US Department of Justice
Institutional Affiliation: Department of Justice
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|November 2005||The Complementary Role of Exports and R&D Investments as Sources of Productivity Growth|
with Bee Yan Aw, Mark J. Roberts: w11774
This paper examines two potential channels of knowledge acquisition that underlie firm productivity growth in the Taiwanese electronics industry: participation in the export market and investments in R&D and/or worker training. We focus on the argument that a firm's own investments in R&D are necessary for the firm to assimilate knowledge or expertise gained from foreign contacts and thus are an important component of the process of learning-by-exporting. Firm-level panel data from 1986, 1991, and 1996 is used to investigate a firm's decision to invest in these two activities and to assess the effects of these investments on the firm's future total factor productivity. The empirical model consists of four equations. The firm's decisions to export and invest in R&D and/or worker training ar...
Published: The World Economy, 2007, Wol. 30, No. 1 (January), pp. 83-104
|January 2000||If at First You Don't Succeed...: Profits, Prices and Market Structure in a Model of Quality with Unknowable Consumer Heterogeneity|
with Kala Krishna: w7494
Why are higher quality niches seen as intrinsically more profitable in business circles? Why do high quality products sometimes have a low real price, while it is unusual to see low quality products with high real prices? Can markets have quality differentiation as well as quality bunching? In this paper we develop a new model of quality which explains such phenomena. Our model builds on the idea that even if a customer chooses to purchase a product, it may fail to deliver'. If a product fails to deliver, the customer may wish to choose some other product. A higher quality product has a higher probability of delivering. We model this as a three stage game where firms first choose whether to enter or not, then in the second stage choose their quality and in the last stage, their price...
Published: Krishna, Kala and Tor Winston. "If At First You Don't Succeed...: Profits, Prices, And Market Structure In A Model Of Quality With Unknowable Consumer Heterogeneity," International Economic Review, 2003, v44(2,May), 573-597. citation courtesy of
|May 1998||A New Model of Quality|
with Kala Krishna: w6580
We develop a new model of quality to capture the idea that even if a customer chooses to purchase a product, it may fail to deliver.' In this event, the customer may wish to choose some other product. We model this as a two stage game where firms first choose quality and then price. We find that in equilibrium, the high quality firm (the one with a higher probability of being able to deliver') will always make higher profits than the low quality one even if costs of quality are sharply increasing. Our work thus provides a reason for high quality niches to be inherently more profitable. The implications for welfare and equilibrium under free entry are also studied.
Published: Krishna, Kala and Tor Winston. "If At First You Don't Succeed...: Profits, Prices, And Market Structure In A Model Of Quality With Unknowable Consumer Heterogeneity," International Economic Review, 2003, v44(2,May), 573-597.