Robert C. Oshinsky
Institutional Affiliation: FDIC
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|December 2008||Evidence of Improved Monitoring and Insolvency Resolution after FDICIA|
with Edward J. Kane, Rosalind Bennett: w14576
To realign supervisory and market incentives, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) adjusts two principal features of federal banking supervision. First, it requires regulators to examine insured institutions more frequently and makes them accountable for exercising their supervisory powers. Second, the Act empowers regulators to wind up the affairs of troubled institutions before their accounting net worth is exhausted.
Using 1984-2003 data on the outcome of individual bank examinations, this paper documents that the frequency of rating transitions and the character of insolvency resolutions have changed substantially under FDICIA. The average interval between bank examinations has dropped for low-rated banks in the post-FDICIA era. Examiner upgrade...