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NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2003||Teacher Incentives|
with Paul Glewwe, Michael Kremer: w9671
Advocates of teacher incentive programs argue that they can strengthen weak incentives, while opponents argue they lead to teaching to the test.' We find evidence that existing teacher incentives in Kenya are indeed weak, with teachers absent 20% of the time. We then report on a randomized evaluation of a program that provided primary school teachers in rural Kenya with incentives based on students' test scores. Students in program schools had higher test scores, significantly so on at least some exams, during the time the program was in place. An examination of the channels through which this effect took place, however, provides little evidence of more teacher effort aimed at increasing long-run learning. Teacher attendance did not improve, homework assignment did not increase, and pedag...
Published: Paul Glewwe & Nauman Ilias & Michael Kremer, 2010.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 205-27, July.
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