# Moral Universalism and the Structure of Ideology*

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**Abstract**

Throughout the Western world, people's policy preferences are correlated across domains in a strikingly similar fashion. Based on a simple model, we propose that what partly explains the internal structure of political ideology is heterogeneity in *moral universalism*: the extent to which people's altruism and their trust in others remain constant as social distance increases. In representative surveys with 15,000 respondents, we measure universalism in both altruism and trust. In the data, heterogeneity in universalism descriptively explains a substantial share of desired government spending levels for welfare, affirmative action, environmental protection, foreign aid, health care, military, border control, and law enforcement. Moreover, the canonical left-right divide on issues such as the military or redistribution disappears or even reverses depending on whether participants evaluate more or less universalist versions of these policies. These patterns hold in the U.S., Australia, Germany, France, and Sweden, but not outside the West. We confirm the idea of higher universalism among the Western left by estimating the universalism of U.S. regions using large-scale donation data and linking this measure to local vote shares.

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# 1 Introduction

It is a stylized fact that Americans' policy views are highly correlated across domains: knowing a person's view on one policy issue (such as redistribution) allows an observer to back out with reasonable confidence the person's views on many other policy issues such as the military, environmental protection or foreign aid. Political scientists refer to this well-known fact as ideological *constraint*. What is perhaps slightly more surprising is that the internal structure of the resulting ideological clusters is strikingly similar throughout the Western world. We confirm this motivating observation using new large-scale survey data from the United States, Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden. In each of these countries, principal component analyses reveal the existence of two bundles that all "Western" readers – irrespective of their nationality – will probably intuitively associate with "left" and "right." In the left cluster, people desire high government expenditure on foreign aid, affirmative action, environmental protection, welfare, and universal health care, while people in a right cluster support government spending on the military, police and law enforcement, and border control. While these intra-correlations among people's policy views appear to have become more pronounced over the last 50 years, the basic qualitative internal structure of ideology has been remarkably constant in recent history, across both time and space.

Yet, it is not immediately obvious why this *particular* structure of policy views prevails. For example, it is well-known that people's overall preferences for "big government" (captured by beliefs about the efficiency of government or the distortionary effects of taxes) are an important determinant of left-wing political attitudes. Yet such views about the size of government as a whole do not rationalize why in some policy domains the left actually demands a lower level of government expenditure than the right, or why demand for redistribution is positively correlated with demand for environmental protection, but negatively with demand for a strong military. Still, the striking similarity of ideological clusters across countries that exhibit vast differences in electoral systems and party structures, suggests the existence of a systematic core that does not merely reflect country-specific peculiarities.

Our central proposition is that what imposes this particular structure on the space of policy views is heterogeneity in *moral universalism*: the extent to which people's altruism and their trust in others remain constant as social distance increases. Universalism is about "us vs. them" rather than "me vs. you": it determines *towards whom* one is altruistic and trusting, rather than *how much*. Universalists allocate a given altruism or trust budget more uniformly, where full universalism corresponds to the extreme case that one's neighbor, friend or cousin are treated in the same way (and trusted by the same amount) as a random stranger.

We make four contributions. First, we present a simple model that articulates why and how universalism in altruism and trust should be linked to a vector of policy views in a way that rationalizes the current structure of ideology. Second, we test and confirm these predictions in large-scale nationally representative surveys in five Western countries. Third, using those same surveys, we document that the left-right divide on policy views substantially attenuates or even reverses once traditionally conservative policy domains are recast as universalist policies, or once traditionally left-wing policies are implemented in non-universalist ways. Fourth, we leverage large-scale donation data to provide complementary field evidence for the idea that the Western political left is more universalist in monetary tradeoffs. The entire paper is descriptive in nature and offers a new set of stylized facts.

To transparently spell out how we think about the link between universalism and policy views, we present a simple model that builds on Tabellini (2008). In the model, the key primitives are two parameters that govern an agent's universalism in altruism and trust. Universalism in altruism determines the welfare weights that each agent assigns to other agents, as a function of social distance. Universalism in trust determines the extent to which trust in others declines as a function of social distance. Both universalist and non-universalist agents have rational expectations about the overall rate of cheating in society, yet they differ in their beliefs about who the cheaters are, where a full universalist believes that cheating is uncorrelated with social distance from him.

Agents evaluate two potential policies, where Policy A is "risky" in that it introduces a scope for free-riding or cheating by individual members of society. Policy B is "safe" in that it reduces the scope for cheating but is associated with other societal costs. For example, in the domain of welfare, Policy A corresponds to a system with more extensive welfare payments, which introduces scope for cheating (claiming benefits one is not entitled to). Policy B, on the other hand, corresponds to a smaller redistributive system with less scope for cheating, yet this introduces the social cost that random income shocks cannot be equalized ex post. In this setup, less universalist agents oppose welfare because they are more likely to believe that the socially distant are likely to cheat on society, and hence on the agent's in-groups. Thus, in the model, universalism in altruism and trust both lead to a stronger demand for welfare.

To further illustrate the logic of the model, consider the domain of police and law enforcement. Here, the risky Policy A corresponds to a system with less police presence, which introduces scope for stealing. The safe Policy B, meanwhile, corresponds to more police presence, which eliminates the scope for cheating but introduces the societal cost of paying for a law enforcement system. Here, less universalist agents again support the safe Policy B because they worry that their in-group members get cheated on by socially distant agents. The takeaway is that, in our framework, less universalist agents (defined

in both altruism and trust space) sometimes support and sometimes oppose government spending, purely depending on whether it introduces or prevents free-riding or cheating opportunities. While our formal model emphasizes the role of cheating, we also discuss informally how universalism in altruism could explain variation in policy preferences absent opportunities for cheating. The common thread that runs through our formal and informal applications is that a person's universalism should be predictive of their support for contemporary "left" policies.

To test these predictions, we present evidence from large-scale pre-registered surveys on representative samples in the United States, Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden. We further include Brazil and South Korea as two non-Western countries in our sample. Non-Western countries typically do not exhibit the particular ideological clusters observed in the West, so that the link between universalism and policy should be weaker or absent in these countries. In total, we survey $N \approx 15,000$ individuals. We measure respondents' universalism in altruism and trust, along with their policy views. The survey is designed to address whether (a) measures of universalism in altruism and trust correlate with policy views in a way that rationalizes the structure of ideology; (b) policy views of left- and right-wingers can be predictably manipulated by proposing specific (non-) universalist implementations of traditionally left- or right-wing policies.

To measure universalism in altruism, we implement tightly structured decision tasks. In each task, a respondent is endowed with the hypothetical sum of $100 and is asked to split the money between two equally rich individuals: (i) a randomly-selected person who lives in their own country of residence and (ii) a randomly selected member of a specific social (in-) group. Each respondent makes ten allocation decisions across which the social group (ii) varies. The list of groups is based on an ex-ante crowdsourcing exercise and includes the respondent's extended family; neighbors; friends of the family; colleagues; members of the same organization; or people who share the respondent's hobbies; religious beliefs; age; political views; and race. In addition to these 10 questions that measure "domestic universalism", we also measure "foreign universalism" and "global universalism" through money allocation tasks that involve different types of foreigners. From all of these questions, we construct an individual-level summary statistic of universalism in altruism. While all of our survey questions are hypothetical in nature, they underwent an extensive selection and experimental validation procedure, and are correlated with real donations decisions (see Enke et al., 2019).

Using an analogous procedure, we estimate respondents' universalism in trust by asking them to allocate 100 trust points between the individuals outlined above, to indicate whom the respondent trusts more. These questions again deliver measures of domestic, foreign, and global universalism in trust. In our data, universalism in altruism and universalism in trust are highly correlated, which suggests that they capture the

same underlying psychology, which we refer to as "moral universalism."

We supplement these measurements of universalism with detailed questions on respondents' policy views. To this effect, we solicit quantitative responses about how much money the government should collect on average from each citizen to fund *specific expenditure categories*. Here, a respondent states a per capita dollar amount that they would like to see collected and spent on each of welfare payments; universal health care; affirmative action; military; law enforcement and police; border control; foreign aid; and environmental protection.

Our results show that universalism is strongly correlated with policy views in the ways predicted by the model and our pre-registration. Universalism is *positively* correlated with desired expenditure levels on welfare payments, environmental protection, affirmative action, foreign aid, and – to a lesser extent – universal health care. Moreover, as predicted, universalism is *negatively* correlated with desired expenditure levels on border control, military, and law enforcement and police. Thus, universalism reproduces the internal structure of policy views observed in the Western world.

These correlations are robust and general in the following three ways. (i) The results are almost identical when we consider either universalism in altruism or universalism in trust, as predicted by our model. (ii) The results are strikingly similar across the United States, Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden. In the two non-Western countries in our sample, Brazil and Korea, where policy views cannot be grouped according to the Western left vs. right divide, universalism explains very little of the variation in policy views. (iii) The relationship between universalism and policy preferences is robust against controlling for a large set of covariates.

To put these results in perspective, we implement a series of benchmarking exercises. Here, other variables – such as religiosity, income and wealth, beliefs about the efficiency of government, or equity-efficiency preferences – are often correlated with desired expenditure levels in important and known ways. However, universalism is the only variable in our data that organizes the key pattern we are trying to explain: simultaneous support for government spending in the domains of welfare, universal health care, environmental protection, affirmative action, and foreign aid, but opposition to large government spending in the domains of military, police, and border control. For instance, individuals who believe that government is efficient, or who place a higher weight on efficiency over equity, desire higher spending in *all* expenditure categories.

Taking our argument a step further, it should be possible to manipulate people's support for broad policy domains by proposing specific (non-) universalist implementations of these policies. After all, to take an example, universalists may well be in favor of specific universalist policies within the general domain of the military. We make the link between moral universalism and policy attitudes more direct by eliciting respondents'

desired spending levels for more specific policy proposals, where some proposals are more universalist than others. For example, within the domain of the military, we separately elicit desired spending levels on "Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions by the military abroad" and "Ensuring American defense and security." Likewise, within the broad domain of welfare payments, we separately elicit desired spending levels on "Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments across all communities nationwide" and "Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments only within the local communities they were raised." Or, within the domain of enviromental protection, we separately elicit support for "Preventing global climate change" and "Cleaning and conserving forests and rivers in local communities in [the U.S.]".

In these exercises, the relationship between universalism and policy views substantially attenuates, and often even *reverses* depending on whether the specific policy proposal is more or less universalist. To take a few examples, universalists (left-wingers) are more supportive of military expenditure than non-universalists (right-wingers) once the military is said to focus on humanitarian missions. Similarly, conservatives are equally likely to support redistribution or environmental protection as left-wingers once it takes place locally. These results further tighten the empirical case for the idea that what matters for the support of a policy is at least partly whether or not it is universalist in nature.

Our survey data have the advantage that (i) we can measure universalism in a controlled decision environment; (ii) regarding both altruism and trust; (iii) in representative samples; along with (iv) detailed information on specific policy views; (v) in multiple countries. At the same time, these analyses all rely on non-incentivized (though experimentally-validated) measures of universalism and self-reports of policy views.

In the final part of the paper, we complement the survey analysis with field evidence. Here, we show that, in the United States, spatial variation in universalism is strongly correlated with local vote shares. To estimate the universalism of U.S. Congressional Districts (CDs), we make use of large-scale donation data from DonorsChoose, an American non-profit organization providing an online "crowdfunding" platform for public school teachers. On this website, individual donors give money to specific funding requests that are posted by teachers. Because DonorsChoose records the location of the donor and the recipient school, we can estimate the extent to which a CD's donations decline as a function of geographic distance between the donor CD and the recipient CD. We only exploit variation in *towards whom* a given donor CD donates, not how much they donate (or receive) overall.

We find that a CD's universalism is strongly correlated with Democratic vote shares: Republican CD's donate relatively more money locally and less money to faraway places. This raw correlation is robust against leveraging only within-state variation, and against

controlling for variables such as local education expenditure or income. This provides additional, financially incentivized evidence for our claim that the Western political left is characterized by higher universalism in monetary tradeoffs.

In political science, much research has been devoted to studying the internal structure of elite opinion (Poole and Rosenthal, 2000), but there is no extant theory that convincingly explains the internal structure of mass opinion. Our emphasis on universalism as psychological core behind ideology exhibits an interesting relationship to the seminal work of Rawls (1971), which sparked two largely orthogonal debates in political and social theory: the traditional one between libertarians and egalitarians (the markets-vs.-government discussion), but also the more recent one between communitarians and universalists (e.g., Rawls, 2005; Sandel, 2005).

Various literatures in economics, political science, and moral and political psychology have highlighted the role of morality, identity and social preferences for political attitudes, though none of them attempts to explain the internal structure of ideology. Enke (forthcoming) studies the supply of and demand for universalist vs. communal moral values in U.S. presidential elections using a psychological (non-utilitarian) framework of moral values (Haidt, 2012). We innovate on this work (i) by examining not just voting behavior but the internal structure of specific policy views; (ii) not just in the U.S. but in the Western world more generally; and (iii) by operating with a utilitarian framework of universalisms and corresponding measurements.[1]

The idea that social groups and identity play an important role in politics runs through various contributions (Shayo, 2009; Grossman and Helpman, 2018; Gennaioli and Tabellini, 2019; Kranton and Sanders, 2017; Besley and Persson, 2019). Large literatures explain variation in demand for redistribution through ethnic divisions (Alesina et al., 1999, 2018; Luttmer, 2001; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Gilens, 2009), or social preferences such as altruism, equity-efficiency preferences, or inequality aversion (Kerschbamer and Müller, 2020; Epper et al., 2020; Fisman et al., 2017). We connect to this work but differ in that we emphasize the relevance of universalism for an entire vector of policy views. Dal Bó et al. (2018) and Algan et al. (2018) document that far-right voters exhibit lower generalized trust, which is loosely consistent with our results.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the internal structure of ideology. Section 3 offers a formal framework. Sections 4 and 5 describe the design and results of our surveys. Section 6 offers field evidence and Section 7 concludes.

[1]A popular view in political psychology is that political affiliation correlates with "negativity bias" (Hibbing et al., 2014) or "threat sensitivity" (Jost et al., 2009). Waytz et al. (2019) show that U.S. liberals express greater moral concern toward friends relative to family, and the world relative to the nation. We believe that our notions of universalism in altruism and trust can be usefully understood as capturing many of the more fine-grained psychological concepts that have received attention in this literature.

# 2 The Structure of Western Political Ideology

To illustrate our motivating observation on the structure of political ideology in rich Western societies, we work with our own survey data, described in detail in Section 4. The data cover the United States, Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden, along with the non-Western countries Brazil and South Korea, for a total of approximately 15,000 respondents. We elicited respondents' desired per capita expenditure levels for eight domains: welfare payments; universal health care; affirmative action; environmental protection; foreign aid; military; police and law enforcement; and border control. That is, respondents provided a dollar amount that they would like their national government to collect and spend on each of these domains.

To probe the correlation structure of policy views, we implement principal component analyses (PCA) separately in each country. The first principal component (first eigenvector) is that convex combination of the underlying variables that accounts for as much variation in the data as possible. It hence assigns similar weights to highly correlated variables. The second principal component is that convex combination of the underlying variables that explains as much of the residual variation as possible, conditional on being orthogonal to the first eigenvector.

We find that, in each Western country, the first principal component of (log) desired expenditures across domains exhibits an unsurprising and almost identical structure: it loads positively and with essentially equal weights on desired expenditure levels in the eight categories. Thus, the first component directly captures "big vs. small government" preferences.

The second principal component, on the other hand, closely corresponds to our object of interest: in each country, it loads negatively on desired expenditure levels for military, police and law enforcement, and border control, and almost always positively on desired expenditure levels for welfare, universal health care, affirmative action, environmental protection, and foreign aid. This second component, by virtue of being orthogonal to the first one, intuitively captures desired expenditure *shares*.

To make this point more explicit, we perform the principal component analysis directly on desired *shares* of overall spending, computed as desired expenditure level in a given domain divided by total desired expenditure on all eight domains. Figure 1 presents the loadings of the first principal component for the Western countries. Again, border control, military, and police and law enforcement all receive negative weights in each country, while foreign aid, affirmative action, environmental protection, welfare payments, and universal health care almost always receive positive weights.

The structure of this eigenvector is reminiscent of intuitive notions of "left" and "right." To confirm this intuition, we elicited from our respondents how they would posi-





Figure 1: Factor loadings of the first principal component of desired expenditure shares, Western countries only. Sign convention: the loading on "Border" is always non-positive, and the other signs are determined accordingly.

tion themselves on an 11-point left-vs.-right Likert scale. Figure 2 summarizes the relationship between respondents' self-positioning and their desired expenditure levels. We see that, in all Western countries, more pronounced left-wing identification is correlated with *higher* desired expenditure levels for canonical left-wing policies and *lower* desired expenditure levels for canonical conservative policies. The objective of this paper is to understand this pattern in greater detail: why do policy views exhibit this particular correlation structure, in a strikingly similar fashion across Western countries?

Two comments on the scope of our analysis are in order. First, we attempt to understand the structure of contemporary, rather than historical, ideology. This being said, while recent research suggests that the *magnitude* of the intra-correlations between people's policy views has increased over the last 50 years, the qualitative structure of ideology has remained remarkably constant over this period (e.g., Rehm and Reilly, 2010; Wu, 2020).

Second, we only attempt to understand the structure of Western, rather than global, ideology. Figures 19 and 20 in Appendix C.4 replicate the analyses above for the two non-Western countries in our sample. Similarly to the results found in other survey datasets, we see that the structure of policy views outside the West is considerably less pronounced, and there is no clear relationship with people's left-vs.-right self-assessment.[2]

[2]Very similar results on the difference between Western and non-Western countries hold in a much larger sample of countries in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset, see Appendix B.





Figure 2: The figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10). The dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.

# 3 Theoretical Framework

This section develops a simple framework to clarify how we think about the relationship between policy preferences and universalism in both altruism and trust. Our setup builds on Tabellini (2008). In the model, agents choose between two policy options, yet we will argue that the structure of these two policies captures an essential feature of all eight policy domains discussed in the previous section.

The main ingredients of the model are: (i) agents live on a rectangle and hence at different (social) distance to different members of humanity, where social distance could capture distance along the lines of family, ethnicity, religion, language, values, geography etc.; (ii) the two policy options differ in the extent to which they enable or rule out free-riding or cheating; (iii) in terms of timeline, agents first vote on a policy and then decide whether to cheat on society; and (iv) agents differ in the extent to which their altruism and trust are universalist. Our object of interest is how an agent's universalism affects their choice between the two policies. We sketch the model here and relegate derivations to Appendix A.





Figure 3: Illustration of distances between agents. A country is illustrated by an oval.

## 3.1 Social Distance and Preferences

Let $I$ be a finite set consisting of $N$ agents from two separate countries, where for convenience $N$ is a multiple of four. We assume that the world population is "large" ($N > \bar{N}$), with $\bar{N}$ defined in Appendix A. We formalize countries and social distances by allocating agents in equal proportion to the vertices of a rectangle of length $d_l$ and width $d_w$ where $d_w < d_l$ by convention and $d_w + d_l$ is normalized to one. The social distance from agent $i$ to agent $j$ is $d_{i,j}$, where distance is measured along the edges of the rectangle. Agents in the same country are connected by the short end of the rectangle. That is, for any agent the distance to another agent in the same country is either 0 or $d_w$ and the distance to another agent in the foreign country is either $d_l$ or 1. See Figure 3 for an illustration.

We assume that each vertex of the rectangle corresponds to a social group. Agents who populate the same vertex are said to belong to the same domestic in-group (say, the same neighborhood or the same set of religious beliefs). Agents at distance $d_w$ can be thought of as domestic out-group. Likewise, we think of agents at distance $d_l$ as global in-group (say, people who live in a different country but adhere to the same values) and at distance $d_l + d_w = 1$ as global out-group.

Agents care about their own consumption and the consumption of others, though to potentially heterogeneous degrees. Our formalization of universalism builds on the seminal contribution of Tabellini (2008); also see Enke (2019) for a recent application. Define $J_i = I \setminus \{i\}$ to be the set of $N-1$ people in the population other than $i$. Let $x_i$ denote the consumption of agent $i$. The utility function of agent $i$ is given by

$$u_i(x_i, x_{-i}) = x_i + \beta_i \sum_{j \in J_i} x_j a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i) \tag{1}$$

$$a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i) = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_{i,j} \tag{2}$$

The parameter $\beta_i \in (0,1]$ scales agent $i$'s *level* of altruism, while $\theta_i \in (0,1]$ governs the *slope* of altruism as a function of social distance. Figure 4 illustrates. We construct $a_{i,j}$ such that (i) altruism declines linearly as a function of distance; and (ii) the function





Figure 4: Illustration of heterogeneity in universalism. In the empirical analysis, we do not impose that the domestic stranger is socially closer than the global in-group.

integrates to a constant (1/2), which clarifies that the universalism parameter $\theta_i$ does not scale who is "more or less moral," but only how uniformly an agent distributes a given altruism budget.[3] Intuitively, a full universalist might argue that it is normatively appealing to treat everyone equally, while others might point out that the universalist's moral compass is distorted in that he treats his friends and others that are close to him not very well. Indeed, in Enke et al. (2019) we show that universalists have fewer friends and spend less time with them, compared to less universalist people.

The timeline of the model is that agents first vote for one of two policies in a simple majority system, where voting is assumed to be sincere. That is, each agent casts a vote $v_i \in \{A, B\}$. Then, depending on which policy was selected, agents potentially take an action $q_i \in \{0, 1\}$ that we will think of as free-riding or cheating on society.

## 3.2 Domestic Policy

### 3.2.1 Domestic Policy Options

Decision makers in this model are presented with a choice between two policy options. The "safe" option A enforces that nobody can cheat on society, so that all domestic agents receive their baseline consumption level $x$. However, the enforcement of this policy is

[3] A potential micro-foundation for such type-dependent altruism is that agents exhibit greater altruism towards those agents that they believe to be "good" types, as in the model of Levine (1998). Then, our utility function corresponds to a reduced-form version of a model in which beliefs about the types of others vary as a function of social distance, as in Section 3.2 below.

costly, and that cost is shared equally among all domestic agents for a per capita cost $c$. The "risky" option B does not impose a per capita cost on each agent, yet each agent can free-ride or cheat on society. Cheating delivers an extra rent $s$ for the cheating agent and imposes a per-capita externality $e$ on all other domestic agents. As will become clear, we only use the terminology "safe" and "risky" to point out the scope for cheating that is implied by the policies – it will sometimes be the case that what we call the "safe policy" is riskier in respects other than cheating, but this is immaterial for our purposes.

As explained in Table 1, we argue that these abstract features of the two policies map into some of the structural features of each of the eight policy domains discussed above. For example, in the case of welfare payments, the safe option A corresponds to a system with few welfare payments, so that agents cannot cheat on society by claiming benefits they are not entitled to. On the other hand, this causes a societal loss because random income shocks cannot be equalized. The risky option B, on the other hand, corresponds to a more expansive welfare state, which opens up the possibility of cheating.

It is worth pointing out that, in our model, Option A and Option B are not defined by the implied level of government spending. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 1, in the domain of welfare, the safe option A corresponds to lower spending, while in the domain of police and law enforcement, the safe policy A corresponds to higher spending.

### 3.2.2 Beliefs and Equilibrium

In order to calculate valuations of each policy, a decision maker must form beliefs about who would cheat under Policy Option B. A crucial assumption of our model is that a specific aspect of these beliefs is not necessarily correct in equilibrium. We assume that decision makers have rational expectations about the *overall* fraction of agents who will cheat under Option B. However, decision makers may not form correct beliefs about *which* agents will cheat. For example, casual introspection suggests that people differ dramatically in whether they believe that immigrants are more likely to be criminals than natives. Formally, the subjective probability that agent $i$ assigns to agent $j$ not cheating under policy B is

$$b_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \delta_i) = \gamma + \frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i d_{i,j} \tag{3}$$

where $\delta_i \in (0, 1]$ controls the rate at which the belief that an agent will not cheat under Option B falls as a function of social distance, which we think of as (the inverse of) universalism in trust.[4] That is, beliefs are defined analogously to altruism above, and

[4]Equation (3) represents beliefs absent agents' knowledge about their own cheating. While we present this version for notational simplicity, in Appendix A we are accurate about scaling beliefs in order to reflect an agent knowing whether or not they form part of the equilibrium fraction of cheaters.

Table 1: Mapping of policy domains to abstract model policies

| **Policy domain** | **Risky Option B** | **Safe Option A** |
|---|---|---|
| Abstract framework | No fixed cost, but agents can cheat and hence earn rent $s$ by imposing per capita externality of $e$ | Cheating impossible, but agents pay fixed per capita cost of $c$ |
| Welfare | Expansive welfare state: Agents can cheat on society by claiming benefits they are not entitled to or by not trying to find a job (and hence reap rent $s$); this causes per capita externality $e$ | No welfare state: Agents cannot cheat by claiming benefits they are not entitled to, yet this imposes a per capita cost $c$ because in the absence of welfare payments, random income shocks cannot be equalized ex post |
| Universal health care | Same logic as for welfare | |
| Affirmative Action | Extensive AA: Agents who benefit from AA can cheat by reducing effort because they know that they will get promoted either way; this imposes a per capita cost on other agents | No AA: Agents cannot reduce effort while still getting promoted; yet absence of AA also entails a social cost because disadvantaged groups in society cannot live up to their potential |
| Police and law enforcement | Weak police: Stealing and fraud possible | Strong police: Stealing is impossible; but entails a per capita cost because the police needs to be paid for |
| Effective border control | Weak border control: Increase in number of people who could come into country and free ride on others' efforts | Strong border control: less immigration, but this entails a per capita cost because border control is expensive, and because some immigrants are truly in need |
| Military | Weak military: Other countries can cheat or exploit | Strong military: Foreigners cannot exploit domestic people; entails per-capita cost because military needs to get paid for |
| Environmental protection | Strong regulation: Other countries can cheat by de-regulating and hence growing their economy at expense of domestic agents | Weak regulation: Foreign countries cannot exploit domestic regulation; yet this entails cost because environmental degradation might have economic or health impacts on domestic agents |
| Foreign aid | Extensive aid: Foreigners can cheat by claiming aid money they are not entitled to or by misusing funds | No aid: Foreigners cannot cheat; yet this entails an cost because lack of aid could cause increased migration or wars |

can be graphically represented in the same way that relative altruism is represented in Figure 4. As in the case of altruism, universalists and non-universalists do not differ in their overall level of trust: the belief function in equation (3) integrates to the same constant $\gamma$, which corresponds to rational expectations about the average fraction of cheaters in equilibrium.

We assume that $(\beta_i, \theta_i, \delta_i)$ are positive independent joint uniform.[5] It is straightforward to derive the equilibrium number of cheaters in this framework. See Appendix A.3 for details.

In equilibrium, we define $L_{i,\text{ no cheat}}$ and $L_{i,\text{ cheat}}$ to be the equilibrium total losses that a non-cheating and a cheating agent $i$ sustains, respectively, as a result of cheating behavior of other agents. Formally, $L_{i,\text{ no cheat}} = (1-\gamma)\frac{N}{2}e$, and $L_{i,\text{ cheat}} = \left((1-\gamma)\frac{N}{2}-1\right)e$.

### 3.2.3 Domestic Policy Preferences

We will analyze the model in the domestic context under the following assumption:

**Assumption 1.** $L_{i,\,no\,cheat} - c \geq (1-b_0)(e+s)$

Here, $b_0$ denotes the belief of a non-cheating agent that domestic in-group members do not cheat. This assumption says that we restrict attention to scenarios in which the safe Policy A is not strictly dominated by the risky Policy B.

We solve the game by backward induction. In the second stage of the game, if the risky policy is implemented, agent $i$ cheats iff

$$E_i[u_i(q_i=1)] = (x+s-L_i) + \beta_i \sum_{j\in J_i}\{x+[1-b_{i,j}(\delta_i)]s-e\}\cdot a_{i,j}(d_{i,j},\theta_i) \tag{4}$$

$$>E_i[u_i(q_i=0)] = (x-L_i) + \beta_i \sum_{j\in J_i}\{x+[1-b_{i,j}(\delta_i)]s\}\cdot a_{i,j}(d_{i,j},\theta_i) \tag{5}$$

which delivers the cheating decision $q_i^*(\theta_i,\delta_i)$. Here, $E_i[\cdot]$ denotes the subjective "expectations operator" that applies the belief function in equation (3). In the first stage of the game, an agent votes for the safe policy A iff

$$u_i(v_i=A) = [x-c] + \beta_i \sum_{j\in J_i}\{x-c\}\cdot a_{i,j}(\theta_i) \tag{6}$$

$$>E_i[u_i(v_i=B)] \tag{7}$$

$$=[x+sq_i^*(\theta_i,\delta_i) - L_i(q_i^*(\theta_i,\delta_i))] + \beta_i \sum_{j\in J_i}\{x+[1-b_{i,j}(\delta_i)]s-L_j\}\cdot a_{i,j}(\theta_i) \tag{8}$$

which delivers the vote $v_i^*(q_i^*(\theta_i,\delta_i),\theta_i,\delta_i) = v_i^*(\theta_i,\delta_i)$ as a function of universalism parameters. We obtain the following prediction:

**Prediction 1.** *Individuals with higher universalism exhibit a stronger preference for the risky domestic policy B: welfare, universal health care, affirmative action, and weak police and law enforcement. These predictions hold for universalism in both altruism and trust.*

[5] In Appendix A.5, we show that our predictions go through also when universalism and altruism are correlated, as long as this correlation is not "too positive."

See Appendix A.3 for a proof. The intuition behind this prediction is straightforward. All else equal, a decision maker who is less universalist will believe that out-group agents are more likely to cheat on society. This, in turn, implies a redistribution of resources away from the agent's in-group members to the out-group. However, the non-universalist dislikes this idea because his altruistic concerns are largely limited to the in-group, which as a consequence makes him dislike Option B.

## 3.3 Foreign Policy

Decision makers are again presented with a choice between two policy options. Under the safe policy option A, domestic and foreign agents receive their baseline consumption $x$. Domestic agents additionally pay a per capita cost $c$. Under the risky policy B, domestic agents do not have to pay $c$. However, in this regime foreign agents can cheat and get $s$ by imposing a per-capita cost $e$ on domestic people. Table 1 explains how this abstract structure maps into the domains of military, border control, foreign aid, and environmental protection. As with the domestic policies above, note that the risky policy B sometimes corresponds to big and sometimes to small government. Again, the key defining characteristic that matters for our analysis is whether a policy introduces or prevents cheating opportunities.

The mechanics of the following are very similar to the domestic case. We again assume that agents' beliefs about the overall fraction of cheaters are correct, but that they have heterogeneous beliefs about how cheating is correlated with distance from them. We exposit the details in Appendix A, and simply state the main prediction here.

**Prediction 2.** *Individuals with higher universalism exhibit a stronger preference for the risky policy B: weak border control, weak military, stringent environmental protection, and expansive foreign aid. These predictions hold for universalism in both altruism and trust.*

## 3.4 Informal Discussion

Our formal model highlights the role of cheating opportunities. We adopt this perspective because it allows us to tie together different types of policy preferences in a simple formal framework, in a way that accommodates both altruism and trust. At the same time, universalism in altruism as such can also plausibly explain heterogeneity in some policy preferences absent cheating opportunities. For instance, non-universalists may intrinsically dislike the idea that their own tax money goes to people that they are socially distant from (for welfare or universal health care). Similarly, non-universalists may support tight border control even in the absence of cheating opportunities for immigrants,

if they intrinsically dislike interacting with socially distant people. To take a final example, non-universalists might dislike the concept of foreign aid simply because they value the welfare of the domestic poor higher than that of the foreign poor. These examples illustrate that our general idea – that "left" policies are appealing to universalists – does not appear to hinge on our specific cheating framework but comfortably accommodates other intuitions as well.

# 4 Survey Design

## 4.1 Logistics

We implemented internet surveys in Australia, France, Germany, Sweden, the United States, Brazil, and South Korea through the infrastructure of the market research panel of *Dynata*. The survey was implemented between June and August 2019. The original survey was developed in English, translated into other languages by *Dynata*, and then checked by us using native speakers. The median completion time was 20 minutes.

The survey consisted of four components: (i) an introductory screen that elicited demographics and routed respondents into or out of the survey; (ii) decision screens to measure universalism and other social preferences; (iii) screens to measure policy views; and (iv) a questionnaire to elicit additional information and covariates. The order of parts (ii) and (iii) was randomized across respondents. We also randomized the order in which universalism in altruism and universalism in trust were elicited.[6]

We took two measures to ensure quality control. First, every respondent who completed the survey in less than 400 seconds was dropped and replaced by *Dynata*. Second, the survey contained two attention check questions, interspersed throughout the survey. Whenever a respondent answered an attention check incorrectly, they were immediately routed out of the survey and replaced by *Dynata*.

We contracted with *Dynata* for nationally representative samples of $N = 1,700$ citizens aged at least 18 in each country (see details on the pre-registration below). However, because constructing a sample that is nationally representative along the lines of age, gender, ethnicity, income, employment status, and education is logistically difficult, *Dynata* eventually supplied a larger sample to us (total $N = 14,769$), a subset of which makes up the more representative samples that we pre-registered. The physical process was that *Dynata* kept sampling respondents until our pre-specified quotas were satisfied. "Surplus" respondents came free of charge for us. Since we view throwing away data as scientifically questionable, all analyses reported in the main text make use of the

[6] A permanent link for the U.S. version of our survey is: `https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_aftuqgHsyIAShkp`.

full sample. In the Appendix we replicate all analyses using the pre-registered (smaller) representative samples. The results are always extremely similar.

As a final remark on the sample, *Dynata* had considerably more difficulty in constructing representative samples in Brazil and South Korea than in the other countries, which we did not anticipate when we initially contracted with them. Thus, the final samples sent to us skew young, rich, and employed in Brazil and Korea. The sample characteristics are summarized in Appendix C.1.

## 4.2 Measurement of Universalism

We rely on a new set of structured experimentally-validated survey games to measure an individual's universalism. To conserve space and focus, we relegated the development, experimental validation, and testing of these survey measures to a separate paper (Enke et al., 2019). We summarize the key aspects below.

### 4.2.1 Survey Games

***Universalism in altruism.*** Respondents completed a total of 16 hypothetical money allocation tasks that allow us to construct a summary statistic of universalism in altruism. The construction of the survey games is closely tied to the theoretical framework in Section 3 in that it makes use of four different types of groups: domestic in-groups, domestic strangers, global in-groups, and global strangers. From these four types of groups, we construct three universalism components: domestic universalism, foreign universalism, and global universalism.

First, to estimate *domestic* universalism, respondents made ten decisions. In each of them, they were asked to split hypothetical $100 between (i) a randomly-selected person from their country of residence and (ii) a randomly-selected member of one of their social groups, who also resides in the respondent's country of residence. We based the selection of in-groups on an ex-ante crowd-sourcing exercise (see Enke et al., 2019, for details). Across the ten questions, the social groups included extended family, friends of family, neighbors, colleagues at work or school, same organization (e.g., club), same age, same ethnic background or race, same political views, same hobbies, and same religious beliefs. For example, in one question, respondents in the U.S. were asked to split $100 between a randomly-selected person who lives in the U.S. and a member of their extended family, such as a cousin. The average allocation to the randomly-selected person across the ten questions then makes up the domestic universalism measure.

Second, to estimate *foreign* universalism, respondents were asked to split $100 between (i) a randomly-selected person from their country of residence and (ii) a randomly-selected person who lives anywhere in the world. Foreign universalism then corresponds

to the monetary amount sent to the global stranger.

Third, to estimate *global* universalism, respondents made five decisions, in each of which they were asked to split hypothetical $100 between (i) a randomly-selected person who lives anywhere in the world and (ii) a randomly-selected person who lives anywhere in the world and is a member of the respondent's social groups. Across the five questions, the social groups included same language, same religious beliefs, same ethnic background, same values, and same occupation. The average amount of money sent to the randomly-selected world citizen makes up the global universalism measure.

For the purpose of these tasks, respondents were always asked to assume (i) that both individuals are equally rich (addressing income effects) and (ii) that neither of these individuals would find out who sent them the money (ruling out reciprocity considerations). The order of questions was randomized across respondents. Figure 13 in Appendix C.2 shows an example decision screen.

As discussed in detail in Enke et al. (2019), the separate money allocation decisions, and in particular the domestic, foreign, and global universalism summary components are all highly positively correlated with each other in a representative sample of the U.S. population. This is also true in our multinational dataset. To reduce the dimensionality of the data and minimize measurement error, we hence average the three components into a summary statistic of universalism in altruism. The construction of this summary statistic was pre-registered, see below. To document the validity of this procedure, some of the analyses below will also work with the separate universalism components.

***Universalism in trust.*** Respondents completed a total of 16 tasks from which we estimate an individual's universalism in trust. The procedure was identical to the one described for altruism above, except that in a given game respondents were asked to allocate 100 "trust points" (rather than $100) between two individuals, to express whom they trust more. This again yields domestic, foreign, and global universalism components, which we average into a summary statistic of universalism in trust. Again, the construction of this summary statistic was pre-registered.

***Composite measure of universalism.*** Universalism in altruism and trust exhibit a correlation of $\rho = 0.45$. To reduce the dimensionality of the analysis, in most analyses below we work with a composite measure of universalism, which consists of the unweighted average of universalism in trust and universalism in altruism. At the same time, throughout the paper we reference robustness checks that use the altruism and trust measures separately, see in particular the discussion of robustness checks in Section 5.6.

Table 2: Individual-level correlates of universalism

| | *Correlation between composite measure of universalism and:* | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Age | Female | Income | Wealth | College | Religiosity | Urbanicity |
| *Raw corr.* | $-0.16^{***}$ | $0.06^{***}$ | $-0.07^{***}$ | $-0.10^{***}$ | $0.02^{**}$ | $-0.09^{***}$ | $0.03^{***}$ |
| *Partial corr. (Country FE)* | $-0.13^{***}$ | $0.07^{***}$ | $-0.07^{***}$ | $-0.10^{***}$ | 0.01 | $-0.10^{***}$ | $0.02^{***}$ |

*Notes.* The first row reports the Pearson raw correlation between individual characteristics and the composite measure of universalism ($N = 14,769$). The second row reports partial correlations conditional on country fixed effects. See Appendix C.8 for details on the construction of the demographic variables. $^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$.

### 4.2.2 Construct Validity

We validate our measurement tool along three dimensions. See Enke et al. (2019) for details. (i) *Experimental validation.* We implemented an ex-ante experimental validation procedure. Specifically, we show that, over a one-week horizon, our hypothetical measure of universalism in altruism is highly correlated with a financially-incentivized measure of universalism, which consists of the same questions with real incentives. Second, we document that behavior in our trust point allocation game is highly correlated with trust beliefs in a structured cheating task that is standard in the experimental economics literature. (ii) *Correlation with real donation decisions.* We also show that our survey measure of moral universalism predicts real donation decisions: while universalists donate less than non-universalists to local community organizations, they donate more to nationwide and international charities. (iii) *Choice of social groups.* We document that an individual's degree of universalism with respect to the set of fifteen domestic and foreign groups that we implement is highly correlated with their universalism with respect to a more comprehensive set of forty social groups.

### 4.2.3 Descriptives

Appendix C.3 shows histograms of the composite universalism measure in each country. Table 2 reports correlations with demographics. The strongest correlations are with age and wealth, both of which correlate negatively with moral universalism. Similarly, men, higher-income individuals, and the religious exhibit lower universalism. These results are consistent with those documented in Enke et al. (2019) for a U.S. sample.

## 4.3 Measurement of Political Attitudes

### 4.3.1 Measures of Support for Expenditure Categories

Respondents were instructed to imagine they could decide the average amount of money that their federal or national government collects per year from each citizen to spend on each of eight policy categories. We asked respondents to assume that all dollar amounts collected for a category would be spent only on this particular category, without any waste. In addition, we provided respondents with a reference value: annual per capita spending on education in their country of residence.

Respondents were asked to enter eight monetary amounts to indicate their desired per capita spending levels for each of welfare, universal health care, foreign aid, environmental protection, affirmative action, military, police and law enforcement, and border control. The order of these categories on the computer screen was randomized.

Figure 16 in Appendix C.2 provides a screenshot. Naturally, because of the free-entry format, responses to these questions are subject to large outliers. To account for these outliers, we winsorize the desired spending levels at $+/-$ 3 standard deviations of the within-country mean, as specified in our pre-registration (discussed below). That is, we replace each dollar amount above (below) the amount that corresponds to 3 SD above (below) the mean with this value. This affects 1.6% of all responses.

As specified in our pre-registration, we compute a simple summary statistic of policy views across all policy domains, which is computed from the desired expenditure shares:

$$\text{Summary statistic of policy views} = \frac{\text{Foreign aid} + \text{Environment} + \text{Aff. action} + \text{Welfare} + \text{Health care}}{5} - \frac{\text{Military} + \text{Police} + \text{Border control}}{3} \tag{9}$$

where each policy denotes share of desired expenditure that goes to a domain. Pooling data across all countries, this summary statistic exhibits a correlation of $\rho = 0.44$ with respondents' self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10). We pre-specified the summary statistic in this particular way because it corresponds very closely to the structure of policy views in the Western countries discussed in Section 2. We standardize into z-scores both the summary statistic of policy views and its individual components.[7]

[7]As a second, and complementary measure of policy views, we elicit respondents' level of support for the eight policy domains above using Likert scale questions. These directly ask participants to indicate whether they strongly support or strongly oppose a given policy, on a scale from zero to ten. As specified in a pre-registration (see below), we use these qualitative measures as instruments for the quantitative ones to be able to account fir measurement error using "Obviously-Related Instrumental Variables" analyses (Gillen et al., 2019)

### 4.3.2 Measures of Support for Specific Policy Proposals

The measures reported in the previous section aim at capturing a respondent's support for broad policy domains. In addition, we measured respondents' preferences over more specific policy proposals, two for each broad policy domain. After respondents had indicated their desired spending levels for the eight broad policy domains, we asked them how much money they would like to see collected and spent on two specific projects or policy proposals. We constructed these proposals such that one was more universalist than the other, yet both focused on the same policy domain. We present the policy proposals in Table 3. To take the example of welfare payments, we elicited desired spending levels for (i) "Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments across all communities nationwide" and (ii) "Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments only within the local communities they were raised." In the case of the military, the policy proposals were given by (i) "Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions by the military abroad" and (ii) "Ensuring [American] defense and security." Figure 17 in Appendix C.2 provides a screenshot.

We again winsorize the data at $+/-$ 3 sd. of the within-country mean, which affects 0.1% of all responses. We also standardize these variables into z-scores.

## 4.4 Covariates

Even though this paper is descriptive in nature, we seek to assess to which extent a potential relationship between universalism and policy views is driven by omitted variables. Our survey hence elicits rich measures of covariates, including: age, gender, ethnicity / race, educational attainment, income (two measures), wealth and asset ownership (three measures), religiosity (three measures), urbanicity, employment status, marital status, migration background, belief about whether the government is efficient or wasteful (on a scale 0–10), beliefs about whether the respondent is likely to personally benefit from government expenditure in a given category, and measures of altruism, generalized trust, and equity-efficiency preferences. All of these covariates and their construction are described in detail in Appendix C.8.

To highlight just a few, an income index is computed as average of the z-scores of two questions, which ask respondents (i) for a continuous estimate of their household income and (ii) to place themselves into income buckets. The wealth index is the average of the z-scores of (i) respondents' estimates of net worth, (ii) whether they owned a home and (iii) whether they own stocks. The religiosity index is constructed as average of the z-scores of (i) a self-assessment of religiosity (scale 0–10), (ii) frequency of church attendance, and (iii) a binary indicator for whether the responent considers themselves to be an Atheist.

Table 3: Specific policy proposals

| **Policy domain** | **More universalist** | **Less universalist** |
|---|---|---|
| Military and counterintelligence | Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions by the military abroad | Ensuring [American, French, etc.] defense and security |
| Welfare payments | Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments across all communities nationwide | Redistributing local tax revenues as welfare payments only within the local communities they were raised |
| Effective border control | Identifying and admitting into the country only those immigrants with the highest need for help | Identifying and admitting into the country only those immigrants who would be good citizens (e.g., be likely to pay taxes and refrain from engaging in criminal activities) |
| Environmental protection | Preventing global climate change | Cleaning and conserving forests and rivers in local communities in [the U.S., France, etc.] |
| Universal healthcare | Using local tax revenues to fund health insurance across all communities nationwide | Using local tax revenues to fund health insurance only within the local communities they were raised |
| Police and law enforcement | Sensitivity training for the police to ensure justice and equal treatment of all | Increasing the capabilities of the police to prevent and prosecute criminal or suspicious behavior |
| Foreign aid | Sending foreign aid to countries that are in most need of help | Sending foreign aid to countries that are our international allies |
| Measures to ensure no individual is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage | Measures to ensure no individual is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage | Measures to ensure no one of your same background (e.g., gender, ethnic background or ancestry) is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage |

## 4.5 Pre-Registration

The survey was pre-registered on EGAP, see `http://egap.org/registration/5792`. The pre-registration contained (i) the desired sample size; (ii) the precise construction of the summary statistics of universalism in altruism and trust; (iii) predictions about how we expected universalism to be correlated with support for each of the eight policy domains, based on the model in Section 3; (iv) the construction of the summary statistic of policy views discussed above; (v) the prediction that universalism would be more positively correlated with the more universalist implementations of policy domains than their less universalist counterparts; and (vi) an analysis of whether the patterns in Brazil and South Korea are different from those in the Western countries.

Two remarks regarding the relationship between the pre-registration and the analyses in this paper are in order. First, as discussed above, our sample turned out to be larger than anticipated, for reasons beyond our control. We report robustness checks

using the smaller representative sample in the Appendix.

Second, we pre-specified that we expect all of our hypotheses to be true for both universalism in altruism and universalism in trust. To conserve space and reduce the dimensionality of the analysis, we mostly work with a composite measure of universalism that averages universalism in altruism and trust. We replicate these analyses with the separate universalism measures in the Appendix. The results are always very similar.

# 5 Survey Results

## 5.1 Summary Statistic of Policy Views

We begin by considering the summary statistic of policy views described in Section 4.3.1, where higher values indicate higher desired expenditure shares for the canonical left-wing policies. We first pool the data across Western countries and then disaggregate the results in a second step.

Table 4 presents the results of a set of OLS regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on each of the separate universalism measures detailed in Section 4.2. Columns (1)–(3) focus on the domestic, foreign, and global universalism in altruism components, while column (4) uses the composite universalism in altruism measure. Analogously, columns (5)–(7) focus on the domestic, foreign, and global universalism in trust components, while column (8) uses the composite universalism in trust measure. Finally, columns (9)–(10) makes use of the composite universalism measure, which is constructed as average of universalism in altruism and trust. The universalism measures are all in [0,1], where zero means that all money and trust points are allocated to the in-group member in a given game, 0.5 means that the money and the trust points are split equally, on average, and one corresponds to the (counterfactual) case that someone always allocates all money and trust points to the socially more distant individual.

We find a strong positive relationship between universalism and the summary statistic of policy views. This is true for each individual component of universalism, regardless of whether it is measured in the altruism or trust space. In fact, as we document in Figure 21 in Appendix C.5.2, this pattern is even more general than what is suggested by the results in Table 4: out of the 32 different allocation decisions in our survey from which we estimate universalism in altruism and trust, *all* are significantly correlated with the summary statistic of policy views, such that a higher allocation towards the socially more distant individual is correlated with a higher left-vs.-right score. This provides evidence that our results are not driven by a just a few in-groups but reflect a general psychological tendency. Given the similarity of results across different universalism components, to average out measurement error, and to reduce the dimensionality of the analysis, we

Table 4: Summary statistic of policy views and different universalism measures, pooled across countries

| | *Dependent variable:* Summary statistic of policy views | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Domestic universalism in altruism | 1.18*** (0.06) | | | | | | | | | |
| Foreign universalism in altruism | | 1.25*** (0.04) | | | | | | | | |
| Global universalism in altruism | | | 1.54*** (0.06) | | | | | | | |
| Composite universalism in altruism | | | | 2.07*** (0.07) | | | | | | |
| Domestic universalism in trust | | | | | 1.25*** (0.07) | | | | | |
| Foreign universalism in trust | | | | | | 1.23*** (0.06) | | | | |
| Global universalism in trust | | | | | | | 1.48*** (0.07) | | | |
| Composite universalism in trust | | | | | | | | 1.91*** (0.08) | | |
| Composite universalism | | | | | | | | | 2.72*** (0.09) | 2.14*** (0.09) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Demographic Controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 10902 | 10902 | 10902 | 10902 | 10902 | 10902 | 10902 | 10902 | 10902 | 10902 |
| $R^2$ | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.18 |

*Notes.* OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Data are pooled across all five Western countries. The dependent variable is the summary statistic of policy views, constructed as described in Section 4.3.1 and standardized into a z-score. The construction of each universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. Demographic controls include age, gender, income, wealth, college, urbanicity, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, and beliefs about the efficiency of government. $^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$.

focus on the composite measure of universalism in what follows.

As we document in columns (9) and (10), the relationship between universalism and our summary statistic of policy views is robust against controlling for age, gender, income, wealth, college, urbanicity, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, and beliefs about the efficiency of government. Composite universalism measure exhibits a raw correlation with the summary statistic of policy views of $\rho = 0.33$. While we provide more sophisticated benchmarking analyses later, it is perhaps informative that the corresponding correlation for the belief that government is efficient vs. wasteful is $\rho = 0.16$, the one for college degree $\rho = 0.06$, for age $\rho = -0.16$, for the religiosity index $\rho = -0.13$, for the income index $\rho = -0.09$, and for the wealth index $\rho = -0.15$.

## 5.2 Separate Policy Views

Figure 5 summarizes the results for the separate policy categories. The underlying OLS regressions relate the desired *share* of overall desired expenditure for each policy (standardized into z-scores) to universalism, separately for each country and all Western

countries combined, for a total of 48 regressions. The left panel shows the results of univariate regressions, while the point estimates in the right panel stem from multivariate regressions that control for age, gender, income, wealth, college, urbanicity, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, beliefs about the efficiency of government, and beliefs about whether one will personally benefit from government expenditure in each domain.

As hypothesized, in all Western countries, we observe a strong negative relationship between universalism and desired expenditure shares for the three "conservative" policy domains, while the relationship is generally positive and statistically significant for the five "left-wing" domains. That is, viewed through the lens of the theoretical framework in Section 3, lower universalism is associated with decreased support for "risky" policies that introduce cheating opportunities. In terms of quantitative magnitude, the estimated regression coefficients suggest that increasing universalism from zero to 1/2 (and hence moving from 100:0 to 50:50 allocation decisions) is associated with a 0.25–1.0 standard deviation change in each of the policy views.

A notable exception occurs in the domain of universal health care, where the relationship is strongly positive in the US but either not statistically significant or even negative in the other countries. This pattern might arise because, in contrast to the United States, all of these countries have had versions of universal health care for decades, which may generate less heterogeneity in views on universal health care across the political spectrum. It probably also implies that respondents outside the U.S. interpret survey questions about "universal health care" in a different fashion than Americans.

Either way, overall, universalism is consistently correlated with policy views in the ways we hypothesized. Out of the 40 regression coefficients for the individual countries reported in Figure 5, 38 have the expected sign and 36 are statistically significant at least at the 10% level.

The preceding discussion provides evidence that universalism is related to desired expenditure *shares*. We proceed by looking at desired expenditure *levels*. To this effect, Figure 6 reproduces the left panel of Figure 5, except that now the dependent variables are desired (log) expenditure *levels*. The results show that universalists desire higher government spending in the canonical left-wing policy domains, yet lower government spending in the canonical conservative domains. Thus, universalists do not always desire higher government spending than non-universalists – just in policy domains that have a universalist orintation. In this sense, universalism directly reproduces the pattern reported in Figure 2 in Section 2 that motivates our paper.





Figure 5: The left panel plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired expenditure shares for each policy domain (as a fraction of overall desired government spending for the eight policy domains) on composite universalism. The right panel plots the analogous coefficients of multivariate regressions, in which we control for age, gender, income, wealth, college, urbanicity, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, beliefs about the efficiency of government, and beliefs about whether one will personally benefit from government expenditure in each domain. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.





Figure 6: The figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on composite universalism. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.

## 5.3 Benchmarking Exercises

An immediate question is whether other individual characteristics could also produce the patterns we are trying to explain. To address this question, Figure 7 summarizes the relationship between desired (log) expenditure levels and eleven additional characteristics that are either commonly associated with an individual's position on the political spectrum or might be predictive of policy views. For simplicity, we pool the data across countries for this analysis. In terms of demographics, we focus on age, religiosity, income, wealth, completion of a college degree, and urbanicity. In terms of beliefs and preferences, we consider residual measures of altruism and of generalized trust, the respondent's preferences over equity vs. efficiency, strength of belief that the government works efficiently, and strength of the belief that one might personally benefit from government spending on each policy domain.[8]

In Figure 7, the leftmost panels serve as reminder and show the pattern we are trying to explain: we are looking for a variable that is negatively correlated with desired spending levels for military, police and law enforcement and border control, but posi-

[8]We employ *residual* measures of altruism and trust because both our dictator game and our elicitation of generalized trust are framed vis-à-vis a randomly-selected stranger. Thus, by construction, these raw measures partly include universalism.

tively correlated with desired spending on welfare, health care, environmental protection, affirmative action and foreign aid. We find that none of the other eleven variables produces the characteristic pattern that universalism successfully reproduces. In other words, other variables are often signiicantly correlated with policy views in meaningful and known ways – we are not trying to argue that they are unimportant for understanding policy views. Yet they don't produce the pattern that we are interested in. For example, we find that beliefs in the efficiency of government and equity-efficiency preferences are important for policy views, yet people who believe that government is relatively efficient and those who favor equity over effciency demand more government in *all* expenditure domains.[9]

## 5.4 Specific Policy Proposals

The claim of our paper, in particular viewed through the lens of the formal framework in Section 3, is not that universalists approve or disapprove of certain policy domains per sé, but that this is the case because these policy domains are predominantly (non-) universalist. If this was true, then it should be possible to manipulate people's support for broad policy domains such as the military or welfare by having them consider particularly universalist or non-universalist implementations of these policies. For this purpose, as described in Section 4.3.2, we asked respondents to indicate their desired government spending level for 16 specific policy proposals (two for each of the eight broad policy domains), where one proposal was more universalist than the other. See Section 4.3.2 for the precise text used to describe the policy proposals.

To analyze whether this affects people's stated policy preferences, Figure 8 plots the OLS regression coefficients of universalism for each of the specific policy proposals. Here, the left panel reports the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist policies.

Focusing first on the left panel, we find strong and positive relationships between desired expenditure levels for each of the eight policy domains and universalism. For example, in contrast to the baseline analysis above, universalists are now *more* likely to endorse a strong military than non-universalists once the military is said to focus on humanitarian missions and peacekeeping abroad. Looking at the right panel, we find that the relationship between universalism and policy views is substantially shifted downwards, relative to the more universalist proposals. That is, the correlations are substantially attenuated and in many cases even reverse. For example, less universalist people are substantially more likely to support welfare once the specific proposal is that

[9]While it appears puzzling that income and wealth are not correlated with support for welfare payments, this is merely a result of analyzing the data in *levels* rather than shares; once we look at desired expenditure shares, support for welfare payments decreases significantly with wealth and income.





Figure 7: Comparison of relationships between policy views and respondent characteristics. The top panel considers the preferences and beliefs of respondents; the bottom panel considers demographics. Coefficients and confidence intervals are from regressions of individual-level log desired expenditure levels (in z-scores) on other standardized characteristics with country fixed effects. To obtain residual altruism and trust, we respectively computed the residuals of dictator game allocations and generalized trust with respect to universalism.





Figure 8: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on universalism, separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.

money be redistributed only within the local communities in which it was raised, than if redistribution occurs across all communities in the country. There is only one instance in which the coefficient on universalism is lower in the left panel than in the right panel (affirmative action in France). Otherwise, the OLS coefficient of universalism is between 0.16 and 2.29 units of a standard deviation larger in the left panel than in the right panel. Table 20 and Figure 26 in Appendix C.5 show that this difference in coefficient magnitudes is statistically significant in almost all cases.

Figure 8 shows that the link between policy views and *universalism* can be manipulated in predictable ways. A related question is whether we can predictably manipulate the link between policy views and *generic self-reported political orientation*. To address this question, Figure 28 in Appendix C.5 reproduces Figure 8, except that it plots the relationship between policy preferences and people's self-positioning on an 11-point left-right scale. Here, very similar patterns hold. For example, self-identified left-wingers more strongly endorse the military than self-identified right-wingers once the military focuses on humanitarian missions and peacekeeping.

In summary, this analysis documents that we can manipulate the relationship between universalism and policy views in predictable ways by having people consider more or less universalist implementations of each expenditure category. These results suggest that the (moral) conflict between the left and the right is not over abstract notions of the military or redistribution as such, but at least partly about which specific (non-) universalist form they take.

## 5.5 Non-Western Countries

Up to this point, our analyses have focused on the five Western countries in our sample. In this section, we comment briefly on the relationship between policy preferences and universalism in Brazil and South Korea. Figure 9 plots the coefficients of regressions of desired expenditure levels on universalism in all countries, including Brazil and Korea. Here, we observe that the relationships between universalism and policy preferences are all weaker in magnitude and sometimes opposite in sign relative to those observed in Western countries.

Furthermore, Figures 26 and 27 in Appendix C.5 show that policy preferences in Brazil and Korea are not observably affected by whether these policy domains are implemented in a more or less universalist way through specific policy proposals, as we did in Section 5.4. This further corroborates the conclusion that heterogeneity in universalism does not shape policy preferences in these countries in a meaningful way.

These patterns might be unsurprising because (as discussed in Section 2 and Appendix C.4) the very clusters of policy views that we attempt to rationalize in this paper





Figure 9: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of regressions of desired log expenditure levels on universalism. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.

are absent in these countries. Put simply, if a baseline pattern is not observed, then it cannot be explained by universalism. We pre-registered the hypothesis that the relationship between universalism and policy views would be weaker in Korea and Brazil than in the Western countries. We discuss potential reasons for the difference between Western and non-Western countries in Section 7.

## 5.6 Robustness Checks

***Universalism in altruism and trust separately.*** Our main analysis employed the composite measure of universalism. As specified in our pre-registration, Appendices C.5.2 and Appendix C.6.3 show that very similar results hold if we work with universalism in altruism or universalism in trust instead.

***Obviously-related instrumental variables analyses.*** As pre-registered, we employ instrumentation strategies from Gillen et al. (2019) to address the effects of measurement error in our elicitations of policy views and universalism. Results using multiple elicitations for both outcome and explanatory variables are very similar, see Appendix C.5.3.

***Representative sub-samples.*** We contracted with *Dynata* for samples of $N = 1,700$ respondents in each country, stratified to match the population on a number of dimensions. In Appendix C.7, we replicate the analysis using these more representative samples, with very similar results.

# 6 Field Evidence

Our survey data have the advantage that (i) we can measure an individual's universalism in a controlled decision environment; (ii) regarding both altruism and trust; (iii) in representative samples; along with (iv) detailed information on specific policy views; (v) in multiple countries. At the same time, these analyses all rely on non-incentivized (though experimentally-validated) survey measures of universalism and self-reported policy views. Thus, we complement the survey analysis with field evidence. Here, we estimate the aggregate universalism of entire Congressional Districts (CDs) using large-scale donation data and link these to administrative data on local vote shares. The objective is to confirm the result that more universalist regions vote left in higher proportions.

## 6.1 Data

To estimate a CD's universalism in altruism, we leverage data from DonorsChoose, an American non-profit organization providing an online "crowdfunding" platform for public school teachers.[10] On this platform, teachers can post funding requests for a wide variety of classroom "projects," such as field trips, classroom furniture, and purchases of basic school supplies or technology. Potential donors visit the website and donate to individual projects. Appendix D.4 provides screenshots of the layout and functionality of the platform. Notably, potential donors' ability to search through and filter projects based on location is a salient (usually, the highest) option available on the website. This makes a donor's selection of a project based on geography particularly straightforward.

The geographic scope of the data is broad and comprehensive: DonorsChoose reported in June 2019 that since the platform's inception in 2000, teachers in 82% of public schools in the United States had posted 1.4 million projects, reaching 34 million students and involving nearly 3.8 million donors, who had contributed $838 million. We use publicly available data to match all individual donations made on DonorsChoose between March 2000 and October of 2016 to their recipient projects. These data report the school's location (latitude and longitude) and the first three digits of each donor's ZIP code. We drop all observations for which the donor ZIP code is missing. All 50 states and

[10]We are indebted to Ray Fisman for suggesting this analysis to us.

all 435 CDs plus the District of Columbia (henceforth counted as a CD) are represented as donors and recipients in the data. Appendix D.1 reports summary statistics.

The geographic measures enable us to investigate how a CD's altruism towards another CD changes as a function of distance to the recipient. To perform this analysis, we aggregate individual donation data at the CD level to construct a dyadic dataset, where each observation represents every possible unique donor-recipient CD pair.

We work with two different measures of distance. First, the simple geographic distance between the CD's centroids. Second, a measure of friendship distance that was recently constructed from Facebook data by Bailey et al. (2018). This measure gives the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from two CDs are friends on Facebook. We view this measure of friendship distance as a summary statistic of social distance that aggregates a wide variety of demographic and social dimensions, such as ethnic distance, age distance, ideological distance, income distance, educational distance, etc.

## 6.2 Empirical Approach: Identifying Universalism in Altruism

To begin, we estimate a CD's universalism in altruism as (the negative of) the extent to which donations from a given donor CD decline as a function of geographic distance. Figure 10 illustrates this approach for four donor CDs from California and New York. For each donor CD, we provide a binned scatter plot of the log donation amount as a function of geographic distance to the recipient. Our interest is then in the *slope* of this gradient, where we define a CD as being less universalist if it exhibits a steeper slope. In these scatter plots, the donation and distance data are residualized from donor and recipient fixed effects. That is, as explained in detail below, we hold fixed the *level* of donations from and to a given CD, and only exploit variation in the *slope*.

Formally, for each donor CD $i$ and recipient CD $j$, denote the log distance measure by $d_{i,j}$ and the log total dollar amount of donations by $p_{i,j}$. Further denote by $S_i \in \{0,1\}$ an indicator variable for each donor CD $i$ and by $R_j \in \{0,1\}$ an indicator variable for each recipient CD $j$. Our estimating equation is then given by:

$$p_{i,j} = \sum_i \boldsymbol{\theta_i} \left[ d_{i,j} \times S_i \right] + \sum_i \alpha_i S_i + \sum_j \varphi_j R_j + \varepsilon_{i,j} \tag{10}$$

The primary measure of interest is the vector of $\theta_i$, which captures the extent to which donations from $i$ to $j$ decline as distance increases. In our baseline specifications, $d_{i,j}$ represents the geographic distance between the geographic centers of the CDs.

The estimating equation includes donor and recipient fixed effects to control for spatial variation in donation rates due to causes unrelated to universalism. For instance, a given donor CD may have disproportionately many users of DonorsChoose or be rich on





Figure 10: This figure illustrates regression equation (10) for four CDs. The left panel presents a binned scatter plot of all donations from both a Democratic and a Republican CD (based on 2016 presidential vote shares) in California against geographic distance to the respective recipient CDs. The right panel presents an analogue for New York state. All data are residualized of donor and recipient CD fixed effects.

average, hence leading to higher overall donation amounts. Similarly, a given recipient CD may post many projects on the DonorsChoose website or be very poor and hence receive many donations. Our specification nets out these level effects and only identifies the responsiveness of donations to distance, holding fixed both the level of donations from the donor and the amount of money a given recipient receives.[11]

## 6.3 Results: Universalism and Vote Shares

Figure 11 shows the raw correlation between universalism (standardized into a z-score) and 2016 Democratic vote shares ($\rho = 0.57$). Table 5 provides a regression analysis. Using the baseline measure of universalism developed above, columns (1)–(4) document that a one-standard-deviation increase in a CD's universalism is associated with a 10 to 13 percent higher Democratic vote share in that CD. Columns (2)–(4) show that the result is robust to including state fixed effects. The regressions also control for the CD's level of donations on DonorsChoose (i.e. a measure of the *level* of altruism of a CD), per capita income, the fraction of the population with at least a college degree, geographic controls, and racial fractionalization.

A potential concern is that our results are merely a mechanical result of the differing geographic distributions of Democratic and Republican CDs—Democratic CDs could lie farther from projects available for donations. Column (4) shows that the results are robust to controlling for the average distance from a given CD to all projects.

[11]To mitigate measurement error in the estimation of CD-level coefficients $\theta_i$, we shrink these coefficients to the sample mean by their signal-to-noise ratio, see Appendix D.2.1. Universalism is measured very precisely at the CD level due to the large underlying sample of donations, so the shrinkage does not meaningfully impact our results – the correlation between the raw and shrunk measures is 0.99.





Figure 11: Relationship between universalism in altruism and CD-level vote shares.

Finally, we present an extension in which universalism in altruism is computed based on *social* rather than geographic distance. When estimating equation (10), we use as $d_{i,j}$ the probability that two individuals from different CDs are friends on Facebook (Bailey et al., 2018); Appendix D.2.2 describes this measure in greater detail. Columns (5)–(6) o Table 5 show that very similar results hold with this alternative distance measure. This show sthat our results do not merely reflect the fact that Democrats' friends are located further away than Republicans' friends. Instead, *holding fixed a given level of friendship distance*, Democrats give relatively less if friendship distance is small and relatively more if friendship distance is large. That is, Republicans treat close friends "better" than Democrats, but Democrats treat distant strangers "better" than Republicans.

## 6.4 Robustness Checks

***Controlling for local sources of education funding.*** An obvious limitation of our analysis is that we estimate universalism only from DonorsChoose data, and do not observe giving outside of this platform. This would be problematic if, for example, variation in universalism across CDs was generated only as an artefact of variation in amounts given locally through other means in each CD. A prime candidate in this respect is the public school funding system, e.g., payments through local property taxes. Table 22 in Appendix D.3 shows that controlling for the per capita amount of primary and secondary education spending derived from local revenue sources does not affect the results.

Table 5: Vote shares and universalism in altruism across Congressional Districts

| | *Dependent variable:* Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Universalism in altruism (wrt geographic distance) | 10.3*** | 13.5*** | 11.1*** | 10.7*** | | |
| | (0.66) | (1.18) | (1.47) | (1.61) | | |
| Universalism in altruism (wrt friendship distance) | | | | | 8.83*** | 5.19*** |
| | | | | | (0.72) | (1.22) |
| Log [1 + Total donations] | | | 2.81** | 2.07* | | 2.18 |
| | | | (1.09) | (1.14) | | (1.36) |
| Log [GDP p/c] | | | | 0.18 | | 0.32 |
| | | | | (1.17) | | (1.40) |
| Fraction of population with college degree | | | | -0.28 | | 10.9 |
| | | | | (7.93) | | (8.02) |
| Latitude | | | | 0.54 | | 0.017 |
| | | | | (0.57) | | (0.59) |
| Log [Distance to coast] | | | | -1.56** | | -1.50** |
| | | | | (0.64) | | (0.70) |
| Racial fractionalization | | | | 21.0*** | | 22.7*** |
| | | | | (6.32) | | (6.55) |
| Log [Average distance to all projects] | | | | 66.6*** | | 56.6*** |
| | | | | (16.76) | | (19.04) |
| State FE | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Observations | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 |
| $R^2$ | 0.33 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.54 | 0.25 | 0.51 |

*Notes.* OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Effective Democratic vote shares are given by Demoractic vote share as a fraction of Democratic and Republican vote share. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

***Geographic distributions of CDs by party.*** Another potential concern pertains to differences in the geographic distribution of red and blue CDs. To address this, we implement two robustness checks. First, we re-estimate universalism after re-coding geographic distance into a binary variable, based on a distance threshold of 50 miles. Thus, this measure of universalism only leverages variation in whether donations are "local" or "distant." Long-distance coast-to-coast donations are hence treated just like other non-local donations. As a second robustness check, we add state-pair fixed-effects to the baseline analysis. That is, our analysis fixes a donor state and a recipient state and only leverages variation in distance within these states, say from Massachusetts to Vermont. The results in these two robustness checks are very similar. See Appendix D.3 and Table 22 for details.

# 7 Conclusion

Based on a simple model, this paper has provided an analysis of the link between moral universalism and the structure of ideology. We have proposed that individual-level heterogeneity in universalism in both altruism and trust accounts for the particular structure of policy views observed in the West. To take just two examples, sending money to starving children in the developing world, or redistributing one's own tax money to people one has never met, are very universalist ideas. Yet, this universalism contrasts with helping those that one is close to and does not comply with everyone's moral views.

As discussed in Section 2, our analysis was modest in that it is conditional on two restrictions. First, we only analyze the structure of ideology as it has prevailed over the last 40-60 years. We do not have anything meaningful to say about whether or how universalism mattered for policy in more distant history. This being said, there is some evidence that suggests that the relevance of universalism for politics has increased over time. First, the Democratic "loss of the South" and subsequent polarization were largely tied to ideas related to (non-) universalism (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). Second, Enke (forthcoming) documents using text analyses that Republicans and Democrats used universalist vs. communal moral language in roughly equal frequencies until the mid-60's but steadily diverged thereafter, which could be understood as suggesting that heterogeneity in universalism is more relevant politically today than in the past.

Our analysis is also modest in that we deliberately focused on the Western world. The connection between the structure of ideology and morality might be different outside the West for various reasons. A first may be that outside the West trust in government may be sufficiently low so that the precise (non-) universalist implementation of policies is irrelevant. More generally, there is a large amount of evidence in political science that has repeatedly documented that "common wisdoms" from Western political systems often do not translate into the newer democracies outside the West (e.g., Moser and Scheiner, 2009; Gallego et al., 2012). A second conjecture is that the different nature of political conflict outside the West is related to cross-cultural heterogeneity in universalism. Indeed, a large body of work argues that over the past 50 years Western societies have increasingly moved towards "post-material" values, and that this transition has not taken place outside the West in a comparable fashion (Inglehart, 1997). Indeed, cultural psychologists and anthropologists routinely point out that rich Western nations are psychologically (and morally) different from non-Western societies (Henrich et al., 2010; Enke, 2019). A possible conjecture is that if (or when) societies outside the West undergo a similar transformation, correlations between universalism and an internally consistent cluster of policy views may emerge.

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# ONLINE APPENDIX

## A Model Derivations

### A.1 Setup

Let $I$ be a discrete set of $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$ agents randomly allocated in equal proportion to the vertices of a rectangle of length $d_l$ and width $d_w$ where $d_w < d_l$ and $d_w + d_l = 1$. Let the distance from agent $i$ to agent $j$ be $d_{i,j}$, where distance is measured along the edge of the rectangle (i.e., the distance between agents diagonal to each other is one).

Agents are divided into two separate countries, where agents connected by the short end of the rectangle are in the same country. Formally, we define a national border $z = d_w$ such that for all agents, any other agent at distance $d_{i,j} \leq z$ are in the same country and all other agents are in a different country.

Define $J_i$ to be the set of people in the population other than $i$, $J_i = I \setminus \{i\}$. Let vector $x_{-i}$ be the consumption of all agents other than $i$. The utility function of an agent $i$ is given by

$$u_i(x_i, x_{-i}) = x_i + \beta_i \sum_{j \in J_i} a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i) x_j$$
$$a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i) = \frac{1 + \theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_{i,j}$$

### A.2 Overview

For each policy domain, agents make a decision to support one of two different policy alternatives. We maintain the convention introduced in the main text that policy option A corresponds to the "safe" option that is costly but does not allow for cheating, while policy option B to the "risky" option that does not impose a per capita cost but introduces scope for cheating by individual agents on the rest of society.

We are concerned with making predictions about the following object, which we define to be an agent $i$'s *relative support for policy option A over policy option B*, and which accordingly dictates which one of the two policy alternatives each agent $i$ prefers:

$$\Omega_{A,B,i} = P(\Lambda_i(\theta_i, \delta_i), \theta_i, \delta_i) \tag{11}$$

$\Lambda_i(\theta_i, \delta_i)$ captures an agent's own decision to *not* cheat on the given policy domain,

given their universalism in preferences and beliefs. That is, agents' decisions to support either a safe or risky policy will derive not only from their social preferences – how allowing or not allowing for cheating would impact the utility of others – but also whether they *themselves* would be likely to cheat on the policy given that opportunity (a greater likelihood of which, everything else equal, should push them towards supporting the risky policy).

Our main prediction will specifically revolve around $\frac{\partial \Omega_{A,B,i}}{\partial \theta_i}$ and $\frac{\partial \Omega_{A,B,i}}{\partial \delta_i}$, the degrees to which an agent $i$'s relative support for the safe option vis-à-vis the risky option evolves independently as a function of both their degree of universalism in altruism and universalism in trust, respectively captured by $\theta_i$ and $\delta_i$. In particular, we will claim:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \Omega_{A,B,i}}{\partial \theta_i} &= \frac{\partial P}{\partial \Lambda_i}\frac{\partial \Lambda_i}{\partial \theta_i} + \frac{\partial P}{\partial \theta_i} > 0 \\ \frac{\partial \Omega_{A,B,i}}{\partial \delta_i} &= \frac{\partial P}{\partial \Lambda_i}\frac{\partial \Lambda_i}{\partial \delta_i} + \frac{\partial P}{\partial \delta_i} = \frac{\partial P}{\partial \delta_i} > 0 \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

That is, both "selfish" and social forces combined, less universalist agents will be more likely to support the safe policy. To make these claims concrete, we will show that in our framework, $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \Lambda_i}$, $\frac{\partial \Lambda_i}{\partial \theta_i}$, $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \theta_i}$, and $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \delta_i}$ are all positive. Meanwhile, $\frac{\partial \Lambda_i}{\partial \delta_i} = 0$.

These derivatives are to be interpreted as follows:

1. $\frac{\partial \Lambda_i}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial \Lambda_i}{\partial \delta_i} = 0$: Agents are less likely to cheat on a policy if they are less universalist (more "groupy") in altruism. Universalism in trust does not affect an agent's decision to cheat on a given policy. See Lemma 1.

2. $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \Lambda_i} > 0$: An agent $i$ is more likely to support the safe policy if they would be less likely to cheat on a risky policy themselves. That is, given a lower likelihood of personally benefitting from cheating, an agent $i$ is more likely to support a policy that eliminates that opportunity in the first place for everybody else, as doing so eliminates the possibility of all others imposing per capita losses on agent $i$, and those agent $i$ cares about. See Lemma 2.

3. $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \delta_i} > 0$: Independent of any *personal* cheating opportunities, "groupy" people are more likely to support the safe policy in both domestic and foreign contexts. Because groupy people think their in-groups (those they care about the most) are also less likely to cheat, they will be more likely to support removing the opportunity to cheat on a policy in the first place from all members of society (predominantly, from the out-group members they simultaneously don't care as much about and believe are more likely to cheat). See Lemmas 3 and 4.

All three derivatives above imply that both personal and prosocial incentives combined unambiguously push less universalist agents to support the safer policy option in

each policy domain over the risky policy option. In the following subsections, we prove each of the relevant lemmas in turn, for both domestic and foreign policy domains.

## A.3 Domestic Policy

We first focus on domestic policy options, defined as policies that only affect the decision-maker and others in the DM's country. We will consider two policy options:

1. Option A: Domestic agents all get a benefit $x$ and pay a cost $c$.
2. Option B: Domestic agents all get a benefit $x$ but domestic agents are allowed to cheat. An agent that cheats gets an extra rent $s$ and imposes a per-capita externality $e$ on all other domestic agents.

We will denote the equilibrium fraction of the population in the DM's country that does not cheat by $\gamma$. Define $L_i$ to be the total loss in equilibrium that agent $i$ sustains as a result of cheating behavior of other agents within the country. Because there is a discrete number of agents, this total equilibrium loss will differ depending on whether or not agent $i$ forms part of the fraction $\gamma$ of non-cheaters. Formally, $L_{i,\text{no cheat}} = (1-\gamma)\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)e$ for all agents who do not cheat, and $L_{i,\text{cheat}} = \left((1-\gamma)\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)-1\right)e$ for all agents who do cheat.

Define $b_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \delta_i)$ to be agent $i$'s subjective probability that agent $j$ is not a cheater. We will assume that agents are correct about the fraction of people that cheat, but may be incorrect in their beliefs about who the cheaters are. Let agent $i$'s subjective beliefs about the probability that agent $j$ is not a cheater if $j$ is in the same country be given by:

$$b_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \delta_i) = \gamma + \frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i d_{i,j} \tag{13}$$

Since in the model distances are discrete, we can define altruism and beliefs about other agents in the same country as

$$a_0 = \tfrac{1+\theta_i}{2} \qquad a_1 = \tfrac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_w$$

$$b_0 = \gamma + \tfrac{d_w}{2}\delta_i \qquad b_1 = \gamma - \tfrac{d_w}{2}\delta_i$$

where throughout these derivations, the 0 subscript refers to domestic in-group members, and the 1 subscript to domestic out-group members.

Assume that $(\theta_i, \delta_i)$ are positive independent joint uniform and drawn i.i.d. in the population. For the altruism weight to be weakly positive we assume $\theta_i \leq 1$. We need $\delta_i \leq \frac{2\gamma}{d_w}$ for beliefs to be non-negative and we need $\delta_i \leq (1-\gamma)\frac{2}{d_w}$ for beliefs to be weakly

less than one. Note that, because all agents are correct about the fraction of cheaters, average beliefs do not depend on $\delta_i$.

### A.3.1 No-Cheat Condition

In an environment in which cheating on a domestic policy is possible, an agent $i$ must decide whether or not to cheat. In evaluating whether or not to cheat, suppose some arbitrary fraction $\varphi_i$ of the other $\frac{N}{2}-1$ domestic agents is perceived by agent $i$ to already be cheating on the policy. In doing so, agent $i$ perceives each of these cheating agents as causing a per-capita loss $e$ on all other agents in the domestic country, including $i$. For every agent $i$, this per-capita loss caused by all cheating agents *other* than $i$ totals $\varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2}-1\right)e$. Let $\tilde{b}_0$ and $\tilde{b}_1$ be respectively agent $i$'s beliefs about the fraction of domestic in-group members and domestic strangers who do *not* cheat, centered around the arbitrary fraction $\varphi_i$ of cheaters among the other agents in the country, as perceived by agent $i$.

If an agent $i$ does *not* cheat on a domestic policy, they derive utility from own consumption, and in addition, utility from the vector of all other domestic agents' consumption, which is partitioned into those who cheat and do not cheat:

$$u_{i,\text{ no cheat}}(x_i, x_{-i}) =$$

$$\underbrace{x-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2}-1\right)e}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s}\\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i\Bigg[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0\tilde{b}_0\left(x-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2}-1\right)e\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic}\\ \text{in-group members (other than agent } i\text{)}\\ \text{who do not cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1\tilde{b}_1\left(x-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2}-1\right)e\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic}\\ \text{out-group members who do not cheat}}}$$

$$+\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0(1-\tilde{b}_0)\left(x-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2}-1-\frac{1}{\varphi_i}\right)e+s\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group members}\\ \text{(other than agent } i\text{) who cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(1-\tilde{b}_1)\left(x-\varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2}-1-\frac{1}{\varphi_i}\right)e+s\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group}\\ \text{members who cheat}}}\Bigg] \tag{14}$$

Agent $i$'s cheating, on the other hand, would deliver utility:

$$u_{i,\,\text{cheat}}(x_i, x_{-i}) =$$

$$\underbrace{x - \varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2} - 1\right)e + s}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i\Bigg[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1\right)a_0\tilde{b}_0\left(x - \left(\varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2} - 1\right) + 1\right)e\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{in-group members (other than agent } i\text{)} \\ \text{who do not cheat}}}$$

$$+\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1\tilde{b}_1\left(x - \left(\varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2} - 1\right) + 1\right)e\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic out-group} \\ \text{members who do not cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1\right)a_0(1 - \tilde{b}_0)\left(x - \left(\varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 - \frac{1}{\varphi_i}\right) + 1\right)e + s\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic in-group} \\ \text{members (other than agent } i\text{) who cheat}}}$$

$$+\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(1 - \tilde{b}_1)\left(x - \left(\varphi_i\left(\frac{N}{2} - 1 - \frac{1}{\varphi_i}\right) + 1\right)e + s\right)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{out-group members who cheat}}}\Bigg] \tag{15}$$

An agent $i$ does *not* cheat on a domestic policy iff $u_{i,\,\text{no cheat}}(x_i, x_{-i}) \geq u_{i,\,\text{cheat}}(x_i, x_{-i})$, i.e. iff eq. (14) $\geq$ eq. (15).

$$\iff s \leq \beta_i e\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)[1 + \theta_i(1 - d_w)] - \frac{1 + \theta_i}{2}\right] \tag{16}$$

Equation (16) defines the equilibrium level of $\gamma$. That is, $\gamma$ is equal to the fraction of agents in each domestic country for which the inequality in equation 16 is true, given an arbitrary and constant $s$, $e$, $N$, $d_w$, and each agent's draw of $\theta_i$ and $\beta_i$. We assume this fraction $\gamma$ exists and is achieved as an equilibrium fraction between 0 and 1, not inclusive.

For any particular individual, their decision is made by calculating the quantity

$$\Lambda_i(\beta_i, \theta_i, \delta_i) \equiv \beta_i e\left[\left(\frac{N}{4} - \frac{1}{2}\right) + \theta_i\left(\frac{N}{4}(1 - d_w) - \frac{1}{2}\right)\right] - s \tag{17}$$

and comparing to zero, i.e. if $\Lambda_i(\beta_i, \theta_i, \delta_i) \geq 0$, agent $i$ does not cheat on a domestic policy.

**Lemma 1.** *Agents displaying low universalism in altruism (relatively large values of $\theta_i$) are less likely to cheat on domestic policies. Likelihood of cheating is independent of universalism in trust.*

Pf: For universalism in altruism,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Lambda_i(\beta_i,\theta_i,\delta_i)}{\partial \theta_i} &= \beta_i e\left(\frac{N}{4}(1-d_w)-\frac{1}{2}\right)\\ &> 0 \iff \frac{N}{4}(1-d_w)-\frac{1}{2}>0\\ &> 0 \iff 1-d_w > \frac{2}{N}\end{aligned}$$

With $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Lambda_i(\beta_i,\theta_i,\delta_i)}{\partial \theta_i} > 0 &\iff 1-d_w > \frac{1}{2}\\ &> 0 \iff d_w < \frac{1}{2}\end{aligned}$$

Given $d_w + d_l = 1$ and $0 < d_w < d_l < 1$, we know:

$$d_w < \frac{1}{2} \implies \frac{\partial \Lambda_i(\beta_i,\theta_i,\delta_i)}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$$

For universalism in trust,

$$\frac{\partial \Lambda_i(\beta_i,\theta_i,\delta_i)}{\partial \delta_i} = 0$$

□

### A.3.2 Policy Preferences

Recall that policy Option A gives $x-c$ to everyone but does not allowing cheating, while Option B gives $x$ to everyone but allows cheating.

The value of policy option A to an agent $i$ would thus be

$$\pi_A = \underbrace{x-c}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s}\\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i\Bigg[\underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0(x-c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of}\\ \text{domestic in-group members}\\ \text{(other than agent } i\text{)}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(x-c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of}\\ \text{domestic out-group members}}}\Bigg] \tag{18}$$

The value of policy option B to an agent $i$ for whom in equilibrium *not* cheating is ex-ante

optimal is:

$$\pi_{B,\text{ no cheat}} =$$

$$\underbrace{x - L_{\text{no cheat}}}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i \Big[ \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1\right) a_0 b_0 (x - L_{\text{no cheat}})}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{in-group members (other than agent i)} \\ \text{who do not cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right) a_1 b_1 (x - L_{\text{no cheat}})}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{out-group members who do not cheat}}} \tag{19}$$

$$+ \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1\right) a_0 (1 - b_0)(x - L_{\text{cheat}} + s)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{in-group members (other than agent i)} \\ \text{who cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right) a_1 (1 - b_1)(x - L_{\text{cheat}} + s)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{out-group members who cheat}}} \Big]$$

while the value of policy option B to an agent $i$ for whom in equilibrium cheating is ex-ante optimal is:

$$\pi_{B,\text{ cheat}} =$$

$$\underbrace{x - L_{\text{cheat}} + s}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility}}} + \beta_i \Big[ \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1\right) a_0 b_0 (x - L_{\text{no cheat}})}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{in-group members (other than agent i)} \\ \text{who do not cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right) a_1 b_1 (x - L_{\text{no cheat}})}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{out-group members who do not cheat}}} \tag{20}$$

$$+ \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1\right) a_0 (1 - b_0)(x - L_{\text{cheat}} + s)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{in-group members (other than agent i)} \\ \text{who cheat}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right) a_1 (1 - b_1)(x - L_{\text{cheat}} + s)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of domestic} \\ \text{out-group members who cheat}}} \Big]$$

In turn, the value of policy A relative to policy B for an agent $i$ who does not cheat is

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Pi_{\text{no cheat}} \equiv (L_{\text{no cheat}} - c) \\
&+ \beta_i \left[ \left( \frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0 \{ L_{\text{no cheat}} - c - (1 - b_0)(e+s) \} + \left( \frac{N}{4} \right) a_1 \{ L_{\text{no cheat}} - c - (1 - b_1)(e+s) \} \right] \\
&= \left( (1-\gamma) \left( \frac{N}{2} \right) e - c \right) \\
&+ \beta_i \left[ \left( \frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} \right) \left\{ (1-\gamma) \left( \frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - \left( 1 - \frac{\gamma \left( \frac{N}{2} \right) - 1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} - \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e+s) \right\} \right. \\
&\left. + \left( \frac{N}{4} \right) \left( \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_w \right) \left\{ (1-\gamma) \left( \frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - \left( 1 - \frac{\gamma \left( \frac{N}{2} \right) - 1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} + \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e+s) \right\} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{21}$$

while the value of policy A relative to policy B to agent $i$ who *does* cheat is

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Pi_{\text{cheat}} \equiv (L_{\text{no cheat}} - c - e - s) \\
&+ \beta_i \left[ \left( \frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) a_0 \{ L_{\text{no cheat}} - c - (1 - b_0)(e+s) \} + \left( \frac{N}{4} \right) a_1 \{ L_{\text{no cheat}} - c - (1 - b_1)(e+s) \} \right] \\
&= \left( (1-\gamma) \left( \frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - e - s \right) \\
&+ \beta_i \left[ \left( \frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} \right) \left\{ (1-\gamma) \left( \frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - \left( 1 - \frac{\gamma \left( \frac{N}{2} \right)}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} - \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e+s) \right\} \right. \\
&\left. + \left( \frac{N}{4} \right) \left( \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_w \right) \left\{ (1-\gamma) \left( \frac{N}{2} \right) e - c - \left( 1 - \frac{\gamma \left( \frac{N}{2} \right)}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} + \frac{d_w}{2} \delta_i \right) (e+s) \right\} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{22}$$

$$\implies \Pi_{\text{cheat}} \equiv \Pi_{\text{no cheat}} + (e+s) \left[ \left( \frac{1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} \right) \beta_i \left\{ \left( \frac{N}{4} \right) (1 + (1 - d_w)\theta_i) - \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} \right\} - 1 \right] \tag{23}$$

Note that in equations (21) and (22), $b_0$ and $b_1$ are scaled to reflect that, in equilibrium, whether or not an agent $i$ forms part of the fraction of cheaters in the country necessarily distorts their beliefs about the fraction of domestic in-group and out-group

members who are cheaters and non-cheaters (in that knowing you yourself are not a cheater means you must scale up the fraction of *other* agents in the country who must be cheating, in order for the fraction $\gamma$ of non-cheaters to be true for the entire country; viceversa for knowing you *are* a cheater, which means you adjust downwards your beliefs about the fraction of *other* agents who are also cheating, given an equilibrium, constant fraction $\gamma$).

**Lemma 2.** *Everything else equal, agent i's relative support for the "safe" policy option A increases with the likelihood of agent i not cheating on the given policy domain.*

Pf: Lemma 2 is true if the value derived from Policy A is greater relative to that derived from Policy B for an agent who would not cheat given the opportunity to do so, compared to one who *would* cheat. That is, if $\Pi_{\text{no cheat}} > \Pi_{\text{cheat}}$. From equation (23), we see that this condition is true if:

$$\left(\frac{1}{\frac{N}{2}-1}\right)\beta_i\left\{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)(1+(1-d_w)\theta_i)-\frac{1+\theta_i}{2}\right\}<1$$

We can confirm the above condition is itself true for *any* values $\beta_i \leq 1$, $d_w \in \left(0, \frac{1}{2}\right)$, $N \geq 4$, and $\theta_i \in [0,1]$. Because by assumption all of the relevant parameters take on values *only* in those prescribed ranges, the condition is true.

Analogously, because $\Pi$'s define the *relative* support for Policy A over Policy B, a would-be cheating agent $i$ values Policy B relatively more than Policy A, compared to a non-cheater.

$$\therefore \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \Lambda_i} > 0$$

□

Now let's consider how the relative valuation of Policy A over Policy B changes as universalism in trust $\delta_i$ varies.

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \delta_i} = \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \delta_i} = \beta_i\left(\frac{d_w}{2}\right)(e+s)\left[\theta_i\left(\frac{N}{4}d_w-\frac{1}{2}\right)-\frac{1}{2}\right] \tag{24}$$

For the case of universalism in altruism, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} =& \beta_i\Bigg[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)\left\{(1-\gamma)\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)e-c-\left(1-\frac{\gamma\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)-1}{\frac{N}{2}-1}-\frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i\right)(e+s)\right\} \\ &+\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}-d_w\right)\left\{(1-\gamma)\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)e-c-\left(1-\frac{\gamma\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)-1}{\frac{N}{2}-1}+\frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i\right)(e+s)\right\}\Bigg]\end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} =& \beta_i \Bigg[ \left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)\left\{(1-\gamma)\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)e - c - \left(1-\frac{\gamma\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)}{\frac{N}{2}-1}-\frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i\right)(e+s)\right\} \\ &+ \left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}-d_w\right)\left\{(1-\gamma)\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)e - c - \left(1-\frac{\gamma\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)}{\frac{N}{2}-1}+\frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i\right)(e+s)\right\}\Bigg] \\ =& \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} + \left(\frac{1}{\frac{N}{2}-1}\right)(e+s)\beta_i\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)(1-d_w)\end{aligned} \tag{26}$$

In what follows, we define $\omega \equiv \left[(1-\gamma)\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)e - c\right] - \left(1-\frac{\gamma\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)-1}{\frac{N}{2}-1}-\frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i\right)(e+s)$. We additionally make the assumption that $\omega \geq 0$, which corresponds to the intuition that Policy B does *not* strictly dominate Policy A. For clarity, consider the counterfactual assumption, i.e. $\omega < 0$. In that case, we'd have $(1-\gamma)\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)e - c < \left(1-\frac{\gamma\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)-1}{\frac{N}{2}-1}-\frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i\right)(e+s)$. The left-hand-side of this inequality can be reexpressed as $L_{\text{no cheat}} - c$ and thus corresponds to the per-capita change in consumption utility for all *non*-cheating agents moving from the "safe" Policy A to the "risky" Policy B; such agents would no longer have to pay the per-capita cost $c$ associated with the safe policy, but would now suffer from the total losses imposed on them by the cheating of others. The right-hand-side of the inequality, on the other hand, can be reexpressed as $(1-b_0)(e+s)$, and thus corresponds conceptually to the expected, per-capita gain for all other domestic in-group members obtained from the equilibrium fraction of those who now get to cheat under the switch from Policy A to Policy B (as given by the no-cheat condition; each of those who ex-ante would find cheating optimal would each gain $e+s$ relative to a non-cheater in an environment in which cheating was allowed).

As such, if $\omega < 0$, it would be the case that even for a *non*-cheater, a switch from Policy A to Policy B would be optimal; the per capita change in consumption utility for them and all other domestic non-cheaters would be more than compensated for by the expected, per capita gain of domestic in-group members cheaters under such a regime switch (produced by those who cheat), let alone without including the gains reaped by domestic *out-group* cheaters. As such, $\omega \geq 0$ captures the reasonable assumption that the risky policy B does not strictly dominate the safe policy A for a non-cheater.

With the above assumption, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} =& \beta_i \left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)\omega + \left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}-d_w\right)(\omega + (d_w\delta_i)(e+s))\right] \\ \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} =& \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} + \left(\frac{1}{\frac{N}{2}-1}\right)(e+s)\beta_i\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)(1-d_w)\end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

**Lemma 3.** *For $N$ sufficiently large, support for the "safe" policy option A increases as universalism in trust decreases. For any $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$, under assumption $\omega \geq 0$, support for the "safe" policy option A increases as universalism in altruism decreases.*

Pf: For universalism in trust,

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \delta_i} = \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \delta_i} > 0 \iff \theta_i \left( \frac{N}{4} d_w - \frac{1}{2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} > 0$$
$$\iff \theta_i > \frac{1}{\frac{N}{2} d_w - 1}$$

As $N \to \infty$, the condition for support for policy option A to decrease with universalism in trust converges to $\theta_i > 0$, which with $\theta_i$ drawn uniformly from the continuum $[0, 1]$, encompasses all values of $\theta_i$ in the population almost surely.

Formally, for the case of a finite $N$, we define some very small fraction $\varepsilon > 0$ of the world population whose draw of $\theta_i$ does *not* satisfy the condition above, but with which in turn a sufficiently large fraction $1 - \varepsilon$ of the world's population $N$ *would* satisfy the condition required for relative support for the safe policy to decline with universalism in trust (i.e., increase with $\delta_i$). Given that $\theta_i \overset{i.i.d.}{\sim} U[0, 1]$, the minimum world population $\bar{N}$ required for a fraction $(1 - \varepsilon) \approx 1$ of the population to have drawn a value of $\theta_i$ that satisfies the condition above is given by:

$$\bar{N} \equiv \left( \frac{1}{\varepsilon} + 1 \right) \frac{2}{d_w}$$

For universalism in altruism, remember that we assume $\omega \geq 0$. Moreover, also notice that with $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$, $\frac{N}{4} - 1 \geq 0$, and that with $d_w + d_l = 1$ and $d_l > d_w$, $d_w < \frac{1}{2}$. As such,

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$$

Moreover, notice that:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} = \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} + \left( \frac{1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} \right) (e + s) \beta_i \left( \frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) (1 - d_w)$$

That is, with $\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$, if it is also the case that $\left( \frac{1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} \right) (e + s) \beta_i \left( \frac{N}{4} - 1 \right) (1 - d_w) \geq 0$, then $\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$ as well.

Because $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$, $0 < d_w < \frac{1}{2}$, $\beta_i \in [0, 1]$, $e > 0$, and $s > 0$, it is indeed the case that:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} > 0$$

Thus relative support for the safe policy option A vis-à-vis the risky policy option B increases with the agent's "groupishness" (i.e., decreases with moral universalism).

□

**Comments on stability.** Note that, in equilibrium, since $L_{\text{cheat}} = L_{\text{no cheat}} - e$, in a world in which Option B is already the incumbent policy, would-be cheaters are better off than non-cheaters by a magnitude of $\pi_{B,\text{ cheat}} - \pi_{B,\text{ no cheat}} > 0$, by virtue of forming part of the equilibrium fraction $1-\gamma$ of cheaters (which means they face a lower total cost from all others' cheating, and the additional rent $s$).

Critically, this does *not* also imply that in equilibrium, those who start off as non-cheaters want to switch to cheating on the policy. This is because, as laid out in Appendix A.3.1, the no-cheat condition assumes some arbitrary fraction $\varphi$ of agents is known to already be cheating on the policy when each agent decides whether or not to cheat. Under a choice of arbitrary $\varphi$ equal to $1-\gamma$, a decision to switch to cheating from non-cheating by an agent who considered cheating to be *ex-ante* suboptimal would make them worse off. Due to the discreteness of the model, each agent would consider their switch to cheating as if changing the equilibrium fraction of cheaters in the world, and as such adding an *additional* per capita cost to others (not as if merely replacing a cheater to maintain $\gamma$ constant), which would make them ultimately worse off. Thus, non-cheating decisions are stable, as are the equilibrium fraction $\gamma$ of non-cheaters, the total equilibrium losses $L_{\text{cheat}}$ and $L_{\text{no cheat}}$, and in turn policy preferences.

We can envision the formation and stability of this equilibrium as if all agents originally construe $\varphi = 0$. That is, before any information is revealed (say policy option B is not yet enacted), all agents decide whether or not they *would* like to cheat if the environment was conducive to do so (i.e. once policy option B was enacted) and as if no one else in the country was cheating. As given by this no-cheat condition with the arbitrary choice of $\varphi = 0$, some fraction of agents would decide to cheat while the remainder would not, as dictated by equation (16). By the linearity of the utility function and the discreteness of the model, even upon learning of the actual fraction of agents $\varphi$ $(= 1-\gamma)$ that *is* cheating, ex-ante non-cheaters would, by the same no-cheat condition, *still* not find it optimal to switch to cheating. So even though *ex-post* cheaters are better off under policy option B than non-cheaters, the equilibrium is stable.

## A.4 Foreign Policy

In the foreign policy context, we will again assume that only two policy options exist. They are

1. Option A: Domestic and foreign agents both receive a benefit $x$, but domestic agents also pay a cost $c$ while foreign agents pay no cost.

2. Option B: All agents, domestic and foreign, get the same benefit $x$ but foreign agents are allowed to cheat and get $s$ by imposing a per-capita cost $e$ on domestic

people.

Note that in this context it is much simpler to derive the relationship between universalism and policy preferences. This is because in the context of foreign policies, only *foreign* agents are allowed to cheat on one's own country, and as such there are no "selfish" components of a domestic agent $i$'s utility function to consider when examining their policy preferences. A no-cheat condition is not needed, and we do not need to examine cases based on a domestic agent $i$'s own decision to cheat or not.

However, in order to evaluate each policy option, decision-makers must form beliefs about who cheats. We will take the stance that the subjective probability of not cheating declines linearly in social distance at a rate $\delta_i$:

$$b_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \delta_i) = \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i d_{i,j} \tag{28}$$

where decision-makers are again correct about the overall fraction of cheaters in the foreign country ($\gamma_f$), but may be incorrect in their beliefs about which foreigners cheat. In order for beliefs to lie on the unit interval, we assume $\delta_i \in \left[0, \min\left(\frac{2\gamma}{1-d_l}, (1-\gamma_f)\frac{2}{1-d_l}\right)\right]$. Levels of altruism and beliefs by distance are given by the below:

$$\begin{array}{cccc} a_0 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} & a_1 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_w & a_2 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_l & a_3 = \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i \\ b_0 = 1 & b_1 = 1 & b_2 = \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - d_l\delta_i & b_3 = \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i \end{array}$$

where, as above, the 0 subscript refers to domestic in-group members, the 1 subscript to domestic out-group members, the 2 subscript to foreign in-group members, and the 3 subscript to foreign out-group members.

We define $L_f$ to be the total cost of cheating imposed by foreigners. That is, $L_f = (1-\gamma_f)\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)e$. For a domestic agent $i$, the relative value of Option A to Option B in the

foreign policy domain is therefore:

$$\Pi \equiv \underbrace{(x-c)}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility} \\ \text{under Policy A}}} + \beta_i \Bigg[ \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0(x-c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic in-group members (other} \\ \text{than agent } i\text{) under Policy A}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(x-c)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic out-group members} \\ \text{under Policy A}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)(a_2+a_3)x}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign agents under Policy A}}} \Bigg]$$

$$- \underbrace{(x-L_f)}_{\substack{\text{Agent } i\text{'s} \\ \text{consumption utility} \\ \text{under Policy B}}} - \beta_i \Bigg[ \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)a_0(x-L_f)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic in-group members (other} \\ \text{than agent } i\text{) under Policy B}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_1(x-L_f)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{domestic out-group members} \\ \text{under Policy B}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_2 b_2 x}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign in-group members who} \\ \text{do not cheat under Policy B}}}$$

$$+ \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_3 b_3 x}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign out-group members} \\ \text{who do not cheat under Policy B}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_2(1-b_2)(x+s)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign in-group members} \\ \text{who cheat under Policy B}}} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)a_3(1-b_3)(x+s)}_{\substack{\text{Utility from consumption of} \\ \text{foreign out-group members} \\ \text{who cheat under Policy B}}} \Bigg]$$

$$= (L_f - c) + \beta_i \left[ \left( \frac{N}{4}(a_0 + a_1) - a_0 \right)(L_f - c) - \left( \frac{N}{4} \right)(a_2(1-b_2) + a_3(1-b_3))s \right]$$

$$= (L_f - c) + \beta_i \Bigg[ \left( \frac{N}{4}(1 + \theta_i(1-d_w)) - \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} \right)(L_f - c)$$

$$- \left( \frac{N}{4} \right) \left\{ \left( \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i d_l \right) \left( 1 - \left( \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - d_l \delta_i \right) \right) + \left( \frac{1+\theta_i}{2} - \theta_i \right) \left( 1 - \left( \gamma_f + \frac{1+d_l}{2}\delta_i - \delta_i \right) \right) \right\} s \Bigg] \tag{29}$$

We first take the comparative static of the relative valuation of Option A compared to Option B with respect to universalism in trust $\delta_i$:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \delta_i} = \beta_i \left( \frac{N}{4} \right) \theta_i \left[ d_l \left( \frac{d_l - 2}{2} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \right] \tag{30}$$

Next, we take the comparative static of the relative valuation of Option A relative to Option B with respect to universalism in altrusim $\theta_i$:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \theta_i} = \beta_i \left[ (L_f - c) \left( \frac{N}{4}(1-d_w) - \frac{1}{2} \right) + \left( \frac{N}{4} \right) \left( d_l - \frac{1}{2} \right)(1-b_2)s + \left( \frac{N}{4} \right) \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)(1-b_3)s \right] \tag{31}$$

**Lemma 4.** *Relative support for the "safe" policy option A increases as universalism in trust decreases. With the condition $c \leq L_f$, relative support for the "safe" policy option A increases as universalism in altruism decreases.*

Pf: For universalism in trust,

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \delta_i} > 0 \iff d_l\left(\frac{d_l - 2}{2}\right) + \frac{1}{2} > 0$$

The above is true for $d_l \neq 1$. Because $d_w + d_l = 1$ and $d_l > d_w > 0$, we have that $\frac{1}{2} < d_l < 1$. Therefore, $\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \delta_i} > 0$.

For universalism in altruism,

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \theta_i} > 0 \iff L_f \geq c,\ \frac{N}{4}(1 - d_w) - \frac{1}{2} > 0,\ d_l > \frac{1}{2}$$

With $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$, $d_w + d_l = 1$, and $d_w < d_l$, we know $d_w < \frac{1}{2}$, $d_l > \frac{1}{2}$, and $\frac{N}{4}(1 - d_w) > \frac{1}{2}$.

Restricting attention by assumption to cases in which $c \leq L_f$, this comparative static is always non-negative, meaning that more groupy agents are more likely to prefer Option A. This condition is quite weak, in that it restricts us to look at cases in which Option B does not dominate. If $c > L_f$, both domestic agents and foreigners would be weakly better off under Option B. We can thus conclude that under reasonable circumstances agents that are more groupish are more likely to prefer Option A.

□

## A.5 Extension: Correlation between Altruism and Universalism

Throughout our baseline model we assumed that $\beta_i$ is orthogonal to $\theta_i$. In this section, we allow for the possibility of a linear relationship between altruism and universalism in altruism:

$$\beta_i = \psi + \eta\theta_i$$

We confirm that the predictions made by our model hold under a limited set of restrictions on the magnitudes of $\psi$ and $\eta$. Specifically, if $\eta > 0$ (i.e., groupy people are more altruistic), then no additional restrictions are necessary, and the derivations from our original model only strengthen. In the case where universalists are more altruistic ($\eta < 0$), in order for our original predictions to hold it must be the case that $|\eta| < g(N, d_w, e, s, \omega, \psi, \theta_i, \delta_i)$ (we outline this function $g$ below). That is, if universalists are more altruistic, the relationship must be sufficiently small enough.

In what follows, we lay out the changes to the mathematical derivations of our original model that are required by allowing $\beta_i = \psi + \eta\theta_i$. We also describe the intutions that accompany these derivations when results deviate from the original model.

**Case of $\eta = 0$:** Equivalent to our original model, where to each agent we assign their own altruism parameter $\beta_i = \psi_i$. The model also holds when $\beta_i = \psi\ \forall\ i$.

**Setup for cases of $\eta \neq 0$:** First we rederive the conditions and derivatives we worked with in our baseline model, under the possibility that $\beta_i = \psi + \eta\theta_i$. In these cases, the utility function of an agent $i$ is given by

$$u_i(x_i, x_{-i}) = x_i + (\psi + \eta\theta_i)\left(\sum_{j \in J_i} a_{i,j}(d_{i,j}, \theta_i)x_j\right)$$

Continuing with the notations of our baseline model and repeating the derivations in Appendix A.3.1 with the above utility function, our no-cheat condition becomes:

$$\Lambda_i(\psi, \eta, \theta_i, \delta_i) = (\psi + \eta\theta_i)e\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)[1 + \theta_i(1 - d_w)] - \frac{1 + \theta_i}{2}\right] - s \geq 0 \tag{32}$$

With regards to policy preferences, repeating the derivations in Appendix A.3.2, the value derived from Policy A relative to Policy B for a cheater versus a non-cheater is given by:

$$\implies \Pi_{\text{cheat}} - \Pi_{\text{no cheat}} \equiv (e + s)\left[\left(\frac{1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1}\right)(\psi + \eta\theta_i)\left\{\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)(1 + (1 - d_w)\theta_i) - \frac{1 + \theta_i}{2}\right\} - 1\right] \tag{33}$$

Finally, we examine how the relative valuation of Policy A over Policy B changes as both universalism in altruism and universalism in trust vary. Maintaining the assumption in Appendix A.3.2 that $\omega \equiv \left[(1 - \gamma)\left(\frac{N}{2}\right)e - c\right] - \left(1 - \frac{\gamma\left(\frac{N}{2}\right) - 1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1} - \frac{d_w}{2}\delta_i\right)(e + s) \geq 0$, we have:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \delta_i} = \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \delta_i} = (\psi + \eta\theta_i)\left(\frac{d_w}{2}\right)(e + s)\left[\theta_i\left(\frac{N}{4}d_w - \frac{1}{2}\right) - \frac{1}{2}\right]$$

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} = {} & \psi\left[\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)\omega + \left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2} - d_w\right)(\omega + (d_w\delta_i)(e + s))\right] \\ & + \eta\left[\left(\frac{N}{4} - 1\right)\left(\frac{1}{2} + \theta_i\right)\omega + \left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2} + \theta_i(1 - 2d_w)\right)(\omega + (d_w\delta_i)(e + s))\right]\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} = {} & \frac{\partial \Pi_{\text{no cheat}}}{\partial \theta_i} \\ & + \left(\frac{1}{\frac{N}{2} - 1}\right)(e + s)\left[\psi\left(\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)(1 - d_w) - \frac{1}{2}\right) + \eta\left(\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)(1 + 2\theta_i(1 - d_w)) - \frac{1}{2} - \theta_i\right)\right]\end{aligned} \tag{34}$$

**Conditions for proof.** Our baseline model relied on demonstrating the following: (i) the derivative of equation (32) with respect to $\theta_i$ is positive and with respect to $\delta_i$ is equal to zero (such that universalists in altruism are more likely to cheat on a policy, while universalism in trust has no relationship to cheating); (ii) that the value of equation (33)

is negative (such that the more likely you are to cheat on a policy, the more likely you are to support an environment in which you *can* cheat, and thus support a safe policy less); and (iii) the derivatives in equation (34) are all positive (such that independent of an agent's own decision to cheat or not, groupy agents in both altruism and trust prefer the safe policy more than universalists in the corresponding domains).

In what follows, we show the restrictions on $\psi$ and $\eta$ by which the above conditions still hold when $\beta_i = \psi + \eta\theta_i$. Throughout, note that in order for $\psi + \eta\theta_i \equiv \beta_i \in [0,1]$ to hold with $\theta \in [0,1]$, we need: $\psi \in [0, 1-\eta\theta_i]$ when $\eta > 0$, and $\psi \in [|\eta|\theta_i, 1]$ when $\eta < 0$. In either case, $\psi$ must be a nonnegative value.

**Case of $\eta > 0$:** With no new restrictions on the parameters introduced in our baseline model, the relationship between policy views and universalism holds when groupy people are more altruistic. That is, for any value of $\eta > 0$, the conditions outlined above still hold making no new assumptions on the values of parameters like $N$, $d_w$, $e$, or $s$, etc.

Intuitively, in our baseline model it was the case that groupy people are less likely to cheat. If in addition groupy people internalize the consumption of others at a higher *baseline* level, they will be even less likely to cheat than universalists, relative to the baseline model. Moreover, independent of their own cheating decisions, internalizing the welfare of others to a greater degree than universalists makes them more strongly oppose the possibility of an environment in which cheating is possible, relative to the baseline model.

**Case of $\eta < 0$:** The conditions required for the proof of our baseline model hold when $\eta < 0$ under a simple restriction on the magnitude of $\eta$ relative to that of $\psi$. Specifically, it is the case that on average, universalists still prefer "risky" policies more than groupy people if, conditional on universalists being also more altruistic on average, the positive relationship between universalism and altruism is sufficiently small.

Intuitively, in the counterfactual case where the relationship is too *strong*, it could potentially be the case not only that universalists internalize the welfare of out-group members more than groupy people do (which is true for our baseline model), but also that universalists internalize the welfare of *in*-group members more than groupy people do. In turn, if universalists not only spread out an altruism budget more evenly but also have a *larger* altruism budget to spread out than groupy people, the predictions of our model reverse, and universalists unambiguously support safe policies over risky ones more than groupy people do.

In order for the conditions of our baseline proof (showing that groupy people prefer safe policies over risky ones more than universalists do) to be met when $\eta < 0$, we

require the following restriction:

$$|\eta| < \psi \left[ \max \left\{ \frac{\left(\frac{N}{4}(1-d_w)-\frac{1}{2}\right)}{\left(\frac{N}{4}-\frac{1}{2}\right)+2\theta_i\left(\frac{N}{4}(1-d_w)-\frac{1}{2}\right)} \; , \; \frac{\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)\omega+\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}-d_w\right)(\omega+(d_w\delta_i)(e+s))\right]}{\left[\left(\frac{N}{4}-1\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}+\theta_i\right)\omega+\left(\frac{N}{4}\right)\left(\frac{1}{2}+\theta_i-2\theta_i d_w\right)(\omega+(d_w\delta_i)(e+s))\right]} \right\} \right]$$

We have confirmed that for all possible values of $\psi \in [|\eta|\theta_i, 1]$, $N \in 4\mathbb{Z}$, $d_w \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$, $\theta_i \in [0,1]$, $\delta_i \in [0,1]$, $\omega \geq 0$, $e > 0$, and $s > 0$, the above restriction converges with sufficiently large $N$ to an inequality of the form $|\eta| < g$ (for some small number $g$) that is both feasible and reasonable within a framework of $\beta_i \equiv (\psi + \eta\theta_i) \in [0,1]$. This can again be summarized with the intuition that, were universalists also more altruistic on average, in order to explain our empirical results the degree to which altruism grows with universalism can only be so large.

# B Analysis of Ideological Clusters in the CSES

To assess whether the trends observed in our survey data extend to a broader set of countries, we use data from Module 4 of the CSES. Data collection for this module was conducted between 2011 and 2016 in 39 countries. These post-election surveys are nationally representative.

The variables of interest in our analysis are left-right leaning and support for various policy positions. The CSES survey asks respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale of 0 to 10, which aligns with the measure of left-right placement used in our survey. We quantify support for policy positions using CSES survey questions that ask respondents for their desired level of government spending in four policy domains that overlap with our survey: healthcare, defense, police, and welfare. Specifically, the CSES asks respondents whether public expenditure on each of these four domains should be "more than now, somewhat more than now, the same as now, somewhat less than now, or much less than now," where these responses are ranked on a discrete scale from 1 to 5. We standardize these values within each country to account for broad cross-country differences in desired levels of spending.

We include all observations for which both left-right leaning and at least one of the four policy preferences are non-missing. Dropping the missing observations, our figures draw on 51,535 observations from 37 countries. We partition these into a set of sixteen "Western" countries—the Western European countries, along with the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—and a set of twenty-one non-Western countries.

Figure 12 illustrates the correlations between policy views and left-right placement for Western and non-Western countries, respectively. As outlined in Section 2, these figures indicate that the trends we observe for the seven countries in our survey data extend to a broader range of countries: Western countries show a stronger correlation between political leaning and policy positions than do non-Western countries.

In Western countries, the regression coefficients of defense spending on left-right leaning average -0.10 (min: -0.19, max: -0.0039), whereas the average in non-Western countries is -0.033 (min: -0.17, max: 0.035). For police spending, these coefficients are respectively an average of -0.058 (min: -0.12, max: -0.014), and -0.0091 (min: -0.083, max: 0.040). In the domain of health care, the regression coefficients in Western countries average 0.056 (min: -0.028, max: 0.12), whereas the average coefficient in non-Western countries is 0.013 (min: -0.048, max: 0.075). Finally, in the domain of welfare, the regression coefficients average 0.099 (min: -0.0096, max: 0.20), and 0.015 (min: -0.029, max: 0.095), respectively.

On average, in these four domains the coefficients are greater in magnitude in Western countries, with the expected signs. This is consistent with the findings in our survey.





Figure 12: Correlation between self-reported political leaning and policy preferences, as measured by the standardized (within each country) answer to the CSES survey questions about whether government expenditures in a category should go up or down. The left panel includes the Western countries and the right panel non-Western countries. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specifications include country fixed effects.

# C Additional Details and Analyses for Survey

## C.1 Sample Characteristics

This section presents sample characteristics for all seven countries included in our survey. For reasons beyond our control and related to Dynata's reach in data collection, several of our samples are relatively too educated in comparison with a representative sample. This is specifically the case for Australia, Brazil, Germany, South Korea, and Sweden.

### C.1.1 Australia

| | | Study Sample (%) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Category | Population (%) | *Full* | *Representative* |
| **Gender** | | | |
| Male | 49 | 47.1 | 48.6 |
| Female | 51 | 52.9 | 51.4 |
| **Age** | | | |
| 18–29 | 24 | 14.5 | 14.9 |
| 30–39 | 17 | 19.2 | 19.2 |
| 40–49 | 17 | 19.3 | 19.1 |
| 50–59 | 16 | 19.4 | 18.3 |
| 60–69 | 13 | 14.1 | 14.6 |
| $\geq 70$ | 13 | 13.5 | 13.9 |
| **Income** (annual; AUD) | | | |
| Below 20,000 | 7 | 5.0 | 5.1 |
| 20,000–34,999 | 13 | 12.4 | 12.8 |
| 35,000–49,999 | 12 | 12.8 | 13.0 |
| 50,000–64,999 | 12 | 12.9 | 12.8 |
| 65,000–79,999 | 10 | 10.2 | 10.5 |
| 80,000–99,999 | 10 | 11.1 | 11.1 |
| 100,000–124,999 | 10 | 11.2 | 11.0 |
| 125,000–149,999 | 8 | 10.0 | 8.9 |
| 150,000–199,999 | 9 | 8.3 | 8.6 |
| 200,000 or more | 8 | 6.0 | 6.2 |
| **Ancestry** | | | |
| English | 26 | 11.5 | 11.8 |
| Australian | 25 | 68.5 | 67.5 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Other | 49 | 20.1 | 20.7 |
| **Education** | | | |
| No high school | 28 | 7.5 | 7.7 |
| High school | 18 | 26.4 | 25.4 |
| Vocational training | 29 | 33.2 | 34.2 |
| Bachelor's degree or higher | 25 | 33.0 | 32.6 |
| **Employment Status (for those at most 65)** | | | |
| Employed full-time | 55 | 53.2 | 55.0 |
| Not employed full-time | 45 | 46.8 | 45.0 |

Note: We were advised by Dynata that it is not common practice to ask respondents in Australia about their race or ethnicity. Accordingly, we found data from the Australian census corresponding to ancestry, which we condensed into "Australian", "English", or "Other". Our final sample characteristics correspond closely to guidance from Dynata that 74% of Australian citizens are Australian-born, which leads us to believe respondents interpreted our ancestry question as eliciting their country of birth or nationality, as is more common practice in Australia.

### C.1.2 Brazil

| | | Study Sample (%) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Category | Population (%) | *Full* | *Representative* |
| **Gender** | | | |
| Male | 48 | 52.1 | 50.2 |
| Female | 52 | 47.9 | 49.8 |
| **Age** | | | |
| 18–29 | 30 | 36.7 | 36.9 |
| 30–39 | 22 | 30.3 | 28.8 |
| 40–49 | 19 | 18.6 | 19.3 |
| 50–59 | 14 | 11.0 | 11.4 |
| ≥60 | 15 | 3.5 | 3.6 |
| **Income** (annual; Brazilian reals) | | | |
| Below 3,000 | 5 | 15.8 | 16.1 |
| 3,000–5,999 | 12 | 13.0 | 13.5 |
| 6,000–11,999 | 22 | 9.7 | 10.1 |
| 12,000–17,999 | 17 | 8.6 | 8.9 |
| 18,000–29,999 | 20 | 9.9 | 10.3 |
| 30,000–59,999 | 16 | 19.2 | 20.0 |
| ≥60,000 | 8 | 23.9 | 21.1 |
| **Ancestry** | | | |
| White | 49 | 61.3 | 59.8 |
| Multi-racial | 41 | 27.4 | 28.5 |
| Other | 10 | 11.3 | 11.8 |
| **Education** | | | |
| No formal education | 45 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Elementary school | 17 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
| High school | 28 | 48.1 | 50.0 |
| Bachelor's degree or higher | 10 | 48.3 | 46.2 |
| **Employment Status (for those at most 65)** | | | |
| Employed full-time | 41 | 67.8 | 66.5 |
| Not employed full-time | 59 | 32.2 | 33.5 |

Note: Our samples in Brazil are relatively educated, young, wealthy, and employed. We have reason to believe that some subsamples of the Brazilian population are inaccessible to *Dynata*. For example, the Brazilian census likely includes indigenous populations that likely make up a sizable portion of the "No formal education" bucket.

### C.1.3 France

| | | Study Sample (%) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Category | Population (%) | *Full* | *Representative* |
| **Gender** | | | |
| Male | 48 | 47.9 | 47.7 |
| Female | 52 | 52.1 | 52.3 |
| **Age** | | | |
| 18–29 | 18 | 12.9 | 17.4 |
| 30–39 | 16 | 20.7 | 18.0 |
| 40–49 | 16 | 23.0 | 18.0 |
| 50–59 | 17 | 23.3 | 19.6 |
| ≥60 | 33 | 20.0 | 27.0 |
| **Income** (annual, EUR) | | | |
| Below 10,000 | 7 | 9.3 | 9.5 |
| 10,000–14,999 | 6 | 7.5 | 7.3 |
| 15,000–19,999 | 13 | 11.0 | 12.4 |
| 20,000–24,999 | 12 | 13.5 | 13.1 |
| 25,000–29,999 | 11 | 11.1 | 10.6 |
| 30,000–34,999 | 10 | 10.9 | 10.2 |
| 35,000–39,999 | 8 | 8.1 | 7.2 |
| 40,000–49,999 | 13 | 13.1 | 12.1 |
| 50,000–64,999 | 10 | 8.7 | 8.6 |
| 65,000 or more | 10 | 6.9 | 9.0 |
| **Ancestry** | | | |
| French or other European | 85 | 96.8 | 95.6 |
| Other | 15 | 3.2 | 4.4 |
| **Education** | | | |
| No high school | 22 | 17.9 | 21.4 |
| High school | 43 | 30.9 | 41.5 |
| Some college | 14 | 20.8 | 14.8 |
| Bachelor's degree or higher | 21 | 30.4 | 22.3 |
| **Employment Status (for those at most 65)** | | | |
| Employed full-time | 56 | 65.6 | 56.5 |
| Not employed full-time | 44 | 34.4 | 43.5 |

Note: "High school" corresponded to "Baccalauréat", "Some college" to "Enseignement supérieur, niveau Bac+2 max", and "Bachelor's degree or higher" to "Enseignement supérieur, niveau Bac+3 et plus".

### C.1.4 Germany

| | | Study Sample (%) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Category | Population (%) | *Full* | *Representative* |
| **Gender** | | | |
| Male | 49 | 51.0 | 50.3 |
| Female | 51 | 49.0 | 49.7 |
| **Age** | | | |
| 18–29 | 21 | 13.5 | 13.7 |
| 30–39 | 14 | 19.4 | 19.7 |
| 40–49 | 19 | 21.0 | 21.3 |
| 50–59 | 17 | 26.0 | 25.0 |
| 60–69 | 13 | 16.0 | 16.2 |
| ≥70 | 17 | 4.0 | 4.1 |
| **Income** (monthly; EUR) | | | |
| Below 1,300 | 19 | 15.1 | 15.3 |
| 1,300–2,599 | 33 | 33.6 | 34.0 |
| 2,600–3,599 | 19 | 22.1 | 22.4 |
| 3,600–5,000 | 15 | 21.8 | 20.7 |
| More than 5,000 | 14 | 7.5 | 7.6 |
| **Ancestry** | | | |
| German | 79 | 96.6 | 96.6 |
| European (not German) | 15 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| Other | 6 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| **Education** | | | |
| No vocational training | 27 | 5.6 | 5.7 |
| Vocational training | 57 | 58.3 | 59.1 |
| University degree | 16 | 36.1 | 35.2 |
| **Employment Status (for those at most 65)** | | | |
| Employed full-time | 59 | 64.3 | 63.8 |
| Not employed full-time | 41 | 35.7 | 36.2 |

Note: The option included in the survey equivalent to vocational training was “Lehre oder Berufsausbildung im dualen System”. For “University degree”, the option provided was “Hochschulabschluss”.

### C.1.5 South Korea

| | | Study Sample (%) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Category | Population (%) | *Full* | *Representative* |
| **Gender** | | | |
| Male | 50 | 49.3 | 48.3 |
| Female | 50 | 50.7 | 51.7 |
| **Age** | | | |
| 18–29 | 19 | 19.6 | 23.0 |
| 30–39 | 18 | 30.8 | 26.2 |
| 40–49 | 20 | 27.3 | 24.7 |
| 50–59 | 20 | 16.3 | 19.1 |
| 60–69 | 13 | 5.5 | 6.4 |
| ≥70 | 10 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
| **Income** (annual; ten-thousand Won) | | | |
| Below 200 ten-thousand Won | 19 | 9.7 | 11.4 |
| 200–350 ten-thousand Won | 23 | 27.4 | 27.7 |
| 350–500 ten-thousand Won | 21 | 26.3 | 23.4 |
| 500–750 ten-thousand Won | 17 | 22.0 | 20.5 |
| More than 750 ten-thousand Won | 20 | 14.5 | 17.1 |
| **Ancestry** | | | |
| Korean | 96 | 99.8 | 99.8 |
| Other | 4 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| **Education** | | | |
| No high school | 13 | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| High school | 40 | 26.9 | 31.6 |
| Some college | 13 | 7.4 | 8.6 |
| Bachelor's degree or higher | 34 | 64.8 | 58.7 |
| **Employment Status (for those at most 65)** | | | |
| Employed full-time | 59 | 85.3 | 82.7 |
| Not employed full-time | 41 | 14.7 | 17.3 |

Note: Our samples in Korea are relatively too educated, too young, and too employed.

### C.1.6 Sweden

| | | Study Sample (%) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Category | Population (%) | *Full* | *Representative* |
| **Gender** | | | |
| Male | 50 | 58.1 | 50.3 |
| Female | 50 | 41.9 | 49.7 |
| **Age** | | | |
| 18–29 | 24 | 12.5 | 17.8 |
| 30–39 | 15 | 10.5 | 14.8 |
| 40–49 | 15 | 13.8 | 16.7 |
| 50–59 | 15 | 19.2 | 16.2 |
| 60–69 | 13 | 20.0 | 14.8 |
| ≥70 | 18 | 24.0 | 19.8 |
| **Income** (annual; Swedish kronor) | | | |
| Below 100,000 kr | 14 | 6.9 | 9.8 |
| 100,000–200,000 kr | 13 | 16.0 | 13.9 |
| 200,000–299,999 kr | 18 | 20.8 | 18.3 |
| 300,000–399,999 kr | 25 | 22.7 | 25.7 |
| 400,000–499,999 kr | 16 | 16.8 | 16.1 |
| 500,000–599,999 kr | 7 | 7.8 | 7.2 |
| 600,000–749,999 kr | 4 | 4.6 | 4.8 |
| 750,000–999,999 kr | 2 | 2.6 | 2.7 |
| 1,000,000 kr or more | 1 | 1.8 | 1.6 |
| **Ancestry** | | | |
| Swedish | 82 | 92.8 | 89.7 |
| Other | 18 | 7.3 | 10.3 |
| **Education** | | | |
| No high school | 40 | 8.1 | 11.5 |
| High school | 22 | 32.3 | 31.8 |
| Some college | 15 | 30.1 | 24.7 |
| Bachelor's degree or higher | 23 | 29.6 | 32.0 |
| **Employment Status (for those at most 65)** | | | |
| Employed full-time | 67 | 63.3 | 66.9 |
| Not employed full-time | 33 | 36.7 | 33.1 |

Note: "High school" corresponded to "Gymnasieexamen", while "Some college" to "Viss universitets-/högskoleutbildning". The option equivalent to a university degree or higher was "Kandidatexamen."

### C.1.7 United States

| | | Study Sample (%) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Category | Population (%) | *Full* | *Representative* |
| **Gender** | | | |
| Male | 49 | 36.4 | 48.9 |
| Female | 51 | 63.6 | 51.1 |
| **Age** | | | |
| 18–29 | 21 | 12.6 | 19.1 |
| 30–39 | 16 | 11.3 | 14.4 |
| 40–49 | 16 | 14.1 | 15.2 |
| 50–59 | 17 | 24.5 | 19.4 |
| 60–69 | 14 | 25.8 | 15.5 |
| ≥70 | 16 | 11.6 | 16.5 |
| **Income** (annual; USD) | | | |
| Below 15,000 | 11 | 14.3 | 13.9 |
| 15,000–24,999 | 9 | 14.3 | 9.2 |
| 25,000–34,999 | 9 | 14.7 | 9.8 |
| 35,000–49,999 | 12 | 14.6 | 11.7 |
| 50,000–74,999 | 17 | 14.8 | 17.3 |
| 75,000–99,999 | 13 | 10.4 | 13.0 |
| 100,000–149,999 | 15 | 9.9 | 14.4 |
| 150,000–199,999 | 7 | 3.9 | 6.0 |
| 200,000 or more | 7 | 3.1 | 4.7 |
| **Ancestry** | | | |
| White | 63 | 81.9 | 69.1 |
| African-American | 17 | 8.1 | 13.6 |
| Hispanic | 12 | 4.7 | 7.9 |
| Asian | 5 | 3.3 | 5.9 |
| Other | 3 | 2.0 | 3.5 |
| **Education** | | | |
| No high school | 11 | 3.9 | 6.4 |
| High school | 29 | 41.8 | 30.2 |
| Some college | 29 | 29.7 | 30.6 |
| Bachelor's degree or higher | 31 | 24.6 | 32.8 |
| **Employment Status (for those at most 65)** | | | |
| Employed full-time | 67 | 37.3 | 63.4 |
| Not employed full-time | 33 | 62.7 | 36.6 |

## C.2 Screenshots

### C.2.1 Universalism tasks

#### Domestic universalism in altruism.





Figure 13: Screenshot of decision screen for money allocation tasks meant to elicit domestic universalism in altruism. Subjects would see two of these screens consecutively, where five of the ten groups would be presented on each screen. Note that across all subjects, the order of the ten social groups was randomized, and whether all social groups appeared on the left or all appeared on the right was also randomized for any given choice domain. The layout for tasks eliciting global universalism in altruism is identical to that of domestic groups.

## Foreign universalism in altruism.





Figure 14: Screenshot of decision screen for money allocation task meant to elicit foreign universalism in altruism. Across subjects, it was randomized whether the domestic social group appeared on the left or on the right. The layout for the task eliciting foreign universalism in *trust* is identical to this layout, with the exception of necessary changes to the instructions and to graphics, as consistent with the layout for trust tasks presented in Figure 15.

## Domestic universalism in trust.





Figure 15: Screenshot of decision screen for tasks meant to elicit domestic universalism in trust. Subjects would see two of these screens consecutively, where five of the ten groups would be presented on each screen. Note that across all subjects, the order of the ten social groups was randomized, and whether all social groups appeared on the left or all appeared on the right was also randomized for any given choice domain. The layout for tasks eliciting global universalism in trust is identical to that of domestic groups.

### C.2.2 Policy preferences

## Desired government spending.

Suppose that you could determine how the United States government spends money on various different categories of the federal budget, such as the military or redistribution.

Specifically, imagine you could decide the **average amount of money that the federal government collects per year from each American to spend on each of the eight categories below**. For the purposes of this question, you should assume that all dollar amounts collected for a category are spent only on this particular category, without any waste.

**How much money would you have the federal government collect on average from each American, in order to spend on each of the following eight categories of expenditure in the federal budget?**

To provide a reference, it is estimated that altogether, all levels of government in the United States spend a combined average amount of $2,750 per American every year for the purposes of education.

| | **Amount of money ($) collected on average from each American to spend on category, per year** |
|---|---|
| Police and law enforcement | $ |
| Foreign aid | $ |
| Universal healthcare | $ |
| Environmental protection | $ |
| Measures to ensure no individual is disadvantaged in access to education, the labor force, and marriage | $ |
| Military and counterintelligence | $ |
| Welfare payments | $ |
| Effective border control | $ |

Figure 16: Screenshot of decision screen eliciting subjects' policy preferences through the means of desired per-capita spending on categories of the federal/national government's budget. Across subjects, the order of categories was randomized.

## Support for Specific Policy Implementations.

You just indicated your preferences over several broad categories of expenditure. We will now ask you to indicate how much money you would like to collect and spend on **specific projects or policy proposals**. After all, even within broad categories such as military or redistribution, **you may like some policies and projects more than others. We are now interested in which specific projects or policies you favor.**

Please consider the policy proposals presented in the table below. Note that the table will expand with additional rows as you fill in your answers and until you see **eight** rows in total. Again assume that all money collected for the purposes of a policy are spent only on implementing that particular policy, without waste.

How much money would you have the federal government collect on average from each American, in order to spend on each of the **specific projects or policies** presented?

| Policy | Amount of money ($) collected on average from each American to spend on policy, per year | Policy | Amount of money ($) collected on average from each American to spend on policy, per year |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity training for the police to **ensure justice and equal treatment of all** | $ | Increasing the capabilities of the police to **prevent and prosecute criminal or suspicious behavior** | $ |

Figure 17: Screenshot of decision screen eliciting subjects' preferences towards particular policy implementations of national government expenditure. Across subjects, the order of categories was randomized, and it was randomized whether all more universalist policies appeared on the left or on the right. Additional policies continued to fill the screen as the subject filled in desired spending levels for each category of policies.

## C.3 Histograms of Composite Universalism





Figure 18: This figure plots a comparative set of distributions of our composite measure of moral universalism. All individual plots are scaled to the same x-axis and y-axis.

## C.4 Analysis of Ideological Clusters





Figure 19: Factor loadings of the first principal component of desired expenditure shares, all countries. Sign convention: the loading on "Border" is always non-positive, and the other signs are determined accordingly.





Figure 20: The figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10). The dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.

## C.5 Relationship between Universalism and Policy Views

### C.5.1 Tables

Table 13: USA, separate policies

| | *Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Border control | | Military | | Police | | Foreign aid | | Aff. action | | Environment | | Health care | | Welfare | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) |
| Composite universalism | -2.00*** | -1.07*** | -1.42*** | -0.59*** | -1.25*** | -0.82*** | 1.25*** | 0.73*** | 1.29*** | 0.90*** | 1.12*** | 0.58*** | 0.87*** | 0.52*** | 1.17*** | 0.64*** |
| | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.16) | (0.18) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.16) | (0.17) |
| Age | | 0.0030*** | | 0.0060*** | | 0.0021 | | -0.0071*** | | -0.00051 | | -0.0035** | | 0.0017 | | -0.0023* |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Male | | -0.035 | | 0.27*** | | -0.058 | | -0.074** | | -0.035 | | -0.11*** | | -0.080** | | 0.071* |
| | | (0.03) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) |
| Religiosity index | | 0.0087 | | 0.062*** | | 0.036** | | 0.029** | | -0.028** | | -0.086*** | | -0.059*** | | -0.040*** |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Wealth index | | 0.045*** | | 0.012 | | 0.067*** | | -0.013 | | -0.038* | | 0.011 | | -0.017 | | -0.047*** |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| Income index | | 0.019 | | 0.067*** | | -0.016 | | 0.0099 | | 0.046*** | | 0.00058 | | 0.037* | | -0.043** |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.03) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| College-educated | | -0.20*** | | 0.030 | | -0.096** | | 0.12*** | | -0.0052 | | 0.19*** | | 0.15*** | | 0.034 |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.04) |
| Neighborhood size | | 0.00016 | | -0.012 | | 0.0052 | | 0.0039 | | 0.0071 | | -0.0045 | | -0.0027 | | 0.0044 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Efficiency vs. equity | | -0.00052 | | -0.0012 | | -0.0041*** | | -0.00051 | | -0.0044*** | | 0.0052** | | 0.0040** | | 0.00063 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Altruism | | -0.00093 | | -0.00055 | | -0.00047 | | 0.0013 | | -0.000083 | | -0.00063 | | -0.0022*** | | 0.00077 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Trust | | -0.00090 | | 0.00078 | | -0.00067 | | 0.00046 | | 0.00065 | | 0.0011 | | -0.0014 | | -0.00035 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Gov't efficient vs. wasteful | | -0.036*** | | -0.037*** | | -0.038*** | | 0.024*** | | -0.011 | | -0.023*** | | -0.015** | | 0.0087 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Belief in short-term benefit | | 0.011*** | | 0.0079*** | | 0.0055*** | | 0.0083*** | | 0.0068*** | | 0.0085*** | | 0.0094*** | | 0.0072*** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Observations | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 | 2873 |
| $R^2$ | 0.06 | 0.22 | 0.03 | 0.16 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.11 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.13 | 0.01 | 0.14 | 0.02 | 0.11 |

*Notes.* OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the "composite measure of support for a policy," constructed as described in Section 4.3.1. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 14: Australia, separate policies

| | *Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Border control | | Military | | Police | | Foreign aid | | Aff. action | | Environment | | Health care | | Welfare | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) |
| Composite universalism | -1.53*** | -1.09*** | -1.37*** | -0.98*** | -0.80*** | -0.41 | 1.75*** | 1.13*** | 1.05*** | 0.71*** | 0.92*** | 0.21 | -0.12 | 0.0097 | 0.22 | 0.30 |
| | (0.26) | (0.28) | (0.24) | (0.23) | (0.28) | (0.30) | (0.20) | (0.19) | (0.21) | (0.22) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.22) | (0.23) | (0.21) | (0.23) |
| Age | | -0.0016 | | 0.0030* | | 0.00074 | | -0.0043** | | -0.0015 | | -0.0030* | | -0.00072 | | 0.0081*** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Male | | -0.017 | | 0.14*** | | -0.078 | | -0.11** | | 0.0067 | | -0.11** | | 0.13*** | | 0.13*** |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) |
| Religiosity index | | 0.053*** | | 0.016 | | 0.013 | | -0.00067 | | -0.0046 | | -0.064*** | | -0.042** | | -0.013 |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.01) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| Wealth index | | 0.055*** | | 0.0092 | | 0.092*** | | -0.042* | | -0.077*** | | -0.033 | | 0.054** | | -0.014 |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| Income index | | -0.042 | | 0.048** | | 0.0066 | | 0.030 | | 0.038* | | 0.019 | | 0.035 | | 0.012 |
| | | (0.03) | | (0.02) | | (0.03) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| College-educated | | -0.078 | | -0.052 | | -0.17*** | | 0.074 | | 0.12** | | 0.11** | | 0.084* | | 0.029 |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.06) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) |
| Neighborhood size | | -0.0091 | | -0.023** | | -0.0057 | | -0.0097 | | -0.020** | | 0.0060 | | 0.032*** | | 0.017* |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Efficiency vs. equity | | 0.0022 | | 0.0010 | | 0.00031 | | 0.0012 | | -0.0029 | | 0.00022 | | -0.0016 | | 0.0026 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Altruism | | -0.00067 | | 0.00020 | | -0.0013 | | 0.0011 | | -0.00018 | | 0.00094 | | -0.0021** | | -0.000072 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Trust | | -0.0027*** | | -0.0010 | | -0.0043*** | | 0.0021** | | 0.0010 | | -0.00093 | | 0.0020* | | 0.0020* |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Gov't efficient vs. wasteful | | -0.014 | | -0.0030 | | -0.011 | | 0.012 | | -0.0024 | | -0.041*** | | -0.038*** | | -0.0067 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Belief in short-term benefit | | 0.0085*** | | 0.0074*** | | 0.0038*** | | 0.0089*** | | 0.0055*** | | 0.0090*** | | 0.0063*** | | 0.0066*** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Observations | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 | 1732 |
| $R^2$ | 0.03 | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.08 |

*Notes.* OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the "composite measure of support for a policy," constructed as described in Section 4.3.1. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 15: Germany, separate policies

| | *Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Border control | | Military | | Police | | Foreign aid | | Aff. action | | Environment | | Health care | | Welfare | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) |
| Composite universalism | -1.59*** | -0.83*** | -0.71*** | -0.62** | -1.28*** | -0.62*** | 2.17*** | 1.56*** | 0.77*** | 0.55** | 1.18*** | 1.06*** | -0.86*** | -0.72*** | 0.31 | -0.021 |
| | (0.28) | (0.28) | (0.22) | (0.25) | (0.23) | (0.24) | (0.19) | (0.20) | (0.22) | (0.23) | (0.21) | (0.23) | (0.23) | (0.26) | (0.21) | (0.23) |
| Age | | 0.00084 | | 0.00075 | | 0.0034** | | -0.0033* | | 0.00017 | | 0.0049*** | | -0.00100 | | 0.0029* |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Male | | 0.00020 | | 0.083 | | -0.021 | | -0.089* | | -0.037 | | -0.16*** | | 0.035 | | 0.18*** |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) |
| Religiosity index | | 0.015 | | 0.012 | | -0.043*** | | 0.025 | | 0.0012 | | -0.034** | | -0.019 | | -0.028 |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| Wealth index | | -0.021 | | -0.011 | | 0.030 | | -0.011 | | -0.014 | | 0.0075 | | 0.041 | | -0.052** |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.03) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.03) | | (0.03) | | (0.02) |
| Income index | | 0.062*** | | 0.038* | | 0.061*** | | -0.039 | | -0.042* | | 0.0083 | | 0.011 | | -0.048** |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.03) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| College-educated | | -0.14*** | | -0.083* | | -0.063 | | -0.0034 | | 0.087 | | 0.031 | | -0.016 | | 0.067 |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) |
| Neighborhood size | | 0.019** | | 0.0033 | | -0.0023 | | -0.00038 | | 0.0053 | | -0.013 | | 0.0061 | | -0.012 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Efficiency vs. equity | | -0.00081 | | 0.0011 | | -0.00076 | | 0.0023 | | -0.0027 | | -0.00022 | | 0.0027 | | -0.00069 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Altruism | | 0.000025 | | -0.00038 | | -0.0034*** | | 0.0020* | | 0.00088 | | 0.000019 | | -0.0027** | | 0.0011 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Trust | | -0.0034*** | | 0.00014 | | -0.0024** | | 0.0015 | | -0.0010 | | -0.00069 | | 0.0020 | | 0.0023* |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Gov't efficient vs. wasteful | | -0.071*** | | -0.0092 | | -0.028*** | | 0.054*** | | -0.0022 | | -0.021** | | -0.0059 | | 0.019* |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Belief in short-term benefit | | 0.011*** | | 0.0094*** | | 0.0078*** | | 0.0059*** | | 0.0050*** | | 0.0064*** | | 0.0018** | | 0.0039*** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Observations | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 | 1654 |
| $R^2$ | 0.03 | 0.20 | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.14 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.04 |

*Notes.* OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the "composite measure of support for a policy," constructed as described in Section 4.3.1. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 16: France, separate policies

| | *Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Border control | | Military | | Police | | Foreign aid | | Aff. action | | Environment | | Health care | | Welfare | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) |
| Composite universalism | -1.08*** | -0.47** | -0.80*** | -0.38* | -1.45*** | -0.92*** | 1.42*** | 0.95*** | 0.64*** | 0.40** | 0.32 | 0.27 | 0.013 | 0.19 | 0.74*** | 0.58*** |
| | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.21) | (0.22) | (0.24) | (0.25) | (0.16) | (0.17) |
| Age | | -0.00075 | | 0.0036** | | 0.0033** | | -0.0051*** | | 0.0021 | | -0.0041** | | 0.0055*** | | 0.00080 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Male | | -0.042 | | 0.11*** | | -0.057 | | -0.11** | | -0.11** | | -0.046 | | 0.16*** | | 0.064 |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.05) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) |
| Religiosity index | | 0.031** | | 0.057*** | | 0.013 | | -0.0064 | | -0.046*** | | -0.066*** | | -0.020 | | -0.0096 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.01) |
| Wealth index | | 0.025 | | 0.025 | | 0.022 | | -0.012 | | -0.025 | | 0.0091 | | -0.028 | | -0.042** |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| Income index | | 0.038** | | 0.0092 | | 0.067*** | | -0.037* | | -0.0025 | | -0.0025 | | 0.069*** | | -0.030 |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| College-educated | | -0.12*** | | 0.0040 | | -0.037 | | -0.0011 | | 0.094* | | 0.15*** | | 0.067 | | -0.069 |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.04) |
| Neighborhood size | | -0.00015 | | 0.0051 | | -0.013* | | 0.0046 | | 0.0033 | | -0.012 | | -0.014* | | 0.0078 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Efficiency vs. equity | | 0.00012 | | -0.00100 | | -0.000071 | | 0.00055 | | -0.00036 | | -0.0030 | | 0.00019 | | 0.0026 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Altruism | | -0.0024*** | | 0.00015 | | -0.0025*** | | 0.0022** | | 0.00048 | | -0.0020** | | 0.000064 | | -0.0010 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Trust | | -0.0025*** | | -0.0029*** | | -0.0025*** | | 0.0022*** | | 0.0017* | | 0.0013 | | -0.0011 | | 0.00095 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Gov't efficient vs. wasteful | | -0.069*** | | -0.018** | | -0.023** | | 0.017* | | 0.0079 | | -0.026*** | | -0.0094 | | 0.016* |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Belief in short-term benefit | | 0.0083*** | | 0.0075*** | | 0.0057*** | | 0.0055*** | | 0.0030*** | | 0.0051*** | | 0.0054*** | | 0.0051*** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Observations | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 | 2255 |
| $R^2$ | 0.02 | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.05 |

*Notes.* OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the "composite measure of support for a policy," constructed as described in Section 4.3.1. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 17: Sweden, separate policies

| | *Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Border control | | Military | | Police | | Foreign aid | | Aff. action | | Environment | | Health care | | Welfare | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) |
| Composite universalism | -2.06*** | -1.07*** | -1.19*** | -0.47*** | -1.49*** | -0.76*** | 1.46*** | 0.78*** | 1.51*** | 0.98*** | 1.23*** | 0.64*** | -0.017 | 0.22 | 0.97*** | 0.60*** |
| | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.17) | (0.18) |
| Age | | 0.0030*** | | 0.0030** | | 0.0022* | | -0.0023* | | 0.00012 | | -0.0040*** | | 0.0019 | | 0.0011 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Male | | -0.051 | | 0.28*** | | -0.0092 | | -0.053 | | -0.087** | | -0.047 | | 0.032 | | -0.046 |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) |
| Religiosity index | | -0.0084 | | 0.018 | | -0.0092 | | 0.015 | | -0.037** | | -0.019 | | -0.039*** | | 0.021 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.02) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.02) | | (0.01) |
| Wealth index | | -0.016 | | 0.053*** | | 0.012 | | -0.020 | | -0.056*** | | 0.0040 | | 0.0075 | | -0.040** |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| Income index | | 0.0058 | | 0.019 | | 0.045** | | -0.011 | | -0.0027 | | -0.011 | | 0.042* | | -0.042** |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| College-educated | | -0.091** | | 0.035 | | -0.14*** | | 0.061 | | 0.065 | | 0.086* | | 0.078* | | 0.091** |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.05) | | (0.04) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) |
| Neighborhood size | | 0.00084 | | 0.0064 | | 0.0070 | | -0.0033 | | -0.0059 | | -0.0043 | | -0.0070 | | -0.011 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Efficiency vs. equity | | -0.0026** | | -0.0019 | | -0.0024* | | 0.0010 | | 0.00044 | | 0.000051 | | 0.0084*** | | -0.0012 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Altruism | | 0.00081 | | 0.0015** | | -0.0033*** | | 0.0018** | | 0.0014 | | 0.00052 | | -0.0038*** | | -0.00067 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Trust | | -0.0022*** | | -0.0017** | | -0.0014* | | 0.00079 | | 0.0022** | | -0.000038 | | 0.0015* | | 0.0017** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Gov't efficient vs. wasteful | | -0.090*** | | -0.058*** | | -0.077*** | | 0.063*** | | 0.057*** | | 0.041*** | | -0.012 | | 0.040*** |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Belief in short-term benefit | | 0.0091*** | | 0.0096*** | | 0.0038*** | | 0.0098*** | | 0.0043*** | | 0.0093*** | | 0.0040*** | | 0.0056*** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Observations | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 | 2388 |
| $R^2$ | 0.07 | 0.25 | 0.02 | 0.17 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.14 | 0.04 | 0.10 | 0.03 | 0.16 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.07 |

*Notes.* OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the "composite measure of support for a policy," constructed as described in Section 4.3.1. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 18: Korea, separate policies

| | *Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Border control | | Military | | Police | | Foreign aid | | Aff. action | | Environment | | Health care | | Welfare | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) |
| Composite universalism | 0.61*** | 0.49** | -0.52* | -0.021 | -0.20 | 0.13 | 0.98*** | 0.41* | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.31 | 0.32 | -0.36* | -0.33 | -0.42* | -0.43* |
| | (0.22) | (0.24) | (0.27) | (0.28) | (0.22) | (0.25) | (0.20) | (0.21) | (0.30) | (0.33) | (0.20) | (0.25) | (0.21) | (0.23) | (0.22) | (0.23) |
| Age | | -0.0013 | | 0.0081*** | | -0.0024 | | -0.0026 | | -0.0045* | | 0.0028 | | -0.0046** | | 0.0090*** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Male | | -0.041 | | 0.25*** | | 0.070 | | -0.097** | | 0.028 | | -0.17*** | | -0.076 | | -0.14*** |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) |
| Religiosity index | | 0.012 | | 0.024* | | -0.0044 | | 0.018 | | -0.018 | | -0.0016 | | -0.015 | | -0.025* |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.02) | | (0.01) |
| Wealth index | | -0.052** | | 0.017 | | 0.013 | | -0.014 | | -0.023 | | -0.026 | | 0.035 | | -0.0075 |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| Income index | | 0.011 | | 0.012 | | 0.048** | | -0.036 | | 0.023 | | 0.00084 | | -0.028 | | -0.014 |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.03) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| College-educated | | -0.065 | | -0.011 | | 0.030 | | -0.13** | | 0.021 | | -0.019 | | 0.10** | | -0.0038 |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) |
| Neighborhood size | | 0.013 | | -0.00087 | | -0.0071 | | 0.0066 | | 0.00011 | | 0.00070 | | 0.016 | | -0.024 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.01) | | (0.02) |
| Efficiency vs. equity | | 0.0030 | | 0.0020 | | 0.0040* | | -0.0016 | | -0.0013 | | -0.0049*** | | -0.0012 | | -0.0015 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Altruism | | 0.0014 | | -0.0012 | | -0.0019 | | 0.0037*** | | -0.0021 | | 0.00020 | | 0.000043 | | -0.00041 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Trust | | -0.000046 | | -0.0023** | | -0.0013 | | 0.0026* | | 0.00097 | | -0.00031 | | -0.0017 | | -0.00086 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Gov't efficient vs. wasteful | | -0.035*** | | -0.068*** | | -0.035*** | | -0.00053 | | 0.0015 | | -0.027** | | 0.011 | | 0.032*** |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Belief in short-term benefit | | 0.0082*** | | 0.0077*** | | 0.0062*** | | 0.0046*** | | 0.0056*** | | 0.0066*** | | 0.00064 | | 0.0030*** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Observations | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 | 1913 |
| $R^2$ | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.03 |

*Notes.* OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the "composite measure of support for a policy," constructed as described in Section 4.3.1. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 19: Brazil, separate policies

| | *Dependent variable: Desired expenditure share* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Border control | | Military | | Police | | Foreign aid | | Aff. action | | Environment | | Health care | | Welfare | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) |
| Composite universalism | 0.13 | 0.13 | -0.0094 | 0.084 | -0.32 | -0.17 | 0.63*** | 0.40*** | 0.12 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 0.12 | -0.45** | -0.34* | -0.13 | -0.024 |
| | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.20) | (0.21) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.21) | (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.15) | (0.16) |
| Age | | -0.000083 | | -0.0019 | | 0.0013 | | -0.0019 | | -0.0027 | | -0.0065*** | | 0.00058 | | 0.011*** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Male | | 0.069 | | 0.12** | | 0.20*** | | -0.074 | | -0.058 | | -0.19*** | | -0.088* | | -0.0082 |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) |
| Religiosity index | | -0.00023 | | 0.015 | | -0.016 | | 0.041*** | | -0.042** | | -0.039** | | -0.0050 | | 0.020 |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| Wealth index | | -0.018 | | -0.010 | | 0.015 | | -0.049* | | 0.012 | | 0.019 | | -0.014 | | 0.0087 |
| | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.03) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| Income index | | -0.028 | | -0.045* | | 0.017 | | -0.073** | | 0.0098 | | 0.00024 | | 0.11*** | | 0.0076 |
| | | (0.03) | | (0.02) | | (0.03) | | (0.03) | | (0.02) | | (0.03) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| College-educated | | -0.098* | | -0.13*** | | -0.024 | | -0.015 | | -0.0042 | | -0.067 | | 0.11** | | 0.092* |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) |
| Neighborhood size | | 0.015 | | -0.024* | | -0.011 | | -0.030* | | 0.0076 | | 0.024* | | -0.0065 | | 0.0047 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.02) |
| Efficiency vs. equity | | 0.0013 | | 0.0040*** | | 0.0037** | | 0.0063*** | | -0.0020 | | 0.0025 | | -0.0026 | | 0.0011 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Altruism | | 0.0027** | | -0.00088 | | -0.00069 | | 0.0035*** | | -0.0021* | | 0.0022** | | -0.0032*** | | -0.0013 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Trust | | -0.0023** | | 0.00042 | | -0.0013 | | -0.0018 | | 0.00083 | | 0.00083 | | -0.00089 | | 0.00054 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Gov't efficient vs. wasteful | | 0.020** | | 0.026*** | | -0.00098 | | 0.0085 | | -0.043*** | | -0.022** | | -0.046*** | | -0.011 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Belief in short-term benefit | | 0.0061*** | | 0.0050*** | | 0.0046*** | | 0.0060*** | | 0.0042*** | | 0.0046*** | | 0.0011 | | 0.0015** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Observations | 1750 | 1749 | 1750 | 1749 | 1750 | 1749 | 1750 | 1749 | 1750 | 1749 | 1750 | 1749 | 1750 | 1749 | 1750 | 1749 |
| $R^2$ | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.03 |

*Notes.* OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the "composite measure of support for a policy," constructed as described in Section 4.3.1. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

### C.5.2 Separate Allocation Decisions and Universalism Measures





Figure 21: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of univariate regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on all separate allocation decisions. A positive regression coefficient indicates that a higher allocation to the more distant individual (i.e. a more "universalist" allocation) is positively correlated with "left-leaning" policy preferences. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors.





Figure 22: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of univariate regressions of desired expenditure shares on the separate universalism measures (universalism in altruism and universalism in trust). Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.





Figure 23: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of univariate regressions of desired log expenditure levels on the separate universalism measures (universalism in altruism and universalism in trust). Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specifications include country fixed effects.

### C.5.3 Measurement Error and ORIV Analyses

Measurement error is ubiquitous in lab and survey settings. To ensure that the estimates presented in this paper are neither artefacts of nor attenuated by the presence of measurement error in our elicitations of outcome and explanatory variables, we make use of the instrumentation strategies laid out in Gillen et al. (2019).

That is, we employ the obviously-related instrumental variables (ORIV) technique by eliciting quasi-duplicate measurements of: (i) the set of specific policy views, (ii) the corresponding summary statistic, and (iii) our measures of universalism. This analysis was pre-registered and detailed the formulation of instruments for our variables of interest as follows.

**Choice of instruments.** In Section 4.3, we document how we elicited support for our eight broad policy categories (affirmative action, border control, environment, foreign aid, health, military, police, and welfare) with two complementary strategies. The first elicited respondents' desired, per capita annual spending by their national government on each of these categories. The second strategy elicited respondents' support for government spending in each of these categories on an 11-point Likert scale. These two elicitations were separated by a series of tasks, including elicitations of support for specific, framed policies, and a sociodemographic questionnaire. From these two proxies for each one of the respondents' policy views on the eight broad categories, we also constructed a summary statistic as described in Section 4.3.1. This leaves us with duplicate measurements (in the notation of Gillen et al. (2019), $Y^a$ and $Y^b$) of both support for the eight individual policies and of a summary statistic for respondents' ideology.

For the set of predictors (our measures of universalism), we leverage the fact that the order of social groups presented in our survey is randomized within the domestic and global categories. As such, the first measure of universalism (in the notation of Gillen et al. (2019), $X^a$) is constructed just like the main measure described in Section 4.2, except that it only uses the five domestic groups that (randomly) appear first and the three global groups that (randomly) appear first in the survey for each subject. We do not include the foreign decision as there was only *one* of these elicitations.

Analogously, the second measure of universalism ($X^b$) is constructed just like the main measure described in Section 4.2, except that it only uses the five domestic groups that (randomly) appear last and the two global groups that (randomly) appear last in the survey. We construct these two proxies for both universalism in altruism and universalism in trust separately, and for the composite measure of universalism that averages the two.





Figure 24: This figure presents ORIV coefficients for the regression of duplicate elicitations of the summary statistic of policy views on duplicate elicitations of our measures of moral universalism. As recommended by Gillen et al. (2019), both the universalism measures and outcome variables are standardized into z-scores so they have the same scale. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

**Results.** With this set of instruments in hand, we replicated our analysis of the relationships between universalism and the structure of ideology with the stacked ORIV regressions described in Gillen et al. (2019). We were interested in ensuring that measurement error neither attenuates nor artifically produces the relationship between views regarding each of our eight individual policies and universalism, and between the summary statistic of these policy views and universalism. We thus examine nine different outcome variables. Moreover, in the notation of Gillen et al. (2019), we examine the relationship between these nine $Y^*$'s and our three $X^*$'s individually, i.e. the measures of universalism in the choice domains of altruism and trust, and the corresponding composite measure.

We follow the recommendations in Gillen et al. (2019) and use standardized versions of both our universalism measures and policy views. Moreover, since each subject appears twice when implementing ORIV, standard errors are clustered at the subject level. In all cases the results with the ORIV estimator are very similar to those presented in the main text with OLS.





Figure 25: This figure presents ORIV coefficients for the regression of duplicate elicitations of policy views on duplicate elicitations of our summary measure of moral universalism. As recommended by Gillen et al. (2019), both the universalism measures and outcome variables are standardized into z-scores so they have the same scale. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

## C.6 Analysis of Specific Policy Proposals

### C.6.1 Tables

Table 20: All western countries, specific policy questions

| | *Dependent variable: Difference in desired log expenditure levels More - Less Universalist Policy Proposal* | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Border control | Military | Police | Foreign aid | Aff. action | Environment | Health care | Welfare |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Composite universalism | 1.87*** | 1.87*** | 1.92*** | 1.29*** | 0.79*** | 1.37*** | 0.93*** | 1.01*** |
| | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.08) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 11086 | 11086 | 11086 | 11086 | 11086 | 11086 | 11086 | 11086 |
| $R^2$ | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 |

*Notes.* OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the difference between log desired spending on the more universalist policy proposal and log desired spending on the less universalist policy proposal. Prior to taking the difference and log, desired spending on each policy proposal is winsorized at 3 standard deviations and standardized within-country. The framed policy proposals are detailed in Section 4.3.2. Construction of the composite universalism measure is outlined in Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

### C.6.2 All Countries





Figure 26: This figure plots the OLS coefficients when the difference in desired log expenditure levels on the two specific policy proposals is estimated by universalism. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the difference between log desired spending on the more universalist policy proposal and log desired spending on the less universalist policy proposal. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.





Figure 27: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on universalism, separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.





Figure 28: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on self-positioning on a left-right scale (0–10), separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The “All western countries” specification includes country fixed effects.

### C.6.3 Separate Measures of Universalism





Figure 29: This figure plots the OLS coefficients of regressions of log desired expenditure levels for specific policy proposals on universalism in trust, separately for each country. The left panel shows the results for the more universalist policies and the right panel those for the less universalist ones. See Table 3 for the wording of each of the policy proposals. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.

## C.7 Representative Sample





Figure 30: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficient of regressions of the summary statistic of policy views on composite universalism, without and with controls, using only the representative sample described in Section 4.1. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variable is standardized into z-scores. Covariates include age, gender, income, wealth, college, neighborhood size, religiosity, equity-efficiency preferences, altruism, trust, and beliefs about the efficiency of government. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.





Figure 31: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of regressions of desired expenditure shares for each policy domain on universalism, using only the representative sample described in Section 4.1. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.





Figure 32: This figure plots the OLS regression coefficients of regressions of desired log expenditure levels for each policy domain on universalism, using only the representative sample described in Section 4.1. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.

### C.7.1 Analysis of Specific Policy Proposals





Figure 33: This figure plots the OLS coefficients when the difference in desired log expenditure levels on the two framed policy proposals is estimated by universalism, using only the representative subsample described in Section 4.1. The dependent variable is, for each policy domain, the difference between log desired spending on the more universalist policy proposal and log desired spending on the less universalist policy proposal. Universalism is in [0,1] and the dependent variables are standardized into z-scores. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. The "All western countries" specification includes country fixed effects.

## C.8 Definition of Main Survey Variables

**Left vs. right.** Respondent's self-positioning on the left-right political spectrum in response to the following prompt: "Oftentimes, people speak of relatively left-wing and relatively right-wing political views. On a scale from 0 (very left-wing) to 10 (very right-wing), where would you place yourself on this scale?"

**Summary statistic of policy views.** Summary statistic of policy views, given by

$$\begin{aligned}&\text{Left vs. right summary statistic } = \\ &\frac{\text{Foreign aid} + \text{Environment} + \text{Aff. action} + \text{Welfare} + \text{Health care}}{5} - \\ &- \frac{\text{Military} + \text{Police} + \text{Border control}}{3}\end{aligned} \tag{35}$$

Each policy denotes the composite measure of support for the given policy, defined also in this section. The summary statistic generally increases with attitudes towards left-wing views, and correlates with self-positioning on a 0 to 10 scale.

**Domestic universalism in altruism.** Universalism with respect to altruism (preferences), measured through bystander dictator games over the local currency analogue of hypothetical $100, between a domestic member of one's in-groups relative to a domestic stranger. The measure averages the ten corresponding money allocation decisions.

**Foreign universalism in altruism.** Universalism with respect to altruism (preferences), measured through a bystander dictator games over the local currency analogue of hypothetical $100 between a domestic stranger and a global stranger.

**Global universalism in altruism.** Universalism with respect to altruism (preferences), measured through bystander dictator games over the local currency analogue of hypothetical $100, between a global member of one's in-groups relative to a global stranger. The measure averages the five corresponding money allocation decisions.

**Summary measure of universalism in altruism.** Unweighted average of domestic universalism in altruism, foreign universalism in altruism, and global universalism in altruism. Because these three individual components correlate highly with each other, the summary measure reduces the dimensionality of the data and describes a respondent's broad universalism in altruism as a general type.

**Domestic universalism in trust.** Trust analogue of domestic universalism in altruism, where the bystander dictator game is instead over 100 trust points.

**Foreign universalism in trust.** Trust analogue of foreign universalism in altruism, where the bystander dictator game is instead over 100 trust points.

**Global universalism in trust.** Trust analogue of global universalism in altruism, where the bystander dictator game is instead over 100 trust points.

**Summary measure of universalism in trust.** Trust analogue of the summary measure of universalism in altruism. That is, unweighted average of domestic universalism in trust, foreign universalism in trust, and global universalism in trust.

**Composite measure of universalism.** Unweighted average of (i) summary measure of universalism in altruism and (ii) summary measure of universalism in trust. Reduces the dimensionality of the data.

**Revealed altruism.** Altruism as elicited through a standard dictator game over $100 between the self and a domestic stranger.

**Residual altruism.** Residuals from a regression of dictator game behavior (revealed altruism) on the summary statistic of universalism in altruism. Because the dictator game is framed vis-à-vis a randomly-selected stranger, the raw measure of altruism partly includes universalism; residualizing of universalism measures that portion of revealed altruism that cannot be explained by behavior in our universalism decisions.

**Revealed generalized trust.** Generalized trust in others as elicited through an allocation of trust points on a scale from 0 to 100. Respondents were prompted to consider their trust in a domestic stranger, where 0 meant that they believe they "cannot trust a randomly-selected person very much", and 100 meant they believe "a randomly-selected person can in general be trusted a great deal."

**Residual trust.** Residuals from a regression of revealed generalized trust on the summary statistic of universalism in trust. Because generalized trust is framed vis-à-vis a randomly-selected stranger, the raw measure of trust partly includes universalism; residualizing of universalism measures that portion of generalized trust that cannot be explained by behavior in our universalism decisions.

**Equity-efficiency preferences.** Elicitation of preferences for efficiency over equity, as given by a bystander dictator game between two "randomly-selected people" who live in the subject's country, in which the most unequal split of money maximizes total payoffs. The measure captures how much a subject deviates from an equal, 50:50 split of the money.

**Desired government spending on policy categories.** Measure of support for eight distinct policy domains: (i) affirmative action, (ii) border control, (iii) environment, (iv) foreign aid, (v) healthcare, (vi) military, (vii) police, and (viii) welfare payments.

Subjects were prompted to respond in free-form text entry with their desired level of annual, per-capita spending (in local currency) by their corresponding national level of government on each of the eight domains. They were provided a reference value of the annual per capita spending amount on education by their national level of government.

These dollar amounts were then translated into desired shares, out of a total amount of per capita spending by the national government.

**Support for policy categories.** Measure of support for eight distinct policy domains: (i) affirmative action, (ii) border control, (iii) environment, (iv) foreign aid, (v) healthcare, (vi) military, (vii) police, and (viii) welfare payments.

Subjects were prompted to respond on a 0 (strongly oppose) to 10 (strongly support) Likert scale with their level of support for national government spending on each of the eight domains.

**Desired government spending on individual policies.** Measure of support for sixteen distinct policies, two per each of the eight broad policy domains. Per each of these policy domains, one specific policy had a less universalist implementation, while the other a more universalist one. See Table 3.

Subjects were prompted to respond with their desired level of annual, per-capita spending (in local currency) by their corresponding national level of government on each of these sixteen policies.

**Religiosity.** Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) self-described religiosity on a scale from 0 (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious); (ii) church attendance on a scale from 0 to 5; and an indicator for atheism, agnosticism, or no religion.

**Income.** Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) log income (from free-form text entry), and (ii) income on a scale from 0 to 4 (roughly corresponding to income quintiles in each country).

**Wealth.** Composite measure from a principal component analysis of: (i) an indicator for stock ownership, (ii) an indicator for home ownership, and (iii) log net worth (from free-form text entry).

**Urbanicity.** Respondent's neighborhood size on a 10-step variable: > 1 million, 200k-1m, 50k-200k, 20k-50k and close to metro, 20k-50k and not close to metro, 3k-20k and close to metro, 3k-20k and not close to metro, 500-300k and close to metro, 500-3k and not close to metro, <500.

**Educational attainment.** Respondent's educational attainment. Across all countries but Brazil and Germany, the four educational categories were the local equivalents of: (i) no high school, (ii) high school, (iii) some college or vocational training, (iv) bachelor's degree or higher. In Brazil, the four educational categories were: (i) no formal education, (ii) elementary school, (iii) high school, and (iv) bachelor's degree or higher. In Germany, the three educational categories were: (i) no vocational training, (ii) vocational training, and (iii) university degree.

**Migration background.** Indicators for whether respondent is a first-generation or second-generation migrant in their country, given by questions eliciting: (i) their country of birth, (ii) their mother's country of birth, and (iii) their father's country of birth. A respondent was classified as a first-generation migrant if their country of birth was different from the local country the survey was being conducted in (where in order to complete the survey, all respondents needed to be citizens of the local country). Meanwhile, a respondent was classified as a second-generation migrant if either one of their parents was born in a country different from the local country the survey was being conducted in (and of the respondent's citizenship).

**Beliefs in the efficiency of government.** Respondent's rating on a scale from 0 (the government is wasteful) to 10 (the government is generally efficient) on the efficiency of the government in implementing policies and providing for public services.

**Belief in personal benefit from government expenditure on policy categories.** Respondent's report on the probability (0%-100%) that they would personally benefit over the twelve months following the survey from the corresponding services of the eight broad policy domains: (i) affirmative action, (ii) border control, (iii) environment, (iv) foreign aid, (v) healthcare, (vi) military, (vii) police, and (viii) welfare payments.

# D Additional Details and Analyses for Field Evidence

## D.1 Summary Statistics for DonorsChoose Data

### D.1.1 Aggregate Statistics

| Category | Statistic |
|---|---|
| Number of donations (overall) | 4,050,872 |
| Number of donors (overall) | 1,265,592 |
| Number of projects (overall) | 896,294 |
| Average donation amount (overall) | $76.25 |
| Median donation amount (overall) | $25.00 |
| Average number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD | 20.82 |
| Median number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD | 3.83 |
| Max number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD | 9,918 |
| Min number of donations by a CD to a recipient CD | 0 |
| Average donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD | $1,602.55 |
| Median donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD | $146.70 |
| Max donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD | $909,664.20 |
| Min donation amount by a CD to a recipient CD | $0 |
| Average total number of donations by a CD | 9,080 |
| Median total number of donations by a CD | 6,003 |
| Max total number of donations by a CD | 192,473 |
| Min total number of donations by a CD | 1,350 |
| Average total donation amount by a CD | $698,709.80 |
| Median total donation amount by a CD | $332,959.40 |
| Max total donation amount by a CD | $18,782,564.00 |
| Min total donation amount by a CD | $59,579.35 |

## D.2 Additional Notes on Methodology

**Data Cleaning.** Our raw data consists of 6,211,940 individual donations made during the time period between March 2000 and October 2016. Beginning with the year 2007, donations are made to projects in all states in the United States plus the District of Columbia.

In addition to dropping observations with missing data, we exclude donations made by donors outside of the 50 states and the District of Columbia; that is, we exclude donations made by donors from the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as any donation made by donors providing military overseas addresses. No projects associated to all but one of these locations are included in the raw data. Only 79 donations are recorded in the data as directed to schools in Puerto Rico, which we drop given sparsity.

**Aggregation to Congressional District level.** Projects were mapped to Congressional Districts through the exact coordinates of their schools, as provided by DonorsChoose. ZIP codes provided in the DonorsChoose data were used to map donors to their respective Congressional Districts.

Note that for reasons of anonymity, donor ZIP codes were truncated at the first three digits, which added a layer of uncertainty to CD mappings beyond the fuzziness of ZIP-to-CD mappings. Thus, through data provided by the United States Census Bureau, every donation was first mapped to all possible *full* ZIP codes corresponding to the truncated ZIP code from DonorsChoose, and then in turn, to a given CD based on all possible Congressional Districts that each one of these possible full ZIP codes could map to. Because this mapping is not 1:1, when aggregating donations to relevant source CDs, all observations were weighted by the degree of a fuzzy match to relevant CDs. For example, if based on the provided ZIP code a donation could have originated from either MA-5 or MA-7, this donation would appear twice in our merged data once all donations were mapped to donor Congressional Districts. In turn, each of these two observations would then be weighted by one-half when aggregating donation statistics by pairs of donor and recipient CDs.

**Distances.** CD-to-CD distances are given by the distance between the population-weighted, average geographic centers of each Congressional District, based on the counties constituting each Congressional District.[12]

[12]Because we have exact school coordinates and three-digit ZIP codes for each donor, we also ran a version of the analysis where first, for every individual donation in the data, we calculated the distance between the exact location of the school and the average set of coordinates of the donor's three-digit ZIP (as given by location data from the U.S. Census Bureau for all the possible *full* ZIP codes that make up

### D.2.1 Bayesian Shrinkage

Our raw regression coefficients $\theta_i$ form unbiased but imprecise estimates of universalism. To reduce measurement error and generate more precise estimates of this parameter, we "shrink" our estimates toward the mean $\overline{\theta}$ of the average across CDs, producing a shrunk coefficient $\theta_i^s$ that is a weighted average of $\theta_i$ and $\overline{\theta}$ :

$$\theta_i^s = w_i\theta_i + (1-w_i)\overline{\theta}. \tag{36}$$

As in Chetty and Hendren (2018) and Enke (forthcoming), the weights $w_i$ are selected to minimize the mean-squared prediction error, so that

$$w_i = \frac{Var(\theta_i) - E[se_i^2]}{Var(\theta_i) - E[se_i^2] + se_i^2}.$$

$Var(\theta_i)$ represents the variance of the raw coefficients across CDs and $se_i$ the standard error of the coefficient for CD $i$. See Chetty and Hendren (2018) for a derivation.

### D.2.2 Social Distance Data

Data on the social connectedness between pairs of counties in the United States, as well as on the social connectedness of these counties with foreign countries, was obtained from Facebook. This Social Connectedness Index (SCI), developed by Bailey et al. (2018), maps all Facebook users active during a 30-day period in early 2016 to their respective U.S. county or country locations. It then takes the aggregate number of friendship links within or between these entities as their respective degree of social connectedness, normalized to a maximum value of 1 milion for Los Angeles County (i.e. the normalized number of Facebook friends that people living in Los Angeles County and active on the platform during the snapshot period have who are also living in the same county and active during the same period). Finally, to account for level effects (in that counties with larger populations will seem relatively more socially-connected than other counties merely because they have larger populations), Bailey et al. (2018) then construct a measure they call the "relative probability of friendship" between two counties, which simply divides the SCI for a pair of counties by the product of the number of Facebook users in each of the two counties.

We aggregate this "relative probability of friendship" data to the Congressional Dis-

each three-digit ZIP). Then, for each CD-to-CD pair, the distances between the "expected" locations of all donors in the source CD to all the corresponding recipients in the other CD were averaged to arrive at the corresponding CD-to-CD distance. The correlation between the log of the distance measure used in our analyses and the log of this more "granular" version of distances is $\rho = 0.98$, so all results hold using this alternative version of distance.

trict level byd taking the average of the relative probabilities of all possible county-to-county pairings between two given Congressional Districts. That is, the friendship distance between a state $i$ made up of counties $A$, $B$, and $C$ and a state $j$ made up of counties $D$ and $E$ is given by the average of the relative probabilities of friendship between $A$ and $D$, $A$ and $E$, $B$ and $D$, $B$ and $E$, and so on. Since mappings from county to Congressional District are not 1:1, the aggregation from county to this geographic level accounts for the potential of a fuzzy match, by weighting observations by the number of different possible Congressional Districts every given county could map to.

This aggregation from county-pair SCIs and relative probabilities of friendship forms our measure of "friendship distance". Specifically, we define the social distance between a donor in geographic entity $i$ and a recipient in a geographic entity $j$ of the same level as $-\ln(1 + \text{rel. prob. of friendship}_{i,j})$.

## D.3 Robustness Checks

***Differing geographic distributions of CDs by party.*** Democratic CDs are more likely than Republican CDs to be found along the coasts, producing disparities in the distributions of distances to other CDs from a typical Democratic and a typical Republican CD. Though our baseline analysis already takes measures to address this concern, we also re-run the analysis using a binary geographic distance measure. We set distance equal to 0 for "local" CD-to-CD pairs $i$ and $j$ for which $d_{i,j} < 50$ miles and 1 otherwise, repeating the analysis for cutoffs of 10 and 100 miles. We also repeat our baseline analysis with an additional control for state-pair fixed-effects, which accounts for broad locational differences between the two political parties. As we report in Table 22, the strong positive relationship between universalism in altruism and Democratic vote share persists.

Table 22: Vote shares and donations as a function of distance: Robustness checks

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %) | | | | | | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Universalism in altruism (wrt number of donations) | 12.8*** | 9.67*** | | | | | | | | |
| | (1.52) | (1.46) | | | | | | | | |
| Universalism in altruism (wrt composite social distance) | | | 10.5*** | 7.59*** | | | | | | |
| | | | (1.02) | (1.47) | | | | | | |
| Universalism in altruism (controlling for state-pair fixed effects) | | | | | 9.50*** | 7.11*** | | | | |
| | | | | | (0.89) | (1.20) | | | | |
| Universalism in altruism (wrt binarized distance variable) | | | | | | | 9.81*** | 8.11*** | | |
| | | | | | | | (0.96) | (1.45) | | |
| Universalism in altruism (wrt geographic distance) | | | | | | | | | 10.5*** | 7.00*** |
| | | | | | | | | | (1.51) | (1.65) |
| Log [1 + Total donations] | | 5.32*** | | 1.69 | | 2.40** | | 1.49 | | 3.16*** |
| | | (1.09) | | (1.32) | | (1.17) | | (1.21) | | (1.21) |
| Log [GDP p/c] | | 0.31 | | 0.38 | | 0.12 | | 0.74 | | -0.17 |
| | | (1.27) | | (1.35) | | (1.20) | | (1.16) | | (0.94) |
| Fraction of population with college degree | | 3.78 | | 7.34 | | 1.65 | | 2.15 | | -5.20 |
| | | (7.77) | | (7.96) | | (8.01) | | (8.03) | | (7.84) |
| Latitude | | 0.12 | | 0.35 | | 0.64 | | -0.058 | | 1.12* |
| | | (0.56) | | (0.59) | | (0.58) | | (0.54) | | (0.60) |
| Log [Distance to coast] | | -1.21* | | -1.45** | | -1.60** | | -0.46 | | -1.30** |
| | | (0.64) | | (0.66) | | (0.65) | | (0.65) | | (0.62) |
| Racial fractionalization | | 22.0*** | | 22.0*** | | 20.7*** | | 22.1*** | | 21.9*** |
| | | (6.30) | | (6.48) | | (6.44) | | (6.34) | | (6.03) |
| Log [Average distance to all projects] | | 63.0*** | | 63.2*** | | 64.7*** | | 81.8*** | | 74.4*** |
| | | (16.14) | | (17.87) | | (17.78) | | (18.55) | | (17.77) |
| Log[1 + Education spending per capita] | | | | | | | | | 4.01*** | 4.77*** |
| | | | | | | | | | (0.98) | (0.91) |
| State FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 | 430 | 430 |
| $R^2$ | 0.42 | 0.53 | 0.46 | 0.52 | 0.47 | 0.53 | 0.47 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.58 |

*Notes.* OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Each observation is one Congressional District. The dependent variable is the vote share for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, out of the total votes cast for either of the two major political parties (i.e., excluding third-party, write-in, or independent candidates). Universalism in altruism (wrt number of donations) in columns (1)–(2) corresponds to our estimate of $\theta_i$ for each Congressional District, as per equation 10, based on geographic distance and *number* of donations as opposed to donation amounts. Universalism in altruism (wrt composite social distance) in columns (3)–(4) refers to a composite measure formed from a principal component analysis of geographic and friendship distances between CD pairs. In columns (5)–(6), we residualize both donation amounts and distances of state-pair fixed effects, and in columns (7)–(8), we estimate universalism in altruism based on a binarized rather than continuous geographic distance measure. In columns (9)–(10), we return to our baseline specification in Table 5, but introduce the log per capita spending on primary and secondary education from *local* sources of funding as controls, as covered in Section 6.4.

Table 23: Vote shares and donations as a function of distance: Robustness checks

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Effective Democratic vote share 2016 (in %) | | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Universalism in altruism (excluding same states) | 8.87*** | 6.92*** | 4.68*** | 9.00*** | 6.29*** | 5.09*** |
| | (0.76) | (0.66) | (0.74) | (1.30) | (1.20) | (1.28) |
| Log [1 + Total donations] | | 6.76*** | 4.42*** | | 6.19*** | 5.02*** |
| | | (0.88) | (1.03) | | (0.95) | (1.10) |
| Log [GDP p/c] | | | 1.21 | | | 0.16 |
| | | | (1.76) | | | (1.38) |
| Fraction of population with college degree | | | 14.6* | | | 6.23 |
| | | | (7.71) | | | (8.19) |
| Latitude | | | 0.22 | | | -0.017 |
| | | | (0.15) | | | (0.59) |
| Log [Distance to coast] | | | -1.64*** | | | -2.05*** |
| | | | (0.46) | | | (0.70) |
| Racial fractionalization | | | 18.2*** | | | 20.7*** |
| | | | (5.21) | | | (6.71) |
| Log [Average distance to all projects] | | | 4.65 | | | 54.6*** |
| | | | (3.40) | | | (17.90) |
| State FE | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 | 436 |
| $R^2$ | 0.25 | 0.35 | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.45 | 0.50 |

*Notes.* OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$. Each observation is one Congressional District. The dependent variable is the vote share for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, out of the total votes cast for either of the two major political parties (i.e., excluding third-party, write-in, or independent candidates). In each regression specification, we exclude all CD-to-CD pairs in which the donor state equals the recipient state; that is, we exclude all within-state donations, in order to estimate the gradient parameter of interest only when it comes to states other than a donor's own.

## D.4 Visual layout and functionality of the DonorsChoose platform

We take care to ensure our results are not artefacts of the layout or functionality of the DonorsChoose website when a potential donor accesses the platform. To do so, we examined all available screenshots of the platform's layout and functionality since its inception.

We can confirm that throughout the relevant time period, it is *not* the case that projects are sorted by closest proximity to each donor on the website. Instead, it appears that as of June 2019 and for a significant portion of the time period, the default sort for projects on the platform was by urgency, which DonorsChoose defines as a combination of the lowest cost to complete, highest economic need, and fewest days left to expiration of the project.

It is also *not* the case that the website's layout varies across space. That is, to the best of our knowledge, at any given time all donors observe the same platform layout regardless of location, and given the default sort, the same exact projects when they first arrive at the platform. As such, it is not the case that donors in Republican CDs are systematically nudged towards donating locally more often or in larger amounts through the website's layout or functionality. Below, we present screenshots of the DonorsChoose platform as accessible in June 2019.

Notable in each screenshot is that throughout our time period of interest, we can confirm that the options available to each donor with which to filter and sort projects were constant. These included the subject/ topic of each project (e.g., literacy, special needs, health & sports), the cost of the project, the urgency or poverty level associated to each project, grade level of the students to be reached by each project, etc.

Most importantly, the ability to search through and filter projects based on location was and continues to be a salient (usually, the highest) option available on the screen. This makes a donor's selection of a project based on geography particularly straightforward, and potentially enhances the case for our claim that geographic distance is a relevant metric employed by donors in selecting projects. That is, given the position of the location filter on each page throughout the years, it is reasonable to imagine that some portion of our results is supported by deliberate donor choices that explicitly involve geographic distance and, in turn, implicitly their degree of universalism.





Figure 34: Screenshot of DonorsChoose platform in June 2019. Note the ability to search for projects near any given geographical location at the top of the page, the options available to the donor with which to filter projects, and the "Double Your Impact" promotion applied to the topmost project presented.





Figure 35: Screenshot of DonorsChoose platform in June 2019. Note the options available to the donor with which to filter projects.





Figure 36: Screenshot of DonorsChoose platform in June 2019. Note the options available to the donor with which to filter projects.





Figure 37: Screenshot of sorting feature as available at the top of the DonorsChoose platform as of June 2019. The default sort appears to be “most urgent”. Note it does not appear to be possible to sort projects by geographic location, though the ability to *search* through projects by geographic location is available, as presented in Figure 34.