# NBER Economics of Digitization Tutorial Application

**Contact Information**
Aviv Caspi
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Economics
Cornell University
amc579@cornell.edu
(425) 894-8060
sites.google.com/view/avivcaspi

**Committee Members**
Kaushik Basu, Cornell University
Ted O'Donoghue, Cornell University
Alex Rees-Jones, University of Pennsylvania

**Graduate Study**
I started pursuing a PhD in the Cornell University economics department in 2017 and am currently in my fourth year. I primarily study public and behavioral economics, with some applications to legal contexts. In addition to the first-year microeconomics, macroeconomics, and econometrics sequences, I have taken the following field courses at Cornell: Public Economics, Behavioral Economics I & II, Mechanism Design, Political Economy, Law & Economics, and Resource Economics.

**Research Interests**
My research agenda lies in the intersection of behavioral economics, institutional actors, and public policy. I have not settled on a dissertation topic yet, but am generally interested in studying how behavioral biases impact optimal design of policies and institutions. My existing projects do this type of inquiry in settings spanning from using natural language processing to study levels of transparency in the US Senate, using a field experiment to study privacy regulatory frameworks in mobile applications, and using novel observational data to study videoconferencing meeting design.

**Current Projects**
1. "Preferences for ad targeting" *with Joy Wu.*
   Description: We study consumers choices to be targeted with mobile ads based on their location. We are conducting a field experiment with a mobile ad targeting company, exploiting new iOS requirements to elicit consumer consent before sharing location with third parties for targeting purposes. Planned treatments include standard behavioral framings, price incentives, and attention manipulations. The experiment will be conducted early 2021.

2. "Punctuality and coordination failures in the remote workplace."
   Abstract: I study the costs of coordination failures in meetings using a novel dataset tracking 1.2 million videoconference meetings. Participants spend a significant amount of time waiting for others to arrive, although this wait time is reduced for smaller, shorter meetings. Despite the existence of substantial wait time costs, I find some evidence for the development of norms that lead to lower coordination failures than the distributions of arrival times suggest. First-time users are more likely to join meetings on time, but converge to a pattern of later arrivals. I discuss implications for a time of many new videoconferencing users.

3. "Observability and Reasoned Discourse: Evidence from the U.S. Senate" *with Jed Stiglitz*.
   Abstract: Many private and public institutions depend on reasoned discourse to reach decisions. Before collective action, before voting, tends to come reasoned discourse, at least in aspiration. Reformers commonly call for increases in the transparency of collective decision-making, lobbying for instance for the Supreme Court to televise proceedings. Here, we examine reasoned discourse in one important public body, the U.S. Senate, and study how increasing transparency through the introduction of C-SPAN changed legislative discourse. We find that the introduction of C-SPAN encouraged member discourse to herd with co-partisans and to anti-herd with cross-partisans; it also appears to have led to the restructuring of Senate time to facilitate performative speech. Suggesting the information problems and career incentives at play, these herding and anti-herding effects seem strongest for those closest to an election and for those with less sophisticated constituencies.