Fueling Alternatives: Evidence From Real-World Driving Data

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May 2019


Typical American family will spend $1,991 on gas in 2019



Projection - Gas Buddy , Image - Track Gabe Blog

America's New Pollution King

Transportation emissions have surpassed electricity emissions for the first time since 1978



U.S. Energy Information Administration

Bloomberg

Gasoline, economics, and policy

- Gasoline remains a dominant transportation fuel and transportation now # 1 source of CO_2
  - Policy and technology driven changes to the industry
    - Fuel economy standards, gas taxes, rise of EVs/hybrids
- Therefore, researchers and policymakers interested in understanding consumer behavior in this market
  - Many theoretical and empirical works on demand/search
  - Due to data limitations, most of the literature has had to rely on aggregate data or strong modeling assumptions

This paper

- Driver's choice about where/when to buy gas is complex
  - We use a unique data set to better understand how drivers decision of where/when to purchase gas
- First paper to use high-frequency micro data on drivers' geographic locations and gasoline purchase behavior
  - We observe 600+ variables including:
    - the last station each driver refueled, stations recently passed, drivers' current tank level, distance out of the way to each potential station
- We model drivers' decision as a combination of:
  1. A choice of which stations to consider
  2. Which station to purchase from conditional on the consideration set

This paper

- We then use our empirical model of driver behavior to evaluate:
  - Drivers' implied value of time
    - Crucial for knowing the required density an alternative fuel network
  - Driver's demand elasticity w.r.t. current prices vs. average prices
    - Key to understanding implications of fuel taxes and fuel economy standards
  - The value of full information in gasoline markets
    - How much are drivers leaving on the table? This also provides an estimate of the cost of search in this mkt.

Literature - choice with imperfect information

- Search Literature
  - Online markets, where actual search behavior is observed (De los Santos, Hortacsu, and Wildenbeest, 2012). But, these are often not products that are purchased frequently or in such national volumes.
    - Other empirical search models: Hortacsu, Syverson (2004), Honka (2014), Salz (2017), and more
- Choice Set Formation
  - Sovinsky Goeree (2008), Abaluck and Adams (2018)
- Hybrids: papers that combine search, rational inattention, and choice set formation
  - Masatlioglu, Nakajima, Ozbay (2012), Matejka and McKay (2015), Hortacsu, Madanizadeh, Puller (2017), Caplin, Dean, Leahy (2018)...

Literature - gasoline demand

- Estimating elasticity of demand for gasoline using aggregate data
  - Houthakker, Verleger, Sheehan (1974), Ramsey, Rasche, Allen (1975), Hughes, Knittel, Sperling (2008), Levin, Lewis, Wolak (2017) and others
- Discrete choice with aggregate data
  - Houde (2012) estimates a model of station-level demand based on distribution of commute patterns.
- Search in gasoline markets
  - Focused on search and consumer price expectations as generating price dispersion and "rockets and feathers" price movements.
    - Yang and Ye (2007), Lewis (2008), Tappata (2009), Chandra and Tappata (2011), and many others.


The IVBSS Experiment

- IVBSS (Integrated Vehicle-Based Safety System) was a $32 million field test of advanced crash-warning technology by the USDOT, industry partners, and the UM Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI)
- Sixteen identical passenger cars were fitted with the technology
- 108 drivers from southeast Michigan were given the vehicles to use for approximately six weeks




What data was collected during the experiments?

- Each car had a computer installed that recorded 600 variables at a rate of 10 times per second
  - Vehicle location, speed, acceleration, fuel use, etc
  - Detailed data from the crash warning systems




- Each car included five cameras (two in-car, three exterior)

Gas pump stops identified using combination of GPS tracks and in-car cameras






We identified over 700 vehicle stops at gas pumps




Pump stops matched to daily station-level price data to obtain gas price paid




People don't drive out of their way to buy gas

We use this data to calculate the excess distance that driver i would need to travel to get to station j on trip t and how long this would take.



Drivers are more likely to stop as their tank gets closer to empty



Model of station choice

- On each trip, t, driver i can stop at a set, $\mathcal{C}$, of potential stations
  - $\mathcal{C}$ includes all station within 3 min. of driver's route
    - 99.2% of stops are < 3 min. away
  - Drivers may not consider all of these stations

- We model the purchase decision in two stages:
  1. Drivers consider a subset $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{C}$ of stations
     - Whether a driver considers a station j can depend on vector Z_{ijt} (i.e. has driver passed stn. recently)
  2. Drivers select a station j from S, or the "outside option" of not stopping to maximize utility
     - A driver's utility from choosing station j depends on a vector X_{ijt} (i.e. current station price)

Probability driver i chooses j on trip t:

$$Prob_{itj} = \underbrace{\sum_{\mathcal{S} \in \mathcal{C}_j}}_{\text{Sum over all choice sets that contain } j} \overbrace{Pr(S|Z_{itj}, \theta)}^{\text{Prob. considers the subset } \mathcal{S}} * \underbrace{Pr(j|X_{itj}, S, \beta)}_{\text{Prob chooses } j \text{ from } \mathcal{S}}$$

- The probability that driver considers j:

$$\phi_{itj}(\theta) = \frac{exp(Z_{itj}\theta)}{1 + exp(Z_{itj}\theta)}$$

- The probability of consideration set $\mathcal{S}$ occurring:

$$Pr(S|Z_{itj}, \theta) = \prod_{l \in S} \phi_{itl} \prod_{k \notin S} (1 - \phi_{itk})$$

- Given $\mathcal{S}$, the choice rule follows a standard logit form


Estimation

- We estimate the parameters via simulated maximum likelihood
  - We find utility parameters, β, and consideration parameters, θ, that best fit the observed station choices
  - Large number of potential consideration sets for each trip
    - Avg. trip has 16 stations nearby, so $2^{16} = 65,536$ possible choice sets
  - Therefore, we approximate the probability of a choice at each parameter by averaging over 100 "simulated choice sets"

How can we identify the probability that drivers consider each station?


- Suppose there are 2 stations and "outside option" of not stopping
  - Each station either sets a "high price" or "low price"
  - We see a panel of market shares for each station and the "outside option"
- There are 3 parameters to estimate:
  - β_0 - the "constant" utility obtained from stopping at either of the stations
  - -β_1 - distaste from stopping at a "high price" station
  - θ - The probability of considering each station
- *Identifying Assumption*: The "outside good" is considered with probability 1

Observation 1: Low Prices




- These mkt. shares provide information about drivers' utility from stopping (β_0) and how likely they are to consider each station (θ)

Observation 2: Differential Prices



- These mkt. shares provide information about drivers' sensitivity to price (β_1) and how likely they are to consider each station (θ)


Observation 3: High Prices



- This pins down consideration, θ, given β_1, β_0.
  Intuition: If fewer drivers substitute to the "outside good" than we would have predicted from observation 2, we infer that many drivers weren't considering both stations

Results: Consideration Probabilities

- One specification allows consideration to depend on tank level and distance to station
- Consideration probs. fall with distance



Consideration Probability

- 0.01
- 0.02
- 0.03
- 0.04

Station Avg. Price


- 2.60
- 2.65
- 2.70

Last Station Chosen

- 0
- 1

Driver 65, Trip 288, Tank level=72%

Results: Choice Probabilities



Choice Probability

- 0.000
- 0.001
- 0.002

Station Avg. Price


- 2.60
- 2.65
- 2.70

Last Station Chosen

- 0
- 1

Driver 65, Trip 288, Tank level=72%


Consideration probs. rise as tank level declines



Driver 6, Trip 74, Tank level=42%

Results: Consideration Probabilities


- Another specification allows consideration to vary if the driver recently passed or purchased from each station




Driver 1, Trip 73, Tank level=27%

Results: Consideration Probabilities

- Drivers more likely to consider stations they passed recently, MUCH more likely to consider station last purchased from



Results: Choice Probabilities



Driver 47, Trip 386, Tank level=35%

Avg. Marginal Effects of Determinants of Consideration

	(1)	(2)
Tank Level (L/10)	−0.093	0.004
(Tank Level)^2 (L/10)^2	0.004	−0.012
Excess Distance (min)	−0.033	
Passed Last 7 Days (0/1)		0.014
Last Station Chosen (0/1)		0.102
E[Stations Considered]	1.09	0.76
E[Stations Considered | Purchase]	6.74	4.52
Num. of Trips	22,360	22,360
Observations	352,449	352,449

In a third specification, we also find that drivers consider more stations when wholesale prices are higher

Choice Parameter Estimates

	(1)	(2)
Choice of Station		
"Inside" good	-3.532^{***}	-3.406^{***}
	(0.096)	(0.089)
Current Station Price ($/gal)	-0.360	-0.081
	(0.322)	(0.347)
Average Station Price ($/gal)	-7.150^{***}	-6.773^{***}
	(0.936)	(1.031)
Excess Distance (min)	-0.414^{***}	-0.898^{***}
	(0.081))	(0.059)
Right Side Arrival (0/1)	0.268^{***}	0.266^{***}
	(0.091)	(0.097)
Own Elasticity w.r.t. Current Price	-0.913	-0.203
Own Elasticity w.r.t. Avg. Price	-18.985	-17.153

Driver's very sensitive to avg. prices, but not to current station staion prices

Policy implications

	(1)	(2)	Logit
Implied Value of Time ($/hr)	10.459	24.825	20.8699
Annual Value of Full Info ($/driver)	229.435	338.146	-
Δ CS from Full Info / Gas Expenditures	0.242	0.357	-

Policy implications

- Information is critically valuable in improving drivers' welfare.
  - Some of this will come by reducing stations' profits.
  - Misallocation of drivers across stations causes a pure welfare loss.
  - Not clear how much this has been improved by "Gas Buddy" and the like.
- Alternative fueling stations may not need to be as dense as existing stations to be competitive
  - Clear prices would provide a competitive advantage by reducing search costs.
  - Lower value of time than previous estimates reinforces this result (more work to do here).
  - Density can be even lower if alternative fuel is cheaper per mile.

Next steps

- Refine and better understand our estimates.
  - Allow station average price to influence consideration.
  - Improved modeling of unobservable station quality (e.g. last stop, brand, etc).
  - Improved modeling of quantity purchased at each stop: fillers vs. non-fillers.
  - Understand what affects the implied value of time and value of information.
- Potential other counterfactuals? Ideas?