Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Facultad de CCEE y Empresariales
Universidad de Granada
s/n E-18071, Granada, Spain
Institutional Affiliations: University of Granada and FUNCAS
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|February 2011||Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-and-Unwind Banks in the US and EU Before and During the Great Recession|
with Edward J. Kane, Francisco Rodriguez-Fernandez: w16787
This paper models and estimates ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove significantly larger for DFU firms in Europe and bailout decisions less driven by asset size than in the US. We also find that a proxy for regulatory capture helps to explain bailout decisions in Europe. A policy implication of our findings is that authorities could better contain safety-net benefits if they refocused their information systems on measuring volatility as well as capital.
- Santiago Carbo-Valverde & Edward J. Kane & Francisco Rodriquez-Fernandez, 2011. "Safety-net benefits conferred on difficulty-to-fail-and-unwind banks in the U.S. and EU before and during the Great Recession," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 327-332.
- CarbÃ³-Valverde, Santiago & Kane, Edward J. & Rodriguez-Fernandez, Francisco, 2013. "Safety-net benefits conferred on difficult-to-fail-and-unwind banks in the US and EU before and during the great recession," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1845-1859. citation courtesy of
|October 2009||Evidence of Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross-Border Mergers of Banks in the EU|
with Edward J. Kane, Francisco Rodriguez-Fernandez: w15447
Banks are in the business of taking calculated risks. Expanding the geographic footprint of an organization's profit-making activities changes the geographic pattern of its exposure to loss in ways that are hard for regulators and supervisors to observe. This paper tests and confirms the hypothesis that differences in the character of safety-net benefits that are available to banks in individual EU countries help to explain the nature of cross-border merger activity. If they wish to protect taxpayers from potentially destabilizing regulatory arbitrage, central bankers need to develop statistical procedures for assessing supervisory strength and weakness in partner countries. We believe that the methods and models used here can help in this task.
|February 2008||Evidence of Differences in the Effectiveness of Safety-Net Management in European Union Countries|
with Edward J. Kane, Francisco Rodriguez-Fernandez: w13782
EU financial safety nets are social contracts that assign uncertain benefits and burdens to taxpayers in different member countries. To help national officials to assess their taxpayers' exposures to loss from partner countries, this paper develops a way to estimate how well markets and regulators in 14 of the EU-15 countries have controlled deposit-institution risk-shifting in recent years. Our method traverses two steps. The first step estimates leverage, return volatility, and safety-net benefits for individual EU financial institutions. For stockholder-owned banks, input data feature 1993-2004 data on stock-market capitalization. Parallel accounting values are used to calculate enterprise value (albeit less precisely) for mutual savings institutions. The second step uses the output fro...
Published: Santiago Carbo-Valverde & Edward Kane & Francisco Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2008. "Evidence of Differences in the Effectiveness of Safety-Net Management in European Union Countries," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 151-176, December. citation courtesy of