interaction term increases marginally young tree count by 21 trees, which is a large economic effect. Moreover, the three variables explain 50 percent of the variation in the outcome.

In column 2, I account for the pre-program outcome, measured as the number of mature trees per hectare. It enters with a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Nonetheless, the coefficient on the interaction term remains stable in magnitude and significance. This is expected, for in Table 2 we saw that the interaction term is uncorrelated with the mature tree count. In column 3, I introduce control variables including proxies of geography, economic heterogeneity, social heterogeneity, and the timing of program launch. This does not lead to any major changes in the coefficient on the interaction term, which is now significant at the 1-percent level. In column 4, when I additionally introduce a vector of clan and village fixed effects, the coefficient on the interaction term rises in magnitude to 29 trees and remains significant at the 1-percent level.

One concern could be that these estimates do not account for non-linearity, so I also report estimates using the interaction between indicators variables for conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws (see section III. D) in column 5. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 1-percent level. Its magnitude is similar to previous estimates and suggest that in groups with both higher levels of conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws, the young trees count is higher by 25 trees, which is economically very large.[10] The results from quantile regressions are very similar to their OLS counterparts and fall within the confidence interval of the OLS estimates. This could be because in most groups conditional cooperation does not exceed 0.8, and

[10]These estimates are robust to dropping one group at a time and controlling for other variables, such as Gini of land and leader type (results available upon request).

the mean and the median are also very similar.

Another concern discussed above is that these effects are due to some weather shocks that positively impacted groups with higher conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws, but negatively the remaining groups. To counteract this concern, I show in columns 6-7 that these effects hold even when I consider the second forest management outcome which is available only for slightly over one-half of the groups in the sample. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients obtained either using the continuous measures of conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws (column 6) or indicator variables (column 7) leads to estimates that are similar to those obtained from the first assessment.

In contrast the coefficient on conditional cooperation alone and grazing bylaws alone are mostly negative, small in magnitude, and statistically insignificant. One reason behind the negative coefficient on grazing bylaws is that when such bylaws exist but are not enforced it might lead to more frustration than otherwise, resulting in even more negative outcomes.

V.A. Sensitivity Analysis and Falsification Tests

The above results suggest a robust effect of the interaction term between conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws on forest management outcome. Nonetheless, it is plausible that these effects are capturing the effect of some omitted variables. To mitigate this concern, I combine sensitivity analysis with falsification tests to ensure that these effects are not spurious and that they arise due to the interaction of conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws.

For this purpose, I use a new dataset obtained from the forest commons management program office for 38 of the 51 groups.[11] The dataset contains the distribution of young and mature trees in the forest from 12 different species. These species are classified into two divisions based on the diameter that can be attained at maturity.

Division I tree species. – are those that attain a diameter at breast height (DBH) of < 40 cm at maturity. This includes seven species *Juniperus excelsa, Podocarpus falcatus Hagenia abyssinica, Ekebergia capensis, Scheffleria abyssinica, Olea europea africana, and Mytenus species*. These species are further organized into two sub-divisions, those that are "very young" (DBH of < 20 cm) and those that are intermediate ($20<$DBH<40).

Division II tree Species. – are those that attain a DBH of < 25 cm at maturity. This includes five tree species *Hypericum lanceolatum, Rapanea melanphloeos, Nuxia congesta, Buddleya polystachia, Erica arborea, Pittosporum viridiflorum, and others.* The trees from this division are not organized into further sub-divisions.

[11] I verify that the main results hold when I use a sample of these 38 groups. In this case, the coefficient on the interaction term is 27.128, s.e. 11.234.

Altogether, there are 19 observations per group: 14 from Division I species (seven each from the two sub-divisions) and 5 from Division II species.

To conduct sensitivity analysis and falsification tests, I use the following OLS specification:

$$y_{idgv} = \alpha_0 + \beta CC_{idgv} + \gamma GB_{idgv} + \delta(CC * GB)_{idgv} + \mathbf{X}_{idgv}\lambda + \omega_d + \theta_c + \eta_v + \epsilon_{idgv}, \quad (3)$$

where y_{icg} is number of young trees of species i, from division d, in forest common managed by group g, located in village v. As before, CC is the average propensity to cooperate conditionally in a group, GB is the number of months grazing is forbidden inside the forest, and $CC * GB$ is the interaction between the two. X is a vector of control variables listed in equation 1. ω_d is a fixed effect for the tree division, θ_c is a fixed effect for the dominant clan in the group, η_v is a fixed effect for the village in which the group is located, and ϵ_v is an error term.

In the Afromontane ecosystem of the Bale Mountains, the forest comprises of broadleaf and coniferous trees. Since cattle browse on young broadleaf tree species, it can have severe consequences on their abundance inside the forest. Thus in groups with both higher levels of conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws, the frequency of young broadleaf tree species is expected to be higher. In contrast, there should not be any effect on the count of young coniferous tree species, as these are not susceptible to browsing by cattle. Furthermore, since cattle cannot damage mature trees from browsing, there should be no effect of the interaction term on mature trees of either the broadleaf or the coniferous type.

Figure 2 displays these patterns after controlling for altitude, which is crucial for specific specific distribution of trees. The interaction term has no effect on mature broadleaf trees, mature coniferous trees, and young coniferous trees. However, it has a positive effect only on the distribution of young broadleaf trees, which is also significant at the 5-percent level.

Table 4 confirms these results after controlling for relevant covariates from Table 1. As before, the coefficients are standardized. I start by showing in columns 1-2 that there is indeed no effect of the interaction term on mature broadleaf or mature coniferous trees. The coefficient on the interaction term is not only small in magnitude but it is also statistically insignificant. These results suggest that for the bias to arise, the omitted variable(s) must be correlated with the count of young and not mature trees. To alleviate this concern, I conduct a within young tree analyses. Column 3 shows that the interaction term is positively and significantly associated with the count of young broadleaf trees. Specifically, one standard deviation increase in the interaction term increases young broadleaf tree count, on average, by 1.38 tree per species per hectare. This is a large effect given that the mean count is 2.99 young broadleaf trees per hectare. Since there

are 19 types of young broadleaf trees (5 young ones of Division 1, 5 intermediate ones of Division I, and 5 young ones of Division II), the mean over all tree species is 21 trees per hectare (1.38 * 15). In contrast, the interaction term has no effect on the count of young coniferous trees. The coefficient is not only small in magnitude relative to its mean of 8.28 but it is also statistically insignificant. Also, since there are only four types of coniferous trees (2 young ones of Division I and 2 intermediate ones of Division I), this estimate is not economically significant. These findings therefore suggest that for the results to be spurious, the omitted variable must be correlated with broadleaf tree species, which seems implausible.




Figure 2: Distribution of Mature and Young Broadleaf and Coniferous Trees, Conditional Cooperation, Grazing Bylaws, and their Interaction Term

Notes: CC stands for conditional cooperation, GB stands for grazing bylaws, and CC*GB stands for the interaction between the these two variables. The upper panel displays results for mature trees, whereas the lower panel does this for young trees. The left panel displays results for broadleaf trees and the right panel for coniferous trees.

To mitigate the scope of omitted variables even further, I consider within broadleaf tree analysis. Ecological studies show that one broadleaf tree species – *Hagenia abyssinica* – is particularly vulnerable to livestock browsing because of the nutritive value of its leaves (Amente 2005, Regassa 2003, Tefaye et al. 2002). Consequently, in groups where grazing bylaws are enforced the count of young Hagenia is expected to be higher but that

of mature Hagenia should remain unaffected. I perform this test in Table 5. Column 1 shows that the interaction term has a large positive effect on the count of young Hagenia trees and is also statistically significant at the 5 percent level. One standard deviation increase in the value of the interaction term increases the marginal count of young Hagenia trees by 0.5 per hectare, which is very large given the mean count is 0.75 per hectare. As before, since there is young and intermediate Hagenia, the estimates imply that there is one young Hagenia tree per hectare. In contrast, no effect is observed for mature Hagenia.

Overall, these effects confirm that the interaction effects are unlikely to be spurious, for now the omitted variable has to affect not only young and mature trees differently, but also broadleaf and coniferous trees. In addition, it must affect young and mature of the same species (Hagenia) differently, which seems highly unlikely.

VI. Plausible Channels

The above findings raise an important question: why do conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws matter for commons management success only when they are present together in groups? Theory suggests that this is because:

(a) It is easier for group members to define acts of grazing violation and also target punishment towards those who violate bylaws. Since the enforcement of grazing bylaws is through decentralized monitoring and punishment of free riders, it is expected to be stronger in groups with higher level of conditional cooperation;

(b) Enforcement generates strong incentives for free riders to cooperate, resulting in upholding the beliefs of conditional cooperators that others will not defect on their cooperation;

(c) Conditional cooperators cooperate only if the expect others to do the same. Thus, having optimistic beliefs results in higher contribution levels.

I provide evidence in support of these channels using individual level survey and behavioral data on (i) enforcement of bylaws through time spent monitoring the forest, (ii) likelihood that free riders will be punished, (iii) belief that the violation of grazing bylaws is infrequent, (iv) beliefs about contribution by the other player in the public goods game, and (v) association between beliefs and contribution. The difference in these outcomes across individuals who behave as conditional cooperators but come from groups with or without grazing bylaws is expected to be positive. Specifically, I test for

$$E[y|GR = 1, CC = 1, X] > E[y|GR = 0, CC = 1, X], \tag{4}$$

where y is one of the outcomes described above. This constitutes a powerful test, as it allows me to compare outcomes across conditional cooperators with and without grazing bylaws while holding the behavioral type of an individual fixed. An individual

is categorized as a conditional cooperator if the Spearman correlation is significant at p-value ≤ 0.05 (see Fischbacher et al. 2001, Fischbacher and Gaechter 2010).

Table 5 reports the results using the extensive margin of grazing bylaws in panel A and the intensive margin in Panel B. In column 1, the dependent variable is time spent monitoring the forest in a month (hours). The coefficient on grazing bylaws is positive and highly significant at the 1-percent level. The magnitude of the coefficient implies that conditional cooperators from groups with grazing bylaws spent twice as many hours monitoring their forest that conditional cooperators from groups without bylaws. Column 2 shows that the effect of this increased monitoring is the higher likelihood that free riders will be punished. In groups with grazing bylaws, this likelihood is 100 percentage points higher than in groups without grazing bylaws.

Columns 3 shows that in response to higher monitoring and punishment likelihood of free riders, conditional cooperators from groups with grazing bylaws hold optimistic beliefs and think that activities that contribute towards deforestation are uncommon. The coefficient on grazing bylaws is positive and statistically significant at the 1-percent level. The magnitude of the coefficient in panel A is 0.36, which is 60 percentage points higher than the baseline and implies that 97 percent of conditional cooperators from groups with grazing bylaws perceive activities resulting in deforestation to be uncommon. In column 4, I use data from behavioral experiment on beliefs about the contribution by the other player in the unconditional decision. The coefficient on grazing bylaws is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in panel A and 1 percent level in panel B. The magnitude of the coefficient in panel A implies that conditional cooperators from groups with grazing bylaws have higher beliefs over others' contribution by nearly 20 percentage points than conditional cooperators from groups without grazing bylaws.

In Table 7, I further show that there is a strong positive association between beliefs and contribution in the public goods game, which is also statistically significant. This confirms that conditional cooperators with optimistic beliefs contribute significantly more than conditional cooperators with pessimistic beliefs. Together, these results explain why the interaction between conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws leads to better forest management outcomes.

VII. Conclusions

Many field studies have demonstrated the importance of rules and civic cooperation in the management of commons. However, we know little about how the interaction between these two forces affects commons management outcomes. Though theoretical and laboratory findings suggest these factors to reinforce each other, field evidence is missing.

I attempt to fill this gap using the context of forest commons management program in Ethiopia, which was launched to arrest deforestation arising from livestock browsing.

Under the program groups were offered secure property rights to manage their forest as a common property forest and an external group level punishment was put in place for poor performance, measured as the number of young surviving trees. I focus on grazing bylaws which forbid members from grazing their livestock inside the forest for certain months in a year to allow young trees to grow. To measure civic values, I focus on conditional cooperation, defined as the propensity to cooperate provided others do the same. It is measured using a behavioral experiment which precludes confounding motives and beliefs from playing a role.

In line with the theory, I show that best forest management outcomes are observed in groups with both higher levels of conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws. In contrast, groups with higher levels of conditional cooperation or grazing bylaws alone do not perform better than groups with lower levels of both of these. These results are robust to accounting for pre-existing differences in forest condition across groups, clan fixed effects, and village fixed effects. Moreover, the effects persist over time. Further sensitivity analyses together with falsification tests show that the effect is observed only for young trees that are prone to browsing damage but no effect is observed for mature trees that are not prone to browsing. Within young trees, the effects hold only for broadleaf trees that the livestock browse upon, but not for coniferous trees that are unpalatable to livestock. Within young broadleaf trees, the largest effects are observed for the species that is most palatable to livestock.

Finally, I use survey and experimental data to shed some light on the mechanisms. I find that in groups with grazing bylaws, conditional cooperators spent much more time monitoring their forest and expect free riders to be punished. As a consequence, they also hold optimistic belief about the behavior of others in both the survey and the experiment. Lastly, beliefs are positively associated with cooperation behavior in the experiment.

These findings have important policy implications. Since decentralized management of commons and public goods is likely to be successful in groups with both conditional cooperation and policies targeting resource use, the program agencies may offer together with property rights and punishment, policies targeting resource use. This might help in upholding the beliefs of conditional cooperators that others will not defect on their contribution. Future studies might consider testing this in the context of randomized field experiments.

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Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.
	A: Forest Outcome	
Young trees per hectare	66.792	34.611
Mature trees per hectare	54.883	19.887
	B: Main Variables	
Conditional cooperation	0.495	0.276
Months grazing is forbidden	1.471	1.701
Interaction term	0.958	1.187
	C: Control Variables	
High altitude forest	0.112	0.229
Plantation forest	0.067	0.332
Border with outsiders	0.608	0.493
Market distance	2.631	0.949
Gini cattle ownership	0.337	0.081
Female share	0.200	0.114
Settlement fragmentation	0.550	0.182
Clan heterogeneity	0.393	0.234
Duration (months)	22.922	19.913
Group size	26.451	4.553

Notes: Young tree count is the number of young trees in a hectare of group managed forest. Mature tree count is the number of mature trees in a hectare of group managed forest. Conditional cooperation is the Spearman rho in the conditional decision of the public goods game. Months grazing is forbidden is the number of months in a year group members are forbidden to graze their livestock inside the forest. Interaction term is the interaction between conditional cooperation and months grazing is forbidden. High altitude forest is the share of total forest managed by the group that is above 3100m. Plantation forest is the share of group managed forest that is planted and not natural. Border with outsiders is an indicator variable that equals 1 if groups share a border with outsiders (groups that are not under the program). Market distance is the number of hours on foot weighted by equine ownership to the nearest market (one-way only). Female share is the share of females who are officially registered as group members. Settlement fragmentation and clan heterogeneity are measured using Herfindahl index. The index varies from 0 to 1 and measures the probability that two persons selected randomly from a group will not be from the same settlement / clan. Gini of cattle ownership is the Gini coefficient of cattle wealth. Duration is the number of months a group has been under the forest management program. Group size is the number of households registered officially as members. The number of observations is 51.

Table 2: Pre-existing Differences
and the Interaction of Conditional Cooperation and Grazing Bylaws

	Pre-Program outcome	Forest area per person	Forest area per cattle	Forest importance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
CC	-0.681	0.075	-2.566	-0.051
	(3.572)	(0.419)	(5.697)	(0.044)
GB	-3.000	-0.281	0.821	-0.070
	(6.503)	(0.423)	(7.216)	(0.158)
CC*GB	2.141	0.015	-1.626	0.047
	(8.120)	(0.619)	(9.334)	(0.170)
Constant	54.883	2.748	41.484	1.596
	(2.864)	(0.260)	(3.171)	(0.040)
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.05
p-value	0.35	0.77	0.68	0.49
Obs	51	51	51	51

Notes: OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. CC stands for conditional cooperation, GB for grazing bylaws and CC*GB for the interaction between these two variables. The coefficients are comparable to each other as the variables are standardized. In column 1, pre-program performance is measured as the number of mature trees per hectare. In column 2, forest area per person is the forest area in hectares per person in a group. In column 3, forest area per cattle is the forest area in hectares per cattle. In column 4, forest importance is the average of individual responses on the importance of forest in livelihood on a scale of 1-3, where 1 means no importance, 2 means medium importance, and 3 means high importance. CC stands for average propensity for conditional cooperation in a group, GB stands for grazing bylaws, and CC * GB is the interaction between these two variables. The p-value is of the joint significance of CC, GB, and CC*GB.

Table 3: Forest Management Outcome
and the Interaction of Conditional Cooperation and Grazing Bylaws

	Dependent variable: Young trees per hectare						
	2005					2012-13	
	No controls	Pre-program outcome	Control variables	Fixed effects	Indicator variables	Control variables	Indicator variables
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
CC	−2.803	−2.452	−2.517	−1.926	−4.717	−3.586	−2.463
	(4.200)	(2.766)	(2.717)	(3.303)	(5.737)	(6.181)	(9.494)
GB	5.044	6.587	−13.433	−21.900	−7.349	−15.368	−13.393
	(7.382)	(7.064)	(7.970)	(10.874)	(13.879)	(7.929)	(9.720)
CC*GB	21.103	20.002	22.115	29.497	25.474	24.058	26.794
	(8.277)	(7.909)	(7.656)	(9.636)	(12.526)	(8.727)	(10.103)
Constant	66.792	38.562	64.355	35.783	67.062	75.202	97.578
	(3.550)	(10.811)	(23.854)	(29.133)	(30.720)	(17.259)	(14.358)
R^2	0.50	0.58	0.86	0.87	0.85	0.91	0.92
p-value	0.52	0.35	0.24	0.14	0.68	0.03	0.36
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Obs	51	51	51	51	51	27	27

Notes: OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients are comparable to each other as the variables are standardized. The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the young tree count in 2005, whereas in columns 6-7 is the young tree count in 2012-13. The data from the second assessment are available for 27 groups only. Column 1 is without any controls, column 2 controls only for the pre-program performance, column 3 includes all controls in the panel C of table 1, column 4 includes fixed effects for clan and village, column 5 reproduces results using the indicator variables for conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws. Column 6 uses continuous measures of conditional cooperation and grazing bylaws, whereas column 7 uses their indicators variables. The p-value is of the joint significance of CC and Grazing Bylaws. Control variables include pre-program outcome, high altitude forest, plantation forest, border with outsiders, market distance, Gini of cattle ownership, female share, settlement fragmentation, clan heterogeneity, duration under the program, and group size. In columns 6-7, because of the small sample size I include only a selective list of control variables including pre-program performance, high altitude forest, market distance, Gini of cattle ownership, settlement fragmentation, and duration under the program.

Table 4: Falsification test: Comparing Mature and Young Trees Across Broadleaf and Coniferous Tree Types

	Mature Trees		Young Trees	
	Broadleaf	Coniferous	Broadleaf	Coniferous
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
CC	1.305	1.505	−0.452	0.160
	(1.449)	(1.375)	(0.191)	(0.926)
GB	4.677	−1.225	−0.213	−1.383
	(3.912)	(3.674)	(0.551)	(2.179)
CC*GB	−3.194	1.525	1.382	0.859
	(3.660)	(3.312)	(0.370)	(1.983)
Constant	49.949	−19.151	−3.477	52.569
	(37.062)	(22.728)	(4.635)	(15.610)
R^2	0.06	0.16	0.28	0.26
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	380	76	570	152
Mean	4.21	13.55	2.99	8.28

Notes: OLS estimates with robust standard errors clustered on the group in parentheses. CC stands for conditional cooperation, GB for grazing bylaws and CC*GB for the interaction between these two variables. The coefficients are comparable to each other as the variables are standardized. In columns 1-2, the dependent variables are number of mature broadleaf and mature coniferous trees per species per hectare, respectively. In columns 3-4, the dependent variables are number of young broadleaf and young coniferous trees per species per hectare, respectively. Control variables include altitude, border with outsiders, market distance, Gini of cattle ownership, female share, settlement fragmentation, clan heterogeneity, duration, group site. Fixed effects include indicator for Division II species and for villages.

Table 5: Falsification test: Hagenia abyssinica
Young vs. Mature Trees

	Young Hagenia	Mature Hagenia
	(1)	(2)
CC	-0.078	-0.336
	(0.095)	(0.637)
GB	-0.102	0.439
	(0.252)	(1.919)
CC*GB	0.507	1.688
	(0.228)	(1.558)
Constant	-2.665	-14.869
	(1.873)	(14.248)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Obs	76	38
Mean	0.75	4.37

Notes: OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. In column 1 the standard errors are clustered on the group. CC stands for conditional cooperation, GB stands for Grazing Bylaws, and CC*GB is the interaction between these variables. The dependent variable in column 1 is the average number of young Hagenia trees per hectare of commons managed forest, whereas in column 2 it is the average number of mature Hagenia trees per hectare. Control variables include altitude, border with outsiders, market distance, Gini of cattle ownership, female share, settlement fragmentation, clan heterogeneity, duration, group site. Fixed effects include indicator for Division II species and for villages.

Table 6: Mechanisms: Monitoring, Punishment, and Beliefs about the Behavior of Others

	Time spent (monitoring) (1)	Punishment likelihood (2)	Belief survey (3)	Belief experiment (4)
	Panel A. Extensive margin (Indicator variable)			
Grazing Bylaw	19.075	0.463	-0.359	0.530
	(2.663)	(0.108)	(0.123)	(0.280)
R^2	0.40	0.38	0.14	0.05
	Panel B. Intensive margin (number of months)			
Grazing Bylaw	4.977	0.123	-0.126	0.164
	(0.947)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.078)
R^2	0.33	0.35	0.19	0.06
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	221	221	220	288
Control mean	21.66	0.47	0.76	2.62

Notes: OLS estimates with robust standard errors clustered on the group in parentheses. Panel A reports estimates using an indicator variable for grazing bylaws, where '1' means present and '0' means absent. Panel B reports estimates using the number of months grazing is forbidden. The dependent variables are as follows: In column 1, it is number of hours spent monitoring the forest in a month; In column 2, it the perceived likelihood that free riders will be punished (1= yes, otherwise, 0); In column 3, it is the belief that there are fewer activities resulting in deforestation (1= yes, 0 = no); In column 4, it is the belief about the contribution by the other player in the public goods game. Control variables include age, education, gender, land wealth, livestock wealth, position in the group. The sample includes only those individuals who are classified as conditional cooperator. The sample size is smaller in column 1-3 because not every player was interviewed using a detailed household survey.

Table 7: Contribution and Beliefs in the Public Goods Game

	Dependent variable: Contribution	
	No controls (1)	Controls (2)
Belief	0.336	0.356
	(0.080)	(0.085)
R^2	0.14	0.22
Controls	Yes	Yes
Obs	335	288
Control group mean	2.179	2.179

Notes: OLS with robust standard errors clustered on the group in parentheses. Data on contribution and belief are in Ethiopain Birr from the unconditional decision of the public goods game. Control variables include age, education, gender, land wealth, livestock wealth, position in the group. The sample includes only those individuals who are classified as conditional cooperator.