Tony Q. Fan

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Graduate Education

First-year Ph.D. Student in Economics, Stanford University 2017 -

- Coursework: Macroeconomics I, Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Matching and Market Design, Quantitative Methods for Empirical Research (2nd-year Applied Econometrics) (Waived out of Microeconomics I and Econometrics I)

General Research Interests

Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Labor Economics
Industrial Organization
Household Finance

Work in Progress

"Social Identity, Favoritism, and Motivated Beliefs"

Abstract: Favoritism for own social groups is widely observed in labor market review processes and in the lab. In an experimental setting of talent selection, two candidates from different social groups finish a task and an evaluator observes noisy signals of their task performances. I elicit the evaluator's beliefs of candidates quality and ask the evaluator to select a candidate for future tasks. I measure aggregate favoritism and decompose it into a preference-based component and a belief-based component. Then I provide evidence suggesting that the elicited beliefs are *motivated*: evaluators manipulate their own beliefs in favor of their in-group members, compared with a control setting in which they are not faced with the decision of talent selection. I interpret my results in light of "normed" preferences.

"The Interviewing Problem Revisited" (with Lukas Bolte)

Abstract: We generalize the interviewing model a la Lee and Schwarz (2017). Preferences are correlated on both sides of the matching market: firms have qualities that are strictly ranked and worker quality is the sum of an individual component and a match-specific component. Firms can only learn the latter through a fixed number of costly interviews. We aim to characterize the equilibria as the number of interview slots vary and analyze their efficiency properties. Specifically, we explore to what extent high quality workers face the risk of being over-qualified and unmatched.

"Overconfidence, Selection Neglect, and Naivete in School Choice Markets with Exams"

Abstract: In school choice settings, students often hold biased beliefs about their priorities at specific schools. When the priorities are determined by exams, the biases could result from overconfidence about own ability, neglect (or mis-calibration) of applicant selection, and a general lack of information about the competitiveness of schools. This could have high-stake consequences, especially in settings where students can only apply to one school, as in the Chinese graduate school admissions market. I aim to experimentally measure the neglect of selection in the applicant pools of schools of varying quality, and its welfare consequences for naive subjects. I also plan to test the external validity of the results by collecting field data from Chinese students applying to graduate programs.