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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HATRED

by

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Abstract

What determines the intensity and objects of hatred? Hatred forms when people believe that out-groups are responsible for past and future crimes, but the reality of past crimes has little to do with the level of hatred. Instead, hatred is the result of an equilibrium where politicians supply stories of past atrocities in order to discredit the opposition and consumers listen to them. The supply of hatred is a function of the degree to which minorities gain or lose from particular party platforms, and as such, groups that are particularly poor or rich are likely to be hated. Strong constitutions that limit the policy space and ban specific anti-minority policies will limit hate. The demand for hatred falls if consumers interact regularly with the hated group, unless their interactions are primarily abusive. The power of hatred is so strong that opponents of hatred motivate their supporters by hating the haters.

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I. Introduction

Throughout history, hate-filled individuals have paid huge personal costs to impose even larger costs on others. The destruction of the World Trade Center is only the latest example of massive, self-sacrificing violence fueled by the hatred of members of one group towards another group.¹ But hatred, which I take to mean the willingness to sacrifice personally to harm others, is as variable as it is powerful. Before 1945, Franco-German hatred was a regular feature of European life. It is no longer. Racial discrimination may be a pervasive feature of American society, but actual hatred of African-Americans was ubiquitous only in the South and only between 1865 and 1970. While anti-Semitism still exists, the virulent hatred of Jews that was dominant in the 1930s has not been widespread in the western democracies since World War II.

What causes hatred? Charles Darwin pinpointed the roots of hatred in self-defense and vengeance: “if we have suffered or expect to suffer some willful injury from a man, or if he is any way offensive to us, we dislike him; and dislike easily rises into hatred” (Darwin, 1979, p. 239). Psychologists agree. Baumeister (1995) emphasizes that hatred and violence stem from “seeing oneself under attack,” and describes many “hate” crimes which “were felt to be a response to bad actions on the victim’s side.” Fromm (1973) describes aggression as a “defense against threats to man’s vital interests.” The experimental literature on reciprocity (see Fehr and Schmidt, 2001) confirms that subjects forgo rewards to punish people who have behaved unfairly, particularly by rejecting unequal offers in ultimatum games.

Indeed, group-level hatred is always fomented with tales of past crimes and future threats. Hitler blamed the Jews for the “stab in the back,” that allegedly caused Germany to lose World War I and he disseminated the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a fairly

¹ A growing literature now documents the economic costs of ethnic strife (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999, Easterly and Levine, 1997, Rodrik, 1999). Mauro (1994) links ethnic heterogeneity to corruption; LaPorta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) provide evidence showing that the quality of government is lower in countries with more ethnic strife.

pathetic forgery, which described the supposed Jewish conspiracy for world domination (Cohn, 1967). The violence against the World Trade Center was supposedly justified because of American troops occupying the holy ground of Saudi Arabia and because of American aid for Israel. Slobodan Milosevic galvanized his Serbian killers by reminding them of the Turkish victory, and the “martyrdom” of Prince Lazar, at Blackbird’s Field in 1389.

But the fact that demagogues form hatred by telling tales of past crimes shouldn’t fool us into thinking that the level of hatred is actually a function of past injustice. Group-level hatred has often formed against the most victimized (and innocent) groups in history, such as American Blacks in 1876 or German Jews in 1933. Likewise, when members of a group perpetrate vast atrocities, people often fail to hate them. The decades after 1945 have not witnessed widespread anti-German or anti-Japanese hysteria. Hatred may increase with the true level of past crimes, but the elasticity appears to be quite small. As such, while stories of American atrocities motivated the September 11 terrorists, the view that American crimes caused terrorism (as voiced by Noam Chomsky among others), seems as foolish as the view that African-American aggression caused Jim Crow racism or that Hitler was a response to Jewish conspiracy.

While group-level hatred is not closely correlated with the reality of past crimes, it is also not ubiquitous in ethnically mixed communities. Commercial entrepots, including at various times, Amsterdam, New York, and Hong Kong, often manage to mix a dizzying array of ethnicities without outbreaks of racial violence and with little evidence of substantial hatred. Indeed, the diverse America of 2002 contains no major leader whose views resemble LePen, let alone Hitler. On the contrary, Hitler rose in the homogeneous world of Weimar Germany.²

If hatred is neither the inherent result of ethnic mixing, nor the result of past grievances, is there any logic to the formation of hatred? Prominent intellectuals have thought not.

² Patrick Buchanan perhaps came closest to being a purveyor of hatred, but he was both far less successful and more moderate than LePen.

Theodore Mommsen, the great German historian, described anti-Semitism one century ago as “a horrible epidemic like cholera, which can neither be explained nor cured.” Indeed, the self-sacrificing and seemingly random nature of hatred would appear to make it utterly irrational.

In this paper, I follow an alternative social science tradition, and argue that hatred is the outcome of a political market in which self-interested political entrepreneurs interact with everyday citizens. Both the purveyors and consumers of hatred behave strategically. Politicians supply hatred if it complements their policies. If the poor are disproportionately black, then politicians who oppose welfare may find it useful to preach race hatred. Consumers demand hatred if it fills some psychological need (such as explaining their own past failures) or if hate-creating messages appear to convey useful information. The demand for hatred will fall if consumers interact with the targeted group, as hatred reduces the returns to interactions (as in Becker, 1957).

This view—that hatred is strategic and responds to the incentives of both suppliers and customers—is not new. Martin Luther King, Jr. himself (citing C. Vann Woodward) declared that “the segregation of the races was really a political stratagem employed by the emerging Bourbon interests to keep the Southern masses divided.” Many historians and social scientists have argued that hatred is strategic and the outcome of political incentives. The contribution of this paper is to use price theory to model the formation of hatred and to craft a formal model which can generate comparative statics to extend the verbal insights of these historians.³

The supply of hatred depends on the degree to which hatred makes a particular politician’s policies more appealing. I analyze the case of progressive taxation and in that case, the supply of hatred depends on the degree to which the group’s income differs from the income of the median voter. If the group is particularly rich or particularly poor, then politicians will have an incentive to castigate the group to make their anti-rich or

³ This paper also clearly follows the distinguished literature on preference formation in economics, most notably Bowles and Gintis (1976) and Becker (1996).

anti-poor policies more attractive. This explains why hatred in the U.S. has tended either to be against blacks (a particularly poor group) or against the rich.

Progressive taxation is just one of many policies that might disproportionately impact different groups. Trade openness, immigration policy and foreign policy all can differentially impact groups. It is no surprise that politicians who favor limits on immigration, such as LePen, don't restrict themselves to arguing that immigration reduces wages for domestic workers.

Many modern constitutions require equality before the law and forbid policies that specifically target particular minorities.⁴ However, in other times, politicians have been free to propose policies that expropriate minorities. These politicians naturally use hatred as a complement to their policies. As such, constitutionally enforced rules that limit the ways in which the government can target taxes or spending will also limit the supply of hatred. However, advocates of violent revolution, whose proposed policies are not bound by any rules, may advocate expropriating minorities and use hatred to build support for their views.

The connection of hatred and revolution is also particularly natural because revolution relies upon strong preferences. Victory in a two-party election requires only that the voters weakly prefer you to the other candidate— inducing strong preferences has little value. However, revolutions require a passionate cadre of supporters and hatred may help generate this passion.

Two-party elections will limit hate if candidates' policies converge on the preferences of the median voter. Indeed, any institutions which create homogenous party platforms will restrict hatred. When proposed policies are similar, different outcomes won't have a big impact on minority groups. As such, investing in hatred will be unrewarding, and politicians will focus more on standard electioneering. Alternatively, institutions which

⁴ This result comes close to the finding of Mui (1999) who shows that strong protection of civil liberties decreases witch hunts, which are themselves quite akin to the formation of hatred.

empower parties with extreme views, such as proportional representation, will facilitate hatred, because these extreme parties will find hatred more useful.

Finally, the supply of hatred will be a function of the financial resources of the different political actors and of the political power of the minorities themselves. If there are large financial gains related to the anti-minority policies, then a large flow of funds will be available and the supply of hatred will increase. Conversely, if minorities themselves are politically powerful, then politicians will hesitate before pushing hatred.

The previous implications are based on supply-side factors that shift the supply for hatred, but the equilibrium level of hatred is a function of both supply and demand. The psychological literature on hatred suggests that groups which have recently faced a loss will show more interest in vengeance and in hate-creating propaganda. Hate creating stories are appealing to damaged groups because they create a scapegoat on which to blame past troubles. German politicians blamed the crash of 1873 on Jewish financiers and today's populists are quick to blame criminal executives for the most recent stock market crash.

The economic approach to hatred also predicts that a healthy economy reduces the demand for discrimination. When economic interactions are more valuable, then being hateful is more costly. This provides us with an alternative economic explanation of the connection between lynching and economic downturns noted by Hovland and Sears (1940).⁵ Economic and social integration will also increase the costs of hatred to consumers and consequently reduce the demand for hate. As such, socially isolated groups, such as American Blacks or Russian Jews, are easier to hate.⁶ Promoters of hatred have generally recognized this and taken steps to promote segregation.

⁵ Friedman (forthcoming) documents the tendency for political and social movements grounded in hatred and xenophobia to decline during periods of economic prosperity.

⁶ My emphasis on social isolation is quite different from Caselli and Coleman (2002) who emphasize the importance of visible markers in supporting ethnic divisions. Their emphasis on visible markers is hard to reconcile with anti-Semitic hatred, since (despite the claims of various anti-Semitic agitators) Jews physiologically resemble neighboring gentile populations.

An exception to the claim that interaction reduces hatred occurs when interaction involves expropriation. Individuals actually receive psychic benefits if they hate people that they are about to rob or fight. As a result, places with limited rule of law, such as sub-Saharan Africa, are open to ethnic hatred (see Easterly and Levine, 1997). Likewise, countries will promote hatred against nations that they are fighting.

The impact of minority group size on hatred is ambiguous. If the group is miniscule then it is economically costless to hate them. However, it may be that it is impossible to induce hatred if the group is too small to be salient or plausible as a villain. Likewise, if the group is too small then hatred towards that group may not influence attitudes towards policies, and then politicians will have little incentive to supply hatred. On the other hand, as the group gets large, politicians will come to fear offending the group. The impact of group size may well be non-monotonic where hatred increases as the group rises from being negligible to being noticed, but then decreases as the group becomes more important. This discussion suggests that hatred is particularly natural when out-groups are a small part of the voting population but are clearly associated with particular leaders (the Americans with the Shah, Bleichroder with Bismarck).

Hatred against minorities appears to be vulnerable to the countervailing strategy of “hating the haters.” Once haters act, their actions can be presented as crimes worthy of retribution, and turn themselves into potential objects of hatred. Indeed, the nonviolent tactics of the Civil Rights movement can be seen as creating visible victims to inspire hatred of Southern whites in the North. In an extension to the model, I consider the costs of building hatred against the haters. If hatred is rare, it will be cheap to build hatred against haters. Once hatred has become too widespread, building anti-hatred sentiments will be very costly. This creates a positive feedback mechanism where hatred is hard to stop once it reaches a certain level.

After discussing the model, I turn to three episodes of group hatred: racism in the American South, anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany, and anti-Americanism in the Middle East. In the case of the Jim Crow south, race hatred, as opposed to racial discrimination,

didn't explode until after the Civil War. Before the war, Southerners certainly believed that blacks were inferior, or even sub-human, but politicians rarely if ever used stories of black atrocities to create a genuine hatred towards African-Americans.

In the wake of the Civil War, racial hatred was a political strategy used by conservative Southern politicians. This strategy was first used against the Republicans and their black allies who dominated during reconstruction. Later, race-baiting was used by conservatives against the pro-redistribution Populists who would have helped blacks. By creating hatred, these elites managed to make populism less attractive and lowered the demand for distribution.

The case of anti-Semitic hatred in Germany is similar to the anti-Black hatred in the South. While only one percent of 19th century Germany was Jewish, the liberal parties in Germany had a number of prominent Jewish leaders. The disproportionate Jewish support for left-wing parties occurred because the fundamental political divide of 19th century continental Europe was the debate between traditional monarchy and constitutionalism. It does not surprise us that Jews generally lined up on the side of 19th century liberalism against the conservative forces of king, court and church. Secular Jewish leaders hoped that liberal constitutionalism would eradicate the ancient laws which kept Jews as inferior citizens.

However, because Jews were disproportionately left-wing, right-wing politicians turned to anti-Semitic agitation. As John Weiss (1996) writes "from Stoecker to Hitler, rightists rarely attempted to refute socialism, preferring to cite the high percentage of intellectuals of Jewish origin among socialist publicists as proof of its subversion." Indeed, Nazism was just the most virulent form of the right wing attack on liberalism and socialism. While Goldhagen (1996) may be right in arguing that Germany was full of anti-Semites even before 1870, virulent political anti-Semitism in Germany is a modern phenomenon and stems from the incentives facing the German right wing at the end of the 19th century.

The rise of anti-Americanism in the Middle East has similar political roots. The first anti-Americans were the Soviet-backed left-wing nationalists, such as Nasser. The first major adoption of anti-Americanism by a religious leader appears to have occurred in the Ayatollah Khomeini's fight against that Shah and against the moderates after the Shah's fall. The Shah was closely associated with the U.S., but few Iranians had ever met an American. Likewise, Islamic opponents of the regimes in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia use anti-Americanism (and anti-Semitism) as a means of discrediting the current regimes. As long as the U.S. is disproportionately associated with one side of the political debate in those countries, anti-Americanism is likely to remain.

II. The Technology of Producing Hatred

Hatred, defined as the willingness to pay personal costs to hurt someone else, has been linked to revenge and fear for millennia. Aristotle (cited in Elster, 1995) defines anger as “a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to sight oneself or one's friends.” Darwin (quoted above) describes hatred and dislike as the result of having “suffered or expect[ing] to suffer some willful injury from a man.” Erich Fromm (1973, p. 304) describes “vengeful destructiveness” (which certainly fits my definition of hate) as “a spontaneous reaction to intense and unjustified suffering inflicted upon a person or the members of the group with whom he is identified.” Rush Dozier summarizes the literature and writes that “hate is a primitive emotion that marks for attack or avoidance those things which we perceive as a threat to our survival or reproduction...” (Dozier, 2002, p. 16).

The empirical literature linking non-remunerative violence to vengeance is vast. Baumeister's (1995) lengthy overview of human evil documents that people who “carry out the massacres see themselves as victims of mistreatment and injustice,” and “bullies, wife-beaters, tyrants, and other violent people tend to think that other people are

attacking or belittling them.”⁷ Daly and Wilson (1988) document that the bulk of murders are between acquaintances (especially spouses) and almost always have an element of retribution.⁸ Likewise, gang wars and riots are also often motivated by vengeance (Jankowski, 1991, DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998).⁹

The link between hatred and vengeance suggests that “hatred” is common reciprocity gone awry. A large, recent literature on the border on the economics and psychology has documented situations where “people are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to punish those who are being unkind” (Rabin, 1993). This behavior is known as reciprocity, reciprocal altruism, fairness, or spite, but in substance (if not in degree) negative reciprocity is hateful.¹⁰ In repeated experiments, anonymous individuals are willing to sacrifice financially to hurt people who appear to have acted opportunistically.

The best evidence for this negative reciprocity occurs in the ultimatum game where a first player suggests a division of some prize (e.g. 10 dollars) and the second player can either accept this division or reject the division and get nothing. Unsurprisingly, players rarely reject 50-50 offers, and frequently accept 60-40 offers, but “a robust result in [the ultimatum game], across hundred of trials, is proposals that give the Responder less than 30 percent of the available sum are rejected with a very high probability” (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Some authors have argued that these experiments only show a dislike to inequality or a preference for relative payoffs (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), but Blount (1995) finds that subjects are willing to accept almost any offer, when it is generated by a computer. This evidence supports the view that the rejections reflect a human desire to punish cheaters.

⁷ It should be emphasized that it is possible that victimhood may not be the cause of violence, but rather an excuse for it. As such, beliefs about the past crimes of others may be a self-serving bias (as in Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997).

⁸ Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000) argue that vengeance is also a driving factor in determining sentences for homicides.

⁹ Of course, as Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) document, there are always professional fighters who earn high salaries for killing.

¹⁰ There are interesting differences between economic models of hatred. For example, Rabin (1993) focuses on spiteful responses to actions, while Levine (1998) focuses on spiteful responses to the preferences of others.

One modern psychological literature on hatred emphasizes the role of “threatened egotism” or “identity uncertainty.” According to this theory “violence results when a person’s favorable image of self is questioned or impugned by someone else” (Baumeister, 1995, p. 376). While this theory emphasizes vengeance against slights to one’s identity (as in Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), instead of slights to one’s income, it is still ultimately a model of hatred based on past transgressions. The “threatened egotism” model still implies that the cognitive path to hatred involves beliefs about being attacked.

Increasingly, researchers are beginning to understand the physical processes that underlie vengeance. Nisbett and Cohen (1996) examine testosterone and cortisol levels in subjects before and after a provocation, and they find that a provocation causes production of these hormones to increase. They also found that the production of these chemicals was linked to hostile activity.¹¹ This rise in testosterone is similar to the increase in this hormone that is usually found in people anticipating conflict (Mazur and Booth, 1997). As Neihoff (1999) details, when we are threatened, our hormonal system works rapidly to produce emotions that help us with an occasionally violent response.

Where did human beings develop a capacity to hate our attackers? One view, suggested by Frank (1985) and Romer (1993), is that vengeance evolved because a taste for vengeance protects individuals against expropriation.¹² If people are known to be vengeful, then others will be less likely to try to steal from them in the first place.¹³ However, Darwin himself sees hatred and anger as simple aids to self-defense: “the excited brain gives strength to the muscles, and at the same time energy to the will” (Darwin, 1979, p. 239). Likewise, the production of testosterone in respect to an attack is

¹¹ More precisely, Nisbett and Cohen separate subjects into northerners and southerners and they hypothesize that southern subjects are more vengeful. They find testosterone increases in both groups, but a much larger increase among southerners. Cortisol increased on average, but among northerners cortisol fell. Southerners displayed more aggressive actions with provocation, but less aggression in the control sample.

¹² DeWaal (1996) reports vengeance in chimpanzee populations and more rarely among macaques.

¹³ In this sense, a preference for vengeance serves the same function as a rational cultural norm for vengeance, as discussed by Posner (1980).

natural because testosterone helps during battle. Assuredly both views have much truth and the human taste for vengeance serves both to deter attacks or to incapacitate attackers.

A taste for reciprocity implies that if one person (the aggressor) harms someone else (the victim), then the victim will want to harm the aggressor. However, simple reciprocity cannot readily explain why other members of the victim's group who are not themselves victims will start to hate other members of the aggressor's group who are not themselves aggressors. Yet this is what happens in group level hatred.

Two leaps of identification are needed in the move from individual hatred to group hatred.¹⁴ Other members of the victim's group must both identify with the victim and must decide that all members of the aggressor's group are guilty of the crime or are at least dangerous.¹⁵ The first leap is made through empathy (or group-identification) which makes it possible for one person to feel anger over harm to someone else. In the case of hatred-formation, identification with the victim only needs to proceed far enough that the aggressor is thought to be a threat to all members of the victim's group. As such, building hatred doesn't require true empathy for the victim but only recognition of a common threat. The purveyors of hatred will always emphasize the existence of just such an ongoing threat.

The second ingredient in the transformation from individual hatred to group hatred is the belief that the crime occurred specifically because all members of the aggressor's group are dangerous, not because of idiosyncratic elements in the crime. Dozier (2002) links this leap with the human tendency towards simple categories, e.g. us vs. them. Another view is that humans leap readily to the view that crimes are caused by something intrinsic in the criminal (e.g. his race) rather than by his circumstances.¹⁶ Of course, the suppliers of hatred will themselves argue that the entire group is dangerous, not just the

¹⁴ I will not address the actual formation of groups which is modeled by Akerlof and Kranton (2000).

¹⁵ Romer (1999) emphasizes the distinction between thinking and feeling, and argues that the normal rules that may govern thinking do not necessarily govern feeling.

¹⁶ This hypothesis is loosely tied to the Fundamental Attribution Error.

perpetrators. The history of group-level hatred suggests that this cognitive leap appears to happen quite easily.

The formation of group hatred ultimately relies on an innate human capacity for reciprocity or vengeance. This innate capacity means that when people are exposed to stories and images of past crimes, they became angry and hateful, at least as long they are able to identify with third-party victims. Finally, people either naturally believe or can be convinced that crimes by an aggressor are symptomatic of a general tendency in the aggressor's group. Together these ingredients mean that there is a technology through which people can be filled with hate. The goal of the following model is to understand when that technology will be used.

III. The Model

In this model, politicians will supply and subsidize hateful messages to consumers. The political gains from hate determine the supply of hatred. Consumers, if they listen to the messages, will turn hateful, but they can decide whether or not to listen. The willingness of consumers to listen reflects the demand for hatred. I first address the demand for hatred and then turn to the supply and then turn to the overall equilibrium.

The Demand for Hatred

There are two groups in society and I will focus entirely on hatred of the majority group to the minority.¹⁷ The proportion of minorities in the population is denoted “ p ”. The non-political aspect of the model is captured by assuming that people interact with each other (either socially or economically) and each interaction yields total benefits of B . These benefits are split equally when the two people are from the same group, but when people from different ethnic groups interact, the individual from the majority group receives “ s ” percent of the benefits. I assume $1 > s$. If $s > 1$, then majority group members

¹⁷ I assume that minorities are not hateful. This clearly counterfactual assumption helps me to focus on the main ideas in the model.

are essentially stealing from minorities, and hatred would be an attractive complement to these activities. This may explain why soldiers or racist political activists often seem to be happy to listen to stories about the evils of the opposition.

Society is segregated: a proportion $(1-m)$ of all interactions occur only within a person's own group. The remainder occurs with a random sample of the population; $1-p$ percent of those interactions will also be with members of the individual's own group. . Thus, $1-mp$ percent of a majority member's interactions occur with his own group and mp percent occur with minority members. The economic returns that a majority group member gains from his interactions equals B times $.5(1-mp)+smp$.

The role of hatred in economic interactions is that a hateful individual loses utility of A (an animosity parameter) times the benefits that he provides to a member of the minority group, or conversely a benefit of A times the harm that he causes. Thus, the total losses due to hatred from interactions with minorities will equal $(1-s)mpBA$.¹⁸ I assume that A is less than $s/(1-s)$ so that hatred doesn't stop inter-group interactions altogether.¹⁹

Including the material and psychic returns from interactions, the total market returns for people who hate are $B(.5 + mp((s - .5) - (1 - s)A))$.

In this model, non-haters become haters if they spend enough time hearing about the atrocities of the minority group. Following the psychological literature discussed above, I assume that if non-haters listen to stories about past and future crimes by the minority group for t units of time, they become hateful with probability $\pi(t)$, where $\pi'(t) > 0$.

The total expected market returns from listening to messages of hate, for an initially non-hateful person, equal $-\pi(t)mpA(1-s)BA$. Economic and social interactions make hatred costly (as in Becker, 1957).

¹⁸ I am assuming that hatred is not selective and individuals can't decide not to hate specific members of the minority group. In reality, people often seem able to say that their minority friends are different and this would act to reduce the costs of hatred. Of course, as I discussed earlier the formation of group hatred relies on making the case that minorities are the same.

If hatred detracts from beneficial interactions, why do people listen to hateful messages about other groups?²⁰ There are at least four different reasons why people listen to messages of hate. First, hateful messages, which tell about the crimes of minorities, may appear to contain useful information. For example, in 1953, Stalin started a plot to remove the Russian Jews from cities, presumably to camps.²¹ The key allegation was that Jewish doctors were poisoners and as a result “patients refused to accept treatment from Jewish doctors, contending that they would be poisoned” (Heller and Nekrich, 1986, p. 503). More generally, when someone says that a group is out to destroy you, unless you are completely sure that the statement is nonsense, self-preservation motivates attention.²²

A second source of demand is that messages of hate are often subsidized. Nazis and southern racists often combined their demagoguery with social services and entertainment. Osama Bin Laden got his entrée into Afghan society by distributing largesse to the downtrodden. As the degree of subsidy is chosen by politicians, I will focus on this force.

A third reason why people listen to hate is that these messages are frequently wrapped up in titillating stories. In the 19th century, both anti-Semitic hatred and anti-Black hatred were fanned with tales of the hated group seducing or raping attractive gentile or white females. The young Hitler’s “favorite tabloid ‘revealed’ that ‘Jewish’ pimps, brothel owners, and white slavers seduced Aryan virgins in order to pollute their blood” (Weiss, 1995, p. 198). Neither the supply nor the demand for such stories seems related to their veracity, and as such, I think of the degree of excitement as being a function of the degree of subsidy provided by the political leader.

¹⁹ If this condition did hold, little in the model would change except the comparative statics would disappear. In a richer model, rising hatred would both entail psychic losses and reduced trade.

²⁰ I am avoiding any discussion of direct utility from hatred. In most cases this will be negative and will serve as an added break on the demand for hatred.

²¹ As usual, Stalin’s political motives are opaque. His plan may have been motivated by his own extreme anti-Semitism or by a desire to use anti-Semitic fury politically or by his view that a number of Jews were dangerous to him politically.

²² This aspect of the demand for hatred is close to the witch hunt model of Mui (1999).

These three explanations are all compatible with a simple economic view, where people like subsidies, exciting stories and information. However, psychologists have identified a fourth source of demand for hateful stories which seems at least as important. The demonization of minorities can provide an external explanation for catastrophes. The Germans could blame the loss in World War I on the Jews, and Arabs can blame their poverty on America and Israel. According to this view, people want an explanation (other than their own mistakes) for their problems, and the preachers of hatred provide a balm to their self-esteem.²³

Instead of modeling each one of these stories, I will assume that individuals receive benefits from hatred equal to $V((r + d)t)$, where r reflects the innate interest in the subsidy and d reflects the level of subsidy. This function is assumed to be concave, and at least initially increasing. For high enough levels of $(r+d)t$, $V'((r+d)t)$ may be negative. Given a fixed subsidy level of “ d ,” the initially non-hateful consumers will choose their exposure to hatred, “ t ,” to maximize the benefits of listening to subsidized hatred minus the costs of disliking people with whom you interact. As such, the consumer maximizes: $V((r + d)t) + B(.5 + mp(s - .5) - \pi(t)mpA(1 - s))$, which yields first order condition: $V'((r + d)t)(r + d) = \pi'(t)BmpA(1 - s)$.²⁴

To ensure that second order conditions hold, and to ensure that an increase in the subsidy of hatred increases the amount of hatred, I assume:

$$\text{Assumption 1: } 1 > -\frac{V''(x)x}{V'(x)} > -\frac{\pi''(x)x}{\pi'(x)}.$$

This assumption implies that an increase in “ d ” increases the willingness to listen to hatred, essentially because the “price effect” dominates satiation. This assumption implies:

²³ This explanation for hatred is emphasized by Baumeister (1995). This demand for hateful stories could be formalized using an identity model such as that of Akerlof and Kranton (2000).

²⁴ I assume that consumers do not internalize the impact of their hatred on the political process and get no direct utility from voting.

Proposition 1: The amount of time spent listening to hate and consequently the level of hate is rising with d and r . The amount of hate is falling with s and with B , m , p and A (if and only if $s < 1$).

Proposition 1 gives us the comforting result that higher subsidies increase the level of hatred. Increases in the value of s increase hatred because economic or social interactions become more exploitative. If interacting with the minority group primarily means doing them harm, then hatred becomes more attractive. If s is low, then the majority members tend to help minorities through interactions and as a result, hatred will be more painful for them.

The economic costs of hatred are increasing with B , m and p . Higher levels of B mean that economic interactions are more lucrative, and as such listening to hatred does more harm. This may explain the stylized fact that outbreaks of racial violence are associated with economic downturns (e.g. Hovland and Sears, 1940).

Higher levels of p and m both lead to more economic interactions with minorities, and integration increases the costs of hatred. The positive impact of interaction is not that familiarity generates positive information, but rather that it is painful to walk around hating people with whom you regularly interact. Of course, if interactions are primarily competitive (whites and blacks looking for the same jobs) or exploitative (SA troopers harassing Jewish shopkeepers), then there is no cost in being hateful.

I am treating r as a demand shift parameter, but the discussion above gives us a guide to the forces which would increase r . If the interest in hate-creating messages is created by a demand for information then the level of r will increase with the level of salience of the out-group and the potential of the group to do harm. The level of “ r ” might also increase with the true crimes of the minority group. In the history section of this paper, I will argue that the elasticity of “ d ” with respect to true crimes is actually quite small and that it seems to be almost as easy to motivate hatred with fictional stories as with real ones.

If hatred provides explanations for misfortunes, then r might be a function $r(y - \tilde{y})$, where y reflects income and \tilde{y} reflects a relevant income benchmark (such as past income or median income in society). This adoption of the model would predict that hatred should flourish during recessions or after military defeats. It would also predict that hatred is particularly appealing to the less successful members of society (see Woodward, 1953, for example).

There is an initial proportion of the population, denoted π_0 that is hateful, and therefore that total population that is hateful after listening to the messages of hate will equal $\pi_0 + (1 - \pi_0)\pi(t)$.

The Supply of Hatred

I assume two politicians (or parties), each of whom maximizes the number of votes they receive. In a more general model, politicians might also care about intensity of support, particularly if they are trying to engage in violence. Indeed, as hatred generates strong emotions, it will be particularly valued by political groups that hope to come to power through force.

There is a discrete policy space with two possible tax policies: a lump sum tax of “ q ” per person (where q is per capita government spending) and a redistributive tax where individuals pay $q + \tau(y - \hat{y})$ where \hat{y} is the average income in society.²⁵ In the absence of hatred and electioneering, individuals would support redistribution if and only if their income is above the mean income in society (as in Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Each

²⁵ In principle, these policies could be the outcome of some earlier political game.

politician makes a binding commitment to one of the two fixed policies.²⁶ In a richer model, the policy choice would be fully endogenous.²⁷

Political candidates have exogenously determined campaign funds, denoted w_R and w_L for the redistribution and lump sum candidates respectively. These funds can either be spent on routine electoral spending or on building hatred. Routine electoral spending builds popularity, specifically, the relative popularity of the redistribution candidate equals $v(e_R - e_L)$, where $v(\cdot)$ is convex and symmetric around zero, and where $e_R - e_L$ is the difference in routine electoral spending between the redistribution candidate (e_R) and the lump sum candidate (e_L). Non-hateful voters will support the redistribution candidate if $v(e_R - e_L)$ is greater than the taxes they save with y lump sum, as opposed to redistributive, taxation, i.e. if $v(e_R - e_L) > \tau(y - \hat{y})$, or $\hat{y} + v(e_R - e_L)/\tau > y$.

Hatred induces people to base their votes both on their private benefits (which include the $v(e_R - e_L)$ term plus tax benefits) and their dislike of the minority. I assume that hateful votes receive negative utility if they vote for a policy of A times the average benefit that the policy gives to members of the minority group times $\mu(p)$. The function $\mu(p)$ is meant to capture the possibility that individuals are bothered more by transferring income to large minority groups than to small minority groups. As such, the negative utility caused by hatred from supporting the pro-redistribution policy equals

$\mu(p)A\tau(y_{MIN} - \hat{y})$, where y_{MIN} denotes the average income in the minority group. As such, hateful members of the majority group only support the pro-redistribution candidate if $\hat{y} + v(e_R - e_L)/\tau + \mu(p)A(y_{MIN} - \hat{y}) > y$.

In the case of minorities, I assume that they vote their economic self-interest, except for the fact that they tend to hate candidates who preach hatred. This tendency is natural—

²⁶ This assumption is justified if free entry assures that someone will always try to represent one of the policies (if the situation is stochastic enough so that anyone might win), but if groups can coordinate enough so to ensure that there will not be multiple candidates splitting the vote for one policy.

²⁷ Endogenous policy significantly complicates the situation. If the two candidates converge on a single policy, then hatred will be minimized. If other factors limit this convergence, then hatred will be higher.

preaching hatred is, of course, an attack on them, and, as I have emphasized throughout this paper, hatred is a response to being attacked. This hatred is captured with a function $h(d)$ (where $h(0)=0$, and $h(d)$ is increasing and weakly convex), so that minorities support the anti-redistribution candidate if and only if their level of income, y , is greater than $\hat{y} + (v(e_R - e_L) + h(d)) / \tau$.

For simplicity, I assume that income is distributed uniformly with density $\frac{1}{2z}$ around y_{MIN} for the minority group and around y_{MAJ} for the majority group, where “ z ” is large enough so that some members of each group end up supporting each candidate.²⁸ If we denote $\Delta = y_{MAJ} - y_{MIN}$ and let π denote the proportion of majority members who hate equals, then the total electoral support for the anti-redistribution candidate equals:

$$(1) \quad .5 - (v(e_R - e_L) + ph(d)) / 2z\tau + \pi\mu(p)A(1-p)^2 \Delta / 2z$$

Equation (1) is increasing with π if and only if $\Delta > 0$. This implies that hatred towards the minority will be pushed by pro-redistribution candidates if minorities are rich and by the anti-redistribution candidate if minorities are poor. When a visible minority group is poor (such as Blacks in the post-Bellum South), then hatred will be a tool of the right, but when a minority group appears to be rich (such as Jews in Germany) then hatred may also be used by the left. If $\Delta > 0$, which we assume for the rest of the next two subsections, then the anti-redistribution candidate wants to “shape the electorate” by making them more hateful.²⁹

The pro-redistribution candidate will spend all of his resources on standard electioneering and as such $e_R = w_R$. The anti-redistribution candidate will need to share his resources between redistribution and building hate so that $w_L = e_L + d$. As $\pi = \pi_0 + (1 - \pi_0)\pi(t)$

²⁸ In practice, it often appears that $h(d)$ is large enough that no minorities end up voting for the hateful candidate (i.e. Jewish support for Hitler was non-existent).

²⁹ There is obviously a link between forming hatred and the Curley Effect (see Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002).

and using the result of the previous section, I can define a function $t(d)$, where $t'(d) > 0$, the anti-redistribution candidate will choose d to maximize:

$$(1') \quad .5 - (v(w_R - w_L + d) + ph(d)) / 2z\tau + (\pi_0 + (1 - \pi_0)\pi(t(d)))\mu(p)A(1 - p)^2 \Delta / 2z$$

which yields first order condition:

$$(2) \quad v'(w_R - w_L + d) + ph'(d) = (1 - \pi_0)\mu(p)A\tau(1 - p)^2 \Delta \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial t} \frac{\partial t}{\partial d}$$

If second order conditions hold, which I assume, this comparative static leads towards the second proposition about factors which influence the supply of hatred:

Proposition 2: The expenditure on hatred is falling with π_0 and w_R . The expenditure on hatred (and level of hatred) is rising with τ , w_L and Δ . If $h(d) = h_0 + h_1 d$, then the expenditure on hatred and the level of hatred is falling with h_1 .

An increase in π_0 means that the population is already hateful so there is little need to continue preaching hatred. This comparative static reflects diminishing returns, but as I will discuss later there are also features of hatred that lead it to have increasing returns aspects as well. A higher level of w_R , which might be the result of greater electoral organization of minorities, means that there is more spending on the pro-redistribution candidate. Since $v(\cdot)$ is convex this increases the marginal benefit of spending on standard electioneering. Likewise higher levels of w_L , which reflect greater financial resources mobilized against redistribution, will create a standard income effect where more wealth will be spent on both standard electioneering and on hatred.

Increases in τ and Δ mean that the inter-group level impact of redistribution is higher. A high value of τ means that the policy distance between the two candidates is greater. Therefore the victory of the pro-redistribution candidate is likely to give more to

minorities, and as a result “playing the race card” becomes more appealing. This means that electoral systems that yield little heterogeneity among candidates are likely to be full of standard electioneering and have little hatred. Systems that produce candidates with wildly different policies, especially if those policies either particularly help or hurt minorities, are likely to create hatred.

The comparative static on Δ has a similar logic. Only when minorities are radically different from the majority, in policy-relevant ways, will there be a large supply of hatred. In this framework, the differences are purely economic, but they need not be. Hatred is likely to be supplied in any situation where attributes of minorities mean that debated government policies will disproportionately impact them.

An increase in h_1 reflects a greater political response of the minority population itself to the spreading of hatred. In populations where minorities are large and where they respond swiftly to the spreading of hate, politicians will tend to lose votes by pushing hatred. This may help us explain why hatred has not become endemic in many pluralistic societies.

Supply and Demand Together

At this point, I assume that $V(x) = \alpha((r + d)t)^{1-\sigma} / (1 - \sigma)$ and $\pi(x) = \text{Max}(1, \theta t)$. I only consider the region where $1/\theta > t$. Together these functions imply that

$$t = (r + d)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{\theta B m p A (1-s)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

and π equals θ times that amount. With these

assumptions, Proposition 3 follows:

Proposition 3: The equilibrium level of hatred is rising with Δ , t , and w_L and falling with w_R .

The equilibrium level of hatred is rising with s , r and α and declining with both B and m .

The equilibrium proportion of people who hate is declining with A and θ .

The equilibrium level of hatred is rising with p if and only if

$$\frac{\mu'(p)p}{\mu(p)} > \frac{2p}{1-p} + \frac{ph'(d)}{v'(w_R - w_L + d) + ph'(d)} + \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \left(1 + \frac{(d+r)(v''(w_R - w_L + d) + ph''(d))}{v'(w_R - w_L + d) + ph'(d)} \right)$$

The intuition of most of these comparative statics has already been discussed. The variables Δ , t , w_L and w_R all impact hatred because they change the politicians' incentive to supply hate. The variables B and m are demand shifters and they impact hate because they raise the costs of hatred to consumers. Increases in s lower the cost of hate and increases in r raise the benefit of hate to consumers and as such, they both shift demand outward.

The variable A and θ increases the supply of hate, but also reduces the demand since higher values of A and θ make listening to hatred more costly. The demand effect dominates.

The impact of “ p ” is most interesting. Higher levels of p have an immediate demand effect which acts to reduce hatred—a larger minority is costlier to hate. In principle, p might also increase r (by increasing the salience of the minority) and this would work in the opposite direction. Higher levels of p also have a supply effect which reduces hatred: as the minority gets larger, it makes more sense to spend on standard electioneering (which affects everyone) and less sense to spend on hatred (which only affects the majority group). The only countervailing force occurs through the impact of minority size on their salience to majority haters, which is captured with the $\mu(p)$ term.

A non-monotonic relationship between minority size and hatred is also possible. If $\mu(p)$ is effectively zero, so minorities just aren't on the radar screen of majority voters, then there is little incentive to supply hate. After that point, a rise in p may increase hatred because minorities become more salient and more relevant to policy debates. Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) suggest just such non-monotonic dynamics. Initially,

the influx of blacks into northern cities created an outburst of racist action, but eventually as blacks became more powerful politically, politicians generally avoided race-baiting.

Anti-Minority Policies

I have so far assumed that there is only one policy dimension: the progressivity of the income tax. This model, in that form, will have trouble addressing the rise of anti-Semitic hatred in 19th and 20th century Germany. The 19th century began with specific anti-Jewish policies and throughout the next 145 years, politicians regularly proposed new policies which would discriminate against Jews. In this section, I ask whether the existence of specifically anti-minority policies will increase the supply of hatred. Second, I ask whether politicians will gain by proposing specifically anti-minority policies.

To address the first question, I assume that the anti-minority policies are exogenously tied to each of the two parties. The pro-redistribution party supports a lump sum tax of k_R on each minority member and the anti-redistribution party supports a lump sum tax of k_L on each minority member. I let Δ_k denote $k_R - k_L$. Both of these quantities may either be positive or negative and the lump sum minority tax is taken from each minority and given to each majority group member, who then receives $pk/(1-p)$. To appropriately address the German situation, I also drop the assumption that $\Delta > 0$ and to simplify matters, I hereafter assume that $h(d)=0$. The following proposition follows:

Proposition 4: The level of hatred will increase with Δ_k if $(1-p)\tau\Delta + \Delta_k > 0$ and decrease with Δ_k if $(1-p)\tau\Delta + \Delta_k < 0$.

If $(1-p)\tau\Delta + \Delta_k$ is positive, then the policies of the anti-redistribution party are on net harmful to minorities and that party will have the incentive to promote hatred. An increase in Δ_k implies that their policies are becoming even more anti-minority, and as a result they will increase the supply of hatred. However, if $(1-p)\tau\Delta + \Delta_k$ is negative,

then the policies of the anti-redistribution party are on net beneficial to minorities. In that case, the pro-redistribution party turns to hatred, and increases in Δ_k will act to decrease the incentive for them to promote hatred.

This proposition emphasizes that when all of one party's policies are harmful to minorities then this party will find hatred appealing. As that party becomes attached to even more virulent anti-minority policies, hatred will continue to increase. However, if parties end up having split platforms, where they favor minorities on general economic issues, but oppose them on other issues, then hatred is likely to diminish. If the anti-minority policies act to balance the economic policies, then they can actually lead to a reduction in hatred. Hatred is most likely when minorities are firmly entrenched on one side of the political aisle. When the interests of minorities are split between the two parties, then hatred will diminish.

Proposition 5: Either party will gain electoral support by introducing anti-minority policies if and only if there is a positive level of hatred in society.

Proposition 5 emphasizes that specific anti-minority redistribution and hatred are complements. If it is constitutionally possible to specifically target minority groups, then this targeting will yield electoral returns if there is a positive level of hatred in society. If there is no hatred, then candidates lose as much from targeting minorities in lost minority votes than they gain from increased majority votes, at least as long as there are some members of the minority who are still voting for each candidate. If one candidate only has majority votes, then he will always gain by proposing extra taxes on the minority even without hatred. This result again suggests that the congregation of minorities in a single party tends to be quite harmful to those minorities.

In a richer model, the party that is already anti-minority will tend to adopt the anti-minority policies more quickly. This can come about because they already have no minority votes, or because the relatively pro-minority policy might generate hostility from minorities if it proposed an anti-minority tax. As such, we will generally expect to

see the same parties that oppose minorities economically come to propose specific anti-minority policies as well, at least if they are constitutionally allowed to do so. This will make hatred more likely since hatred is a complement to such targeted redistribution.

As such, constitutional guarantees which limit the ability to specifically target minorities will tend to reduce the overall level of hatred in society. Constitutions with fewer protections, or situations where constitutions are unlikely to bind, are more likely to degenerate into hatred. If the political battle is not an election, but rather an armed revolution, then there are clearly no rules binding possible policies. As such, revolutionaries will be free to target any minority and hatred will flourish. The Nazis, of course, always promised to scrap the Weimar constitution and as such were never bound by constitutional rules on their proposed policies.

Hating the Haters

Hatred is such a powerful tool that it is used both by politicians who want to hurt minorities and by people who want to defend minorities. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the nonviolent protest movements of Gandhi and King. The power of nonviolent protest comes from the transmission of images where the racists can be seen as violent attackers instead of victims. The pictures of Bull Connor turning the hoses and dogs on Civil Rights marchers became etched into the minds of liberal northerners. The powerful pictures of southern blacks, and northern allies, being abused by southern policemen and citizens did not create tolerance; instead, they created hatred of the southern regime. Likewise, the Holocaust made the evil of the Nazis so apparent, that the haters of Jews themselves became the objects of hatred.

This section will ask—given an existing level of hatred—how much would such an anti-hatred message need to be subsidized to overwhelm the pro-hatred messages. I assume that there is no intrinsic interest in anti-hatred messages (i.e. $r=0$). As before, if individuals watch “ t ” minutes of anti-hatred hatred, they will turn into a hater of haters with probability $\pi(t)$. Just as before, if anti-hatred propaganda is subsidized at a level

“k”, individuals receive utility from listening to it that is equal to $V(kt)$. By assumption, individuals will not listen to both messages of hatred and messages against hatred. People will choose between listening to anti-minority hatred, or anti-hatred hatred.

I return to the assumption that $\pi(x) = \text{Max}(1, \theta t)$. Furthermore, I denote the expected equilibrium level of hatred in society as $\tilde{\pi}$ and ask about the level of subsidy needed, to push the population into hating haters. Individuals who currently don't hate will maximize: $V(kt) + B(.5 + mp(s - .5) - \pi(t)(1 - mp)\tilde{\pi}A/2)$, which yields first order condition: $V'(kt)k = \pi'(t)B((1 - mp)\tilde{\pi}A/2)$. This equation then defines a value of $k(t)$ —the cost of acquiring a fixed level of anti-hatred hate through rival broadcasts, and proposition 6 follows:

Proposition 6: If second order conditions are satisfied, then the price of fighting hatred is rising with A, B and $\tilde{\pi}$ and declining with m and p.

This proposition emphasizes that the price of fighting hatred is rising with the expected equilibrium number of haters. This implies that hatred displays increasing returns. Once a large enough share of the population becomes hateful, the price of fighting hatred rises. No one is willing to hate haters, if haters reflect the bulk of the population. If everyone is a racist, it is costly to get upset about racism. This increasing returns phenomenon could easily generate multiple equilibria. It also helps us understand why hateful regimes rarely seem to disappear without external pressure—once the level of hatred gets sufficiently large, there is a positive feedback mechanism that makes it hard to induce people to hate the haters.

The price of fighting hatred is rising with B. While high economic returns are anathema to hatred against minorities, they also make it difficult to generate much enthusiasm for hatred against haters. This might explain why mid-19th century New York merchants were hostile to the Civil War. Their frequent financial interactions with southerners made hating them costly. Naturally, if the minority represents a large share of social

interactions for non-hateful majority groups, then it is presumably easier to generate hatred against haters.

IV. Example #1: Racism in the U.S.

Racial discrimination and race hatred are different phenomena. The view that one race is inferior does not imply a desire to harm them. Indeed, anti-Semitic hatred was often linked to positive beliefs about Jewish intelligence.³⁰ This distinction between racial hatred and racial discrimination helps us understand the remarkable shifts that characterize the history of race relations in the United States. Racial discrimination is a perpetual feature of American society, but race hatred is less common and its history fits the model well.

Before the Civil War, discrimination, not hatred, was the rule. The American Revolution contained a great deal of talk about the rights of man (in part to emphasize King George III's crimes surely to generate hatred), and this talk was somewhat incompatible with enslaving equal human beings. As such, the apologists of slavery argued that slavery was appropriate, if not benevolent, given the limited abilities of African-Americans. A typical apologist for slavery, George Fitzhugh, wrote in 1854 that the black man "is but a grown up child, and must be governed as a child, not as a lunatic or criminal." William Simms, another slavery apologist, wrote in 1837 that "it is [the black's] mental and moral inferiority which has enslaved, or subjected him to a superior."

Even Northerners, such as Stephen Douglas, defended slavery in just this manner, and said (in the Lincoln-Douglas debates): "the civilized world has always held that when any race of men have shown themselves to be so degraded by ignorance, superstition, cruelty, and barbarism, as to be utterly incapable of governing themselves, they must, in the nature of things, be governed by others, by such laws as are deemed to be applicable to their position" (cited in D'Souza, ,1995, p. 103). The prominent historian Eugene Genovese concurs "Southerners from social theorists to divines to politicians to ordinary

slaveholders insisted fiercely that emancipation would cast blacks into a marketplace in which they could not compete and would condemn them to the fate of the Indians or worse.”

Like hatred, this type of prejudice was the result of incentives. As David Cooper noted in 1772:

The power of prejudice over the minds of mankind is very extraordinary; hardly any extremes too distant, or absurdities too glaring for it to unite or reconcile, if it tends to promote or justify a favorite pursuit. It is thus we are to account for the fallacious reasonings and absurd sentiments used and entertained concerning negroes and the lawfulness of keeping them as slaves. (cited in Jordan, p. 276).

While the self-serving nature of these opinions is clear, before 1860, there was little of the hatred towards blacks that would later characterize Southern politics. Southern hatred was focused on the Abolitionists and Northerners, not slaves.³¹ The relative lack of hatred towards blacks during the ante-bellum period can be understood with the model. There were no Southern politicians that supported policies which were pro-Black and thus race wasn't a relevant issue in Southern politics. In the political battle against northern abolitionists, it was easier to generate hatred directly, by accusing the Northerners of being thieves (taking “private property”) and tyrants (violating states' rights), than by accusing them of complicity with blacks.

Moreover, the demand for hatred was muted, as interactions between slaveowners and slaves were frequent, and while always deeply exploitative, not always hostile. As W. E. B. DuBois wrote “when all the best of the Negroes were domestic servants in the best of the white families, there were bonds of intimacy, affections, and sometimes blood

³⁰ For example, the myth of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion postulates an international Jewish conspiracy developed with truly devilish cleverness (see Cohn, 1967).

³¹ For example, when South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks violently attacked the legendary abolitionist Charles Sumner on the floor of the Senate, he justified his action with the words of vengeance (and hatred) “whatever insults my state insults me,” and his voters agreed, re-electing him after he resigned.

relationship, between the races.” Even if DuBois romanticizes the ante-bellum South, there is no question that slaveowners would find it costly to carry around a burning hatred that would push them towards damaging their valuable “property.”

After the Civil War, the political and economic situation in the South changed, and race hatred emerged. The familiar image of an inferior, but not malign black, was replaced by the image of a lustful, violent, aggressive black who had been guilty (and would be guilty again given the chance) of crimes against whites. Stories about black evils against whites, and particularly against white women served as the basis for race hatred. The rise of race hatred occurred between 1870 and 1900, and accompanied the rise of racial lynching and the Jim Crow system. Prominent politicians continued to foment hatred through the 1960s, and the messages of the later Southern demagogues, including Orval Faubus and George Wallace, emphasized the evil of blacks more than their inferiority.

The apostles of race hatred emphasized the past and present assaults by blacks against the white community. “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman, a Governor and Senator from South Carolina, claimed that reconstruction was an attempt to “put white necks under black heels,” and that “we will not submit to [an African American] gratifying his lust on our wives and our daughters without lynching him.” Tillman argued that among black males “murder and rape become a monomania” and that “the negro becomes a fiend in human form.” Vardaman, a Governor of Georgia, “won office by campaigning against negro education” (Bauerlein, 2001, p. 30), and said (supporting whites who had attacked blacks in the Atlanta Riot of 1906) “I have no word of censure for the man who kills that character of destroyer of the home” (i.e. African-Americans), and that “civilization cannot be suited to low-browed, veneered, semi-savage negroes.”

According to C. Vann Woodward, the rise of southern race hatred during the post-bellum period is associated with two separate political battles. The first battle pitted the Republicans (white and black) who dominated the South during reconstruction (through Black votes) against traditional southern elites (Bourbons). The Southern elites were fighting to retake (or “redeem”) the South. As Woodward (1951) writes: “in order to

gain power to overthrow the carpetbaggers, the conservatives had enlisted the support of the aggressively anti-Negro whites in the struggle for redemption.” It is during this period that the first Ku Klux Klan flourished and that men like Ben Tillman first came to prominence through their advocacy of racial hatred.

The logic of the model is clearly at work. The policies of the southern republicans were intrinsically tied to improving the lot of the ex-slaves. The southern elites fomented hatred in order to discredit the pro-Black policies of their political opponents. They did this by expounding an endless array of black atrocities. Along with hatred of blacks, the Bourbon whites pushed hatred of northern carpetbaggers and republicans more generally. As the redeemers handily defeated their reconstruction-era opponents, race hatred proved its value as a political strategy.

Once that battle for redemption was won, the southern elites, at least in the 1880s, had little interest in furthering race hatred. As Woodward writes, after redemption “the conservatives then attempted to moderate the passions of their Negrophobe allies and conciliate the freedmen with paternalistic offers of patronage and protection.” The reason for this is that after redemption, “the white rulers of the Black Belt ... became heirs to the control of the more-or-less submissive or intimidated Negro voters.” As the conservative southern politician told a black audience “the best friends of the colored men are the old slaveholders” (Woodward, 2002, p. 79). Before the secret ballot, it was natural that white planters would control the votes of their black voters, and this created the somewhat odd “conservative alliance with the Negro” (Woodward, 1951, p. 75). Indeed, immediately after reconstruction, white planters tended to control their black workers’ votes, so a conservative-black alliance grew up, and this tended to limit the spread of race hatred in the 1880s.

Race hatred re-appeared with the rise of the populist movement. The depression of the 1880s had created fertile ground for the first American party, the Populists, that was strongly committed to redistribution from rich to poor. The early Populists sought support among poor farmers, regardless of race and because their pro-poor policies would

help the blacks. As Tom Watson, a leading populist, declared “I have no words which can portray my contempt for the white men, Anglo-Saxons, who can knock their knees together, and through their chattering teeth and pale lips admit that they are afraid the Negroes will ‘dominate us.’” C. Vann Woodward writes “more important to the success of Southern Populism than the combination with the West or with labor was the alliance with the Negro,” and as a result “populists of other Southern states followed the example of Texas, electing Negroes to their councils and giving them a voice in the party organization.”

The alliance between populist and black was the crucial factor leading to the reappearance of elite support for race hatred: “Alarmed by the success that the Populists were enjoying with their appeal to the Negro voter, the conservatives themselves raised the cry of ‘Negro domination,’ and white supremacy, and enlisted the Negrophobe elements” (Woodward, 1951, p. 79). The technique of building hatred, as always, hinged upon casting the black as a threatening villain “In Georgia and elsewhere the propaganda was furthered by a sensational press that played up and headlined current stories of Negro crime, charges of rape and attempted rape, and alleged instances of arrogance ... already cowed and intimidated, the race was falsely pictured as stirred up to a mutinous and insurrectionary pitch” (Woodward, 2002, p. 123).

Eventually, this racial hatred was followed by disenfranchisement of the blacks and by a rigid system of segregation totally unlike anything that had preceded it in the South. White interactions with blacks often involved lynching or less lethal harassment. These are all natural outcomes of extreme racial hatred. Even the populists caved in. Tom Watson, who had been a strong voice for tolerance in the 1890s, had become an apostle of race hatred. By 1906, he claimed that the black man “grows more bumptious on the street, more impudent in his dealings with white men, and then, when he cannot achieve social equality as he wishes, with the instinct of the barbarian to destroy what he cannot attain to, he lies in wait, as that dastardly brute did yesterday near this city, and assaults the fair young girlhood of the south...” Watson’s strategic switch to race hatred mirrors

the later opportunism of George Wallace who first list, running as racial moderate, and then switched to race hatred vowing never to be “out-niggered” again.

Many features of the rise of southern race hatred fit the model. Hatred was used cynically and effectively by political entrepreneurs. This hatred was based on stories of Black crimes, even though few groups have ever been as abused as the former slaves. Blacks were the poorest group in the South and furthermore, the U.S. constitution failed to protect blacks against group-specific expropriation.³²

The demand for hatred was largest among the poorer whites who had few mutually beneficial market transactions with blacks. Indeed, the upland whites who barely connected with blacks at all were some of the most avid accepters of race hatred, just as the model suggests. The lowland planters, who interacted regularly with blacks, were much less prone to racism, and turned to racism only when preaching race hatred became the most effective weapon against income redistribution that would help both poor whites and poor blacks. The lack of property rights protection in the South at the individual level meant that whites often stole from blacks or hurt them in other ways, and this thievery helped build a market for hatred. The large financial resources of the Bourbons helped ensure that the campaign for hatred was successful. Ultimately, hatred became so intense that no anti-hatred hate could be generated in the South.

The War Against Racism

The fights against the South, both during the Civil War and during the Civil Rights Era, ironically also depended on their own forms of hatred. It is impossible to look at abolitionism and the rise of the Republican Party and not see the logic of the model at work as well. Abolitionists emphasized the crimes of Southerners against blacks (in this case, the crimes were generally real). Their lectures were full of righteous anger and men like John Brown saw war (and in his case something like terrorism) as a legitimate response to the evils of the South.

³² This fact makes it clear that a written constitution does not guarantee effective protection.

Union soldiers fought for a wide number of reasons (most unrelated to slavery), but there was a hard core of abolitionist soldiers who saw violence as the only just retribution for the evils of slavery. For example, an infantry captain (and Harvard graduate) who in 1861 wrote that “I want to sing ‘John Brown’ in the streets of Charleston, and ram red-hot abolitionism down their unwilling throats at the point of a bayonet” (cited in McPherson, 1997, p. 19), and Robert Gould Shaw (made famous in the movie *Glory*) wrote that he wanted to see the confederates “running before us hacked to little pieces” (McPherson, 1997, p. 153). Obviously, the North had its own brand of hatred. It is quite possible that the inability of the two sides to reach a compromise involving compensated emancipation in the 1850s was closely tied to the growing hatred of both North and South for one another.

In the Civil Rights Era, hatred of Southern racists was again a major political tool. African-American leaders worked to publicize the suffering of blacks to Northern whites. Southern leaders like Bull Conner powerfully helped the Civil Rights cause when they used violence to subdue peaceful civil rights demonstrators in front of the cameras. Northern politicians, like Hubert Humphrey, rose to prominence emphasizing the evil of the South and calling for action. Indeed, the end result of this campaign was a powerful anti-Southern bias that showed up regularly in opinion polls during the 1960s and 1970s.

The haters of hatred were also powerfully aided by the propaganda machine that had gone to war against Hitler. As Frederickson (2002) writes “the civil rights movement in the United States, which succeeded in outlawing legalized racial segregation and discrimination in the 1960s, was a beneficiary of revulsion against the Holocaust as the local extreme of racism.” After all, the strongest charge against the Nazis was their racist genocide. Once the country had hated one racist hater, it was only a small step to hating our racist haters. It is a strange lesson of the fight against race hatred that this fight was not won with tolerance, but rather with another form of hate.

V. Example # 2: Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria

Anti-Semitic hatred has deep roots in European civilization. Just as in the case of race hatred in America, anti-Semitic hatred was always based on allegations of Jewish crimes. One 11th century Rabbi wrote that the Crusaders who perpetrated the first pogroms said to themselves “let us first avenge ourselves on [the Jews] and exterminate them” (quotation in Armstrong, 1994, p. 73). Of course, the ultimate alleged crime was killing Jesus himself, but the alleged Jewish crimes didn’t end with the crucifixion. Jews were accused of “supernatural powers, international conspiracies, and the ability to wreck economies; using the blood of Christian children in their rituals, even murdering them for their blood; being in league with the Devil; controlling simultaneously both the levers of international capital and of Bolshevism” (Goldhagen, 1996, p. 39). Just as in the case of race hatred, “anti-Semitism has fundamentally nothing to do with the actions of Jews, and therefore fundamentally nothing to do with an anti-Semite’s knowledge of the real nature of Jews, is the widespread historical and contemporary appearance of anti-Semitism, even in its most virulent forms, where there are no Jews, and among people who have never met Jews” (Goldhagen, 1996, p. 41).

Instead, anti-Semitic hatred appears to have much more to do with the incentives facing the suppliers of hate. The original Christian libel against Jews has generally been thought to be the outcome of competition between early Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism for adherents. For example, James Carroll writes:

Of all the characters in the Jesus story, none are more vilified by the Christian imagination than the Pharisees, and not because they would have so opposed what Jesus represented, or because they actually challenged him during his lifetime. While Jesus lived, the Pharisees would have been relatively powerless missionaries, teachers, and low-level administrators. It is only with the elimination of the Temple, and its priesthood that the Pharisees emerge as rivals – not of Jesus, but of his movement a full generation removed. That is why they are cast as enemies in the Gospels, which is why, in turn, almost nothing said by Christians about these particular Jews is true. (Carroll, 2001, p. 110).

As such, the original anti-Semitic component of Christianity can certainly be interpreted as a strategic message sent by the Church to discredit the competing religion of Judaism.

In the modern era, political anti-Semitism exploded in late 19th century Austria and Germany and obviously reached its apogee in the Nazi era. Certainly, the rise of anti-Semitic hatred during this era was supported by improvements in communications technology that made it easier to spread stories of Jewish atrocities, but the primary anti-Semitic agitators were political and they were acting in a way that improved their own political positions. As such, to understand the rise of anti-Semitism in the 19th century, it is crucial to understand the political fault lines in 19th century Europe and the position of politically-active Jews relative to those fault lines.

From the 20th century perspective, it is natural to associate left-right divides with income redistribution. In the 19th century, particularly before socialism became important, this association is inappropriate. After all, taxes didn't go to the poor. They funded royal enterprises. The left-right divide in the 19th century concerned the issue of monarchy. Right-wing politicians, like Bismarck in Germany and Metternich in Austria, weren't fighting against income redistribution.³³ They were fighting against constitutions and democracy. As the young Emperor Franz Joseph wrote to his mother in 1851 "we threw the constitution overboard and Austria has only one sovereign! We have taken a great step forward" (McGuigan, 1966, p. 326). Conversely, their opponents, and the left-wing espoused the ideals of the French revolution and clamored for constitutionalism and equality before the law.

As the traditional monarchs refused to accept that their power came from a constitutional contract with the people, it was inevitable that they would claim their power came from God.³⁴ As Kann (1974, p. 321) wrote about the Austrian empire "a political system so flagrantly out of step with the spirit of the times needed at least one strong ideological ally; this ally by a process of elimination could only be the Church." These words could have been written about any number of Europe's 19th century monarchies. In 1824, the

³³ Indeed Bismarck pioneered the social welfare system in Germany. He tried to create a right wing alliance with the lower classes to fight the liberal bourgeoisie.

³⁴ For example, King Frederick William IV of Prussia had refused to become Emperor of Germany in 1848 because that title was being offered by an elected assembly.

French King Charles X was crowned and anointed with pre-revolutionary holy oil by a Cardinal at the Cathedral of Rheims. The Tsar's mystical relationship with God and the church (which he had supposedly inherited from the last Byzantine Basileus) was a primary justification for his autocratic rule. Francis I of Austria had renounced the title of Holy Roman Emperor (under duress) in 1804, but his heirs were still referred to as their apostolic majesties.

The inevitable partner of religious support for the monarchy was monarchical support for the church. The church-crown partnership inevitably led to restrictions on Jews and other religious minorities. Indeed, even beyond its religious affiliations, the traditional monarchies were bound to a whole series of long-standing rules, such as those which enshrined aristocratic privileges, and these rules often reflected Europe's ancient restrictions on Jewish activities.

The 19th century European left began as constitutionalists demanding restrictions on the arbitrary powers of kings. Just as monarchs insisted that their authority sprung from God, the liberals argued that the power of the king came from the support of the people. As the church supported the king, the left inevitably became ardently secular. This process began in the French revolution and continued throughout the 19th century. As Cohn (1956) wrote "the Right (conservative, monarchical, 'clerical') maintained that there must be a place for the Church in the public order; the Left (democratic, liberal, radical) held that there can be no (public) Church at all." Moreover, in their fight against aristocratic privilege, the left advanced the ideal of equality before the law, which had little place for ancient restrictions of Jewish activities.

Left wing secularism and support for legal equality naturally led to the emancipation of the Jews and this ensured the strong Jewish affiliation with the left. As Cohn (1956) writes "Jews supported the Left, then, not only because they had become unshakeable partisans of the Emancipation, but also because they had no choice; as far as the internal life of the Right was concerned, the Emancipation had never taken place, and the Christian religion remained a prerequisite for political participation." Politically active

Jews generally ended up on the liberal side of the political spectrum and ultimately on the side of socialism and Marxism, which held out even more promise for the replacement of age-old anti-Semitic restrictions with equality. However, as the model stresses, when a minority ends up on one side of the political spectrum, the other side will find hatred a tempting tool.

In the 1870s, German anti-Semitism, like all of German politics, revolved around Bismarck—the dominant chancellor was the prime political protagonist and the inevitable target of almost everyone else. Bismarck’s connection with the Jewish banker, Gerson Bleichroder, and his alliance with the National Liberals (a party with significant Jewish membership and leadership) during the *kulturkampf* (his war on the Catholic Church) opened that Prussian Junker up to anti-Semitic attacks. A typical charge was that “as long as Prince Bismarck remains the all powerful Idol of the German people, then the German nation will be sacrificed to the Empire, the Empire sacrificed to the Chancellor; and the Chancellor belongs to the Jews and speculators” (Weiss, 1996, p. 84).

Anti-Semitism was used against Bismarck from the right, where the Junkers wanted agricultural protectionism and claimed that they weren’t getting it because “Jews actually govern us now” (Stern, 1977, p. 187). Bismarck’s Catholic opponents also used anti-Semitism against him, writing that “whosoever makes laws in our country and has the decisive voice in finance, science, art, and the press has Semitic blood in his veins” (Stern, 1977, p. 502). The official Catholic journal *Germania* urged its readers to “buy not from Jews” (Weiss, 1996, p.85). Anti-Semitism was also used against Bismarck from the left, where Otto Glagau preached anti-Semitic populism, ranting against Jews “commanding the globe by means of mere cunning and slyness, usury and shoddy dealings” (Weiss, 1996, p. 84).

While somewhat scattershot attacks are the origins of modern, political anti-Semitism in Germany, they had limited effect because Bismarck’s opponents were weak and Bismarck was ultimately far too pure a Junker to be truly tarred with anti-Semitism. The turning point occurred in 1878 when Bismarck ended the *kulturkampf* and turned on his

erstwhile liberal allies. After this point, the traditional political alignment reappeared with Bismarck, the Junkers and the Catholic Center party on the right and the liberals and increasingly the Social Democrats on the left. This rearrangement meant that Jews were no longer in the center with the Iron Chancellor himself, but on the left with the socialists. After 1878, anti-Semitism became the right wing's weapon of choice.

Jews were a tiny share of the overall left-wing movements, but there were several prominent Jews in the left wing including Rudolph Virchow ("the most popular Progressive deputy in Berlin," Weiss, 1996, p. 93), and Eduard Lasker (a leader of the National Liberals, who Bismarck viciously turned on after the kulturkampf). Just as racism was the Bourbon's best defense against populism, anti-Semitism turned out to be the strongest weapon against socialism.

Adolph Stoecker, an Evangelical pastor, court chaplain and right wing politician, was a typical anti-Semitic political entrepreneur. He "founded the Christian Social Workers party, hoping to win proletarian votes for the right" (Weiss, 1996, p. 90), and announced that "the social problem is the Jewish problem" and "Israel must renounce its ambition to be master of Germany" (both quotations from Weiss, 1996, pp. 90-91). In particular, "Stoecker shouted at leftists who disrupted his campaigns that the founders of German socialism, Ferdinand Lassalle and Karl Marx, were Jewish" (Weiss, 1996, p. 94). After "anti-Semitism won Stoecker the election" others followed and "conservative party candidates also denounced the Jews" (Weiss, 1996, p. 91).

By 1892, the conservative party platform embraced anti-Semitism and pledged to "do battle against the many-sided aggressive, decomposing, and arrogant Jewish influence on the life of our people" (Weiss, 1996, p. 116). Kaiser Wilhelm II institutionalized barriers against Jews. Germany in 1870 was an old fashioned anti-Semitic regime with deep prejudices, but limited race hatred. By 1914, the country had become riddled with venom against the Jews. In 1919, the Kaiser himself insisted that no German "should rest until [the Jews] have been destroyed and exterminated" (Weiss, 1996, p. 126).

After the First World War, the apostles of anti-Semitism became even more aggressive. Hitler and the Nazis used the standard tools of hatred-formation: “the Jews, as Hitler and the Nazis intoned obsessively, were seen to be the root cause of all of Germany’s other afflictions, including the loss of the First World War, the evisceration of Germany’s strength by the imposition of democracy, the threat posed by Bolshevism, the discontinuities and disorientations of modernity and more” (Goldhagen, 1996, p. 85). In Hitler’s own words “the Jew would really devour the peoples of the earth” (Hitler, 1971, p. 452).

Like his 19th century predecessors, Hitler turned anti-Semitism into a political tool by claiming that Jews lay behind almost all of his political opponents. According to Hitler, the Social Democrats were Jews (“I gradually became aware that the Social Democratic press was directly predominantly by Jews”), the communists were Jews (“the Jewish doctrine of Marxism”), and indeed the entire Weimer Republic was, according to Hitler, a Jewish state. As such, his commitment to ending the republic became a crusade against a Jewish form of politics. Naturally, since Hitler’s policies were so fervently destructive to the Jews, anti-Semitism was a natural complement to Nazi policies.

Just as the model suggests, Germany’s anti-Semitism rose as a political tool used by opponents of policies that might have helped the Jews. The existence of a few prominent Jews among the left made it easier to tar the left as being a “Jewish conspiracy.” Openness to hatred was surely exacerbated by the fact that the Jews were such a small minority of Germans (about one percent). A particular feature of this era is that because left-wing Jews were frequently non-religious, anti-Semitism to be effective needed to expand from being an attack on a religion to an attack on an immutable race. Far from being a particular result of German history, political anti-Semitism was used predictably as a political tool against politicians that could be tarred with Jewish sympathies.

Anti-Semitism in Austria

In Austria the Hapsburgs were committed to a greater Austro-Hungary that included over one million Jews in Galicia and the Bukovina alone, and they were committed to legal equality within their empire.³⁵ While the Hapsburgs were hardly pro-Jewish, they were at least reasonably tolerant. In a world without constitutional restrictions on policies, political entrepreneurs entered Austrian politics advocating expropriating the Jews and using anti-Semitic hatred against the current regime.

Georg Schonerer pioneered political anti-Semitism in Austria, but he certainly did not begin his career pushing hatred. Schonerer was a member of the Austrian Reichstag who had positioned himself against Austrian imperialism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and indeed against the Hapsburg dynasty more generally. His Linz program advocated restructuring (if not dissolution of the empire). As his speeches in the 1870s were not particularly anti-Semitic, it seems likely that his political stances were not driven by hatred of Jews. But hatred of Jews was clearly complementary to his policies.

Separation from non-German Austrian provinces would lead to separation from over a million Jews. Between 1857 and 1910, the Jewish population of Vienna rose from 6,000 to 175,318 (Hamann, 2001), and dissolution of the empire would also end the stream of Jewish refugees coming into Vienna.

So, opportunistically, in the 1880s, Schonerer became the arch-apostle of anti-Semitism, uttering sentiments like “every German has the duty to help eliminate the Jews as much as he can” and “we consider anyone a renegade of his people who knowingly supports the Jews and their agents and comrades.” This last phrase makes it clear that Schonerer used anti-Semitism to build guilt by association. Schonerer called out to the Emperor “your majesty, deliver the people from the yoke of the Jewish press.” Like all advocates of hatred, he emphasized Jewish crimes likening the Jews to “vampires” and saying that they wanted “to suck their vital force from the strength of the German people.”

Eventually, the Hapsburgs struck back and in 1888, “Schonerer was put before a court, with the active help of Crown Prince Rudolph, and sentenced to four months in high-

³⁵ The Hapsburgs had committed themselves to something like tolerance primarily as a way of diffusing ethnic strife in their tremendously diverse empire.

security prison.” He was also barred from politics for five years, and during this period his political star faded.³⁶

Karl Lueger stepped into the political vacuum created by Schonerer’s political banishment. Lueger’s political base was the lower middle class Christian Social Association which opposed both the capitalist liberals and the court.³⁷ The Emperor initially disliked Lueger so much that he demanded four elections before he would recognize Lueger as Mayor of Vienna.³⁸ Lueger called for an end to legal equality within the Empire and wanted “to pass laws on the elimination of equal rights for Jews, on the confiscation of Jewish property, and the expulsion of the Jews” (Hamman, 1999 , p. 286). As Lueger’s policies were most harmful to Jews, it is natural that he pushed his policies by fomenting hatred.

In public Lueger created hatred by stoking the fires of vengeance. He accused Jews of “practicing a kind of terrorism,” and claimed that “the Jews are not the martyrs of the Germans, but the Germans, the martyrs of the Jews.” He called Jews “Christ-killers” and talked about how Jews “hatch cockatrice’s eggs, and wave the spider’s web.” Oddly, in private, Lueger claimed not to be anti-Semitic and said that “I’m not an enemy of the Viennese Jews; they’re not in the least all that bad.” He even admitted that race hatred was really just a political ruse; Hamann (1999) writes that Lueger admitted that anti-Semitism was “only a slogan used to bait the masses, and that he personally respected and appreciated many Jews and would never deliberately do an injustice to any of them.”

The case of Austria belies the simple left-right discussion of the model. Instead, it shows the natural appeal of anti-Semitism to political entrepreneurs who can push both hatred and policies which damage minorities. In a world without constitutional limits, the free

³⁶ Upon his return, he became more focused on anti-Catholic hatred, again as a means of fighting the monarchy. In this case, his appeals were much less successful.

³⁷ Interestingly, Lueger was also opposed by the higher Austrian clergy. However, Pope Leo XIII specifically “let himself be convinced by the Christian Socials’ defense plea, in particular by its program of social reform, and sent Lueger his blessings” (Hamann, 2001, p. 282).

entry of hateful political entrepreneurs may ensure that some hatred is turned on segregated, politically weak minorities.

Anti-Semitism Elsewhere

In both England and the United States, anti-Semitic hatred never became a significant political force in the 19th century. Several factors are relevant. The strong constitutional traditions (written and unwritten) of both countries limited the extent to which minority groups could be particularly exploited. More importantly, by the 19th century, traditional monarchism was a dead force in both countries. Since the Glorious Revolution the principle of parliamentary ascendancy was well entrenched and no politician supported arbitrary royal power justified by divine right. As a result, Jews were left on both sides of the political aisle in both countries.

How could the Tories turn to anti-Semitism? Their most prominent leader, Benjamin Disraeli, was proud of his Jewish heritage. Likewise, there were prominent Jews in Republican and Democratic circles.³⁹ Judah Benjamin was a Democratic member of the confederate cabinet. Theodore Roosevelt appointed the Jew to the U.S. cabinet. Later on, Jews would become sufficiently numerous in the United States that anti-Semitism became a perilous strategy, but before then the 19th century history of England and the U.S. shows that minorities are safest when they are evenly distributed across parties, and when rules make it hard for political entrepreneurs to propose discriminatory policies that are complements to hatred.

In France, as in Germany, political anti-Semitism did appear as a strategy to tar the left and for the same reasons. Through the 1870s, the monarchists were a dominant party and their royal candidate, the Comte de Chambord, was both absolutist and highly

³⁸ After his installation as Mayor of Vienna in 1897, Lueger and the Emperor were reconciled to one another.

³⁹ Indeed, as far as I can tell, the strong association of Jews and the Democratic party in the United States doesn't really happen until the 20th century. This transition occurs for two reasons. First, the Eastern European Jews, who had suffered under the Tsar, were much more radicalized than the German Jews who

religious. In France, Jews were strongly associated with the left. As might be expected then, the right did try to use anti-Semitism against the left, particularly in the Dreyfus Affair, where the Army falsely accused a Jewish officer with being a German spy.

However, the French left hit back hard and essentially accused the anti-Semites of being criminals. In his famous tract, *J'Accuse*, the left-wing writer, Emile Zola, indicted the government and turned the rhetoric of vengeance and hatred against the anti-Semites. Tapping into the long French tradition of anti-Royalism and anti-Clericalism, Zola describes the War Office that convicted Dreyfus as a “nest of Jesuits” prone to “inquisitorial and tyrannical methods.” Zola accuses the anti-Semites as poisoners who would kill France. Hannah Arendt writes that Zola excited the passions of the mob “by raising the bogy of ‘Secret Rome’” (Arendt, 1958, p. 113). *J'Accuse* is a remarkable document that taps into the same emotions of vengeance and hatred in an attempt to stop anti-Semitism.

German left-wing writers certainly tried to do the same thing, but not until after the Second World War were they able to really create an atmosphere of hatred against the haters. However, there was a major difference between France and Germany: a deeply anti-clerical, anti-monarchist regime had been in power since the 1870s. During this time period, the French educational system had emphasized the dangers posed by enemies of the republic such as church and king. As such, when Zola connected anti-Semitism to the enemies of France, he hit fertile soil. France was wracked with anti-anti-Semites and anti-Semites firing back at one another, but ultimately the greater strength of the left in France led to the defeat of large scale political anti-Semitism.

VI. Example # 3: Islamic Hatred of Americans

September 11, 2001, shocked the American population both because of the tragedy and because it revealed a depth of hatred against the U.S. which had gone unnoticed by most

came before them. Second, until the 1930s, the American parties did not line up well with traditional ideas of liberalism and conservatism.

Americans until the planes hit the towers. In the months since the attack, Americans have seen and read transcripts from Osama Bin Laden whose hateful messages are full of righteous vengeance against American support for Israel and American troops in Saudi Arabia. Americans have seen demonstrations throughout the Arab world where the U.S. has been depicted as an evil aggressor and Bin Laden has been hailed as a hero acting to right grievous wrongs.

Just as in the case of anti-Semitic hatred in Europe and anti-Black hatred in the South, anti-American hatred is built on stories of past and future crimes. Typical comments from Palestinian activists include “the U.S. and Israel are the source of terrorism in the world,” “Palestinian Children stand with Iraqi Children against U.S. Barbarism,” and the “United States is a fundamental enemy which takes part and holds responsibility to the elimination of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian villages.” The U.S. is accused of stationing non-Islamic soldiers on the hallowed ground of Saudi Arabia. The U.S. is accused of supporting Israeli “atrocities” against Palestinians. Al-Jazeera’s broadcasts of wounded Palestinians help engender vengeful emotions against the U.S. and Israel. Finally, the U.S. is accused of spreading materialism in a war against Islam.

Hatred of the west, as opposed to hatred of America, has its roots in the struggle against the colonial empires of France and England which dominated the Middle East after the First World War. These two nations split up the remains of the Ottoman empire and they were naturally imposed by a wild array of various nationalist groups. Some of these groups, such as the Society of Muslim Brothers founded by Hassan Al-Bannah in 1928, were Islamic, but the majority appear to have been secular. Some of the groups appear to have been traditional communists, sometimes funded by the Soviet Union. Others were nationalistic modernizers, who often sought to imitate Western methods.

The anti-colonialists preached hatred against the colonial powers of England and France (as the U.S. did against England in 1776). This hatred led to strong pro-Nazi sympathies. The “Green Shirts of the Young Egypt party had been received as fraternal delegates to the Nazi Congress in Nuremberg,” and during the war “the main chant of the crowds was

not designed to improve the morale of British soldiers: Ila'l-amam ya Rommel! (Forward Rommel!)” (Ali, 2002, p. 97). Ultimately, the attempts of the British to support the pro-west government in Egypt was sabotaged by the fact that the British “continuing presence in the country had created a situation where the people could no longer distinguish ‘between patriotism and communist propaganda’” (Ali, 2002, p. 99).

Still, despite anti-colonialism and anti-westernism, as late as the 1960s, hatred was not particularly directed against the United States. As Fareed Zakaria wrote in Newsweek (quoting Mohamed Heikel, a prominent Egyptian journalist) while “Britain and France were fading, hated empires” the U.S. was not hated: “in the 1950s and 1960s it seemed unimaginable that the United States and the Arab world would end up locked in a cultural clash.” The U.S. was not particularly relevant to the internal political struggles in the Middle East and as such, hating the U.S. was not an advantageous strategy.

This pattern changed as the U.S. became more strongly associated with particular Middle Eastern regimes. When the U.S. became an ally of the regime, the regime’s opponents turned to hatred of the U.S. As such, it can be no surprise that the anti-American hatred first flared with the revolution against the Shah. No leader in the Persian Gulf area was as closely associated with the United States. After all, the C.I.A. had led his coup against Mossadegh and America supported his military. In return, the Shah’s policies were pro-America and anti-U.S. hatred could be used against him. Opposition to the Shah was either communist (and naturally anti-U.S.) or religious. Both groups preached against the U.S.: the communists relied on the time-tried messages against capitalist exploitation. Khomeini focused instead on how the Americans had, through the Shah, worked to destroy traditional Islam.

Anti-U.S. propaganda exploded after the revolution, and hatred of the U.S. was a tool used for establishing the supremacy of the Ayatollah Khomeini within Iran. Initially, the Ayatollah and his Islamic Revolutionary Council seemed unlikely to rule post-revolution Iran. Anti-U.S. sentiment was used by the Islamic Revolutionary Council to discredit their more moderate competitors and establish control over the country. The Ayatollah

preached against the more moderate elements in the revolution emphasizing their pro-western elements and connections to the “Great Satan”—America.

The taking of American hostages was motivated as an act of righteous retribution “protesting the Shah’s admission to the United States for treatment of the cancer that would kill him shortly afterward.”⁴⁰ (Kepel, 2002, p. 114). The takeover of the embassy produced evidence of “U.S. contacts with a number of middle-class liberals,” and “these revelations were promptly used as a pretext for new trials, executions and confiscations of property.” Indeed, since that date, the religious leaders of Iran have regularly used hatred against the U.S. as a political weapon to fight against their more moderate opponents whose policies would lead to a reconciliation with the U.S.

Anti-Americanism elsewhere in the Arab world really exploded only in the 1990s, where it served a variety of political interests. Dictators who are enemies of the U.S., like Saddam Hussein, naturally build support for their regime by fomenting hatred. As Arafat and the PLO brought himself closer to the U.S. and Israel, first by accepting the existence of Israel in 1988 and then in the Madrid Conference (in 1991) and the Oslo Accords (1994), Arafat’s rival “ Hamas appealed to those opposed to the PLO’s diplomatic initiative, calling the organization a hostage to ‘Israeli duplicity,’ ” (Kepel, 2002, p. 156) and generally increased their support by emphasizing the evils of the Israelis and the Americans.

Finally, in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where the regimes are bound together with the U.S. for financial and security reasons, opponents of these regimes follow Khomeini and preach hatred against the U.S. as a means of discrediting the incumbent regimes. In Egypt, groups such as the Gamaat Islamiya have used hatred as a tool for building support against the Mubarak regime. This group particularly specializes in hatred against the Egyptian Christians (Copts) who Mubarak protects (echoing the Hapsburgs). Kepel (2002) describes the spread of rumors which in their bizarre disconnection from reality

resemble the anti-Semitism of Germany or racism of the south: “a rumor spread that Christians had surreptitiously sprayed the veils of Muslim women with a mysterious aerosol that made the veils display the sign of the cross after the first wash.” In Saudi Arabia, Osama Bin Laden “invites the faithful to forgo their differences and unite against the Al-Saud family, who have ‘collaborated with the Zionist-Crusader alliance.’” Islamists were active politically, but it was the communists who really preached hatred of the U.S.

The spread of hatred has been so effective that the Saudi regime itself—despite being closely tied to the U.S.—has ended up echoing the anti-U.S. mantras of its opposition. While the Saudi regime would clearly be better off if the level of hatred against the U.S. fell, once the level of hatred reaches a certain peak, the regime needs to preach a little hatred itself to avoid being labeled as being too friendly with the Americans.⁴¹

Why has anti-American hatred become so widespread in the Middle East? There are two features of the Middle East that are relatively unique and that served as a basis for the rise of anti-Americanism. First, the U.S. plays an important role in the Gulf, and the presence of oil means that policies of Gulf countries towards America can really hurt or help the U.S. As such, the U.S. has become closely tied to a number of regimes for strategic and economic reasons. Second, there are very few Americans who are actually involved directly with citizens of these areas. The social interactions which make hatred costly don’t exist. It is this combination of the association of incumbent leaders with America and a complete absence of interactions with everyday citizens that makes the spread of hatred in this region so natural.

Why did anti-Americanism wait until the 1990s to explode (outside of Iran)? One possible explanation is the end of the Cold War. Until the past 15 years, the Soviet Union was a major player in the Middle East. In some countries, the leadership,

⁴⁰ The fact that the U.S.’s crime in this case was admitting a sick man for medical treatment underscores my previous claim that it appears possible to be able to make almost any act appear to be vicious and worthy of vengeance.

including Gamal Nasser, had strong ties to the Soviet Union. In other places, popular political movements were split between communists and Islamists. During this era, the communists certainly attempted to build hatred against the West, but the Islamists did not.⁴² Their silence made sense. The communists, not the Islamists, proposed policies that were most hostile to U.S. interests. If the clerics had worked to turn hatred against the U.S. into an overriding force, they would have only pushed support towards their communist opponents. It was only after the communists disappeared politically, that the Islamists ended up as the most anti-U.S. party and only then did they start fomenting hatred. Of course, militant Islam is not inherently American, but its isolationism and anti-commercialism ultimately ends up at the most anti-American end of the political spectrum.

VII. Conclusion

The history of hatred suggests that when people are willing to listen, political entrepreneurs can make hatred. By telling tales of past crimes, people can be convinced that some out-group is populated with dangerous criminals. This paper attempts to understand when we should expect to see the congruence of a supply of hatred and a willingness to listen, or demand, for hatred.

The demand for hatred is shaped by the costs of being hateful. People who interact frequently with minorities in peaceful market settings will find hatred a costly emotion. Naturally, they will tend to avoid messages that describe any interaction with minorities as trading with the enemy. Conversely, people who are either unconnected with the minority, or who actually steal from the minority, will find hatred much less costly. Segregation and theft create a willingness to listen to hatred.

⁴¹ Of course, the Saudis themselves had initially supported Islamic extremism as a means of building their own power within the Islamic world.

⁴² Anthony Eden's reference to Nasser as "Hitler on the Nile" illustrates the tendencies of both Nasser and Eden towards building hatred.

The supply of hatred is formed from political competition. When policy alternatives will have a large impact on the minority group, then it is natural for the politicians supporting the anti-minority policy to use hatred. Anti-minority policies can take the form of standard income redistribution, or targeted expropriation of minorities, or international policies that will impact the outside population. Hatred will increase support for policies that hurt minorities.

As an equilibrium phenomenon, the model predicts that constitutional protection of minorities and rule of law is a strong bulwark against hatred. If minorities cannot be particularly targeted, this eliminates one big reason for fomenting hatred. If society doesn't allow majority group members to abuse minorities in their private transactions, this will tend to dampen hatred as well. Naturally, revolutionary movements are particularly dangerous since they can model their policies to pander to (and build) any form of ethnic dislike.

Integrated minorities which closely resemble the majority are less likely to be objects of hatred. Integration ensures that there are costs to hating the minorities. Similarity helps to ensure that normal policies, like income redistribution, won't end up having a particularly strong racial element. Minority group size is also helpful, at least once the minority has become large enough to be noticed. Hating a big group is harder than hating a small group.

The most effective weapon against hatred appears to be the weapon that Emile Zola used in *J'Accuse*—building hatred against the haters. This mechanism taps into the same emotional mechanisms that hatred itself uses, but turns them against those who hate minorities. In general, this mechanism requires that haters are a small portion of the population initially or at least that they are segregated.

Hatred is surely with us to stay, but if it is to be minimized then its roots must be understood. The examples I have just discussed make it clear that hatred is not innate, but is rather a creation of particular political actors who face incentives to build hatred. If

we are to fight hatred, then we must try to change the incentives faced by the suppliers and consumers of hate.

Appendix: Proofs of Propositions

Proof of Proposition 1: The first order condition can be rewritten $V'(nt)y = \pi'(t)Q$, where $Q = BmpA(1-s)$ and $n=r+d$. Differentiating this condition yields:

$$\frac{\partial t}{\partial n} = \frac{V'(nt) + ntV''(yt)}{V''(nt)n^2 - \pi''(t)Q} = \frac{n}{t} \frac{1 + \frac{ntV''(nt)}{V'(yt)}}{-\frac{ntV''(nt)}{V'(nt)} - \left(-\frac{\pi''(t)t}{\pi'(t)}\right)},$$

which using assumption 1 is

clearly positive, which proves the t is rising with both r and d . For all other parameters

$$\text{(denoted "X")} \quad \frac{\partial t}{\partial X} = \frac{\frac{\pi''(t)t}{\pi'(t)}}{-\frac{V''(nt)nt}{V'(nt)} - \left(-\frac{\pi''(t)t}{\pi'(t)}\right)} \frac{1}{Q} \frac{\partial Q}{\partial X}$$

which has the opposite sign of $\frac{\partial Q}{\partial X}$.

As $\frac{\partial Q}{\partial X}$ is always negative for s , hatred is always increasing with s . For B , m , p and A ,

$\frac{\partial Q}{\partial X}$ is positive if and only if $s < 1$.

Proof of Proposition 2: If I define $W(d, \tilde{X})$, as the maximand of the anti-redistribution politician times $2z\tau$, we note that

$$W_d(d, \tilde{X}) = (1 - \pi_0)\mu(p)A\tau(1-p)^2 \Delta \pi'(t)t'(d) - v'(w_R - w_L + d) - ph'(d)$$

For any parameter "X" $\frac{\partial d}{\partial X} = -\frac{W_{dX}(d, \tilde{X})}{W_{dd}(d, \tilde{X})}$. The parameters that will impact $t'(d)$ are B ,

m , p , A , r and s . The others will not and therefore $t'(d)$ can be taken as being independent of them.

As I have assumed second order conditions hold, the sign of $\frac{\partial d}{\partial X}$ is the same as the sign of $W_{dX}(d, \tilde{X})$. If the parameter in question W does not enter directly into equation (2), then the sign of $\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial X}$ must be the same as the sign of $\frac{\partial d}{\partial X}$.

Obvious differentiation tells us that $W_{d\pi_0}(d, \tilde{X}) < 0$, $W_{dw_R}(d, \tilde{X}) < 0$, $W_{yw_L}(y, \tilde{X}) > 0$, $W_{d\tau}(d, \tilde{X}) > 0$, $W_{d\Delta}(d, \tilde{X}) > 0$, and if $h(d) = h_0 + h_1d$, $W_{dh_1}(d, \tilde{X}) < 0$.

Proof of Proposition 3: Again defining $W(y, \tilde{X})$, as the maximand of the anti-redistribution politician times $2z\tau$:

$$W_d(d, \tilde{X}) = \frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma} (r+d)^{\frac{1-2\sigma}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{Bmp(1-s)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\omega}} (A\theta)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} (1-\pi_0)\mu(p)\tau(1-p)^2 \Delta$$

$$-v'(w_R - w_L + d) - ph'(d)$$

For variables that only impact the supply side (i.e. don't have an impact on d if d is held constant), again we find that $W_{d\pi_0}(d, \tilde{X}) < 0$, $W_{dw_R}(d, \tilde{X}) < 0$, $W_{dw_L}(d, \tilde{X}) > 0$, $W_{d\Delta}(d, \tilde{X}) > 0$, and $W_{d\tau}(d, \tilde{X}) > 0$, and if $h(d) = h_0 + h_1d$, $W_{dh_1}(d, \tilde{X}) < 0$. For all of the variables except for π_0 , this is enough to determine their impact on hatred.

For variables that only impact the demand side, we know that $W_{ds}(d, \tilde{X}) < 0$, $W_{dB}(d, \tilde{X}) < 0$, $W_{d\alpha}(d, \tilde{X}) > 0$ and $W_{dm}(d, \tilde{X}) < 0$. As the direct impact of these variables on t goes in the same direction as the indirect effect through d , the level of hatred is rising with s , falling with B , m and α .

However, four variables, A , θ , r and p , will impact both the demand and supply of hatred.

The level of A impacts both the supply and demand side, however, given this functional form these effects go in the same direction (i.e. $W_{dA}(d, \tilde{X}) < 0$), so higher values of A will reduce the proportion of haters in the population.

The level of hatred equals $\theta t = \theta^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} (d+r)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{BmpA(1-s)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\omega}}$. Thus the total impact of a change in θ on hatred will equal: $\frac{(1-\sigma)t}{\sigma} \left(\frac{\theta}{d+r} \frac{\partial d}{\partial \theta} - 1 \right)$, which is always negative because $W_{y\theta}(y, \tilde{X}) < 0$.

Differentiation tells us that $W_{dr}(d, \tilde{X}) < 0$, but for

$$\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma} (r+d)^{\frac{1-2\sigma}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{Bmp(1-s)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\omega}} (A\theta)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} (1-\pi_0)\mu(p)\tau(1-p)^2 \Delta$$

to equal, $v'(w_R - w_L + d) + ph'(d)$, then as r rises, the level of d falls, the overall level of $r+d$ must

go up as d falls. As $t = (d+r)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{B\theta mpA(1-s)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\omega}}$, this gives us that the amount of time listening to hatred and the overall level of hatred will rise with the value of r .

The total impact of p on t equals $\frac{\partial t}{\partial p} = \left(\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma(d+r)} \frac{\partial d}{\partial p} - \frac{1}{\sigma p} \right) (d+r)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{\theta B m p A (1-s)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}$,

which is positive if and only if $p \frac{\partial d}{\partial p} > \frac{d+r}{1-\sigma}$.

$$W_d(d, \tilde{X}) = \frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma} (r+d)^{\frac{1-2\sigma}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{B m p (1-s)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (A\theta)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} (1-\pi_0) \mu(p) \tau (1-p)^2 \Delta$$

$$-v'(w_R - w_L + d) - ph'(d)$$

The value of

$$-W_{dd}(d, \tilde{X}) = \frac{(2\sigma-1)}{\sigma} \Psi(r+d)^{\frac{1-3\sigma}{\sigma}} p^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \mu(p) (1-p)^2 + v''(w_R - w_L + d) + ph''(d), \text{ and}$$

$$W_{dp}(d, \tilde{X}) = \Psi(r+d)^{\frac{1-2\sigma}{\sigma}} \mu(p) (1-p)^2 p^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\mu'(p)}{\mu(p)} - \frac{2}{1-p} - \frac{1}{p\sigma} \right) - h'(d), \text{ where}$$

$$\Psi = \frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma} \left(\frac{\alpha}{B m (1-s)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (A\theta)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} (1-\pi_0) \Delta \tau, \text{ so}$$

$$\frac{\partial d}{\partial p} = \frac{\Psi(r+d)^{\frac{1-2\sigma}{\sigma}} \mu(p) (1-p)^2 p^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\mu'(p)}{\mu(p)} - \frac{2}{1-p} - \frac{1}{p\sigma} \right) - h'(d)}{\frac{(2\sigma-1)}{\sigma} \Psi(r+d)^{\frac{1-3\sigma}{\sigma}} p^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \mu(p) (1-p)^2 + v''(w_R - w_L + d) + ph''(d)}.$$

Thus $p \frac{\partial d}{\partial p} > \frac{d+r}{1-\sigma}$ if and only if:

$$\Psi(r+d)^{\frac{1-2\sigma}{\sigma}} \mu(p) (1-p)^2 p^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{\mu'(p)p}{\mu(p)} - \frac{2p}{1-p} - \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \right) >$$

$$\frac{d+r}{1-\sigma} (v''(w_R - w_L + d) + ph''(d)) + ph'(d)$$

Using the fact that:

$$v'(w_R - w_L + y) + ph'(d) = y^{\frac{1-2\sigma}{\sigma}} \Psi \mu(p) (1-p)^2 p^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}, \text{ this inequality can be rewritten:}$$

$$\frac{\mu'(p)p}{\mu(p)} > \frac{2p}{1-p} + \frac{ph'(d)}{v'(w_R - w_L + d) + ph'(d)} + \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \left(1 + \frac{(d+r)(v''(w_R - w_L + d) + ph''(d))}{v'(w_R - w_L + d) + ph'(d)} \right)$$

Proof of Proposition 4: The support for the anti-redistribution candidate will equal:

$$.5 - \frac{v(w_R - w_L + d)}{2z\tau} + (\pi_0 + (1 - \pi_0)\pi(t(d)))\mu(p)A\left(\frac{(1-p)^2\Delta}{2z} + \frac{(1-p)\Delta_k}{2z\tau}\right),$$

and the support for the anti-redistribution candidate will equal, one minus this amount. When $(1-p)\tau\Delta + \Delta_k > 0$, then the anti-redistribution candidate will gain from hatred.

Returning to the notation above and again assuming that, letting $W(d, \tilde{X})$, refer the maximand of the anti-redistribution politician times $2z\tau$, differentiation yields:

$$W_d(d, \tilde{X}) = -v'(w_R - w_L + y) + (1 - \pi_0)\mu(p)A\left(\frac{(1-p)^2\Delta}{2z} + \frac{(1-p)\Delta_k}{2z\tau}\right)\pi'(t)t'(d)$$

and $W_{d\Delta_k}(d, \tilde{X}) = (1 - \pi_0)\mu(p)A\frac{(1-p)}{2z\tau}\pi'(t)t'(d) > 0$, so as Δ_k rises so does the supply of hatred. Since k does not directly impact “ t ”, d , t , and the overall level of hatred must be rising with k .

However, if $(1-p)\tau\Delta + \Delta_k < 0$, then the pro-redistribution party will support hatred. If we now let $W(d, \tilde{X})$, refer to the maximand of the pro-redistribution politician times

$$2z\tau, \text{ we find that } W_{d\Delta_k}(d, \tilde{X}) = -(1 - \pi_0)\mu(p)A\frac{(1-p)}{2z\tau}\pi'(t)t'(d) < 0, \text{ so the supply of}$$

hatred (and again the overall level of hatred) will decline with Δ_k .

Proof of Proposition 5: If the anti-redistribution candidates support a specific anti-minority policy, then the support for the candidate equals

$$.5 - \frac{v(w_R - w_L + d)}{2z\tau} + (\pi_0 + (1 - \pi_0)\pi(t(d)))\mu(p)A\left(\frac{(1-p)^2\Delta}{2z} + \frac{(1-p)k}{2z\tau}\right),$$

which is obviously increasing in k if and only if $(\pi_0 + (1 - \pi_0)\pi(t(d))) > 0$. If the pro-

redistribution candidate offers a specific anti-minority policy, then support for that candidate will equal

$$.5 + \frac{v(w_R - w_L + d)}{2z\tau} - (\pi_0 + (1 - \pi_0)\pi(t(d)))\mu(p)A\left(\frac{(1-p)^2\Delta}{2z} - \frac{(1-p)k}{2z\tau}\right)$$

which is again increasing in k if and only if $(\pi_0 + (1 - \pi_0)\pi(t(d))) > 0$.

Proof of Proposition 6: Let X denote $B((1 - mp)\tilde{\pi}A/2)$, then total differentiation of $V'(kt)k = \pi'(t)B((1 - mp)\tilde{\pi}A/2)$, with respect to X , holding t constant yields

$$\frac{dk}{dX} = \frac{\pi'(t)}{V'(kt) + V''(kt)k(t, X)},$$
 which tells us that k increases with X . Since X is rising

with A , B and $\tilde{\pi}$ and declining with m , p , and A , the proposition follows.

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