Institutional Affiliation: Tel Aviv University
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2005||Why Does Capital Flow to Rich States?|
with Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Ariell Reshef, Bent Sorensen: w11301
The magnitude and the direction of net international capital flows does not fit neo-classical models. The 50 U.S. states comprise an integrated capital market with very low barriers to capital flows, which makes them an ideal testing ground for neoclassical models. We develop a simple frictionless open economy model with perfectly diversified ownership of capital and find that capital flows between the U.S. states are consistent with the model. Therefore, the small size and "wrong" direction of net international capital flows are likely due to frictions associated with national borders and not due to inherent flaws in the neoclassical model.
Published: Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan & Ariell Reshef & Bent E Sørensen & Oved Yosha, 2010.
"Why Does Capital Flow to Rich States?,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 769-783, October.
citation courtesy of
|January 1999||Consumption Smoothing through Fiscal Policy in OECD and EU Countries|
with Adriana Arreaza, Bent E. Sgrensen
in Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, James M. Poterba and Jürgen von Hagen, editors
|January 1998||Consumption Smoothing through Fiscal Policy in OECD and EU Countries|
with Adriana Arreaza, Bent E. Sorensen: w6372
We measure the amount of smoothing achieved through various components of the government deficit in EU and OECD countries. For EU countries, at the 1-year frequency percent of shocks to GDP are smoothed via government consumption, 18 percent via transfers percent via subsidies, while taxes provide no smoothing. The results for OECD countries are similar. Government transfers provide more smoothing of negative than of positive shocks among EU countries. There seems to be no trade-off between high government deficits in a country and the ability to smooth consumption. We find that in countries where there is delegation' of power or where fiscal targets are negotiated effectively by coalition members consumption smoothing via government consumption and government transfers is considerabl...
Published: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance. Poterba, James M., and Jurgen von Hagen, eds., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999,pp. 59-80.