Dear Marianne and Paul,
I'd like to submit "A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in
Market Equilibrium" (joint with Alex Edmans and Augustin Landier) for the
upcoming conference on "The economics of high-skill labor markets".
We develop a frictionless theoretical benchmark for the CEO market, with
optimal incentives contracts, and perfect matching, all in market
equilibrium. We can derive sharp, readily testable predictions (some of
which we do test, successfully) on the behavior of incentives and pay with
own-firm and market-wide size, risk, effort. We suspect that much of the
economic and methodology of this paper could be useful for other
"high-skill" markets.
We'd love to be part of this conference, and to get feedback from the
audience. It's a great topic, thanks for organizing a conference on it, and
for your attention.
All the best,
Xavier
--
Xavier Gabaix
Associate Professor of Finance
New York University, Stern School of Business
Finance Department
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-77
New York, NY 10012
ph: 212-998-0257
fax: 212-995-4233
http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/xgabaix/papers.htm
Received on Tue Sep 11 2007 - 16:01:22 EDT
