September 6, 2020

Dear Organizers of NBER Graduate Student Workshop on Business Income Taxation:

I, Atsushi Yamagishi, would like to apply for NBER Graduate Student Workshop on Business Income Taxation on October 1, 2020. The attached curriculum vitae lists all Ph.D. courses I have taken and the one-page essay describes my research interests in corporate tax competition. I hope that these documents prove my qualification and strong interests in attending this workshop. The recommendation letter written by Professor Owen Zidar (Princeton) will be submitted separately.

Thank you very much for your consideration, I am looking forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,

Atsushi Yamagishi
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Recommendation letter writer: Professor Owen Zidar.

Atsushi YAMAGISHI

September 2020

Princeton University
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EDUCATION

Princeton University.
Ph.D. Student in Economics, August, 2019–ongoing.

The University of Tokyo.
Doctoral Study in Economics, April, 2018– July 2019.
M.A. in Economics, March 2018.
B.A. in Economics, March 2016.

RESEARCH FIELDS

Primary: Public Economics, Urban and Regional Economics
Secondary: Political Economics, Labor Economics

A LIST OF ALL CURRENT AND COMPLETED PH.D. COURSES

Princeton University.
Microeconomics 1, 2.
Macroeconomics 1, 2.
Econometric Theory 1, 2.
Game Theory.
Public Finance 1 (completed, but currently re-taking the same class taught by another instructor)
International Trade 1 (ongoing)
Industrial Organization and Public Policy 1 (ongoing)
Empirical Approaches in Microeconomics: Program Evaluation and Research Design (ongoing)

The University of Tokyo.
Microeconomics 1, 2.
Macroeconomics 1, 2.
Econometrics 1, 2.
Mathematics 1, 2.
Mathematics for Economists.
The Young Economists' Toolkit: Writing and Presenting Your Work.
Empirical Public Finance 1, 2.
Tax Competition Theory.
Economic Analysis of Public Sector (public policy school class)
Beyond GDP: Welfare and Fairness
Regional Economics.
Urban Economics (x2).
Politics in Urban Economics.
Labor Economics.
Empirical Methods in Labor Economics.
Empirical Methods and Program Evaluation in Labor Market.
Economics of Education.
Advanced Development Economics 1.
Oligopoly Theory (x3).
Search Theory.

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Minimum Wage Competition. 2020.
Forthcoming, *International Tax and Public Finance.* (with Koichi Fukumura).

Transboundary Pollution, Tax Competition, and the Efficiency of Uncoordinated Environmental Regulation. 2019.
Canadian Journal of Economics, 52(3), 1165-1194.

A Negative Effect of Cost-Reducing Public Investment : The Role of Firms' Entry. 2019.
Economic Record, 95, 81–89. (with Toshihiro Matsumura)

Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders. 2017.
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 52(1), 63-76. (with Toshihiro Matsumura)

Long-Run Welfare Effect of Energy Conservation Regulation. 2017.
Economics Letters, 154, 64-68. (with Toshihiro Matsumura)

Consumers' Misevaluation and Public Promotion. 2016.
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 16(4).

WORKING PAPERS

School Bullying Increases Support for Redistribution in Adulthood. 2020.
Available at SSRN. Revision requested by *Economics of Education Review.*

Minimum Wages and Housing Rents: Theory and Evidence. 2018. Revision requested by *Regional Science and Urban Economics.*
Available at SSRN.

Contagion of Populist Extremism. 2019. Revision requested by *Journal of Public Economics.*
ISER Discussion Paper 1077. (with Daiki Kishishita)

Do Supermajority Rules Really Deter Extremism? The Role of Electoral Competition. 2018.
Available at SSRN. (with Daiki Kishishita)

September 6, 2020

Atsushi Yamagishi (Princeton University)

I am interested in understanding the consequences of tax competition between local governments or countries. The first time I got interested in this issue was when I was a high school student in Japan. At that time, Japanese government introduced a policy (*"furusato-nou-zei"*) that allows local government to compete for personal income tax revenues. This policy does not allow each local jurisdiction to manipulate its tax rate, but the policy allows local governments to offer "something fancy" as a gratuity for taxpayers. As a result, local governments started offering beef (*wagyu*), organic vegetables, and even computers and amazon gift cards. As a high school student I had no clear understanding about what such intergovernmental competition would imply for the society, but the phenomenon seemed very interesting.

As I study economics, I learned that at a much larger scale, countries might compete over tax bases by cutting down income or corporate tax burdens. Since then I think deepening our understanding on tax competition is important because it might have a huge consequence on each country's tax revenues and welfare. In my masters' study at the University of Tokyo, I wrote an applied theory paper analyzing the interaction of capital tax competition and competition in environmental standards. The paper reveals that although in a special case, capital tax competition might allow each government to internalize externalities in setting environmental standards and the efficiency is achieved. I also characterize in what situations the environmental standard becomes too loose or too strict. This paper is published in *Canadian Journal of Economics*.

While I still believe that such a theoretical approach can be illuminating, I now feel the strong necessity to combine empirical and theoretical approaches to better understand tax competition. In particular, I think it would be quite valuable to quantitatively gauge the cost of tax competition. Although some classic studies (e.g., Wildasin 1989 JUE; Parry 2003 JUE) provide an estimate of the welfare cost of tax competition, a more realistic calibration would be useful to inform policymakers about the potential cost of tax competition. I think Ossa (2019, wp) is an important recent advancement in this direction: he uses a quantitative spatial model (Redding and Rossi-Hansberg 2017 Annual Review of Economics) to quantify the welfare cost of subsidy competition among the US states to attract businesses. Also, Slattery (2020, wp) uses an auction model to plausibly estimate the welfare impact of subsidy competition. I think these interesting recent studies provide a basis for rigorously evaluating the welfare cost of international corporate tax competition. I am really interested in this important topic in my Ph.D. study.