Bank of France,
Paris School of Economics and CEPR
31 rue Croix des Petits Champs
75049 Paris Cedex 01
Institutional Affiliation: Banque de France, Paris School of Economics, CEPR
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|November 2017||The Gold Pool (1961-1968) and the Fall of the Bretton Woods System. Lessons for Central Bank Cooperation.|
with Michael Bordo, Alain Naef: w24016
The Gold Pool (1961-1968) was one of the most ambitious cases of central bank cooperation in history. Major central banks pooled interventions – sharing profits and losses – to stabilize the dollar price of gold. Why did it collapse? From at least 1964, the fate of the Pool was in fact tied to sterling, the first line of defense for the dollar. Sterling’s unsuccessful devaluation in November 1967 spurred speculation and massive losses for the Pool. Contagion occurred because US policies were inflationary and insufficiently credible as well. The demise of the Pool provides a striking example of contagion between reserve currencies.
|October 2014||The Price of Stability: The balance sheet policy of the Banque de France and the Gold Standard (1880-1914)|
with Guillaume Bazot, Michael D. Bordo: w20554
Under the classical gold standard (1880-1914), the Bank of France maintained a stable discount rate while the Bank of England changed its rate very frequently. Why did the policies of these central banks, the two pillars of the gold standard, differ so much? How did the Bank of France manage to keep a stable rate and continuously violate the "rules of the game"? This paper tackles these questions and shows that the domestic asset portfolio of the Bank of France played a crucial role in smoothing international shocks and in maintaining the stability of the discount rate. This policy provides a striking example of a central bank that uses its balance sheet to block the interest rate channel and protect the domestic economy from international constraints (Mundell's trilemma).