Department of Economics & LIEPP
28 rue des Saints-Peres
Paris 75007, France
Institutional Affiliation: Sciences Po
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2013||Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States|
with Filipe R. Campante: w19027
We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability, and in contrast with the alternative hypothesis that it might forestall political capture. We then provide direct evidence that the spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different accountability mechanisms over state politics: newspaper coverage, voter knowledge and information, and turnout. We also find evidence against the capture hypothesis: isolated capitals are associated with more money in state-level campaigns. Finally, we show that isolation is linked with worse public good provision.
Published: Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do, 2014. "Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and Corruption: Evidence from US States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 104(8), pages 2456-81, August. citation courtesy of
|Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence|
with Filipe R. Campante, Bernardo V. Guimaraes: w19028
Motivated by a novel stylized fact - countries with isolated capital cities display worse quality of governance - we provide a framework of endogenous institutional choice based on the idea that elites are constrained by the threat of rebellion, and that this threat is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. In established democracies, the threat of insurgencies is not a binding constraint, and the model predicts no correlation between isolated capitals and misgovernance. In contrast, a correlation emerges in equilibrium in the case of autocracies. Causality runs both ways: broader power sharing (associated with better governance) means that any rents have to be shared more broadly, hence the elite has less of an incentive to protect its position by isolating ...
|May 2007||Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks: How Much is A Friend Worth?|
with Stephen Leider, Markus M. Möbius, Tanya Rosenblat: w13135
We conduct field experiments in a large real-world social network to examine why decision makers treat friends more generously than strangers. Subjects are asked to divide surplus between themselves and named partners at various social distances, where only one of the decisions is implemented. In order to separate altruistic and future interaction motives, we implement an anonymous treatment where neither player is told at the end of the experiment which decision was selected for payment and a non-anonymous treatment where both players are told. Moreover, we include both games where transfers increase and decrease social surplus to distinguish between different future interaction channels including signaling one's generosity and enforced reciprocity, where the decision maker treats the par...
Published: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2009) 124 (4): 1815-1851. doi: 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1815