NBER Summer Institute 2019

July 15-16, 2019

Did Exposure to Communism Spur Pro-Social Behaviour?[1]

Joan Costa-Font[a] and Anna Nicińska[b]

[1] [a] London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), CESIfo & IZA, E-mail: j.costa-font@lse.ac.uk

[b] Corresponding Author: University of Warsaw, E-mail: anicinska@wne.uw.edu.pl

We are grateful to CESifo Social Protection Conference (April 2019), LSE colleagues and ESPE conference participants (June 2019) and Betul Akar, Eric Bonsang, Jan Fałkowski, Panu Poutvaara, Kai Konrad, Štěpán Mikula, Sofia Trommlerova, Jorge Garcia Hombrados, for their valuable comments. All errors are our own and the usual disclaimer applies.

Abstract

We study the effect of exposure to communism, an institutional system based on the collectivist planning of human needs, on pro-social preferences across cohorts of individuals from Eastern European countries that vary in their entry (as defined in their constitution) and exit into Soviet communism (as defined by first free elections). We specifically measure exposure to communism (EC) during an individual's impressionable years (IY), controlling for total number of years of EC. We examine the effect of EC on pro-social preferences in both the private and the public realms using a difference in differences (DiD) strategy that employs a sample of Western European countries as control group. Our results suggest that EC during an individual's IY makes individuals more likely to hold pro-social preferences towards their own family members (private realm) but not towards others (public realm). We replicate and extend previous findings on total exposure to communism. EC during an individual's IY reduces a preference for income equality (by an average 4%). The effect is driven by a reduced confidence in specific institutions (such as police, labour unions, and courts) and a more intense reliance on tradition (such as religiosity).

Keywords: individualism, familiarism, impressionable years, communism, social values, Eastern Europe, formal institutions, preference for equality.

JEL: Z1, P3.

1. Introduction

An important channel shaping individual and social preferences (and behaviours) is through the exposure to political-economic regimes (which we refer to as 'regime'). However, the opportunities to test the effects of regime change are limited, as regimes at most exhibit moderate reforms. The demise of communism, a political-economic regime based on the collectivist planning of human needs, in countries of the Soviet bloc, is probably the most significant regime change Europe has undergone in the last century. Soviet communism made a profound impact on numerous aspects of both the private and the public sphere during its half a century of exposure (Basu et al., 2005; Tommaso et al., 2007; Shleifer and Treisman, 2005). However, evidence on the long-lasting repercussions is still limited. This paper contributes to understanding of the effects of communism in the long-term on preferences and behaviours concerning both public and private realms[2].

Already in 1992, immediately after the demise of communism, there were significant differences in social preferences between Eastern and Western European countries (Corneo and Gruner, 2002). Such differences are explained by 'indoctrination effects', namely that the number of years of exposure to communism (EC) increased people's willingness to redistribute (Alesina et al., 2001; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). Other studies found consistent evidence suggesting that EC brought a reduced individual self-reliance (Bauernschuster et al., 2012) and more egalitarian gender norms (Bauernschuster and Rainer, 2012). Nonetheless, these evidences appear, on first sight, at odds with other classical studies such as Shiller et al. (1990, 1992), who did not find significant differences between individuals living in post-communist countries and

[2] A companion paper examines the effect of communist exposure on a number of wellbeing indicators and individual behaviours (Costa-Font and Nicińska, 2019) currently being drafted.

market economies. Neither it appears consistent with experimental evidence, from immediately after the fall of the Berlin wall, documenting higher selfishness levels among Eastern Germans (Ockenfels and Wimann, 1999). More recent evidence suggests that after 20 years of communism, Eastern Germans exhibit weaker pro-social behaviour (Brosig-Koch et al., 2011). A recent study uncovers that lower social capital in post-communist countries compared to Western European countries is due to the cohorts socialised prior to the demise of Soviet communism (Huber and Mikula, 2019). Hence, it seems important to reconcile such findings, and disentangle what preferences did change after the exposure to communism. This paper provides an explanation that reconciles both literatures.

More specifically, we attempt to answer the following question: do pro-social preferences, conceptualised as behaviours that impact on others in the public and private realms, change with the EC during an individual's IY? A way to approach this question, is first by examining internalized social norms (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Cooter, 2000) which can be identified in survey data, such as the primary of the family in the private real, individuals prefers for equality, and especially the role of individual responsibility (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Furthermore, we distinguish public and private realms as individuals exhibit different preferences and behaviours in both spheres[3]. Previous research offers an incomplete picture of the communism exposure effects as a number of pro-social preferences in both public and private domains have not been fully examined. Second, the measurement of exposure is far from trivial, and more specifically the formation of pro-social behaviour depends on the regime individuals are exposed to in

[3] Consistently Hannah Arendt distinguished in the *Human Condition* (1958) the *private realm* as the realm of the household, where inequality is the norm, from the *public realm* which is where individuals are 'free among equals.

some critical periods of an individual's life (Elder et al., 2003), and more specifically, an individual's 'impressionable years' (Osborne et al., 2011) impinge specific effects in preferences' formation. According to the impressionable year's (IY) hypothesis, childhood and early adulthood are periods of life characterized by particular vulnerability to influences. The circumstances of and events during the IY (ages 18-25) of an individual, might be useful in the explanation of this individual's later-life situation. Consistently, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2013) find that experiencing a recession during an individual's IY exerts an influence on preferences for redistribution. Finally, most of existing evidence refers to preferences of Eastern Germans, though it is unclear whether exposure to other communist regimes, including Soviet communist regimes in Europe, or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) exhibits consistent effects.

This paper addresses such gaps in the literature by examining how EC affects pro-social preferences and behaviours in both private and public realms. We study the effect of EC distinguishing them from the effects in other critical periods (pre- and post-impressionable years). One of the currently unexplored dimensions, that is the effect of EC on the private realm (e.g., familiarism), refers to pro-social behaviours towards family members. The importance of family ties lies in that in an environment where privilege could not reflect in the form of wealth accumulation, elites cultivated their 'internal family connections' that allowed access to education and elite positions (Filtzer, 2013). Similarly, along with previous research, we examine preferences in public realm such as preferences for income equality, political self-identification, and choice between freedom and equality.

Among pro-social behaviours examined, we specifically examine the effect of EC on generalised trust. More specifically, Rainer and Siedler (2009) document a negative

effect of communism on social and institutional trust in Eastern Germany. Similarly, Becker et al. (2014) find that exposure to Habsburg empire increased individuals trust, and Booth et al. (2018) find that parental exposure to the Chinese cultural revolution still affects trust today[4]. An explanation of this evidence includes the increasing surveillance of communist authorities over individuals, which even encouraged and rewarded citizens spying and reporting on each other, and more generally, fearing political repression. For instance, Lichter et al. (2016) examine the discontinuities at state borders affecting levels of spying across states in Eastern Germany to document that government surveillance (by Stasi police) reduces contemporary trust and social interactions, which limit cooperation and innovation. Nikolaova et al. (2019) find that proximity to a Soviet gulag affected contemporary trust. Consistently, our purpose is to estimate the long-term effects of communism exposure, and specifically whether exposure to communism during an individual's IY exerted an effect, as well as its drivers and mechanisms. A few other possible mechanisms include confidence in institutions, active and inactive membership to organizations and especially membership of religious denominations which survived the communist regimes as well as accepted gender roles.

We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, this paper is related to the strands of economics research on pro-social behaviours in the private realm (Becker, 2009), as well in the public realm (Alesina et al., 2001; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). Second, our paper is related, and add credibility to the studies testing the so-called 'impressionable years hypothesis' (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2013; Roth and Wohlfart, 2018), by examining whether the exposure to communism fared differently in such a period. Third, we contribute to a wider discussion on the role of markets on social

[4] This result is consistent with Aghion et al. (2010) who document a negative correlation between government regulation, typical of communist countries, and trust.

behaviours (McCloskey, 2006) and more generally on 'civilising' individual effects of markets (Hirschman, 1977), and its counter Marxian argument recently undusted by Sandel (2012) that markets crowd-out pro-social behaviour (Marx and Engels, 1848)[5]. With this in mid, EC should exert some counter effects on pro-social preferences either via indoctrination or crowding out. Testing these effects can help disentangle some of the issues in the mentioned debates. Fourth, our study is related to an increasing literature on the origins of social values placed in the interaction between formal or informal institutions (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). Finally, we add to the knowledge on communism repercussions beyond Eastern Germany and extend previous work by analysing numerous social values and larger number of mechanisms explaining our results.

Our results replicate previous findings (examining Germany alone) and suggest that an exposure to communism during people's IY crowds out pro-social preferences in the public realm, in particular it reduces the preference for income equality (by 2 percentage points or by an average 4%). In contrast, we observe a significant increase in pro-social preferences in the private realm, and more specifically we identify an increase in familiarism. The effects are driven by a reduced confidence in specific public institutions (such as police, labour unions, and courts), and a more intense reliance on traditional gender roles and religion.

Next section describes the background to identify the contribution of the paper in the wider and specific literature. Section three reports the datasets employed and empirical strategy. Next, section four contains the baseline results and section five reports

[5] Besley (2013) in discussing Sandel (2013) argues that the welfare effect of egalitarian alternatives to markets depends on the specific institutions of the country, and its underlying incentives. It is an empirical question whether markets or other rationing mechanisms add more welfare (Weitzman, 1977).

on the heterogeneity of our estimates and possible threads to the identification, followed by a section on potential mechanisms. A final section concludes.

2. Related literature

Social behaviour. A few empirical studies are suggestive of an effect of culture interactions with political institutions on economic behaviour (Butler and Fehr, 2018). The effect of institutions includes its influence in the formation of social norms that shape beliefs about how individuals are expected to behave, which in turn vary across their life cycle, gender, ethnicity, etc. These beliefs constitute identities, which in turn constrain social preferences (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Shayo, 2009). Testing for the causal effect of institutions on behaviour can take place by taking advantage of shocks in the institutional environment, such as political economic regime changes. Yet, it is critical to disentangle how social norms, which are expressed in social attitudes, are affected by a change in the political economic regime (Schelling, 2006). Although, it is rarely the case where one can test these hypotheses, there are a few exceptions (Nee and Swedberg, 2005). We study how regime variation across countries and cohort, affected pro-social behaviour.

The 'wall in head' theory. An important literature developed in the last decades examines the phenomenon labelled as the 'wall in head' theory, namely the existence of differences in preferences and behaviour that result specifically from a different political economic regime. Corneo and Gruner (2002) find differences in social preferences that seem to result from exposure to communism, similarly as Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007). However, this evidence is inconsistent with other studies (Shiller et al., 1990; 1992, Ockenfels and Wimann, 1999; Brosig-Koch et al., 2011) that found either non-significant differences or weaker pro-social behaviour among individuals exposed to

communism, and clearly behaviour was contrary to expectations and perceptions of market institutions compared to planned economies. Evidence documents that even during communism, there were significant informal payments to access health care (Lewis, 2000). Some literature has attempted to reconcile the lack of empirical consensus by establishing that differences in social values between Eastern and Western Germany are substantial. Van Hoorn and Maseland (2010) observe difference between East and West Germans using happiness data and identify, that contrary to expectations, Easterners appeared to entertain values more conducive to economic growth, which questions the myth of pro-entrepreneurial values in the West. Campa and Serafinelli (2018) compare attitudes toward work in the sample of women and men who, before reunification, had lived in East versus West Germany. They show that women were more likely to work in Eastern Europe as state-socialist governments promoted women's economic independence, which led to the introduction of new family laws. Furthermore, they showed that US migrants educated under the state-socialist regimes become less traditionalistic compared to Western European countries.

Familiarism. Family culture defines one of the private realm domains where individuals express their pro-social preferences and behaviours (Greif, 2006). Familiarism can be modelled as a club good, whereby betraying the family norms entails costs to individuals, produces social isolation, and influences social esteem (Manzi et al., 2006). Market economies might be more focused on individualist approaches to life, which are argued to erode family pro-social preferences, and pose both positive and detrimental effects for society (Alesina and Guliano, 2010). In contrast, family ties were strong under communist societies. Indeed, when traditional market alternatives to the access to privilege, such as wealth accumulation, were not available or were 'weakly monetised', the family strategies of privileged groups were to turn to the family to

cultivate their groups connections that provide access to privileges and elite positions (Filtzer, 2013). Such strategies were different across genders, and urban and rural areas.

When pro-social behaviour to the private realm, and more specifically familiarism, erodes of generalised trust and inhibits pro-sociality in the public realm, it gives rise to phenomenon known as 'amoral familism' (Banfield, 1967). However, familism can serve a specific instrumental role of providing care in the event of need, namely a form of informal insurance. In such a circumstance, family members are expected to subsidise or care for other family members in exchange of emotional and social pay-offs. Putnam (2001) provides a useful distinction between two types of social capital arguing that in certain circumstances the family ties 'bond' becomes 'too strong' to compete with weaker social ties that 'bridge' individuals from different families enabling wider cooperation networks. Strong 'bridging' social capital is socially desirable, because it enhances inclusiveness of societies. Therefore, to contribute to this debate, this paper examines whether communism effects on pro-social behaviour in both the private domain (particular familiarism) and public domains (generalised trust, preferences on equality, etc.).

Impressionable years. Pro-social behaviours with regards to private (such as caregiving arrangements) and public realms are moulded during IY (Sears and Funk, 1999; Prior, 2010; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2011). Thus, the exposure to communism in IY and earlier life might explain later-life attitudes and behaviours[6]. However, one can identify different periods (Stalinist, post-Stalinist or reformist) of socialism and its

[6] This is consistent with totalitarianism using public schooling for indoctrination purposes (Lott, 1999), which is argues as an independent channel of communist impact.

propaganda that would result in heterogeneity of exposure to communism in IY between cohorts.

Generalised trust. Communism could have exerted effects on generalized trust by increasing the exist costs of society and penalising disagreements[7]. Yet, the effect of communism on trust is far from trivial insofar as though individuals are found to underestimate others' trustworthiness, they act as if they have overestimated it (Fetchenhauer and Dunning, 2009).

Literature gap. Prior evidence on the impact of EC on pro-social preferences exhibits the following limitations. First, most of previous studies measure the EC as total number of years of exposure, and for the most part results are specific of East Germany. However, EC in East Germany might have been smoother than in other post-communist countries characterised by weaker economic, religious, and cultural ties to Western Europe. Migration flows from East to West Germany were more pronounced than in other countries from the Soviet bloc that were isolated from Western Europe. Second, there might be significant heterogeneity between and within Eastern and Western countries, which is important when cultural aspects are highly dependent on contextual circumstances. Finally, the literature looks at specific trends to disregard the effects of a larger number of pro-social preferences and behaviours in the private realm, and some potential mechanisms that the literature on communism in other social sciences has established (such as the instrumental networking effects of family ties and religious affiliation, as well as the effect of communism on trust and perceived efficiency of formal institutions such as the police, the judiciary and tax authorities). Next, we provide a detail

[7] Barry's (1974) concept of loyalty refers to the capacity of individuals to voice their concerns, even at significant cost, rather than to make an exit from the community (Dowding et al., 2000).

description of the preferences and behaviours examined, and the empirical strategy follows.

3. Data and empirical strategy

3.1 Data sources

Our primary source of data is from the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) Program which collects survey data on various aspects of intergenerational and gender relations in adults living in 17 European countries between 2002-2016, in particular, on care arrangements and caregiving values being the primary social attitudes we examine from this dataset. Additionally, we use the World Values Survey (WVS) that collects broader set of data concerned specifically with beliefs, values and motivations. We use a quasi-experimental design to measure the exposure to communism by using post-communist countries exposed at different times of entry and exit to Soviet communism along with Western countries as controls, and different cohorts of individuals that exhibit a differential exposure over time. We employ the two available waves of GGS[8]. Migrants are excluded, because their mobility is likely to alter the IY effects[9]. This yields the research sample of about 157 and 65 thousand individuals in first and second wave, respectively.

[8] The Generations and Gender Program data can be found in: http://www.ggp-i.org/data/online-codebook

[9] After the promulgation of the Soviet Constitution in 1936 migration was very rare if not existent with the exception of family reunification and some forced deportations (Dowty, 1989; Marshall, 2000). It is estimated that after the second WW, twelve million ethnic Germans were deported out of Germany to other Eastern European countries, though until the early 1950s, the lines between the East and the West in some of Eastern European borders were easily crossed. Furthermore, Boenisch and Schneider (2013) document related evidence suggesting that exposure to communism affects the probability of spatial mobility.

The World Values Survey (WVS) is a longitudinal survey comprised of five waves conducted in 58 countries between 1981 and 2014 (Inglehart et al., 2014). In the present study, we use the data for the same set of countries as GGS (except from Austria Belgium unavailable in WVS) that participated in one (France, Italy, Lithuania), two (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Netherlands), three (Bulgaria, Georgia, Germany, Romania, Sweden) or four (Poland, Russia) different waves of data collection post 1989, which yields an overall sample of about 46 thousand individuals aged from 15 to 97. Table A1 in the Appendix provides detailed information the number of observations by country and wave in both data sources. Table A2 shows the composition of the research samples by country of residence and birth cohorts.

3.2 Measuring pro-social preferences and the exposure measures

Pro-social attitudes in private realm. Common measures of attitudinal and behavioural familiarism include measures of familism subscales from the Family Obligations Scale (Fuligni et al., 1999). However, in this paper we focus on familism measures concerning intergenerational transfers of care and money flowing up- or downwards[10]. Figure B1 in the Appendix summarizes distributions of responses to these questions, to which we further refer to as measures of general familiarism. Besides, we examine attitudes of specific duties concerning intergenerational transfers of care and money exchanged between family members (which we refer as particular familiarism)[11].

[10] More specifically, GGS respondents answered questions around expectations of 'care for pre-school children' alongside 'care for older persons in need of care at their home' as well as 'financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level' and 'financial support for older people who live below subsistence level'. These forms of support could be reported as mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family on the following Linkert scale: '1 – mainly a task for society, 2 – more a task for society than for the family, 3 – a task equally for both society and the family, 4 – more a task for the family than for society, 5 – mainly a task for the family'.

[11] Respondents answered 'to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements': 'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so'; 'children ought to provide financial help for their parents when their parents are having financial difficulties'; 'parents ought to provide financial help for their adult children when the children are having

Figure B2 in the Appendix shows distributions of responses to these questions in Eastern and Western European countries. The distributions indicate that familiaristic attitudes are more common in the East than in the West, with the case of care for the elderly being the most pronounced example. Table A4 in the Appendix summarizes differences between Eastern and Western Europe in the analysed familiaristic attitudes. We build simple indexes of strong and weak familiarism observed in general and attitudes for the monetary and caregiving support, for both to younger and older generations. Adding up strong (weak) preference for family support, we obtain a discrete measure of strong (weak) familiarism ranging from 0 to 4. We find the East to be significantly more familiaristic than the West, especially as far as the strong preferences are concerned. We examine the effects of EC both on the intensive margin (familiarism scale) and the extensive margin (binarised familiarism).

Pro-social attitudes in public realm. We measure preferences for income equality, preference for equality over freedom[12] and left- or right-wing political self-identification[13]. Figure B3 in the Appendix illustrates distributions of these three measures and Table A5 shows descriptive statistics, suggestive of slightly stronger support for income equality, left-wing values, and equality as compared to freedom in the

financial difficulties'; and 'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need' using the following Linkert scale: '1 – strongly agree, 2 – agree, 3 – neither agree nor disagree, 4 – disagree, 5 – strongly disagree'.

[12] Russian, Polish and Czech WVS respondents were asked 'Which of these two statements comes closest to your own opinion? A. I find that both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, everyone can live in freedom and develop without hinderance. B. Certainly both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong.' Individuals who reported to agree with statement A and B were assigned 1 and 3, respectively in the variable equality over freedom. The undecided individuals who answered agreeing with neither A nor B were assigned 2, and the 'do not know' answers were treated as refusals.

[13] In our variable left-wing, we use responses to question 'In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this [1 to 10] scale, generally speaking?'

West. Again, we examine the effects of EC on the intensive margin and the extensive margin, using the dichotomized measures of social attitudes.

Exposure to communism. Our study concerns post-war Soviet communism. Living in Eastern or Western European country provides a crude measure of external margin of the exposure communism, but it fails to inform precisely on the extent of the exposure to communism. Thus, we measure the number of years an individual lived under communist regimes in the countries belonging to the Soviet bloc to capture the exposure to communism[14]. Because more accurate measures of actual instalment of communist regime are unavailable, we use the year when socialist constitution of the state was announced as an indication of the maturity of communist institutions. It ranges from 1936 to 1952 (see Table 1 for details). The end of communism is also country-specific ranging from 1989 to 1995 (see Table 1 for details) and operationalized as the year of first democratic parliamentary elections, with the exception for Romania and Russia, where dates of the death sentence for the Romanian Communist Party general secretary and legislative election were used, respectively.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

We compute the total number of years an individual was exposed to communism, measuring years of EC in total. Furthermore, we operationalize a measure of IY under communism as the number of years between 18 and 25 years of age, given an individual's age that took place while communism was in place. We generate a dummy equal to one if exposure to communism took place in any of the impressionable years (extensive EC in IY) and we summarize the number of IY under communism (intensive EC in IY).

[14] We exclude earlier periods from the main analysis because of the instability of political environment at that times.

Individuals undertaking international migration during and after communism are removed from the sample.

Table A5 summarizes basic descriptive statistics on the exposure to communism and our main variables of interest, measuring public and private pro-social behaviours. The average span of life spent under communist regime in GGS sample is on average 19 years and in WVS it is about 22, which is in line with the differences between the samples in age and in the set of countries included. For those exposed to communism, the averages are the same in both research samples (29 years), as shown in Table A5. For both samples more than a half (about 5 years) out of 8 IY were lived under communism, on average. These similarities are reassuring with respect to the comparability and validity of our data sources.

Other measures. To examine mechanisms governing results obtained in the main analysis, we refer to a number of relevant measures, including generalized trust, confidence in public institutions, political and civic participation, certain dimensions of religiosity as well as traditionalism in gender roles. Table A6 in the Appendix provides more details on these measures.

We observe deep differences in generalized trust, reaching to 25 percentage points in favour for the West, both in GGS and WVS. Similar patterns are observed for confidence in several state institutions. In general, the East reports lower levels of participation in civil society than the West. The most drastic differences are seen for the membership on organizations as in the West in concerns at least half of the respondents who answered this question, while in the East respective prevalence is below a quarter. Hardly any involvement in political actions was observed in the East. Descriptive statistics indicate that communism failed to weaken religiosity, as despite the proportion of individuals

raised religiously, it is almost the same in the East and the West. Various measures of spirituality and adherence to God show that religion is less important in the post-communist countries, but ritual participation in religious services is more frequent[15]. Finally, we find that traditionalistic approach to female care-giving and male bread-wining duties is substantially more pronounced, and also characterized with smaller variation, in the East than in the West.

3.3 Empirical strategy

Baseline estimates. Our baseline estimates exploit both cross-section and longitudinal data which contains both the cross country and cohort specific variation in exposure to communism. We conduct pooled OLS regressions of social attitudes (preferences) and behaviours which were influenced by the exposure to communism and a set of control variables including age in a quadratic form, gender, year of the interview, cohort group, and current country of residence. More specifically, we estimate the equation below:

$$Y_{it}^{m} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_{g1} EC_{igt}^{TOT} + \gamma_{g2} EC_{igt}^{IMP,n} + \gamma_1 \vartheta_t + \gamma_2 \mu_g + \gamma_3 c_{it} + \gamma_4 X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \qquad (1)$$

The effect of the total number of years of exposure to communism (EC^{TOT}) as well as the extensive and intensive margin of exposure to communism during IY ($EC^{IMP,I}$ and $EC^{IMP,E}$, respectively) are used to explain the intensive and extensive margins of pro-social preferences Y_{it}^{m}, m={I,E}, where i refers to individuals, t to survey waves, g to the country, c to the birth cohort group, and n={I,E} to the margin type). We include a set of control

[15] For the details concerning harmonization of country-specific deviations and aggregation of the frequency of attending religious ceremonies into categories, please see the Notes to Table A6 in the Appendix.

variables (X_{it}), which adjust the estimates for demographic and socio-economic individual characteristics and other controls[16].

Table A3 reports the balance sample analysis containing the descriptive statistics for the key variables of interest in the treated and untreated sample. It points to statistically significant differences between East and West groups in both research samples. Although some of the differences are negligible, others are significant, and specifically household size and number of children observed in GGS Western sample are found to be smaller than in the East by 18 and 16 per cent, respectively.

Heterogeneity. We undertake a series of heterogeneity analysis to understand what the main drivers of our baseline estimates are. First, we study the stability of exposure to communism in IY in younger and older ages, namely ages from 18 to 21 and from 22 to 25. The reason behind this is that not all IY have the same effect. Second, we examine how our results fare to the consideration of demographic differences using gender and 10-year birth cohort groups. Third we examine how our results hold when we consider different communist country regimes using various country groups and regions (urban and rural) and institutional heritage (e.g., whether belonging to Prussia, Habsburg empire or Russia exerted a differential effect). Finally, we refer to different religious heritage, and the stages of communism[17]. Finally, we examine different control groups, as some countries in our control group were exposed to different kinds of democratic regimes in the period of analysis.

Threads to the identification. We examine the impact of alternative empirical specifications on the baseline results. More specifically, we consider the effects of defining

[16] We further test whether the $\gamma_{g1} + \gamma_{g2} = 0$ in a postestimation analysis.
[17] Namely Stalinist (1936-1953), post-Stalinist (1954-1964), or reformist (1964 till the collapse) periods.

a fixed start and end dates of communism, experience of recession and war during IY, household average monthly income per capita with imputations instead of the ability to make ends meet, 10-year cohort groups, birth year, occupation, occupation interacted with graduation year, age at communism collapse, rural area and other as additional controls including macroeconomic indicators. We exclude groups of countries to check if the results remain intact.

Robustness checks. We employ fixed effects models in familiarism estimations for the panel subsample of GGS and run probit models with dichotomized dependent variables on familiaristic and social attitudes. We also run synthetic controls models at aggregated level and propensity score matching using regional occupation characteristics (the percentage of agriculture workers and farmers, and the percentage of unskilled workers) and being over thirty years old for the propensity score at individual level, to remove sample selection problem from our comparisons. In addition, we examine communism effects for Eastern and Western Germany only. Finally, we test our results on attitudes for external validity by estimating effects of exposure to communism on familiaristic and political behaviours.

4. Results

4.1 Baseline results

Tables 2 and 3 show the effect of communism exposure during the IY alongside total exposure to communism. That is, we measure the additional effect of EC during an individual's IY above and beyond the effect of communism as such. We find evidence of a significant effect on pro-social preferences in both public and private realm. Table 2 suggest that the EC in IY exerts a significant negative effect on both the extensive and intensive margins of the preference for income equality (redistribution). These results

help reconciling previous estimates from Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), who find that exposure to communism did increase preferences for redistribution, as the effects of the total years of EC are consistent with their estimates. However, we find significantly negative impact of an impressionable year under communism on the intensity of the preference for income equality.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

Similarly, we find a significant negative effect of EC during the impressionable years on left-wing self-identification and a preference for equality over freedom. An impressionable year of exposure to communism reduced the preference for income equality by 2 percentage points, and of the preference for equality over freedom by 22 percentage points (and average reduction by 4 per cent from 48% to 46% and 63 per cent from 35% to 13%), respectively. When we look at the intensive margin of equality over freedom, the effect of EC in an impressionable year is twice as strong as for the intensive margin. However, we should be cautious as the question is observed only for Czech Republic, Poland, and Russia.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

Table 3 shows that EC during IY increases particular and general familiarist preferences, and the effects are significant for both time and money transfer types (with one exception for financial support from parents to their adult children, i.e. particular downwards money). In case of general upwards familism (towards older generations) we find that the EC enhances familiarism regardless from the period of life when it took place. The opposite effects are observed for familiarism concerning any support towards younger generations, and particular familiarism towards the older. These pictures are the

same at both the intensive and extensive margins. Hence, these results are consistent with a crowding out effect, namely EC during an individual's IY reduces prosocial behaviour in the public realm and increases it in the private realm.

Let us illustrate the size of the increase due to EC in an impressionable year on familiarism with regards to care over older individuals (general upwards care). We find that probability of agreement with statement that the family rather than the state is responsible for care over older generations declined by 8 per cent. If we consider instead individuals, exposed to communism in their last impressionable year, upwards care familiarism would be completely crowded out by communism after reaching age of 92, if communism did not collapse before[18].

When we distinguish between familiaristic attitudes affecting one's family (particular familiarism) from a more general attitude (general familiarism), we find that the effects of EC in IY are stronger for general familiarism than for particular familiarism (the later refers to a preference for family vs society responsibilities for financial and non-financial support to those in need). The pattern of the EC in impressionable years posing stronger and opposite effects than the EC in total is robust and consistent for majority support types, which indicates that EC during an individual's IY reduces pro-social behaviour in the public realm and increases it in the private realm (family pro-social behaviour), contrary to an indoctrination hypothesis. The average person in post-communist countries lived 29 years under communism of which five were during IY. Compared to a similar exposure in Western Europe, we find an increase in general

[18] This means that familiarism for instance in Russia would have been replaced by the preference for public care if communism had survived at least till 2004.

familiarism in downwards financial support of 5%. However, if none of these years had been during IY, the change would have been more than twice as big, reaching 11 per cent.

4.2 Heterogeneity analysis

We conduct analysis of heterogeneous impact of EC in an individual's IY at the intensive margins using different periods in the IY of an individual as well as different demographic (gender, birth cohort), regional (rural versus urban and various country groups), and cultural (historical and religious heritage) characteristics.

Early and late impressionable years. Our baseline results suggest that the social environment to which individuals are exposed during their young adulthood, facilitates being in the opposition to the status quo and prevailing values. We find that EC mostly in older IY (ages 22-25) seems to exhibit a negative effect on social attitudes in case of preferences for income equality and equality over freedom (cf. Figure 1; for more details see Table C1 in the Appendix). Similarly, for majority of familiaristic values, EC in older IY had stronger impact than in younger ages (18-21) (cf. Figure 2 and 3; Table C2 in the Appendix). These results suggest familiaristic attitudes are shaped by observation of family behaviour already in younger ages whereas social and political maturity in older IY makes the experiences from this period particularly important for formation of preferences concerned with social behaviour in public realm.

Demographics. Consistently with previous literature, we find that the IY under communism yield stronger impact on social preferences for men than women. Similar results are observed for total years of exposure to communism, but in this case gender differences are less pronounced. Hence, the baseline results for the reduction of pro-social attitudes seem to be driven by men (see Table D1 in the Appendix). In contrast

familiarism increases due to EC in impressionable period do not vary by gender (cf. Table D2 in the Appendix). We observe significant heterogeneity with respect to cohort-specific deviations from general patterns (cf. Tables D3, D4 in the Appendix). The results show that EC in total posed the strongest impact on pre-war cohorts and cohorts entering IY at a demise of communism. As for familiarism, it seems that the rise in its strength due to EC in IY is driven mainly by cohorts born between 1950 and 1969 (cf. Tables D5 and D6 in the Appendix). Furthermore, we find weak evidence of positive effects of the EC in an individual's IY among the youngest cohorts.

Regions and countries. The effects of EC are more intense in some countries such as Germany, Poland, and Russia. Consistently with previous research (Filtzer, 2013), the effects of EC differ between rural and urban areas. Indeed, it seems that the instalment of egalitarian values due to EC in general was stronger in urban than rural areas, but no regional difference was found with respect to left-wing self-identification. In urban areas the support for equality over freedom and income redistribution was reinforced by the EC in IY. In rural areas, the positive effects of EC experienced in impressionable periods concern all examined familiarism types, which was less evident in urban areas.

Historic heritage. We find distinctive and complex patterns in the pro-social behavioural changes due to EC in regions belonging to the Habsburg, Prussian and Russian empires originated in the Vienna Congress of 1815. With respect to political self-identification, we find a significantly different effect of the Habsburg empire from that of Prussia and Russia, while in case of income redistribution, similarities between Habsburg and Russian empires make the Prussian lands stand out. So is also the case of financial support to older generations (for both particular and general familiarism). Furthermore, it seems that the reduction in preference for equality over freedom was strongest for

traditionally orthodox Christian countries, while the crowding out of the preference for income distributions by communism experienced in impressionable years was most pronounced in the countries with significant role of protestant moves in the past (such as Germany). Hence, the separateness of the historic heritage is a reason limiting generalization of findings concerning communism repercussions in Germany.

Country control groups. Qualitatively, our baseline results on social attitudes and familiarism remain intact when using alternative control groups of countries unexposed to communism[19].

4.3 Mechanisms

Next, we examine a number of potential mechanisms that could explain our results. Specifically, in this section we examine a number of variables measuring confidence in public institutions and traditionalism. Table 4 shows that family is most important to individuals exposed to EC in IY, who have also most children as compared to those unexposed to communism at all and to those exposed in other periods of life. That might suggest that the private rather than public realm is more important to those who experienced communism in their IY. Our results suggest that trust between family members is stronger due to EC in any period of life (despite the negative and substantial effects of EC on generalized trust). If family trust, contrary to generalized trust, remained insensitive to communist destruction, we might expect crowding-in of pro-social behavior in the private realm. That might explain increased familiarism in general and especially its variant oriented towards own family members. However, Torgler (2003) found higher levels of tax compliance among Eastern than Western Germans. Hence, a differential

[19] We excluded from the control group one country at a time: Italy, having a strongest communist party in Europe, and Sweden, being the only Scandinavian country in the sample.

institutional efficiency at collecting taxes of Eastern European institutions might underpin our findings.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

Consistently with evidence documenting a negative correlation between government regulation and trust (Aghion et al., 2010), we find that communism reduced not only generalized trust, but also confidence in several state institutions. That is, we observe significant and negative effects of EC in IY decreasing confidence in the press, labour unions, political parties, police, and justice system, which are critical also in democratic regimes. If such public institutions are perceived as corrupted, then the preference for placing responsibility over individuals in need of support in family rather than the state is a rational strategy. This finding is in turn consistent with evidence of an increase in general familiarism due to EC in IY.

We observe significant and negative impact of EC in any period of life on spirituality and referring to churches' teaching, but those exposed to EC in IY take part in religious services more often than other individuals in our sample (cf. Table 5). Considering the fact that communism mostly succeeded in instilling materialist values by removing spirituality, it seems that the main sense of community observed in our analysis in the post-communist countries stems from belonging to family and ritual participation in religious ceremonies.

Finally, another interesting consequence of EC are its effects on gender equality, as total of years of EC made individuals more supportive of female economic activity (also in case of mothers of pre-school age children), of equality in parenting between men and women, and more likely to report that motherhood is redundant for female fulfillment (cf.

Table 5). Surprisingly, the gender roles promoted during communism seem to be perceived as oppressive during IY, as we observe pronounced effects of EC in IY with respect to work-life balance in line with traditionalistic assignment of bread-wining and care-giving duties to men and women, respectively. This traditionalism leads to more pronounced particular familiarism of individuals exposed to communism during impressionable period of life. The shift to private realm makes individuals more selfish and less interested in others' wellbeing. Thus, EC in IY reduces social attitudes such as preference for equality and income equality, generalized trust and left-wing self-identification.

[Insert Table 5 about here]

In sum, we find that mistrust in public institutions combined with importance of family and tradition make people exposed to EC in IY more right-wing and more familiaristic. We find that that EC strengthened family ties and reduced generalized trust, EC crowded in familiaristic values, in line with religious tradition. Communism weakened pro-social behaviour in the public realms and increased it in the private realm. Although total exposure to communism reduced familiarism and made individuals passive, leaving responsibility for those in need for the government, EC in an individual's IY reverted the effects mainly due to the strength of adherence to traditional female roles, and the weaker confidence in public institutions.

4.4 Threats to the identification

Communism entry and exit.[20] We examine alternative operationalization of communism end and beginning, setting it to 1991 and 1945, respectively, that yielded three combinations of country-specific or fixed entry and exit dates. We observe a similar picture irrespective of the definition employed, confirming the robustness of our baseline results for income equality, left-wing views, both general and particular familiarism. Allowing the entry into communism to differ between countries resulted in stronger effects of EC in impressionable years on care-giving particular familiarism and left-wing views, but weaker effects for income equality and general familiarism. That might suggest, indoctrination at different stages of communism might have exhibit different efficacy.

Alternative cohort grouping.[21] We employ a 10-year cohort groups and birth year to check alternative grouping by year of birth to see whether the changes in the regime details affected our results. Qualitatively it changed nothing, while magnitude of EC in impressionable years was slightly smaller in case of 10-year cohorts and slightly greater in case of 1-year cohorts.

Recession. Official macroeconomic statistics reported by communist central statistical offices fail to properly describe economic conditions, because they were used by the propaganda to convince citizens to the superiority of communism. Therefore, the standard measures of economic recession such as the changes in unemployment rate or in gross domestic product are unreliable and inaccurate for the communist period. Nonetheless, we control for the recessions experienced during IY after communism in the post-communist countries and in the Western European countries to find that the

[20] See Tables F1-F6 in the Appendix for the detailed results of the robustness checks discussed in this passage.

[21] See Tables F7-F10 in the Appendix for the detailed results of the robustness checks discussed in this passage.

baseline results of the impact that EC in IY and in total poses on pro-social attitudes, remain robust (cf. tables G1 and G2 in the Appendix).

Income effects. Household average monthly income per capita with imputations (in logs) instead of the ability to make ends meet was used in the GGS sample, where observations on income were available. The effects of exposure to communism in this specification remain significant similarly to baseline results (cf. Table G3 in the Appendix). It is reasonable to assume that the ability to make ends meet fails to grasp heterogeneity in the highest income percentiles by aggregating them into one category of making ends meet easily. Interestingly, when controlling for average household monthly income per capita, the size of the effects for particular familiarism was significantly smaller whereas for general familiarism concerning financial support - stronger with the except for care over older people. Our interpretation is that higher income makes individuals less obliged by the family norms of support and enhances the sense of public responsibility for those in need of support, especially when financial assistance is involved.

Occupation and age at communism collapse. We control for the occupation at the time of communism collapse (and, in addition, we interacted occupation with graduation year), and age at communism collapse to proxy the risk of unemployment during the transformation period as well as chances of having relatively high socio-economic status under communism. These factors might be relevant for the attitudes examined in our study. Controlling for the occupation interacted with the graduation age yields results suggesting even stronger role of communism in IY than the baseline results, because it shows significant effects for all the attitudes except for one (preferring equality over freedom). The effects controlling for additional variables often have a smaller size than

the baseline specifications, but in some cases the opposite is true (general downwards care, general upwards money, general downwards money).

Country groups.[22] Groups of countries analogous to those used in the heterogeneity analysis were excluded to check, if the results remain intact to such alterations. Although we found variation in results, we conclude that our baseline results are not driven by a particular group of countries.

Longitudinal analysis. We employ random effects models in familiarism estimations for the panel subsample of GGS and find that all significant effects remain so and their magnitudes remain at a similar level. The models with fixed effects are not reported, because the observations on the explanatory variables do not change over time as we observe individuals after the communism collapsed. Thus, the model with fixed individual effects is unsuitable for tracking currently observed communism effects.

Discrete models. We run probit and OLS models with dichotomized dependent variables on familiaristic and political attitudes, which confirmed our baseline results. In the Appendix, we report only one way of dichotomization (strong preference for familiarism), because other alternatives (including weak preference for familiarism and excluding the undecided), lead to the same conclusions.

Sample selection correction. We run synthetic controls models at aggregated level and propensity score matching using parental characteristics for the propensity score at individual level, to remove sample selection problem from our comparisons. Results using the propensity score based on share of workers in agricultural and unskilled occupations support credibility of our baseline results on preferences for income equality and equality

[22] See section H in the Appendix for details of results discussed in this passage.

over freedom (cf. Table J1 in the Appendix). They indicate significantly negative effects of exposure to communism in IY for these two preferences. However, the opposite concerns political self-identification, contrary to our baseline results.

Other controls. Controlling for rural area, and household size when such information is available, confirms our baseline results. Also results obtained for standard errors clustered by year of observation and by country of residence are in line with our results.

4.5 Credibility checks

Our results on the preference for income equality for Germany are consistent with previous studies pointing to positive effects of the exposure to communism in general. Nonetheless, we show that the overall effects during IY are negative, as the size of negative coefficient for EC in IY exceeds significantly the size of positive coefficients on one year under communism, for all three alternative controls' sets. Finally, we test our results on a sample of migrants and referring to data on actual familial support with respect to care and money. The results show a similar picture[23].

5. Discussion

We find a positive effect of EC on pro-social preferences such as preference for income redistribution to be weakened by exposure to communism during IY, and the overall effects are negative, because the exposure to communism during an IY is stronger than the positive effects of any year under communism.

[23] These analyses will be added to the next version of the paper.

Our results are consistent with previous studies such as Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007)[24], but suggest that Eastern Germany was a unique country given its stronger connections to capitalist Western Europe tradition and therefore, received a relatively weaker influence of the Soviet domination[25]. Although communist regimes regarded religions as a social problem 'to be eradicated', western Christians denominations such as Polish Catholics and German protestants were tolerated and kept links with counterpart churches in the West (Djankov and Nikolova, 2018). In contrast, orthodox Christians faced significant religious persecution in several Eastern European countries including Bulgaria and Romania, as did protestants in Hungary and Czechoslovakia[26]. Affiliated but not practicing Christians were significantly more frequent in the East than West Germany (40% and 21%, respectively) and so were the non-religious (21% and 3%, respectively) in the mid-70s (O'Brien and Palmer 2007). In the USSR 29% of population was non-religious whereas respective proportion was below 1% in Austria and 10% in France (O'Brien and Palmer 2007). It suggests that religion might be important factor in the process of preference formation by communism.

Our findings indicate that EC during an individual's IY crowded in pro-social behaviours in the private realm but crowded out pro-social behaviour in the public realm. One explanation of this phenomenon lies in the perceived relative inefficiency and corruption of Soviet institutions, which encouraged opportunism in public life. For example, members of the communist Party belonged to it formally for the sake of opportunities it provided, but they would not identify with nor actively participate in the

[24] We show that EC in Germany leads to a preference for income inequality.
[25] Religion or religiosity, endured more in Germany and Poland than in other communist countries.
[26] The relation between number of protestants and Roman-Catholics in mid-70's was similar in West Germany and East Germany, while in other post-communist countries in our sample orthodox or Roman-Catholicism were dominant religions (O'Brien and Palmer 2007).

Party actions. In contrast, individuals would devote most of their focus to the private realm[27]. Public life was dominated by hierarchy, and an elite would uphold significant privileges. The fear of subordinates to question the authority of their superior by voicing concerns inhibited undertaking initiative. Hence, a passive public life was a dominant approach in communist countries, which was destructive for cooperation in building common institutions and for the generalized trust. Obedient on the surface, individuals were very creative in coping with daily living difficulties using tight circles of trusted individuals as long as their actions remained officially unnoticed. Under such circumstances 'Solidarność' grew underground in parallel to officially recognized trade unions representing hardly anyone's interests and supporting the Party.

6. Conclusion

Drawing on evidence from a large list of Eastern European countries which differ in the entry and exit into communism and in their cohort exposure, we find that EC did not exert a significant effect on pro-social behaviour in the public realm. However, when one examines the influence of EC during the so-called IY, we do find that an increasing exposure to Soviet communism during people's IY makes individuals more likely to uphold pro-social preference in the private realm (only towards their own family members) but not in the public realm. Familism was instrumentally valuable as a source of connection and status at a time where privilege could not translate with visible differences in wealth accumulation. These results are driven by a reduction in confidence in fundamental state institutions (such as political parties, labour unions, and the justice system), and an increasing reliance on traditional gender roles and religious

[27] For example, even though sales of meat and other deficit food products were officially controlled (and limited) in Poland in the 1980s, the unofficial trade flourished 'under the table.'

organisations. Overall, results indicate the importance of regime exposure during an individual's IY which suggests that indoctrination is unlikely to have driven the effect of EC on redistributive preferences. Instead, our results are consistent with a crowding out effects resulting from state surveillance and the privileges inherent to the elitist nature of central planning institutions.

References

Aghion, P., Algan Y., Cahuc P., & Shleifer, A. (2010). Regulation and distrust. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* , 125(3), 1015-1049.

Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2000). Economics and identity. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* , 115(3), 715-753.

Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2010). The power of the family. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 15(2) 93–125.

Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2015). Culture and institutions. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 53 (4), 898–944.

Alesina, A., & Fuchs-Schündeln, N. (2007). Goodbye Lenin (or not?): The effect of communism on people's preferences. *American Economic Review*, 97 (4), 1507–1528.

Alesina, A., Glaser, E., & Sacerdote, B. (2001). Why doesn't the United States have a European-style welfare state? *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 2(2), 187.

Arendt, H. (1958). *The Human Condition*. University of Chicago Press.

Banfield, E. C. (1967). *The moral basis of a backward society*. Free Press.

Barry, B. (1974). Exit, voice, and loyalty. *British Journal of Political Science*, 4(1), 79–107.

Basu, S., Estrin, S., & Svejnar, J. (2005). Employment determination in enterprises under communism and in transition: Evidence from Central Europe. *ILR Review*, 58(3), 353–369.

Bauernschuster, S., Falck, O., Gold, R., & Heblich, S. (2012). The shadows of the socialist past: Lack of self-reliance hinders entrepreneurship. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 28(4), 485-497.

Bauernschuster, S., & Rainer, H. (2012). Political regimes and the family: how sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany. *Journal of Population Economics*, 25(1), 5-27.

Becker, G. S. (2009). *A treatise on the family*. Harvard University Press.

Becker, S. O., Boeckh, K., Hainz, C., & Woessmann, L. (2016). The empire is dead, long live the empire! Long-run persistence of trust and corruption in the bureaucracy. *The Economic Journa*l, 126(590), 40-74.

Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006). Belief in a just world and redistributive politics. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121 (2), 699–746.

Besley, T. (2013). What's the good of the market? An essay on Michael Sandel's what money can't buy. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 51(2), 478–495.

Böcker, A. (1998). *Regulation of Migration*: International Experiences, Het Spinhuis.

Bönisch, P., & Schneider, L. (2013). The social capital legacy of communism-results from the Berlin Wall experiment. *Eur J Polit Econ* 32, 391–411.

Booth, A. L., Meng, X., Fan, E., & Zhang, D. (2018). *The Intergenerational Behavioral Consequences of a Socio-Political Upheaval*, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 11991, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn.

Brosig-Koch, J., Helbach, C., Ockenfels, A., & Weimann, J. (2011). Still different after all these years: Solidarity behavior in East and West Germany. *Journal of public economics*, 95(11-12), 1373-1376.

Butler, J. V., & Fehr, D. (2018). *The causal effect of cultural identity on cooperation*. Mimeo.

Campa, P., & Serafinelli, M. (2018). Politico-economic regimes and attitudes: Female workers under state-socialism. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* (in press (November)).

Cooter, R. (2000). Do good laws make good citizens? An economic analysis of internalized norms. *Virginia Law Review*, 86(8), 1577–1601.

Corneo, G., & Grüner, H. P. (2002). Individual preferences for political redistribution. *Journal of Public Economics*, 83(1), 83–107.

Djankov, S., & Nikolova, E. (2018). *Communism as the unhappy coming*. The World Bank.

Dowding, K., J, P., Mergoupis, T., & Van Vugt, M. (2000). Exit, voice and loyalty: Analytic and empirical developments. *European Journal of Political Research*, 37(4), 469–495.

Dowty, A (1989). *Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement*, Yale University Press

Elder, G. H., Johnson, M. K., & Crosnoe, R. (2003). The emergence and development of life course theory. *In Handbook of the life course* (pp. 3–19). Springer.

Fetchenhauer, D., & Dunning, D. (2009). Do people trust too much or too little? *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 30(3), 263–276.

Filtzer, D. (2014). Privilege and Inequality in Communist Society. In *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism*.

Fuligni, A. J., & Tsai, K. M. (2015). Developmental flexibility in the age of globalization: Autonomy and identity development among immigrant adolescents. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 66, 411–431.

Giuliano, P. & Spilimbergo A. (2013). Growing up in a Recession. *Review of Economic Studies*, 81(2), 787–781.

Greif, A. (2006). Family structure, institutions, and growth: the origins and implications of western corporations. *American Economic Review*, 96(2), 308–312.

Hirschmann, A. O., (1977). *The passions and the interests: Political arguments for capitalism before its triump*h. Princeton University Press.

Huber, P., & Mikula, S. (2019). Social capital and willingness to migrate in post-communist countries. *Empirica*, 46(1), 31-59.

Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. *World Values Survey: All Rounds* - Country-Pooled

Datafile Version:http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp. Madrid: JD Systems Institute.

Lewis, M. (2000). Who Is Paying for Health Care in Eastern Europe and Central Asia? Washington, D.C.: World Bank

Lichter, A., Löffler, M., & Siegloch, S. (2016). The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany.

Lott, J. R., Jr. (1999). Public schooling, indoctrination, and totalitarianism. *Journal of Political Economy*, 107 (S6), S127–S157.

Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1848). Manifesto of the Communist Party. 2013 ed. Simon and Schuster.

McCloskey, D. N. (2006). Bourgeois Virtue. Wiley Online Library.

Manzi, C., Vignoles, V. L., Regalia, C., & Scabini, E. (2006). Cohesion and enmeshment revisited: differentiation, identity, and well-being in two European cultures. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 68(3), 673–689.

Marshall, B. (2000). The new Germany and migration in Europe. Manchester University Press.

Nee, V., & Swedberg, R. (2005). Economic sociology and new institutional economics. In Handbook of new institutional economics (pp. 789–818). Springer.

Nikolova, M., Popova, O. & Otrachshenko, V. (2019). Stalin and the Origins of Mistrust, IZA Working Paper, No 12326.

Ockenfels, A., & Weimann, J. (1999). Types and patterns: an experimental East-West-German comparison of cooperation and solidarity. *Journal of public economics*, 71(2), 275-287.

Osborne, D., Sears, D. O., & Valentino, N. A. (2011). The end of the solidly democratic south: The impressionable-years hypothesis. Political Psychology, 32 (1), 81–108.

O'Brien J., & Palmer, M. (2007). The atlas of religion. Earthscan

Pop-Eleches, G., & Tucker, J. (2011). Communist legacies, and political values and behavior: A theoretical framework with an application to political party trust. *Comparative Politics*, 43(4), 379–408.

Prior, M. (2010). You've either got it or you don't? The stability of political interest over the life cycle. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(3), 747–766.

Putnam, R. D. (2001). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. Simon and Schuster.

Rainer, H., & Siedler, T. (2009). Does democracy foster trust? *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 37(2), 251-269.

Roth, C., & Wohlfart, J. (2018). Experienced inequality and preferences for redistribution. *Journal of Public Economics,* 167, 251-262.

Sandel, M. J. (2012). What money can't buy: the moral limits of markets. Macmillan.

Sears, D. O., & Funk, C. L. (1999). Evidence of the long-term persistence of adults' political predispositions. *The Journal of Politics*, 61 (1), 1–28.

Schelling, T. C. (2006). Micromotives and macrobehavior. WW Norton & Company.

Shayo, M. (2009). A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class, and redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 103(02), 147–174.

Shiller, R. J., Boycko, M., & Korobov, V. (1990). Popular attitudes towards free markets: The Soviet Union and the United States compared.

Shiller, R. J., Boycko, M., Korobov, V., Winter, S. G., & Schelling, T. (1992). Hunting for Homo Sovieticus: situational versus attitudinal factors in economic behaviour. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1992(1), 127–194.

Shleifer, A., & Treisman, D. (2005). A normal country: Russia after communism. *Journal of Economic Perspective*s, 19(1), 151–174.

Torgler, B. (2003). Does culture matter? Tax morale in an East-West-German comparison. *FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis*, 59(4), 504-528.

Tommaso, M. L. di., Raiser, M., & Weeks, M. (2007). Home grown or imported? Initial conditions, external anchors and the determinants of institutional reform in the transition economies. *The Economic Journa*l, 117(520), 858–881.

Von Hoorn, A., & Maseland, R. (2010). Cultural differences between East and West Germany after 1991: Communist values versus economic performance? *Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization*, 76(3), 791–804.

Weitzman, M L. (1977). Is the price system or rationing more effective in getting a commodity to those who need it most? *Bell Journal of Economics*, 8(2), 517–524.

Figures and Tables

Table 1. Entry and exit into Soviet communism in analyzed post-communist countries.

	Entry				
Exit	1936	1947	1948	1949	1952
1989			Romania		Poland
1990	Lithuania Georgia	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Germany Hungary	
1992	Estonia				
1995	Russia				

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on dates of socialist constitution and first free democratic elections.

Table 2. Estimation results for social preferences.

	Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in an	-0.0137	-0.0179	-0.0232*	-0.0976	-0.125*	-0.161**
impressionable year	(0.0128)	(0.0127)	(0.0127)	(0.0730)	(0.0724)	(0.0723)
Years of EC	0.00393***	0.00326***	0.00375***	0.0255***	0.0216***	0.0247***
in total	(0.000407)	(0.000406)	(0.000407)	(0.00228)	(0.00227)	(0.00227)
Joint significance F-test	83.79***	52.40***	67.15***	123.13***	80.68***	100.81***
	LEFT WING					
EC in an	-0.0287*	-0.0337**	-0.0355**	-0.154**	-0.170**	-0.166**
impressionable year	(0.0157)	(0.0156)	(0.0157)	(0.0679)	(0.0676)	(0.0677)
Years of EC	0.00424***	0.00377***	0.00387***	0.0199***	0.0180***	0.0177***
in total	(0.000490)	(0.000490)	(0.000492)	(0.00213)	(0.00213)	(0.00214)
Joint significance F-test	69.21***	48.48***	49.87***	82.22***	60.53***	58.40***
	GENERALIZED TRUST (GGS)					
EC in an	-0.00992	-0.0117	-0.0144*	-	-	-
impressionable year	(0.00755)	(0.00743)	(0.00742)	-	-	-
Years of EC	-0.00231***	-0.000917***	-0.000936***	-	-	-
in total	(0.000284)	(0.000280)	(0.000280)	-	-	-
Joint significance F-test	65.65***	18.70***	18.70***	-	-	-
	GENERALIZED TRUST (WVS)					
EC in an	-0.0395***	-0.0358***	-0.0325***	-	-	-
impressionable year	(0.0120)	(0.0120)	(0.0119)	-	-	-
Years of EC	-0.000978**	-0.000623	-0.000999**	-	-	-
in total	(0.000392)	(0.000392)	(0.000391)	-	-	-
Joint significance F-test	28.54***	17.91***	23.59***	-	-	-
	EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in an	-0.232**	-0.217**	-0.217**	-0.471**	-0.438**	-0.438**
impressionable year	(0.1000)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.184)	(0.187)	(0.187)
Years of EC	0.00839**	0.00890**	0.00890**	0.0205***	0.0219***	0.0219***
in total	(0.00386)	(0.00391)	(0.00391)	(0.00733)	(0.00744)	(0.00744)
Joint significance F-test	5.42***	5.23***	5.23***	7.88***	7.72***	7.72***
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; generalized trust (GGS) – 137,209; generalized trust (WVS) – 41,499; equality over freedom – 2,634. Joint significance F-test for EC in total and in an

impressionable year. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

Table 3. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes.

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
EC in an	0.0562***	0.0567***	0.0563***	0.0364***	0.0360***	0.0356***	0.154***	0.155***	0.154***	0.0857***	0.0845***	0.0804***
impressionable year	(0.00506)	(0.00506)	(0.00506)	(0.00806)	(0.00806)	(0.00807)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.0178)	(0.0178)	(0.0178)
Years of EC	0.000830***	0.00103***	0.00102***	-0.00201***	-0.00174***	-0.00173***	0.00101**	0.00148***	0.00144***	-0.00331***	-0.00245***	-0.00225***
in total	(0.000183)	(0.000183)	(0.000183)	(0.000284)	(0.000285)	(0.000285)	(0.000449)	(0.000449)	(0.000448)	(0.000632)	(0.000634)	(0.000634)
Joint significance F-test	152.86***	172.89***	170.06***	25.00***	18.80***	18.58***	161.87***	181.69***	176.93	15.34***	11.78***	10.53***
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in an	0.0478***	0.0479***	0.0500***	0.0353***	0.0350***	0.0331***	0.123***	0.124***	0.128***	0.0706***	0.0700***	0.0654***
impressionable year	(0.00730)	(0.00730)	(0.00730)	(0.00760)	(0.00760)	(0.00760)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0170)	(0.0170)	(0.0170)
Years of EC	-0.00235***	-0.00242***	-0.00252***	-0.00254***	-0.00250***	-0.00242***	-0.00736***	-0.00756***	-0.00779***	-0.00669***	-0.00661***	-0.00637***
in total	(0.000232)	(0.000233)	(0.000234)	(0.000264)	(0.000264)	(0.000264)	(0.000499)	(0.000500)	(0.000501)	(0.000612)	(0.000614)	(0.000614)
Joint significance F-test	51.60***	54.37***	58.87***	48.34***	46.57***	43.75***	112.82***	119.33***	125.99***	65.55***	63.36***	59.29
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in an	0.0293***	0.0301***	0.0284***	0.0154***	0.0151***	0.0162***	0.109***	0.109***	0.106***	0.0484**	0.0462**	0.0489**
impressionable year	(0.00600)	(0.00599)	(0.00599)	(0.00569)	(0.00569)	(0.00569)	(0.0140)	(0.0140)	(0.0139)	(0.0195)	(0.0194)	(0.0194)
Years of EC	0.000199	0.000554**	0.000590***	-0.00227***	-0.00200***	-0.00205***	0.000675	0.00148***	0.00147***	-0.00802***	-0.00643***	-0.00651***
in total	(0.000221)	(0.000221)	(0.000221)	(0.000214)	(0.000213)	(0.000213)	(0.000510)	(0.000511)	(0.000510)	(0.000731)	(0.000729)	(0.000728)
Joint significance F-test	22.62***	34.81***	33.30***	73.84***	55.22***	57.22***	63.37***	82.22***	77.74***	78.39***	48.20***	48.80***
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in an	0.0529***	0.0533***	0.0533***	0.0128**	0.0126**	0.0133**	0.123***	0.124***	0.125***	0.0215	0.0210	0.0245
impressionable year	(0.00719)	(0.00720)	(0.00720)	(0.00525)	(0.00525)	(0.00525)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0161)	(0.0161)	(0.0161)
Years of EC	-0.00282***	-0.00268***	-0.00271***	-0.00301***	-0.00282***	-0.00287***	-0.00657***	-0.00633***	-0.00645***	-0.00995***	-0.00876***	-0.00892***
in total	(0.000236)	(0.000237)	(0.000237)	(0.000217)	(0.000217)	(0.000216)	(0.000461)	(0.000462)	(0.000462)	(0.000648)	(0.000647)	(0.000647)
Joint significance F-test	72.07***	63.98***	65.66***	134..65***	116.50***	119.69***	102.90***	94.17***	97.99***	173.34***	133.00***	135.36***
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older

people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,860. Joint significance F-test for EC in total and in an impressionable year. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

Table 4. Estimation results for mechanisms in family, social trust and civic participation.

	Family			Trust and Civic Participation			Formal Institutions			Politics		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	FAMILY IMPORTANCE			PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY			CONFIDENCE IN PRESS			INTEREST IN POLITICS		
EC in an	0.0545***	0.0572***	0.0576***	0.0591	0.0309	-0.00637	-0.0438**	-0.0407**	-0.0414**	-0.0415*	-0.0318	-0.0142
impressionable year	(0.0112)	(0.0112)	(0.0112)	(0.0724)	(0.0721)	(0.0719)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0206)	(0.0231)	(0.0231)	(0.0226)
Years of EC	-0.00100***	-0.000686*	-0.000765**	0.0315***	0.0278***	0.0310***	-0.000464	-0.000252	-6.59e-05	0.000130	0.00108	-0.000868
in total	(0.000381)	(0.000380)	(0.000381)	(0.00224)	(0.00224)	(0.00223)	(0.000638)	(0.000639)	(0.000643)	(0.000750)	(0.000748)	(0.000733)
Joint significance F-test	12.12***	15.31***	15.00***	246.95***	183.22***	216.22***	8.55***	5.98***	4.98***	2.91*	1.16	3.06**
	NUMBER OF CHILDREN (GGS)			VOLUNTARY WORK [b]			CONFIDENCE IN LABOUR UNIONS			DISCUSSING POLITICS		
EC in an	0.0525***	0.0524***	0.0617***	-0.0395***	-0.0358***	-0.0325***	-0.0836***	-0.0795***	-0.0784***	0.0186	0.0219	0.0267
impressionable year	(0.0195)	(0.0194)	(0.0193)	(0.0120)	(0.0120)	(0.0119)	(0.0233)	(0.0233)	(0.0233)	(0.0256)	(0.0257)	(0.0255)
Years of EC	-0.00656***	-0.00731***	-0.00737***	-0.000978**	-0.000623	-0.000999**	0.00548***	0.00552***	0.00564***	-0.00174*	-0.00245***	-0.00183**
in total	(0.000683)	(0.000684)	(0.000679)	(0.000392)	(0.000392)	(0.000391)	(0.000741)	(0.000743)	(0.000747)	(0.000904)	(0.000912)	(0.000898)
Joint significance F-test	78.31**	100.42***	96.32***	-3.46***	-3.12***	-2.88***	32.52***	33.60***	35.25***	2.04	4.16**	2.14
	NUMBER OF CHILDREN (WVS)			PASSIVE MEMBERSHIP			CONFIDENCE IN POLICE			POLITICAL ACTIONS		
EC in an	0.160***	0.159***	0.142***	-0.0215*	-0.0196*	-0.0178	-0.0784***	-0.0740***	-0.0722***	-0.0133*	-0.0121*	-0.0114*
impressionable year	(0.0288)	(0.0288)	(0.0287)	(0.0115)	(0.0115)	(0.0115)	(0.0218)	(0.0219)	(0.0219)	(0.00685)	(0.00685)	(0.00684)
Years of EC	-0.00614***	-0.00630***	-0.00478***	-0.00411***	-0.00380***	-0.00411***	-0.00222***	-0.00191***	-0.00169**	0.00112***	0.00122***	0.00104***
in total	(0.000971)	(0.000975)	(0.000975)	(0.000374)	(0.000375)	(0.000374)	(0.000674)	(0.000675)	(0.000677)	(0.000223)	(0.000223)	(0.000225)
Joint significance F-test	20.90***	21.62***	14.08***	146.31***	123.14***	139.70***	52.40***	42.35***	36.54***	13.68***	16.67***	11.67***
	TRUST IN FAMILY [a]			ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP			CONFIDENCE IN JUSTICE SYSTEM			CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL PARTIES		
EC in an	0.264	0.201	0.201	-0.0150	-0.0126	-0.00889	-0.131***	-0.127***	-0.125***	-0.0525***	-0.0477**	-0.0459**
impressionable year	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.0102)	(0.0101)	(0.0100)	(0.0223)	(0.0223)	(0.0223)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)	(0.0204)
Years of EC	0.0171*	0.0131	0.0131	-0.00141***	-0.00098***	-0.00151***	0.000316	0.000665	0.000755	0.000951	0.00148**	0.00133**
in total	(0.00930)	(0.00953)	(0.00953)	(0.000344)	(0.000344)	(0.000341)	(0.000706)	(0.000708)	(0.000711)	(0.000642)	(0.000642)	(0.000645)
Joint significance F-test	2.38*	1.34	1.34	22.08***	11.57***	20.79***	35.71***	28.82***	27.03***	3.66**	3.07**	2.67*
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3) and WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: family importance – 36,629; number of children (GGS) – 215,001; number of children (WVS) – 43,170; trust in family – 2,765;public responsibility – 42,365; voluntary work – 1,961; passive membership – 40,467; active membership – 40,459; confidence in press – 42,174; labour unions – 37,787; police – 42,334; justice system – 41,411; interest in politics – 43,068; discussing politics – 36,538; political actions – 42,697; confidence in political parties – 40,993. Joint significance F-test for EC in total and in an impressionable year. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. [b] Only for Russia. *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

Table 5. Estimation results for mechanisms in religiosity and gender roles.

	Religiosity						Gender roles					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	GOD IMPORTANCE			CHURCH ANSWERS FAMILY PROBLEMS [c]			INDEPENDENCE (GGS)			MARRIAGE (GGS) [b]		
EC in an	-0.0807	-0.0883	-0.0975	0.0525*	0.0480	0.0462	0.0284	0.0278	0.0368**	0.00264	0.00315	0.00998
impressionable year	(0.0774)	(0.0774)	(0.0775)	(0.0298)	(0.0298)	(0.0298)	(0.0173)	(0.0173)	(0.0172)	(0.0725)	(0.0722)	(0.0709)
Years of EC	-0.0502***	-0.0513***	-0.0499***	-0.00363***	-0.00351***	-0.00331***	-0.00291***	-0.00389***	-0.00419***	-0.0116	-0.00926	-0.0116
in total	(0.00247)	(0.00248)	(0.00249)	(0.000940)	(0.000938)	(0.000944)	(0.000647)	(0.000647)	(0.000646)	(0.0147)	(0.0147)	(0.0145)
Joint significance F-test	478.64***	492.78***	464.77***	10.45***	10.02***	8.67***	11.67***	25.01***	25.01***	0.31	0.32	0.32
	RELIGION IMPORTANCE			CHURCH ANSWERS SOCIAL PROBLEMS [c]			WORKING WOMAN (GGS)			MOTHERHOOD (GGS)		
EC in an	-0.0232	-0.0246	-0.0285	0.0259	0.0195	0.0173	-0.139***	-0.140***	-0.161***	-0.198***	-0.197***	-0.200***
impressionable year	(0.0245)	(0.0245)	(0.0245)	(0.0304)	(0.0304)	(0.0304)	(0.0190)	(0.0190)	(0.0187)	(0.0165)	(0.0164)	(0.0164)
Years of EC	-0.0131***	-0.0133***	-0.0128***	-0.00228**	-0.00213**	-0.00194**	0.0148***	0.0162***	0.0172***	0.00619***	0.00702***	0.00726***
in total	(0.000793)	(0.000795)	(0.000800)	(0.000961)	(0.000959)	(0.000964)	(0.000707)	(0.000706)	(0.000700)	(0.000608)	(0.000608)	(0.000608)
Joint significance F-test	310.47***	317.28***	295.46***	4.90***	4.73***	3.87**	278.66***	377.95***	377.95***	78.31***	90.22***	90.22***
	SCIENCE IMPORTANCE			CHURCH ANSWERS SPIRITUAL NEEDS [c]			WIFE'S EARNINGS (GGS)			WIFE'S AGE (GGS)		
EC in an	-0.00453	-0.00140	-0.00235	0.00755	0.00809	0.00743	-0.119***	-0.118***	-0.125***	-0.196***	-0.195***	-0.200***
impressionable year	(0.0256)	(0.0256)	(0.0256)	(0.0247)	(0.0247)	(0.0248)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)
Years of EC	-0.00242***	-0.00226***	-0.00250***	-0.00194**	-0.00189**	-0.00167**	0.0109***	0.0113***	0.0116***	0.00742***	0.00782***	0.00801***
in total	(0.000827)	(0.000830)	(0.000833)	(0.000789)	(0.000789)	(0.000796)	(0.000537)	(0.000537)	(0.000537)	(0.000572)	(0.000572)	(0.000572)
Joint significance F-test	9.90***	7.99***	9.93***	5.80***	5.34***	4.04**	224.46***	255.74***	255.74***	103.26***	114.46***	114.46***
	FREQUENCY OF PRAYING			RELIGIOSITY (GGS)			WORKING MOTHER (GGS)			PARENTING AFTER DIVORCE (GGS)		
EC in an	-0.127	-0.132	-0.125	0.0774***	0.0744***	0.0659***	-0.123***	-0.123***	-0.128***	-0.163***	-0.164***	-0.170***
impressionable year	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.0233)	(0.0232)	(0.0232)	(0.0173)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0157)
Years of EC	-0.0209***	-0.0216***	-0.0211***	-0.0179***	-0.0169***	-0.0166***	0.0203***	0.0218***	0.0220***	0.0107***	0.0114***	0.0116***
in total	(0.00379)	(0.00380)	(0.00381)	(0.000835)	(0.000834)	(0.000834)	(0.000629)	(0.000626)	(0.000625)	(0.000557)	(0.000557)	(0.000557)
Joint significance F-test	55.58***	58.10***	54.55***	387.15***	340.01***	336.75***	679.59***	809.52***	809.52***	190.88***	226.04***	226.04***
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3) and WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Frequency of praying: several times a day, once a day, several times each week, only when attending religious services, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never. Dummies for churches giving answers to problems and spiritual needs. Importance of God measured on a scale from 1 to 10. Religiosity (GGS) measures frequency of attending religious ceremony on a following scale: never, less than once every 3 months, 1-3 times every 3 months, 1-3 times a month, at least once a week. Independence: financial independence from husband. Working woman: men have more right to job. Wife's earnings: women earning more than partner is not good for relationship; Working mother: pre-school child suffers when mother works. Marriage: women should try to marry and have a child. Motherhood: women without children is unfulfilled. Wife's age: in a couple it is better for the man to be older than the women. Parenting after divorce: child should stay with mother after divorce. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls:

highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: God importance – 39,916; religion importance – 42,506; science importance – 29,569; frequency of praying – 11,467; church answers family problems – 9720, social problems – 9,427, and spiritual needs – 9,994; religiosity – 163,516; independence – 172,214; working woman – 170,077; wife's earnings - 176,416; working mother – 173,729; marriage – 17,164; motherhood – 186,974; wife's age – 177,073; parenting after divorce – 177,676. Joint significance F-test for EC in total and in an impressionable year. [c] Only for Russia and Sweden. [b] Only for Russia. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

Figure 1a. Effects of younger and older impressionable years on the extensive margin of social attitudes.





Figure 1b. Effects of younger and older impressionable years on the intensive margin of social attitudes.



Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

Figure 2a. Effects of younger and older impressionable years on the extensive margin of general familiarism.





Figure 2b. Effects of younger and older impressionable years on the intensive margin of general familiarism.



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

Figure 3a. Effects of younger and older impressionable years on the extensive margin of particular familiarism.





Figure 3b. Effects of younger and older impressionable years on the intensive margin of particular familiarism.



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

July 9 2019

Appendix[28]

to

Did exposure to communism spur pro-social behaviour?

Joan Costa-Font[a] and Anna Nicińska[b]

[a]London School of Economics, CESIfo & IZA

[b]University of Warsaw

[28] Tables from sections C-K are being updated on the effects for the generalized trust, and will be available in the upcoming version of the Appendix.

A. Descriptive statistics

The Gender and Generation Survey (GGS) provides individual longitudinal data comparable across countries of adults living in 17 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Sweden) and Australia. The dataset contains unique data on attitudes for the population of adults uncensored with respect to age (except from Italy and Austria sampling respondents aged up to 65). Wave 1 was conducted, depending on the country, in years 2002-2013. Wave 2 followed in years 2006-2013 in 10 countries out of the initial 18. Wave 2 is unavailable for Belgium, Estonia, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Sweden. We remove Australia from the control group for the sake of cultural differences.

Table A1. Number of individuals by wave of data collection research samples.

	GGS		WVS			
Wave	1	2	2	3	4	5
Year	2002-15	2006-13	1989-93	1994-98	2005-09	2010-14
Austria	4,173	3,352	-	-	-	-
Belgium	6,270	-	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	12,739	9,271	-	1,072	1,001	-
Czech Rep.	9,606	3,041	924	1,147	-	-
Estonia	6,191	-	-	1,021	-	1,323
France	8,964	5,923	-	-	1,001	-
Georgia	9,807	8,149	-	2,008	1,500	1,202
Germany	8,707	2,941	-	2,026	2,064	1,825
East	1,678	548	-	1,009	1,076	944
West	6,604	2,393	-	1,017	988	881
Hungary	13,540	10,634	-	650	1,007	-
Italy	9,925	6,283	-	-	1,012	-
Lithuania	9,560	2,171	-	1,009	-	-
Netherlands	7,694	5,826	-	-	1,050	1,686
Poland	19,488	-	938	1,153	-	951
Romania	11,971	-	-	1,239	1,776	1,497
Russia	10,146	7,062	1,961	2,040	2,033	2,370
Sweden	8,522	-	-	1,009	1,003	1,073
Total	156,673	64,653	3,823	14,374	14,447	11,910

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), and WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18).

Table A2. Percentage of individuals by country of residence and birth cohort in research samples.

	GGS		WVS			
Wave	1	2	2	3	4	5
Birth cohort						
1900-05	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.00
1905-10	0.00	0.00	0.45	0.18	0.01	0.00
1910-15	0.00	0.00	1.59	0.72	0.05	0.00
1915-20	1.06	0.08	2.25	1.21	0.24	0.05
1920-25	4.59	3.30	3.95	3.69	1.25	0.26
1925-30	8.01	7.61	7.90	5.94	2.51	1.39
1930-35	8.93	9.00	8.21	6.53	4.49	3.15
1935-40	9.64	10.28	8.08	7.84	7.02	5.48
1940-45	9.93	11.08	6.45	7.46	7.32	6.43
1945-50	9.64	10.68	10.05	8.20	7.88	7.89
1950-55	9.18	9.48	13.28	10.21	8.70	9.20
1955-60	9.20	9.04	12.31	10.15	9.28	8.82
1960-65	8.45	8.42	10.16	10.06	9.12	8.99
1965-70	7.02	7.47	10.09	9.64	9.42	8.59
1970-75	6.54	6.22	5.03	9.69	8.67	8.03
1975-80	4.86	4.63	0.00	7.94	8.36	7.94
1980-85	2.87	2.58	0.00	0.54	8.05	7.73
1985-90	0.11	0.11	0.00	0.00	6.87	8.71
1990-95	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.78	7.32
Country						
Austria	2.99	5.78	-	-	-	-
Belgium	4.28	0.00	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	7.69	13.80	0.00	7.46	6.93	0.00
Czech Republic	5.98	0.00	24.17	7.98	0.00	0.00
Estonia	4.70	0.00	0.00	7.10	0.00	11.92
France	6.03	9.65	0.00	0.00	6.93	0.00
Georgia	5.98	12.24	0.00	13.97	10.38	9.95
Germany	5.99	4.76	0.00	14.09	14.29	15.32
East	1.06	0.86	0.00	7.02	5.88	8,29
West	4.93	3.90	0.00	7.05	6.41	9,03
Hungary	8.10	15.70	0.00	4.52	6.97	0.00
Italy	5.72	9.56	0.00	0.00	7.00	0.00
Lithuania	6.00	3.38	0.00	7.02	0.00	0.00
Netherlands	4.88	8.99	0.00	0.00	7.27	14.16
Poland	11.95	0.00	24.54	8.02	6.92	7.98
Romania	7.17	0.00	0.00	8.62	12.29	12.57
Russia	6.73	11.49	51.29	14.19	14.07	19.90
Sweden	5.79	0.00	0.00	7.02	6.94	9.01
Number of individuals	156,673	64,653	3,823	14,374	14,447	11,910

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), and WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Austria and Belgium were not included in WVS.

Table A3. Balance table and regression of exposure to communism results.

	East				West				Regression	
	Mean	Std Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std Dev.	Min	Max	Coef.	Std Err.
	GGS									
Age	47.02	(16.65)	17	85	46.00	(15.39)	17	89	0.0023***	(0.0001)
Household size	3.30	(2.18)	1	16	2.71	(1.31)	1	14	0.0363***	(0.0007)
Number of children	1.75	(1.80)	0	19	1.44	(1.36)	0	12	-0.0108***	(0.0008)
Female	0.56	(0.50)	0	1	0.55	(0.50)	0	1	0.0086***	(0.0018)
Education										
ISCED 0	0.01	(0.09)	0	1	0.01	(0.08)	0	1	reference	
ISCED 1	0.07	(0.26)	0	1	0.06	(0.24)	0	1	-0.0331***	(0.0110)
ISCED 2	0.14	(0.35)	0	1	0.16	(0.36)	0	1	-0.1020***	(0.0107)
ISCED 3	0.42	(0.49)	0	1	0.34	(0.47)	0	1	-0.0474***	(0.0106)
ISCED 4	0.13	(0.33)	0	1	0.03	(0.18)	0	1	0.1045***	(0.0109)
ISCED 5	0.21	(0.40)	0	1	0.17	(0.38)	0	1	-0.0742***	(0.0107)
ISCED 6	0.02	(0.15)	0	1	0.01	(0.10)	0	1	0.0310**	(0.0124)
unknown	0.01	(0.08)	0	1	0.22	(0.42)	0	1	-0.6946***	(0.0109)
Number of observations	145,602				75,724				215,043	
	WVS									
Age	45.47	(17.11)	16	97	47.49	(17.62)	15	94	-0.0011***	(0.0001)
Household size	3.08	(1.14)	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Number of children	1.53	(1.21)	0	8	1.47	(1.32)	0	8	0.0142***	(0.0018)
Female	0.54	(0.50)	0	1	0.52	(0.50)	0	1	0.0147***	(0.0040)
Education										
incomplete primary	0.04	(0.19)	0	1	0.04	(0.19)	0	1	reference	
primary	0.09	(0.29)	0	1	0.18	(0.38)	0	1	-0.1411***	(0.0115)
incomplete secondary: technical	0.06	(0.25)	0	1	0.09	(0.29)	0	1	-0.0830***	(0.0125)
complete secondary: technical	0.22	(0.42)	0	1	0.16	(0.36)	0	1	0.0490***	(0.0110)
incomplete secondary: general	0.05	(0.22)	0	1	0.10	(0.30)	0	1	-0.1335***	(0.0127)
complete secondary: general	0.17	(0.37)	0	1	0.12	(0.33)	0	1	0.0348***	(0.0114)
incomplete higher	0.04	(0.19)	0	1	0.10	(0.30)	0	1	-0.2234***	(0.0133)
complete higher	0.16	(0.36)	0	1	0.19	(0.39)	0	1	-0.0481***	(0.0113)
unknown	0.16	(0.36)	0	1	0.01	(0.11)	0	1	0.1780***	(0.0125)
Number of observations	34,647				11,123				43,350	

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), and WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Household size not observed in WVS for the group of Western European countries, and number of children observed up to 8th child. All variables statistically significantly different between East and West in t-test with $p<0.01$ except for ISCED 0 in WVS.

Table A4. Strong and weak caregiving and monetary familiarisms in Eastern and Western Europe.

	East				West			
	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max
	Caregiving familiarism							
strong	2.85	(1.08)	0	4	1.93	(1.21)	0	4
weak	3.70	(0.59)	0	4	3.06	(1.02)	0	4
Number of observations	113,273				34,807			
	Monetary familiarism							
strong	1.65	(0.97)	0	4	1.37	(1.11)	0	4
weak	2.77	(1.01)	0	4	2.41	(1.14)	0	4
Number of observations	113,145				29,256			

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Caregiving strong (weak) familiarism is a non-weighted sum of responses indicating strong (weak) preference for family care in general and particular upwards and downwards intergenerational non-financial support. Analogously, monetary strong (weak) familiarism is a non-weighted sum of responses indicating strong (weak) preference for family in general and particular upwards and downwards intergenerational financial support. Differences between Eastern and Western Europe significant at 0.01 for all the measures.

Table A5. Familiarism and social attitudes in Eastern and Western Europe.

	East				West			
	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max
	Exposure to communism							
GGS								
impressionable years	5.24	(3.55)	0	8	0.00	(0.00)	0	0
total years	29.21	(14.27)	0	59	0.00	(0.00)	0	0
Number of observations	145,602				75,724			
WVS	5.18	(3.59)	0	8	0.00	(0.00)	0	0
impressionable years	5.31	(3.87)	0	8	0.00	(0.00)	0	0
total years	29.22	(17.39)	0	59	0.00	(0.00)	0	0
Number of observations	35,298				10,720			
	Particular familiarism (GGS)							
upwards care	3.62	(1.12)	1	5	2.94	(1.14)	1	5
Number of observations	113,291				34,967			
downwards care	4.16	(0.95)	1	5	3.60	(1.18)	1	5
Number of observations	113,228				46,127			
upwards money	2.38	(1.10)	1	5	2.12	(1.19)	1	5
Number of observations	133,244				29,462			
downwards money	2.27	(1.07)	1	5	2.20	(1.15)	1	5
Number of observations	113,214				36,685			
	General familiarism (GGS)							
upwards care	4.12	(0.73)	1	5	3.48	(1.05)	1	5
Number of observations	113,293				49,078			
downwards care	3.74	(0.93)	1	5	3.50	(1.14)	1	5
Number of observations	130,338				42,041			
upwards money	3.86	(0.81)	1	5	3.33	(1.11)	1	5
Number of observations	133,129				36,494			
downwards money	3.70	(0.87)	1	5	3.47	(1.03)	1	5
Number of observations	130,331					49,104		
	Social attitudes (WVS)							
income equality	5.24	(3.05)	1	10	5.63	(2.47)	1	10
Number of observations	32,499				10,490			
equality over freedom [a]	1.88	(0.90)	1	3	-	-	-	-
Number of observations	3,506				-			
left wing	5.56	(2.18)	1	10	5.75	(2.08)	1	10
Number of observations	23,264				9,622			

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on and WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. Differences between Eastern and Western Europe significant at 0.01 for all the measures.

Table A6. Trust, civic participation, religiosity, and gender roles in Eastern and Western Europe.

	East				West			
	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max
				Trust				
generalized trust (GGS)	0.38	(0.48)	0	1	0.63	(0.48)	0	1
generalized trust (WVS)	0.25	(0.43)	0	1	0.50	(0.50)	0	1
confidence in press	2.32	(0.80)	1	4	2.22	(0.69)	1	4
confidence in political parties	1.91	(0.77)	1	4	2.06	(0.67)	1	4
confidence in police	2.34	(0.86)	1	4	2.84	(0.69)	1	4
confidence in labour unions	2.16	(0.86)	1	4	2.33	(0.75)	1	4
confidence in justice system	2.34	(0.87)	1	4	2.64	(0.77)	1	4
				Civic participation				
interest in politics	2.38	(0.92)	1	4	2.60	(0.92)	1	4
discussing politics	2.02	(0.65)	1	3	1.92	(0.60)	1	3
political actions	0.06	(0.23)	0	1	0.20	(0.40)	0	1
active membership	0.14	(0.35)	0	1	0.50	(0.50)	0	1
passive membership	0.23	(0.42)	0	1	0.59	(0.49)	0	1
politics' importance	2.14	(0.91)	1	4	2.46	(0.86)	1	4
				Religiosity				
church answers social problems	0.40	(0.49)	0	1	0.33	(0.47)	0	1
church answers family problems	0.58	(0.49)	0	1	0.36	(0.48)	0	1
frequency of praying	4.19	(2.71)	1	8	2.97	(2.47)	1	8
importance of religion	2.64	(1.11)	1	4	2.21	(1.01)	1	4
importance of God	6.29	(3.41)	1	10	4.89	(3.23)	1	10
religiosity (GGS)	1.69	(1.49)	0	4	1.41	(1.47)	0	4
				Gender roles				
financial independence (GGS)	2.63	(1.09)	1	5	2.17	(1.20)	1	5
working women (GGS)	3.08	(1.23)	1	5	3.85	(1.22)	1	5
working mothers (GGS)	2.39	(1.06)	1	5	3.05	(1.27)	1	5
marriage (GGS)	2.35	(0.92)	1	5	-	-	-	-
motherhood (GGS)	2.04	(1.00)	1	5	3.17	(1.34)	1	5
parenting after divorce (GGS)	2.36	(0.96)	1	5	3.14	(1.06)	1	5
Number of observations in GGS	105,512				31,739			
Number of observations in WVS	34,974				10,579			

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), and WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Measures from WVS, if not stated otherwise. Differences between Eastern and Western Europe significant at 0.01 for all the comparable measures.

Trust. Both data sources include a standard measure of generalized trust using the same question 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?' with the answer 'most people can be trusted' opposed to 'need to be very careful'. The WVS survey asked how much confidence respondents have in a number of public institutions such as press, political parties, police, labour unions or justice system. On a scale from 1 to 4, the confidence in most of the mentioned institutions was significantly lower in the post-communist countries than in the control group.

Civic participation. Another group of social behaviours outside family relevant to our study includes 'interest in politics,' 'discussing political matters with friends,' willingness to engage in a number of political actions, active and passive membership in organization. 'Interest in politics' is measured on 4-point and 'discussing political matters with friends' on 3-point scale. Dummies for willingness to engage are generated using responses to questions on undertaking number of political actions. Dummies for active and passive membership use data on membership in up to 10 civil society organizations, excluding religious ones.


Religiosity. We refer to WVS questions concerned with the role of religion, as well as GGS questions on the frequency of attendance to religious ceremonies. We used responses to question whether 'your church is giving, in your country, adequate answers' to the 'moral problems and

needs of the individual', 'the problems of family life', 'social problems facing our country today' (dummies). Additionally, the importance of God in respondents' lives and frequency of praying to God 'outside of religious services' was measured in WVS on 10- and 8-point scale, respectively. Religiosity in GGS: 0 – never, 1 – less than once every 3 months, 2 – one to three times every three months, 3 – one to three times every month, 4 – at least once a week.

Gender roles. We use responses to questions whether individuals agree or disagree, measured on 5-point scale, with statements concerning traditional gender roles. The higher the score, the less traditional are the views on whether women should be financially independent from their husbands (independence); whether men have more right to job than women, if jobs are scarce (Working woman); whether pre-school children suffer when their mothers work (working mother); whether women should try to marry and have a child (marriage); whether women without children is fulfilled (motherhood); and whether children should stay with mother rather than father after divorce (parenting after divorce).


B. Distribution of familiaristic and political attitudes

Figure B1. Distribution of responses to questions on general familiarism in the Eastern and Western Europe.




Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family".

Figure B2. Distribution of responses to questions on particular familiarism in the Eastern and Western Europe.



Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties".

Figure B3. Distribution of responses to questions on social attitudes in the Eastern and Western Europe.



Source: Authors' own tabulation based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes:Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important".

C. Intensive margin of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years

The assumption of the baseline analysis is that the exposure in impressionable period is constant, regardless of particular age or exposure duration. The linear effects of each impressionable year on top and beyond total years of EC, and of the share of EC in impressionable years in total years of EC can be found in the Tables C3-C4 and C5-C6, respectively.

It seems important to distinguish between the exposure among the earlier and later impressionable years, because one may expect that in older ages due to participation at the labour market or continuation of education, interactions with formal and public institutions become more intensive. Accordingly, the effects sizes and signs among younger and older impressionable years are consistent.

Consistent with our baseline results, EC during impressionable years yields opposite and stronger effects than EC in general. This result confirms that impressionable years' exposure is especially relevant in the period of preferences formation. The social environment to which individuals are exposed during their young adulthood, facilitates being in the opposition to the status quo and prevailing values. We find that EC mostly in older impressionable years (ages 22-25) seems to exhibit a negative effect on social attitudes in case of preferences for income equality and equality over freedom. Similarly, for majority of familiaristic values, EC in older impressionable years had stronger impact than in younger ages (18-21). These results suggest familiaristic attitudes are shaped by observation of family behaviour already in younger ages whereas social and political maturity in older impressionable years makes the experiences from this period particularly important for formation of preferences concerned with social behaviour outside family.

Table C1. Effects of EC in younger and older impressionable years on social attitudes.

	Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in younger [18-21]	-0.00779	-0.0110	-0.0163	-0.0527	-0.0748	-0.111
impressionable years	(0.0134)	(0.0133)	(0.0133)	(0.0773)	(0.0768)	(0.0766)
EC in older [22-25]	-0.0240	-0.0297**	-0.0353**	-0.175**	-0.211**	-0.249***
impressionable years	(0.0150)	(0.0149)	(0.0149)	(0.0860)	(0.0854)	(0.0854)
Years of EC	0.00418***	0.00354***	0.00404***	0.0273***	0.0237***	0.0268***
in total	(0.000448)	(0.000447)	(0.000448)	(0.00253)	(0.00252)	(0.00252)
	LEFT WING					
EC in younger [18-21]	-0.0229	-0.0266	-0.0284*	-0.133*	-0.144**	-0.141**
impressionable years	(0.0167)	(0.0166)	(0.0166)	(0.0715)	(0.0713)	(0.0713)
EC in older [22-25]	-0.0386**	-0.0459**	-0.0478***	-0.190**	-0.214***	-0.208***
impressionable years	(0.0182)	(0.0182)	(0.0182)	(0.0803)	(0.0800)	(0.0802)
Years of EC	0.00448***	0.00406***	0.00416***	0.0208***	0.0190***	0.0188***
in total	(0.000538)	(0.000538)	(0.000540)	(0.00237)	(0.00237)	(0.00237)
	EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in younger [18-21]	-0.186*	-0.169	-0.169	-0.244*	-0.224	-0.224
impressionable years	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.142)
EC in older [22-25]	-0.263**	-0.248**	-0.248**	-0.347***	-0.332**	-0.332**
impressionable years	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.134)	(0.136)	(0.136)
Years of EC	0.00840**	0.00889**	0.00889**	0.0261**	0.0242**	0.0242**
in total	(0.00386)	(0.00390)	(0.00390)	(0.0120)	(0.0120)	(0.0120)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: EC – exposure to communism. Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 1,715. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

Table C2. Effects of EC in younger and older impressionable years on familiaristic attitudes.

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
EC in younger [18-21]	0.0266***	0.0263***	0.0262***	0.0473***	0.0476***	0.0475***	0.0565***	0.0558***	0.0536***	0.116***	0.116***	0.115***
impressionable years	(0.00764)	(0.00763)	(0.00764)	(0.00521)	(0.00521)	(0.00521)	(0.0167)	(0.0167)	(0.0167)	(0.0111)	(0.0111)	(0.0111)
EC in older [22-25]	0.0380***	0.0385***	0.0388***	0.0749***	0.0758***	0.0752***	0.0979***	0.0997***	0.0978***	0.183***	0.185***	0.183***
impressionable years	(0.00884)	(0.00883)	(0.00885)	(0.00625)	(0.00625)	(0.00626)	(0.0195)	(0.0195)	(0.0195)	(0.0136)	(0.0136)	(0.0136)
Years of EC	-0.00220***	-0.00191***	-0.00193***	0.000336*	0.000521***	0.000527***	-0.00393***	-0.00307***	-0.00298***	-5.95e-05	0.000347	0.000384
in total	(0.000295)	(0.000295)	(0.000295)	(0.000202)	(0.000202)	(0.000202)	(0.000661)	(0.000661)	(0.000661)	(0.000447)	(0.000447)	(0.000447)
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in younger [18-21]	0.0305***	0.0302***	0.0290***	0.0272***	0.0272***	0.0287***	0.0578***	0.0571***	0.0540***	0.0749***	0.0749***	0.0780***
impressionable years	(0.00692)	(0.00692)	(0.00692)	(0.00684)	(0.00684)	(0.00684)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)
EC in older [22-25]	0.0253***	0.0251***	0.0249***	0.0406***	0.0406***	0.0434***	0.0511***	0.0507***	0.0500***	0.111***	0.110***	0.116***
impressionable years	(0.00806)	(0.00806)	(0.00807)	(0.00792)	(0.00792)	(0.00793)	(0.0180)	(0.0180)	(0.0180)	(0.0164)	(0.0164)	(0.0164)
Years of EC	-0.00223***	-0.00217***	-0.00215***	-0.00236***	-0.00240***	-0.00251***	-0.00593***	-0.00577***	-0.00570***	-0.00733***	-0.00744***	-0.00766***
in total	(0.000266)	(0.000266)	(0.000266)	(0.000243)	(0.000243)	(0.000243)	(0.000608)	(0.000609)	(0.000609)	(0.000510)	(0.000511)	(0.000511)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in younger [18-21]	0.0102**	0.0102**	0.0112**	0.0213***	0.0217***	0.0206***	0.0316*	0.0304*	0.0334*	0.0681***	0.0689***	0.0664***
impressionable years	(0.00514)	(0.00514)	(0.00514)	(0.00621)	(0.00620)	(0.00619)	(0.0178)	(0.0177)	(0.0177)	(0.0119)	(0.0119)	(0.0119)
EC in older [22-25]	0.00843	0.00909	0.0111*	0.0485***	0.0501***	0.0472***	0.0417**	0.0445**	0.0512**	0.138***	0.141***	0.134***
impressionable years	(0.00605)	(0.00605)	(0.00606)	(0.00746)	(0.00745)	(0.00746)	(0.0210)	(0.0210)	(0.0210)	(0.0148)	(0.0148)	(0.0148)
Years of EC	-0.00197***	-0.00173***	-0.00181***	-0.000294	4.02e-05	0.000108	-0.00725***	-0.00589***	-0.00611***	-7.15e-05	0.000618	0.000750
in total	(0.000211)	(0.000211)	(0.000211)	(0.000246)	(0.000246)	(0.000246)	(0.000733)	(0.000730)	(0.000730)	(0.000499)	(0.000499)	(0.000498)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in younger [18-21]	0.00762*	0.00754	0.00819*	0.0255***	0.0259***	0.0261***	0.0181	0.0165	0.0192	0.0684***	0.0691***	0.0701***
impressionable years	(0.00460)	(0.00460)	(0.00460)	(0.00679)	(0.00680)	(0.00680)	(0.0169)	(0.0168)	(0.0168)	(0.0128)	(0.0128)	(0.0128)
EC in older [22-25]	0.0107*	0.0112**	0.0122**	0.0404***	0.0413***	0.0418***	0.0289	0.0308	0.0360*	0.0960***	0.0975***	0.0998***
impressionable years	(0.00555)	(0.00554)	(0.00556)	(0.00784)	(0.00785)	(0.00786)	(0.0201)	(0.0200)	(0.0201)	(0.0150)	(0.0150)	(0.0150)
Years of EC	-0.00280***	-0.00262***	-0.00267***	-0.00268***	-0.00252***	-0.00255***	-0.0101***	-0.00902***	-0.00922***	-0.00610***	-0.00583***	-0.00593***
in total	(0.000209)	(0.000209)	(0.000209)	(0.000246)	(0.000247)	(0.000247)	(0.000720)	(0.000718)	(0.000718)	(0.000473)	(0.000474)	(0.000474)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: EC – exposure to communism. Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should

take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

Table C3. Linear effects of EC in impressionable years and in total on social attitudes.

	Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	INCOME EQUALITY					
Years of EC in impressionable years	-0.00235	-0.00314	-0.00353*	-0.0215*	-0.0263**	-0.0291**
	(0.00200)	(0.00198)	(0.00198)	(0.0114)	(0.0113)	(0.0113)
Years of EC in total	0.00405***	0.00343***	0.00387***	0.0272***	0.0237***	0.0264***
	(0.000465)	(0.000464)	(0.000464)	(0.00262)	(0.00261)	(0.00261)
Lincom t-test	1.03	0.18	0.21	0.61	-0.28	-0.30
	LEFT WING					
Years of EC in impressionable years	-0.00600**	-0.00697***	-0.00714***	-0.0318***	-0.0353***	-0.0347***
	(0.00240)	(0.00240)	(0.00240)	(0.0108)	(0.0107)	(0.0108)
Years of EC in total	0.00470***	0.00429***	0.00438***	0.0223***	0.0206***	0.0204***
	(0.000554)	(0.000554)	(0.000555)	(0.00246)	(0.00246)	(0.00247)
Lincom t-test	-0.66	-1.37	-1.41	-1.08	-1.67*	-1.64
	EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
Years of EC in impressionable years	-0.00235	-0.00314	-0.00353*	-0.0384**	-0.0370**	-0.0370**
	(0.00200)	(0.00198)	(0.00198)	(0.0187)	(0.0186)	(0.0186)
Years of EC in total	0.00405***	0.00343***	0.00387***	0.0186**	0.0202**	0.0202**
	(0.000465)	(0.000464)	(0.000464)	(0.00797)	(0.00808)	(0.00808)
Lincom t-test	-0.97	-0.89	-0.89	-0.96	-0.81	-0.81
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: EC – exposure to communism.Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 1,715. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. Lincom t-test for the sum of coefficients on an impressionable year and any year under communism equal to 0. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0.10.

Table C4. Linear effects of EC in impressionable years and in total on familiaristic attitudes.

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
Years of EC in impressionable years	0.00987***	0.00997***	0.00993***	0.00652***	0.00654***	0.00652***	0.0265***	0.0267***	0.0265***	0.0160***	0.0161***	0.0155***
	(0.00109)	(0.00109)	(0.00109)	(0.00138)	(0.00138)	(0.00138)	(0.00236)	(0.00236)	(0.00236)	(0.00309)	(0.00309)	(0.00310)
Years of EC in total	0.000367	0.000576**	0.000567**	-0.00250***	-0.00224***	-0.00224***	-0.000718	-0.000274	-0.000286	-0.00461***	-0.00379***	-0.00356***
	(0.000260)	(0.000260)	(0.000260)	(0.000354)	(0.000354)	(0.000354)	(0.000567)	(0.000567)	(0.000567)	(0.000795)	(0.000796)	(0.000797)
Lincom t-test	11.44***	11.79***	11.71***	3.59***	3.84***	3.81***	13.33***	13.67***	13.52***	4.57***	4.94***	4.78***
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
Years of EC in impressionable years	0.00796***	0.00796***	0.00840***	0.00297**	0.00296**	0.00278**	0.0210***	0.0209***	0.0219***	0.00573*	0.00571*	0.00531*
	(0.00124)	(0.00124)	(0.00124)	(0.00131)	(0.00131)	(0.00131)	(0.00269)	(0.00269)	(0.00269)	(0.00301)	(0.00301)	(0.00301)
Years of EC in total	-0.00283***	-0.00289***	-0.00303***	-0.00231***	-0.00228***	-0.00220***	-0.00867***	-0.00886***	-0.00916***	-0.00619***	-0.00611***	-0.00590***
	(0.000290)	(0.000291)	(0.000292)	(0.000327)	(0.000327)	(0.000327)	(0.000629)	(0.000629)	(0.000630)	(0.000759)	(0.000760)	(0.000761)
Lincom t-test	5.07***	5.00***	5.29***	0.62	0.64	0.54	5.57***	5.47***	5.74***	-0.18	-0.16	-0.24
	UPWARDS MONEY											
Years of EC in impressionable years	0.00887***	0.00906***	0.00865***	0.00183*	0.00187*	0.00214**	0.0251***	0.0255***	0.0246***	0.00642*	0.00661*	0.00737**
	(0.00126)	(0.00126)	(0.00126)	(0.00102)	(0.00102)	(0.00102)	(0.00267)	(0.00266)	(0.00267)	(0.00352)	(0.00351)	(0.00352)
Years of EC in total	-0.00084***	-0.000489	-0.000425	-0.00228***	-0.00202***	-0.00210***	-0.00182***	-0.00107*	-0.000981	-0.00820***	-0.00670***	-0.00686***
	(0.000312)	(0.000312)	(0.000312)	(0.000267)	(0.000267)	(0.000267)	(0.000647)	(0.000646)	(0.000645)	(0.000917)	(0.000913)	(0.000913)
Lincom t-test	7.75***	8.29***	7.94***	-0.55	-0.18	0.05	10.65***	11.18***	10.79***	-0.62	-0.03	0.18
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
Years of EC in impressionable years	0.00861***	0.00868***	0.00871***	0.00231**	0.00236**	0.00250**	0.0180***	0.0182***	0.0185***	0.00652*	0.00668**	0.00730**
	(0.00123)	(0.00123)	(0.00123)	(0.000970)	(0.000970)	(0.000972)	(0.00245)	(0.00245)	(0.00245)	(0.00336)	(0.00335)	(0.00336)
Years of EC in total	-0.00331***	-0.00318***	-0.00322***	-0.00318***	-0.00300***	-0.00306***	-0.00731***	-0.00707***	-0.00723***	-0.0115***	-0.0103***	-0.0105***
	(0.000296)	(0.000297)	(0.000297)	(0.000267)	(0.000267)	(0.000266)	(0.000583)	(0.000584)	(0.000584)	(0.000892)	(0.000890)	(0.000889)
Lincom t-test	5.31***	5.51***	5.49***	-1.12	-0.82	-0.72	5.39***	5.56***	5.65***	-1.84	-1.33	-1.17
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: EC – exposure to communism. Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is

mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

Table C5. Effects of total years of EC and the share of impressionable years in total EC on social attitudes.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table C6. Effects of total years of EC and the share of impressionable years in total EC on familiaristic attitudes.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

D. Heterogeneity analysis

Table D1. Gender heterogeneity of exposure to communism (EC) effects for social attitudes.

		Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in impressinable year	- women	-0.00954	-0.00547	0.000926	-0.0137	0.0112	0.0537
		(0.0154)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0895)	(0.0890)	(0.0888)
	-men	-0.0423***	-0.0468***	-0.0510***	-0.231**	-0.262***	-0.292***
		(0.0163)	(0.0162)	(0.0162)	(0.0943)	(0.0935)	(0.0933)
Years of EC in total	- women	0.00335***	0.00262***	0.00310***	0.0236***	0.0193***	0.0223***
		(0.000464)	(0.000464)	(0.000464)	(0.00265)	(0.00264)	(0.00263)
	- men	0.00466***	0.00408***	0.00458***	0.0279***	0.0246***	0.0277***
		(0.000493)	(0.000490)	(0.000490)	(0.00279)	(0.00278)	(0.00277)
		LEFT WING					
EC in impressinable year	- women	0.0246	0.0303	0.0319*	0.131	0.149*	0.143*
		(0.0193)	(0.0193)	(0.0193)	(0.0816)	(0.0813)	(0.0813)
	-men	-0.0331*	-0.0374*	-0.0394**	-0.179**	-0.193**	-0.191**
		(0.0200)	(0.0199)	(0.0200)	(0.0885)	(0.0883)	(0.0884)
Years of EC in total	- women	0.00382***	0.00332***	0.00341***	0.0167***	0.0146***	0.0143***
		(0.000572)	(0.000573)	(0.000575)	(0.00246)	(0.00246)	(0.00247)
	- men	0.00468***	0.00423***	0.00434***	0.0232***	0.0214***	0.0213***
		(0.000588)	(0.000588)	(0.000589)	(0.00262)	(0.00262)	(0.00263)
		EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in impressinable year	- women	0.279**	0.258**	0.258**	0.538**	0.489**	0.489**
		(0.120)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.216)	(0.222)	(0.222)
	-men	-0.163	-0.157	-0.157	-0.382	-0.376	-0.376
		(0.160)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.301)	(0.302)	(0.302)
Years of EC in total	- women	0.00779**	0.00825**	0.00825**	0.0189**	0.0203***	0.0203***
		(0.00392)	(0.00397)	(0.00397)	(0.00746)	(0.00755)	(0.00755)
	- men	0.00949**	0.0100**	0.0100**	0.0231***	0.0246***	0.0246***
		(0.00399)	(0.00404)	(0.00404)	(0.00757)	(0.00768)	(0.00768)
Demographic controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls		no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls		no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes:. Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 1,715. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

Table D2. Gender heterogeneity exposure to communism (EC) effects for familiaristic attitudes.

		Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
		GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		UPWARDS CARE											
EC in IY	-women	0.0482***	0.0494***	0.0499***	0.0438***	0.0447***	0.0428***	0.111***	0.114***	0.114***	0.113***	0.116***	0.112***
		(0.0101)	(0.0100)	(0.00934)	(0.00692)	(0.00674)	(0.00668)	(0.0213)	(0.0210)	(0.0204)	(0.0208)	(0.0204)	(0.0209)
	-men	0.0402***	0.0414***	0.0389***	0.0265*	0.0277**	0.0251*	0.103***	0.106***	0.0995***	0.0602**	0.0639**	0.0615**
		(0.0129)	(0.0128)	(0.0122)	(0.0118)	(0.0116)	(0.0114)	(0.0267)	(0.0263)	(0.0244)	(0.0207)	(0.0205)	(0.0210)
Years of EC in total	- women	0.00198**	0.00219**	0.00147**	-0.00200***	-0.00174***	-0.00175***	0.00372*	0.00417**	0.00273	-0.00378**	-0.00297**	-0.00209
		(0.000778)	(0.000746)	(0.000629)	(0.000489)	(0.000499)	(0.000534)	(0.00174)	(0.00170)	(0.00153)	(0.00118)	(0.00117)	(0.00116)
	- men	0.000496	0.000689	0.00147**	-0.00194**	-0.00173**	-0.00162**	0.000252	0.000669	0.00225	-0.00246	-0.00181	-0.00233
		(0.000596)	(0.000564)	(0.000649)	(0.000663)	(0.000655)	(0.000641)	(0.00151)	(0.00145)	(0.00159)	(0.00144)	(0.00137)	(0.00140)
		DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in IY	-women	0.0108	0.0107	0.0102	0.0396***	0.0394***	0.0353***	0.0144	0.0137	0.0126	0.0848***	0.0844***	0.0754**
		(0.0152)	(0.0150)	(0.0140)	(0.00956)	(0.00941)	(0.0101)	(0.0371)	(0.0367)	(0.0353)	(0.0246)	(0.0240)	(0.0257)
	-men	0.00414	0.00402	-0.000519	0.0501***	0.0502***	0.0426***	0.0291	0.0285	0.0192	0.107**	0.107***	0.0905**
		(0.0127)	(0.0127)	(0.0117)	(0.0147)	(0.0144)	(0.0120)	(0.0252)	(0.0252)	(0.0235)	(0.0352)	(0.0344)	(0.0296)
Years of EC in total	- women	-0.000476	-0.000521	-0.00118	-0.00174***	-0.00169***	-0.00239***	-0.00253	-0.00267	-0.00402**	-0.00512***	-0.00501***	-0.00636***
		(0.000649)	(0.000671)	(0.000657)	(0.000511)	(0.000544)	(0.000554)	(0.00148)	(0.00151)	(0.00150)	(0.00111)	(0.00119)	(0.00109)
	- men	-0.00178**	-0.00182**	-0.00112*	-0.00370***	-0.00368***	-0.00263***	-0.00610***	-0.00624***	-0.00483***	-0.00925***	-0.00920***	-0.00700***
		(0.000553)	(0.000572)	(0.000570)	(0.000482)	(0.000525)	(0.000476)	(0.00114)	(0.00118)	(0.00119)	(0.000896)	(0.000983)	(0.000784)
		UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY	-women	0.0282***	0.0303***	0.0308***	0.0267**	0.0278***	0.0276***	0.0740***	0.0782***	0.0789***	0.0926**	0.0984**	0.0973**
		(0.00685)	(0.00664)	(0.00688)	(0.00835)	(0.00842)	(0.00830)	(0.0191)	(0.0188)	(0.0205)	(0.0342)	(0.0336)	(0.0336)
	-men	0.0259	0.0279	0.0271*	0.00375	0.00489	0.00353	0.0763*	0.0804*	0.0786*	0.00756	0.0141	0.0106
		(0.0158)	(0.0156)	(0.0146)	(0.00489)	(0.00482)	(0.00478)	(0.0380)	(0.0373)	(0.0351)	(0.0290)	(0.0295)	(0.0301)
Years of EC in total	- women	0.000993	0.00133*	0.000713	-0.00242***	-0.00218***	-0.00230***	0.00291	0.00362**	0.00234	-0.00866**	-0.00723**	-0.00713**
		(0.000721)	(0.000694)	(0.000585)	(0.000581)	(0.000555)	(0.000525)	(0.00161)	(0.00155)	(0.00136)	(0.00315)	(0.00301)	(0.00280)
	- men	-0.000357	-2.89e-05	0.000652	-0.00194**	-0.00172**	-0.00162**	8.13e-05	0.000766	0.00211	-0.00628*	-0.00504*	-0.00511
		(0.000638)	(0.000620)	(0.000708)	(0.000614)	(0.000576)	(0.000614)	(0.00164)	(0.00158)	(0.00175)	(0.00291)	(0.00273)	(0.00298)
		DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY	-women	0.0218	0.0228	0.0218	0.0169**	0.0176**	0.0172**	0.0397	0.0415	0.0398	0.0778***	0.0817***	0.0797***
		(0.0176)	(0.0176)	(0.0176)	(0.00626)	(0.00634)	(0.00632)	(0.0409)	(0.0406)	(0.0404)	(0.0201)	(0.0190)	(0.0194)
	-men	0.0169	0.0177	0.0126	0.00388	0.00462	0.00312	0.0428	0.0442	0.0342	0.00528	0.0101	0.00521
		(0.0188)	(0.0188)	(0.0181)	(0.00521)	(0.00516)	(0.00502)	(0.0332)	(0.0332)	(0.0317)	(0.0201)	(0.0206)	(0.0186)

Years of EC in total - women	-0.00111	-0.000970	-0.00183	-0.00280***	-0.00263**	-0.00281***	-0.00278	-0.00253	-0.00419	-0.0112**	-0.00998**	-0.0101**
	(0.00119)	(0.00124)	(0.00128)	(0.000837)	(0.000818)	(0.000790)	(0.00249)	(0.00257)	(0.00265)	(0.00364)	(0.00353)	(0.00329)
- men	-0.00279*	-0.00264*	-0.00167	-0.00266***	-0.00250***	-0.00231**	-0.00611**	-0.00585**	-0.00405	-0.00904**	-0.00803**	-0.00791**
	(0.00135)	(0.00140)	(0.00132)	(0.000792)	(0.000763)	(0.000805)	(0.00250)	(0.00258)	(0.00241)	(0.00299)	(0.00287)	(0.00319)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: IY – an impressionable years. Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

Gender differences were mostly negligible when we consider general familiaristic attitudes, yet some differences emerge when particular familiarism is measured: we observe often weaker effects of EC in impressionable years for men than for women, with an interesting exception for grandparents' care over their pre-school grandchildren. Women seem to be more familiaristic than men with respect to financial support to their adult children.

Table D3. Cohort heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years for social attitudes.

	Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in impressionable year 1970-79	-0.0196	-0.0187	-0.0196	-0.152	-0.151	-0.158
	(0.0181)	(0.0180)	(0.0180)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.104)
- 1960-69	-0.0254	-0.0466	-0.0509	0.0256	-0.0954	-0.111
	(0.0627)	(0.0621)	(0.0619)	(0.360)	(0.357)	(0.356)
- 1950-59	0.0130	0.0323	0.0279	-0.455	-0.345	-0.352
	(0.0861)	(0.0854)	(0.0852)	(0.501)	(0.498)	(0.496)
- 1940-49	-0.00153	-0.0107	-0.0553	-0.686	-0.733	-1.009**
	(0.0765)	(0.0756)	(0.0756)	(0.457)	(0.453)	(0.452)
- 1930-39	0.139***	0.133**	0.0962*	0.619*	0.573*	0.320
	(0.0541)	(0.0540)	(0.0541)	(0.323)	(0.322)	(0.322)
- 1920-29	-0.0592	-0.0624	-0.0771	-0.230	-0.250	-0.359
	(0.0487)	(0.0485)	(0.0484)	(0.300)	(0.298)	(0.297)
- 1900-19	0.0775	0.0674	0.0642	-0.246	-0.317	-0.335
	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.613)	(0.603)	(0.612)
	LEFT WING					
EC in impressionable year 1970-79	-0.0402*	-0.0383*	-0.0388*	-0.105	-0.0980	-0.0999
	(0.0226)	(0.0225)	(0.0225)	(0.0942)	(0.0938)	(0.0938)
- 1960-69	0.0720	0.0526	0.0490	-0.136	-0.209	-0.211
	(0.0775)	(0.0772)	(0.0772)	(0.322)	(0.320)	(0.320)
- 1950-59	-0.147	-0.135	-0.135	-0.405	-0.342	-0.325
	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.458)	(0.456)	(0.456)
- 1940-49	0.0244	0.0129	0.00587	0.0572	0.0266	0.0348
	(0.0956)	(0.0956)	(0.0957)	(0.447)	(0.448)	(0.448)
- 1930-39	0.278***	0.269***	0.265***	1.505***	1.487***	1.503***
	(0.0641)	(0.0643)	(0.0645)	(0.314)	(0.314)	(0.315)
- 1920-29	0.0848	0.0836	0.0790	0.705**	0.710**	0.703**
	(0.0604)	(0.0606)	(0.0604)	(0.315)	(0.314)	(0.314)
- 1900-19	-0.275*	-0.275*	-0.277*	-1.860**	-1.858**	-1.863**
	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.826)	(0.827)	(0.823)
	EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in impressionable year 1970-79	-0.0148	0.0104	0.0141	-0.101	-0.0567	-0.0486
	(0.175)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.303)	(0.305)	(0.307)
- 1960-69	-1.381***	-1.407***	-1.413***	-2.810***	-2.840***	-2.852***
	(0.504)	(0.500)	(0.496)	(0.929)	(0.920)	(0.917)
- 1950-59	-1.719***	-1.701***	-1.720***	-3.537***	-3.506***	-3.546***
	(0.529)	(0.526)	(0.524)	(0.980)	(0.974)	(0.973)
- 1940-49	-1.784***	-1.801***	-1.808***	-4.025***	-4.074***	-4.090***
	(0.551)	(0.549)	(0.546)	(1.022)	(1.016)	(1.014)
- 1930-39	-1.766***	-1.821***	-1.836***	-3.858***	-3.954***	-3.989***
	(0.545)	(0.543)	(0.539)	(1.011)	(1.006)	(1.002)
- 1920-29	0.0325	0.0353	0.0237	0.174	0.189	0.163
	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.215)	(0.421)	(0.424)	(0.431)
- 1900-19	-0.364***	-0.345***	-0.355***	-0.658***	-0.600***	-0.621***
	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.193)	(0.199)	(0.195)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Years of EC in total by10-year cohort groups	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in

parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 1,715. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

We find that in the 1970's cohorts, entering impressionable period after 1987, the indoctrination effects in previous life periods are stronger than in any other post-war cohort group, resembling rather individuals born before 1930. This suggests that the indoctrination might be more successful in pre-impressionable years of life when the negative consequences of communism in adult life are not present or when the indoctrination lasts almost for a lifetime. It also shows, that if communism is not experienced in impressionable years, previously instilled pro-social attitudes enhanced by EC are not crowded out. Secondly, we observe major separateness in social attitudes of individuals born in the 1930's (entering impressionable period of life after 1948) suggestive of successful instalment of left-wing political views and preference for income redistribution not only in general, but also during impressionable period of life. In other words, the effects of communism were crowded out to much less extent in impressionable years that took place between 1948 and 1957 than in other times. Thirdly, in the case of the choice between equality and freedom, our results show that impressionable period poses stronger impact on the preference than other periods of life.

As for familiarism, it seems that the rise in its strength due to EC in impressionable years is driven mainly by cohorts born between 1950 and 1969 (cf. Tables D5 and D6 in the Appendix). Their impressionable years overlap with generous policy in several post-communist countries granting long maternity leaves with high maternity benefits (Szelewa and Polakowski 2008). Furthermore, we find little evidence of positive effects of the EC in impressionable years for the youngest cohorts in GGS, where particularly financial support to individuals in need is substantially less common and less pronounced than in older cohorts, which is in line with findings respect to social attitudes of the lack crowding out in impressionable years in the youngest cohorts. Because we observe it for general and particular familiarism, we might expect limited sustainability of long-term care systems relying on family in post-communist countries and political pressure on development public instruments dealing with this issue.

Table D4. Cohort heterogeneity in the effects of years of exposure to communism (EC) in total for social attitudes.

		Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		INCOME EQUALITY					
Years of EC in total	- 1990-96	0.00999	0.00664	0.00807	0.0597	0.0417	0.0500
		(0.0101)	(0.0100)	(0.0101)	(0.0630)	(0.0626)	(0.0633)
	- 1980-89	-0.000771	-0.000731	-0.000506	-0.00926	-0.00847	-0.00692
		(0.00224)	(0.00223)	(0.00223)	(0.0124)	(0.0124)	(0.0124)
	- 1970-79	0.00457***	0.00413***	0.00418***	0.0258***	0.0234***	0.0238***
		(0.00113)	(0.00112)	(0.00112)	(0.00594)	(0.00589)	(0.00587)
	- 1960-69	0.00424*	0.00414*	0.00453*	0.0237*	0.0231*	0.0250*
		(0.00237)	(0.00234)	(0.00234)	(0.0136)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)
	- 1950-59	0.00217	0.000776	0.00127	0.0285**	0.0205	0.0229*
		(0.00237)	(0.00235)	(0.00234)	(0.0138)	(0.0137)	(0.0137)
	- 1940-49	0.00345**	0.00289*	0.00429**	0.0355***	0.0322***	0.0408***
		(0.00174)	(0.00172)	(0.00173)	(0.0104)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)
	- 1930-39	0.000856	0.000381	0.00145	0.0123*	0.00962	0.0167**
		(0.00110)	(0.00110)	(0.00110)	(0.00664)	(0.00662)	(0.00664)
	- 1920-29	0.00572***	0.00511***	0.00568***	0.0321***	0.0286***	0.0324***
		(0.00103)	(0.00103)	(0.00102)	(0.00623)	(0.00619)	(0.00616)
	- 1900-19	0.00612***	0.00538**	0.00569**	0.0513***	0.0472***	0.0490***
		(0.00235)	(0.00234)	(0.00234)	(0.0123)	(0.0122)	(0.0123)
		LEFT WING					
Years of EC in total	- 1990-96	-0.00416	-0.00720	-0.00898	-0.0707	-0.0845	-0.0982*
		(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0560)	(0.0558)	(0.0558)
	- 1980-89	0.00229	0.00233	0.00235	-0.00856	-0.00846	-0.00748
		(0.00280)	(0.00279)	(0.00279)	(0.0115)	(0.0115)	(0.0115)
	- 1970-79	0.00578***	0.00533***	0.00530***	0.0129**	0.0113**	0.0118**
		(0.00122)	(0.00122)	(0.00122)	(0.00504)	(0.00502)	(0.00502)
	- 1960-69	7.55e-05	1.13e-05	0.000111	0.0106	0.0104	0.0105
		(0.00294)	(0.00293)	(0.00293)	(0.0123)	(0.0122)	(0.0122)
	- 1950-59	0.00602**	0.00499*	0.00502*	0.0169	0.0124	0.0119
		(0.00287)	(0.00286)	(0.00286)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)
	- 1940-49	0.00289	0.00255	0.00276	0.0134	0.0117	0.0112
		(0.00220)	(0.00220)	(0.00221)	(0.0102)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)
	- 1930-39	-0.000802	-0.00106	-0.000924	-0.00735	-0.00873	-0.00924
		(0.00135)	(0.00135)	(0.00136)	(0.00659)	(0.00659)	(0.00662)
	- 1920-29	0.00248*	0.00200	0.00214*	0.00350	0.00134	0.00119
		(0.00127)	(0.00127)	(0.00127)	(0.00651)	(0.00649)	(0.00650)
	- 1900-19	0.00655**	0.00576**	0.00578**	0.0415***	0.0384**	0.0383**
		(0.00288)	(0.00290)	(0.00290)	(0.0159)	(0.0159)	(0.0158)
		EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
Years of EC in total	- 1970-79	-0.0471*	-0.0497**	-0.0502**	-0.100**	-0.105**	-0.106**
		(0.0256)	(0.0253)	(0.0251)	(0.0475)	(0.0470)	(0.0467)
	- 1960-69	0.00822	0.00723	0.00662	0.0115	0.00946	0.00813
		(0.0138)	(0.0139)	(0.0138)	(0.0264)	(0.0265)	(0.0265)
	- 1950-59	0.0123	0.0105	0.0102	0.0211	0.0182	0.0176
		(0.0123)	(0.0124)	(0.0125)	(0.0237)	(0.0238)	(0.0239)
	- 1940-49	0.00801	0.00753	0.00717	0.0203	0.0202	0.0194
		(0.00913)	(0.00913)	(0.00912)	(0.0175)	(0.0175)	(0.0175)
	- 1930-39	0.00718	0.00737	0.00711	0.0151	0.0159	0.0153
		(0.00509)	(0.00512)	(0.00513)	(0.00966)	(0.00971)	(0.00973)
	- 1920-29	0.00534	0.00543	0.00516	0.0145	0.0152	0.0146
		(0.00542)	(0.00548)	(0.00549)	(0.0104)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)
	- 1900-19	0.0146*	0.0142*	0.0140*	0.0280*	0.0275*	0.0272*
		(0.00757)	(0.00772)	(0.00767)	(0.0144)	(0.0147)	(0.0146)
Demographic controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls		no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls		no	no	yes	no	no	yes
EC in IY by 10-year cohort groups		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: IY – impressionable years. Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", public responsibility – "state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for" rather than "individuals should take more responsibility for […] themselves", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 1,715. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – $p < 0.01$; ** – $p < 0.05$; * – $p < 0.10$.

Table D5a. Cohort heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years (IY) for familiarism (support with care).

		Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
		GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		UPWARDS CARE											
EC in IY	- 1970-79	0.00629	0.00702	0.00720	5.48e-05	0.000909	-5.82e-06	0.0271	0.0288	0.0289	-0.0139	-0.0111	-0.0130
		(0.00958)	(0.00958)	(0.00954)	(0.00673)	(0.00663)	(0.00675)	(0.0199)	(0.0196)	(0.0194)	(0.0242)	(0.0243)	(0.0240)
	- 1960-69	0.0336	0.0301	0.0316	0.0186	0.0118	0.00913	0.0379	0.0313	0.0337	0.0660	0.0452	0.0385
		(0.0357)	(0.0358)	(0.0353)	(0.0538)	(0.0548)	(0.0575)	(0.0756)	(0.0751)	(0.0737)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.110)
	- 1950-59	0.0727	0.0744	0.0749	0.0429	0.0382	0.0303	0.196**	0.201**	0.199**	0.202**	0.189*	0.175*
		(0.0520)	(0.0519)	(0.0516)	(0.0484)	(0.0496)	(0.0489)	(0.0836)	(0.0829)	(0.0840)	(0.0828)	(0.0882)	(0.0921)
	- 1940-49	0.157**	0.158**	0.153**	-0.0192	-0.0224	-0.0268	0.231**	0.234**	0.216*	0.0336	0.0245	0.0190
		(0.0661)	(0.0679)	(0.0660)	(0.0395)	(0.0392)	(0.0402)	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.135)
	- 1930-39	0.172***	0.177***	0.170***	0.0286	0.0305	0.0323	0.323***	0.336***	0.317***	0.118	0.126	0.142
		(0.0253)	(0.0247)	(0.0240)	(0.0470)	(0.0461)	(0.0461)	(0.0583)	(0.0572)	(0.0572)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.118)
	- 1910-29	0.217*	0.227**	0.222**	-0.0665*	-0.0470	-0.0398	0.408	0.430	0.413	-0.168	-0.105	-0.0994
		(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.0982)	(0.0342)	(0.0287)	(0.0264)	(0.250)	(0.243)	(0.236)	(0.209)	(0.195)	(0.201)
		DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in IY	- 1970-79	-0.00382	-0.00427	-0.00579	-0.00266	-0.00256	-0.00355	-0.0346	-0.0356	-0.0390	-0.0154	-0.0154	-0.0183
		(0.0145)	(0.0145)	(0.0149)	(0.00901)	(0.00890)	(0.00892)	(0.0250)	(0.0254)	(0.0264)	(0.0178)	(0.0174)	(0.0174)
	- 1960-69	0.0212	0.0228	0.0232	0.0480	0.0462	0.0370	0.103	0.108	0.111	0.125	0.121	0.100
		(0.0264)	(0.0270)	(0.0251)	(0.0457)	(0.0467)	(0.0482)	(0.0883)	(0.0883)	(0.0823)	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.107)
	- 1950-59	0.0754	0.0753	0.0688	0.0613	0.0587	0.0484	0.373**	0.373**	0.359**	0.188**	0.182**	0.161**
		(0.0684)	(0.0686)	(0.0684)	(0.0359)	(0.0360)	(0.0304)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.125)	(0.0625)	(0.0624)	(0.0529)
	- 1940-49	0.0930	0.0940	0.0968	0.0174	0.0145	0.0185	0.196	0.198	0.203	0.0889	0.0835	0.100
		(0.0970)	(0.0971)	(0.0971)	(0.0381)	(0.0381)	(0.0435)	(0.277)	(0.278)	(0.282)	(0.0990)	(0.0976)	(0.118)
	- 1930-39	0.0871	0.0873	0.0907	-0.0309	-0.0336	-0.0204	0.134	0.134	0.139	-0.0238	-0.0282	0.0143
		(0.0730)	(0.0736)	(0.0711)	(0.0616)	(0.0610)	(0.0607)	(0.196)	(0.198)	(0.195)	(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.138)
	- 1910-29	0.127	0.124	0.138	-0.0959	-0.0942	-0.0573	0.277	0.269	0.295	-0.282**	-0.277**	-0.188
		(0.0800)	(0.0818)	(0.0768)	(0.0673)	(0.0721)	(0.0961)	(0.263)	(0.267)	(0.259)	(0.0996)	(0.109)	(0.174)

Table D5b. Cohort heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years (IY) for familiarism (support with money).

		Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
		GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY	- 1970-79	-0.000942	0.000746	0.00206	-0.00956	-0.00859	-0.00929	0.00198	0.00556	0.00817	-0.0756**	-0.0699**	-0.0728**
		(0.0109)	(0.0111)	(0.0110)	(0.00769)	(0.00746)	(0.00761)	(0.0211)	(0.0214)	(0.0210)	(0.0256)	(0.0245)	(0.0249)
	- 1960-69	-0.00295	-0.0105	-0.00721	0.0279	0.0224	0.0217	-0.00999	-0.0261	-0.0173	0.0996	0.0632	0.0613
		(0.0326)	(0.0323)	(0.0305)	(0.0264)	(0.0264)	(0.0263)	(0.0653)	(0.0646)	(0.0634)	(0.102)	(0.0989)	(0.0974)
	- 1950-59	0.120**	0.122**	0.129**	0.0958***	0.0937***	0.0913***	0.257**	0.261**	0.273**	0.407***	0.388**	0.381**
		(0.0443)	(0.0443)	(0.0437)	(0.0237)	(0.0252)	(0.0250)	(0.0961)	(0.0956)	(0.0947)	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.123)
	- 1940-49	0.00295	0.00585	-0.00197	0.00249	0.00318	0.00543	0.102	0.106	0.0798	0.118	0.113	0.128
		(0.0474)	(0.0478)	(0.0477)	(0.0508)	(0.0505)	(0.0504)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.216)	(0.212)	(0.212)
	- 1930-39	0.0246	0.0342	0.0226	0.000620	0.00614	0.00950	0.108	0.127	0.0916	0.0225	0.0462	0.0700
		(0.0386)	(0.0366)	(0.0357)	(0.0488)	(0.0480)	(0.0486)	(0.0757)	(0.0732)	(0.0695)	(0.197)	(0.190)	(0.192)
	- 1910-29	0.0514	0.0696	0.0571	-0.0331	-0.0140	-0.00497	0.212*	0.249**	0.212*	-0.256	-0.145	-0.114
		(0.0637)	(0.0591)	(0.0595)	(0.0493)	(0.0464)	(0.0426)	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.284)	(0.260)	(0.249)
		DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY	- 1970-79	-0.0225*	-0.0222*	-0.0226*	-0.00775	-0.00706	-0.00744	-0.0397	-0.0392	-0.0402	-0.0450*	-0.0402*	-0.0426*
		(0.0108)	(0.0107)	(0.0109)	(0.00461)	(0.00436)	(0.00448)	(0.0259)	(0.0256)	(0.0265)	(0.0206)	(0.0202)	(0.0196)
	- 1960-69	0.0337	0.0327	0.0323	-0.00600	-0.00964	-0.0104	0.0910	0.0896	0.0888	0.0174	-0.0125	-0.0153
		(0.0533)	(0.0530)	(0.0538)	(0.0160)	(0.0158)	(0.0159)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.0859)	(0.0829)	(0.0818)
	- 1950-59	0.0440	0.0462	0.0420	0.0871***	0.0856***	0.0830***	0.193	0.198	0.186	0.315***	0.297**	0.285**
		(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.0225)	(0.0240)	(0.0239)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.194)	(0.0964)	(0.0948)	(0.0974)
	- 1940-49	-0.0442	-0.0409	-0.0422	-0.0181	-0.0172	-0.0185	-0.0522	-0.0453	-0.0492	0.0551	0.0477	0.0511
		(0.0913)	(0.0912)	(0.0929)	(0.0463)	(0.0456)	(0.0456)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.227)	(0.203)	(0.199)	(0.200)
	- 1930-39	0.0205	0.0257	0.0218	-0.0182	-0.0141	-0.0149	0.0357	0.0457	0.0371	-0.0869	-0.0707	-0.0591
		(0.0898)	(0.0893)	(0.0865)	(0.0598)	(0.0587)	(0.0590)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.168)	(0.200)	(0.195)	(0.195)
	- 1910-29	0.0719	0.0790	0.0853	-0.0460	-0.0320	-0.0259	0.177	0.190	0.205	-0.348	-0.255	-0.227
		(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.115)	(0.0293)	(0.0294)	(0.0280)	(0.265)	(0.265)	(0.245)	(0.218)	(0.195)	(0.190)
Demographic controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls		no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls		no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Total EC#10-year cohort groups		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards

(downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

Table D6a. Cohort heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in total for familiarism (support with care).

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
EC in total - 1980-89	-0.00328*	-0.00319	-0.00307	(0.00264)	(0.00262)	(0.00246)	(0.00484)	(0.00480)	(0.00465)	-0.0117**	-0.0115**	-0.0113**
	(0.00180)	(0.00178)	(0.00172)	0.000711	0.000768	0.000812	0.00441**	0.00478**	0.00473**	(0.00484)	(0.00480)	(0.00465)
- 1970-79	0.00306***	0.00323***	0.00323***	(0.00114)	(0.00116)	(0.00107)	(0.00182)	(0.00177)	(0.00175)	0.00441**	0.00478**	0.00473**
	(0.000903)	(0.000889)	(0.000888)	0.000446	0.000837	0.000956	0.00656**	0.00720**	0.00707**	(0.00182)	(0.00177)	(0.00175)
- 1960-69	0.00278*	0.00310**	0.00304**	(0.00261)	(0.00264)	(0.00271)	(0.00289)	(0.00284)	(0.00284)	0.00656**	0.00720**	0.00707**
	(0.00138)	(0.00135)	(0.00136)	-0.000874	-0.000573	-0.000348	0.00125	0.00155	0.00155	(0.00289)	(0.00284)	(0.00284)
- 1950-59	0.00112	0.00128	0.00125	(0.00129)	(0.00134)	(0.00135)	(0.00284)	(0.00282)	(0.00292)	0.00125	0.00155	0.00155
	(0.00145)	(0.00145)	(0.00148)	-7.83e-05	0.000186	0.000295	-0.000232	0.000152	0.000465	(0.00284)	(0.00282)	(0.00292)
- 1940-49	-0.000870	-0.000682	-0.000609	(0.000737)	(0.000716)	(0.000758)	(0.00285)	(0.00288)	(0.00286)	-0.000232	0.000152	0.000465
	(0.00159)	(0.00161)	(0.00158)	-0.00161**	-0.00141**	-0.00145**	-0.00375**	-0.00352**	-0.00328**	(0.00285)	(0.00288)	(0.00286)
- 1930-39	-0.00170**	-0.00158**	-0.00150**	(0.000590)	(0.000577)	(0.000617)	(0.00139)	(0.00137)	(0.00135)	-0.00375**	-0.00352**	-0.00328**
	(0.000605)	(0.000584)	(0.000576)	-0.00131	-0.00144	-0.00160*	-0.00765**	-0.00763**	-0.00749**	(0.00139)	(0.00137)	(0.00135)
- 1910-29	-0.00344*	-0.00343*	-0.00339**	(0.000879)	(0.000787)	(0.000839)	(0.00339)	(0.00325)	(0.00307)	-0.00765**	-0.00763**	-0.00749**
	(0.00165)	(0.00156)	(0.00150)	-0.00111	-0.00153	-0.000601	(0.00148)	(0.00134)	(0.00135)	(0.00339)	(0.00325)	(0.00307)
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in total - 1980-89	0.00120	0.00121	0.00125	-0.000611	-0.000722	-0.000722	0.000764	0.000739	0.000916	1.64e-05	-0.000217	-0.000116
	(0.00260)	(0.00257)	(0.00286)	(0.00310)	(0.00307)	(0.00296)	(0.00619)	(0.00620)	(0.00672)	(0.00529)	(0.00522)	(0.00510)
- 1970-79	0.000555	0.000556	0.000679	0.00291	0.00287	0.00277	0.00335	0.00327	0.00361	0.00630	0.00623	0.00610
	(0.00112)	(0.00114)	(0.00125)	(0.00200)	(0.00200)	(0.00194)	(0.00224)	(0.00232)	(0.00249)	(0.00370)	(0.00372)	(0.00364)
- 1960-69	0.000753	0.000666	0.000751	-0.000640	-0.000582	-0.000324	-0.000382	-0.000698	-0.000543	-0.00309	-0.00296	-0.00231
	(0.00114)	(0.00117)	(0.00109)	(0.00197)	(0.00201)	(0.00206)	(0.00308)	(0.00309)	(0.00285)	(0.00445)	(0.00457)	(0.00463)
- 1950-59	-0.00164	-0.00169	-0.00147	-0.00166	-0.00159	-0.00140	-0.00948***	-0.00967***	-0.00916**	-0.00638**	-0.00622**	-0.00577**
	(0.00172)	(0.00172)	(0.00172)	(0.00119)	(0.00122)	(0.00116)	(0.00291)	(0.00291)	(0.00309)	(0.00211)	(0.00218)	(0.00209)
- 1940-49	-0.00310	-0.00318	-0.00325	-0.00109	-0.00102	-0.00118	-0.00778	-0.00802	-0.00813	-0.00417	-0.00405	-0.00454
	(0.00228)	(0.00228)	(0.00228)	(0.00117)	(0.00117)	(0.00130)	(0.00638)	(0.00643)	(0.00650)	(0.00279)	(0.00272)	(0.00319)
- 1930-39	-0.00319*	-0.00326*	-0.00345**	-0.000800	-0.000735	-0.00102	-0.00781	-0.00800	-0.00838*	-0.00366	-0.00354	-0.00434
	(0.00159)	(0.00159)	(0.00149)	(0.00101)	(0.00103)	(0.00108)	(0.00455)	(0.00459)	(0.00448)	(0.00245)	(0.00248)	(0.00276)
- 1910-29	-0.00329*	-0.00330*	-0.00378**	5.70e-05	4.58e-05	-0.000646	-0.00941	-0.00945	-0.0104*	-1.75e-05	-5.73e-05	-0.00161
	(0.00168)	(0.00171)	(0.00159)	(0.00106)	(0.00112)	(0.00159)	(0.00559)	(0.00568)	(0.00550)	(0.00189)	(0.00199)	(0.00322)

Table D6b. Cohort heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in total for familiarism (support with money).

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in total - 1980-89	-0.00617**	-0.00604**	-0.00587**	0.000475	0.000463	0.000327	-0.0178**	-0.0175*	-0.0172**	-0.000829	-0.00121	-0.00151
	(0.00255)	(0.00258)	(0.00251)	(0.000893)	(0.000896)	(0.000827)	(0.00771)	(0.00774)	(0.00752)	(0.00840)	(0.00852)	(0.00831)
- 1970-79	-0.000106	9.94e-05	-6.63e-05	0.000826	0.000907	0.000954*	2.47e-05	0.000428	8.43e-05	0.00643	0.00675	0.00703
	(0.00144)	(0.00145)	(0.00143)	(0.000548)	(0.000545)	(0.000492)	(0.00338)	(0.00339)	(0.00332)	(0.00585)	(0.00591)	(0.00579)
- 1960-69	0.00183	0.00237*	0.00214	-0.00108	-0.000741	-0.000676	0.00512*	0.00624**	0.00569**	-0.00284	-0.000761	-0.000505
	(0.00122)	(0.00121)	(0.00118)	(0.00103)	(0.00105)	(0.00105)	(0.00245)	(0.00241)	(0.00240)	(0.00427)	(0.00428)	(0.00431)
- 1950-59	-0.00192*	-0.00164	-0.00192*	-0.00332***	-0.00307***	-0.00298***	-0.00261	-0.00202	-0.00255	-0.0132***	-0.0116**	-0.0113**
	(0.000905)	(0.000915)	(0.000920)	(0.000866)	(0.000907)	(0.000905)	(0.00179)	(0.00186)	(0.00188)	(0.00397)	(0.00415)	(0.00414)
- 1940-49	0.000763	0.00107	0.00117	-0.00150	-0.00130	-0.00136	0.000633	0.00129	0.00174	-0.00774*	-0.00642	-0.00671
	(0.00139)	(0.00138)	(0.00138)	(0.000833)	(0.000834)	(0.000850)	(0.00308)	(0.00307)	(0.00305)	(0.00381)	(0.00369)	(0.00371)
- 1930-39	-0.000341	-0.000165	3.54e-05	-0.00149*	-0.00136	-0.00148*	-0.00122	-0.000817	-0.000255	-0.00573*	-0.00483*	-0.00535*
	(0.00102)	(0.000965)	(0.000958)	(0.000734)	(0.000745)	(0.000777)	(0.00207)	(0.00198)	(0.00193)	(0.00254)	(0.00251)	(0.00257)
- 1910-29	-0.00201	-0.00201	-0.00177	-0.00175	-0.00186*	-0.00215**	-0.00693**	-0.00690***	-0.00632**	-0.00350	-0.00416	-0.00489
	(0.00148)	(0.00134)	(0.00135)	(0.000976)	(0.000904)	(0.000830)	(0.00232)	(0.00208)	(0.00206)	(0.00610)	(0.00553)	(0.00537)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in total - 1980-89	-0.000345	-0.000180	0.000156	-0.000200	-0.000194	-0.000279	-0.00425	-0.00398	-0.00329	-0.00299	-0.00339	-0.00364
	(0.00263)	(0.00255)	(0.00270)	(0.00109)	(0.00109)	(0.00112)	(0.00606)	(0.00597)	(0.00624)	(0.00646)	(0.00656)	(0.00634)
- 1970-79	0.00246	0.00264	0.00264	-0.000494	-0.000448	-0.000445	0.00595	0.00626	0.00630	-0.00249	-0.00235	-0.00219
	(0.00177)	(0.00175)	(0.00179)	(0.000476)	(0.000476)	(0.000460)	(0.00393)	(0.00390)	(0.00399)	(0.00483)	(0.00495)	(0.00483)
- 1960-69	0.00131	0.00150	0.00154	-0.000815	-0.000582	-0.000547	0.00181	0.00212	0.00224	-0.00529	-0.00360	-0.00339
	(0.00165)	(0.00165)	(0.00169)	(0.000884)	(0.000880)	(0.000901)	(0.00369)	(0.00371)	(0.00366)	(0.00464)	(0.00458)	(0.00463)
- 1950-59	-0.000761	-0.000663	-0.000567	-0.00400***	-0.00382***	-0.00375***	-0.00483	-0.00468	-0.00435	-0.0154***	-0.0140**	-0.0136**
	(0.00271)	(0.00272)	(0.00277)	(0.000989)	(0.00103)	(0.00104)	(0.00499)	(0.00497)	(0.00505)	(0.00451)	(0.00458)	(0.00466)
- 1940-49	0.000124	0.000205	0.000192	-0.00192**	-0.00178**	-0.00178**	-0.000982	-0.000867	-0.000837	-0.0104**	-0.00920**	-0.00929**
	(0.00216)	(0.00217)	(0.00219)	(0.000711)	(0.000693)	(0.000708)	(0.00542)	(0.00543)	(0.00548)	(0.00363)	(0.00343)	(0.00352)
- 1930-39	-0.00186	-0.00182	-0.00184	-0.00209*	-0.00201*	-0.00206*	-0.00411	-0.00405	-0.00412	-0.00780**	-0.00698**	-0.00736**
	(0.00192)	(0.00191)	(0.00183)	(0.000936)	(0.000936)	(0.000960)	(0.00425)	(0.00424)	(0.00412)	(0.00276)	(0.00270)	(0.00282)
- 1910-29	-0.00344	-0.00344	-0.00368	-0.00213**	-0.00222***	-0.00246***	-0.00830	-0.00833	-0.00896	-0.00397	-0.00453	-0.00535
	(0.00231)	(0.00227)	(0.00210)	(0.000670)	(0.000674)	(0.000650)	(0.00544)	(0.00539)	(0.00505)	(0.00471)	(0.00420)	(0.00407)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Total EC in 10-year cohort groups	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

Table D7. Region heterogeneity of exposure to communism (EC) effects for social attitudes.

		Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in impressinable year	- urban	0.0104	-0.00893	-0.00688	0.200	0.0864	0.101
		(0.0320)	(0.0319)	(0.0318)	(0.195)	(0.194)	(0.193)
	- rural	0.0481**	0.0330	0.0340	0.444***	0.356**	0.362**
		(0.0240)	(0.0239)	(0.0239)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.147)
Years of EC in total	- urban	0.00384***	0.00406***	0.00335***	0.0266***	0.0279***	0.0236***
		(0.000834)	(0.000830)	(0.000829)	(0.00509)	(0.00506)	(0.00505)
	- rural	0.00145**	0.00198***	0.00177***	0.0121***	0.0153***	0.0141***
		(0.000634)	(0.000633)	(0.000633)	(0.00389)	(0.00389)	(0.00389)
		LEFT WING					
EC in impressinable year	- urban	0.0378	0.0303	0.0300	0.200	0.172	0.177
		(0.0438)	(0.0437)	(0.0437)	(0.195)	(0.194)	(0.194)
	- rural	0.0357	0.0322	0.0322	0.217	0.209	0.213
		(0.0341)	(0.0340)	(0.0340)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)
Years of EC in total	- urban	0.000776	0.000960	0.000844	0.00190	0.00297	0.00340
		(0.00114)	(0.00114)	(0.00114)	(0.00511)	(0.00510)	(0.00511)
	- rural	0.000839	0.00123	0.00120	0.00113	0.00293	0.00307
		(0.000890)	(0.000890)	(0.000890)	(0.00393)	(0.00393)	(0.00393)
		EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in impressinable year	- urban	0.0647	0.0521	0.0462	0.0104	-0.00850	-0.0214
		(0.203)	(0.201)	(0.200)	(0.388)	(0.385)	(0.384)
	- rural	-0.231**	-0.217**	-0.219**	-0.470**	-0.439**	-0.444**
		(0.0999)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.184)	(0.186)	(0.188)
Years of EC in total	- urban	0.00297	0.00370	0.00350	0.0119	0.0138	0.0134
		(0.00510)	(0.00512)	(0.00511)	(0.00973)	(0.00975)	(0.00974)
	- rural	0.00939**	0.00978**	0.00955**	0.0221***	0.0233***	0.0228***
		(0.00390)	(0.00394)	(0.00395)	(0.00742)	(0.00751)	(0.00754)
Demographic controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls		no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls		no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes:. Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 1,715. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

It seems that the instalment of egalitarian values due to EC in general was stronger in urban than rural areas, but no regional difference was found with respect to left-wing self-identification. In urban areas the support for equality over freedom and income redistribution was reinforced by the EC in impressionable years. In rural areas, the positive effects of EC experienced in impressionable periods concern all examined familiarism types, which was less evident in urban areas. However, in urban areas family ties in society (or general familiarism) measuring family versus public responsibility for older people in need for support are positively affected by the EC in impressionable years, but we find little evidence of analogous effect on general familarism to younger generations and particular familiarsm.

Table D8. Region heterogeneity exposure to communism (EC) effects for familiaristic attitudes.

		Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
		GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		UPWARDS CARE											
EC in IY	- urban	0.0851***	0.0857***	0.0866***	0.0187	0.0186	0.0164	0.192***	0.193***	0.194***	0.0319	0.0314	0.0171
		(0.0120)	(0.0121)	(0.0120)	(0.0140)	(0.0145)	(0.0133)	(0.0228)	(0.0226)	(0.0227)	(0.0374)	(0.0391)	(0.0358)
	- rural	0.0569***	0.0571***	0.0571***	0.0405***	0.0399***	0.0393***	0.144***	0.145***	0.144***	0.0992***	0.0975***	0.0940***
		(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0140)	(0.0113)	(0.0113)	(0.0112)	(0.0341)	(0.0339)	(0.0332)	(0.0263)	(0.0263)	(0.0262)
Years of EC in total	- urban	0.000427	0.000704	0.000627	-0.000688	-0.000336	-0.000287	0.000227	0.000817	0.000646	-0.000128	0.000966	0.00180
		(0.000760)	(0.000722)	(0.000704)	(0.000570)	(0.000584)	(0.000558)	(0.00177)	(0.00170)	(0.00164)	(0.00143)	(0.00142)	(0.00127)
	- rural	0.00101	0.00122	0.00115	-0.00239***	-0.00212**	-0.00207**	0.00123	0.00167	0.00155	-0.00423**	-0.00339*	-0.00312*
		(0.000781)	(0.000738)	(0.000737)	(0.000677)	(0.000674)	(0.000681)	(0.00191)	(0.00185)	(0.00186)	(0.00156)	(0.00151)	(0.00148)
		DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in IY	- urban	0.0654***	0.0656***	0.0695***	0.0490**	0.0488**	0.0463**	0.157**	0.157**	0.165**	0.0829*	0.0826*	0.0744*
		(0.0198)	(0.0197)	(0.0198)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0180)	(0.0508)	(0.0505)	(0.0511)	(0.0378)	(0.0378)	(0.0411)
	- rural	0.0418**	0.0420**	0.0438**	0.0309**	0.0305**	0.0291**	0.112**	0.112**	0.116**	0.0663**	0.0656**	0.0625**
		(0.0170)	(0.0170)	(0.0164)	(0.0124)	(0.0125)	(0.0124)	(0.0446)	(0.0446)	(0.0435)	(0.0245)	(0.0248)	(0.0248)
Years of EC in total	- urban	-0.00254**	-0.00263**	-0.00298***	-0.00263***	-0.00259***	-0.00256***	-0.00755***	-0.00780***	-0.00856***	-0.00653***	-0.00643***	-0.00616***
		(0.000827)	(0.000845)	(0.000811)	(0.000505)	(0.000492)	(0.000522)	(0.00189)	(0.00191)	(0.00189)	(0.00103)	(0.000974)	(0.00109)
	- rural	-0.00228***	-0.00234***	-0.00242***	-0.00251***	-0.00247***	-0.00247***	-0.00725***	-0.00744***	-0.00761***	-0.00674***	-0.00666***	-0.00662***
		(0.000677)	(0.000696)	(0.000697)	(0.000602)	(0.000639)	(0.000634)	(0.00150)	(0.00154)	(0.00152)	(0.00107)	(0.00114)	(0.00113)
		UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY	- urban	0.0627***	0.0633***	0.0621***	0.00466	0.00451	0.00616	0.158***	0.159***	0.157***	0.0111	0.00971	0.00990
		(0.0103)	(0.00968)	(0.0103)	(0.0147)	(0.0143)	(0.0143)	(0.0195)	(0.0186)	(0.0188)	(0.0487)	(0.0464)	(0.0465)
	- rural	0.0323*	0.0326*	0.0313*	0.0181*	0.0177*	0.0187**	0.0959**	0.0962**	0.0933**	0.0567*	0.0537	0.0556*
		(0.0148)	(0.0145)	(0.0147)	(0.00804)	(0.00797)	(0.00784)	(0.0370)	(0.0362)	(0.0365)	(0.0301)	(0.0296)	(0.0293)
Years of EC in total	- urban	-0.000878	-0.000409	-0.000318	-0.00171*	-0.00137	-0.00150*	-0.000675	0.000322	0.000403	-0.00523	-0.00323	-0.00327
		(0.000498)	(0.000507)	(0.000552)	(0.000823)	(0.000781)	(0.000767)	(0.00118)	(0.00113)	(0.00118)	(0.00315)	(0.00291)	(0.00287)
	- rural	0.000272	0.000632	0.000579	-0.00243***	-0.00217***	-0.00219***	0.00105	0.00181	0.00167	-0.00880***	-0.00727**	-0.00724**
		(0.000625)	(0.000599)	(0.000621)	(0.000567)	(0.000537)	(0.000524)	(0.00151)	(0.00145)	(0.00150)	(0.00263)	(0.00242)	(0.00239)
		DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY	- urban	0.0591	0.0594	0.0615*	0.00278	0.00268	0.00403	0.138*	0.138*	0.145**	-0.00456	-0.00611	-0.00462
		(0.0331)	(0.0332)	(0.0326)	(0.00793)	(0.00762)	(0.00758)	(0.0660)	(0.0661)	(0.0655)	(0.0412)	(0.0388)	(0.0390)
	- rural	0.0509**	0.0513**	0.0513**	0.0153**	0.0150**	0.0154**	0.118**	0.119**	0.120**	0.0434	0.0402	0.0416
		(0.0227)	(0.0227)	(0.0220)	(0.00562)	(0.00562)	(0.00532)	(0.0523)	(0.0524)	(0.0512)	(0.0240)	(0.0236)	(0.0230)

Years of EC in total	- urban	-0.00302*	-0.00285	-0.00308*	-0.00242**	-0.00217**	-0.00231**	-0.00665*	-0.00634*	-0.00697*	-0.00783**	-0.00615*	-0.00639*
		(0.00167)	(0.00173)	(0.00171)	(0.000848)	(0.000812)	(0.000789)	(0.00330)	(0.00340)	(0.00337)	(0.00338)	(0.00319)	(0.00312)
	- rural	-0.00276**	-0.00262*	-0.00270**	-0.00318***	-0.00300***	-0.00303***	-0.00654**	-0.00630**	-0.00647**	-0.0119***	-0.0106***	-0.0106***
		(0.00114)	(0.00119)	(0.00117)	(0.000698)	(0.000672)	(0.000665)	(0.00247)	(0.00256)	(0.00251)	(0.00287)	(0.00272)	(0.00269)
Demographic controls		yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls		no	no	Yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls		no	yes	Yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects		yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects		yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects		yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: IY – an impressionable years. Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

Table D9. Country heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years for social attitudes.

	Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in impressionable year - Russia	0.00129	0.0111	0.0176	0.00672	0.0585	0.0931
	(0.0309)	(0.0309)	(0.0309)	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.191)
- Germany	-0.0440	-0.0519	-0.0465	-0.0634	-0.113	-0.0828
	(0.0419)	(0.0419)	(0.0418)	(0.234)	(0.233)	(0.232)
- Poland	-0.00902	-0.0170	-0.0260	0.105	0.0530	-0.000566
	(0.0453)	(0.0451)	(0.0450)	(0.272)	(0.271)	(0.272)
- uprisings	0.0692*	0.0723*	0.0479	0.314	0.333	0.185
	(0.0382)	(0.0379)	(0.0377)	(0.224)	(0.222)	(0.221)
- former USSR	0.0493	0.0347	0.0184	0.216	0.127	0.0224
	(0.0337)	(0.0336)	(0.0336)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.203)
- Baltic countries	-0.0416	-0.0156	0.000125	-0.101	0.0445	0.129
	(0.0371)	(0.0368)	(0.0368)	(0.210)	(0.208)	(0.207)
	LEFT WING					
EC in impressionable year - Russia	0.0184	0.0175	0.0199	0.0103	0.0139	0.0146
	(0.0457)	(0.0457)	(0.0456)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)
- Germany	0.0675	0.0650	0.0648	0.342*	0.331*	0.338*
	(0.0455)	(0.0454)	(0.0454)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.193)
- Poland	-0.0331	-0.0382	-0.0406	0.249	0.227	0.243
	(0.0551)	(0.0551)	(0.0552)	(0.246)	(0.245)	(0.245)
- uprisings	0.0521	0.0551	0.0510	0.212	0.224	0.236
	(0.0458)	(0.0455)	(0.0455)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.193)
- former USSR	0.0463	0.0384	0.0350	0.414**	0.379**	0.392**
	(0.0420)	(0.0418)	(0.0418)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.193)
- Baltic countries	-0.0284	-0.00749	-0.00492	0.0287	0.124	0.122
	(0.0462)	(0.0460)	(0.0460)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.193)
	EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in impressionable year - Russia	-0.413***	-0.391***	-0.401***	-0.733***	-0.666***	-0.688***
	(0.0926)	(0.0966)	(0.0948)	(0.176)	(0.182)	(0.178)
- uprising	-0.169	-0.159	-0.160	-0.334	-0.309	-0.312
	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.218)	(0.222)	(0.224)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Years of EC in total by10-year cohort groups	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Uprising countries: Czech Republic and Hungary. Former USSR: Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia. Baltic: Estionia and Lithuania. Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 1,715. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

Table D10. Country heterogeneity in the effects of years of exposure to communism (EC) in total for social attitudes.

		Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		INCOME EQUALITY					
Years of EC in total	- Russia	0.00276***	0.00257***	0.00222***	0.0265***	0.0258***	0.0240***
		(0.000811)	(0.000813)	(0.000814)	(0.00499)	(0.00500)	(0.00501)
	- Germany	-0.000657	4.79e-05	0.000179	-0.00764	-0.00323	-0.00201
		(0.00129)	(0.00129)	(0.00129)	(0.00734)	(0.00731)	(0.00730)
	- Poland	-0.000704	-0.000670	-0.000107	-0.0164	-0.0161	-0.0123
		(0.00167)	(0.00166)	(0.00166)	(0.00999)	(0.00994)	(0.00996)
	- uprisings	-0.00409***	-0.00368***	-0.00252**	-0.0227***	-0.0203***	-0.0131*
		(0.00128)	(0.00127)	(0.00127)	(0.00759)	(0.00756)	(0.00752)
	- former USSR	-0.00548***	-0.00492***	-0.00381***	-0.0359***	-0.0328***	-0.0257***
		(0.00108)	(0.00108)	(0.00109)	(0.00660)	(0.00659)	(0.00661)
	- Baltic countries	0.00301***	0.00212**	0.00159	0.0188***	0.0141**	0.0113*
		(0.00100)	(0.00100)	(0.00100)	(0.00580)	(0.00578)	(0.00577)
		LEFT WING					
Years of EC in total	- Russia	0.00216**	0.00217**	0.00216**	0.0164***	0.0164***	0.0168***
		(0.00110)	(0.00110)	(0.00110)	(0.00514)	(0.00515)	(0.00515)
	- Germany	-0.00224	-0.00193	-0.00189	-0.0251***	-0.0238***	-0.0239***
		(0.00143)	(0.00142)	(0.00143)	(0.00637)	(0.00634)	(0.00634)
	- Poland	-0.00209	-0.00205	-0.00189	-0.0349***	-0.0345***	-0.0349***
		(0.00202)	(0.00203)	(0.00203)	(0.00924)	(0.00922)	(0.00924)
	- uprisings	0.000598	0.000868	0.00104	-0.00449	-0.00329	-0.00397
		(0.00154)	(0.00154)	(0.00154)	(0.00681)	(0.00677)	(0.00680)
	- former USSR	-0.00450***	-0.00415***	-0.00397***	-0.0375***	-0.0361***	-0.0367***
		(0.00135)	(0.00134)	(0.00135)	(0.00646)	(0.00643)	(0.00646)
	- Baltic countries	0.00124	0.000493	0.000455	0.00380	0.000648	0.000941
		(0.00126)	(0.00126)	(0.00126)	(0.00548)	(0.00547)	(0.00548)
		EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
Years of EC in total	- Russia	0.00504	0.00595	0.00574	0.0106	0.0123	0.0118
		(0.00494)	(0.00500)	(0.00501)	(0.00932)	(0.00942)	(0.00944)
	- uprising	0.00157	0.00289	0.00272	0.000263	0.00211	0.00172
		(0.00746)	(0.00752)	(0.00752)	(0.0141)	(0.0141)	(0.0142)
Demographic controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls		no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls		no	no	yes	no	no	yes
EC in IY by 10-year cohort groups		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Uprising countries: Czech Republic and Hungary. Former USSR: Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia. Baltic: Estionia and Lithuania. Uprising countries: Czech Republic and Hungary. Former USSR: Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia. Baltic: Estionia and Lithuania. IY – impressionable years. Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 1,715. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

Table D11a. Country heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years (IY) for familiarism (support with care).

		Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
		GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		UPWARDS CARE											
EC in IY	- Russia	-0.00921**	-0.00750*	-0.00694	-0.00126	0.00112	0.00735*	-0.0293	-0.0258	-0.0231	0.0231	0.0305	0.0378*
		(0.00369)	(0.00378)	(0.00439)	(0.00403)	(0.00405)	(0.00382)	(0.0229)	(0.0233)	(0.0243)	(0.0172)	(0.0171)	(0.0199)
	- Germany	-0.0824***	-0.0763***	-0.0803***	0.00356	0.0105	0.0117	-0.115*	-0.102	-0.110*	-0.00264	0.0207	0.0307*
		(0.0101)	(0.00998)	(0.00961)	(0.0164)	(0.0173)	(0.0181)	(0.0594)	(0.0578)	(0.0575)	(0.0152)	(0.0128)	(0.0157)
	- Poland	0.00293	0.00581	0.00816	0.00722	0.0109	0.00963	-0.00517	0.000557	0.00351	-0.0370	-0.0255	-0.0255
		(0.0148)	(0.0152)	(0.0147)	(0.00806)	(0.00785)	(0.00792)	(0.0189)	(0.0193)	(0.0179)	(0.0212)	(0.0204)	(0.0194)
	- uprising	-0.0432	-0.0414	-0.0423	0.0127	0.0152	0.0184	-0.0892	-0.0858	-0.0887	-0.00911	-0.00182	0.0123
		(0.0266)	(0.0264)	(0.0247)	(0.0123)	(0.0130)	(0.0134)	(0.0546)	(0.0538)	(0.0506)	(0.0196)	(0.0219)	(0.0253)
	- former USSR	0.0370***	0.0395***	0.0381***	0.0262***	0.0299***	0.0275***	0.0907***	0.0951***	0.0891***	0.00505	0.0162	0.0184
		(0.00533)	(0.00545)	(0.00489)	(0.00451)	(0.00501)	(0.00635)	(0.0238)	(0.0236)	(0.0239)	(0.0228)	(0.0231)	(0.0306)
	- Baltic	0.0341*	0.0346*	0.0350*	-0.0577***	-0.0574***	-0.0568***	0.0555	0.0565	0.0578	-0.0814**	-0.0804***	-0.0859***
		(0.0176)	(0.0173)	(0.0175)	(0.00908)	(0.00822)	(0.00806)	(0.0464)	(0.0456)	(0.0455)	(0.0255)	(0.0228)	(0.0254)
		DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in IY	- Russia	-0.0729**	-0.0736**	-0.0682**	-0.0337**	-0.0331**	-0.0232*	-0.169**	-0.171**	-0.159**	-0.0444	-0.0431	-0.0218
		(0.0235)	(0.0236)	(0.0227)	(0.0116)	(0.0116)	(0.0121)	(0.0552)	(0.0551)	(0.0540)	(0.0381)	(0.0380)	(0.0385)
	- Germany	0.0159	0.0136	0.0125	-0.00824	-0.00628	-0.00487	-0.00863	-0.0155	-0.0193	-0.0378*	-0.0332	-0.0267
		(0.0211)	(0.0209)	(0.0196)	(0.0108)	(0.0120)	(0.0145)	(0.0653)	(0.0646)	(0.0610)	(0.0200)	(0.0250)	(0.0321)
	- Poland	0.0239	0.0229	0.0195	0.00183	0.00267	0.00440	0.0741**	0.0711**	0.0630*	0.0257	0.0278	0.0337
		(0.0136)	(0.0138)	(0.0129)	(0.0130)	(0.0134)	(0.0149)	(0.0309)	(0.0310)	(0.0308)	(0.0238)	(0.0254)	(0.0294)
	- uprising	-0.0604*	-0.0606*	-0.0645**	-0.00109	-0.000100	0.00919	-0.170*	-0.171*	-0.180*	-0.0950**	-0.0926**	-0.0676
		(0.0280)	(0.0280)	(0.0275)	(0.0129)	(0.0133)	(0.0159)	(0.0893)	(0.0894)	(0.0881)	(0.0335)	(0.0351)	(0.0417)
	- former USSR	0.0456	0.0453	0.0423	0.0181*	0.0189*	0.0205	0.138**	0.136**	0.127**	-0.00240	-0.000191	0.00846
		(0.0259)	(0.0259)	(0.0244)	(0.0101)	(0.0103)	(0.0135)	(0.0455)	(0.0451)	(0.0410)	(0.0177)	(0.0193)	(0.0293)
	- Baltic	-0.0746*	-0.0747*	-0.0699*	-0.0345**	-0.0346**	-0.0366**	-0.182**	-0.182**	-0.171**	-0.0948***	-0.0949***	-0.102***
		(0.0359)	(0.0363)	(0.0350)	(0.0133)	(0.0131)	(0.0129)	(0.0766)	(0.0773)	(0.0748)	(0.0295)	(0.0294)	(0.0309)

Table D11b. Country heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years (IY) for familiarism (support with money).

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY - Russia	-0.0323	-0.0298	-0.0329	0.00386	0.00579	0.00827	-0.0630	-0.0575	-0.0630	0.0676	0.0798*	0.0869**
	(0.0235)	(0.0232)	(0.0237)	(0.00996)	(0.0101)	(0.00981)	(0.0436)	(0.0430)	(0.0437)	(0.0377)	(0.0375)	(0.0365)
- Germany	-0.0281*	-0.0181	-0.0225	-0.0421**	-0.0375**	-0.0401**	-0.0950	-0.0736	-0.0870	0.350***	0.382***	0.380***
	(0.0135)	(0.0132)	(0.0127)	(0.0143)	(0.0151)	(0.0161)	(0.0550)	(0.0531)	(0.0543)	(0.0640)	(0.0652)	(0.0675)
- Poland	-0.0176	-0.0133	-0.00914	0.00282	0.00596	0.00451	-0.0168	-0.00743	-0.000324	-0.00456	0.0147	0.0108
	(0.0162)	(0.0167)	(0.0169)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)	(0.0176)	(0.0178)	(0.0162)	(0.0432)	(0.0423)	(0.0400)
- uprising	-0.0709***	-0.0685**	-0.0707***	-0.00543	-0.00368	-0.00324	-0.130*	-0.124*	-0.132**	0.0439	0.0555	0.0616
	(0.0218)	(0.0214)	(0.0195)	(0.00771)	(0.00795)	(0.00842)	(0.0614)	(0.0605)	(0.0564)	(0.0427)	(0.0406)	(0.0401)
- former USSR	0.0173	0.0210*	0.0175	-0.0137	-0.0108	-0.0105	0.0777***	0.0856***	0.0740***	-0.106**	-0.0878*	-0.0838*
	(0.00951)	(0.00996)	(0.0111)	(0.0131)	(0.0131)	(0.0130)	(0.0224)	(0.0224)	(0.0223)	(0.0460)	(0.0445)	(0.0425)
- Baltic	-0.00891	-0.00811	-0.0103	-0.000134	0.000362	0.00199	-0.0270	-0.0255	-0.0288	0.0134	0.0158	0.0176
	(0.0169)	(0.0161)	(0.0163)	(0.0216)	(0.0207)	(0.0203)	(0.0360)	(0.0343)	(0.0340)	(0.0697)	(0.0645)	(0.0647)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY - Russia	-0.0445***	-0.0438***	-0.0386***	0.00778	0.00908	0.0111	-0.102**	-0.101**	-0.0900**	0.0492	0.0594	0.0677
	(0.00861)	(0.00889)	(0.00942)	(0.0170)	(0.0171)	(0.0168)	(0.0378)	(0.0383)	(0.0384)	(0.0406)	(0.0415)	(0.0411)
- Germany	-0.0445**	-0.0408**	-0.0394**	-0.0230	-0.0198	-0.0225	-0.154***	-0.148***	-0.148***	0.575***	0.604***	0.599***
	(0.0163)	(0.0150)	(0.0143)	(0.0230)	(0.0237)	(0.0243)	(0.0377)	(0.0355)	(0.0332)	(0.0269)	(0.0276)	(0.0306)
- Poland	0.0375**	0.0389**	0.0395**	-0.00813	-0.00566	-0.00690	0.0550*	0.0576*	0.0561*	-0.0300	-0.0126	-0.0183
	(0.0145)	(0.0139)	(0.0142)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)	(0.0136)	(0.0282)	(0.0271)	(0.0282)	(0.0323)	(0.0319)	(0.0300)
- uprising	-0.00494	-0.00458	-0.00659	0.00227	0.00370	0.00251	-0.0379	-0.0372	-0.0450	0.0664	0.0770	0.0772*
	(0.0342)	(0.0340)	(0.0347)	(0.00880)	(0.00898)	(0.00886)	(0.0367)	(0.0360)	(0.0382)	(0.0442)	(0.0429)	(0.0418)
- former USSR	0.0640***	0.0654***	0.0599***	-0.0146	-0.0125	-0.0132	0.130***	0.133***	0.120***	-0.0657	-0.0504	-0.0503
	(0.0126)	(0.0119)	(0.0128)	(0.0146)	(0.0146)	(0.0143)	(0.0252)	(0.0244)	(0.0269)	(0.0372)	(0.0364)	(0.0342)
- Baltic	-0.118**	-0.118**	-0.115**	0.00615	0.00655	0.00809	-0.264***	-0.263***	-0.255***	0.0538	0.0555	0.0596
	(0.0403)	(0.0401)	(0.0385)	(0.0280)	(0.0273)	(0.0269)	(0.0801)	(0.0798)	(0.0778)	(0.0695)	(0.0652)	(0.0651)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Total EC in country groups	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Uprising countries: Czech Republic and Hungary. Former USSR: Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia. Baltic: Estionia and Lithuania. Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need",

downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. General familiarism: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home…”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children…”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

Table D12a. Country heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in total for familiarism (support with care).

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
EC in total - Russia	0.000101	6.24e-05	5.71e-06	-2.30e-05	-8.12e-05	-0.000239	0.000959	0.000886	0.000777	-0.00173	-0.00190	-0.00205
	(0.000362)	(0.000372)	(0.000369)	(0.000552)	(0.000574)	(0.000566)	(0.00113)	(0.00117)	(0.00117)	(0.00115)	(0.00126)	(0.00131)
- Germany	0.00113	0.000853	0.00100	0.00148**	0.00108*	0.00107*	-0.000869	-0.00141	-0.00105	0.00144	4.22e-05	-0.000450
	(0.00120)	(0.00112)	(0.00112)	(0.000495)	(0.000526)	(0.000571)	(0.00354)	(0.00340)	(0.00341)	(0.000939)	(0.000935)	(0.000905)
- Poland	0.00118	0.00111	0.00101	0.00193**	0.00177**	0.00170**	0.00180	0.00169	0.00150	0.00574**	0.00523**	0.00524**
	(0.00106)	(0.00105)	(0.00106)	(0.000677)	(0.000638)	(0.000638)	(0.00179)	(0.00174)	(0.00180)	(0.00230)	(0.00218)	(0.00214)
- uprising	0.000715**	0.000590**	0.000603***	-0.00134***	-0.00159***	-0.0016***	0.00135	0.00114	0.00126	-0.00131*	-0.0021***	-0.00262***
	(0.000241)	(0.000248)	(0.000185)	(0.000283)	(0.000309)	(0.000322)	(0.000822)	(0.000839)	(0.000705)	(0.000638)	(0.000619)	(0.000691)
- former USSR	-0.000920**	-0.00102**	-0.000963**	-0.000163	-0.000277	-0.000221	-0.00269**	-0.00288**	-0.00266**	0.00116	0.000785	0.000658
	(0.000358)	(0.000337)	(0.000350)	(0.000317)	(0.000284)	(0.000268)	(0.00103)	(0.00103)	(0.00107)	(0.000806)	(0.000778)	(0.000813)
- Baltic	-0.00153**	-0.00156**	-0.00157**	0.00198***	0.00190***	0.00187***	-0.00217	-0.00220	-0.00224*	0.00269***	0.00246**	0.00275**
	(0.000579)	(0.000608)	(0.000594)	(0.000439)	(0.000429)	(0.000453)	(0.00122)	(0.00128)	(0.00123)	(0.000801)	(0.000782)	(0.000943)
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in total - Russia	0.00316***	0.00318***	0.00295***	0.000813	0.000794	0.000515	0.00604***	0.00608***	0.00561***	-0.000159	-0.000197	-0.000868
	(0.000804)	(0.000801)	(0.000736)	(0.000731)	(0.000738)	(0.000720)	(0.00166)	(0.00163)	(0.00152)	(0.00184)	(0.00185)	(0.00178)
- Germany	0.00319***	0.00330***	0.00357***	-0.00085**	-0.00099**	-0.00117**	0.00821***	0.00855***	0.00923***	0.00143*	0.00112	0.000517
	(0.000562)	(0.000552)	(0.000547)	(0.000384)	(0.000410)	(0.000523)	(0.00161)	(0.00156)	(0.00167)	(0.000752)	(0.00102)	(0.00131)
- Poland	0.000815	0.000837	0.000758	0.00186***	0.00180***	0.00145**	-3.09e-05	6.44e-05	-4.71e-05	0.00468***	0.00453**	0.00375**
	(0.00108)	(0.00108)	(0.00101)	(0.000521)	(0.000548)	(0.000556)	(0.00270)	(0.00271)	(0.00264)	(0.00140)	(0.00147)	(0.00142)
- uprising	0.00344	0.00349	0.00360	-0.000298	-0.000391	-0.000899	0.0112	0.0113	0.0117	0.00354**	0.00333**	0.00199
	(0.00261)	(0.00262)	(0.00249)	(0.000471)	(0.000536)	(0.000656)	(0.00832)	(0.00837)	(0.00807)	(0.00123)	(0.00143)	(0.00173)
- former USSR	-0.00108	-0.00107	-0.000896	-0.000323	-0.000335	-0.000603	-0.00233	-0.00226	-0.00181	0.00140	0.00135	0.000607
	(0.000959)	(0.000955)	(0.000846)	(0.000387)	(0.000412)	(0.000547)	(0.00156)	(0.00154)	(0.00129)	(0.000917)	(0.000980)	(0.00126)
- Baltic	0.00212	0.00212	0.00189	0.00242***	0.00238***	0.00257***	0.00412	0.00418	0.00363	0.00525***	0.00514***	0.00571***
	(0.00116)	(0.00119)	(0.00116)	(0.000303)	(0.000310)	(0.000384)	(0.00300)	(0.00305)	(0.00302)	(0.000688)	(0.000717)	(0.000972)

Table D12b. Country heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in total for familiarism (support with money).

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in total - Russia	-0.000684	-0.000723*	-0.000607	-0.000417	-0.000457	-0.000555**	-0.00163*	-0.00172*	-0.00148*	-0.00367***	-0.00394***	-0.00420***
	(0.000437)	(0.000387)	(0.000354)	(0.000237)	(0.000256)	(0.000233)	(0.000864)	(0.000795)	(0.000712)	(0.000965)	(0.000929)	(0.000961)
- Germany	-0.00117	-0.00163*	-0.00148*	0.00284***	0.00257***	0.00266***	-0.00452	-0.00552*	-0.00499*	-0.00817***	-0.0101***	-0.0101***
	(0.000777)	(0.000785)	(0.000784)	(0.000628)	(0.000654)	(0.000686)	(0.00254)	(0.00245)	(0.00251)	(0.00132)	(0.00134)	(0.00142)
- Poland	0.000796	0.000661	0.000657	0.00156	0.00145	0.00138	0.00104	0.000730	0.000748	0.00855**	0.00778*	0.00766*
	(0.00105)	(0.00109)	(0.00108)	(0.000862)	(0.000848)	(0.000888)	(0.00143)	(0.00147)	(0.00141)	(0.00371)	(0.00360)	(0.00363)
- uprising	0.000470	0.000330	0.000486	0.000421	0.000257	0.000269	-0.000439	-0.000763	-0.000243	0.00108	-6.17e-05	-0.000271
	(0.000499)	(0.000517)	(0.000571)	(0.000395)	(0.000404)	(0.000447)	(0.000687)	(0.000717)	(0.000819)	(0.00221)	(0.00209)	(0.00207)
- former USSR	0.00107	0.000889	0.000973	0.000603	0.000486	0.000483	-0.000183	-0.000556	-0.000184	0.00389***	0.00322***	0.00305***
	(0.000736)	(0.000763)	(0.000803)	(0.000499)	(0.000504)	(0.000534)	(0.00103)	(0.00111)	(0.00117)	(0.000713)	(0.000817)	(0.000877)
- Baltic	-0.00189**	-0.00190**	-0.00181**	0.000927*	0.000909*	0.000839*	-0.00312**	-0.00317*	-0.00306*	0.000913	0.000665	0.000609
	(0.000699)	(0.000750)	(0.000744)	(0.000460)	(0.000458)	(0.000455)	(0.00133)	(0.00142)	(0.00136)	(0.00167)	(0.00166)	(0.00172)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in total - Russia	0.00276***	0.00274***	0.00259***	-0.000599*	-0.000631*	-0.000700**	0.00471***	0.00467***	0.00431***	-0.00274***	-0.00299***	-0.00327***
	(0.000228)	(0.000221)	(0.000241)	(0.000277)	(0.000286)	(0.000272)	(0.000722)	(0.000744)	(0.000685)	(0.000787)	(0.000683)	(0.000730)
- Germany	0.00643***	0.00631***	0.00651***	0.00251***	0.00233***	0.00245***	0.0135***	0.0133***	0.0139***	-0.0136***	-0.0153***	-0.0151***
	(0.000506)	(0.000612)	(0.000549)	(0.000680)	(0.000696)	(0.000707)	(0.00126)	(0.00135)	(0.00132)	(0.00149)	(0.00149)	(0.00152)
- Poland	8.15e-05	8.14e-05	-5.17e-05	0.00201*	0.00192*	0.00185	0.000501	0.000509	0.000248	0.00782*	0.00711*	0.00693*
	(0.000632)	(0.000658)	(0.000570)	(0.00100)	(0.000992)	(0.00102)	(0.00159)	(0.00163)	(0.00145)	(0.00353)	(0.00346)	(0.00348)
- uprising	0.00381***	0.00376***	0.00379***	0.000201	7.65e-05	0.000126	0.0102**	0.0101**	0.0104**	5.66e-05	-0.00101	-0.00101
	(0.000743)	(0.000756)	(0.000671)	(0.000463)	(0.000474)	(0.000469)	(0.00398)	(0.00403)	(0.00376)	(0.00239)	(0.00233)	(0.00224)
- former USSR	-0.000474	-0.000543	-0.000391	0.00101*	0.000923	0.000948*	-0.000141	-0.000255	0.000182	0.00338***	0.00284**	0.00281***
	(0.000421)	(0.000450)	(0.000434)	(0.000515)	(0.000516)	(0.000509)	(0.00128)	(0.00134)	(0.00130)	(0.000847)	(0.000878)	(0.000851)
- Baltic	0.00410**	0.00412**	0.00400**	0.000640	0.000625	0.000562	0.00819*	0.00825*	0.00785*	8.76e-05	-0.000187	-0.000341
	(0.00168)	(0.00166)	(0.00162)	(0.000720)	(0.000717)	(0.000715)	(0.00396)	(0.00395)	(0.00390)	(0.00135)	(0.00133)	(0.00141)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	No	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	No	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes
EC in IY in country groups	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: IY – impressionable years. Uprising countries: Czech Republic and Hungary. Former USSR: Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia. Baltic: Estionia and Lithuania. Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when

parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

Table D13. Historic empire's heterogeneity of exposure to communism (EC) effects for social attitudes.

		Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in impressionable year	- Russian	0.0305	0.0281	0.0188	0.0883	0.0676	0.000615
		(0.0253)	(0.0252)	(0.0251)	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.151)
	- Prussian	-0.0282	-0.0341	-0.0317	-0.0310	-0.0668	-0.0542
		(0.0386)	(0.0386)	(0.0385)	(0.218)	(0.217)	(0.217)
	- Habsburg	0.0662*	0.0711**	0.0466	0.299	0.330	0.181
		(0.0358)	(0.0356)	(0.0355)	(0.210)	(0.209)	(0.208)
Years of EC in total	- Russian	-0.00192**	-0.00160**	-0.000951	-0.00776	-0.00589	-0.00155
		(0.000813)	(0.000808)	(0.000810)	(0.00492)	(0.00489)	(0.00490)
	- Prussian	0.000729	0.00149	0.00150	0.00293	0.00741	0.00763
		(0.00117)	(0.00118)	(0.00117)	(0.00673)	(0.00672)	(0.00672)
	- Habsburg	-0.00234**	-0.00186	-0.000862	-0.0104	-0.00780	-0.00182
		(0.00119)	(0.00118)	(0.00118)	(0.00710)	(0.00707)	(0.00705)
		LEFT WING					
EC in impressionable year	- Russian	0.0577*	0.0569*	0.0547*	0.371***	0.371***	0.376***
		(0.0317)	(0.0315)	(0.0316)	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.143)
	- Prussian	0.0786*	0.0779*	0.0773*	0.343*	0.340*	0.344*
		(0.0419)	(0.0419)	(0.0419)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.178)
	- Habsburg	0.0674	0.0721*	0.0681	0.195	0.213	0.221
		(0.0430)	(0.0429)	(0.0429)	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.180)
Years of EC in total	- Russian	-0.00293***	-0.00268***	-0.00255**	-0.0212***	-0.0201***	-0.0202***
		(0.000990)	(0.000986)	(0.000990)	(0.00474)	(0.00471)	(0.00473)
	- Prussian	-0.00182	-0.00136	-0.00134	-0.0163***	-0.0143**	-0.0143**
		(0.00129)	(0.00129)	(0.00129)	(0.00572)	(0.00570)	(0.00570)
	- Habsburg	0.000800	0.00115	0.00131	0.00166	0.00326	0.00284
		(0.00142)	(0.00142)	(0.00142)	(0.00623)	(0.00621)	(0.00623)
		EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in impressionable year	- Russian	-0.413***	-0.391***	-0.401***	0.0104	-0.00850	-0.0214
		(0.0926)	(0.0966)	(0.0948)	(0.388)	(0.385)	(0.384)
	- Prussian	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	-	-	-	-
	- Habsburg	-0.169	-0.159	-0.160	-0.470**	-0.439**	-0.444**
		(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.184)	(0.186)	(0.188)
Years of EC in total	- Russian	0.00504	0.00595	0.00574	0.0119	0.0138	0.0134
		(0.00494)	(0.00500)	(0.00501)	(0.00973)	(0.00975)	(0.00974)
	- Prussian	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	-	-	-	-
	- Habsburg	0.00157	0.00289	0.00272	0.0221***	0.0233***	0.0228***
		(0.00746)	(0.00752)	(0.00752)	(0.00742)	(0.00751)	(0.00754)
Demographic controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls		no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls		no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes:. Russian empire: Russia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, mazowieckie, podlaskie, świętokrzyskie vojevodships in Poland (lubelskie, warszawskie, białostockie, bielskie, chełmskie, częstochowskie, kieleckie, konińskie, łomżyńskie, ostrołęckie, piotrkowskie, płockie, radomskie, siedleckie, sieradzkie, skierniewickie, suwalskie, włocławskie, zamojskie). Prussian empire: Germany and dolnośląskie, kujawsko-pomorskie, opolskie, pomorskie, śląskie, wielkopolskie, zachodnipopomorskie and lubuskie voievodships in Poland (bydgoskie, elbląskie, gdańskie, gorzowskie, jeleniogórskie, koszalińskie, legnickie, leszczyńskie, olsztyńskie, pilskie, poznańśkie, słupskie, toruńskie, wrocławskie, zieleniogórskie). Habsburg empire: Czech Republic, Hungary, Transylvania, Banat and Crisana-Maramureş in Romania (Bihor, Bistriţa-Năsăud, Caraş-Severin, Cluj, Covasna, Harghita, Hunedoara, Iaşi, Maramureş, Mureş, Neamţ, Sălaj, Vrancea), małopolskie and podkarpackie voievodships in Poland (bialskopodlaskie, krakowskie, krośnieńskie, nowosądeckie, przemyskie, rzeszowskie, tarnowskie, NUTS-2 regions). Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should

be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 1,715. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – $p < 0.01$; ** – $p < 0.05$; * – $p < 0.10$.

Table D14. Historic empire's heterogeneity exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years (IY) effects for familiaristic attitudes.

		Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
		GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		UPWARDS CARE											
EC in IY	- Russian	0.0569***	0.0594***	0.0589***	0.00997	0.0136	0.0127	0.120***	0.125***	0.121***	-0.00113	0.0102	0.0104
		(0.00984)	(0.00973)	(0.0105)	(0.0122)	(0.0134)	(0.0165)	(0.0173)	(0.0175)	(0.0196)	(0.0330)	(0.0363)	(0.0461)
	- Prussian	0.0149	0.0186	0.0189	0.0310	0.0338	0.0314	0.0362	0.0439	0.0428	-0.0134	-0.00397	-0.00453
		(0.0255)	(0.0243)	(0.0254)	(0.0223)	(0.0223)	(0.0222)	(0.0425)	(0.0404)	(0.0425)	(0.0387)	(0.0405)	(0.0413)
	- Habsburg	-0.0353**	-0.0338**	-0.0329**	-0.0182*	-0.0143	-0.0153	-0.0406**	-0.0375**	-0.0363**	-0.0951***	-0.0813***	-0.0796***
		(0.0120)	(0.0121)	(0.0119)	(0.00925)	(0.00979)	(0.0110)	(0.0141)	(0.0141)	(0.0140)	(0.0216)	(0.0224)	(0.0245)
		DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in IY	- Russian	0.0284	0.0281	0.0306	-0.00147	-0.000922	0.00136	0.0895	0.0875	0.0913	-0.00873	-0.00707	0.00182
		(0.0272)	(0.0273)	(0.0270)	(0.0128)	(0.0130)	(0.0151)	(0.0592)	(0.0589)	(0.0580)	(0.0260)	(0.0260)	(0.0347)
	- Prussian	0.0379*	0.0368*	0.0329	0.0616*	0.0619*	0.0614*	0.0634	0.0598	0.0510	0.186**	0.187**	0.188**
		(0.0200)	(0.0201)	(0.0202)	(0.0294)	(0.0294)	(0.0290)	(0.0663)	(0.0668)	(0.0666)	(0.0704)	(0.0703)	(0.0681)
	- Habsburg	-0.00447	-0.00452	-0.00464	-0.0378**	-0.0365**	-0.0361*	-0.0973	-0.0976	-0.0983	-0.0711***	-0.0685**	-0.0652**
		(0.0332)	(0.0329)	(0.0328)	(0.0138)	(0.0140)	(0.0170)	(0.0834)	(0.0825)	(0.0821)	(0.0209)	(0.0226)	(0.0257)
		UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY	- Russian	0.0286	0.0325	0.0283	-0.00928	-0.00617	-0.00485	0.0897**	0.0977***	0.0860**	-0.0731*	-0.0543	-0.0492
		(0.0211)	(0.0208)	(0.0220)	(0.0107)	(0.0114)	(0.0117)	(0.0297)	(0.0296)	(0.0311)	(0.0338)	(0.0363)	(0.0372)
	- Prussian	0.0200	0.0257	0.0286	0.0194	0.0221	0.0198	0.0462	0.0581	0.0616	0.116**	0.132**	0.126**
		(0.0221)	(0.0229)	(0.0232)	(0.0166)	(0.0162)	(0.0165)	(0.0439)	(0.0427)	(0.0450)	(0.0461)	(0.0501)	(0.0494)
	- Habsburg	-0.0141	-0.0120	-0.0117	-0.0335	-0.0310	-0.0328	-0.0425*	-0.0379	-0.0386	-0.106	-0.0881	-0.0922
		(0.0163)	(0.0164)	(0.0174)	(0.0364)	(0.0361)	(0.0350)	(0.0214)	(0.0209)	(0.0223)	(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.129)
		DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY	- Russian	0.0265**	0.0285**	0.0274**	-0.00707	-0.00482	-0.00445	0.0503	0.0536	0.0524	-0.0384	-0.0228	-0.0196
		(0.0114)	(0.0110)	(0.0105)	(0.0132)	(0.0137)	(0.0137)	(0.0315)	(0.0311)	(0.0302)	(0.0290)	(0.0324)	(0.0319)
	- Prussian	-0.00566	-0.00284	-0.00330	0.00583	0.00792	0.00594	-0.0251	-0.0202	-0.0240	0.122**	0.135**	0.128**
		(0.0276)	(0.0267)	(0.0265)	(0.0202)	(0.0200)	(0.0200)	(0.0707)	(0.0691)	(0.0693)	(0.0514)	(0.0564)	(0.0554)
	- Habsburg	0.112***	0.112***	0.113***	-0.0323	-0.0305	-0.0321	0.169***	0.170***	0.170***	-0.190	-0.173	-0.179
		(0.0202)	(0.0198)	(0.0197)	(0.0336)	(0.0334)	(0.0325)	(0.0330)	(0.0323)	(0.0324)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.142)
Demographic controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes
Income controls		no	no	yes	no	no	yes	No	no	yes	no	no	Yes
Education controls		no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	No	yes	yes	no	yes	Yes
Country effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes
Year effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes
Cohort effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: IY – an impressionable years. Russian empire: Russia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, mazowieckie, podlaskie, świętokrzyskie vojevodships in Poland (lubelskie, warszawskie, białostockie, bielskie, chełmskie, częstochowskie, kieleckie, konińskie, łomżyńskie, ostrołęckie,

piotrkowskie, płockie, radomskie, siedleckie, sieradzkie, skierniewickie, suwalskie, włocławskie, zamojskie). Prussian empire: Germany and dolnośląskie, kujawsko-pomorskie, opolskie, pomorskie, śląskie, wielkopolskie, zachodnipopomorskie and lubuskie voievodships in Poland (bydgoskie, elbląskie, gdańskie, gorzowskie, jeleniogórskie, koszalińskie, legnickie, leszczyńskie, olsztyńskie, pilskie, poznańśkie, słupskie, toruńskie, wrocławskie, zieleniogórskie). Habsburg empire: Czech Republic, Hungary, Transylvania, Banat and Crisana-Maramureş in Romania (Bihor, Bistriţa-Năsăud, Caraş-Severin, Cluj, Covasna, Harghita, Hunedoara, Iaşi, Maramureş, Mureş, Neamţ, Sălaj, Vrancea), małopolskie and podkarpackie voievodships in Poland (bialskopodlaskie, krakowskie, krośnieńskie, nowosądeckie, przemyskie, rzeszowskie, tarnowskie, NUTS-2 regions). Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

Table D15. Historic empire's heterogeneity exposure to communism (EC) in total effects for familiaristic attitudes.

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
Year of EC in total - Russian	-0.00146***	-0.00155***	-0.00152***	0.000622	0.000523	0.000545	-0.00320***	-0.00337***	-0.00324***	0.00178	0.00146	0.00148
	(0.000281)	(0.000274)	(0.000282)	(0.000485)	(0.000533)	(0.000573)	(0.000606)	(0.000616)	(0.000648)	(0.00120)	(0.00135)	(0.00155)
- Prussian	-0.000784	-0.000927	-0.000919	-0.000556	-0.000666	-0.000636	-0.00251*	-0.00280**	-0.00272*	0.00156	0.00118	0.00115
	(0.000715)	(0.000645)	(0.000692)	(0.00187)	(0.00187)	(0.00185)	(0.00134)	(0.00127)	(0.00132)	(0.00362)	(0.00367)	(0.00366)
- Habsburg	0.000644**	0.000631**	0.000615**	0.000871	0.000780	0.000758	-0.000797	-0.000807	-0.000821	0.00400**	0.00365**	0.00351**
	(0.000258)	(0.000265)	(0.000266)	(0.000860)	(0.000862)	(0.000898)	(0.000639)	(0.000643)	(0.000642)	(0.00128)	(0.00129)	(0.00136)
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
Year of EC in total - Russian	-0.000797	-0.000794	-0.000846	-4.67e-06	-8.20e-06	-0.000150	-0.00283	-0.00278	-0.00287	0.000105	7.40e-05	-0.000338
	(0.00126)	(0.00126)	(0.00122)	(0.000673)	(0.000667)	(0.000743)	(0.00327)	(0.00327)	(0.00325)	(0.00143)	(0.00140)	(0.00164)
- Prussian	-0.000465	-0.000430	-0.000299	-0.00304*	-0.00305*	-0.00320*	-0.000658	-0.000529	-0.000226	-0.00676	-0.00681*	-0.00721*
	(0.00179)	(0.00179)	(0.00185)	(0.00161)	(0.00159)	(0.00154)	(0.00463)	(0.00464)	(0.00478)	(0.00377)	(0.00371)	(0.00357)
- Habsburg	0.000540	0.000536	0.000456	0.00216*	0.00211*	0.00194	0.00424	0.00424	0.00409	0.00423**	0.00412**	0.00367**
	(0.000992)	(0.000990)	(0.000974)	(0.00109)	(0.00107)	(0.00111)	(0.00261)	(0.00260)	(0.00257)	(0.00161)	(0.00155)	(0.00161)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
Year of EC in total - Russian	0.000267	0.000117	0.000217	0.000854	0.000752	0.000716	-0.00131	-0.00162	-0.00130	0.00276**	0.00218*	0.00202
	(0.000799)	(0.000792)	(0.000818)	(0.000507)	(0.000532)	(0.000552)	(0.00104)	(0.00106)	(0.00112)	(0.00107)	(0.00117)	(0.00129)
- Prussian	-0.00139**	-0.00164**	-0.00168**	0.000301	0.000196	0.000227	-0.00481***	-0.00531***	-0.00529***	-0.00106	-0.00167	-0.00161
	(0.000572)	(0.000640)	(0.000639)	(0.000737)	(0.000730)	(0.000737)	(0.00124)	(0.00131)	(0.00135)	(0.00161)	(0.00184)	(0.00182)
- Habsburg	-0.00138*	-0.00138*	-0.00131*	0.00214*	0.00210*	0.00212*	-0.00320***	-0.00322***	-0.00300***	0.00620	0.00585	0.00586
	(0.000629)	(0.000641)	(0.000656)	(0.00104)	(0.00103)	(0.00101)	(0.000473)	(0.000495)	(0.000537)	(0.00407)	(0.00401)	(0.00393)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
Year of EC in total - Russian	-0.000260	-0.000332	-0.000321	0.000971*	0.000896	0.000891	-0.000755	-0.000876	-0.000859	0.00280*	0.00234	0.00226
	(0.00110)	(0.00109)	(0.00106)	(0.000518)	(0.000535)	(0.000534)	(0.00271)	(0.00270)	(0.00267)	(0.00131)	(0.00142)	(0.00149)
- Prussian	0.00132	0.00122	0.00128	0.000814	0.000736	0.000765	0.00195	0.00178	0.00200	-0.00121	-0.00173	-0.00162
	(0.00187)	(0.00186)	(0.00194)	(0.000846)	(0.000843)	(0.000841)	(0.00428)	(0.00424)	(0.00445)	(0.00154)	(0.00180)	(0.00175)
- Habsburg	-0.00273***	-0.00274***	-0.00280***	0.00235*	0.00233*	0.00235*	-0.00317**	-0.00318**	-0.00330**	0.00970*	0.00935*	0.00941*
	(0.000481)	(0.000483)	(0.000492)	(0.00115)	(0.00114)	(0.00112)	(0.00115)	(0.00116)	(0.00118)	(0.00465)	(0.00462)	(0.00451)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	Yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	Yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: IY – an impressionable years. Russian empire: Russia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, mazowieckie, podlaskie, świętokrzyskie vojevodships in Poland (lubelskie, warszawskie, białostockie, bielskie, chełmskie, częstochowskie, kieleckie, konińskie, łomżyńskie, ostrołęckie,

piotrkowskie, płockie, radomskie, siedleckie, sieradzkie, skierniewickie, suwalskie, włocławskie, zamojskie). Prussian empire: Germany and dolnośląskie, kujawsko-pomorskie, opolskie, pomorskie, śląskie, wielkopolskie, zachodnipopomorskie and lubuskie voievodships in Poland (bydgoskie, elbląskie, gdańskie, gorzowskie, jeleniogórskie, koszalińskie, legnickie, leszczyńskie, olsztyńskie, pilskie, poznańśkie, słupskie, toruńskie, wrocławskie, zieleniogórskie). Habsburg empire: Czech Republic, Hungary, Transylvania, Banat and Crisana-Maramureş in Romania (Bihor, Bistriţa-Năsăud, Caraş-Severin, Cluj, Covasna, Harghita, Hunedoara, Iaşi, Maramureş, Mureş, Neamţ, Sălaj, Vrancea), małopolskie and podkarpackie voievodships in Poland (bialskopodlaskie, krakowskie, krośnieńskie, nowosądeckie, przemyskie, rzeszowskie, tarnowskie, NUTS-2 regions). Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

Table D16. Historically prevailing religion's heterogeneity of exposure to communism (EC) effects for social attitudes.

		Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in impressinable year - orthodox		-0.0132	-0.0182	-0.0234*	-0.117	-0.151*	-0.189**
		(0.0139)	(0.0138)	(0.0138)	(0.0804)	(0.0797)	(0.0796)
	- catholic	0.00803	0.00553	-0.0125	0.130	0.115	0.00958
		(0.0282)	(0.0281)	(0.0281)	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.167)
	- protestant	-0.0889**	-0.0980***	-0.0880**	-0.301	-0.356*	-0.296
		(0.0356)	(0.0357)	(0.0356)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.189)
Years of EC in total	- orthodox	0.00383***	0.00302***	0.00362***	0.0247***	0.0200***	0.0237***
		(0.000444)	(0.000443)	(0.000445)	(0.00251)	(0.00250)	(0.00251)
	- catholic	0.00357***	0.00237**	0.00345***	0.0142**	0.00711	0.0134**
		(0.00105)	(0.00105)	(0.00105)	(0.00614)	(0.00613)	(0.00612)
	- protestant	0.00604***	0.00568***	0.00570***	0.0323***	0.0304***	0.0304***
		(0.00101)	(0.00101)	(0.00101)	(0.00537)	(0.00536)	(0.00535)
		LEFT WING					
EC in impressinable year – orthodox		-0.0259	-0.0311*	-0.0330*	-0.0940	-0.111	-0.109
		(0.0175)	(0.0175)	(0.0175)	(0.0752)	(0.0749)	(0.0750)
	- catholic	-0.100***	-0.104***	-0.108***	-0.413***	-0.423***	-0.409***
		(0.0345)	(0.0346)	(0.0346)	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.151)
	- protestant	-0.000822	-0.00692	-0.00653	-0.107	-0.129	-0.125
		(0.0367)	(0.0367)	(0.0368)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Years of EC in total	- orthodox	0.00363***	0.00310***	0.00323***	0.0193***	0.0172***	0.0169***
		(0.000545)	(0.000545)	(0.000548)	(0.00241)	(0.00240)	(0.00242)
	- catholic	0.00556***	0.00473***	0.00494***	0.0246***	0.0211***	0.0205***
		(0.00127)	(0.00127)	(0.00127)	(0.00551)	(0.00551)	(0.00553)
	- protestant	0.00405***	0.00368***	0.00370***	0.0184***	0.0169***	0.0167***
		(0.00105)	(0.00105)	(0.00105)	(0.00423)	(0.00423)	(0.00422)
		EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in impressinable year	- orthodox	-0.413***	-0.391***	-0.401***	-0.733***	-0.666***	-0.688***
		(0.0926)	(0.0966)	(0.0948)	(0.176)	(0.182)	(0.178)
	- catholic	-0.169	-0.159	-0.160	-0.334	-0.309	-0.312
		(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.218)	(0.222)	(0.224)
Years of EC in total	- orthodox	0.00504	0.00595	0.00574	0.0106	0.0123	0.0118
		(0.00494)	(0.00500)	(0.00501)	(0.00932)	(0.00942)	(0.00944)
	- catholic	0.00157	0.00289	0.00272	0.000263	0.00211	0.00172
		(0.00746)	(0.00752)	(0.00752)	(0.0141)	(0.0141)	(0.0142)
Demographic controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	Yes
Income controls		no	yes	yes	no	Yes	Yes
Education controls		no	no	yes	no	No	Yes
Country effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	Yes
Year effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	Yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Orthodox: Bulgaria, Russia, Georgia, Romania, Estoinia. Catholic: Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Czech Republic. Protestant: Germany, Sweden. Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 1,715. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

Table D17. Historically prevailing religion's heterogeneity exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years (IY) effects for familiaristic attitudes.

		Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
		GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		UPWARDS CARE											
EC in IY	- orthodox	0.0569***	0.0594***	0.0589***	0.00997	0.0136	0.0127	0.120***	0.125***	0.121***	-0.00113	0.0102	0.0104
		(0.00984)	(0.00973)	(0.0105)	(0.0122)	(0.0134)	(0.0165)	(0.0173)	(0.0175)	(0.0196)	(0.0330)	(0.0363)	(0.0461)
	- catholic	0.0149	0.0186	0.0189	0.0310	0.0338	0.0314	0.0362	0.0439	0.0428	-0.0134	-0.00397	-0.00453
		(0.0255)	(0.0243)	(0.0254)	(0.0223)	(0.0223)	(0.0222)	(0.0425)	(0.0404)	(0.0425)	(0.0387)	(0.0405)	(0.0413)
	- protestant	-0.0353**	-0.0338**	-0.0329**	-0.0182*	-0.0143	-0.0153	-0.0406**	-0.0375**	-0.0363**	-0.0951***	-0.0813***	-0.0796***
		(0.0120)	(0.0121)	(0.0119)	(0.00925)	(0.00979)	(0.0110)	(0.0141)	(0.0141)	(0.0140)	(0.0216)	(0.0224)	(0.0245)
		DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in IY	- orthodox	0.0284	0.0281	0.0306	-0.00147	-0.000922	0.00136	0.0895	0.0875	0.0913	-0.00873	-0.00707	0.00182
		(0.0272)	(0.0273)	(0.0270)	(0.0128)	(0.0130)	(0.0151)	(0.0592)	(0.0589)	(0.0580)	(0.0260)	(0.0260)	(0.0347)
	- catholic	0.0379*	0.0368*	0.0329	0.0616*	0.0619*	0.0614*	0.0634	0.0598	0.0510	0.186**	0.187**	0.188**
		(0.0200)	(0.0201)	(0.0202)	(0.0294)	(0.0294)	(0.0290)	(0.0663)	(0.0668)	(0.0666)	(0.0704)	(0.0703)	(0.0681)
	- protestant	-0.00447	-0.00452	-0.00464	-0.0378**	-0.0365**	-0.0361*	-0.0973	-0.0976	-0.0983	-0.0711***	-0.0685**	-0.0652**
		(0.0332)	(0.0329)	(0.0328)	(0.0138)	(0.0140)	(0.0170)	(0.0834)	(0.0825)	(0.0821)	(0.0209)	(0.0226)	(0.0257)
		UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY	- orthodox	0.0286	0.0325	0.0283	-0.00928	-0.00617	-0.00485	0.0897**	0.0977***	0.0860**	-0.0731*	-0.0543	-0.0492
		(0.0211)	(0.0208)	(0.0220)	(0.0107)	(0.0114)	(0.0117)	(0.0297)	(0.0296)	(0.0311)	(0.0338)	(0.0363)	(0.0372)
	- catholic	0.0200	0.0257	0.0286	0.0194	0.0221	0.0198	0.0462	0.0581	0.0616	0.116**	0.132**	0.126**
		(0.0221)	(0.0229)	(0.0232)	(0.0166)	(0.0162)	(0.0165)	(0.0439)	(0.0427)	(0.0450)	(0.0461)	(0.0501)	(0.0494)
	- protestant	-0.0141	-0.0120	-0.0117	-0.0335	-0.0310	-0.0328	-0.0425*	-0.0379	-0.0386	-0.106	-0.0881	-0.0922
		(0.0163)	(0.0164)	(0.0174)	(0.0364)	(0.0361)	(0.0350)	(0.0214)	(0.0209)	(0.0223)	(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.129)
		DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY	- orthodox	0.0265**	0.0285**	0.0274**	-0.0384	-0.0228	-0.0196	0.0503	0.0536	0.0524	-0.0384	-0.0228	-0.0196
		(0.0114)	(0.0110)	(0.0105)	(0.0290)	(0.0324)	(0.0319)	(0.0315)	(0.0311)	(0.0302)	(0.0290)	(0.0324)	(0.0319)
	- catholic	-0.00566	-0.00284	-0.00330	0.122**	0.135**	0.128**	-0.0251	-0.0202	-0.0240	0.122**	0.135**	0.128**
		(0.0276)	(0.0267)	(0.0265)	(0.0514)	(0.0564)	(0.0554)	(0.0707)	(0.0691)	(0.0693)	(0.0514)	(0.0564)	(0.0554)
	- protestant	0.112***	0.112***	0.113***	-0.190	-0.173	-0.179	0.169***	0.170***	0.170***	-0.190	-0.173	-0.179
		(0.0202)	(0.0198)	(0.0197)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.142)	(0.0330)	(0.0323)	(0.0324)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.142)
Demographic controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls		no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls		no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: IY – an impressionable years. Orthodox: Bulgaria, Russia, Georgia, Romania, Estoinia. Catholic: Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Czech Republic. Protestant: Germany, Sweden. Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take

responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

Table D18. Historically prevailing religion empire's heterogeneity exposure to communism (EC) in total effects for familiaristic attitudes.

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
Year of EC in total - orthodox	-0.00146***	-0.00155***	-0.00152***	0.000622	0.000523	0.000545	-0.0032***	-0.0034***	-0.0032***	0.00178	0.00146	0.00148
	(0.000281)	(0.000274)	(0.000282)	(0.000485)	(0.000533)	(0.000573)	(0.000606)	(0.000616)	(0.000648)	(0.00120)	(0.00135)	(0.00155)
- catholic	-0.000784	-0.000927	-0.000919	-0.000556	-0.000666	-0.000636	-0.00251*	-0.00280**	-0.00272*	0.00156	0.00118	0.00115
	(0.000715)	(0.000645)	(0.000692)	(0.00187)	(0.00187)	(0.00185)	(0.00134)	(0.00127)	(0.00132)	(0.00362)	(0.00367)	(0.00366)
- protestant	0.000644**	0.000631**	0.000615**	0.000871	0.000780	0.000758	-0.000797	-0.000807	-0.000821	0.00400**	0.00365**	0.00351**
	(0.000258)	(0.000265)	(0.000266)	(0.000860)	(0.000862)	(0.000898)	(0.000639)	(0.000643)	(0.000642)	(0.00128)	(0.00129)	(0.00136)
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
Year of EC in total - orthodox	-0.000797	-0.000794	-0.000846	-4.67e-06	-8.20e-06	-0.000150	-0.00283	-0.00278	-0.00287	-0.00873	-0.00707	0.00182
	(0.00126)	(0.00126)	(0.00122)	(0.000673)	(0.000667)	(0.000743)	(0.00327)	(0.00327)	(0.00325)	(0.0260)	(0.0260)	(0.0347)
- catholic	-0.000465	-0.000430	-0.000299	-0.00304*	-0.00305*	-0.00320*	-0.000658	-0.000529	-0.000226	0.186**	0.187**	0.188**
	(0.00179)	(0.00179)	(0.00185)	(0.00161)	(0.00159)	(0.00154)	(0.00463)	(0.00464)	(0.00478)	(0.0704)	(0.0703)	(0.0681)
- protestant	0.000540	0.000536	0.000456	0.00216*	0.00211*	0.00194	0.00424	0.00424	0.00409	-0.0711***	-0.0685**	-0.0652**
	(0.000992)	(0.000990)	(0.000974)	(0.00109)	(0.00107)	(0.00111)	(0.00261)	(0.00260)	(0.00257)	(0.0209)	(0.0226)	(0.0257)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
Year of EC in total - orthodox	0.000267	0.000117	0.000217	0.000854	0.000752	0.000716	-0.00131	-0.00162	-0.00130	0.00276**	0.00218*	0.00202
	(0.000799)	(0.000792)	(0.000818)	(0.000507)	(0.000532)	(0.000552)	(0.00104)	(0.00106)	(0.00112)	(0.00107)	(0.00117)	(0.00129)
- catholic	-0.00139**	-0.00164**	-0.00168**	0.000301	0.000196	0.000227	-0.0048***	-0.0053***	-0.0053***	-0.00106	-0.00167	-0.00161
	(0.000572)	(0.000640)	(0.000639)	(0.000737)	(0.000730)	(0.000737)	(0.00124)	(0.00131)	(0.00135)	(0.00161)	(0.00184)	(0.00182)
- protestant	-0.00138*	-0.00138*	-0.00131*	0.00214*	0.00210*	0.00212*	-0.0032***	-0.0032***	-0.0030***	0.00620	0.00585	0.00586
	(0.000629)	(0.000641)	(0.000656)	(0.00104)	(0.00103)	(0.00101)	(0.000473)	(0.000495)	(0.000537)	(0.00407)	(0.00401)	(0.00393)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
Year of EC in total - orthodox	-0.000260	-0.000332	-0.000321	0.000971*	0.000896	0.000891	-0.000755	-0.000876	-0.000859	0.00280*	0.00234	0.00226
	(0.00110)	(0.00109)	(0.00106)	(0.000518)	(0.000535)	(0.000534)	(0.00271)	(0.00270)	(0.00267)	(0.00131)	(0.00142)	(0.00149)
- catholic	0.00132	0.00122	0.00128	0.000814	0.000736	0.000765	0.00195	0.00178	0.00200	-0.00121	-0.00173	-0.00162
	(0.00187)	(0.00186)	(0.00194)	(0.000846)	(0.000843)	(0.000841)	(0.00428)	(0.00424)	(0.00445)	(0.00154)	(0.00180)	(0.00175)
- protestant	-0.00273***	-0.00274***	-0.00280***	0.00235*	0.00233*	0.00235*	-0.00317**	-0.00318**	-0.00330**	0.00970*	0.00935*	0.00941*
	(0.000481)	(0.000483)	(0.000492)	(0.00115)	(0.00114)	(0.00112)	(0.00115)	(0.00116)	(0.00118)	(0.00465)	(0.00462)	(0.00451)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	Yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	Yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: IY – an impressionable years. Orthodox: Bulgaria, Russia, Georgia, Romania, Estoinia. Catholic: Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Czech Republic. Protestant: Germany, Sweden. Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take

responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

E. Control groups

Table E1. The effects of exposure to communism (EC) on social attitudes using alternative control country groups.

		Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in IY, excluding	- Italy	-0.0123	-0.0163	-0.0221*	-0.103	-0.129*	-0.168**
		(0.0129)	(0.0128)	(0.0128)	(0.0737)	(0.0732)	(0.0731)
	- Sweden	-0.0162	-0.0176	-0.0233*	-0.112	-0.122	-0.162**
		(0.0131)	(0.0130)	(0.0130)	(0.0752)	(0.0747)	(0.0746)
Years of EC in total, excluding	- Italy	0.00391***	0.00323***	0.00371***	0.0254***	0.0215***	0.0244***
		(0.000413)	(0.000412)	(0.000412)	(0.00231)	(0.00230)	(0.00230)
	- Sweden	0.00385***	0.00325***	0.00382***	0.0261***	0.0227***	0.0262***
		(0.000429)	(0.000429)	(0.000430)	(0.00241)	(0.00240)	(0.00240)
		LEFT WING					
EC in IY, excluding	- Italy	-0.0289*	-0.0343**	-0.0364**	-0.161**	-0.178***	-0.175**
		(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0684)	(0.0682)	(0.0683)
	- Sweden	-0.0330**	-0.0352**	-0.0362**	-0.145**	-0.150**	-0.146**
		(0.0162)	(0.0162)	(0.0162)	(0.0697)	(0.0696)	(0.0696)
Years of EC in total, excluding	- Italy	0.00428***	0.00382***	0.00392***	0.0199***	0.0180***	0.0178***
		(0.000495)	(0.000495)	(0.000497)	(0.00215)	(0.00215)	(0.00216)
	- Sweden	0.00433***	0.00388***	0.00389***	0.0187***	0.0170***	0.0164***
		(0.000516)	(0.000517)	(0.000520)	(0.00221)	(0.00221)	(0.00222)
		EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in IY, excluding	- Italy	-0.232**	-0.217**	-0.217**	-0.471**	-0.438**	-0.438**
		(0.1000)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.184)	(0.187)	(0.187)
	- Sweden	-0.232**	-0.217**	-0.217**	-0.471**	-0.438**	-0.438**
		(0.1000)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.184)	(0.187)	(0.187)
Years of EC in total, excluding	- Italy	0.00839**	0.00890**	0.00890**	0.0205***	0.0219***	0.0219***
		(0.00386)	(0.00391)	(0.00391)	(0.00733)	(0.00744)	(0.00744)
	- Sweden	0.00839**	0.00890**	0.00890**	0.0205***	0.0219***	0.0219***
		(0.00386)	(0.00391)	(0.00391)	(0.00733)	(0.00744)	(0.00744)
Demographic controls		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls		no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls		no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 1,715. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

Table E2. The effects of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years (IY) on familiaristic attitudes using alternative control country groups.

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
EC in IY, excluding – Italy	0.0628***	0.0631***	0.0630***	0.0364***	0.0360***	0.0356***	0.154***	0.155***	0.154***	0.0857***	0.0845***	0.0804***
	(0.00608)	(0.00608)	(0.00608)	(0.00806)	(0.00806)	(0.00807)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.0178)	(0.0178)	(0.0178)
- Sweden	0.0595***	0.0599***	0.0601***	0.0316***	0.0312***	0.0307***	0.148***	0.149***	0.149***	0.0689***	0.0679***	0.0638***
	(0.00619)	(0.00618)	(0.00619)	(0.00845)	(0.00844)	(0.00845)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0184)	(0.0184)	(0.0184)
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in IY, excluding – Italy	0.0478***	0.0479***	0.0500***	0.0353***	0.0350***	0.0331***	0.123***	0.124***	0.128***	0.0706***	0.0700***	0.0654***
	(0.00730)	(0.00730)	(0.00730)	(0.00760)	(0.00760)	(0.00760)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0170)	(0.0170)	(0.0170)
- Sweden	0.0438***	0.0438***	0.0457***	0.0293***	0.0290***	0.0267***	0.108***	0.109***	0.113***	0.0583***	0.0576***	0.0520***
	(0.00748)	(0.00748)	(0.00749)	(0.00774)	(0.00774)	(0.00774)	(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0175)	(0.0175)	(0.0175)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY, excluding - Italy	0.0387***	0.0391***	0.0376***	0.0154***	0.0151***	0.0162***	0.109***	0.109***	0.106***	0.0484**	0.0462**	0.0489**
	(0.00697)	(0.00696)	(0.00696)	(0.00569)	(0.00569)	(0.00569)	(0.0140)	(0.0140)	(0.0139)	(0.0195)	(0.0194)	(0.0194)
- Sweden	0.0364***	0.0367***	0.0357***	0.0107*	0.0106*	0.0116*	0.102***	0.103***	0.101***	0.0230	0.0213	0.0240
	(0.00716)	(0.00715)	(0.00715)	(0.00598)	(0.00598)	(0.00598)	(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0204)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in IY, excluding - Italy	0.0529***	0.0533***	0.0533***	0.0128**	0.0126**	0.0133**	0.123***	0.124***	0.125***	0.0349*	0.0325*	0.0350*
	(0.00719)	(0.00720)	(0.00720)	(0.00525)	(0.00525)	(0.00525)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0185)	(0.0185)	(0.0185)
- Sweden	0.0567***	0.0570***	0.0568***	0.0103*	0.0102*	0.0108**	0.129***	0.129***	0.130***	0.0195	0.0170	0.0197
	(0.00732)	(0.00732)	(0.00733)	(0.00543)	(0.00543)	(0.00543)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0191)	(0.0191)	(0.0191)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: IY – an impressionable years. Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

Table E3. The effects of exposure to communism (EC) in total on familiaristic attitudes using alternative control country groups.

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
EC in total, excluding - Italy	0.000882***	0.00110***	0.00109***	-0.00201***	-0.0017***	-0.00173***	0.00101**	0.00148***	0.00144***	-0.00331***	-0.0024***	-0.00225***
	(0.000207)	(0.000207)	(0.000207)	(0.000284)	(0.000285)	(0.000285)	(0.000449)	(0.000449)	(0.000448)	(0.000632)	(0.000634)	(0.000634)
- Sweden	0.000500**	0.000722***	0.000699***	-0.00237***	-0.0021***	-0.00206***	0.000268	0.000751	0.000700	-0.00425***	-0.0033***	-0.00311***
	(0.000213)	(0.000213)	(0.000213)	(0.000299)	(0.000300)	(0.000300)	(0.000466)	(0.000466)	(0.000466)	(0.000661)	(0.000663)	(0.000663)
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in total, excluding - Italy	-0.00235***	-0.00242***	-0.00252***	-0.00254***	-0.0025***	-0.00242***	-0.00736***	-0.00756***	-0.00779***	-0.00669***	-0.0066***	-0.00637***
	(0.000232)	(0.000233)	(0.000234)	(0.000264)	(0.000264)	(0.000264)	(0.000499)	(0.000500)	(0.000501)	(0.000612)	(0.000614)	(0.000614)
- Sweden	-0.0027***	-0.00275***	-0.00286***	-0.00257***	-0.0025***	-0.00244***	-0.00812***	-0.00835***	-0.00857***	-0.00677***	-0.0067***	-0.00641***
	(0.000237)	(0.000238)	(0.000239)	(0.000272)	(0.000273)	(0.000273)	(0.000515)	(0.000516)	(0.000516)	(0.000642)	(0.000644)	(0.000644)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in total, excluding - Italy	2.69e-05	0.000412*	0.000429*	-0.00227***	-0.0020***	-0.00205***	0.000675	0.00148***	0.00147***	-0.00802***	-0.0064***	-0.00651***
	(0.000247)	(0.000248)	(0.000248)	(0.000214)	(0.000213)	(0.000213)	(0.000510)	(0.000511)	(0.000510)	(0.000731)	(0.000729)	(0.000728)
- Sweden	-0.000241	0.000154	0.000166	-0.00273***	-0.0024***	-0.00248***	9.68e-06	0.000849	0.000825	-0.0104***	-0.0087***	-0.00879***
	(0.000257)	(0.000258)	(0.000258)	(0.000228)	(0.000228)	(0.000228)	(0.000534)	(0.000535)	(0.000534)	(0.000778)	(0.000775)	(0.000774)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in total, excluding - Italy	-0.00282***	-0.00268***	-0.00271***	-0.00301***	-0.0028***	-0.00287***	-0.00657***	-0.00633***	-0.00645***	-0.0110***	-0.0097***	-0.00982***
	(0.000236)	(0.000237)	(0.000237)	(0.000217)	(0.000217)	(0.000216)	(0.000461)	(0.000462)	(0.000462)	(0.000722)	(0.000720)	(0.000719)
- Sweden	0.0364***	0.0367***	0.0357***	-0.00365***	-0.0034***	-0.00350***	-0.00691***	-0.00668***	-0.00681***	-0.0136***	-0.0122***	-0.0123***
	(0.00716)	(0.00715)	(0.00715)	(0.000233)	(0.000232)	(0.000232)	(0.000475)	(0.000477)	(0.000477)	(0.000763)	(0.000762)	(0.000761)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: IY – an impressionable years. Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,857. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

Table E4. The effects of exposure to Stalinist, post-Stalinist and reformist communism on social attitudes.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table E5. The effects of exposure to Stalinist, post-Stalinist and reformist communism in impressionable years on familiaristic attitudes.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table E6. The effects of exposure to Stalinist, post-Stalinist and reformist communism in total on familiaristic attitudes.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

F. Alternatives to beaseline exposure measures

Table F1. Estimation results for social attitudes with fixed entry to communism date.

	Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in an	-0.00314	-0.00478**	-0.00442*	-0.0210	-0.0304**	-0.0287**
impressionable year	(0.00236)	(0.00234)	(0.00234)	(0.0131)	(0.0130)	(0.0130)
Years of EC	0.00425***	0.00373***	0.00402***	0.0274***	0.0244***	0.0261***
in total	(0.000533)	(0.000531)	(0.000531)	(0.00295)	(0.00294)	(0.00294)
	LEFT WING					
EC in an	-0.00908***	-0.0105***	-0.0106***	-0.0494***	-0.0549***	-0.0541***
impressionable year	(0.00273)	(0.00272)	(0.00272)	(0.0123)	(0.0122)	(0.0122)
Years of EC	0.00534***	0.00502***	0.00508***	0.0256***	0.0243***	0.0239***
in total	(0.000616)	(0.000616)	(0.000617)	(0.00275)	(0.00274)	(0.00275)
	EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in an	-0.0100	-0.0113	-0.0113	0.0177	0.0194	0.0194
impressionable year	(0.0106)	(0.0106)	(0.0106)	(0.0202)	(0.0201)	(0.0201)
Years of EC	0.00892**	0.00948**	0.00948**	-0.0212***	-0.0227***	-0.0227***
in total	(0.00370)	(0.00374)	(0.00374)	(0.00704)	(0.00713)	(0.00713)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 2,634. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

Table F2. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes with fixed entry to communism date.

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
EC in an	0.0114***	0.0115***	0.0114***	0.00514***	0.00516***	0.00521***	0.0293***	0.0295***	0.0292***	0.0138***	0.0139***	0.0134***
impressionable year	(0.00111)	(0.00110)	(0.00111)	(0.00141)	(0.00141)	(0.00141)	(0.00240)	(0.00239)	(0.00240)	(0.00318)	(0.00318)	(0.00319)
Years of EC	-0.000216	-2.99e-05	-2.90e-05	-0.00237***	-0.00207***	-0.00209***	-0.00171***	-0.00130**	-0.00126**	-0.00445***	-0.00356***	-0.00341***
in total	(0.000259)	(0.000259)	(0.000259)	(0.000355)	(0.000355)	(0.000355)	(0.000568)	(0.000567)	(0.000567)	(0.000810)	(0.000810)	(0.000810)
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in an	0.00890***	0.00891***	0.00944***	0.00330**	0.00327**	0.00315**	0.0231***	0.0231***	0.0242***	0.00599**	0.00593*	0.00551*
impressionable year	(0.00125)	(0.00125)	(0.00125)	(0.00131)	(0.00131)	(0.00131)	(0.00274)	(0.00274)	(0.00274)	(0.00305)	(0.00305)	(0.00305)
Years of EC	-0.00321***	-0.00324***	-0.00340***	-0.00235***	-0.00229***	-0.00225***	-0.00940***	-0.00951***	-0.00983***	-0.00602***	-0.00586***	-0.00571***
in total	(0.000292)	(0.000292)	(0.000293)	(0.000321)	(0.000322)	(0.000322)	(0.000632)	(0.000633)	(0.000633)	(0.000751)	(0.000751)	(0.000752)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in an	0.00931***	0.00952***	0.00911***	0.000439	0.000483	0.000847	0.0260***	0.0264***	0.0255***	0.00502	0.00517	0.00628*
impressionable year	(0.00129)	(0.00129)	(0.00129)	(0.00104)	(0.00104)	(0.00104)	(0.00272)	(0.00271)	(0.00272)	(0.00360)	(0.00359)	(0.00359)
Years of EC	-0.00101***	-0.000679**	-0.000598*	-0.00187***	-0.00162***	-0.00173***	-0.00203***	-0.00134**	-0.00119*	-0.00727***	-0.00588***	-0.00616***
in total	(0.000309)	(0.000309)	(0.000309)	(0.000264)	(0.000264)	(0.000264)	(0.000640)	(0.000639)	(0.000639)	(0.000911)	(0.000907)	(0.000907)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in an	0.0103***	0.0103***	0.0105***	0.00135	0.00141	0.00161*	0.0203***	0.0205***	0.0210***	0.00587*	0.00602*	0.00692**
impressionable year	(0.00123)	(0.00123)	(0.00123)	(0.000952)	(0.000951)	(0.000952)	(0.00245)	(0.00245)	(0.00245)	(0.00336)	(0.00335)	(0.00335)
Years of EC	-0.00382***	-0.00366***	-0.00370***	-0.00281***	-0.00264***	-0.00271***	-0.00800***	-0.00772***	-0.00789***	-0.0106***	-0.00948***	-0.00974***
in total	(0.000294)	(0.000294)	(0.000295)	(0.000254)	(0.000254)	(0.000254)	(0.000579)	(0.000579)	(0.000579)	(0.000871)	(0.000868)	(0.000868)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country & cohort FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,860. *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

Table F3. Estimation results for social attitudes with fixed exit from communism date.

	Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in an	-0.00643***	-0.00677***	-0.00693***	-0.0402***	-0.0425***	-0.0438***
impressionable year	(0.00227)	(0.00225)	(0.00225)	(0.0128)	(0.0127)	(0.0126)
Years of EC	0.00498***	0.00429***	0.00462***	0.0314***	0.0274***	0.0294***
in total	(0.000530)	(0.000528)	(0.000527)	(0.00294)	(0.00292)	(0.00291)
	LEFT WING					
EC in an	-0.00857***	-0.00925***	-0.00935***	-0.0421***	-0.0444***	-0.0437***
impressionable year	(0.00268)	(0.00267)	(0.00267)	(0.0115)	(0.0114)	(0.0114)
Years of EC	0.00542***	0.00497***	0.00503***	0.0256***	0.0238***	0.0234***
in total	(0.000613)	(0.000612)	(0.000613)	(0.00260)	(0.00260)	(0.00260)
	EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in an	-0.0125	-0.0113	-0.0113	0.0387*	0.0371*	0.0371*
impressionable year	(0.0106)	(0.0106)	(0.0106)	(0.0201)	(0.0202)	(0.0202)
Years of EC	0.0248**	0.0229*	0.0229*	-0.0387*	-0.0355	-0.0355
in total	(0.0120)	(0.0120)	(0.0120)	(0.0229)	(0.0229)	(0.0229)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 2,634. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

Table F4. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes with fixed exit from communism date.

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
EC in an	0.00848***	0.00849***	0.00842***	0.00626***	0.00623***	0.00617***	0.0232***	0.0232***	0.0229***	0.0162***	0.0162***	0.0153***
impressionable year	(0.00114)	(0.00114)	(0.00114)	(0.00156)	(0.00156)	(0.00156)	(0.00254)	(0.00253)	(0.00253)	(0.00344)	(0.00344)	(0.00344)
Years of EC	0.000504*	0.000735**	0.000737**	-0.00313***	-0.00281***	-0.00276***	-0.000229	0.000274	0.000293	-0.00624***	-0.00526***	-0.00502***
in total	(0.000292)	(0.000292)	(0.000293)	(0.000421)	(0.000421)	(0.000421)	(0.000647)	(0.000647)	(0.000647)	(0.000931)	(0.000932)	(0.000932)
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in an	0.00477***	0.00480***	0.00510***	0.00379***	0.00380***	0.00356**	0.0177***	0.0177***	0.0184***	0.00793**	0.00792**	0.00724**
impressionable year	(0.00139)	(0.00139)	(0.00139)	(0.00146)	(0.00146)	(0.00146)	(0.00300)	(0.00299)	(0.00300)	(0.00330)	(0.00330)	(0.00330)
Years of EC	-0.00240***	-0.00245***	-0.00250***	-0.00289***	-0.00279***	-0.00270***	-0.00819***	-0.00837***	-0.00850***	-0.00748***	-0.00716***	-0.00693***
in total	(0.000338)	(0.000338)	(0.000339)	(0.000386)	(0.000387)	(0.000387)	(0.000733)	(0.000734)	(0.000734)	(0.000896)	(0.000897)	(0.000897)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in an	0.00840***	0.00837***	0.00787***	0.00297***	0.00288***	0.00316***	0.0228***	0.0228***	0.0218***	0.0121***	0.0117***	0.0124***
impressionable year	(0.00135)	(0.00134)	(0.00134)	(0.00107)	(0.00107)	(0.00107)	(0.00283)	(0.00282)	(0.00282)	(0.00386)	(0.00385)	(0.00386)
Years of EC	-0.000866**	-0.000496	-0.000437	-0.00294***	-0.00264***	-0.00269***	-0.00155**	-0.000727	-0.000637	-0.0114***	-0.00980***	-0.00986***
in total	(0.000355)	(0.000356)	(0.000356)	(0.000299)	(0.000299)	(0.000299)	(0.000738)	(0.000738)	(0.000738)	(0.00106)	(0.00106)	(0.00106)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in an	0.00838***	0.00833***	0.00836***	0.00383***	0.00377***	0.00394***	0.0195***	0.0194***	0.0197***	0.0145***	0.0143***	0.0148***
impressionable year	(0.00136)	(0.00136)	(0.00136)	(0.000991)	(0.000991)	(0.000991)	(0.00268)	(0.00268)	(0.00269)	(0.00365)	(0.00364)	(0.00364)
Years of EC	-0.00323***	-0.00307***	-0.00308***	-0.00395***	-0.00371***	-0.00374***	-0.00739***	-0.00711***	-0.00718***	-0.0150***	-0.0137***	-0.0137***
in total	(0.000342)	(0.000343)	(0.000343)	(0.000298)	(0.000297)	(0.000297)	(0.000672)	(0.000673)	(0.000673)	(0.00103)	(0.00103)	(0.00103)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country & cohort FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,860. *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

Table F5. Estimation results for social attitudes with fixed communism entry and exit dates.

	Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in an	-0.00757***	-0.00875***	-0.00825***	-0.0361**	-0.0428***	-0.0399***
impressionable year	(0.00262)	(0.00260)	(0.00259)	(0.0142)	(0.0141)	(0.0141)
Years of EC	0.00524***	0.00471***	0.00491***	0.0307***	0.0276***	0.0288***
in total	(0.000597)	(0.000593)	(0.000592)	(0.00322)	(0.00320)	(0.00319)
	LEFT WING					
EC in an	-0.0107***	-0.0120***	-0.0120***	-0.0486***	-0.0532***	-0.0528***
impressionable year	(0.00295)	(0.00293)	(0.00293)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)
Years of EC	0.00587***	0.00553***	0.00557***	0.0269***	0.0256***	0.0254***
in total	(0.000664)	(0.000663)	(0.000663)	(0.00283)	(0.00282)	(0.00282)
	EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in an	0.0105	0.0107	0.0107	-0.0146	-0.0154	-0.0154
impressionable year	(0.0131)	(0.0131)	(0.0131)	(0.0250)	(0.0251)	(0.0251)
Years of EC	0.0230*	0.0210*	0.0210*	-0.0354	-0.0320	-0.0320
in total	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.0232)	(0.0232)	(0.0232)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 2,634. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

Table F6. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes with communism entry and exit dates.

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
EC in an impressionable year	0.00845***	0.00850***	0.00854***	0.00631***	0.00633***	0.00638***	0.0249***	0.0249***	0.0249***	0.0162***	0.0162***	0.0156***
	(0.00133)	(0.00133)	(0.00133)	(0.00163)	(0.00163)	(0.00163)	(0.00287)	(0.00287)	(0.00287)	(0.00366)	(0.00366)	(0.00367)
Years of EC in total	0.000733**	0.000938***	0.000908***	-0.0026***	-0.0023***	-0.0023***	-0.000206	0.000257	0.000205	-0.00489***	-0.00398***	-0.00380***
	(0.000329)	(0.000329)	(0.000329)	(0.000423)	(0.000423)	(0.000424)	(0.000710)	(0.000710)	(0.000710)	(0.000959)	(0.000959)	(0.000960)
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in an impressionable year	0.00905***	0.00908***	0.00944***	0.00384**	0.00389**	0.00362**	0.0252***	0.0252***	0.0259***	0.00670*	0.00679*	0.00595*
	(0.00147)	(0.00147)	(0.00147)	(0.00154)	(0.00154)	(0.00154)	(0.00325)	(0.00325)	(0.00325)	(0.00362)	(0.00362)	(0.00361)
Years of EC in total	-0.00316***	-0.00320***	-0.00330***	-0.0025***	-0.0024***	-0.0023***	-0.00979***	-0.00991***	-0.0101***	-0.00617***	-0.00605***	-0.00575***
	(0.000353)	(0.000353)	(0.000354)	(0.000400)	(0.000400)	(0.000400)	(0.000780)	(0.000780)	(0.000781)	(0.000943)	(0.000945)	(0.000944)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in an impressionable year	0.0105***	0.0105***	0.0103***	0.00206*	0.00202*	0.00228*	0.0273***	0.0274***	0.0271***	0.00912**	0.00904**	0.00958**
	(0.00155)	(0.00154)	(0.00154)	(0.00122)	(0.00122)	(0.00122)	(0.00331)	(0.00330)	(0.00330)	(0.00426)	(0.00424)	(0.00424)
Years of EC in total	-0.00124***	-0.000859**	-0.000855**	-0.0023***	-0.0020***	-0.0021***	-0.00214***	-0.00135	-0.00140*	-0.00834***	-0.00685***	-0.00695***
	(0.000391)	(0.000391)	(0.000391)	(0.000321)	(0.000321)	(0.000321)	(0.000822)	(0.000821)	(0.000821)	(0.00112)	(0.00111)	(0.00111)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in an impressionable year	0.0126***	0.0126***	0.0127***	0.00347***	0.00348***	0.00364***	0.0255***	0.0254***	0.0258***	0.0128***	0.0129***	0.0134***
	(0.00143)	(0.00143)	(0.00143)	(0.00111)	(0.00111)	(0.00111)	(0.00289)	(0.00289)	(0.00289)	(0.00392)	(0.00391)	(0.00391)
Years of EC in total	-0.00446***	-0.00426***	-0.00429***	-0.0034***	-0.0032***	-0.0032***	-0.00934***	-0.00900***	-0.00913***	-0.0125***	-0.0113***	-0.0115***
	(0.000357)	(0.000358)	(0.000358)	(0.000310)	(0.000310)	(0.000309)	(0.000710)	(0.000711)	(0.000711)	(0.00105)	(0.00105)	(0.00105)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country & cohort FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,860. *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

Table F7. Estimation results for social attitudes controlling for 10-year cohort groups.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table F8. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes controlling for 10-year cohort groups.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table F9. Estimation results for social attitudes controlling for birth year.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table F10. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes controlling for birth year.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

G. Additional variables

Table G1. Estimation results for social attitudes controlling for the experience of recession in the impressionable years.

	Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in an	-0.0133	-0.0176	-0.0229*	-0.0932	-0.121*	-0.157**
impressionable year	(0.0128)	(0.0127)	(0.0127)	(0.0730)	(0.0725)	(0.0724)
Years of EC	0.00388***	0.00323***	0.00372***	0.0250***	0.0212***	0.0242***
in total	(0.000409)	(0.000408)	(0.000409)	(0.00229)	(0.00228)	(0.00228)
	LEFT WING					
EC in an	-0.0289*	-0.0339**	-0.0357**	-0.157**	-0.173**	-0.169**
impressionable year	(0.0157)	(0.0156)	(0.0157)	(0.0678)	(0.0676)	(0.0676)
Years of EC	0.00421***	0.00375***	0.00384***	0.0195***	0.0176***	0.0173***
in total	(0.000491)	(0.000491)	(0.000493)	(0.00213)	(0.00213)	(0.00214)
	EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM [a]					
EC in an	-0.232**	-0.217**	-0.217**	-0.471**	-0.438**	-0.438**
impressionable year	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.184)	(0.187)	(0.187)
Years of EC	0.00852**	0.00902**	0.00902**	0.0203***	0.0217***	0.0217***
in total	(0.00394)	(0.00400)	(0.00400)	(0.00748)	(0.00760)	(0.00760)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Recession is conceptualized as a year of negative GDP growth based on OECD (2019) indicators data. Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important […] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 41,876; left wing – 32,087; equality over freedom – 2,634. [a] Only for Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

Table G2. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes controlling for the experience of recession in the impressionable years.

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
EC in an impressionable year	0.0376***	0.0389***	0.0391***	0.0305***	0.0321***	0.0305***	0.0879***	0.0910***	0.0902***	0.0712***	0.0758***	0.0729***
	(0.00400)	(0.00400)	(0.00401)	(0.00610)	(0.00609)	(0.00611)	(0.00851)	(0.00850)	(0.00852)	(0.0133)	(0.0133)	(0.0133)
Years of EC in total	0.00127***	0.00145***	0.00144***	-0.0020***	-0.0017***	-0.0017***	0.00234***	0.00272***	0.00273***	-0.00315***	-0.00238***	-0.00226***
	(0.000167)	(0.000167)	(0.000168)	(0.000235)	(0.000235)	(0.000235)	(0.000361)	(0.000361)	(0.000361)	(0.000528)	(0.000528)	(0.000529)
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in an impressionable year	-0.00678	-0.00687	-0.00777	0.0340***	0.0340***	0.0313***	-0.0118	-0.0124	-0.0140	0.0711***	0.0714***	0.0654***
	(0.00539)	(0.00539)	(0.00539)	(0.00549)	(0.00549)	(0.00550)	(0.0108)	(0.0108)	(0.0109)	(0.0120)	(0.0119)	(0.0120)
Years of EC in total	-0.000959***	-0.000977***	-0.00102***	-0.0023***	-0.0022***	-0.0022***	-0.00367***	-0.00375***	-0.00383***	-0.00607***	-0.00593***	-0.00573***
	(0.000195)	(0.000196)	(0.000196)	(0.000218)	(0.000218)	(0.000218)	(0.000410)	(0.000411)	(0.000412)	(0.000499)	(0.000499)	(0.000500)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in an impressionable year	0.0208***	0.0233***	0.0236***	0.0123***	0.0137***	0.0135***	0.0569***	0.0618***	0.0621***	0.0414***	0.0488***	0.0482***
	(0.00488)	(0.00487)	(0.00488)	(0.00414)	(0.00414)	(0.00414)	(0.00914)	(0.00913)	(0.00914)	(0.0140)	(0.0139)	(0.0140)
Years of EC in total	0.000424**	0.000726***	0.000737***	-0.0020***	-0.0018***	-0.0018***	0.00193***	0.00256***	0.00257***	-0.00682***	-0.00562***	-0.00569***
	(0.000201)	(0.000201)	(0.000201)	(0.000167)	(0.000167)	(0.000167)	(0.000402)	(0.000402)	(0.000402)	(0.000585)	(0.000583)	(0.000583)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in an impressionable year	0.00149	0.00271	0.00188	0.00741**	0.00842**	0.00793**	0.00547	0.00758	0.00601	0.0281**	0.0335**	0.0316**
	(0.00537)	(0.00537)	(0.00538)	(0.00377)	(0.00376)	(0.00377)	(0.00997)	(0.00997)	(0.00998)	(0.0136)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)
Years of EC in total	-0.00155***	-0.00139***	-0.00140***	-0.0025***	-0.0024***	-0.0024***	-0.00355***	-0.00327***	-0.00331***	-0.00928***	-0.00830***	-0.00835***
	(0.000200)	(0.000201)	(0.000201)	(0.000166)	(0.000166)	(0.000166)	(0.000381)	(0.000382)	(0.000382)	(0.000573)	(0.000572)	(0.000572)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country & cohort FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Recession is conceptualized as a year of negative GDP growth based on OECD (2019) indicators data. Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,860. *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10.

Table G3. Estimation results for famliaristic attitudes controlling for income.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table G4. Estimation results for social attitudes controlling for occupation.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table G5. Estimation results for famliaristic attitudes controlling for occupation.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table G6. Estimation results for social attitudes controlling for age at communism collapse.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table G7. Estimation results for famliaristic attitudes controlling for age at communism collapse.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table G8. Estimation results for social attitudes controlling for interaction between occupation and graduation year.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table G9. Estimation results for famliaristic attitudes controlling for interaction between occupation and graduation year.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table G10. Estimation results for famliaristic attitudes controlling for household size.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table G11. Estimation results for famliaristic attitudes controlling for region.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

H. Country groups

Table H1a. Estimation results for social attitudes in Poland, Germany, and Russia.

Table H1b. Estimation results for social attitudes in former USSR, Baltic, and countries with uprisings.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table H2a. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes in Poland and Germany.

Table H2b. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes in Russia and former USSR countries.

Table H2c. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes in Baltic countries and countries with uprisings.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

I. Alternative estimation methods

Table I1. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes using random effects.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table I2. Estimation results for dichotomized social attitudes using probit.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table I3. Estimation results for dichotomized familiaristic attitudes using probit.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table I4. Estimation results for social attitudes clustered by country.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table I5. Estimation results for dichotomized familiaristic attitudes clustered by country and wave.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

J. Non-random selection [the final table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table J1. Population average treatment effects of exposure to communism in impressionable years using ropensity score matching.

	Extensive Margin				Intensive Margin			
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
	Social attitudes							
	INCOME EQUALITY							
EC in an impressionable year	-0.0576316	-0.0408426			-0.538324	-0.4572473		
	(0.0099343)	(0.0107512)			(0.0845202)	(0.075982)		
z-test	-5.80***	-3.80***			-6.37***	-6.02***		
	LEFT-WING							
EC in an impressionable year	0.0791387	0 .0599137			0.0559445	0. 1052834		
	(0.0103927)	(0. 021754)			(0.0446092)	(0.0973395)		
z-test	7.62***	2.75***			1.25	1.08		
	EQUALITY [a]							
EC in an impressionable year	-0.1158102	-0.4995824			-0.1613233	-0.9353518		
	(0.03466551)	(0.0374445)			(0.06885366)	(0. 074442)		
z-test	-0.33	-13.34***			-0.23	-12.56***		
	Familiarism							
	GENERAL		PARTICULAR		GENERAL		PARTICULAR	
	UPWARDS CARE							
EC in an impressionable year								
z-test								
	DOWNWARDS CARE							
EC in an impressionable year								
z-test								
	UPWARDS MONEY							
EC in an impressionable year								
z-test								
	DOWNWARDS MONEY							
EC in an impressionable year								
z-test								

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3) and WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: (1) Propensity score generated using dummy for being over thirty years old and NUTS-2 regional rate of employees or the self-employed in farmer and fishery occupations, byear, and (2) NUTS-2 regional rate of employees or the self-employed in ow-skill occupations. Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards

care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. General familiarism: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home…”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children…”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. AI robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 182,330; downwards care – 172,337; upwards money – 169,582; downwards money – 179,393. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 148,216; downwards care – 159,313; upwards money – 142,664; downwards money – 149,860. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

Table J2. Estimation results for social attitudes using synthetic controls at aggregated level..

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table J3. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes using synthetic controls at aggregated level.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table J4. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes using synthetic controls at individual level.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

K. Credibility checks

Table K1. Estimation results for social attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany.

	Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	INCOME EQUALITY					
EC in an	-0.0971**	-0.105**	-0.109***	-0.277	-0.327	-0.357*
impressionable year	(0.0423)	(0.0422)	(0.0421)	(0.217)	(0.215)	(0.214)
Years of EC	0.00645***	0.00610***	0.00643***	0.0332***	0.0312***	0.0330***
in total	(0.00120)	(0.00120)	(0.00119)	(0.00614)	(0.00609)	(0.00608)
	GENERALIZED TRUST (WVS)					
EC in an	-0.120***	-0.112**	-0.105**	-	-	-
impressionable year	(0.0454)	(0.0451)	(0.0441)	-	-	-
Years of EC	-0.000830	-0.000695	-0.00129	-	-	-
in total	(0.00128)	(0.00128)	(0.00125)	-	-	-
	LEFT WING					
EC in an	-0.0424	-0.0438	-0.0322	-0.347**	-0.341**	-0.283*
impressionable year	(0.0427)	(0.0428)	(0.0426)	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.167)
Years of EC	0.00553***	0.00539***	0.00506***	0.0262***	0.0256***	0.0233***
in total	(0.00123)	(0.00123)	(0.00122)	(0.00487)	(0.00488)	(0.00477)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Attitudes on: income equality – "incomes should be made more equal" rather than "there should be more incentives for individual effort", left-wing "how would you place your views on this [1-10] scale", equality over freedom – "I find that both freedom and equality are important [...] if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom/equality more important". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations: income equality – 5,744; left wing – 5,365; generalized trust – 5,618. *** – p <0.01; ** – p <0.05; * – p <0. 10.

Table K2. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany.

	Extensive Margin						Intensive Margin					
	GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UPWARDS CARE											
EC in an impressionable year	0.00520	0.00991	0.00955	0.0721	0.0843	0.0859	0.0630	0.0681	0.0658	0.189	0.216	0.215
	(0.0463)	(0.0462)	(0.0463)	(0.0895)	(0.0889)	(0.0888)	(0.0871)	(0.0869)	(0.0869)	(0.179)	(0.176)	(0.176)
Years of EC in total	0.00135	0.00142	0.00146	-0.00238	-0.00254	-0.00252	0.000248	0.000483	0.000612	-0.00709	-0.00750	-0.00749
	(0.00125)	(0.00125)	(0.00125)	(0.00249)	(0.00247)	(0.00247)	(0.00237)	(0.00237)	(0.00237)	(0.00495)	(0.00488)	(0.00488)
	DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in an impressionable year	0.121**	0.120**	0.117**	-0.00176	-5.31e-05	-0.00896	0.150	0.145	0.142	-0.0838	-0.0738	-0.0900
	(0.0501)	(0.0501)	(0.0500)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.0940)	(0.0942)	(0.0942)	(0.234)	(0.234)	(0.234)
Years of EC in total	-0.00202	-0.00207	-0.00195	-0.00323	-0.00332	-0.00292	-0.00292	-0.00291	-0.00270	-0.00454	-0.00497	-0.00425
	(0.00134)	(0.00134)	(0.00134)	(0.00284)	(0.00285)	(0.00284)	(0.00257)	(0.00257)	(0.00257)	(0.00657)	(0.00657)	(0.00656)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in an impressionable year	0.0691	0.0746	0.0750	-0.0147	-0.0140	-0.0119	0.0685	0.0820	0.0828	0.405**	0.435***	0.436***
	(0.0549)	(0.0548)	(0.0547)	(0.0210)	(0.0212)	(0.0210)	(0.0986)	(0.0979)	(0.0976)	(0.167)	(0.164)	(0.164)
Years of EC in total	-0.00239	-0.00233	-0.00237	-0.000427	-0.000316	-0.000318	-0.00321	-0.00307	-0.00321	-0.0193***	-0.0191***	-0.0192***
	(0.00152)	(0.00151)	(0.00151)	(0.000699)	(0.000698)	(0.000694)	(0.00271)	(0.00270)	(0.00269)	(0.00463)	(0.00457)	(0.00456)
	DOWNWARDS MONEY											
EC in an impressionable year	0.0974*	0.100*	0.0971*	-0.0283	-0.0225	-0.0186	0.0851	0.0910	0.0859	0.487**	0.523**	0.519**
	(0.0528)	(0.0528)	(0.0528)	(0.0527)	(0.0533)	(0.0532)	(0.0922)	(0.0920)	(0.0920)	(0.209)	(0.207)	(0.207)
Years of EC in total	-0.00108	-0.00109	-0.00106	-0.000859	-0.000732	-0.000753	-0.000467	-0.000476	-0.000449	-0.0244***	-0.0244***	-0.0241***
	(0.00144)	(0.00143)	(0.00143)	(0.00152)	(0.00153)	(0.00153)	(0.00252)	(0.00252)	(0.00252)	(0.00586)	(0.00581)	(0.00581)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country & cohort FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Particular familiarism: upwards care – "children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need", downwards care – "grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so", upwards (downwards) money – "children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties". General familiarism: upwards care – "care for older persons in need of care at their home…", downwards care – "care for pre-school children…", upwards money – "financial support for older people who live below subsistence level…", downwards money – "financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family". Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS). Education controls: highest education level attained (ISCED). Cohorts: 5-year groups. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for general familiarism: upwards care – 11,580; downwards care – 11,539; upwards money – 11,528; downwards money – 11,559. Number of observations for particular familiarism: upwards care – 2,922; downwards care – 2,930; upwards money – 2,921; downwards money – 2,877. *** - p <0.01; ** - p <0.05; * - p <0. 10

Table K3. Estimation results for fairness and female roles using alternative data sources.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table K4. Estimation results for care-giving behaviour to family members.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table K5. Estimation results for material and financial gifts to family members.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

Table K6. Estimation results for money donations.

[the table will be provided in the updated version of the Appendix]

References

Szelewa, D., & Polakowski, M. P. (2008). Who cares? Changing patterns of childcare in Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Social Policy, 18(2), 115–131.

OECD. (2019. Gross domestic product (GDP) (indicator), https://doi.org/10.1787/dc2f7aec-en (accessed on 06 May 2019).