Robust Monetary Policy under Model, Data and Shock Uncertainty in a Small Forward Looking Model of the U.S Economy.

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Abstract

Recently there has been interest in studying the robustness of monetary policy rules under model uncertainty. One of the prominent ways to analyze robustness consists of the following three steps. First, choose a reference model of the economy. Next, define a set of perturbations around this model, where the set is structured so that the uncertainty is focused on potentially important weaknesses of the reference model. Finally, compute an index of robustness for a given policy rule. The index measures a distance between the reference model and those perturbations that result in the dynamic instability under the policy rule studied. The larger the index the more robust the rule. Unfortunately, previous applications of this approach allowed only for a purely backward-looking reference model and perturbation set. This paper, therefore, extends the analysis of robustness to reference models and perturbation sets that may include forward-looking components. I apply theoretical results of the paper to analyze simple policy rules under model uncertainty in an empirical New Keynesian models of the US economy studied in Rudebusch (2000b). I address three sets of issues: the degree of policy activism under model, data and shock uncertainty, the stabilization properties of nominal income rules, and the robustness of forecast-based rules. I find that aggressive policy rules are relatively more robust than cautious rules with respect to uncertainty about point estimates of parameters of the reference model. However, cautious rules look relatively more robust under more broadly specified uncertainty. Nominal income rules are shown to be much less robust than rules responding to inflation and the output gap. The policy rules responding to a forecast of inflation and the current output gap are found to be quite robust even for forecast horizon longer than 1 year.

1. Introduction

The question of robustness of monetary policy rules to model uncertainty has recently received much attention, both from practitioners and academic researchers. The recent Asian crisis, the steady decline of the natural unemployment rate in the US, and uncertainty about the workings of the economy in the new European environment have all contributed to this interest. Alan Greenspan (2000) recently acknowledged the challenges that model uncertainty introduces for monetary policy making. In particular he said:

> "Policymakers... inevitably construct working hypotheses or models of the way our economies work. Of necessity, these models are a major simplification of the many forces that govern the functioning of our system at any point in time. Obviously, to the extent that these constructs ... fail to capture critical factors driving economic expansion or contraction, conclusions drawn from their application will be off the mark."

How should a central bank conduct monetary policy in a situation when the existent models of the economy may be misspecified, imperfectly estimated and subject to structural breaks? This paper tries to answer this question. It follows the logic of analysis proposed recently by Onatski and Stock (1999). This analysis consists of the following three steps. First, choose a reference model that approximates the true workings of the economy. Next, define a non-parametric space of perturbations around this model, where the space is structured so that the uncertainty is focused on potentially important weaknesses of the reference model. So, for example, if a reference model states that the real interest rate affects the real output through a policy multiplier, a possible perturbation would add some "long and variable lags" to the effect. If, in addition, the reference model is known to result from a log-linearization procedure then the space of perturbations may be augmented to include non-linear perturbations consistent with the accuracy of the linearization of paricular dynamic channels, etc. Finally, compute an index of robustness for a given policy rule. The index measures a distance between the reference model and those perturbations that result in the dynamic instability under the policy rule studied. The larger the index the more robust the rule.

Unfortunately, the practical application of this method was limited in an important way. Previous analysis allowed only for purely backward-looking reference models and uncertainty sets. This seriously impaired the analysis at several levels. Most fundamentally, restricting attention to backward-looking models rules out models with rational or partially rational expectations. A prominent example of such a model is the Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) New Keynesian model, which consists of *purely forward-looking* IS and Phillips-curve-type equations. Second, approximating model uncertainty by a strictly backward-looking version is not innocuous for certain policy rules. Thus, for example, the much discussed nominal income rules can result in dynamic instability in the purely backward-looking models of Ball (1999b) and Svensson (1999). As shown by McCallum (1997), however, the instability disappears for a variety of alternative more forward-looking (and more plausible) model specifications. Finally, the backward-looking analysis is ill-suited for studying such phenomena as the indeterminacy of equilibrium and forecast-based rules. The latter has received a lot of attention in such inflation-targeting central banks as the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, and the Reserve Bank of Australia. As was shown by Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999b), the equilibrium indeterminacy can be an important source of non-robustness for the forecast-based rules (see also Bernanke and Woodford (1997)).

The main methodological contribution of this paper is to solve the above problem, that is, to extend the Onatski-Stock approach to forward-looking reference models and uncertainty sets. Since forward-looking behavior is specific to social as opposed to physical processes, the extension cannot directly draw upon advances in the field of robust control in the engineering literature. Therefore, the ideas of robust stability analysis (see, for example, Zhou, Doyle and Glover (1996), and Dahleh and Diaz-Bobillo (1995)) must be considerably changed to use them for models incorporating rational expectations.[1] I implement this change and apply my theoretical results to analyze policy rules in the context of an empirical New Keynesian model of the US economy described in Rudebusch (2000b).

[1] As Hansen and Sargent (2000a) noted, it is natural to consider private agents sharing policy maker's uncertainty about the true model of economy. Thus, the philosophy of robust analysis suggests that the rational expectation hypothesis should be changed into something that could be called a "robust expectations" hypothesis. However in this paper I assume rational expectations, leaving the ideal of the robust expectations hypothesis for future research.

There has been one previous attempt to generalize the approach to forward-looking models. Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2000) propose to obtain a saddle path backward-looking representation of the reference model controlled by a particular policy rule, then specify the uncertainty set around the controlled model, and finally compute the index of robustness as in the backward-looking case. One problem with this approach is that the uncertainty is introduced around the controlled model, so it is specific for each policy rule. Therefore, comparison of the degree of robustness for different policy rules is problematic. Another limitation of the approach is that it makes difficult to interpret the possible deviations from the reference model since the parameters of the model solved for rational expectations are highly non-linear functions of the parameters of the original model. Finally, the approach assumes that the private sector believes that the reference model of the economy is true which is not plausible.[2]

In this paper I show how to analyze model uncertainty specified directly in the original forward-looking model before it is controlled by a specific policy rule. This approach makes the economic interpretation of uncertainty easier. It also results in a measure of robustness consistent across different policy rules which is convenient for policy analysis. The private sector is assumed to believe that the right model of the economy is a particular (unknown to a policy maker) model from the model uncertainty set.

The empirical part of the paper addresses three sets of questions. The first set of questions concerns degree of policy activism appropriate under model uncertainty. A number of recent studies (see Sargent (1999), Stock (1999), Hansen and Sargent (1999), Giannoni (1999)) found that policy rules robust to model uncertainty must be very aggressive. In contrast, Brainard's (1967) classic analysis states that a policy maker facing model uncertainty must do less than in the certain environment (see also Rudebusch (1998), Wieland (1998), Söderström (2000b)). Previous studies of model uncertainty of the type considered in this paper produced results in between: relatively more robust policy turned out to be more responsive to some economic variables and less responsive to others. How will these

[2] Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2000) avoid the problems by considering a special structure of uncertainty that is invariant to solving out the expectations from the reference model. This assumption is made for technical convenience, however, and begs the question of robustness with respect to this assumed information structure.

results change for forward-looking models?

The second group of questions concerns the recent debate on the stabilization properties of nominal income rules. The nominal income rules are attractive from several perspectives. In particular, such rules imply automatic reaction to two variables of major interest for central bankers: prices and real output. A target for nominal output can serve as a nominal anchor for monetary policy. Reacting to changes in nominal income is similar to reacting to changes in money (under a relatively stable velocity). Finally, the rules do not rely upon output gap estimates, hence they are robust to real-time data uncertainty that has been a focus of many recent studies (see, for example, Orphanides (1999)).[3]

As I briefly mentioned before, stabilization properties of nominal income rules were seriously questioned by Ball (1999b) and Svensson (1999). Because the unfavorable results of these authors turn out to be model-specific, McCallum (1999) suggested that the relative quality of the nominal income rules and other monetary policy rules be assessed by a wide-scale analysis, including, in particular, a study of robustness to model specification. Rudebusch (2000b) conducts such a study. He compares the performance of nominal income targeting with that of a benchmark Taylor rule for three different parameter specifications of his model. He finds that though nominal income growth rules do not destabilize the economy, they perform much worse than Taylor type rules. Do his results hold under the more general model uncertainty analysis provided here?

The final issue addressed is that of robustness of forecast-based rules. This issue could not in principle be addressed by the Onatski and Stock approach in its backward-looking form. I compare the robustness of forecast-based rules with that of benchmark Taylor-type rules and nominal income rules. I am particularly interested in the question of whether, as suggested by studies of Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999b) and Bernanke and Woodford (1997), the forecast-based rules can easily result in indeterminacy of the equilibrium.

I consider several sources of uncertainty about the Rudebusch model. First, it is econometric uncertainty about point estimates of the model's parameters. Second, the reference model may be misspecified so that the true model may include different lags or leads of

[3]The attractive features of the nominal income rules mentioned above are reviewed in greater detail in Rudebusch (2000b).

endogenous variables. Finally, there exist uncertainty about the quality of data available in the real time.

I find that for the majority of the policy rules studied even statistically small perturbations of the Rudebusch model may lead to dynamic instability. For example, it is enough to change parameters of the model inside the 70% asymptotic confidense ellipsoid to face the dynamic instability under the famous Taylor rule (interest rate reacts to inflation and the output gap with coefficients 1.5 and 0.5 respectively).

Robustness ordering of different policy rules strongly depends on the particular specification of the uncertainty chosen. For econometric error uncertainty, those rules that are relatively more aggressive are relatively more robust. Just the opposite is true for more broadly specified uncertainty: those rules that are relatively less aggressive are relatively more robust.

I find the nominal income growth rules to be much less robust than the Taylor-type rules for majority of the uncertainty specifications studied. However, for those uncertainty specifications that include real-time data uncertainty the robustness of nominal income policy rules may be comparable to that of the Taylor-type rules.

The indeterminacy in the equilibrium triggered by the model uncertainty is not a real threat for the forecast based rules. So, for example, reacting to 4 years ahead forecasts of inflation and the output gap does not lead to indeterminacy for reasonable perturbations of the reference model. In general, the robustness of the forecast based rules seem to be higher than that of the rules based on current or past data.

Most of the above results depend on the particular choice of the reference model made. I illustrate this dependence by trying to replicate some of the above results for the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) model.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notions of a reference model and a perturbation space and defines a distance between a perturbation and the reference model. In Section 3, I define the index of robustness and develop an algorithm for its computation. Section 4 is devoted to an application of the developed techniques to the analysis of robustness in the New Keynesian model of economy described in Rudebusch (2000b). Section 5 concludes. Some technical details of the paper are given in the Appendix.

2. Modeling uncertainty

In this section I define the basic components of the structured non-parametric approach to model uncertainty described in Onatski and Stock (1999). These components are: the reference model, the perturbation space, and the distance between a perturbation and the reference model.

2.1. Reference model

Assume that a policy-maker's model of the economy is

$$\sum_{j=0}^{m} E_{t-j} M^j(L) X_t = u_t, \tag{2.1}$$

where X_t is a $n \times 1$ vector of endogenous variables including a policy instrument, u_t is $n \times 1$ vector of shocks, $M^j(L)$ is a $n \times n$ matrix lag polynomial containing both positive and negative powers of the lag operator, L, and where E_{t-j} is expectation given information available at time $t-j$ including knowledge of the model structure. The information set at time t consists of current and all past values of shock u_t. The first $n-1$ equations of the model describe dynamics of the endogenous variables and the last equation represents policy.[4]

A policy-maker can affect the state of the economy by choosing the coefficients of the policy equation. I assume that the policy-maker is able to commit to her choice so that the policy equation can be viewed as a policy rule. The only rules I consider are linear responses to current, past and expected future values of the variables X_t. This choice of possible rules is not very restrictive. Indeed, most simple policy rules that receive much attention are linear rules (see Taylor (1999)). Besides, as is well known, optimal rules in the case of conventional linear quadratic control are linear. However, the set of linear rules is too restrictive in some important settings, such as one with lower bound on the nominal

[4] Models (2.1) were studied, for example, in Broze, Gourieroux and Szafarz (1995) and include many special linear rational expectations models studied in the literature. Note that the popular models of monetary policy described in Rudebusch and Svensson (1997), Ball (1999a), McCallum and Nelson (1999), Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), all can be represented in the above form.

interest rate explicitly taken into account (see Orphanides and Wieland (1999)). In this paper I will not consider such settings.

In what follows I employ Whiteman's (1983) solution principle to solve (2.1). That is, first, I restrict attention to the case when expectations are formed linearly. Hence, $E_t X$ must be read as optimal linear predictor of X given information available by t. Second, the shock process u_t is a zero-mean regular stationary process. Third, solutions will be sought in the space spanned by time-invariant square-summable linear combinations of u_t. I also require that the coefficients of $M^j(L)$ are absolutely summable, which is satisfied automatically for standard models where $M^j(L)$ represents a finite order polynomial.

2.2. Perturbation space

The policy-maker understands that her model, which I will call the reference model, is only an approximation to reality because, perhaps, not all relevant variables are included in X_t, or not all relevant lags are considered, or because linear equations of the model are imperfect substitute for the true nonlinear relations describing the economy, or, maybe, true economic relations are subject to structural breaks etc. She prefers, therefore, to use a policy rule that works well for all models from a neighborhood of the reference model:

$$\sum_{j=0}^{m} E_{t-j}\left(M^j(L) + W_1^j(L)\Delta^j W_2^j(L)\right) X_t = u_t. \tag{2.2}$$

Here Δ^j are in general $k \times k$ nonlinear, time-varying, and not necessarily causal block-diagonal operators from the space of $k \times 1$ stationary processes to itself, and $W_1^j(L)$ and $W_2^j(L)$ are $n \times k$ and $k \times n$ weighting matrix lag-lead polynomials. It is assumed that the private sector knows the true model so that the expectations in (2.2) are taken with the full knowledge of Δ^j.

The blocks on the diagonal of Δ^j and the weighting matrices can be structured so that the uncertainty is focused on potentially important weaknesses of the model. The following extremely stylized example illustrates the idea of structured perturbations. Assume that the reference model of the policy-maker is

$$\begin{aligned} x_t &= ap_{t-1} + s_t \\ p_t &= kx_t + v_t, \end{aligned} \tag{2.3}$$

where p_t is a policy instrument, s_t, v_t are exogenous shocks, and x_t is the variable of interest for the policy-maker. The model has form (2.1) with $m = 0$, $M^0 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -aL \\ -k & 1 \end{pmatrix}$, $u_t = [s_t, v_t]'$, and $X_t = [x_t, p_t]'$.

Now, suppose that the policy-maker suspects that the effect of policy on x_t has some weak but long and variable unmodeled lag structure. Besides, it is suspected that x_t might have some inertia of its own and the value of x_t today is somewhat affected by expectations of future x_t. The policy-maker then may believe that a better model of the economy has the following form

$$\begin{aligned} x_t &= w_1\Delta_1 x_{t-1} + w_2 E_t \Delta_2 x_{t+1} + (a + w_3\Delta_3)p_{t-1} + u_t \\ p_t &= kx_t + v_t, \end{aligned} \tag{2.4}$$

where Δ_1 is a linear, time-invariant, causal operator represented by an infinite lag polynomial, Δ_2 is a linear, time-invariant anti-causal operator represented by infinite lead polynomial, and Δ_3 is a linear, causal, slowly time-varying operator represented by infinite lag polynomial with slowly time-varying coefficients. The weights w_i reflect relative importance of the model weaknesses corresponding to Δ_1, Δ_2, and Δ_3. The above model has form (2.2) with $\Delta^0 = diag\,(\Delta_1, \Delta_2, \Delta_3)$, $W_1^0 = -\begin{pmatrix} w_1 & w_2 & w_3 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$, and $W_2^0 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & L \\ L & L^{-1} & 0 \end{pmatrix}'$.

In this paper I consider only linear time invariant perturbations Δ^j, such that their infinite lag-lead polynomial representations have absolutely summable coefficients. The simplest case of such perturbations is multiplication by a constant (all coefficients in the lag-lead polynomial representation are zero except the one on $L^0 \equiv 1$). Such static operators may be used in (2.2) to represent uncertainty about values of model parameters. In the above example, if uncertainty were about the size of coefficient a only, we would have

$$x_t = (a + \Delta)p_{t-1} + s_t, \tag{2.5}$$

with $\Delta^0 = \Delta$ which is simply a constant, $W_1^0 = (-1, 0)'$, and $W_2^0 = (0, L)$.

Note that in general the perturbed model (2.2) may be represented in the "shock uncertainty" form

$$\sum_{j=0}^{m} E_{t-j} M_j(L) X_t = u_t + \xi_t, \tag{2.6}$$

where $\xi_t = -\sum_{j=0}^{m} W_{j,1}(L)\Delta_j W_{j,2}(L) X_t$. The shock representation of uncertainty that does not specify particular structure of the additive shock ξ_t became recently a popular vehicle of research on robustness (see, for example, Hansen and Sargent (2000) and references therein).

2.3. Distance between perturbations and the reference model

To define a neighborhood of the reference model in the perturbation space we need a notion of distance between the reference model and the alternatives. I define the distance between the reference model, M, and perturbation (2.2), M_Δ, as

$$d(M, M_\Delta) = \max_j \left\|\Delta^j\right\|.$$

Here the norm of Δ, $\|\Delta\|$, is taken to be L_∞ norm of the function $\Delta(e^{i\omega})$, that is[5]

$$\|\Delta\| = \left\{\sup_\omega \text{maxeval}\left[\Delta'(e^{-i\omega})\Delta(e^{i\omega})\right]\right\}^{1/2},$$

where maxeval denotes maximum eigenvalue.

If the uncertainty exists only about values of parameters of the reference model so that Δ is a diagonal matrix of constants, the L_∞ norm of Δ is simply the maximum of absolute values of its diagonal elements. So if in example (2.3) we are uncertain only about value of

[5] In what follows I will ignore indices j as if all expectations in the model were taken as of time t. This will simplify my notations. I will use the indices whenever they are needed for understanding of the material.

a then the perturbations have form (2.5)with Δ equal to some real number and the distance between (2.3) and (2.5) is equal to $|\Delta|$.

General linear time invariant perturbations Δ may be viewed as linear filters acting in the space of stationary random processes with finite variances. Then L_∞ norm of $\Delta(e^{i\omega})$ is the gain of filter Δ. That is for any stationary input of the filter, ξ_t, with variance 1 the variance of the output will be less than or equal to $\|\Delta\|$. Moreover, there exists input ξ_t with variance 1 such that the output has variance arbitrarily close to $\|\Delta\|$.

Indeed, let ξ_t be a stationary input of the filter. Then, for the variance of the output we have:

$$\begin{aligned} & tr\frac{1}{2\pi}\int_{-\pi}^{\pi}\Delta(e^{i\omega})F_\xi(\omega)\Delta'(e^{-i\omega})d\omega \\ = \; & tr\frac{1}{2\pi}\int_{-\pi}^{\pi}\Delta'(e^{-i\omega})\Delta(e^{i\omega})F_\xi(\omega)d\omega \end{aligned} \tag{2.7}$$

where F_ξ is the spectral density matrix of the process ξ_t. Let f be the eigenvector corresponding to $\sup_\omega \text{maxeval}[\Delta'(e^{-i\omega})\Delta(e^{i\omega})]$ and ω_0 is the frequency where the supremum is attained. Then the spectral density matrix can be chosen so that it is proportional to $f * f'$ with huge coefficient of proportionality at ω_0 and it is small for other ω.

Indeed, let ζ_t be a real-valued stationary process with spectral density function equal to $f * f'$ at frequency ω_0. Consider a sequence of filters with positive Fourier transforms $g_n(\omega)$ such that $\frac{1}{2\pi}\int_{-\pi}^{\pi} g_n(\omega)d\omega = 1$, $g_n(\omega) = g_n(-\omega)$, and g_n converges to zero uniformly outside any open set containing $\pm\omega_0$. Apply these filters to ζ_t and denote the resulting processes (scaled so as to have unit variance) as ξ_{nt}. Expression (2.7) can be made arbitrarily close to $\|\Delta\|$ by choosing $\xi_t = \xi_{nt}$ for large enough n. On the other hand, this expression is obviously no larger than $\|\Delta\|$. Hence, the gain of Δ is equval to $\|\Delta\|$. It seems reasonable to consider perturbation operators that cannot increase the variance of an input process too much.

Interpretation of the distance between models depends on the reference model, the weighting matrices and assumptions made about operators on the diagonal of Δ. Depending on these factors there may or may not exist a monotone relationship between the distance and some statistical measure of closeness of models. More on this will be said in the application part of the paper.

3. Index of robustness

The policy-maker is assumed to have a quadratic loss function

$$L_t = (1-\beta)\, E_t \sum \beta^i \left(X'_{t+i} \Lambda X_{t+i} \right), \tag{3.1}$$

where Λ is some positive-definite weighting matrix, and β is between zero and one. Below I consider the case $\beta \to 1$, so that, for stationary X_t, the loss is equal to the variance of a linear combination of variables from X_t.

$$L = EX_t' \Lambda X_t.$$

The policy maker's problem is to choose a rule for the policy instrument so that the loss for all models from the vicinity of the reference model is not too high. The two most popular formalizations of this problem lead to the Bayesian and the minimax criterion of optimality. Let $\mathcal{F}$ be the set of feasible policy rules rules, f. Then a Bayesian policy-maker will choose the policy rule

$$f = \arg\min_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \int \sup_{X_t \in S} EX_t' \Lambda X_t dF(\Delta), \tag{3.2}$$

where the inner supremum is taken over all X_t from the set S of all stationary solutions to a particular model and F is a probability measure over the perturbation space.

Note that if there is indeterminacy situation, when S consists of more than one element, the inner supremum is infinite. Indeed, let X_{1t} and X_{2t} be two different stationary solutions. Then any linear combination $Z_t = \lambda X_{1t} + (1-\lambda) X_{2t}$ is also a solution. It is then possible to choose λ so as to make loss associated with Z_t as large as one wants.

A "minimax policy maker" will choose

$$f = \arg\min_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \sup_{\|\Delta\| \leq r} \sup_{X_t \in S} EX_t' \Lambda X_t, \tag{3.3}$$

where the outer supremum is taken over all perturbations from the ball of radius r. The radius can be chosen in many different ways. One way would be to choose r large enough for uncertainty set to include some particular alternative to the reference model. In the example given in the previous section suppose that a prominent alternative to the reference model was

$$\begin{aligned} x_t &= bx_{t-1} + ap_{t-1} + s_t \\ p_t &= kx_t + v_t. \end{aligned}$$

Then for the uncertainty set to include this model $||\Delta||$ must be at least b/w_1. Hence, we can choose $r = b/w_1$.

Another way to choose r would be to include in the model uncertainty set only those models that are statistically close to the reference one. For example, if a point estimate of parameter a in the reference model $x_t = ap_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$ is, say, 0.5 and its standard deviation is 0.1 we can represent the uncertainty by a set of models $x_t = (a+\Delta)p_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$ with $|\Delta| < 0.1$. Still another possibility would be not to choose r in advance but vary it from zero to infinity to get a whole family of the minimax rules robust to the uncertainty of different size.[6]

At present no numerical algorithms solving either the Bayesian or the minimax problem as they are stated above are known.[7] However, as I show below, it is possible to compute the set of rules that do not result in economic instability for each perturbation from the set

$$D_r = \{\Delta : \Delta \text{ has particular block diagonal structure specified at the stage}$$
$$\text{of formulating the model uncertainty and } ||\Delta|| < r\}.$$

Similar to Christiano and Gust (1999), I focuse attention on the extreme economic instability that results either in non-stationarity or in indeterminacy in the equilibrium. Obviously,

[6]Note also that I consider a situation when the model uncertainty represented by the probability distribution $F(\Delta)$ in (3.2) and by the perturbation set $||\Delta|| \leq r$ in (3.3) is not changing over time. There is no learning and rule f is chosen once and for all given the model uncertainty prevailing at the time of the choice.

[7]Paganini (1996) gives an algorithm for computation of the minimax rules when the model and uncertainty operators are backward looking. Application of these techniques for the robustness analysis in the Rudebusch-Svensson model can be found in Onatski (2000).

the set of stabilizing rules contains the minimax rule. It also contains the optimal Bayesian rule if the support of measure F on perturbations Δ includes D_r. In general, the larger the size of possible perturbations, r, the smaller the set of stabilizing rules. Hence, for sufficiently large r the set of stabilizing rules is very narrow and, therefore, it characterizes the optimal rules fairly precisely. On the other hand, when r is small, the set of stabilizing rules can be large and it is relatively uninformative about the nature of the optimal rules that solve (3.2) and (3.3).

One way to summarize stabilization properties of a policy rule is to compute the maximum r such that the rule still results in the finite loss for any model from the ball D_r. I call such maximum the index of robustness for the rule. More formally,

Definition 1. *I define the index of robustness for a rule f as supremum r such that f results in unique stationary solution for any model from D_r except, maybe, a degenrate set of models such that it does not include any open subset.*[8]

Since it is natural to assume that the precise autocorrelation structure of the noise is not known, by the existence of a solution to the model I mean existence of a solution for any stationary noise process with the correlation structure arbitrarily close to that assumed for the reference noise. This definition avoids some pathological situations when the solution to the model exists only for a particular correlation structure of the noise. For example, consider a model

$$\frac{1}{2^{i+1}}\sum_{i=-1}^{\infty} E_t X_{t+i} = u_t$$

Let $u_t = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} c_k \varepsilon_{t-k}$ be Wold representation of u_t. The model has solution if and only if $2c_0 = c_1$. This condition cannot be granted if second moments of the noise are known imprecisely.

One should interpret the index of robustness with caution. If the size of uncertainty,

[8] *This qualification simplifies computation of the index. It is tempting to say that it also makes the index less sensitive to extremely improbable destabilizing perturbations. However, if there exists an open neighborhood of a degenerate set of models where the policy-maker's loss is not necessarily infinite but simply very high then sensitivity of the index to degenerate sets of perturbations that literally destabilize the model of the economy may be desirable because it indicates existence of a non-degenerate set that leaves the model stable but makes it extremely volatile.*

r, is known to the policy-maker, then an optimally robust rule in terms of either (3.2) or (3.3) must have the index greater than r. It would be wrong, however, to recommend the rule with the highest index. Indeed, such a rule may trade off extreme stability robustness with poor conventional loss. An example of such a situation will be given in the application section.

3.1. Comutation of the index

In this section I explain how to compute the index of robustness for a given policy rule. To get this computation done one needs to have a criterion for existence and uniqueness of a stationary solution for any given perturbation around the reference model. Conditions for existence and uniqueness of solution to forward-looking models are well known for the case when the model has only finite number of leads and lags (see, for example, Blanchard and Kahn (1980) or Whiteman (1983)). For example, if the model has form

$$P(L)x_t + E_t Q(L^{-1})x_t = \varepsilon_t$$

where x_t is one-dimensional variable and P and Q are polynomials, then a stationary solution exists and is unique if and only if the number of zeros of $P(z) + Q(z^{-1})$ lying outside (inside) the unit circle is exactly equal to the degree of P (respectively degree of Q).

However, because I do not restrict attention to perturbations with finite number of lags or leads I need a criterion of existence and uniqueness that will work for models having infinite lag-lead structure. Below I formulate such a criterion that was developed in a separate paper (see Onatski (2001)).

Define a winding number of a complex-valued function $f(e^{i\omega})$, wind$f$, as the number of times the graph of f rotates around zero counter-clockwise in the complex plane when ω goes from 0 to 2π.[9] Define a function $M(e^{i\omega}) = \sum_{j=0}^{m} e^{-im} M^j(e^{i\omega})$. Then the following criterion of existence and uniqueness of solution holds except for a degenerate set of models

[9] A clockwise rotation of the graph around zero is counted with the negative sign.

Criterion. *Model (2.1) has a unique solution, multiple solutions, or, no solutions if and only if the winding number of* $\det M(e^{i\omega})$ *is equal to zero, less than zero, or greater than zero respectively.*

The first step in computing the index of robustness for a given rule is to check whether the reference model has unique stationary solution. I assume that the reference (not perturbed) model has only finite lags and leads so that one can use standard criteria described in Whiteman (1983). If the reference model does not have unique solution then the index of robustness for the rule is zero. Otherwise, the radius is positive and according to the above criterion the winding number of $\det M(e^{i\omega})$ is zero.

Now consider perturbations (2.2) to the reference model. Define function $M_\Delta(e^{i\omega})$ as

$$M_\Delta(e^{i\omega}) = e^{-im} \sum_{j=0}^{m} \left(M^j(e^{i\omega}) + W_1^j(e^{i\omega})\Delta^j(e^{i\omega})W_2^j(e^{i\omega}) \right).$$

It is convenient to rewrite $M_\Delta(e^{i\omega})$ in the form

$$M_\Delta(e^{i\omega}) = e^{-im} \left(M(e^{i\omega}) + W_1(e^{i\omega})\Delta(e^{i\omega})W_2(e^{i\omega}) \right),$$

where $M = \sum_{j=0}^{m} M^j$, $W_1 = [W_1^0, W_1^1, ..., W_1^m]$, $W_2 = [W_2^0, W_2^1, ..., W_2^m]'$, and $\Delta = diag\left(\Delta^0, \Delta^1, ..., \Delta^m\right)$.For each point on the unit circle, e^{iw}, the value of $\det M_\Delta(e^{i\omega})$ is a continuous function of $\Delta(e^{iw})$. Recall that the size of the perturbation operator, Δ, is measured by the L_∞ norm of $\Delta(e^{iw})$. Hence, the graph of $\det M_\Delta(e^{i\omega})$ changes continuously with respect to small (in L_∞ sense) changes in the perturbation operator, Δ. Therefore, wind($\det M_\Delta$) can become different from zero only after the perturbation Δ becomes large enough for $\det M_\Delta(e^{i\omega})$ to hit zero for some $w \in [0, 2\pi)$.

Suppose that the graph of $\det M_\Delta$ hits zero for some $\Delta = \Delta_0$ of size r but not for smaller Δ. Then, the index of robustness is larger than or equal to r. Indeed, for perturbations Δ such that $||\Delta|| < r$ the winding number of $\det M_\Delta$ is equal to zero, so according to the criterion the perturbed model has a unique stationary solution unless it belongs to a degenerate set of models that we exclude from consideration. On the other hand, the index must be less than or equal to r because it is possible to change Δ_0 marginally so that the graph of det M_Δ will cross zero and the winding number of det M_Δ becomes different from zero. Thus, as the criterion implies, there exists a perturbation operator, $\bar{\Delta}_0$, of the size marginally larger than r such that the model either has multiple or no solutions.[10]

To summarize, to get the index of robustness one needs to find minimum $||\Delta||$ such that matrix $M(z) + W_1(z)\Delta(z)W_2(z)$ is singular for some $z : |z| = 1$. Note that M is invertible on the unit circle because the reference model has unique solution under the policy rule. Therefore, on the unit circle we have

$$\begin{aligned} \det(M + W_1\Delta W_2) &= \det(M)\det\left(I_n + M^{-1}W_1\Delta W_2\right) \\ &= \det(M)\det\left(I_k + W_2M^{-1}W_1\Delta\right) \end{aligned}$$

where I_n denotes $n \times n$ unity matrix. Denote $-W_2M^{-1}W_1$ as S. Then we are looking for minimum $||\Delta||$, having a particular block-diagonal structure, that makes matrix $I_m - S(z)\Delta(z)$ singular at some point on the unit circle.

This problem is known in engineering literature as the problem of computing structured norm of operator S (see, for example, Dahleh and Diaz-Bobillo (1995)). In the next section I implement numerical algorithms[11] for computing the structured norm to analyze robustness of simple policy rules under model uncertainty in a small empirical New Keynesian model of the economy studied in Rudebusch (2000b).

4. Application

In this section, I use the above results to study three sets of questions. The questions concern policy activism appropriate under model uncertainty, the robustness of nominal income rules, and the robustness of forecast-based rules. As was explained in the introduction I am particularly interested to know whether the extension of Onatski and Stock (1999) to forward-looking models recommends extreme activism or not, how robust nominal income

[10] Note that small deviations from $\bar{\Delta}_0$ leave the winding number of det M_Δ different from zero so that the perturbed model corresponding to $\bar{\Delta}_0$ is not from the degenerate set mentioned in Definition 3.1.

[11] Computer codes I use are based on the programs available in Mu Analysis and Synthesis Toolbox in Matlab.

rules are relative to benchmark Taylor-type rules, and whether forecast-based rules can easily lead to indeterminacy of equilibrium.

4.1. Reference model

To perform the analysis I first need to choose a reference model. As John Taylor (2000) notes, despite a lot of differences in models now used for normative policy analysis, there is a common general framework. It consists of three basic equations: a Phillips-curve-type equation, an IS-type equation relating real GDP and the real interest rate, and an equation for monetary policy rule. On one end of the spectrum of models having the above form there are New Keynesian forward-looking models of the economy such as those described in Woodford (1999) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). These models have solid micro foundations and based on general equilibrium analysis but fail to fit data well. On the other end of the spectrum there are empirical purely backward-looking models such as Rudebusch and Svensson's (1999) and Ball's (1999) models. These models fit data surprisingly well but have obscure foundations.

I chose to study an empirical New Keynesian model proposed and estimated in Rudebusch (2000b). The model nests both theoretically appealing forward-looking models and empirically sound backward-looking models. It consists of two equations estimated using US quarterly data from 1968:Q3 to 1998:Q2

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_t \;=\; & \underset{(.08)}{.26} E_{t-1}\bar{\pi}_{t+3} + .74\left(\underset{(.14)}{.69}\pi_{t-1} - \underset{(.14)}{.15}\pi_{t-2} + \underset{(.14)}{.41}\pi_{t-3} + \underset{(.12)}{.07}\pi_{t-4}\right) + \\ & \underset{(.05)}{.16} y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \end{aligned} \tag{4.1}$$

$$y_t = \underset{(.09)}{1.15} y_{t-1} - \underset{(.09)}{.27} y_{t-2} - \underset{(.03)}{.09}(i_{t-1} - E_{t-1}\bar{\pi}_{t+3}) + \eta_t. \tag{4.2}$$

Here $\bar{\pi}_t = \frac{1}{4}(\pi_t+\pi_{t-1}+\pi_{t-2}+\pi_{t-3})$ is the four-quarter average value of the annual percentage rate of inflation, y_t is the output gap, measured as 100 times the log ratio of actual real output to potential output, and i_t is the federal funds rate at an annual rate.. The standard errors of the coefficient estimates are given in parenthesis.

The first equation is an accelerationist Phillips-curve-type relationship. It is a hybrid of a backward-looking Phillips curve and a forward-looking equation. Inclusion of the backward-looking terms substantially improves the equation's fit to data (see Estrella and Fuhrer (1998)). Besides, the backward-looking terms can be theoretically justified by assuming sticky inflation as in Fuhrer and Moore (1995) or sticky information as in Mankiw and Reis (2001).

The second equation is an IS curve linking the output gap to the past output gap and ex ante real interest rate. Such a backward-looking own dynamics of the output gap contrasts with the forward-looking theoretical behavior described by Woodford (1999) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). It is, however, possible to justify the backward-looking dynamic of the output gap theoretically by assuming consumers' habit formation, as in Fuhrer (2000), or capital adjustment costs. The timing structure of the equations (4.1) and (4.2) reflects "real world recognition, processing, and adjustment lags" as discussed in Rudebusch (2000b).

4.2. Uncertainty

I consider several sources of uncertainty about the reference model.

4.2.1. Econometric error.

The parameters of the reference model are estimated with econometric error so that the true values may differ from the point estimates in the range of a p% confidence ellips. Unfortunately, it is impossible to represent such an uncertainty set in the form (2.2) that is convenient for computations. I therefore consider a set of models whose parameters differ from the point estimates in the range of a p% confidence parallelepiped.[12] As shown in Appendix, such a set can be represented in the form (2.2).

[12] Precisely, denote vector of deviations of the perturbed model parameters from the point estimates as $d = [d_1, ..., d_8]'$ (there are 8 estimated parameters in the reference model). And denote the variance-covariance matrix of the point estimates as V. Define $\delta = V^{-1/2'} d$. I consider the set of models corresponding to δ sweeping an 8-dimensional cube with the center at zero and the side length $2s$. Since δ is distributed approximately as 8-dimensional standard normal random variable, the confidence level corresponding to such a cube (or parallelepiped in terms of d) is equal to $(2\Phi(s) - 1)^8$ where Φ is a cumulative distribution function (cdf) for a standard normal distribution. The parallelepiped is completely covered by a confidence ellips with the level of confidence $p = F_{\chi_2(8)}(8s^2)$ where $F_{\chi_2(8)}$ is a cdf for chi-squared with 8 degrees of freedom, it includes a confidence ellips with the level of confidence $p = F_{\chi_2(8)}(s^2)$.

4.2.2. Specification error.

The reference model may be misspecified. At the simplest level, a few lags or leads of the endogenous variables may be wrongfully omitted from the reference equations. As an example, I reestimate the reference model with one additional lag of the output gap added to the Phillips curve and the IS equations and one additional lag of the real interest rate added to the IS equation. Then I form a set of models whose parameters differ from these point estimates in the range of a p% confidence parallelepiped.

The above treatment of possible misspecifications is obviously very limited. Therefore, to introduce less restricted specification errors, I perturb the reference equations so as to include potentially infinite number lags or leads of all variables in the right hand side. Denote the right hand side of equations (4.1) and (4.2) as ref_π and ref_y respectively. I consider the following perturbations:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_t &= ref_\pi + w_{\pi\pi} E_{t-1}\Delta_{\pi\pi}(\pi_{t+1} - \pi_t) + w_{\pi y}\Delta_{\pi y} y_{t-1} \\ y_t &= ref_y + w_{yy} E_{t-1}\Delta_{yy} y_{t+1} + w_{yr} E_{t-1}\Delta_{yr}(i_{t-1} - E_{t-1}\bar{\pi}_{t+3}),\end{aligned}$$

where $\Delta_{\pi\pi}, \Delta_{\pi y}, \Delta_{yy}$, and Δ_{yr} represent uncertainty about the four dynamic channels of the model: inflation-inflation, inflation-output gap, output gap-output gap, and output gap-real interest rate. The weights w_{ij} are supposed to reflect relative importance of the uncertainties. I measure them by an average standard error in coefficient estimates corresponding to a particular channel.[13] Hence, $w_{\pi\pi} = 0.09, w_{\pi y} = 0.05, w_{yy} = 0.09$, and $w_{yr} = 0.03$. Obviousy, such a choice of the weights is arbitrary. Therefore, I vary the weights in the numerical computations below to check robustness of my results with respect to the above choice.

Uncertainty operator $\Delta_{\pi\pi}$ is taken to be linear time invariant operator with absolutely summable coefficients. It acts on the first differences instead of the level of inflation because

[13]Since Δ_{ij} may include infinite number of lags/leads, this weighting scheme makes little sense from the econometrics point of view. Moreover, the size of Δ_{ij} measured by its L_∞ norm may have little connection with statistical probability of such perturbations. Still, the robustness analysis with such perturbations is useful because it may suggest the structure of statistically relevant misspecifications that bring most harm to the policymaker.

I want to keep sum of inflation coefficients in the right hand side of the Phillips curve equal to one. By adding $\Delta_{\pi\pi}$ I allow for deviations from the reference model that have different inflation lags and leads structure of the Phillips curve. In particular, choosing large enough uncertainty size I can get a purely forward-looking form of the Phillips curve.

Similarly, I choose uncertainty operator Δ_{yy} to be a two-sided (mixed forward and backward-looking) linear time invariant operator. Thus, I can consider a deviation from IS curve (4.2) to a purely forward-looking theoretical IS curve. It would be enough to choose $\Delta_{yy} = \frac{1}{w_{yy}}(1 - 1.15L^2 + .27L^3)$.

Uncertainty Δ_{yr} is considered to be a forward-looking linear time invariant uncertainty. It captures a fact that the monetary policy affects the economy not only through the short-term interest rate but also through longer-term interest rates and precise specification of this transmission is uncertain. Finally, the uncertainty $\Delta_{\pi y}$ is taken to be mixed linear time invariant uncertainty. This captures uncertain lags/leads in the effect of a change in the output gap on inflation.

4.2.3. Potential output uncertainty (measurement error).

The next source of uncertainty that I consider is uncertainty about potential output. The potential output is usually obtained from smoothing the output series. Since at the end of the sample we have only past observations of the output, the current potential output, and therefore the current output gap, is poorely estimated. Therefore, as pointed out in the important work by Orphanides (1998), the real-time estimate of the output gap that a policy maker feeds to his policy rule is seriously off the revised estimates.[14]

Typically, the potential output uncertainty is modeled as an additive measurement error entering policy equation. Orphanides (1998) shows that this measurement error is highly persistent and have variance comparable to the variance of the output gap itself. He modeles it as a AR(1) process with large autoregressive root. Here I will model the potential output uncertainty in a different way. I will assume that the real-time ouput gap estimate, y_t^{rt}, is

[14] Another reason for discrepancy of the real-time and final estimates is the revisions in the data (see Orphanides and van Norden (2000) for more on this).

related to the final estimate, y_t, through the following equation:

$$y_t^{rt} = y_t + \Delta(L) y_t + \varsigma_t, \tag{4.3}$$

where Δ is a linear time invariant operator. This relationship implies that the error in the real-time potential output estimate is correlated to the output gap. If, for example, the potential output is overestimated in the time of recessions and underestimated in the time of booms then policy makers risk to overreact to the available information which may stimulate economic instability.[15]

Equation (4.3) should not necesarily be thought of as representing a true relationship between real-time data and the "actual" data. Instead, one can think that it represents policy makers' fears about potential scenario of the real-time estimation process. In my view, it is realistic to assume that policy makers not only fear situations when the potential output estimate is noisy (as would be modeled by assuming an additive measurement error not correlated to the gap), but they are particularly afraid of those situations when the potential output estimate is noisy in a way that makes policy inadequate. In the numerical section below I consider situations when policy makers give different weights to the data uncertanty fears relative to the fears about econometric errors in the parameters' estimates.

4.2.4. Shock uncertainty

Finally, I study uncertainty about serial correlation of the shocks to the reference model. I assume that ε_t and η_t may be arbitrarily serially correlated, but have finite variance. Then for each policy rule I find the loss which is assumed to be

$$L = \text{Var}\pi_t + 0.5\text{Var}y_t,$$

[15] Onatski and Stock (1999) analyzed data uncertainty in the backward looking models and found that it is not very important for formulation of robust rules. However, their finding was dictated by the standard way they modeled the data uncertainty and by the fact that only robust stability was analyzed. Some thought reveal that if we assume that the data uncertainty manifests itself only in an additive shock that does not feed on the endogenous variables then the stability of the system does not depend on this uncertainty. Feeding on the endogenous variables is a crucial element that makes robust stability analysis bite.

under the worst serial correlation scenario. The rule that minimizes such a worst possible loss is called H_∞ control. It is a limit of minimum entropy control rules when a parameter regulating degree of uncertainty aversion tends to a breakdown value (see Hansen and Sargent (2000)).

4.3. Policy Rules

I consider the policy rule equations of two different types. The first type is represented by the rules of the form

$$i_t = g_i i_{t-1} + (1 - g_i)i^* + g_\pi E_t(\bar{\pi}_{t+J} - \pi^*) + g_y E_t y_{t+K}. \tag{4.4}$$

that set nominal interest rate equal to a linear combination of inflation (lagged if $J < 0$, current if $J = 0$, or expected if $J > 0$), the output gap (lagged if $K < 0$, current if $K = 0$, or expected if $K > 0$), and the lagged interest rate. Constants π^* and i^* correspond to the inflation target and the unconditional mean of the nominal interest rate given that there is no inflation bias.[16] The second type is represented by the nominal income rules proposed by Orphanides (1999) and McCallum and Nelson (1999):

$$i_t = i^* + (\bar{\pi}_t - \pi^*) + g_{n1}(\bar{\pi}_t - \pi^* + y_t - y_{t-4}) \tag{4.5}$$

$$i_t = g_{n2}(\pi_t - \pi^* + 4(y_t - y_{t-1})) + g_i i_{t-1}. \tag{4.6}$$

According to these rules a policy maker changes nominal interest rate in response to deviations in growth in the nominal income from the target growth. In what follows I use standard zero normalization (see Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)) for π^* and i^*.[17] Such a normalization does not affect "stability and uniqueness robustness" characteristics of the

[16] The rules of the above type are equivalent to

$$i_t = \rho i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho)(r^* + E_t\bar{\pi}_{t+J}) + \alpha E_t(\bar{\pi}_{t+J} - \pi^*) + \beta E_t y_{t+K}$$

that might look more familiar (see, for example, Levin, Wieland, and Wiliams (1999b)). Here r^* denotes the unconditional mean of the equilibrium real interest rate. Parameters of (4.4) can be expressed in terms of ρ, α, and β as follows: $g_i = \rho, g_\pi = 1 + \alpha - \rho$, and $g_y = \beta$.

[17] Note that the variables used to estimate (5.1,5.2) were demeaned prior to estimation so the normalization was imposed.

rules because adding constants to system equations (4.1,4.2) changes neither the system's stability nor its determinacy.[18]

Attractive properties of nominal income rules were briefly discussed in the introduction. The rules of type (4.4) were introduced by J. Taylor (1993) and since then were subject to active research. The famous Taylor rule corresponds to $g_\pi = 1.5$, $g_y = 0.5$, and $g_i = J = K = 0$. Such rules fit data quite well, at least since late 80's, and were shown to be near optimal in variety of models and relatively robust to different model specifications (see Taylor (1999)).

Introducing the lagged interest rate into the rules was advocated by Woodford (1999), Sack (1998) and Sack and Wieland (1999) among others. Such a smoothing of interest rate considerably improves data fit and robustness properties of the rules (see Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999a)). Letting $K, J < 0$ can account for data processing lags, importance of which was emphasized by McCallum (1997). The forecast-based rules correspond to positive J, or K, or both and have many desirable properties. In particular, as argued by Svensson (1997), inflation forecast is a very good intermediate target for inflation targeting policy adopted by many central banks. Therefore, reacting to forecast of inflation is an "information-encompassing" strategy.

4.4. Numerical Results

I compute the index of robustness for different uncertainty specifications as described above and different policy rules. Parameters of the rules are chosen in the following domain: $g_\pi, g_{n1}, g_{n2}, g_y \in [0, 9]$ (grid of 0.33), $g_i \in [-1.5, 1.5]$ (grid of 0.1). I experimented with the size of the grid and chose the reported one because it represents my solutions well.[19]

Table 1 reports the index of robustness for simple policy rules that are optimal under no uncertainty about the reference model.[20] XXX More entries to be addedXXX Different columns of the table correspond to different uncertainty specifications described above.

[18] Choosing incorrect value of i^* does , however, increase loss associated with a given policy rule because it implies inflation bias. Therefore, the normalization matters for more precise level of analysis than that considered in this paper.

[19] In some cases I used a crude grid of 1 for g_π and g_y. I used this grid to speed up computations in situations when interpretation of the resulting contour plots was unambiguous.

[20] The expected loss considered is $E(L_t) = \text{Var}(\bar{\pi}_t) + \text{Var} y_t + 0.5\text{Var}(i_t - i_{t-1})$ as in Rudebusch (2000b).

The column titled "Few lags+ real time" corresponds to the combined specification error (with only few lags added to the reference model) and potential output error uncertainty. These two sources of uncertainty are weighted equally. That is, policy makers fears to have parameters of the model deviating from the point estimates in the range of $100\% * (2\Phi(1) - 1)^{11}$ confidence parallelepiped (as explained in footnote 12 for the case of 8 parameters) and her fears to have $||\Delta||$ as large as 1 in (4.3) are taken to be equally strong.

The first observation to be made is that the index of robustness is surprisingly low for the rules reported in the table. Indeed, consider the uncertainty associated with adding few lags to the model and varying its parameters in p% confidence parallelepipeds around the point estimates ("Few lags" column). The index of robustness for the Taylor-type rule optimal under no uncertainty is no larger than 1.1. This means that under the rule there exist a destabilizing combination of parameters that belong to $100\% * F_{\chi^2(11)}(11 * 1.1^2) = 73\%$ asymptotic confidence *ellipsoid* (sic) around the point estimates (see footnote 12). For the Orphanides and McCallum and Nelson rules the ellipsoid would be even smaller and dramatically so: $100\% * F_{\chi^2(11)}(11 * 0.6^2) \approx 3\%$.

Comparing column 1 and column 2 we see that introducing few additional lags to the model reduces the index by half. This is a very large reduction taken into consideration the non-linear relationship between the index and the sizes of corresponding confidence ellipsoids.

Adding real-time uncertainty about potential output makes both Taylor-type and nominal income rules even less robust. Robustness of nominal income rules deteriorate because I assume that the target for the nominal output growth is equal to the estimated growth of the potential output. If we assume that the target is fixed and does not depend on the uncertain potential output then the nominal income rules look more robust than the optimal Taylor-type rule (compare column "Few lags" for the nominal income rules and "Few lags+ real time" for the Taylor -type rule) but about equally robust with the benchmark Taylor rule: $g_\pi = 1.5$, $g_y = 0.5$.

It is instructive to compare the rows of the table corresponding to the optimal Taylor rule and the benchmark Taylor rule. We see that the robutness of the benchmark rule (believed to better correspond to actual historical policy than the optimal rule) is much less sensitive to the different choices of the uncertainty formulation. The benchmark rule looks much less robust than the optimal rule for the econometric error uncertainty specification. But it is in fact more robust than the optimal rule under the combined "few lags uncertainty" and potential output uncertainty As we will see below, in general, relative robustness of different rules considerably varies with different uncertainty specification. The rules with relatively sluggish response to inflation and the output gap tend to become relatively more robust when relatively more ecompassing formulation of uncertainty is chosen.

Figures 1 through 4 present results in more detail. They show contour plots of the upper bounds for the index for different rules in the whole range of the parameters studied. Figure 1 corresponds to the Taylor-type rule based on current observations of inflation and the output gap (J,K=0).[21] We see that relatively more aggressive rules become non-robust when uncertainty about quality of the real-time data is introduced. Without this uncertainty, rules with aggressive reaction to the output gap and moderate reaction to inflation are relatively more robust.

I analyzed how the worst possible perturbations destabilizing the economy depend on the aggressiveness of the corresponding policy rules. I find that increasing reaction to inflation substantially increases chances of destabilizing the economy at the business cycle frequences. Sluggish reaction to inflation increases chances of destabizing the economy at the low frequences. It turns out that the destabilization at the business cycle frequences is easier triggered by model uncertainty than that at the low frequences. This explains why those rules with g_π slightly larger than 1 have relatively higher index of robustness. Note that such rules must correspond to very high conventional loss because they operate on the verge of the instability at frequency zero. This peculiar fact demonstrates the point made in previous section that the stability robustness may come at the expense of deterioration in the conventional loss.

Figure 2 and 3 present results for the nominal income growth rules. The index of robustness for the nominal income growth rules is generally much smaller than that for the Taylor-type rules. However, in the most favorable situation when we assume that the target

[21] The index of robustness is discontinous with respect to g_π. It drops to zero if g_π becomes smaller than 1.

for the nominal income growth does not depend on the potential output estimates, the most robust nominal income rules are more robust than the most robust Taylor-type rules. For this comparison, the robustness of the latter is analyzed under the most ecompassing "few lags + real time data uncertaninty" whereas the robustness of the former is analyzed under the "few lags" uncertainty only.

Figure 4 shows the index of robustness for the forecast based rule that responds to 1 year ahead forecast of inflation and the current output gap. The results for other specifications of the forecast based rules considered in this paper ($J = 4, K = 4$; $J = 8, K = 0$; $J = 8, K = 8$) are similar. We see that relative robustness of the forecast based rules very strongly depends on the specification of uncertainty chosen. In general, the forecast rules are much more robust than the Taylor-type rules responding to the current data and the nominal income rules.

Interestingly, this extra robustness of the forecast based rules is not specific for the reference model chosen here. Even if we consider a purely forward-looking Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) model as the reference model the forecast based rules remain to be very robust and not easily result in indeterminacy of equilibrium.

UNDER CONSTRUCTION

5. Conclusion

The main methodological contribution of this paper is an extension of the robustness analysis proposed by Onatski and Stock (1999) to forward-looking reference models and uncertainty sets. The fact that most interesting models of the economy include some forward-looking components suggests the importance of such an extension. I propose to characterize the robustness of a given policy rule by the maximal size of the uncertainty set that does not include any unstable models or models having multiple solutions under this particular rule. I modify the ideas of the robust control literature to fit the case of systems with rational expectations.

I apply theoretical results of the paper to analyze simple policy rules under model uncertainty in an empirical New Keynesian models of the US economy discussed in Rudebusch (2000b). I address three sets of issues: the degree of policy activism under model uncertainty, the stabilization properties of nominal income rules, and the robustness of forecast-based rules. I find that aggressive policy rules are relatively more robust than cautious rules with respect to uncertainty about point estimates of parameters of the reference model. However, cautious rules look relatively more robust under more broadly specified uncertainty. Nominal income rules are shown to be much less robust than rules responding to inflation and the output gap. The policy rules responding to a forecast of inflation and the current output gap are found to be quite robust even for forecast horizon longer than 1 year.

There are many issues left for future analysis. First, in this paper I assume that the private sector knows the true model of economy whereas a policy maker faces model uncertainty. It would be interesting to put the private agents and policy makers on an equal footing. Second, finding exact minimax rules instead of analyzing stability and uniqueness robustness is a question of practical importance. It is also of interest to try to generalize the technique developed to non-linear and linear time-varying model uncertainty. Finally, a more detailed analysis of the empirical questions studied would be helpful.

6. Appendix

To be added

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Table 1. Index of robustness for simple policy rules optimal under no uncertainty

Rule specification	Econometric Error	Few Lags	General lag-lead	Few Lags+ Real time
Taylor-type, g_pi=2.86, g_y=1.84	[1.5,1.8]*	[1,1.1]	1	0.5
Orphanides, g_n1=1.52	[0.8,0.9]	0.6	0.4	0.4
McCallum & Nelson, g_n2=0.77, g_i=0.68	[0.7,0.8]	0.6	0.3	0.3
Benchmark Taylor: g_pi=1.5,g_y=.5	[0.9,1.1]	[0.8,0.9]	0.7	[0.6,0.7]

TO BE COMPLETED

* - upper and lower bounds on the index.

Figure 1. The index of robustness for Taylor-type rules



Figure 1. The index of robustness for McCallum&Nelson rules



Figure 3. The index of robustness for Orphanides rules



Figure 4. The index of robustness for forecast based rules, J=4, K=0.