Does Revolution Work? Evidence from Nepal's People's War *

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Abstract

The political and policy consequences of revolution are among the most important, but least understood, of all war impacts. In 2015, after a decade-long conflict and nine years of negotiation, Nepal promulgated a constitution that replaced its 240-year-old monarchy by a federal republic. The subsequent 2017 local elections ushered in more than 30,000 first-time politicians into office. Using a census of 3.68 million Nepalis covering eleven districts, party nomination lists and party candidate selection committee surveys, electoral data and information on conflict incidence, we document patterns of political selection and implications for policy. We have four main findings: First, castes that were historically excluded from political representation gained representation generally, and to a greater extent in conflict-affected constituencies. Second, the Maoist party – the group that led the armed conflict – played a critical role in enabling political inclusion, with the greatest relative nomination of historically under-represented castes and a high premium placed on political inclusion in selection decisions.n Third, we don't find a significant representation-ability trade-off: improved social representation among politicians is accompanied by positive selection on education and income. Fourth, political representation does, however, affect policy inclusion: we exploit close local elections to show that greater political representation for excluded castes closed the gap between excluded and included castes in individual access to earthquake reconstruction transfers.

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1 Introduction

Revolutions aim to change the ruling class and to redress political inequalities. They occur frequently and, if successful, fundamentally alter institutions. When they lead to democratization, the resulting political institutions prove remarkably durable. Eleven of the 63 revolutions that occurred between 1950 and 2006 ended in democracy and only one reverted to autocracy (Albertus and Menaldo, 2014). That said, the nature of post-conflict transition to democracy influences subsequent political stability. Matanock and Staniland (2018) estimate that when signatories to negotiated peace settlements agree to establish political parties, the chance of enduring democratic peace increases by 80% (also see Weinstein (2006); Manning and Smith (2016)). While cross-country evidence is striking in its suggestion that revolutions create real potential for democratic consolidation, why this is so is less clear. In particular, our knowledge of whether and how revolutions redress historical inequities in political representation and ultimately affect policy outcomes remains limited (Blattman and Miguel, 2010).

In this paper, we use administrative and electoral data from Nepal for two broad purposes. First, we quantify the extent of ethnic inclusion in post-conflict local elections and evaluate political selection on education, assets, income, and ability.[1] Of particular interest is how conflict changed political institutions – in particular, the party selection process – and the political class. Second, we examine whether political inclusion enables policy inclusion as measured by the distribution of government reconstruction assistance in the wake of a devastating earthquake.

These issues have been difficult to answer for multiple reasons. Micro census data – needed to quantify the extent of political representation afforded to different population groups – is rarely available in lower income countries. Data limitations are particularly severe in countries that are emerging from conflict, often lacking the resources and stability to conduct large-scale data collection. Data on party selection processes is rare. And, finally, it is an additional challenge to identify the causal impact of ethnic favoritism in public policy as the socioeconomic characteristics of ethnic groups that do and do not gain political representation typically differ in ways that are also predictive of their eligibility for public

[1] We measure ability as the z-score of the residual from the regression $Income_i = f(Education_i, Age_i) + \gamma_w + \varepsilon_i$, where $Education_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one for having above median education, Age_i is a categorical variable with five year age bins, and γ_w are ward fixed effects. Function f represents the fact that this specification includes a dummy for each subgroup and for every possible double and triple interaction. Our measure is therefore the cross-sectional analogue of the measure used in Besley et al. (2017), Dal Bó et al. (2017), and Dal Bó et al. (2019).

policies (related empirical studies that seek to identify the causal link between identity and policy include Chandra (2006); Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004); Pande (2003); Dunning and Nilekani (2013); Burgess et al. (2015); Jensenius (2015)).

Nepal's political history, and a unique set of administrative datasets, enable progress on both fronts. For most of the 20th century, Nepal suffered political instability rooted in deep economic and political inequalities between castes and remained under the thumb of a powerful monarch. Following failed attempts at peaceful democratization, the Maoist People's War began in 1996. The war concluded in 2007 with the definitive end of the 240-year-old monarchy and the introduction of an interim constitution. In 2017, the Maoist's fundamental objective to replace the caste-based monarchy with a federal multiparty democracy, was realized with the promulgation of a federal constitution and local elections in 2017.

In the midst of this post-conflict Constitution-building, a devastating earthquake in 2015 damaged or destroyed houses of over 750,000 Nepali households. To identify affected households, the government conducted a full census in 11 crisis-hit districts in early 2016. Since then, providing housing reconstruction aid has, arguably, been the government of Nepal's highest priority. The census provides an important source of population data from just before the first local elections under the new constitution in 2017 while the beneficiary database enable us to examine how targeting changed after elections.

We merge this census of 3,680,772 Nepalis across 11 districts with 2017 electoral data, including candidate nomination lists from the three main political parties. The election data cover 20,408 nominees, 15,523 candidates, and 4,029 elected representatives. Finally, we use data on conflict incidence from the Informal Sector Service Center to measure local variation in exposure to the revolution. These data allow, to the best of our knowledge, the first comprehensive examination of the nature of political selection, including the role of parties and citizens, in a post-conflict, low-income setting. We then pair these data with person-level data on beneficiaries for national reconstruction grants, using a close election regression discontinuity design, to assess whether local politicians enable households from their ethnic group to gain faster access to housing benefits.

These data allow us to contribute to four core research questions in political economy. First: does revolution improve political representation? Specifically, in Nepal, did the People's war provide historically under-represented castes greater political representation? We leverage variation in exposure to the Maoist revolution across localities and we categorize politicians

into two groups: historically over-represented and historically under-represented castes (now on, included and excluded castes, respectively) .[2] In 2017, relative to 1992 elections, we find that political power transitions from included to excluded castes were more frequent in communities that saw Maoist activity during the conflict: power transferred from included to excluded caste politicians in 19% of conflict-affected localities, as compared to only 16% of non-conflict localities. A principal channel was the political power of the Maoist party in conflict-affected localities: conflict-affected localities were 6 percentage points more likely to elect a Maoist party candidate as ward chairperson. Semi-structured interviews with political party members further highlight that during the Revolution the Maoists invested in raising political awareness, promoting political participation of excluded castes, and cultivating a set of leaders who could contest office after the conflict.[3]

Second, how do party institutions shape patterns of political representation and selection post-conflict? We focus specifically on the role of political parties, particularly in conditioning the effects of conflict. In many low-income democracies, political parties play a critical role in distilling the pool of potential candidates and therefore in setting the terms for political representation. As a result, the institutions that parties establish for identifying candidates deserve evaluation. To do so, we conducted what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first representative survey of political party selection committees. As part of this survey we measure committee members implicit biases against leadership of excluded castes using an implicit association test. Preliminary results show that committee members are both unrepresentative of the population and even of politicians (70% of committee members come from included castes) and highly positively selected on education, income, and ability. We further show that a non-negligible proportion (25%) of committee members demonstrate moderate to severe bias against excluded castes. We then compare actual patterns of political inclusion across political parties. On average across all parties, included castes continued to enjoy an electoral advantage, and, among elected officials, are richer and more educated.[4] However, parties select according to very different patterns. While 60% of nominees considered for candidacy by the Maoists are from excluded castes, only 42% and 26% are for the center party (Marxist-Leninist) and the right party (Nepali Congress)

[2]We identify politician caste using a predictive algorithm that determined the most likely caste from politician surname, leveraging the census data to both train and validate the algorithm. Next to categorize Nepal's 125 castes, we follow Vollan (2015) in defining which castes are historically-included vs. historically-excluded: If a group wins seats equal to or less than 60% of their share of the population across Nepal in the 1991 and 1994 parliamentary elections, they are excluded (and otherwise, they are included).

[3]It is also worth noting that the Maoist party led the demand for a federal democracy with electoral quotas for women and minorities.

[4]On the salience of education for politics, see Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011)

respectively. For the Maoists, after controlling for income and education, being from an included caste *negatively* predicts candidacy. For the center party (United Marxist-Leninists), controlling for income and education simply eliminates the relationship. For the right party (Nepali Congress), being from an included caste continues to predict candidacy even after controlling for education and income. These party effects further vary by conflict patterns: for instance, relative to the population share, Maoist ward chairpersons are 10% more likely to belong to excluded castes in areas that had conflict. In contrast, in areas without conflict the representation of excluded castes among Maoist chairpersons is slightly below the population share of excluded castes. In combination with the advantage afforded to Maoists in conflict-affected localities, this provides suggestive evidence for the importance of the Maoist ideology in forging patterns of political selection.

Third, does political inclusion come at the expense of political ability? While inclusion is often cited as a core tenet of democracies (Dahl, 1973), we lack an understanding of whether new democracies, emerging from violent revolution can yield both representative and competent representatives. Contrary to expectations given Nepal's low GDP and limited experience with democracy, we find that the newly elected cadre of representatives in Nepal are positively selected (in terms of income, education, assets, and ability) relative to the population, yet they closely represent the caste and gender characteristics of Nepal's society. This contrasts sharply with 1992. Representation in 1992 was highly skewed toward included castes and women held less than 1% of seats. While the greater representation of women (40% of seats) is largely tied to the inclusion of gender quotas, the improved representation of excluded castes occurs across non-quota seats. In particular, while quotas improved representation among untouchables (Dalits), historically excluded indigenous groups (Janajatis), emerged in non-quota seats, consistent with an explicit aim of the Maoists. These patterns bear a qualitative resemblance to those documented in Sweden in Dal Bó et al. (2017), which the authors appropriately describe as an 'exemplar of democracy.' They also look notably different from patterns documented in the United States in Thompson et al. (2019), where the cadre of federal representatives are highly educated relative to population but derive disproportionately from elite backgrounds. We interpret this as suggestive that changing selection patterns reflected a reduction in bias. In ongoing work, we explicitly test this using Implicit Association tests conducted with Selection Committee members.

Finally, does political inclusion yield policy inclusion? We evaluate this by studying the distribution of government earthquake reconstruction grants comparing localities barely won by a candidate from a historically excluded caste. In general, citizens from included castes receive more post-earthquake reconstruction assistance, even after controlling for objective

grant eligibility. Among excluded castes, this access gap is closed for a subset: those who share the same caste, last name, and constituency as a mayor (which we term as belonging to the Mayor's 'clan'). That is, having a clan member elected to office appears to completely remediate the access disadvantage for excluded castes, but provides no additional benefit to the already included castes. We use a close elections regression discontinuity to enable a causal interpretation of the policy benefits of political inclusion, finding that individuals who had a clan member win mayoral office are more likely to receive earthquake reconstruction grants.

These results point to the importance of political selection and representation for policy, demonstrating that Nepal's political inclusion has started to yield policy inclusion. Our findings are consistent with a growing body of empirical work that suggests that group identity is a salient dimension of politics in lower income settings (Padró-i-Miquel, 2007; Pande, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Cruz et al., 2017). Kramon and Posner (2013) provide a list of 50 of the leading studies on distributive politics. Of these, we count eight that provide direct evidence that the ethnicity, gender, or caste of politicians relates to the allocation of government services. The idea that the identity of politicians influences policy selection underpins citizen candidate models of representative democracy (Besley and Coate, 1997). Finally, by examining the salience of ethnicity in a post-conflict setting, we also speak to the grievance-based literature that examines the link between ethnic divisions and conflict.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the economic, political, and social context relevant to the Maoist Movement. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 reports results on conflict and inclusion. Section 6 describes patterns of political selection. Section 7 documents preferential access to earthquake reconstruction grants by family members of politicians and by historically elite castes. Section 8 concludes.

2 Context: Nepal and The Maoist Movement

In this section, we review the economic, social, and political background of Nepal, with a specific reference to the rise of the Maoists, and the consequent formation of a republic in Nepal.

2.1 Economic and social context

Nepal, a landlocked country in South Asia, is the 17th poorest country in the world with a GDP per capita of 730 USD in 2018. Urbanization rates remain low at 20 percent, and 70

percent of the population is involved in agriculture. A quarter of Nepal's population lives in extreme poverty (less than 1.9 USD a day). At the same time, literacy rates are increasing in Nepal, though there still remains significant gender inequality: 71.6 percent of the men, and 44.5 percent of women are educated.

Nepal can be roughly divided into three regions: the Terai (plains), the hills, and the mountains. Most people live in the Terai and hills. In 2015, Nepal was hit by a severe earthquake that killed nearly 9,000 people. This earthquake caused most damage in the 'earthquake affected districts' in the hill areas. Our data for conflict and elections come from all of Nepal. However, detailed census data come only from these earthquake affected hill regions.

While a country of minorities comprising 125 different groups speaking 123 languages (Census, 2011), the historical legacies of a codified caste system remain active. In 1854 the Muluki Ain (Legal Code) system sought to enhance the monarch's state control by providing hierarchically arranging caste categorization of all Nepalis. The three elite casts Bahun (Brahman), Chhetri, and Newar castes (BCN) comprise 35 percent of the population. The BCN have historically wielded much economic and political power in Nepal, while the indigenous ethnic groups (Janjatis) and other out-caste groups (Dalits) remain significantly marginalized. For instance, in 1990 90% of Nepal's civil service comprised people from BCN castes. These castes also dominate politics: in the 1991 first past the post election, a majority (53.7%) of the positions were held by BCN (Vollan, 2015). In 1995-96, while poverty rates within BCN were in the 20-30%, disadvantaged lower castes (Dalits and Janjatis) were much worse off with poverty between 50 and 55% BS 2005, based on NLSS-I).

2.2 Political Context

We provide a brief historical background on the rise of the Maoist movement, Nepal's civil war that claimed about 13,000 lives, and the post-war constitution building and elections. Overall, the Maoists sought to change political and economic inequality deeply rooted in Nepal's caste system that organizes social and political life in the country.

Political liberalization experienced several false starts. In 1960, a political coup re-established monarchic rule under a party less 'Panchayat' system aimed at weakening republican forces. This system continued until 1990 from where we provide more detailed context.

2.2.1 The 1990 People's Movement

A popular uprising in 1990, called the People's Movement, forced the Monarchy of Nepal to form a new constitution that allowed for a first round of party-based elections in Nepal at the central level in 1991 and at the local level in 1992. From the beginning, however, this move toward democracy was incomplete. For example, the Constitution Recommendations Commission summarily dismissed a large number of recommendations from Dalits, Janajatis, Madhesis, and women in constructing the 1990 constitution (Lawoti, 2007, p. 57). In addition, in the first local elections, held in 1992, human rights reports document substantial harassment of United People's Front of Nepal candidates and efforts to prevent them from running for village development committees.

The two major political parties were the Nepali Congress and the left-wing CPN-UML. The United Nepal People's Front (UNPF), was not allowed to participate in the 1991 elections.[5] Elite representation, both in politics and bureaucracy, increased dramatically after 1990. During the largely ceremonial Panchayat parliament of the 1980s, Bahuns and Chhtetris occupied around 50% of seats. This share increased to 55% in 1991, and 63% in 1994. Similarly, 69% of those passing the civil services exam in 1985 where Chhetri, this rose to 81% in 1992, topping out at 98% in 2001.

The government failed both in providing broader representation and in delivering services, price stability, or growth. During this period the system remained fairly fragile: three separate governments formed in the parliament between 1990 and 1996. This created a fertile setting for the 1996 Maoist uprising.

2.2.2 1996 - 2007: The Maoist Revolution

The People's War was launched by the Maoists in 1996. This economically driven armed uprising lasted until 2006 (Weinstein, 2006). There were three major players engaged in political negotiations in this period: the monarchy, the Maoists, and the two mainstream parties (Nepali congress and UML). The monarchy wanted to retain full control over the political processes. The mainstream parties aimed for a constitutional monarchy with a constituent assembly. The Maoists wanted a full republic with no role for the Monarchy, and remained committed to a full republic throughout the conflict. Violence was mostly

[5]Many of the people who came to power were former Panchayat members who had joined the Nepali Congress which won the election in 1991 and formed government. The Prime Minister from the Nepali Congress, G.P. Koirala, vocally opposed political participation by leftists.

restricted to the local level until 2001, when the monarchy decided to retaliate using the full force of the state. As a result, 85 percent of the 17,800 battle deaths from the conflict occurred during this period (Gilligan et al., 2014).

In 2007, a Peace Agreement was signed with a 19-point statement. This was signed by the Maoists and mainstream parties to fight monarchy, leading the foundation for the republic.

Several papers investigate the predictors of conflict. Bohara et al. (2006) find that favorable terrain (e.g., mountains and forests) makes conflict more likely, while turnout in parliamentary elections prior to the conflict, and measures of social capital negatively predict conflict. Acharya (2009) finds that the intensity of violence was greatest in districts with low road density. Do and Iyer (2010) find that poorer districts, and, again, favorable geography, see more conflict. Moreover, poorer districts enter the conflict earlier. However, ethnic polarization and caste polarization, land inequality, and political participation are not correlated with violence.[6]

Regarding the consequences of the conflict, Libois (2016) finds that the conflict reduces incomes in the short-run, but that in the longer run lower castes do not recover, while higher castes do, particularly because they can avail themselves of migration opportunities. Valente (2013) finds that more intense conflict is associated with increases in female educational attainment. This is consistent with our finding that where conflict was more intense, more of the Maoist agenda appears to be implemented more robustly. She also finds that forced abductions have a negative effect on educational outcomes.

2.2.3 2008 - 2015: The Struggle to Promulgate a Constitution

After the peace agreement, on January 15, 2007, the government created an interim constitution, which provided for a constituent assembly that was to write the new constitution. Disagreements led to the assembly missing the April 2010 deadline and, because of continued failure, the assembly was dissolved in November 2013. A new assembly was subsequently elected, which again failed to write a constitution.

[6] Macours (2011) studies how conflict erupted, despite Nepal's healthy economic growth in the period prior to the conflict. She finds that, during this period, economic gains were much smaller for the (near) landless, relative to the landed. She also finds that recruitment via forced abductions was more common in districts where inequality between the landed and the landless had previously increased. Mitra and Mitra (2018) also find that poorer districts are more likely to see conflict and argue that this is an agreement between Nepal's disenfranchised and the Maoists whereby they would be empowered should the Maoists prevail. Murshed and Gates (2005) find that inequality (measured as the difference between the district average and the average in Kathmandu) in life expectancy, schooling, HDI, Landlessness, Road density, and natural resources, all robustly predict the number of battle deaths.

Motivated by the April 2015 earthquake, and a substantial degree of subsequent international political pressure, 90% of the legislators voted in favor of a new constitution, establishing Nepal as a federal republic. In 2017, local elections were held across 756 municipalities. In each municipality, a mayor and deputy mayor (for urban areas) and a chairperson and vice-chairperson (in rural areas) was elected. One of the two positions was reserved for women, and invariably parties fielded women for the deputy mayor/vice-chairperson position. In addition, ward members (between 5-15) were elected along with a ward chair. At the ward-level, two posts was reserved - one each for a woman and a Dalit woman (see Figure 1 for the schema).

3 Data

We have undertaken a large data collection effort to collate data on the entire population of 11 districts of Nepal, election outcomes in both 2017 and 1992, and local data on experiences of violence during the conflict. Each data sets is described below and Appendix A provides additional details regarding all data sets, how we deal with the reorganization of administrative units across time, and how data sets are merged.

Post-earthquake Census in 11 Districts in 2016 Following the 2015 earthquake the Government of Nepal conducted a household census in 11 districts. The purpose was to map earthquake damage and identify reconstruction needs. Through a partnership with the National Reconstruction Authority, we were given access to person-level data for these eleven districts, including information on caste, education, household income, household pre- and post-earthquake assets, destruction, and aid receipts for all family members. The data also permit us to measure ability as the residual from a Mincer wage regression following Besley et al. (2017).[7]

[7]Specifically, we estimate the regression $Income_i = f(Education_i, Age_i) + \gamma_w + \varepsilon_i$, where $Education_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one for having above median education, Age_i is a categorical variable with five year age bins, and γ_w are ward fixed effecs. Function f represents the fact that this specificaton includes a dummy for each subgroup and for every possible double and triple interaction. We then keep the residual, and transform it into a z-score to assist with interpretation.

Election Outcomes in 2017 We have collected basic information on all 148,362 candidates in the municipal and ward-level elections across Nepal in 2017, including vote totals. We paired these with data we collected directly from the three largest political parties - Nepali Congress, CPN UML, and Maoist - on all nominees in the 11 earthquake-affected districts. These data were collected from the district party officials within six months of the election to ensure their accuracy. In combination, these data allow us to trace the process of political selection that began with 17,338 nominees, 13,834 candidates, and 3,615 representatives across the three largest parties in 11 districts of Nepal.

We merge these with the PDNA Census data to capture background covariates on all political hopefuls, including information on their caste, education, household income, and household assets.

Election Outcomes in 1992 As a baseline to compare representation in the 2017 elections, we use electoral outcomes from the 1992 local elections for mayoral positions. Chacón and Paik (2017) digitized these data, including all candidate names and corresponding vote totals.

As with the 2017 election data, the 1992 election returns data do not provide data on caste or other background characteristics of candidates. We therefore build a prediction model that links surnames to castes using the 3,680,772 observations in the PDNA census that contain both names and caste categories. Appendix B describes the prediction model and how we validate it out of sample.

Maoist Conflict Violence To determine local conflict incidence, we use data from the Informal Sector Service Sector (INSEC) to code a variable indicating whether or not a death occurred within any VDC (locality). These data also includes information on where soldiers and political operatives killed in the conflict were initially recruited. We use this information to construct a proxy for Maoist political activities that are separate from the conflict. This allows us to examine more accurately whether it was conflict *per se*, or the set of political activities that attend violent conflict (providing services, political mobilization, etc.), that play a role in Nepal's political transformation.

Survey of Party Selection Committees Party selection committees nominate candidates, and thereby play a fundamental role in selecting politicians. In 2019, we surveyed selection committees for all three major parties.

Selection committees are comprised of senior party officials; conducting this survey therefore took considerable cooperation with each of the parties. We sampled 883 officials in the eleven districts and succeeding in interviewing 705 for a success rate of 79.84%. As we describe in Section 5.3 below, this group is quite positively selected, even relative to other politicians. We provide full sampling protocols in Appendix Section **??**. Appendix Table A3 reports predictors of successfully interviewd candidates. Coverage is uniform across genders, parties, and districts (with the exception of a higher success rate in Kavre district).

4 The Maoist Revolution and Political Inclusion

Nepal's constitution and 2017 local elections are evidence that the Maoist Revolution reshaped Nepal's political landscape, accomplishing a principal revolutionary goal of creating a federal democracy. Did this enable greater political representation of historically-excluded populations?

Figure 2 shows the caste distribution of unelected candidates and elected representatives for all local positions relative the population distribution in panel (a) and for non-caste-based quota positions in panel (b). Panel (a) shows that the caste distribution of candidates (elected and not) is largely representative of the population distribution, with overrepresentaion of Dalits. After removing the Dalit reserved seat (panel b), the caste distribution of candidates is still representative of the underlying caste distribution of the population, except for underrepresentation of Dalits. This is striking evidence that Nepal's first local election since democratization generated a set of local representatives that are ethnically representative of the population.

Next, we leverage VDC-level data on conflict to examine whether representation varied by the VDC's history of conflict. Figure 3 compares VDCs (localities) that did and did not experience conflict (have any conflict-related deaths) in terms of the representativeness of candidates (unelected and elected) in the Ward Chairperson races in the 2017 elections by party. Specifically, this figure compares representation from historically-included castes (Brahmin, Chhetri, Newar, and Janajati Included) with representation from historically-excluded castes (Janajati-Excluded and Dalit). One thing is clear: representation of ex-

cluded castes is greater relative to the population in VDCs that experienced conflict, but this is almost exclusively the result of the choices of Maoist voters.

Finally, we turn to a regression framework to examine whether these patterns in inclusion reflect a change from pre-conflict outcomes (in the 1992 election) and, if yes, then whether they correlate with conflict incidence in the VDC. We estimate the equation:

$$\Delta Y_c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Violence_c + \beta_2 MaoistsActive_c + \sum_{i=1}^{3} \gamma_i Ward\ Category_c + \varepsilon_c \qquad (1)$$

where ΔY_c measures changes in measures of inclusion from 1992 to 2017 in VDC c and $Ward\ Category_c$ is a categorical variable reflecting the number of wards into which the VDC was divided for the 2017 elections. For dependent variables not observed in 1992, we run cross-sectional regressions.[8] β_1 is a dummy variable equal to one for VDCs recording any type of casualty. β_2 is a dummy variable equal to one only for VDCs that record both a Maoist casualty and a successful Maoist recruitment. Interpreting β_1 and β_2 as the causal impacts of violence and of Maoist political activity requires us to assume that conflict incidence in a VDC does not proxy for other (independently determined) time-varying changes in population attitudes (or socio-economic characteristics) that independently influence the outcome of interest. Given that this is a somewhat strong assumption, we consider these regression results similarly to the figures – as valuable descriptive evidence on the links of conflict and political inclusion.

Table 1, panel A, reports estimates of the specification 1 when only the violence dummy is included. Relative to 1992, the number of candidates contesting mayoral seats increased by about 4.3 (column 1). While violence does not predict a relatively greater number of total candidates (column 1), it does predict a steeper rise in the number of excluded candidates (column 2) and, less precisely, a slower increase in the number of included candidates (column 3). Taken together, while 16 percent of non-violent VDCs saw a transition from being governed by an included mayor to an excluded one, 19.1 percent of violent VDCs saw such a transition (column 4). By contrast, only 8% of both violent and non-violent VDCs saw a transition in the other direction toward less inclusion.

Turning to cross-sectional results (columns 6-8), Maoists won only 12% of ward chair positions in non-violent VDCs and 18.1% of ward chair positions in violent VDCs (column 6).

[8] Note that our specification is mathematically equivalent to estimating $_{ct} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Violence_{ct} + \sum_{i=1}^{3} \gamma_i Ward\ Category_{ct} + \gamma_c + \mu_t + \varepsilon_{ct}$ where $Violence_{c1} = 0\ \forall\ c$.

This increase in Maoist representation is fairly evenly divided between Maoist ward chairs coming from historically-included and historically-excluded castes (columns 7 and 8).

4.1 Understanding the channel

For initial suggestive evidence, in Panels B and C of Table 1 we include a dummy for Maoist activity specifically (defined as having both a Maoist casualty and a Maoist recruited) as the main explanatory variable. Using this definition, if anything, the results from Panel A are starker. In particular, the share of these VDCs that transitioned from included to exclude rule is 4.8%. Including measures of both having any casualties, and of having Maoist casualties and recruitments specifically (Panel C), indicate that Maoist activity best predicts political transitions.

To further discern the mechanisms underlying the heightened representation of excluded castes in conflict-affected areas, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 60 political party leaders across the eleven earthquake affected districts. These semi-structured interviews were conducted at the end of a short survey with the party leaders that served on committees to select the candidates for the 2017 election. Party members were asked how conflict-affected areas differed from non-conflict-affected areas with respect to voter turnout, the number of candidates, the victory margin, and the likelihood of excluded caste candidates being elected[9]. Table 2 categorizes the responses to these questions and provides the frequency of each response category by political party.

The most oft-cited reasons for differences in conflict-affected areas were greater political participation by historically-excluded castes and heightened political consciousness. As the UML party representative from Makwanpur district states, greater awareness around caste bias and discrimination in conflict-affected areas has led to increased engagement in political spaces. The Makwanpur district Maoist party member also emphasizes that excluded castes became empowered to raise their voices in conflict-affected areas. Other related reasons for differences between conflict and non-conflict-affected areas include stronger norms of inclusion, altered perceptions of marginalized groups, and direct impact of the Maoist party.

[9]Specifically, respondents were asked: As you know, the levels of conflict during 1996 to 2006 varied across Nepal. In the 2017 elections, what is your impression of how areas with more conflict differed? Specifically, relative to low conflict areas do you think the following were higher or lower in high conflict areas relative to low conflict: (i) voter turnout; (ii) number of candidates; (iii) victory margin; (iv) likelihood that candidates from excluded castes were elected as ward chairperson

> The likelihood [that excluded castes will be elected] was higher in conflict affected areas because the revolution made people aware of discrimination based on caste. Marginalized groups have become more active and conscious politically....The revolution uplifted people's political and social consciousness. In conflict affected areas, participation in politics has broadened.
> *Male Party Member, Makwanpur District, UML Party*

> This is the impact of civil war. An ordinary citizen has now understood that they can raise their voice. In the Panchayat era for example, people were afraid of the mukhiyas (local leaders), and they did not voice their opinion. But this environment has changed; the revolution changed people's consciousness. *Female Party Member, Makwanpur District, Maoist Party*

Further evaluation shows that these gains to political participation and consciousness were largely attributed to the Maoist party and the aims of the revolution:

> Yes, the likelihood [that excluded castes be elected in conflict-affected areas] was high because these groups had been a part of the Maoist movement.
> *Male Party Member, Dolakha District, UML Party*

> The Maoists started their struggle for the upliftment of oppressed groups and Janajatis. For example, the discriminatory practice of untouchability that was prevalent in our society has ended now, thanks to the revolution....Because Maoists fought for the welfare of the lower class and represent marginalized groups, the likelihood of winning for these groups was higher in conflict affected areas.
> *Male Party Member, Dolakha District, Maoist Party*

> The Maoist revolution's agenda was to ensure that the marginalized groups had access to and representation in the state. In 2074 elections, the Maoists distribution of tickets was influenced by this agenda. Therefore, the likelihood of candidates from marginalized groups winning in conflict affected areas was higher.
> *Male Party Member, Dolakha District, UML Party*

However, these explanations focused on increased political inclusion of historically-excluded groups were much more frequently reported by party members from the Maoist and UML

parties. Nepali Congress Party members were more likely to state that continued political control of Maoists and specifically Maoist coercion in the polling booth was the key reason for differences between conflict and non-conflict-affected areas:

> In conflict affected areas, the Maoists continued using their tactics of intimidating and threatening political leaders from other political parties. Due to this, politicians from other political parties were reluctant to stand in the election. *Male Party Member, Gorkha District, Nepali Congress Party*

Some members of the Nepali Congress party instead focused on how the Maoist Revolution created norms of democratic participation that have subsequently yielded differences in conflict-affected areas.

> The revolution convinced people that democratic system should be strengthened to avoid violent conflict; so, they participated in the elections enthusiastically. *Male Party Member, Ramechap District, Nepali Congress Party*

The results from Panels B and C of Table 1 and from the interviews with party leaders provide evidence that the Maoist Revolution specifically triggered political change from the 1992 to 2017 elections that increased the representation of historically-excluded castes by bringing historically-excluded castes into political spaces, increasing political consciousness and norms of citizen engagement more broadly, and through the intentional promotion by the Maoist party of underrepresented groups.

5 Party Selection Committees and Caste Bias

Selection committees are fundamental to the operation of parties: they determine who the party sponsors. In many developing countries, candidates are not selected through open primaries, but rather by (often opaque) intra-party protocols. Parties, therefore, play an important role in deciding which nominees ultimately appear on the ballot. Understanding how these committees operate may provide fundamental insights into why representation has improved particularly in conflict-affected areas.

To deepen our understanding of how these committees operate, we conducted what is, to our knowledge, the first representative survey of party selection committees. The survey yields

the following results. First, committee members are quite positively selected, even relative to politicians. However, they are mostly men from elite caste backgrounds. Second, they exhibit implicit biases against women and minority castes (as measured using an IAT). Third, female committee members (significantly) and minority committee members (directionally) are less biased than other committee members. In future versions of this paper, we will utilize these data to understand how selection committee biases shaped their real-world decisions over which nominees to put forward for candidacy. Importantly, we will compare the composition of these committees and the nature of their biases across conflict-affected and non-conflict-affected localities. For now, we summarize the survey method and initial summary statistics.

5.1 Selection Committee Survey

To better identify the role of parties, we conducted a representative survey of selection committee members from the three main political parties (United Marxist-Leninist, Maoist Centre, and Nepali Congress) in 11 districts of Nepal from March - August 2019.[10] Party selection committees consist of party members that meet before the local elections to evaluate potential nominees and select party candidates for each position.

The structure of selection committees varied by party. All parties had two tiers of selection committees. The United Marxist Leninist and Maoist parties both had district-level selection committees that decided on candidates for municipal positions and municipality-level selection committees that decided on candidates for ward positions. The Nepali Congress party had district-level selection committees that chose candidates for municipal positions and regional selection committees which oversaw the selection of ward candidates across several municipalities. We collected lists of all committee members from the leadership of each party in each district, including the committee member's status within the committee. Importantly, there are varying degrees of influence across committee members depending on the position held within the committee. We disaggregated the committee members into influential and non-influential members, with influential committee members being those who held a specifically nominated position.

From these lists, we sampled as follows:

- All district committee members

[10]The 11 districts in which this survey was conducted correspond with the 11 districts for which we have the post disaster needs assessment census.

- All influential committee members in the Nepali Congress regional committees
- Two randomly sampled influential committee members in the UML and Maoist municipal committees
- One randomly sampled committee members from all remaining unsampled committee members in both regional and municipal committees.

Of the 883 selection committee members sampled, 705 were successfully interviewed, yielding a success rate of roughly 80%. Six observations were removed because of data incompleteness and duplication, yielding a final sample of 699 committee members. Appendix Table A3 demonstrates the representativeness of this final sample.

Committee members were first asked to complete an Implicit Association test (described below). They were then orally administered a questionnaire regarding their experiences in the party, their experiences on the selection committee, and their perceptions over the characteristics needed for being elected. Following the survey questionnaire, a short semi-structured interview was conducted with each committee member around their perceptions of conflict-affected areas.

5.2 Are Selection Committees Positively Selected?

Table 5 summarizes demographics separately for committee members and for politicians. The comparisons are stark: only 9% of selection committee members are women, as opposed to 40% of politicians, and 70% come from an included caste. Committee members have, on average, 10.6 years of education, and score 2.4 standard deviations above the mean in the general population on the ability score. By contrast, politicians have on average only 3.7 years of education and score only 0.2 standard deviations higher on the ability score. Similarly, incomes of committee members are more than double those of politicians. These data suggest that while we may see that politicians are representative of the social diversity in the population, selection committee members are not. They are, however, positively selected both relative to the population as a whole and also relative to politicians.

5.3 Are Committee Members Biased?

An important question is whether selection committee members themselves are biased against historically-excluded castes. If so, these biases may affect where excluded caste candidates

are fielded and the ultimate representativeness of party candidates. We measure this bias using a single-attribute implicit association test (Penke et al., 2006) that had selection committee members categorize words associate with two different castes (Brahmins which are historically included and Tamangs which are historically excluded) with words associated with leadership. Words from all three categories (Brahmin, Tamang, and leadership) appeared one at a time on a tablet screen and respondents were instructed to categorize them by clicking left or right according to the labels associated with each particular round[11]. The idea behind this measure is that if committee members have biases against excluded castes (Tamangs), then it will be harder and take longer for them to associate (i.e. categorize) Tamang names with leadership words. To measure bias, we calculated for each respondent the difference in time on average it took to categorize Brahmin and leadership together from the time on average it took to categorize Tamang and leadership together[12]. This average difference is then normalized by the standard deviation across all trials to create a final respondent-level, standardized measure of bias.

Our data shows that a non-negligible number of committee members are substantially slower to associate excluded castes with leadership than included castes to such a degree as would conventionally be considered biased. Appendix Figure A3 plots the distribution of IAT scores by party; a positive value indicates a slower association of excluded castes with leadership compared to included castes and a score greater than .35 is conventionally noted as signifying moderate to severe bias (Greenwald et al., 2003). The data show that across all three parties the mean IAT score is positive, the average caste bias across committee members is 0.118 σ, and on average 27.5% of selection committee members achieving scores that signify moderate to severe bias against excluded castes. Figure A3 shows that the distributions across the three parties are largely similar, with Maoists having a slightly greater mean than the other two parties. We also find that on average committee members from excluded castes have lower IAT scores (i.e. less bias) than those from included castes (mean of 0.09 as compared

[11]Respondents were asked to complete a total of five rounds as follows:
Randomization of Brahmin/Tamang to right or left
Round 1: Brahmin/Tamang, 10 trials
Randomization of Leadership to right or left
Round 2: Brahmin/Tamang; Leader, 20 trials
Round 3: Brahmin/Tamang; Leader, 20 trials (identical to round 2)
Round 4: Tamang/Brahmin; Leader, 20 trials (reverse to round 2)
Round 5: Tamang/Brahmin; Leader, 20 trials (identical to round 4)

[12]This difference is calculated by taking the difference in average time to correctly categorize responses in round 3 and round 5. Following common practices, we eliminate trials with latencies ¿ 3,000ms and ¡ 300ms. We further drop respondents if more than 10% of trials have latency ¡ 300 ms or more than 10% of trials have ¿ 3000 ms.

to 0.13).

The next step in this analysis will be to link committee composition and committee member bias with actual selection decisions to evaluate whether bias against excluded castes correlates with the likelihood of an excluded caste nominee being selected for candidacy. We will further explore whether the degree of bias on selection committee varies across conflict-affected and non-conflict-affected localities and whether any observed link between committee bias and selection decisions is conditioned by past experience with conflict.**TBC**

5.4 How did Political Selection evolve?

Given our improved knowledge of party internal selection protocols, we conclude this section by examining politician selection at three critical stages through a comparison of who parties consider for nomination, who they put on their ticket, and who voters then vote into office.

Figure 4 depicts the distribution of education, income, and assets separately for the general population, potential candidates (nominees), unelected candidates, and elected representatives. It is clear that nomination, party selection, and voter choice each exert important influence in shaping the positive selection of politicians. First, by comparing the population to nominees, we see that a substantial degree of selection occurs at the nomination stage. For example, while about 26.4% of the population is illiterate, only about 16.6% of nominees are illiterate. This further justifies the importance of understanding party selection committees. Second, it also appears that party selection committees play a role: illiteracy among candidates is only 8.28%. Finally, voters also play a role in selection: only 6.2% of elected representatives are illiterate. The distribution of politicians clearly lies to the right of unelected candidates. Similar patterns with varying degrees are evidence with respect to household income and assets.

6 Is There an Inclusion - Competence Tradeoff?y

Given the significant gains in representation enjoyed by excluded castes in the 2017 elections, a natural question, is whether these improvement came at the cost of a less qualified political class. We are able to do this by merging the earthquake district census data with the lists of nominees and candidates provided by parties and the election commission.

Table 3 reports the means (and standard errors) of several key demographic variables for the general population and for politicians holding each of the seven local government seats. A few clear patterns emerge. First, there is clear inequality in terms of education, income, and assets in the general population between included and excluded castes. Second, politicians are positively selected, and they are especially so for higher offices. Third, politicians from excluded groups are also much more likely to come from the most populous caste in their constituency than politicians from included groups, indicating that politicians from included castes are, on occasion, able to win in constituencies where their caste is not a majority. Last, while politicians have more income, education, and assets than the general population, there remains substantial inequality between included and excluded politicians. To the extent that education, income, and assets signal ability, this implies that there remains some inclusion - competence trade off.

6.1 Graphical evidence

A. Comparison to population

Figure 5 compares the distribution of education, household income, and a household asset index across municipal-level (mayor and deputy mayor) representatives, unelected candidates, nominees and the population by degree of historical caste political inclusion. Several important things are clear. First, the population distribution of education, income, and assets is quite different between historically-included and historically-excluded castes. Specifically, historically-excluded castes have lower levels of education, lower household income, and fewer household assets. Second, while the *population* distributions for historically-excluded and historically-included castes are different, the *candidate* distributions are quite similar. Candidates from historically-included castes are positively selected on these variables relative to the population distribution for historically-included castes. Notable, candidates from historically-excluded castes are also positively selected on these variables relative to the population distribution for historically-excluded castes and relative to the population distribution for historically-included castes. Put simply, candidates from excluded castes are generally better educated than the population from included castes. This suggests that, using education, income, and assets as a proxy for competence, there is not an inclusion - competence trade-off.

B. Comparison to clan-members

To fully assess the quality of political selection, we need to know whether politicians come from a representative set of not only caste, but also of economic backgrounds. Ideally, we would consider the demographics of their parents or siblings to assess this, as in Dal Bó et al. (2017). However, our data do not allow us to directly identify family relations in the PDNA census for citizens who are not cohabitating. We therefore compare the background of candidates relative to members of their 'clan', defined as all individuals who simultaneously share the same surname, belong to the same caste, and live in the same ward. We identify roughly 90,000 clans in our population of over 3 million.[13] This is a very natural unit of social identification in Nepal. Our aim is to understand whether politicians higher than general levels of education, income, and assets are the result of their being exceptional or the result of their being from exceptional clans.

Figure 6 depicts patterns of political selection relative to the population by education, income, and assets. Clan members of both municipal and ward politicians closely resemble the general population in these districts. By contrast, politicians, themselves, are positively selected relative to both the population and their clan. Moreover,comparing the top and bottom panels, we see that the extent of positive selection is greater for municipal than for ward politicians.

Interestingly, the pattern is qualitatively in line with those reported in Dal Bó et al.'s (2017) study of Sweden in several regards. Politicians are positively selected, the degree of positive selection is greater for higher office, and their families/clans are representative of the general population. This may suggest that Nepal is in the beginnings of an 'inclusively meritocratic' political system. Appendix Figure A4 examines selection by each local government position. In the disaggregated data, we see only one clear violation of this pattern, for deputy mayors, a position generally held by women as the result of quotas. The clans of deputy mayors are also quite positively selected.

[13] If, instead, we identify clans as individuals who simultaneously share the same surname, belong to the same caste, and live in the same municipality.

6.2 Regressions: Basic Findings

While Figure 5 descriptively points against a representation-competence trade-off, we further investigate these questions using the following empirical specifications:

$$Selected_{ic} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Historically\text{-}Included_{ic} + \beta_2 Female_{ic} + \beta_3 Education_{ic} + \beta_4 Income_{ic} + \beta_5 Assets_{ic} + \gamma_c + \varepsilon_{ic}, \quad (2)$$

where $Selected_{ic}$ is a dummy variable equal to one for individual i running in constituency c who is selected. In the first set of specifications, we will set $Selected_{ic}$ equal to one for individuals who win party tickets, and in the second set of specifications, we will set $Selected_{ic}$ equal to one for individuals who win office. We also focus on within-constituency variation and add constituency fixed effects, γ_c, though the same pattern emerges without their inclusion.[14] We transform the measures of education and income, presented above, by first recoding each category as the midpoint of the values contained in that bin and then transforming the measure to a z-score. The asset index is also transformed into a z-score.

We can interpret Specification 2 according to the taxonomy given in Dal Bó et al. (2017). If Nepal's political system is purely 'elitist' or 'historically deterministic', then it should be the case that $\beta_1 > 0$ always, and that adding additional covariates to account for education, income, and wealth should not alter the importance of elitism for selection. By contrast, in an 'elitist meritocracy', wherein elites disproportionately win office, but do so only because they are disproportionately educated and wealthy, then, after controlling for competence, β_1 should be close to zero. In a fully inclusive meritocracy, by contrast, β_1 should always be irrelevant.

Table 6 presents variants of Specification 2, pooling across all open seats (seats without a caste-based quota). Panel A reports the predictors of winning a ticket and Panel B reports the predictors of winning a seat. In Panel A, based on population means we see that 0.279% of all citizens are selected as candidates on a party ticket, and more specifically 0.255% of excluded caste citizens are nominated as compared to 0.305% of included caste members. Controlling for ward fixed effects (column 1) and gender (column 2) do not alter the estimate of β_1, which corresponds to the advantage created by being from a historically-included caste. Controlling for education (column 3) reduces the estimate of β_1 to 0.045, controlling for income (column 4) further reduces β_1 to 0.036, and controlling for assets does not change the estimate. As shown in column 5, while being from a historically-excluded caste does convey some advantage in terms of selection by political parties into candidacy, this advantage is

[14] These results are presented in the Appendix.

attenuated by proxies of competence, namely education and income. In selecting candidates, parties appear to focus on competence, and it is clear that parties disproportionately draw from included castes, in part, because they have higher levels of education and income.

The probability that any citizen is elected to local office is 0.07% (Panel B). The probability for historically-included castes is about 0.08% as compared to about 0.06% for historically-excluded castes. A similar pattern to candidate selection emerges: controlling for ward fixed effects (column 1) and gender (column 2) does not change the estimate of β_1 (the advantage in selection from being from a historically-included caste) by much, while controlling for education (column 3), and income (column 4) reduces it substantially. An additional control for assets does not change much. This suggests that voters make selections in largely the same fashion as political parties, prioritizing both competence and elite status.

However, there is some evidence that voters have a preference for included caste members that exceeds the preference of parties.. After controlling for gender, education, income, and assets, being from a included caste increases the probability of winning a position on a party ticket by 12.9% relative to the unconditional mean. By contrast, being from a included caste increases the probability of winning a seat by 18.6% relative to the unconditional mean.

Overall, while belonging to an included caste positively predicts political representation a substantial part of the relevance of caste is explained by proxies for competence (education, income, and assets). Moreover, for the most important positions that we observe in our data – municipal seats – the relevance of caste is completely accounted for by competence (see Appendix Tables).

6.3 Regressions: Differences by Parties

The Maoist uprising sought to expand political access for disenfranchised castes. If, as we have argued above, the main reason for this lies in Maoist ideology and the role of the Maoist Conflict, then it stands to reason that patterns of political selection within the Maoist party should impose less advantage on members of historically-included castes. Unlike the Maoists, the United Marxist Leninist (UML) party – the most left-wing party among the mainstream parties in power during the civil war – shared the objective of increased representation, but sought to work within existing power structures. The Nepali congress, by contrast, sought to maintain the constitutional monarchy. We therefore compare patterns of political selection

across these three large political parties by looking at heterogeneity in Specification 2 by party.

Table 8 reports the predictors of wining a ticket in each of three different races - all open races (Panel A), open municipal races (Panel B), and open ward races (Panel C) - separated across the three main parties - Maoists (Columns 1 and 2), UML (Columns 3 and 4), and Nepali Congress (Columns 5 and 6). Looking at all open races in Panel A, historically-included caste members were 0.029 pp more likely to be selected for candidacy by the Nepali Congress than historically-excluded caste members, 0.025 pp more likely to be selected for candidacy by the UML, and only 0.002 pp more likely to be selected for candidacy by the Maoist. Controlling for education and income, this reduces to 0.016 pp for Nepali Congress and 0.013 pp for UML. For the Maoists, on the otherhand, controling for measures of competence, being from a historically-excluded caste actually appears to generate advantage in the selection process (0.007 pp more likely to be selected than members of historically-included castes). Similar patterns hold in open ward seats (Panel C). As noted above, while historical elitism does convey some advantage in the UML and Nepali Congress selection process before accounting for education and income, this advantage disappears with these proxies for competence.

Altogether, Table 8 provides clear evidence that Maoist political selection in 2017 differed markedly from political selection in the two other largest political parties. Maoist party members gave no advantage to being from an included caste, and may even have conveyed disadvantage once proxies for competence are accounted for. The two other large political parties conveyed some advantage to included caste members, however, this was discounted once education and income are held equal. This party-wise comparison provides further suggestive evidence of the importance of the Maoist party and its ideology of inclusivity in shaping the representativeness of the first local elections after democratization.

7 Political Inclusion and Policy Selection

Nepal accomplished what many would find unthinkable: local institutions with competent representatives that largely resemble the population in terms of caste. In of itself, these are important findings since achieving political inclusion without trading off quality is often considered difficult (Dahl, 1973). Yet, we also know that the identity of politicians matters for politics and policy (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Chandra, 2006; Besley et al., 2011; Jensenius, 2015; Dunning and Nilekani, 2013). In our final section we, therefore, ask: does

the caste identity of politicians affect the distribution of public services?

We examine one aspect of this – the distribution of reconstruction grants for earthquake damage; an ongoing policy that newly elected local politicians had significant ability to immediately influence following their election. It is also a program that distributed benefits to individuals and households and as a result presents opportunities for discretion.

In April of 2015, roughly one-third of Nepal's population was affected by a devastating earthquake. The government, with international support, responded by providing cash grants to earthquake victims. Beneficiary identification was intended to be based on the PDNA census, conducted later in 2015. During the census, households received a damage grade based on an engineering assessment with those receiving a damage grade of three to five eligible for grants. Grants were to be paid out in three tranches of NPR 50,000, NPR 150,000 and NPR 100,000. While first installments of these grants began being distributed in 2015, at the time of the elections in 2017 many people are still applying for benefits (or filing for reconsideration of status if their initial application had been refused) and others were filing claims for the second or third installment.

After the elections, local representatives, principally at the municipal level (mayors), were empowered to adjudicate on eligibility decisions and the release of second and third tranches. To examine whether mayor identity affected the composition of beneficiaries we merge person-level census data on beneficiary grant receipt (up to March 2018) from the National Reconstruction Authority with the PDNA census, which informs us of eligibility, caste, and political connections. We then utilize an election regression discontinuity to see if being in the clan of a mayor (same caste and ward) who just won election conveys some degree of advantage in the beneficiary receipt process.

7.1 Does Being from a Politician's Clan Predict Earthquake Receipts? A comparison across included and e

7.1.1 Basic estimates

Officially, earthquake reconstruction grant eligibility is determined by a formula based on extent of house damage, and feasibility of reconstruction. If the rules are followed, then after controlling for the degree of damage and the feasibility of reconstruction, a household's caste identity and whether they belong to the same clan of a politician should not matter. To test

this, we estimate variants of:

$$\begin{aligned} Relief\ Transfers_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Included_i + \beta_2 Mayor's\ Clan_i \\ + \beta_3 Included_i \times Mayor's\ Clan_i + \beta_4 Damage\ Grade_i \\ + \beta_5 Feasible_i + \beta_6 \boldsymbol{X}_i \varepsilon_i, \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

where $Relief\ Transfers_i$ are cumulative reconstruction transfers received by household i, $Included_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one for households from an included caste, $Mayor'sClan_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one for households belonging to the mayor's clan, and $Damage\ Grade_i$ and $Feasible_i$ are controls for the damage grade and the feasibility of reconstruction assessed during the PDNA census.

Table 8 reports estimates corresponding to specification 3. Households living in the 11 PDNA districts receive on average around 80,053 rupees worth of reconstruction grants. Those from included castes are estimated to receive an additional 10,266 rupees, even with controlling for damage for damage grade and feasibility (column 1). This relationship is quite similar controlling for assets, education, and income (column 2). Likewise, belonging to the clan of a mayor appears to confer benefits (column 3), even controlling for assets, education, and income (column 4).

These findings indicate substantial discretion in the awarding of reconstruction funds to included castes and members of politicians' clans. Columns (5) and (6) examine the relationship between belonging to a mayor's clan and receiving benefits separately for included and excluded castes. The relationship is entirely localized to excluded castes: when the mayor is from an excluded caste, being from their clan is estimated to increase the amount of earthquake transfers received; this is not the case when the mayor is from a historically-included caste. One potential interpretation is that included castes benefit disproportionately, independent of whether they are connected to a politician, whereas excluded castes need a connection to a politician in order to receive favorable treatment.

7.1.2 Regression Discontinuity estimates

If municipalities that elect excluded castes as mayor systematically differ, then Table 8 estimates may not capture the causal impact of belonging to a mayor's clan on benefit receipts. We, therefore, compare transfers received by clan members of candidates who barely won to transfers received by clan members of those who barely lost.

Two reasons makes our setting suited to this type of analysis. First, caste-identity is observable and plays a large role in shaping political relationships. Second, because we are using a census, we have a substantial amount of data in elections very close to the winning threshold. Specifically, we estimate:

$$TE = \lim_{x \downarrow 0} E[Y_{mic}|x_{ic}] - \lim_{x \uparrow 0} E[Y_{mic}|x_{ic}], \tag{4}$$

where Y_{mic} is a measure of earthquake transfers to member m of candidate i's clan in constituency c. x_{ic} is candidate i's vote share minus the runner-up's (winner's) vote share for the winner (runner-up) in constituency c. We cluster standard errors at the clan level, which is the effective unit of treatment, and select optimal bandwidths using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) approach. We also perform placebo tests, comparing the second and third place candidates.

Table 9 presents the regression discontinuity results. Being the clan member of a barely elected mayor results in an additional 18,134 Rs. worth of transfers (column 1). It also increases the number of tranches received by 0.261 (column 2) and the probability of receiving any tranche by 19.2 percentage points (column 3). The evidence clearly indicates that mayors are able to successfully direct earthquake reconstruction grants to their clan members, providing direct evidence that politician identity matters for service delivery outcomes. Given these findings, there is clear relevance of the consequences of the Maoist conflict for representation amongst local politicians.

8 Conclusion

Combining census data from a new federal democracy with detailed electoral and party data, we examine how a violent people's revolution transformed subsequent politics. Following the People's war, Nepalese local politics became substantially more inclusive in terms of ethnic composition, particularly in places that witnessed direct conflict. Using electoral data and surveys of selection committee members, we show that political parties – especially, the Maoist party - played an important role.

After the revolution, the caste distribution of elected politicians largely resemble the population they represent but are positively selected on education and ability. Importantly, while

we dont see a representation-ability tradeoff we do see that changes in caste representation matter for policy outcomes. Clan members of politicians receive greater reconstruction assistance, but only when they are from historically included castes.

More broadly, Nepal's recent political transformation speaks to the true objectives of the original mass social mobilization and of the revolution itself. A large literature considers both the role of political grievances in driving conflict and of how these considerations interact with ethnolinguistic fractionalization and polarization. Studying the institutions that emerge from conflict carries information about its initial causes.

Studying the political institutions that emerge from conflict, and especially the extent to which they succeed in redressing caste-based grievances, carries an additional benefit. It provides information about the likelihood that such institutions will endure and provide public services more equitably. Nepal's conflict is clearly rooted in the country's long history of caste-based economic and political inequality enforced by a powerful monarchy. The Maoists fundamental goal was to move toward a federal system that leveled the political playing field for different castes. Our data indicate that the institutions that emerged from the conflict are achieving these ends. Representation for under-represented groups and for women has improved dramatically. In turn, this is providing historically excluded castes with easier access to earthquake reconstruction funds.

Nepal is at a 'critical juncture' (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). While the peace agreement written in 2007 laid the groundwork for a more inclusive set of institutions, it was ultimately the earthquake of 2015 that drove elites to act. Indeed, prior to the earthquake, many were skeptical that the peace deal, by itself, could transform patterns of political power. Writing in 2008, Ghani and Lockhart (2008) observe: "The mass social mobilization that brought an end to the autocratic regime of the king created an open moment in Nepal." Yet, the same authors were cynical about the country's prospects, arguing: "Nepalese politics has long been about the capture of government resources for purposes of patronage" and that the "fragmentation of the elite, its lack of consensus on a common vision, and its apathy in implement technical programs all reveal the disjunction between the people's aspirations and the narrow concerns of the elite.' The earthquake, then, appears to have created a necessary final push. It led to a national emergency that forced feuding parties to the table. It also provided the international community, which marshalled $5 Billion to assist with reconstruct, substantial leverage. It is telling that there was very little movement on implementing the constitution agreed to in the peace agreement until an earthquake took place.

Given what the data have to say about increased inclusion, and the importance of this for the equitable provision of earthquake reconstruction funds, a natural question is whether other paths could have transformed Nepal's institutions during this 'open moment.' It is conceivable that international actors could have incentivized the parties to the peace agreement to actually carry it forward, without having to be prompted by a devastating earthquake.

Tables and Figures




Figure 1: Nepal's Federal Structure




Figure 2: Quotas and Caste Representation

Notes:




Figure 3: Conflict and Inclusion

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


Figure 4: The Role of Voters and of Parties in Political Selection

Notes:




Figure 5: Inclusion and Competence

Notes:




Figure 6: Political Selection

Notes:

Table 1: Violence and Political Representation

	(1) Change in No. of Candidates	(2) Change in No. of Excl. Caste Candidates	(3) Change in No. of Incl. Caste Candidates	(4) Included to Excluded	(5) Excluded to Included	(6) 2017 Ward Chair = Maoist	(7) 2017 Ward Chair = Maoist Excl. Caste	(8) 2017 Ward Chair = Maoist Incl. Caste
Violence (=1)	-0.028	0.167***	-0.075	0.031**	0.003	0.061***	0.025***	0.037***
	(0.133)	(0.059)	(0.122)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.010)
# Observations	3268	3268	3268	3268	3268	3268	3268	3268
R-Squared	0.534	0.213	0.447	0.042	0.005	0.014	0.006	0.009
Mean, Violence (=0)	4.29	1.06	4.29	0.16	0.08	0.12	0.03	0.08
Panel B - Maoist Activity and Inclusion								
Maoists Active (=1)	-0.304**	0.020	-0.241*	0.048***	0.011	0.114***	0.046***	0.070***
	(0.154)	(0.072)	(0.141)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.011)
# Observations	3268	3268	3268	3268	3268	3268	3268	3268
R-Squared	0.535	0.211	0.448	0.044	0.005	0.031	0.014	0.018
Mean if Maoists Active (=0)	4.66	1.21	3.41	0.17	0.08	0.12	0.03	0.09
Panel C - Maoist Activity, Violence, and Inclusion								
Maoists Active (=1)	-0.407**	-0.109	-0.280*	0.043**	0.013	0.111***	0.045***	0.068***
	(0.183)	(0.085)	(0.167)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Violence (=1)	0.178	0.222***	0.066	0.010	-0.004	0.005	0.003	0.003
	(0.158)	(0.070)	(0.144)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.011)
# Observations	3268	3268	3268	3268	3268	3268	3268	3268
R-Squared	0.535	0.213	0.448	0.044	0.005	0.031	0.014	0.018

Notes: This table reports on the relationship between experiencing violence and changes in measures of political inclusion between 1992 and 2007. The unit of observation is the Village Development Committee. We compare Village Development Committee chairs in 1992 with ward chairs in 2017. Typically, Village Development Committees were divided into several wards. We include a categorical variable accounting for the number of wards into which a VDC was divided. Dependent variables for columns 1 - 4 are calculated as changes from 1992 to 2017. Dependent variables for columns 6 - 8 are dummy variables corresponding to the identity of the politician in 2017. Violence is a dummy variable equal to one for all VDCs that recorded any causality during the conflict (1,925 VDCs). Maoists Active is a dummy variable equal to one for VDCs that recorded both Maoist casualties and have a record of a Maoist being recruited in that VDC and eventually killed, often in a different VDC (1,009 VDCs). 916 VDCs record some causalties, but no Maoist casualties or recruitments.

Table 2: Frequency of stated reasons for differences in conflict areas by political party leaders

	Total	UML	Maoist	Nepali Congress
Greater political participation by excluded castes	13	6	5	2
Greater political consciousness	13	6	5	2
Maoist coercion	12	2	0	10
Stronger norms of inclusion	5	2	3	0
Stronger norms of democratic engagement	4	2	0	2
Altered perceptions of marginalized groups	4	1	2	1
Direct effect of Maoist presence during revolution	4	2	1	1
Displacement of population	4	2	1	1
Marginalized groups were most populous	3	0	0	3

Table 3: Political Selection By Position and By Caste

	Voting Population		Mayor		Deputy Mayor		Ward Chair		Ward Member		Female Member	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.
Age (Years)												
Included	44.616	(0.135)	49.725	(1.096)	39.203	(1.150)	46.824	(0.461)	45.589	(0.365)	41.418	(0.456)
Excluded	41.751	(0.124)	48.519	(1.507)	37.316	(2.110)	43.897	(0.564)	43.887	(0.399)	38.707	(0.484)
Difference	2.864	(0.183)	1.207	(1.863)	1.887	(2.403)	2.927	(0.729)	1.702	(0.541)	2.712	(0.665)
Female												
Included	0.499	(0.000)	0.020	(0.016)	0.922	(0.030)	0.000	(0.002)	0.013	(0.004)	1.000	(0.000)
Excluded	0.498	(0.000)	0.000	(0.022)	1.000	(0.055)	0.003	(0.002)	0.011	(0.004)	1.000	(0.000)
Difference	0.001	(0.001)	0.020	(0.027)	-0.078	(0.062)	-0.003	(0.003)	0.002	(0.006)	0.000	(0.000)
Dominant Caste												
Included	0.589	(0.000)	0.686	(0.058)	0.625	(0.058)	0.628	(0.021)	0.584	(0.016)	0.579	(0.023)
Excluded	0.658	(0.000)	0.926	(0.079)	0.842	(0.107)	0.849	(0.026)	0.769	(0.017)	0.775	(0.024)
Difference	-0.069	(0.001)	-0.240	(0.098)	-0.217	(0.122)	-0.221	(0.033)	-0.186	(0.024)	-0.196	(0.033)
Education (Years)												
Included	3.817	(0.003)	7.814	(0.485)	6.141	(0.479)	6.174	(0.166)	4.482	(0.108)	3.190	(0.134)
Excluded	2.339	(0.003)	5.333	(0.666)	7.789	(0.879)	4.390	(0.203)	3.106	(0.118)	1.963	(0.142)
Difference	1.479	(0.004)	2.480	(0.824)	-1.649	(1.002)	1.783	(0.262)	1.376	(0.161)	1.227	(0.195)
Ability - Mincer Wage Residual (Z-score)												
Included	0.089	(0.001)	0.890	(0.290)	0.252	(0.137)	0.584	(0.069)	0.236	(0.041)	0.203	(0.061)
Excluded	-0.090	(0.001)	0.292	(0.366)	0.258	(0.224)	0.340	(0.086)	0.060	(0.045)	0.071	(0.062)
Difference	0.179	(0.001)	0.598	(0.467)	-0.007	(0.262)	0.244	(0.111)	0.175	(0.061)	0.132	(0.087)
Income (Rupees)												
Included	14113.243	(8.698)	24705.882	(1890.704)	15781.250	(1317.838)	18995.434	(584.881)	14791.169	(348.041)	14817.518	(494.720)
Excluded	11008.135	(8.857)	15740.741	(2598.524)	18684.211	(2418.663)	14880.137	(716.330)	12414.530	(380.263)	12245.179	(526.413)
Difference	3105.108	(12.414)	8965.142	(3213.579)	-2902.961	(2754.383)	4115.297	(924.778)	2376.640	(515.492)	2572.339	(722.398)
Asset Index (Z-score)												
Included	0.177	(0.001)	1.053	(0.295)	0.590	(0.168)	0.776	(0.075)	0.301	(0.036)	0.356	(0.056)
Excluded	-0.182	(0.001)	0.632	(0.406)	0.129	(0.308)	0.287	(0.092)	-0.058	(0.040)	-0.098	(0.059)
Difference	0.360	(0.001)	0.421	(0.502)	0.460	(0.351)	0.489	(0.118)	0.360	(0.054)	0.454	(0.081)
# Observations	2,195,297		78		83		732		1,549		782	

Notes: This table reports means of key demographics for the voting age population, and for politicians at each level of Nepal's local government separately for included and excluded castes. Ability is the z-score of the residual from the regression $Income_i = f(Education_i, Age_i) + \gamma_w + \varepsilon_i$, where $Education_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one for having above median education, Age_i is a categorical variable with five year age bins, and γ_w are ward fixed effecs. Function f represents the fact that this specificaton includes a dummy for each subgroup and for every possible double and triple interaction. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 4: Political Selection by Position and Party

	Mayor		Deputy Mayor		Ward Chair		Ward Member		Female Member		Dalit Female Member	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.
Age (Years)												
Maoists	47.250	(2.068)	36.000	(1.726)	43.220	(0.753)	43.458	(0.591)	39.247	(0.630)	38.229	(0.739)
UML	50.475	(1.135)	39.730	(1.497)	46.142	(0.497)	45.352	(0.382)	40.533	(0.491)	39.714	(0.577)
Congress	49.125	(1.715)	39.300	(1.875)	46.450	(0.688)	44.798	(0.507)	40.203	(0.654)	40.881	(0.743)
Diff: UML - Maoist	3.225	(2.359)	3.730	(2.284)	2.922	(0.902)	1.894	(0.704)	1.285	(0.799)	1.485	(0.938)
Diff: Congress - Maoist	1.875	(2.687)	3.300	(2.549)	3.230	(1.020)	1.339	(0.779)	0.956	(0.908)	2.652	(1.048)
Female												
Maoist	0.000	(0.000)	0.800	(0.105)	0.000	(0.000)	0.022	(0.008)	1.000	(0.000)	1.000	(0.000)
UML	0.025	(0.025)	0.973	(0.027)	0.003	(0.003)	0.010	(0.004)	1.000	(0.000)	1.000	(0.000)
Congress	0.000	(0.000)	0.967	(0.033)	0.000	(0.000)	0.008	(0.004)	1.000	(0.000)	1.000	(0.000)
Diff: UML - Maoist	0.025	(0.025)	0.173	(0.109)	0.003	(0.003)	-0.012	(0.009)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Diff: Congress - Maoist	0.000	(0.000)	0.167	(0.110)	0.000	(0.000)	-0.013	(0.009)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Included Caste												
Maoist	0.417	(0.145)	0.867	(0.089)	0.500	(0.041)	0.433	(0.028)	0.462	(0.038)	0.022	(0.012)
UML	0.700	(0.074)	0.757	(0.072)	0.661	(0.027)	0.561	(0.019)	0.577	(0.026)	0.025	(0.009)
Congress	0.750	(0.090)	0.733	(0.082)	0.603	(0.031)	0.583	(0.022)	0.523	(0.032)	0.015	(0.009)
Diff: UML - Maoist	0.283	(0.163)	-0.110	(0.115)	0.161	(0.049)	0.128	(0.033)	0.115	(0.046)	0.003	(0.015)
Diff: Congress - Maoist	0.333	(0.171)	-0.133	(0.122)	0.103	(0.051)	0.150	(0.036)	0.061	(0.050)	-0.007	(0.015)
Dominant Caste												
Maoist	0.667	(0.139)	0.800	(0.105)	0.747	(0.036)	0.715	(0.025)	0.730	(0.034)	0.057	(0.020)
UML	0.775	(0.067)	0.703	(0.077)	0.687	(0.026)	0.641	(0.018)	0.606	(0.026)	0.025	(0.009)
Congress	0.792	(0.085)	0.567	(0.092)	0.723	(0.028)	0.669	(0.021)	0.701	(0.030)	0.045	(0.015)
Diff: UML - Maoist	0.108	(0.154)	-0.097	(0.130)	-0.060	(0.044)	-0.074	(0.031)	-0.124	(0.043)	-0.033	(0.021)
Diff: Congress - Maoist	0.125	(0.163)	-0.233	(0.140)	-0.024	(0.046)	-0.046	(0.033)	-0.029	(0.045)	-0.012	(0.025)
Education (Years)												
Maoists	5.208	(1.054)	5.733	(1.035)	5.123	(0.292)	3.652	(0.168)	2.092	(0.176)	1.650	(0.177)
UML	7.875	(0.530)	7.027	(0.652)	5.684	(0.207)	3.892	(0.125)	2.874	(0.157)	2.054	(0.151)
Congress	6.542	(0.749)	6.233	(0.691)	5.416	(0.220)	3.951	(0.144)	2.660	(0.181)	1.284	(0.131)
Diff: UML - Maoist	2.667	(1.179)	1.294	(1.223)	0.560	(0.357)	0.240	(0.209)	0.782	(0.235)	0.404	(0.233)
Diff: Congress - Maoist	1.333	(1.293)	0.500	(1.245)	0.292	(0.365)	0.299	(0.221)	0.568	(0.252)	-0.366	(0.220)
Ability - Mincer Wage Residual (Z-score)												
Maoists	0.201	(0.573)	0.098	(0.183)	0.183	(0.094)	0.162	(0.069)	0.116	(0.094)	-0.213	(0.078)
UML	0.658	(0.357)	0.222	(0.209)	0.505	(0.080)	0.143	(0.046)	0.132	(0.065)	-0.125	(0.059)
Congress	0.874	(0.360)	0.369	(0.191)	0.666	(0.104)	0.184	(0.051)	0.167	(0.078)	-0.185	(0.058)
Diff: UML - Maoist	0.458	(0.675)	0.124	(0.278)	0.321	(0.124)	-0.020	(0.083)	0.016	(0.114)	0.088	(0.098)
Diff: Congress - Maoist	0.673	(0.677)	0.271	(0.265)	0.483	(0.140)	0.021	(0.086)	0.051	(0.122)	0.028	(0.097)
Income (Rupees)												
Maoists	21250.000	(3806.519)	15333.333	(2375.063)	15133.333	(878.598)	13544.892	(559.244)	12587.209	(773.316)	10107.143	(639.221)
UML	22750.000	(2574.563)	15945.946	(1865.470)	17674.051	(663.392)	14123.932	(388.501)	14263.456	(555.170)	11769.231	(521.117)
Congress	20416.667	(2286.611)	18000.000	(1884.292)	18534.137	(871.430)	13425.358	(450.741)	13381.743	(616.904)	10348.259	(489.188)
Diff: UML - Maoist	1500.000	(4595.428)	612.613	(3020.083)	2540.717	(1100.919)	579.040	(680.945)	1676.247	(951.962)	1662.088	(824.722)
Diff: Congress - Maoist	-833.333	(4440.515)	2666.667	(3031.746)	3400.803	(1237.467)	-119.534	(718.277)	794.533	(989.236)	241.116	(804.927)
Asset Index (Z-score)												
Maoists	0.029	(0.178)	-0.121	(0.225)	0.091	(0.086)	-0.209	(0.035)	-0.272	(0.042)	-0.318	(0.043)
UML	0.936	(0.338)	0.464	(0.211)	0.403	(0.083)	0.002	(0.037)	0.035	(0.059)	-0.189	(0.040)
Congress	0.358	(0.266)	0.169	(0.175)	0.347	(0.078)	-0.045	(0.036)	-0.043	(0.056)	-0.276	(0.044)
Diff: UML - Maoist	0.908	(0.382)	0.585	(0.308)	0.312	(0.119)	0.211	(0.051)	0.307	(0.073)	0.129	(0.058)
Diff: Congress - Maoist	0.330	(0.320)	0.290	(0.285)	0.256	(0.116)	0.164	(0.050)	0.228	(0.070)	0.041	(0.061)
# Observations	78		83		732		1,549		782		682	

Notes: This table reports means of key demographics for the voting age population, and for politicians at each level of Nepal's local government separately by party. Ability is the z-score of the residual from the regression $Income_i = f(Education_i, Age\epsilon_i) + \gamma_w + \varepsilon_i$, where $Education_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one for having above median education, $Age\epsilon_i$ is a categorical variable with five year age bins, and γ_w are ward fixed effecs. Function f represents the fact that this specificaton includes a dummy for each subgroup and for every possible double and triple interaction. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. We are able to estimate means for included castes in the Dalit Female Member seat as our data indicate that 14 of the 682 Dalit Female Members are from included castes.

Table 5: Comparing Committee Members and Politicians

Sample	# Obs.	Age (Yrs.)		Female (=1)		Included (=1)		Education (Yrs)		Ability		Income (Rs)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
	N	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.
All Committee Members	699	45.082	(0.357)	0.089	(0.011)	0.699	(0.018)	10.563	(0.123)	2.419	(0.065)	37428.356	(566.069)
District Committee Members	240	46.929	(0.544)	0.083	(0.018)	0.730	(0.029)	10.855	(0.215)	2.641	(0.105)	40156.951	(940.660)
Municipal Committee Members	459	44.427	(0.478)	0.099	(0.014)	0.677	(0.023)	10.292	(0.153)	2.306	(0.084)	35980.392	(722.186)
All Politicians	3,906	43.076	(0.166)	0.400	(0.008)	0.467	(0.008)	3.653	(0.054)	0.190	(0.017)	14099.641	(170.261)
Municipal Politicians	161	43.876	(0.787)	0.491	(0.039)	0.714	(0.036)	6.730	(0.295)	0.490	(0.097)	18944.099	(991.526)
Ward Politicians	3,745	43.042	(0.170)	0.396	(0.008)	0.457	(0.008)	3.521	(0.054)	0.177	(0.017)	13891.264	(171.592)

Notes: This table reports means of key demographics for selection committee members and for politicians. Ability is the z-score of the residual from the regression $Income_i = f(Education_i, Age_i) + \gamma_w + \varepsilon_i$, where $Education_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one for having above median education in the population, Age_i is a categorical variable with five year age bins, and γ_w are ward fixed effecs. Function f represents the fact that this specification includes a dummy for each subgroup and for every possible double and triple interaction. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 6: Eliteness, Competence, and Selection

Panel A - Historical Caste Eliteness and Winning a Party Ticket

Dependent variable:	Candidate in Open Race (=1) x 100				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Historically Included Caste (=1)	0.076***	0.075***	0.045***	0.036***	0.022***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Female (=1)		-0.527***	-0.507***	-0.508***	-0.510***
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education (z-score)			0.084***	0.077***	0.069***
			(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income (z-score)				0.046***	0.025***
				(0.004)	(0.004)
Asset Index (z-score)					0.089***
					(0.005)
Constant	0.242***	1.031***	1.017***	1.022***	1.032***
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
# Observations	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722
R-Squared	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Mean in Population	0.279	0.279	0.279	0.279	0.279

Panel B - Historical Caste Eliteness and Winning Office

Dependent variable:	Wins Seat in Open Race (=1) x 100				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Historically Included Caste (=1)	0.030***	0.030***	0.019***	0.015***	0.010***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female (=1)		-0.137***	-0.129***	-0.130***	-0.131***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education (z-score)			0.031***	0.028***	0.026***
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income (z-score)				0.021***	0.014***
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Asset Index (z-score)					0.029***
					(0.003)
Constant	0.055***	0.260***	0.255***	0.257***	0.260***
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
# Observations	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722
R-Squared	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Mean in Population	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070

Notes: This table reports on the relationship between belonging to a historically politically included caste and the probability of becoming a candidate (Panel A) or of becoming a politicians (Panel B). All regressions include constituency fixed effects. White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *Levels of significance*: $*p < 0.1$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$.

Table 7: Elite Status and Candidacy by Party

Panel A - All Open Seats

Dependent variable:	Candidate in Open Race (=1) x 100					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Historically Included Caste (=1)	0.002	-0.009***	0.025***	0.008**	0.029***	0.011***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female (=1)		-0.122***		-0.130***		-0.124***
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)
Education (z-score)		0.018***		0.018***		0.023***
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Income (z-score)		0.001		0.013***		0.010***
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Asset Index (z-score)		0.017***		0.027***		0.028***
		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.003)
Constant	0.066***	0.254***	0.058***	0.260***	0.053***	0.247***
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Party	Maoist	Maoist	UML	UML	NPC	NPC
# Observations	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722
R-Squared	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001
Mean in Population	0.067	0.067	0.070	0.070	0.067	0.067

Panel B - Historical Caste Eliteness and Winning Office

Dependent variable:	Wins Seat in Open Race (=1) x 100					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Historically Included Caste (=1)	0.003*	-0.001	0.015***	0.005**	0.012***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female (=1)		-0.027***		-0.059***		-0.042***
		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Education (z-score)		0.005***		0.011***		0.009***
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Income (z-score)		0.002**		0.007***		0.006***
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Asset Index (z-score)		0.004***		0.015***		0.010***
		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.001)
Constant	0.013***	0.055***	0.024***	0.117***	0.017***	0.083***
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Party	Maoist	Maoist	UML	UML	NPC	NPC
# Observations	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722
R-Squared	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Mean in Population	0.014	0.014	0.032	0.032	0.023	0.023

Notes: This table reports on the predictors of receiving a party ticket (panel A) and of winning office (Panel B) separately for each party. UML corresponds to the United Marxist Leninist and NPC to the Nepali Congress Party. All regressions include constituency fixed effects. *Levels of significance*: $^{*}p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Elite Status and Receipt of Earthquake Relief Transfers

Dependent variable:	Cumulative Earthquake Relief Transfers (Rs.)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Historically Included Caste (=1)	10265.6***	11709.3***			11141.6***	12569.8***
	(1933.367)	(1884.555)			(2010.207)	(1976.863)
Member of Mayor's Clan (=1)			9763.1*	9798.5*		
			(5760.217)	(5766.114)		
Mayor's Clan x Included					-972.7	-740.1
					(6273.381)	(6332.737)
Mayor's Clan x Excluded					19952.0*	19976.2*
					(10161.185)	(10174.232)
Constant	-2180.6**	-1305.4	2365.4***	3291.8***	-2673.4**	-2577.5***
	(980.684)	(936.241)	(566.054)	(578.407)	(1033.823)	(951.135)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
# Observations	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722	3342722
R-Squared	0.209	0.211	0.207	0.208	0.210	0.212
Mean in Population	80052.476	80052.476	85228.612	85228.612	80052.476	80052.476

Notes:

Table 9: Does the Identity of Politicians Matter

Dependent variable:	Relief Benefits (Rs.)	# Tranches	Any Tranche (=1)	Relief Benefits (Rs.)	# Tranches	Any Tranche (=1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Optimal Bandwidth	18133.079*	0.261***	0.192***	-14127.525	-0.185	-0.225
	(9301.414)	(0.098)	(0.049)	(26105.056)	(0.251)	(0.199)
1/2 x Optimal Bandwidth	32075.565***	0.354***	0.229***	-61815.833*	-0.550	0.170
	(5286.713)	(0.061)	(0.038)	(33462.583)	(0.353)	(0.234)
2 x Optimal Bandwidth	22857.227*	0.320**	0.209***	-9919.750	-0.220	-0.176
	(12564.822)	(0.148)	(0.079)	(24454.870)	(0.227)	(0.203)
Sample	1st and 2nd	1st and 2nd	1st and 2nd	2nd and 3rd	2nd and 3rd	2nd and 3rd
# Observations	265,980	265,980	265,980	303,227	303,227	303,227

Notes: This table reports the effect of having a clan member win office on earthquake reconstruction cash grant receipts. A person is defined as belonging to the clan of the mayor if they are in the same caste (according to the 125 caste categorizations given by the Central Bureau of Statistics of Nepal), share the same surname, and live in the same municipality as the mayor. In columns 1 - 3, the sample is restricted to clan members of the mayor or the runner up. In columns 4 - 6, the sample is restricted to the clan members of the runner up and the third place candidate. The optimal bandwidth is chosen using the method of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2013).

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Appendices

A Data

1. **Census**

   - Variables: Education, income, assets, gender, caste
   - Description: Education, gender and income were categorical in the original data. For the final analysis that uses caste/ethnicity, we follow Vollan (2015) to re-group over 100 categories in the original caste/ethnicity variable to into included and excluded castes. The asset index is created as the first principal component of household assets in pre-earthquake period, separately for rural and urban respondents. Assets in the index are: land, television, mobile phone, computer/laptop, internet, telephone, refrigerator, motorcycle, four-wheeler for personal/business use, land, availability of toilet, source of cooking, source of drinking water, source of lighting, and type of house that included surface type, foundation type, roof type, number of floors, height of house and plinth area.
   - Source: Household Registration for Housing Reconstruction Survey (HRHRS)
   - Note: Government of Nepal collected these data with help of Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and National Reconstruction Authority (NRA). It was a census of households conducted across 11 severely affected districts after the 2015 earthquake.

2. **Party lists for the 2017 election**

   - Variables: Names, position, location, party
   - Description: We obtained the information of nominated individuals for candidacy for the 2017 local election from three major political parties that won 88.46% of the total seats: Nepali Congress, CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist.
   - Source: Respective party offices of Nepali Congress, CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist.
   - Note: We collected these data by visiting the respective party offices. We call this the nominee list.

3. **2017 election data**

   - Variables: Names, position, location, party, votes, rank
   - Description: These data had information on individual candidates, their age, gender, party, location, position they contested for as well as 2017 election outcomes such as votes and ranks.

- Source: Election Commission of Nepal
- Note: We call this the candidate list.

4. **Demographic variables for politicians (nominees, candidates and representatives)**

   - Variabes: Education, income, assets, gender, caste/ethnicity for nominees, candidates, and politicans.
   - Description: These variables for politicians and nominees were obtained from the HRHRS census data by fuzzy matching the nominee list and the candidate list. In order to facilitate the fuzzy matching, we had also obtained the information on the spouse and parents of the politicians by scraping the 2017 voter list. That is, we extracted voter information such as the voter ID, voter name and name of parent/spouse for about 800,000 voters that was placed on the website of election commission website using Python.
   - Source: HRHRS + Nominee List + Candidate list + Voter list from the website of the Election Commission of Nepal
   - Note: The individual-level matching on names and locations was done with the help of NRA staff at their office, using a combination of the reclink2 command in Stata and manual matching.

5. **Electoral outcomes for candidates and representatives during 1992 Election**

   - Variables: Names, position, location, party, votes, rank
   - Description: These data were available only for key positions at local level. Information was available on individual candidates, their age, gender, party, location, position they contested for and 1992 election outcomes.
   - Source: Election Commission of Nepal

6. **Matching datasets over time in light of changing administrative structures**

   - Description: Administrative structures in Nepal have changed over time in Nepal over the last 3 decades. Our data come from 1992, 1996-2006, 2015 and 2017. Before 2017 the administrative structure had the following hierarchy: center, provinces, districts, Village Development Committees (VDCs) and wards. After 2017, this changed to center, provinces, districts, municipalities and wards. While the number of provinces and districts remained more or less same, VDCs and

wards were transformed to municipalities and to wards. About 3915 VDCs and 36,000 wards in 1992 were transformed to 753 municipalities and 6743 wards in 2017. So, between 1992 and 2017 VDCs and wards are the closest comparable administrative tier at the local level.

- Note: We manually matched the names of VDCs over time and used the official crosswalk of their respective wards to trace the 1992 VDCs to the municipalities and wards of 2017. The table below provides an example of changes in this administrative structure. There were five types of transformations. A VDC in 1992, say VDC 1, uniquely converted into a ward in 2017, ward A1. Most of the transformations were of this type. Similarly, VDC 2 in 1992 split into multiple wards B1 and B2 in 2017. Multiple VDCs 3 and 4 of 1992 combined to form a ward C1 in 2017. Lastly, multiple VDCs in 1992 converted into multiple wards in 2017 in two ways: (i) some parts of VDCs 5 and 6 were combined into ward C2 and remaining parts of 5 and 6 were respectively converted in to C1 and C3; (ii) all of VDC 7 and a part of VDC 8 transformed to ward D1 while the other part of VDC 8 and all of VDC 9 transformed to ward D2 in 2017.

Figure A1: Crosswalk Example

VDC_92	Ward_2017	Transformation type
1	A1	Unique
2	B1	One VDC into multiple wards
2	B2	
3	C1	One Ward into multiple VDCs
4	C1	
5	C1	Multiple VDCs into multiple wards: Type 1
5	C2	
6	C2	
6	C3	
7	D1	Multiple VDCs into multiple wards: Type 2
8	D1	
8	D2	
9	D2	

B Estimating caste using surnames for the 1992 election

The 1992 Village Development Council election results do not record the caste of candidates. We therefore train a prediction model using the 2017 pdna in order to estimate the caste identify of politicians using their surnames.

Let $n_{s,c}$ be the number of individuals with the surname s who belong to caste c. For each surname, we define the set of possible castes of as $C(s) = \{c|n_{s,c} > 0\} \cup \{dummy\}$, where we include the *dummy* set of castes to stand for castes that exist in the national census grouping but that are not observed in the PDNA data. Then, for each $c \in C(s)$ we define

$$\hat{P}(caste|surname) = \frac{(n_{s,c}+1)}{\sum_{c \in C(last)}(n_{s,c}+1)} \tag{5}$$

The top predicted caste for a given last last name is therefore the caste with the largest number of individuals who share that name.[15] The estimated probability is therefore $\hat{P}(c|s)$.[16] We retain three predicted castes for each individual. In cases of equal number of $n_(s, c)$ for different castes, we ordered them randomly to keep the cutoff at three castes.

Within the 2017 PDNA survey, the classification accuracy using the maximum $\hat{P}(c|l)$ is 89 percent. The accuracy of one of the top 3 caste predictions being correct is 98 percent. In order for this prediction model to perform similarly in other data sets requires the assumption the individuals have the same distribution of castes conditional on surname.

We have corrected misspellings in the 1992 elections and in the 2017 PDNA. We then used these corrected names for classification. Six percent of politicians in the 1992 data were not able to be classified since their last name did not appear in the 2015 census even once. These could be misspellings.[17]

We can now estimate prediction accuracy on those 94% of individuals who are able to be classified, using the accuracy estimates $P(c|s)$. The probability that the first estimate is correct is 0.81. The probability that one of the top three predictions is correct is 0.92.

Using the same methods, where this time the spellings of last names in the census were made to accord to the names of individuals in the 2017 elections, so that almost all individuals

[15]This form for $\hat{P}(c|s)$ reflects Laplace Smoothing. For example, if 10 individuals who share a last name in the PDNA all come from the same caste, it is not with certainty (probability 1) that an 11th individual (to be predicted) would belong to the same caste.

[16]We retain three predicted castes for each individual in the 1992 data. In cases with an even number $n_{s,c}$ for two different castes, we randomly order them.

[17]It is unlikely that they are simply very rare names since, for comparison, the fraction of individuals in the census who have a name that appears only once in the entire census is only 0.03%.

(99.7 percent) are able to be classified.[18]

[18]We investigated using location as well as last name to improve classification. In this exercise, we give an upper bound on classification accuracy using last name and district. To give an upper bound on the added effect of this information, we perform an overfit estimate of the prediction accuracy with the 2015 census. For each last name and district, we take the modal caste for individuals of that last name in that district as the predicted caste. That is, instead of using $n_{l,c}$ we use the counts in each district $n_{last,district,caste}$ and perform the modal classification for each pair (last, district). We then test our prediction accuracy for all individuals in the census using their name and district. We use the entire census as both the training set and test set. Since any model using only last name and district as features must be some function f(last,district), and since we are selecting the best such function for our test data using overfitting, the accuracy of this overfit model produces a strict upper bound on accuracy of prediction using last name and district. The accuracy attained is 91 percent. This is compared to 89 percent for modal classification based on last name without using location - a 2 percent increase. Recall that there was 98% accuracy for the top 3 predictions together based on last name alone, so this is a more important margin to pursue.

C Figures and Tables

Table A1: Balance Tests - Matching the Census Data to Party Lists

	(1)		(2)		T-test
	Unique matches		Unmatched		Difference
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	(1)-(2)
Age	13754	43.108	4407	43.182	-0.074
		(0.096)		(0.173)	
Female (=1)	15386	0.351	5565	0.356	-0.004
		(0.004)		(0.006)	
Votes Received	13754	422.009	4407	491.841	-69.831***
		(6.166)		(14.824)	
Municipality Position (=1)	15386	0.076	5565	0.110	-0.034***
		(0.002)		(0.004)	
Ward Chair Position (=1)	15386	0.244	5565	0.297	-0.052***
		(0.003)		(0.006)	
Ward Member Position (=1)	15386	0.536	5565	0.444	0.092***
		(0.004)		(0.007)	
Dalit Ward Member Position (=1)	15386	0.144	5565	0.150	-0.006
		(0.003)		(0.005)	
CPN (UML) = 1	15386	0.287	5565	0.284	0.003
		(0.004)		(0.006)	
CPN (M) = 1	15386	0.248	5565	0.276	-0.029***
		(0.003)		(0.006)	
Nepali Congress = 1	15386	0.250	5565	0.247	0.003
		(0.003)		(0.006)	
Other Political Parties = 1	15386	0.215	5565	0.193	0.022***
		(0.003)		(0.005)	

Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Notes:

Table A2: Political Selection by Position

	Population	Mayor	Deputy Mayor	Ward Chair	Ward Member	Female Member	Dalit Female Member
Female (=1)	0.49	0.05	0.84	0.02	0.02	1.00	1.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Elite Caste (=1)	0.62	0.67	0.63	0.70	0.66	0.67	0.04
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Dominant Caste (=1)	0.47	0.59	0.62	0.57	0.48	0.50	0.02
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Education (years)	2.89	5.96	5.56	4.91	3.41	2.45	1.64
	(0.00)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Income (Rupees)	12341.61	17277.43	16169.15	15578.24	12883.30	12954.95	10621.37
	(5.12)	(569.27)	(570.96)	(197.45)	(130.40)	(180.12)	(170.87)
Assets (Z-Score)	-0.00	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age (years)	43.06	45.85	39.47	45.27	44.51	40.28	39.70
	(0.01)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.22)
	3,680,772	483	402	3,208	5,683	2,778	2,237


Notes:

Table A3: Sampling Attrition Tests

Dependent variable:	Successfully Interviewed (=1)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Female (=1)	0.005				0.008
	(0.048)				(0.049)
Maoist (=1)		-0.021			-0.033
		(0.030)			(0.031)
Nepali Congress (=1)		0.007			-0.029
		(0.037)			(0.047)
District Committee			0.039		0.049
			(0.027)		(0.035)
Dolakha				0.081	0.075
				(0.055)	(0.056)
Gorkha				-0.070	-0.074
				(0.063)	(0.062)
Kavrepalanchowk				0.091*	0.089*
				(0.052)	(0.051)
Makwanpur				-0.048	-0.059
				(0.064)	(0.064)
Nuwakot				0.022	0.020
				(0.059)	(0.059)
Okhaldhunga				-0.042	-0.044
				(0.068)	(0.068)
Ramechhap				0.067	0.059
				(0.060)	(0.060)
Rasuwa				0.004	-0.009
				(0.071)	(0.071)
Sindhuli				-0.042	-0.046
				(0.063)	(0.063)
Sindhupalchowk				-0.006	-0.010
				(0.060)	(0.060)
Constant	0.798***	0.806***	0.783***	0.792***	0.797***
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.041)	(0.044)
Omitted Category	Male	UML	Muni. Comms.	Dhading	All Cols 1 -4
R-Squared	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02
# Politicians	883	883	883	883	883


Notes: This table reports on the predictors of successfully interviewing a party selection committee member. 705 of the 883 party selection committee members sampled were successfully interviewed, yielding a success rate of 79.84%. Summary statistics describing the sample are reported in Table 5. *Levels of significance*: *$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$.

Figure A2: The Role of Voters and of Parties in Political Selection




Notes:

Figure A3: Caste Bias from IAT among Party Selection Committee Members by Political Party



Notes:

Figure A4: Political Selection by Position



Notes: