Regina Seibel

Personal Information

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Place | Date of Birth:	Sakar Chage, Turkmenistan | April 11, 1991
Citizenship:	German

Education

08/2017-now	PhD candidate in Economics, **University of Zurich** 1st PhD Advisor: Armin Schmutzler, Professor of Economics 2nd PhD Advisor: Gregory Crawford, Professor of Economics
10/2015-07/2017	M.Sc. in Economics, **Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU)**, Munich Final grade: 1.22 *(very good)*
08/2016-12/2016	Exchange Semester, **University of California**, Berkeley Average grade: A
10/2013-07/2016	B.Sc. in Economics, **LMU**, Munich Final grade: 1.23 *(very good)*
10/2011-09/2015	B.Sc. in Business Administration, **LMU**, Munich Final grade: 1.40 *(very good)*
02/2014-07/2014	Exchange Semester, **Monash University**, Melbourne Average grade: B

Research Interests

Competition Policy, Industrial Organization, Innovation, Collusion, Auctions.

The new challenges for competition policy we face with the rise of Big Tech Companies like Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon are fascinating to me. Therefore, finding the right tools to evaluate and regulate large companies which abuse their market power and thereby harm consumers lies at the heart of my research agenda. Currently, I am at the very early stages of a project which analyzes how Amazon's use of seller data may harm consumers and which policies could be an effective tool to alleviate or even abolish those harms.

Work in Progress

Collusion by Exclusion in Electronic Public Procurement *(with Samuel Skoda)*
Bid rigging by groups of firms is perceived as a major threat to an efficient and competitive procurement process. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that design of a procurement auction may facilitate collusion. One design element where variation is observed in practice, but which is not analyzed by the collusion literature, is whether only a restricted number of bidders is allowed to participate in a tender, referred to as pre-selection. We show, theoretically as well as empirically, how pre-selection may facilitate bid-rigging, increase collusive gains, and thereby increase public procurement costs, which harms taxpayers and users of public services more generally.

Working Papers

Killer Acquisitions and Beyond: Policy Effects on Innovation Strategies
(with Igor Letina & Armin Schmutzler)
This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups. We show that prohibiting killer acquisitions strictly reduces the variety of innovation projects. By contrast, we find that prohibiting other acquisitions only has a weakly negative innovation effect, and we provide conditions under which the effect is zero. Furthermore, for both killer and other acquisitions, we identify market conditions under which the innovation effect is small, so that prohibiting acquisitions to enhance competition would be justified.

Inconsistent Time Preferences and On-the-job Search – When it Pays to be Naïve
(with Matthias Fahn)
We study optimal employment contracts for present-biased employees who can conduct on-the-job search. Presuming that firms cannot offer long-term contracts, we find that individuals who are naive about their present bias will actually be better off than sophisticated or time-consistent individuals. They also search more, which partially counteracts the inefficiencies caused by their present bias. Moreover, firms might benefit from being ignorant of the extent of an employee's naiveté. Our results also indicate that naive employees might be harmed by policies such as a minimum wage, whereas sophisticated employees are (weakly) better off.

Invited Talks and Conference Presentations

2020 JKU Linz (Economics Research Seminar), EEA Virtual Conference 2020, LMU (Innovation Brown Bag)

Teaching

Fall 2019 & 2020 TA for Microeconomics for Research Students Part I *(1st year PhD)*
Sep 2018 - 2020 TA for Math Camp: Probability Theory *(1st year PhD)*
Fall 2018 - 2020 TA for Advanced Industrial Organization and Competition Policy *(Graduate Seminar)*

Fellowships and Awards

10/2017	**Alumni-Award for Young Economists** Awarded by the Department of Economics, LMU, to the top three master's graduates in each cohort
10/2013-07/2017	**Fellowship from the Max Weber-Program** Foundation of the State of Bavaria for the support of highly-gifted students
09/2012-07/2017	**Fellowship from the German National Merit Foundation** Foundation for the financial and intellectual support of high-achieving students funded by the German government (Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes)
04/2012-09/2012	**Deutschlandstipendium at LMU** Fellowship awarded from LMU in partnership with the Federal Ministry of Education and Research

Work and Research Experience

09/2018-05/2019	Research Assistant for Pietro Biroli, University of Zurich
02/2017-06/2017	Student Assistant at the Chair for Organizational Economics Prof. Florian Englmaier, LMU Munich
12/2015-07/2016	Student Assistant at the Seminar for Comparative Economics, Prof. Monika Schnitzer, LMU Munich
08/2014-12/2014	Intern at TNS Infratest, a market research company, Munich
03/2013-05/2013	Student Assistant at Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, a research organization, Munich

Programming Skills

STATA, R, Matlab, Python

Languages

English:	Fluent
German:	Mother tongue
French:	Very good command
Russian:	Very good command

References

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Gregory Crawford	+41 44 634 37 99	gregory.crawford@econ.uzh.ch