Department of Economics
Bocconi University and IGIER
via Roentgen 1
Institutional Affiliation: Bocconi University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|October 2014||Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment|
with Mikhail Golosov: w20633
We study the optimal provision of insurance against unobservable idiosyncratic shocks in a setting in which a benevolent government cannot commit. A continuum of agents and the government play an infinitely repeated game. Actions of the government are constrained only by the threat of reverting to the worst perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). We construct a recursive problem that characterizes the resource allocation and information revelation on the Pareto frontier of the set of PBE. We prove a version of the Revelation Principle and find an upper bound on the maximum number of messages that are needed to achieve the optimal allocation. Agents play mixed strategies over that message set to limit the amount of information transmitted to the government. The central feature of the optimal co...
|July 2011||Cycles, Gaps, and the Social Value of Information|
with George-Marios Angeletos, Jennifer La'O: w17229
What are the welfare effects of the information contained in macroeconomic statistics, central-bank communications, or news in the media? We address this question in a business-cycle framework that nests the neoclassical core of modern DSGE models. Earlier lessons that were based on "beauty contests" (Morris and Shin, 2002) are found to be inapplicable. Instead, the social value of information is shown to hinge on essentially the same conditions as the optimality of output stabilization policies. More precise information is unambiguously welfare-improving as long as the business cycle is driven primarily by technology and preference shocks--but can be detrimental when shocks to markups and wedges cause sufficient volatility in "output gaps." A numerical exploration suggests that the first...