Department of Economics
University of Haifa
Haifa 31905, ISRAEL
Institutional Affiliation: University of Haifa, Haifa, ISRAEL
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|July 2009||Insulation Impossible: Fiscal Spillovers in a Monetary Union|
with Russell Cooper, Hubert Kempf: w15176
This paper studies fiscal spillovers in a monetary union. The focus of the analysis is on the interaction between the fiscal policy of member countries (regions) and the central monetary authority. When capital markets are integrated, the fiscal policy of one country will influence equilibrium wages and interest rates. Thus there are fiscal spillovers within a federation. The magnitude and direction of these spillovers, in particular the presence of a crowding out effect, can be influenced by the choice of monetary policy rules. We find that there does not exist a monetary policy rule which completely insulates agents in one region from fiscal policy in another. Some familiar policy rules, such as pegging an interest rate, can provide partial insulation.
|October 2005||Is It Is or Is It Ain't My Obligation? Regional Debt in a Fiscal Federation|
with Russell Cooper, Hubert Kempf: w11655
This paper studies the repayment of regional debt in a multi-region economy with a central authority: who pays the obligation issued by a region? With commitment, a central government will use its taxation power to smooth distortionary taxes across regions. Absent commitment, the central government may be induced to bailout the regional government in order to smooth consumption and distortionary taxes across the regions. We characterize the conditions under which bailouts occur and their welfare implications. The gains to creating a federation are higher when the (government spending) shocks across regions are negatively correlated and volatile. We use these insights to comment on actual fiscal relations in three quite different federations: the US, the European Union and Argentina.
Published: Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2008. "Is It Is Or Is It Ain'T My Obligation? Regional Debt In A Fiscal Federation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1469-1504, November. citation courtesy of
|January 2004||Is it is or is it Ain't my Obligation? Regional Debt in Monetary Unions|
with Russell Cooper, Hubert Kempf: w10239
This paper studies the implications of the circulation of interest bearing regional debt in a monetary union. Does the circulation of this debt have the same monetary implications as the printing of money by a central government? Or are the obligations of this debt simply backed by future taxation with no inflationary consequences? We argue here that both outcomes can arise in equilibrium. In the model economy we consider there are multiple equilibria which reflect the perceptions of agents regarding the manner in which the debt obligations will be met. In one equilibrium, termed Ricardian, the future obligations are met with taxation by a regional government while in the other, termed Monetization, the central bank is induced to print money to finance the region's obligations. The multipl...
Published: Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2008. "Is It Is Or Is It Ain'T My Obligation? Regional Debt In A Fiscal Federation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1469-1504, November.
|October 1986||Capital Accumulation and Annuities in an Adverse Selection Economy|
with Martin S. Eichenbaum: w2046
This paper suggests that adverse selection problems in competitive annuity markets can generate quantity constrained equilibria in which some agents whose length of lifetime is uncertain find it advantageous to accumulate capital privately. This occurs despite the higher rates of return on annuities. The welfare properties of these allocations are analyzed. It is shown that the level of capital accumulation is excessive in a Paretian sense. Policies which eliminate this inefficiency are discussed.
- Eichenbaum, Martin S. and Dan S. Peled. "Capital Accumulation and Annuitiesin an Adverse Selection Economy," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95, No. 2, April 1987, pp. 334-354. citation courtesy of
- In The Measurement of Saving, Investment, and Wealth, Robert Lipsey, and Helen Tice, eds. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 1989.