NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
loading...

Giorgio Martini

Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305
USA

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: Stanford Graduate School of Business

NBER Working Papers and Publications

August 2018Quadratic Games
with Nicolas S. Lambert, Michael Ostrovsky: w24914
We study general quadratic games with multidimensional actions, stochastic payoff interactions, and rich information structures. We first consider games with arbitrary finite information structures. In such games, we show that there generically exists a unique equilibrium. We then extend the result to games with infinite information structures, under an additional assumption of linearity of certain conditional expectations. In that case, there generically exists a unique linear equilibrium. In both cases, the equilibria can be explicitly characterized in compact closed form. We illustrate our results by studying information aggregation in large asymmetric Cournot markets and the effects of stochastic payoff interactions in beauty contests. Our results apply to general games with linear bes...
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us